【无良原创翻译】东盟试图努力保持在南中国海冲突中的影 ...

ASEAN Struggles for Relevance in South China Sea Disputes

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11890/asean-struggles-for-relevance-in-south-china-sea-disputes

Mark J. Valencia is senior research associate at the Nautilus Institute.
Mark J. Valencia是Nautilus智库的资深研究员

By Mark J. Valencia | 26 Apr 2012
Although the tense standoff between Chinese and Philippine warships at Scarborough Shoal in the northern South China Sea has been walked back from the brink, it is a harbinger of more confrontations to come. Indeed, more such incidents are inevitable if China and the four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states -- the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei -- that also claim the sea's disputed islands and their adjacent waters and resources cannot agree on and implement a robust code of conduct to govern their activities there.

尽管中国和菲律宾在南中国海北部黄岩岛的对峙缓和了下来，这只是更多此类冲突的前兆。如果中国和东盟四个国家（越南，菲律宾，马拉西亚，文莱）不能就其有争议的地区和其油汽资源达成一个行为准则的话，此类冲突事件就会持续发生。

Unfortunately, the April 2012 ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh came and went without agreement on such a code. Indeed, the summit ended not with a bang but with a whimper as far as the South China Sea disputes are concerned.

但不幸的是在2012年4月金边的东盟会议上什么也没有达成。该次会议上南海问题是几乎一无所获。

In the run-up to the summit, expectations ran high that ASEAN would at long last agree on the content, or at least the principles, of a code of conduct. But going in, the Philippines insisted that the code include a provision to separate disputed from nondisputed areas -- a thinly veiled attempt to have ASEAN reject China's historical claim to most of the sea. Starting from the assumption that China's claim is invalid, the Philippine proposal limited the disputed areas to only the islands and outcroppings themselves, a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea around them and, in some cases, an Exclusive Economic Zone where it doesn't overlap with other countries' claims from their baselines -- in other words, little or none. The approach did not pass muster with most of ASEAN's members, however.

在会议召开之前很多人认为此次会议会达成早该达成的南海行为准则，至少也要有基本原则出来。但是菲律宾坚持在《准则》中必须包括分开有争议和没有争议地区的条款，谁都知道这是要让东盟反对中国在大部分海域的历史主张权利。从事先认为中国的要求是没有道理出发，菲律宾提议把有争议的地区仅仅定义为岛礁及其12海里线，或有些地方包括没有和其他国家从海岸出发而互相重叠的200海里专属区——这样的地区非常的少。不过此次提议大部分国家都没有通过。

The Philippine initiative didn't make much difference in the end, as the leaders never got around to formally discussing the content of the code. Indeed, ASEAN could not even agree on whether it should first reach a consensus on a draft and then negotiate with China, or involve China from the beginning. They apparently will do both -- negotiate the content among themselves while keeping China "in the loop." They also committed to implementing the nonbinding Declaration of Conduct agreed upon in 2002, according to the guidelines for doing so agreed upon in 2011. But this was only confirming their commitment to something that was supposedly already being done.

不过菲律宾的提议到最后也没有什么意义，因为东盟的政治领导人最后也没有正式的讨论《准则》的内容。东盟甚至都没有在是先达成一致的草案后再和中国谈，还是一开始就把中国包括在内上达成一致。东盟好像要两件事一起做，在内部讨论，同时随时知会中国。东盟还打算把2002年通过的没有约束力的《南海各方行为宣言》实施起来，这个是在2011年通过的《宣言》指导意见中的。这仅仅重复了东盟要做某些本来应该已经完成的事情。

Trying to put a good face on the summit outcome, this year's host and ASEAN chair Cambodia issued a statement saying that the 10 member states agreed to increase the pace of negotiations on a code, at least among themselves. But still to be addressed are such "wicked" issues as the code's geographic scope (whether to include the Vietnamese-claimed, Chinese-occupied Paracel Islands and surrounding waters, for instance), the inclusion and specifics of a dispute-settlement mechanism, and a ban on further construction on the islands and reefs. Meanwhile, China continued to insist on bilateral negotiations with each of the four ASEAN claimants regarding the disputes, instead of with all the claimants at once or with ASEAN as a whole. The good news coming out of the summit was that all parties apparently seem to support a code, at least in principle.

这届东盟会议的主办方柬埔寨试图美化此次会议，发表了一个声明说东盟国家起码要在自己内部加快关于《准则》谈判的进程。但还有一些“棘手”问题还没被谈到，如《准则》包括的地理范围（如是否包括越南主张中国占领的珍宝岛及其周边海域），加入和明确纠纷发生时的解决流程，禁止在有争议的岛礁上继续建东西等。这同时中国还在坚持一对一的谈判而不是和有争议的国家一起或东盟谈判。好消息是东盟国家貌似至少原则上支持有一个《准则》。

There are several ways this political drama can unfold from here. In perhaps a worst-case scenario from ASEAN's perspective, the broader China-U.S. rivalry could feed upon and reinforce itself, becoming a serious political conflict that not only dominates the South China Sea disputes, but ultimately splits ASEAN on the issue and subordinates its "centrality" in regional security matters. This would leave the South China Sea disputes to fester, with tensions waxing and waning in cycles of action-reaction dynamics. International oil companies would shy away from prospects in the disputed areas, and exploration would remain in limbo.

现在有多种事情发展的可能。对东盟最糟的是中美摩擦加强，不仅严重的政治冲突成为地区主要事件，各种事情导致东盟不统一，不能在地区安全中不在扮演“主角”。这会让南中国海纠纷扩大并反复出现。国际石油公司就会来这些有争议的地区。

ASEAN's preferred scenario would be that in which a robust, binding code of conduct is agreed and implemented within ASEAN and with China as well. This would remove one opportunity for U.S.-China competition and reaffirm ASEAN's political strength and centrality. Not only could this lead to an era of peace and stability in the South China Sea, but the claimants might also find a way to encourage hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the area, perhaps through joint development.

东盟希望的是一个有力，有约束的东盟和中国都遵守的行为准则，这能减少中美冲突的一个诱发点，同时也能加强东盟的政治能力和角色。这不仅能在南中国海带来和平，还能让冲突双方发现通过合作来共同开发的途径。

Neither of these scenarios are likely, however. The reality will be somewhere in-between. Talks are likely to drag on, both within ASEAN and between it and China. Meanwhile, diplomatic vitriol and tensions between China and the ASEAN claimants, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, will continue to ebb and flow.

但是以上两个假设大概都不会发生，实际情况大概是介于两者之间。谈判大概会一直进行下去，不管是在东盟内部还是和中国。同时中国和东盟（特别是菲律宾和越南）的摩擦大概也会一直出现。

Indeed, the U.S.-China competition for the hearts and minds of Southeast Asian governments has already begun to thwart ASEAN's goal of centrality in regional security management. The U.S. has essentially sided with the ASEAN claimants on the disputes, encouraging some of them to be more assertive and take riskier actions than they might have in the absence of tacit U.S. Support.

中国和美国拉拢东盟国家的行为已经消弱了东盟试图在地区安全中扮演主角的努力。美国基本站到了东盟的那些和中国有冲突的一方，鼓励那些国家进行一些没有美国支持就不会有的更强硬和危险的行动。

But ASEAN and its members can still work to ensure that the outcome is closer to their preferred scenario by trying to manage the U.S.-China rivalry without overtly siding with either protagonist. Singapore's warning to the U.S. to avoid extreme anti-China rhetoric is a step in this direction.

但是东盟还是可以通过不完全站到中美中一方去的行为来保证达到对自己比较有利的状况出现。新加坡对美国不要采取过激的反中动作就是一例。

For many ASEAN members, staying neutral will not be easy. But an evenhanded approach may be the key to preserving ASEAN's unity and control of the region's security. ASEAN must be proactive, take a coherent and balanced approach -- and prepare for crisis management.

对很多东盟国家来说，保持中立是很困难的。但是不一边倒的政策是很重要的，这对保证东盟的统一和控制地区的安全大概是关键性的一点。
ASEAN Struggles for Relevance in South China Sea Disputes

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11890/asean-struggles-for-relevance-in-south-china-sea-disputes

Mark J. Valencia is senior research associate at the Nautilus Institute.
Mark J. Valencia是Nautilus智库的资深研究员

By Mark J. Valencia | 26 Apr 2012
Although the tense standoff between Chinese and Philippine warships at Scarborough Shoal in the northern South China Sea has been walked back from the brink, it is a harbinger of more confrontations to come. Indeed, more such incidents are inevitable if China and the four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states -- the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei -- that also claim the sea's disputed islands and their adjacent waters and resources cannot agree on and implement a robust code of conduct to govern their activities there.

尽管中国和菲律宾在南中国海北部黄岩岛的对峙缓和了下来，这只是更多此类冲突的前兆。如果中国和东盟四个国家（越南，菲律宾，马拉西亚，文莱）不能就其有争议的地区和其油汽资源达成一个行为准则的话，此类冲突事件就会持续发生。

Unfortunately, the April 2012 ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh came and went without agreement on such a code. Indeed, the summit ended not with a bang but with a whimper as far as the South China Sea disputes are concerned.

但不幸的是在2012年4月金边的东盟会议上什么也没有达成。该次会议上南海问题是几乎一无所获。

In the run-up to the summit, expectations ran high that ASEAN would at long last agree on the content, or at least the principles, of a code of conduct. But going in, the Philippines insisted that the code include a provision to separate disputed from nondisputed areas -- a thinly veiled attempt to have ASEAN reject China's historical claim to most of the sea. Starting from the assumption that China's claim is invalid, the Philippine proposal limited the disputed areas to only the islands and outcroppings themselves, a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea around them and, in some cases, an Exclusive Economic Zone where it doesn't overlap with other countries' claims from their baselines -- in other words, little or none. The approach did not pass muster with most of ASEAN's members, however.

在会议召开之前很多人认为此次会议会达成早该达成的南海行为准则，至少也要有基本原则出来。但是菲律宾坚持在《准则》中必须包括分开有争议和没有争议地区的条款，谁都知道这是要让东盟反对中国在大部分海域的历史主张权利。从事先认为中国的要求是没有道理出发，菲律宾提议把有争议的地区仅仅定义为岛礁及其12海里线，或有些地方包括没有和其他国家从海岸出发而互相重叠的200海里专属区——这样的地区非常的少。不过此次提议大部分国家都没有通过。

The Philippine initiative didn't make much difference in the end, as the leaders never got around to formally discussing the content of the code. Indeed, ASEAN could not even agree on whether it should first reach a consensus on a draft and then negotiate with China, or involve China from the beginning. They apparently will do both -- negotiate the content among themselves while keeping China "in the loop." They also committed to implementing the nonbinding Declaration of Conduct agreed upon in 2002, according to the guidelines for doing so agreed upon in 2011. But this was only confirming their commitment to something that was supposedly already being done.

不过菲律宾的提议到最后也没有什么意义，因为东盟的政治领导人最后也没有正式的讨论《准则》的内容。东盟甚至都没有在是先达成一致的草案后再和中国谈，还是一开始就把中国包括在内上达成一致。东盟好像要两件事一起做，在内部讨论，同时随时知会中国。东盟还打算把2002年通过的没有约束力的《南海各方行为宣言》实施起来，这个是在2011年通过的《宣言》指导意见中的。这仅仅重复了东盟要做某些本来应该已经完成的事情。

Trying to put a good face on the summit outcome, this year's host and ASEAN chair Cambodia issued a statement saying that the 10 member states agreed to increase the pace of negotiations on a code, at least among themselves. But still to be addressed are such "wicked" issues as the code's geographic scope (whether to include the Vietnamese-claimed, Chinese-occupied Paracel Islands and surrounding waters, for instance), the inclusion and specifics of a dispute-settlement mechanism, and a ban on further construction on the islands and reefs. Meanwhile, China continued to insist on bilateral negotiations with each of the four ASEAN claimants regarding the disputes, instead of with all the claimants at once or with ASEAN as a whole. The good news coming out of the summit was that all parties apparently seem to support a code, at least in principle.

这届东盟会议的主办方柬埔寨试图美化此次会议，发表了一个声明说东盟国家起码要在自己内部加快关于《准则》谈判的进程。但还有一些“棘手”问题还没被谈到，如《准则》包括的地理范围（如是否包括越南主张中国占领的珍宝岛及其周边海域），加入和明确纠纷发生时的解决流程，禁止在有争议的岛礁上继续建东西等。这同时中国还在坚持一对一的谈判而不是和有争议的国家一起或东盟谈判。好消息是东盟国家貌似至少原则上支持有一个《准则》。

There are several ways this political drama can unfold from here. In perhaps a worst-case scenario from ASEAN's perspective, the broader China-U.S. rivalry could feed upon and reinforce itself, becoming a serious political conflict that not only dominates the South China Sea disputes, but ultimately splits ASEAN on the issue and subordinates its "centrality" in regional security matters. This would leave the South China Sea disputes to fester, with tensions waxing and waning in cycles of action-reaction dynamics. International oil companies would shy away from prospects in the disputed areas, and exploration would remain in limbo.

现在有多种事情发展的可能。对东盟最糟的是中美摩擦加强，不仅严重的政治冲突成为地区主要事件，各种事情导致东盟不统一，不能在地区安全中不在扮演“主角”。这会让南中国海纠纷扩大并反复出现。国际石油公司就会来这些有争议的地区。

ASEAN's preferred scenario would be that in which a robust, binding code of conduct is agreed and implemented within ASEAN and with China as well. This would remove one opportunity for U.S.-China competition and reaffirm ASEAN's political strength and centrality. Not only could this lead to an era of peace and stability in the South China Sea, but the claimants might also find a way to encourage hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the area, perhaps through joint development.

东盟希望的是一个有力，有约束的东盟和中国都遵守的行为准则，这能减少中美冲突的一个诱发点，同时也能加强东盟的政治能力和角色。这不仅能在南中国海带来和平，还能让冲突双方发现通过合作来共同开发的途径。

Neither of these scenarios are likely, however. The reality will be somewhere in-between. Talks are likely to drag on, both within ASEAN and between it and China. Meanwhile, diplomatic vitriol and tensions between China and the ASEAN claimants, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, will continue to ebb and flow.

但是以上两个假设大概都不会发生，实际情况大概是介于两者之间。谈判大概会一直进行下去，不管是在东盟内部还是和中国。同时中国和东盟（特别是菲律宾和越南）的摩擦大概也会一直出现。

Indeed, the U.S.-China competition for the hearts and minds of Southeast Asian governments has already begun to thwart ASEAN's goal of centrality in regional security management. The U.S. has essentially sided with the ASEAN claimants on the disputes, encouraging some of them to be more assertive and take riskier actions than they might have in the absence of tacit U.S. Support.

中国和美国拉拢东盟国家的行为已经消弱了东盟试图在地区安全中扮演主角的努力。美国基本站到了东盟的那些和中国有冲突的一方，鼓励那些国家进行一些没有美国支持就不会有的更强硬和危险的行动。

But ASEAN and its members can still work to ensure that the outcome is closer to their preferred scenario by trying to manage the U.S.-China rivalry without overtly siding with either protagonist. Singapore's warning to the U.S. to avoid extreme anti-China rhetoric is a step in this direction.

但是东盟还是可以通过不完全站到中美中一方去的行为来保证达到对自己比较有利的状况出现。新加坡对美国不要采取过激的反中动作就是一例。

For many ASEAN members, staying neutral will not be easy. But an evenhanded approach may be the key to preserving ASEAN's unity and control of the region's security. ASEAN must be proactive, take a coherent and balanced approach -- and prepare for crisis management.

对很多东盟国家来说，保持中立是很困难的。但是不一边倒的政策是很重要的，这对保证东盟的统一和控制地区的安全大概是关键性的一点。