【吐血原创翻译】南中国海的“小棒”外交

Small-Stick Diplomacy in the South China Sea
南中国海的“小棒”外交
James Holmes, Toshi Yoshihara
April 23, 2012

我是刚注册，超大说我不能发链接，所以就以以下形式发出来了
nationalinterest.org/commentary/small-stick-diplomacy-the-south-china-sea-6831

大概因为家庭背景，我本人相对来说比较关心国外学术界对中国海上力量的分析，相对于国内一帮到处打打杀杀的喊声，痛斥TG卖国，国外一般分析都是中国这次做的很聪明，我也想尽我之力，多翻译一些这类的文章，让大家多看看一些比较深度的事件分析，不过因为这类文章都比较长，我的英语只能说是一般，时间也没有那么多，只能是尽力而为了。

关于作者
James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, where Toshi Yoshihara holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies. They are the coauthors ofRed Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Best Book of 2010. The views voiced here are theirs alone.
James Holms是美国海军战争学院（U.S. Naval War College）战略学副教授，Toshi Yoshihara（看名字是个日本佬）为亚太问题the John A. van Beuren研究员，他们是大西洋月刊2010年度最佳图书Red Star over the Pacific （红星照耀太平洋）的作者，本文章只代表他们本人观点。

A seemingly quixotic impasse between Philippine and Chinese ships played out this week at Scarborough Shoal, 120-odd miles west of the Philippine island of Luzon. We say “seemingly” because it makes eminently good sense for China to dispatch lightly armed—or even unarmed—noncombat vessels to uphold its territorial claims in the South China Sea. That's what happened at Scarborough Shoal, where no Chinese warships got involved. Beijing's muted approach conforms to its pattern of calibrating deployments of force to the circumstances while holding overwhelming military might in reserve to deter or compel recalcitrant Southeast Asian states.
一个看起来不可思议的僵局本周正在中国和菲律宾船只之间展开，地点就是离菲律宾吕宋岛以西大概120英里处的黄岩岛。我们说“看起来”是因为对中国来说，派出有很少武装或根本没有武装的船只去往南中国海那些地区是非常有道理的。这也是正在黄岩岛发生的事情，中国没有派出战舰。北京这种不张扬的行为证明了这种同时在后方保持压倒性军事优势行为对付吓阻有反抗可能的东南亚国家的部署。
That's savvy diplomacy. It means using the least force necessary—including nonmilitary ships from its maritime surveillance and law-enforcement services, or “five dragons stirring up the sea,” as one Chinese author calls them. Sea power is about more than men-of-war and ship-launched aircraft, the high-profile implements that grace the cover of Jane's Fighting Ships. Shore-based missiles, aircraft, sensors and command-and-control infrastructure can influence events on the high seas. So can coast guards and maritime-enforcement agencies. Even privately owned assets like merchantmen and fishing boats represent an arm of sea power if they can transport war materiel, monitor foreign ship movements, lay sea mines and the like.
这是非常聪明的外交。这意味着用最少可能的武力—包括非军方的海监及其他执法单位，或就像一个中国作者说的“五龙闹海”。海上力量不仅仅是作战人员，舰载飞机，或能登上简氏周刊封面的战舰。岸基导弹、飞机，传感器及指挥控制系统都会对公海上发生的事件有影响。同样海岸警卫队和海上执法机构同样有很大的影响。甚至像私人拥有的商船和渔船如有能力运送军用物资和监视外国船只，布水雷等，他们就都是海上力量的一部分。
Viewing sea power as a continuum gives China's leadership a range of options, including brandishing a small stick to accomplish its goals. It can do so because Manila and other claimants to regional islands and seas know full well that Beijing may unlimber the big stick—in the form of People's Liberation Army (PLA) ships, warplanes and missiles—and wallop them if they defy its will. The future will probably witness more encounters like the one at Scarborough Shoal unless the Philippines deploys a counterweight to Chinese ambitions, either by accumulating sea power of its own or by attracting help from powerful outsiders.
海上力量是统一连续体的观点给予了中国领导人很多选择，包括用小棒（比较少的力量）来达到自己的目的。中国能这么做是因为马尼拉很明白中方可以把“大棒”拿出来—中国人民解放军海军的战舰、飞机、导弹—然后把菲律宾打回原始社会。如果菲律宾不能有自己相应的海上力量或其他强力国家的帮助，这种事情会越来越多的发生。
Communities of Interest
利益共同体
Neither the Philippines nor any other Southeast Asian state is likely to amass sufficient physical power to stand alone against Chinese blandishments. That leaves balancing. But presenting a united front is hard for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the most obvious candidate to act as a balancing coalition. ASEAN is a notoriously loose regional consortium. True to form, its members have not yet mustered a consensus on the Scarborough Shoal standoff. Nor is the United States eager to take sides. Washington professes agnosticism toward conflicting maritime claims, insisting only that navigational freedoms be preserved.
不管是菲律宾还是其他东南亚国家大概都很难拥有对抗中国海上力量的实力。那就需要利益再次平衡了。但是对东盟来说是很困难做到这一点，虽然东盟是最佳的作为此种联盟的候选人。东盟是一个非常松散的地区联盟。东盟成员到现在还没有一个一致对目前黄岩岛事件的立场。美国现在也不愿出头，美国对海域争执持不置可否的态度，仅仅强调航海自由权。
The vagaries of coalition politics, then, could determine Manila's fortunes at Scarborough Shoal and in future showdowns. Beijing has displayed an impressive capacity to learn from its mistakes since 2010, when its hamfisted tactics frightened China's weaker neighbors into making common cause among themselves and with the United States. “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact,” proclaimed China's foreign minister in one shockingly undiplomatic exchange with his Singaporean counterpart.
这样一来，变化无常的联盟政治将决定马尼拉在黄岩岛及未来类似冲突中的命运。从2010年以来，北京表现出非常强的知错就改的能力。当时北京强硬的态度让周边的邻居有了联合美国到一起的共同目标。“中国是大国，其他国家是小国，这是事实。”当时中国的外交部长用了非常不外交的语言。
The unsaid but unmistakable message behind such in-your-face statements: “Get used to it.” That's a message minor powers situated near major ones take to heart. Hence Southeast Asians' receptiveness to diplomatic and military cooperation with one another and with outsiders like the United States, India and Japan.
这种近乎打脸的不可说但无误的说法：“老实接受。”这是离大国很近的小国非常明白的，所以东南亚国家开始在外交及军事方面和其他及美国、日本及印度等大国合作。
China wants to reduce Southeast Asians' newfound propensity for balancing. Since 2010, realizing the error of its ways, Beijing has prosecuted its maritime claims with a lighter hand. For insight into China's small-stick diplomacy, consider military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz is all about pummeling enemy armies, but in passing he urges statesmen to look for opportunities to disrupt the “community of interest” binding together an enemy alliance.
中国先要减少东南亚国家这种从新分配利益的倾向。关于中国这种“小棒”外交，考虑一下军事理论家克劳塞维茨的说法，克劳塞维茨主要是要打击对方的部队，但他也曾要政治家考虑打破对方“利益共同体”。
This might not prove too difficult, he implies. After all, “One country may support another's cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own.” Allies and coalition partners contribute token forces unless their survival is at stake, and they look for the exit when the going gets tough. By exercising restraint, then, Beijing can hope to divide and conquer. And indeed, Chinese leaders insist on treating Southeast Asian governments on a one-to-one basis. That keeps ASEAN members from pooling their diplomatic and military resources.
克劳塞维茨说打破“利益共同体”可能不是很困难，因为“就算一个国家支持另外一个国家的利益，这个国家也不会像重视自己的利益一样重视其他国家的。”除非自己的生存受到威胁，盟友只会提供象征性的部队，而且情况不好的时候第一个跑路。所以北京能够利用这一点来分而击之。北京一向主张和东盟国家进行国对国的接触，这样能防止东盟国家联合起来。
Five Hungry Dragons
五条饥饿的龙
ASEAN's drift relative to a unified, determined China coincides with a dramatic surge in Chinese maritime strength. Foreign observers' attention is understandably riveted on the more conspicuous military dimension of China's sea power, as manifest in high-end destroyers, stealth fighters and the nation's first aircraft carrier. But the non-naval maritime services constitute an important—and largely overlooked—facet of Chinese nautical prowess.
东盟的不给力和中国海上力量的增强同时发生，外国观察家的注意力很自然的被那些军事上发展所吸引，像隐身飞机航空母舰一类的，但是非海军的海上力量的发展是中国海上力量发展很重要但又很少有人注意的一部分。
Indeed, Beijing is evidently expanding the five dragons faster than the PLA Navy. The maritime-enforcement services are recruiting new manpower while taking delivery of decommissioned naval vessels. Furthermore, Chinese shipyards are turning out state-of-the-art cutters like sausages. Many are capable of sustained patrols in the farthest reaches of the China seas, assuring that China can maintain a visible presence in waters where it asserts sovereign jurisdiction. Indeed, Haijan 84, one of China's most modern law-enforcement vessels, occupied the epicenter of this week's imbroglio. Not the navy but China Marine Surveillance, an agency entrusted with protecting China's exclusive economic zones, dispatched Haijan 84to the scene.
北京正在以比海军还快的速度来发展“五条龙”。海上执法机构正在同时扩充人力和接受退役海军船只。中国的造船厂还在大造特造新船。很多船只都能在最偏远的地方持续执法。这样中国能在那些地方持续出现并行使司法权。现在黄岩岛大出风头的海监84就是负责保护中国海上经济专属区机构海监局的船只。
Beijing's buildup of nonmilitary sea power testifies to its balanced approach to managing the nation's nautical surroundings. Employing non-naval assets in clashes over territory reveals a sophisticated, methodical strategy for securing China's maritime claims throughout Asian waters. Best of all from China's standpoint, this strategy artfully widens fissures in ASEAN's already crumbling edifice. Clausewitz would nod approvingly.
北京的这种发展非军事力量的行为说明其对管理海上利益时平衡的做法。在海域争端中派出非海军舰船是一种完善及有效的做法，对中国来说，这种做法能有效的让本来就不行的东盟更加不行。克劳塞维茨一定会赞赏这种做法的。
First, using coast-guard-like assets reinforces China's diplomatic messaging. Sending warships to shoo away Philippine ships would indicate that China accepts that it is competing for territory claimed by others. Sending enforcement vessels, by contrast, matter-of-factly signals that China is policing sovereign waters. Chinese skippers can act against foreign vessels while diplomats condemn Southeast Asian governments for infringing on China's sovereignty and violating domestic law. Furthermore, relying on non-naval vessels partially inoculates Beijing against the charge that it is practicing gunboat diplomacy. China's narrative: this isn't diplomacy at all, it's routine law enforcement!
首先，用类似海岸警卫队一类的机构来加强中国的外交说辞。派战舰吓走菲律宾船只将被认为中国接受这是在和其他国家有领土争端。而使用执法船只，不言自明中国是在本土执法。中国的船长能一边对抗，一边在外交上攻击东南亚政府侵害中国主权和违法中国国内法。同时，使用非海军船只还能部分回应中国执行“炮舰外交”的指责。中国的说法：“这和外交无关，这是常规执法！”
Second, the lopsided power mismatch between China and ASEAN dictates a softer touch. Beijing can afford to deploy lightly armed ships against maritime rivals whose navies barely rate as coast guards. PLA Navy involvement would constitute an overmatch in most cases. Imagine the press photos if a tip-of-the-spear Chinese frigate or destroyer faced off against an outclassed Philippine Navy vessel. China would look like a bully in regional eyes.
第二，在中国和东盟之间的一边倒的力量对比也有另外的用处，北京能部署有很少武装的船只对抗那些连海岸警卫队都算不上的海军，中国海军能保证在大部分情况下保持极大优势。想象一下中国护卫舰或驱逐舰对抗小几级得菲律宾海军船只的新闻照片，那样中国在本地区就像的地霸。
For instance, the first Philippine vessel to respond off Scarborough Shoal was flagship BRP Gregorio del Pilar. The Gregorio del Pilar—the pride of the Philippine Navy fleet—is a U.S. Coast Guard hand-me-down of 1960s' vintage. Though grandiosely rebranded as a frigate, it boasts minimal combat capacity. There's little doubt who would prevail in a hypothetical battle. But while Godzilla can squash Bambi, his public image suffers. Relying on the maritime-enforcement services limits the chances of a diplomatic debacle without forfeiting Chinese interests.
举例来说，第一艘反应到达黄岩岛的菲律宾船只是其旗舰BRP Gregorio del Pilar，这艘船号称是菲律宾海军舰队的骄傲—其实就是美国海岸警卫队六十年代设计的二手货。虽然从新命名成了护卫舰，可是实际作战能力不值一提，如果打起来，谁会赢是很明显的事情。但是虽然大国能痛扁小国，国际形象就要受损。而使用海上执法机构可以在减少外交障碍的情况下避免中国利益受损。
Third, employing nonmilitary means eschews escalation while keeping disputes local. Using a blunt military instrument like the PLA Navy would internationalize any minor incident, bringing about the outcome China fears most. Shots fired in anger by PLA gunners likely would provoke regionwide protests while igniting nationalist passions. Unobtrusive methods, by contrast, keep contests bilateral while stacking the deck in China's favor.
第三，使用非军方能保证在避免冲突升级的情况下保证事件地区化，直接使用强硬的解放军海军会让任何小摩擦都国际化，中国最不愿意此种情况出现。解放军的开火行为会引起地区范围的抗议和爱国精神的高涨。而不显眼的方法会让冲突双边化（非国际化），同时中国从中占便宜。
Fourth, nonmilitary vessels empower Beijing to exert low-grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South China Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe weaknesses in coastal states' maritime-surveillance capacity while testing their political resolve. Keeping disputes at a low simmer, moreover, grants China the diplomatic initiative to turn up or down the heat as strategic circumstances warrant.
第四，非军事船只能让北京对那些对南中国海声称有同样主权的国家保持低度但持续的压力。持续的巡逻能看出其他海岸国家的海上执法的漏洞，同时考验这些国家的政治决心。让冲突保持在一个低烈度，能让中国随时能根据情况作出反应。
And if all else fails, Beijing can employ its navy as a backstop to the civilian agencies. That China—unlike its weaker rivals—has the option of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor in places like Scarborough Shoal or the Spratly Islands. Indeed, the mere threat of naval coercion may induce an opponent to back down in a crisis. Innocuous in themselves, the five dragons' peacetime patrols carry significant weight when backed by the firepower of a great fleet—and Manila knows it.
如果所有手段都失败了，北京还能使用海军作为非军方机构的支持，中国不像她的那些弱小对手，可以选择在黄岩岛或珍宝岛这样类似的地方仅仅靠增加恐吓的因素就让冲突升级。有时仅仅是海军的威胁存在就能让对手屈服。“五龙”和平时期的日常巡逻看起来是没有威胁的，但在强有力的海军舰队支持下，是非常有分量的—马尼拉是深知这一点的。
Sign of the Times
时代的特征
Given the strategic benefits of nonmilitary sea power, maritime-law enforcement promises to remain a growth industry in China in the coming years. Beijing can hope to achieve its goals through discreet methods while applying a solvent to any opposing coalition before it solidifies. That would be an impressive feat of nautical diplomacy, and it could succeed. It behooves the United States and its Southeast Asian allies to pay as much attention to unglamorous civilian ships—China's small stick—as they do to big-stick platforms that dominate headlines.
考虑到非军方海上力量的战略意义，中国的海上执法机构在可见的未来会一直发展的，北京能够希望在使用小心谨慎的方法下让任何可能的对立联盟无法成型。这将是非常令人深刻的海上外交成功，而且这个目标也是可以达到的。这应该让美国和其东南亚盟国对这种不怎么起眼的非军事力量—中国的“小棒”—现对于那些占据头条新闻的“大棒”—多加注意。
Scarborough Shoal is a harbinger of things to come. Never overlook the political value of ships just because they don't bristle with guns and missiles.
黄岩岛是将来的预兆，绝不要因为某些船没有装备火炮和导弹就忽视其的政治价值。Small-Stick Diplomacy in the South China Sea
南中国海的“小棒”外交
James Holmes, Toshi Yoshihara
April 23, 2012

我是刚注册，超大说我不能发链接，所以就以以下形式发出来了
nationalinterest.org/commentary/small-stick-diplomacy-the-south-china-sea-6831

大概因为家庭背景，我本人相对来说比较关心国外学术界对中国海上力量的分析，相对于国内一帮到处打打杀杀的喊声，痛斥TG卖国，国外一般分析都是中国这次做的很聪明，我也想尽我之力，多翻译一些这类的文章，让大家多看看一些比较深度的事件分析，不过因为这类文章都比较长，我的英语只能说是一般，时间也没有那么多，只能是尽力而为了。

关于作者
James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, where Toshi Yoshihara holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies. They are the coauthors ofRed Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Best Book of 2010. The views voiced here are theirs alone.
James Holms是美国海军战争学院（U.S. Naval War College）战略学副教授，Toshi Yoshihara（看名字是个日本佬）为亚太问题the John A. van Beuren研究员，他们是大西洋月刊2010年度最佳图书Red Star over the Pacific （红星照耀太平洋）的作者，本文章只代表他们本人观点。

A seemingly quixotic impasse between Philippine and Chinese ships played out this week at Scarborough Shoal, 120-odd miles west of the Philippine island of Luzon. We say “seemingly” because it makes eminently good sense for China to dispatch lightly armed—or even unarmed—noncombat vessels to uphold its territorial claims in the South China Sea. That's what happened at Scarborough Shoal, where no Chinese warships got involved. Beijing's muted approach conforms to its pattern of calibrating deployments of force to the circumstances while holding overwhelming military might in reserve to deter or compel recalcitrant Southeast Asian states.
一个看起来不可思议的僵局本周正在中国和菲律宾船只之间展开，地点就是离菲律宾吕宋岛以西大概120英里处的黄岩岛。我们说“看起来”是因为对中国来说，派出有很少武装或根本没有武装的船只去往南中国海那些地区是非常有道理的。这也是正在黄岩岛发生的事情，中国没有派出战舰。北京这种不张扬的行为证明了这种同时在后方保持压倒性军事优势行为对付吓阻有反抗可能的东南亚国家的部署。
That's savvy diplomacy. It means using the least force necessary—including nonmilitary ships from its maritime surveillance and law-enforcement services, or “five dragons stirring up the sea,” as one Chinese author calls them. Sea power is about more than men-of-war and ship-launched aircraft, the high-profile implements that grace the cover of Jane's Fighting Ships. Shore-based missiles, aircraft, sensors and command-and-control infrastructure can influence events on the high seas. So can coast guards and maritime-enforcement agencies. Even privately owned assets like merchantmen and fishing boats represent an arm of sea power if they can transport war materiel, monitor foreign ship movements, lay sea mines and the like.
这是非常聪明的外交。这意味着用最少可能的武力—包括非军方的海监及其他执法单位，或就像一个中国作者说的“五龙闹海”。海上力量不仅仅是作战人员，舰载飞机，或能登上简氏周刊封面的战舰。岸基导弹、飞机，传感器及指挥控制系统都会对公海上发生的事件有影响。同样海岸警卫队和海上执法机构同样有很大的影响。甚至像私人拥有的商船和渔船如有能力运送军用物资和监视外国船只，布水雷等，他们就都是海上力量的一部分。
Viewing sea power as a continuum gives China's leadership a range of options, including brandishing a small stick to accomplish its goals. It can do so because Manila and other claimants to regional islands and seas know full well that Beijing may unlimber the big stick—in the form of People's Liberation Army (PLA) ships, warplanes and missiles—and wallop them if they defy its will. The future will probably witness more encounters like the one at Scarborough Shoal unless the Philippines deploys a counterweight to Chinese ambitions, either by accumulating sea power of its own or by attracting help from powerful outsiders.
海上力量是统一连续体的观点给予了中国领导人很多选择，包括用小棒（比较少的力量）来达到自己的目的。中国能这么做是因为马尼拉很明白中方可以把“大棒”拿出来—中国人民解放军海军的战舰、飞机、导弹—然后把菲律宾打回原始社会。如果菲律宾不能有自己相应的海上力量或其他强力国家的帮助，这种事情会越来越多的发生。
Communities of Interest
利益共同体
Neither the Philippines nor any other Southeast Asian state is likely to amass sufficient physical power to stand alone against Chinese blandishments. That leaves balancing. But presenting a united front is hard for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the most obvious candidate to act as a balancing coalition. ASEAN is a notoriously loose regional consortium. True to form, its members have not yet mustered a consensus on the Scarborough Shoal standoff. Nor is the United States eager to take sides. Washington professes agnosticism toward conflicting maritime claims, insisting only that navigational freedoms be preserved.
不管是菲律宾还是其他东南亚国家大概都很难拥有对抗中国海上力量的实力。那就需要利益再次平衡了。但是对东盟来说是很困难做到这一点，虽然东盟是最佳的作为此种联盟的候选人。东盟是一个非常松散的地区联盟。东盟成员到现在还没有一个一致对目前黄岩岛事件的立场。美国现在也不愿出头，美国对海域争执持不置可否的态度，仅仅强调航海自由权。
The vagaries of coalition politics, then, could determine Manila's fortunes at Scarborough Shoal and in future showdowns. Beijing has displayed an impressive capacity to learn from its mistakes since 2010, when its hamfisted tactics frightened China's weaker neighbors into making common cause among themselves and with the United States. “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact,” proclaimed China's foreign minister in one shockingly undiplomatic exchange with his Singaporean counterpart.
这样一来，变化无常的联盟政治将决定马尼拉在黄岩岛及未来类似冲突中的命运。从2010年以来，北京表现出非常强的知错就改的能力。当时北京强硬的态度让周边的邻居有了联合美国到一起的共同目标。“中国是大国，其他国家是小国，这是事实。”当时中国的外交部长用了非常不外交的语言。
The unsaid but unmistakable message behind such in-your-face statements: “Get used to it.” That's a message minor powers situated near major ones take to heart. Hence Southeast Asians' receptiveness to diplomatic and military cooperation with one another and with outsiders like the United States, India and Japan.
这种近乎打脸的不可说但无误的说法：“老实接受。”这是离大国很近的小国非常明白的，所以东南亚国家开始在外交及军事方面和其他及美国、日本及印度等大国合作。
China wants to reduce Southeast Asians' newfound propensity for balancing. Since 2010, realizing the error of its ways, Beijing has prosecuted its maritime claims with a lighter hand. For insight into China's small-stick diplomacy, consider military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz is all about pummeling enemy armies, but in passing he urges statesmen to look for opportunities to disrupt the “community of interest” binding together an enemy alliance.
中国先要减少东南亚国家这种从新分配利益的倾向。关于中国这种“小棒”外交，考虑一下军事理论家克劳塞维茨的说法，克劳塞维茨主要是要打击对方的部队，但他也曾要政治家考虑打破对方“利益共同体”。
This might not prove too difficult, he implies. After all, “One country may support another's cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own.” Allies and coalition partners contribute token forces unless their survival is at stake, and they look for the exit when the going gets tough. By exercising restraint, then, Beijing can hope to divide and conquer. And indeed, Chinese leaders insist on treating Southeast Asian governments on a one-to-one basis. That keeps ASEAN members from pooling their diplomatic and military resources.
克劳塞维茨说打破“利益共同体”可能不是很困难，因为“就算一个国家支持另外一个国家的利益，这个国家也不会像重视自己的利益一样重视其他国家的。”除非自己的生存受到威胁，盟友只会提供象征性的部队，而且情况不好的时候第一个跑路。所以北京能够利用这一点来分而击之。北京一向主张和东盟国家进行国对国的接触，这样能防止东盟国家联合起来。
Five Hungry Dragons
五条饥饿的龙
ASEAN's drift relative to a unified, determined China coincides with a dramatic surge in Chinese maritime strength. Foreign observers' attention is understandably riveted on the more conspicuous military dimension of China's sea power, as manifest in high-end destroyers, stealth fighters and the nation's first aircraft carrier. But the non-naval maritime services constitute an important—and largely overlooked—facet of Chinese nautical prowess.
东盟的不给力和中国海上力量的增强同时发生，外国观察家的注意力很自然的被那些军事上发展所吸引，像隐身飞机航空母舰一类的，但是非海军的海上力量的发展是中国海上力量发展很重要但又很少有人注意的一部分。
Indeed, Beijing is evidently expanding the five dragons faster than the PLA Navy. The maritime-enforcement services are recruiting new manpower while taking delivery of decommissioned naval vessels. Furthermore, Chinese shipyards are turning out state-of-the-art cutters like sausages. Many are capable of sustained patrols in the farthest reaches of the China seas, assuring that China can maintain a visible presence in waters where it asserts sovereign jurisdiction. Indeed, Haijan 84, one of China's most modern law-enforcement vessels, occupied the epicenter of this week's imbroglio. Not the navy but China Marine Surveillance, an agency entrusted with protecting China's exclusive economic zones, dispatched Haijan 84to the scene.
北京正在以比海军还快的速度来发展“五条龙”。海上执法机构正在同时扩充人力和接受退役海军船只。中国的造船厂还在大造特造新船。很多船只都能在最偏远的地方持续执法。这样中国能在那些地方持续出现并行使司法权。现在黄岩岛大出风头的海监84就是负责保护中国海上经济专属区机构海监局的船只。
Beijing's buildup of nonmilitary sea power testifies to its balanced approach to managing the nation's nautical surroundings. Employing non-naval assets in clashes over territory reveals a sophisticated, methodical strategy for securing China's maritime claims throughout Asian waters. Best of all from China's standpoint, this strategy artfully widens fissures in ASEAN's already crumbling edifice. Clausewitz would nod approvingly.
北京的这种发展非军事力量的行为说明其对管理海上利益时平衡的做法。在海域争端中派出非海军舰船是一种完善及有效的做法，对中国来说，这种做法能有效的让本来就不行的东盟更加不行。克劳塞维茨一定会赞赏这种做法的。
First, using coast-guard-like assets reinforces China's diplomatic messaging. Sending warships to shoo away Philippine ships would indicate that China accepts that it is competing for territory claimed by others. Sending enforcement vessels, by contrast, matter-of-factly signals that China is policing sovereign waters. Chinese skippers can act against foreign vessels while diplomats condemn Southeast Asian governments for infringing on China's sovereignty and violating domestic law. Furthermore, relying on non-naval vessels partially inoculates Beijing against the charge that it is practicing gunboat diplomacy. China's narrative: this isn't diplomacy at all, it's routine law enforcement!
首先，用类似海岸警卫队一类的机构来加强中国的外交说辞。派战舰吓走菲律宾船只将被认为中国接受这是在和其他国家有领土争端。而使用执法船只，不言自明中国是在本土执法。中国的船长能一边对抗，一边在外交上攻击东南亚政府侵害中国主权和违法中国国内法。同时，使用非海军船只还能部分回应中国执行“炮舰外交”的指责。中国的说法：“这和外交无关，这是常规执法！”
Second, the lopsided power mismatch between China and ASEAN dictates a softer touch. Beijing can afford to deploy lightly armed ships against maritime rivals whose navies barely rate as coast guards. PLA Navy involvement would constitute an overmatch in most cases. Imagine the press photos if a tip-of-the-spear Chinese frigate or destroyer faced off against an outclassed Philippine Navy vessel. China would look like a bully in regional eyes.
第二，在中国和东盟之间的一边倒的力量对比也有另外的用处，北京能部署有很少武装的船只对抗那些连海岸警卫队都算不上的海军，中国海军能保证在大部分情况下保持极大优势。想象一下中国护卫舰或驱逐舰对抗小几级得菲律宾海军船只的新闻照片，那样中国在本地区就像的地霸。
For instance, the first Philippine vessel to respond off Scarborough Shoal was flagship BRP Gregorio del Pilar. The Gregorio del Pilar—the pride of the Philippine Navy fleet—is a U.S. Coast Guard hand-me-down of 1960s' vintage. Though grandiosely rebranded as a frigate, it boasts minimal combat capacity. There's little doubt who would prevail in a hypothetical battle. But while Godzilla can squash Bambi, his public image suffers. Relying on the maritime-enforcement services limits the chances of a diplomatic debacle without forfeiting Chinese interests.
举例来说，第一艘反应到达黄岩岛的菲律宾船只是其旗舰BRP Gregorio del Pilar，这艘船号称是菲律宾海军舰队的骄傲—其实就是美国海岸警卫队六十年代设计的二手货。虽然从新命名成了护卫舰，可是实际作战能力不值一提，如果打起来，谁会赢是很明显的事情。但是虽然大国能痛扁小国，国际形象就要受损。而使用海上执法机构可以在减少外交障碍的情况下避免中国利益受损。
Third, employing nonmilitary means eschews escalation while keeping disputes local. Using a blunt military instrument like the PLA Navy would internationalize any minor incident, bringing about the outcome China fears most. Shots fired in anger by PLA gunners likely would provoke regionwide protests while igniting nationalist passions. Unobtrusive methods, by contrast, keep contests bilateral while stacking the deck in China's favor.
第三，使用非军方能保证在避免冲突升级的情况下保证事件地区化，直接使用强硬的解放军海军会让任何小摩擦都国际化，中国最不愿意此种情况出现。解放军的开火行为会引起地区范围的抗议和爱国精神的高涨。而不显眼的方法会让冲突双边化（非国际化），同时中国从中占便宜。
Fourth, nonmilitary vessels empower Beijing to exert low-grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South China Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe weaknesses in coastal states' maritime-surveillance capacity while testing their political resolve. Keeping disputes at a low simmer, moreover, grants China the diplomatic initiative to turn up or down the heat as strategic circumstances warrant.
第四，非军事船只能让北京对那些对南中国海声称有同样主权的国家保持低度但持续的压力。持续的巡逻能看出其他海岸国家的海上执法的漏洞，同时考验这些国家的政治决心。让冲突保持在一个低烈度，能让中国随时能根据情况作出反应。
And if all else fails, Beijing can employ its navy as a backstop to the civilian agencies. That China—unlike its weaker rivals—has the option of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor in places like Scarborough Shoal or the Spratly Islands. Indeed, the mere threat of naval coercion may induce an opponent to back down in a crisis. Innocuous in themselves, the five dragons' peacetime patrols carry significant weight when backed by the firepower of a great fleet—and Manila knows it.
如果所有手段都失败了，北京还能使用海军作为非军方机构的支持，中国不像她的那些弱小对手，可以选择在黄岩岛或珍宝岛这样类似的地方仅仅靠增加恐吓的因素就让冲突升级。有时仅仅是海军的威胁存在就能让对手屈服。“五龙”和平时期的日常巡逻看起来是没有威胁的，但在强有力的海军舰队支持下，是非常有分量的—马尼拉是深知这一点的。
Sign of the Times
时代的特征
Given the strategic benefits of nonmilitary sea power, maritime-law enforcement promises to remain a growth industry in China in the coming years. Beijing can hope to achieve its goals through discreet methods while applying a solvent to any opposing coalition before it solidifies. That would be an impressive feat of nautical diplomacy, and it could succeed. It behooves the United States and its Southeast Asian allies to pay as much attention to unglamorous civilian ships—China's small stick—as they do to big-stick platforms that dominate headlines.
考虑到非军方海上力量的战略意义，中国的海上执法机构在可见的未来会一直发展的，北京能够希望在使用小心谨慎的方法下让任何可能的对立联盟无法成型。这将是非常令人深刻的海上外交成功，而且这个目标也是可以达到的。这应该让美国和其东南亚盟国对这种不怎么起眼的非军事力量—中国的“小棒”—现对于那些占据头条新闻的“大棒”—多加注意。
Scarborough Shoal is a harbinger of things to come. Never overlook the political value of ships just because they don't bristle with guns and missiles.
黄岩岛是将来的预兆，绝不要因为某些船没有装备火炮和导弹就忽视其的政治价值。