【无良原创翻译】《纽约时报》：南中国海浑水

Muddy Waters

By PATRICK M. CRONIN
Patrick M. Cronin is the director of the Asia program at the Center for a New American Security and the editor and a co-author of “Cooperation From Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea.”

Patrick M. Cronin是新美国安全中心（某个智库）亚洲项目主任。

Published: April 24, 2012

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/opinion/the-philippines-china-and-the-us-meet-at-sea.html

THIS month’s maritime standoff between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea isn’t the first time the region’s navies have gone toe-to-toe. But while past tensions revolved around resources under the ocean floor, this most recent event is part of a growing strategic rivalry pitting Chinese power against the United States and its East Asian allies. How Washington responds may determine the prospects for continued peace in the Pacific.

这个月的中国和菲律宾之间的海上纠纷已经不是第一次这个地区的海军对上了。但是以往基本是关于海底下资源的，这次是中国和美国及其东亚盟友之间战略上逐渐发展出来的对抗。华盛顿的应对有可能会决定以后太平洋的持续和平。

The latest crisis arose after the pocket-size Philippine Navy, with an old United States Coast Guard cutter as its new flagship, tried to apprehend Chinese fishermen it claimed were operating illegally near the Scarborough Shoal. China then sent two surveillance vessels — part of a recent effort to protect its claims in the East and South China Seas — to block the Philippine ship.

今次事件的发生是因为极小规模的菲律宾海军——用一艘美国海岸警卫队的二手货作旗舰——试图把在黄岩岛周边的其声称非法的中国渔民抓起来，中国随后派了两条监视船——其近来试图保护在东海及南中国海利益的努力——堵住了菲律宾的船只。

The message was stark: escalate and risk a violent run-in with the Chinese Navy, or stand down and negotiate with Beijing from a position of weakness.

发出的信息很明显：把事情闹大面对和中国海军发生暴力冲突的危险，或者是痿了以后以一个不利的地位和北京谈判。

Manila wisely chose the latter, first substituting a civilian vessel for its combat vessel, and then containing the dispute through diplomatic channels. But China was also sending a flare to Washington, to the effect that American efforts to strengthen the military capacity of its regional allies would be checked.

马尼拉很聪明的选择了后者，首先用一条平民船替换了战斗舰只，接着又把纠纷限制在外交途径。中国就此还向华盛顿发出了一个信号，美国增强地区盟友军事实力的行为是会遭到反击的。

It’s easy to see the standoff as an act of quasi-aggression, but it’s not. Because China is looking for influence rather than spoiling for a fight, it will seek a minimal show of force, as it did in the Scarborough incident by sending surveillance vessels instead of warships. Drawing attention to its rapid military modernization or its intensifying nationalist sentiment, after all, could undermine China’s core interests.

虽然很容易把冲突看成是自我扩张的行为，但这不是。中国要求影响力而不是叫嚣战争，中国会最小程度的展现武力，就像中国在黄岩岛派出的是监视船而不是军舰。让人注意其快速的军事发展或引起民族主义狂热都会影响中国的核心利益。

The key take-away from the recent showdown is that the United States needs to remain coolheaded. Not only are such skirmishes at sea inevitable, but they are also of minor consequence — assuming they are managed shrewdly.

从目前的事件来看，美国要保持冷静，这种在海上的小规模冲突是不可避免的，而且影响也比较小——如果能够被冷静的对待的话。

Given our allies’ overlapping interests in the South China Sea, we are bound to feel pressure to act aggressively against what appears to be Chinese expansionism. But as wiser heads in the United States have understood for decades, China is not truly expansionist. Its mercantilist international policies have material rather than imperial ambitions. China is testing the limits, not necessarily trying to pick a fight.

从我们盟友在南中国海的交叉利益来看，我们肯定会感到压力去积极应对中国的扩张主义。但是就像美国的那些聪明人几十年来明白的，中国并不是真正的扩张主义者，中国重商主义的政策更倾向物质上的而是帝国主义野心。中国正在试探底线，但未必是要大打出手。

And we would do well to remember that for all their differences, China and the United States are not the cold war ideological adversaries of old. They both benefit enormously from an open global maritime commons. Globalization is possible only because of the unfettered sea lanes over which the vast majority of goods and resources move around the world. And the South China Sea, which joins the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is the narrow throat of our globalized economy.

而且我们也要记住虽然有如此之多的不同，中美两国不是冷战时期的意识形态对手。两者都从开放的全球海洋上获利甚多。全球化成功的原因就是不受影响的海路航道能够在全球范围内运送大量的物资。而连接太平洋和印度洋的南中国海就是全球贸易的咽喉要道。

That said, we shouldn’t ignore the underlying risk in such incidents, either. At least in the South China Sea, China’s military might will continue to bump up against the American Navy’s role as guarantor of freedom of the seas.

话说虽然这么说，我们也不能忽视这类事件其中的潜在危险。至少在南中国海，中国的军事力量将继续和作为地区和平捍卫者的美国海军发生摩擦。

Nor will the two powers always see eye to eye. The United States has a treaty commitment to help defend the Philippines, but it has always been careful to maintain neutrality over sovereignty disputes. American diplomatic exertions have thus gone into supporting multilateral approaches that would make it more difficult for one power — China — to coerce its neighbors.

当然也不会总是如此。美国和菲律宾签订有条约，但美国一向很小心不卷入主权纠纷中去。美国外交努力就主要是支持多边介入，这能让中国更加困难要挟其邻居。

China, on the other hand, prefers to deal with the players in the region one by one, starting with a country like the Philippines, which it knows lacks the military capacity to defend its disparate islands.

中国从另一方面讲，倾向于和地区势力一对一，先从菲律宾这类国家开始，一个缺少武力保卫其岛屿的国家。

While the current standoff may be under control, more are likely to occur, especially as our allies turn to us for protection — something we may see at next week’s meeting between the United States and the Philippines in Washington. And it hasn’t helped that soon after the dispute began, the United States and the Philippines started a long-planned military exercise nearby involving thousands of soldiers, sailors and Marines.

目前的事件也许也许被控制住了，更多的此类事件将会发生，特别是我们的盟友会向我们寻求帮助——下周在华盛顿举行的美菲会谈此事也许就会出现。当然就在黄岩岛事件发生后不久，美菲就举行了一次早就计划好了的军事演习的事对情况没有什么帮助。

At the same time, separate disputes are guaranteed to continue among the countries around the South China Sea — including Malaysia, Vietnam and Japan as well as China and the Philippines — as long as oil and natural gas continue to be discovered under its waters.

同时，环南中国海的国家将会遇到和黄岩岛事件类似的事件——包括马拉西亚、越南和日本、中国和菲律宾——只要南海地区还有新的油汽资源被发现。

Should a fight erupt, China is increasingly ready to rumble. Years of double-digit growth in its defense budgets are providing a historic land power with a blue-water naval capability and missile and air forces that put the American military presence in East Asia at risk.

如有事情升级，中国越来越准备大搞一场。多年来国防开支双位数的增长让一个大陆国家有了蓝水海军能力和能威胁到美国在东亚军事存在的空军及导弹力量。

This new reality, in short, recommends a specific course of action, one we are at risk of losing sight of: namely, to understand that China is testing the waters and sending signals but nothing more — but also to respond with precise, measured steps to ensure it doesn’t push the limits too far.

这一新的事实，简短来说，需要特别计划的行动，我们可能会搞不清：中国只是在试水——同时也要用精确计算好的步骤让其不得越界。

The maritime drama near Scarborough Shoal is just another salvo in a growing strategic rivalry that can be managed but not resolved. A resolute but prudent American position that seeks region-wide cooperation on common rules, but backed by American strength, remains the best means of keeping the waters tranquil.

现在发生在黄岩岛的事情是那些战略对抗中可以控制但不能解决的事情。一个有美国力量支持的坚决而又谨慎的寻求在公认法则下进行地区间合作的行为还是保守地区平静的最好方案。Muddy Waters

By PATRICK M. CRONIN
Patrick M. Cronin is the director of the Asia program at the Center for a New American Security and the editor and a co-author of “Cooperation From Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea.”

Patrick M. Cronin是新美国安全中心（某个智库）亚洲项目主任。

Published: April 24, 2012

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/opinion/the-philippines-china-and-the-us-meet-at-sea.html

THIS month’s maritime standoff between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea isn’t the first time the region’s navies have gone toe-to-toe. But while past tensions revolved around resources under the ocean floor, this most recent event is part of a growing strategic rivalry pitting Chinese power against the United States and its East Asian allies. How Washington responds may determine the prospects for continued peace in the Pacific.

这个月的中国和菲律宾之间的海上纠纷已经不是第一次这个地区的海军对上了。但是以往基本是关于海底下资源的，这次是中国和美国及其东亚盟友之间战略上逐渐发展出来的对抗。华盛顿的应对有可能会决定以后太平洋的持续和平。

The latest crisis arose after the pocket-size Philippine Navy, with an old United States Coast Guard cutter as its new flagship, tried to apprehend Chinese fishermen it claimed were operating illegally near the Scarborough Shoal. China then sent two surveillance vessels — part of a recent effort to protect its claims in the East and South China Seas — to block the Philippine ship.

今次事件的发生是因为极小规模的菲律宾海军——用一艘美国海岸警卫队的二手货作旗舰——试图把在黄岩岛周边的其声称非法的中国渔民抓起来，中国随后派了两条监视船——其近来试图保护在东海及南中国海利益的努力——堵住了菲律宾的船只。

The message was stark: escalate and risk a violent run-in with the Chinese Navy, or stand down and negotiate with Beijing from a position of weakness.

发出的信息很明显：把事情闹大面对和中国海军发生暴力冲突的危险，或者是痿了以后以一个不利的地位和北京谈判。

Manila wisely chose the latter, first substituting a civilian vessel for its combat vessel, and then containing the dispute through diplomatic channels. But China was also sending a flare to Washington, to the effect that American efforts to strengthen the military capacity of its regional allies would be checked.

马尼拉很聪明的选择了后者，首先用一条平民船替换了战斗舰只，接着又把纠纷限制在外交途径。中国就此还向华盛顿发出了一个信号，美国增强地区盟友军事实力的行为是会遭到反击的。

It’s easy to see the standoff as an act of quasi-aggression, but it’s not. Because China is looking for influence rather than spoiling for a fight, it will seek a minimal show of force, as it did in the Scarborough incident by sending surveillance vessels instead of warships. Drawing attention to its rapid military modernization or its intensifying nationalist sentiment, after all, could undermine China’s core interests.

虽然很容易把冲突看成是自我扩张的行为，但这不是。中国要求影响力而不是叫嚣战争，中国会最小程度的展现武力，就像中国在黄岩岛派出的是监视船而不是军舰。让人注意其快速的军事发展或引起民族主义狂热都会影响中国的核心利益。

The key take-away from the recent showdown is that the United States needs to remain coolheaded. Not only are such skirmishes at sea inevitable, but they are also of minor consequence — assuming they are managed shrewdly.

从目前的事件来看，美国要保持冷静，这种在海上的小规模冲突是不可避免的，而且影响也比较小——如果能够被冷静的对待的话。

Given our allies’ overlapping interests in the South China Sea, we are bound to feel pressure to act aggressively against what appears to be Chinese expansionism. But as wiser heads in the United States have understood for decades, China is not truly expansionist. Its mercantilist international policies have material rather than imperial ambitions. China is testing the limits, not necessarily trying to pick a fight.

从我们盟友在南中国海的交叉利益来看，我们肯定会感到压力去积极应对中国的扩张主义。但是就像美国的那些聪明人几十年来明白的，中国并不是真正的扩张主义者，中国重商主义的政策更倾向物质上的而是帝国主义野心。中国正在试探底线，但未必是要大打出手。

And we would do well to remember that for all their differences, China and the United States are not the cold war ideological adversaries of old. They both benefit enormously from an open global maritime commons. Globalization is possible only because of the unfettered sea lanes over which the vast majority of goods and resources move around the world. And the South China Sea, which joins the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is the narrow throat of our globalized economy.

而且我们也要记住虽然有如此之多的不同，中美两国不是冷战时期的意识形态对手。两者都从开放的全球海洋上获利甚多。全球化成功的原因就是不受影响的海路航道能够在全球范围内运送大量的物资。而连接太平洋和印度洋的南中国海就是全球贸易的咽喉要道。

That said, we shouldn’t ignore the underlying risk in such incidents, either. At least in the South China Sea, China’s military might will continue to bump up against the American Navy’s role as guarantor of freedom of the seas.

话说虽然这么说，我们也不能忽视这类事件其中的潜在危险。至少在南中国海，中国的军事力量将继续和作为地区和平捍卫者的美国海军发生摩擦。

Nor will the two powers always see eye to eye. The United States has a treaty commitment to help defend the Philippines, but it has always been careful to maintain neutrality over sovereignty disputes. American diplomatic exertions have thus gone into supporting multilateral approaches that would make it more difficult for one power — China — to coerce its neighbors.

当然也不会总是如此。美国和菲律宾签订有条约，但美国一向很小心不卷入主权纠纷中去。美国外交努力就主要是支持多边介入，这能让中国更加困难要挟其邻居。

China, on the other hand, prefers to deal with the players in the region one by one, starting with a country like the Philippines, which it knows lacks the military capacity to defend its disparate islands.

中国从另一方面讲，倾向于和地区势力一对一，先从菲律宾这类国家开始，一个缺少武力保卫其岛屿的国家。

While the current standoff may be under control, more are likely to occur, especially as our allies turn to us for protection — something we may see at next week’s meeting between the United States and the Philippines in Washington. And it hasn’t helped that soon after the dispute began, the United States and the Philippines started a long-planned military exercise nearby involving thousands of soldiers, sailors and Marines.

目前的事件也许也许被控制住了，更多的此类事件将会发生，特别是我们的盟友会向我们寻求帮助——下周在华盛顿举行的美菲会谈此事也许就会出现。当然就在黄岩岛事件发生后不久，美菲就举行了一次早就计划好了的军事演习的事对情况没有什么帮助。

At the same time, separate disputes are guaranteed to continue among the countries around the South China Sea — including Malaysia, Vietnam and Japan as well as China and the Philippines — as long as oil and natural gas continue to be discovered under its waters.

同时，环南中国海的国家将会遇到和黄岩岛事件类似的事件——包括马拉西亚、越南和日本、中国和菲律宾——只要南海地区还有新的油汽资源被发现。

Should a fight erupt, China is increasingly ready to rumble. Years of double-digit growth in its defense budgets are providing a historic land power with a blue-water naval capability and missile and air forces that put the American military presence in East Asia at risk.

如有事情升级，中国越来越准备大搞一场。多年来国防开支双位数的增长让一个大陆国家有了蓝水海军能力和能威胁到美国在东亚军事存在的空军及导弹力量。

This new reality, in short, recommends a specific course of action, one we are at risk of losing sight of: namely, to understand that China is testing the waters and sending signals but nothing more — but also to respond with precise, measured steps to ensure it doesn’t push the limits too far.

这一新的事实，简短来说，需要特别计划的行动，我们可能会搞不清：中国只是在试水——同时也要用精确计算好的步骤让其不得越界。

The maritime drama near Scarborough Shoal is just another salvo in a growing strategic rivalry that can be managed but not resolved. A resolute but prudent American position that seeks region-wide cooperation on common rules, but backed by American strength, remains the best means of keeping the waters tranquil.

现在发生在黄岩岛的事情是那些战略对抗中可以控制但不能解决的事情。一个有美国力量支持的坚决而又谨慎的寻求在公认法则下进行地区间合作的行为还是保守地区平静的最好方案。