原创翻译,《外交事务》评中国——巴基斯坦关系

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China’s Pakistan Conundrum

中国的巴基斯坦谜题

The End of the All-Weather Friendship
全天候友谊的终结

原文作者Evan A. Feigenbaum,于01年至09年任美国副助理国务卿,负责中亚、南亚事务。

China is often called an “all-weather friend” to Pakistan — a strategic partner, a reliable source of trade and aid, and Islamabad’s closest military ally. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has described the friendship between the two countries as “higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey.” In September, he told the visiting Chinese Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, “Your friends are our friends,” continuing, “your enemies are our enemies, and your security is our security.”

中国常被称为巴基斯坦的"全天候朋友"——一名战略伙伴、可信赖的贸易与援助源泉、伊斯兰堡最亲密的军事盟友。巴基斯坦首相Yousef Raza Gilani 曾将两国间的友谊形容为"比山还高、比海还深、比钢还强、比蜜还甜"。九月份,他向到访的中国公安部长孟 建柱表示:"你们的朋友就是我们的朋友,你们的敌人就是我们的敌人,你们的安全就是我们的安全。"

But do things look so straightforward when viewed from Beijing? To be sure, Chinese money pours into places Western cash fears to tread. But Beijing is not oblivious to risk. In fact, Chinese money flows disproportionately to investments that carry little to no risk and deliver returns that, however modest, are predictable. Moreover, at least some Chinese companies have proved willing to abandon investments as their perception of risk has risen. In September, for example, Kingho, a large private Chinese miner, is reported to have abandoned a proposed $19 billion investment to build a coal mine and power and chemical plants in Pakistan’s Sindh province after reassessing the investment and security environment.

但在北京的眼里事情就这么简单吗?诚然,中国资金蜂拥至西方资本不敢涉足之处,但北京对风险并非无动于衷。事实上,中国资金绝大部分流向低风险或零风险的投资项目,无论收益如何微薄,回报总是可预期的。此外,在感到风险増加时,至少有一部分中国公司情愿放弃投资。例如,中国大型矿业私企Kingho据称在对投资与安全环境进行重新评估之后,于今年九月放弃一个位于巴基斯坦Sindh省的、高达190亿美元的煤矿、电力及化工厂拟议投资项目。

Indeed, Beijing’s investment calculus is increasingly based on a sophisticated balancing of three types of risk: geopolitical, political, and financial.

确实,北京的投资考虑正日益建立在对三类风险进行综合权衡的基础之上:地缘、政治、金融。

Geopolitical risk (not least China’s rivalry with India) has long led Beijing to support Islamabad through thick and thin. Friendly ties between the two help satisfy four Chinese strategic objectives: They ensure security and stability in China’s western provinces and along its continental Asian border; anchor China’s poorer western provinces in a web of cross-border economic activity; bottle up India in the subcontinent, forestalling the emergence of a continental-sized rival and precluding more extensive Indian security activities in East Asia; and assure that no other major power, particularly the United States, advances its interests in continental Asia at China’s expense through, for instance, military deployments or permanent access arrangements.

地缘风险(不仅仅限于中印之争)让北京对伊斯兰堡的支持始终不渝。中巴友好有助于实现中方四大战略目标:确保中国西部省份及其与亚洲大陆邻国交界地区的安全稳定;将中国西部贫困省份纳入国际经济活动网络;将印度遏制于亚洲次大陆,扼制一个大陆级别敌手的崛起,并防止印度在东亚有更大的安全动作;确保其它强国(尤其是美国)不能通过驻军、永久进入权等手段在亚洲大陆扩张、损及中国利益。

In recent years, these four objectives have become ever more pressing, reinforcing Beijing’s inclination to support Pakistan. Take the issue of securing China’s western border. The drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan will, unavoidably, prompt serious questions in Beijing about Kabul’s capacity to maintain security. That, in turn, will prompt still larger questions about whether Pakistan and Central Asian governments can suppress extremist groups and ideologies that may emanate from Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas and bleed across the Chinese frontier.

近几年,这四大目标已变得更为紧迫,促使北京更倾向于支持巴基斯坦。例如中国西部边界的安全问题。美国减少在阿富汗的驻军必将引起北京对喀布尔维安能力的质疑。这又将进一步引发一个更大范围的疑问,即巴基斯坦及中亚诸国政府能否镇压那些有可能从阿富汗和巴基斯坦部族地区向中国渗透的极端组织和意识形态。

Beijing also aims to use Islamabad to box out New Delhi in Afghanistan and the broader region. Thus, India’s expanding reach into East Asia is no doubt reinforcing China’s reflexive tilt toward Pakistan. Until now, India has been, at most, a third-tier Chinese strategic concern — distantly behind internal insecurity and challenges in the East Asian littoral. But India’s rapid economic growth has given it a growing strategic profile beyond South Asia. India is becoming an Asian power and a global player. It is deepening defense ties with Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam, four countries that are wary of China’s rise and also are increasingly close to the United States. And New Delhi has signed free trade agreements with South Korea, Singapore, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as a comprehensive economic partnership with Japan. As India’s strategic reach expands, a continuing rivalry with Pakistan that preoccupies its diplomacy and pulls its attention back to its own neighborhood remains a net positive for Beijing.

北京还寄希望于利用伊斯兰堡将新德里拒于阿富汗及更广阔区域之外。因此,印度在东亚的扩张无疑促使中国条件反射式地倒向巴基斯坦。在此之前,印度充其量不过是中国的第三等战略考量——远远排在国内安定与东亚沿海挑战之后。但快速成长的印度经济使其在南亚之外也形成了不断增强的战略气场。印度正成为一个亚洲强国和一支全球性力量,它与澳大利亚、日本、新加坡、越南等四个因中国崛起而备感不安的国家加强了军备联系,还与美国愈行愈近。同时,印度与韩国、新加坡及东南亚国家联盟签订了自由贸易协定,并与日本缔结了综合经济伙伴关系。在印度战略触角对外扩张之时,印巴间的持续敌对不断拖累印度外交且将印度注意力拉回本地区,对北京而言乃纯粹利好。

Through this traditional geopolitical prism, then, Beijing’s relationship with Islamabad appears unassailable. But Beijing no longer has the luxury of looking exclusively through this single lens. Increasingly, it also balances political, and especially financial, risks to its interests as well.

透过这一传统的地缘棱镜,中巴关系似乎固若金汤。但北京再也无福仅仅从这一视角观察事物,中国愈加考虑政治风险,特别是金融风险。

Chinese nationals in Pakistan have come under unprecedented attack in recent years. And Beijing is ever more sensitive to protecting those citizens — mostly engineers and other skilled workers — abroad. Libya proved a watershed in this regard because of the scope and sheer scale of the Chinese presence there. The onset of violence yielded a robust debate in China about the state’s responsibilities to its citizens overseas. Sensitive to domestic perceptions and pressures, Beijing undertook its largest ever noncombatant evacuation, removing some 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya by chartered merchant vessels, chartered and military aircraft, and overland buses. The Chinese navy also dispatched a frigate to support the operation, an unprecedented long-range operational deployment.

近年来,中国人在巴基斯坦遭受到了史无前例的袭击。而北京也从未像今天这样用心地保护海外国民(多为工程师和熟练工人)。由于中国驻员的范围和庞大规模,利比亚已成为此类事件的分水岭,当地暴乱在中国国内引发了一场关于国家对海外国民责任的激烈辩论。有感于国内民意和压力,北京实施了该国历史上最大规模的非战斗撤侨,动用包船、包机、军用机及大巴将约三万五千名中国公民撤出利比亚。中国海军也派出一艘护卫舰支援撤侨行动,这是空前的远程任务调遣。

This means that Islamabad cannot forever presume that Chinese workers and money will stay in Pakistan if those assets come under attack on a larger scale. Beijing has shown little stomach for telling Islamabad to rein in anti-India insurgent groups that operate from Pakistan, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. But those groups that have killed or kidnapped Chinese nationals are another matter. And China appears to have begun sorting and distinguishing these anti-India proxies from domestically focused groups, such as the Baloch separatists or pro-Taliban elements that could pose a more existential threat to Chinese interests. Balochistan has seen repeated attacks on Chinese nationals, including a 2004 bombing that killed three engineers working at the Gwadar port and a 2006 attack on a bus near Hub. In response to one kidnapping case, conducted by elements associated with the Lal Masjid in Islamabad, Beijing placed ferocious pressure on the Pakistan army to intervene.

这意味着伊斯兰堡不能永远指望中国工人和资金在遭受大规模袭击的危急关头仍会驻守在巴基斯坦。北京没有兴趣告诫伊斯兰堡约束处于其境内的诸如Lashkar-e-Taiba等反印叛乱组织,但对那些杀害或绑架过中国公民的组织则另当别论。中国似乎将反印组织和专门针对巴基斯坦国内的组织区分开来,例如Baloch分裂势力和塔利班支持分子等有可能危及中国利益的团伙。Baloch已多次袭击中国公民,其中包括在04年炸死三名参与建设Gwadar港的工程师及06年在Hub附近攻击一辆大巴。当与伊斯兰堡Lal Masjid有关联的势力实施一起绑架案时,北京向巴基斯坦军方施以猛烈压力,要求其予以干预。

But it is investment risks, not geopolitical or political ones, that are more likely to alter China’s long-standing calculus in Pakistan. Chinese money generally follows the flag, yet global trends suggest that Beijing is becoming vastly more sensitive to investment constraints and macroeconomic conditions. It is often taken for granted that Chinese companies can bear more risk than their Western counterparts and that Beijing will underwrite the kinds of investments from which most other governments and firms would shy away. But as China’s global reach has grown, so, too, has its economic incentive to revisit these practices.

但投资风险相较地缘或政治风险而言则更有可能改变中国对巴基斯坦的长期态度。中国资本通常紧跟政府的大旗,全球大势似乎暗示着北京对投资困境和宏观经济环境愈加敏感。人们经常想当然地认为中国公司比西方公司更能承受风险,并且北京会为那些大多数其它政府和公司望而却步的投资项目提供担保。但是,随着中国在世界范围内的触角不断延伸,重新考虑以往作法的利益驱动也变得愈发强烈。

There are, for example, intriguing parallels between China’s conundrum in Pakistan and the problem it faces in Europe. In both cases, debt-laden economies have aggressively sought to attract a portion of Beijing’s considerable stock of investment capital — its $3 trillion pool of foreign exchange reserves. But Beijing is weighing such activities against the many problems it must now manage at home. Investment in such environments has grown more difficult to sell domestically. As one pithy post put it on Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter): “Better to save [debt-burdened] Wenzhou than to rescue [debt-burdened] Europe!” And when China does invest abroad, it is under enormous pressure to ensure a positive return.

例如,中国在巴基斯坦的困境与其在欧洲遇到的问题有微妙的相似之处。两个被债务缠身的经济体正积极争取北京可观的投资资本:高达三万亿美元的外汇储备。但北京正将这些活动(按:指对外投资)与国内诸多问题的处理相权衡。在此环境下的对外投资愈发难以说服国内民众,正如微博(中国版推特)上一帖子精辟地指出:"救欧洲不如救温州!"中国在海外投资时,必须有所斩获的压力极大。

So it matters more than ever that Pakistan faces an array of economic constraints, including a debt-to-GDP ratio that crossed 60 percent in 2010; painful debt service obligations to its creditors; a large fiscal deficit; double-digit inflation; a depreciating rupee; a trade deficit worsened by high global commodity prices; and above all, the lack of a credible growth strategy. Chinese financiers will be increasingly skeptical of the returns on investment into such an economy. And here, too, domestic politics come into play. Most of China’s population has been left out of the growth miracle of the reform era, and the resultant income and development gap is economically and politically unsustainable. To address the problem, Beijing has been trying to redistribute resources to less wealthy inland provinces that are increasingly important to political stability. Road and infrastructure construction in Pakistan, as well as a bilateral free trade agreement, are tied to Beijing’s effort to develop these regions. But these projects will increasingly need to meet higher expectations for returns than did China’s traditional low-strings approach to aid.

因此,巴基斯坦面临一系列经济困难的事实比以往更为紧要:2010年巴基斯坦债务占到GDP的60%、周转债务的巨痛、大量财政赤字、两位数的通涨、正在贬值的卢比、因国际原材料涨价而恶化的逆差、最重要的是缺乏可信的经济增长策略。中国金融家们会日渐质疑向这样的经济体投资的回报前景。此外,中国国内政治也前来搅局,大多数中国人口被改革时期的增长奇迹抛在一旁,由此产生的收入和发展鸿沟无论在经济上或政治上都无法持续。为应对这一问题,北京已试图将资源再分配到对政治稳定日渐重要的内陆落后省份。在巴基斯坦修建公路和其它基础设施,以及双边自由贸易协定均与中国內陆的发展挂钩。但与中国传统的低附加条件不同,这些项目将不得不满足高涨的回报预期。

All this means that China’s calculus in Pakistan is becoming more diverse. The central question will be the extent to which political, and especially investment, risks begin to complicate the straightforward geopolitical calculus that has long yielded a remarkable intimacy between Beijing and Islamabad.

这一切意味着中国在巴基斯坦的考量不再铁板一块。核心问题是对于政治风险尤其是投资风险的考虑会在多大程度上影响简单的、长期以来促进中巴交好的地缘关系考量。

To be sure, Beijing is too strategically tied to Pakistan — and too timid in its diplomacy, in any case — to off-load an erstwhile ally. But China is unlikely to be such an accommodating patron, either. Thus, it will prove less willing to fund the ambitious infrastructure development schemes Islamabad favors. And what is more, the scope and scale of future Chinese economic activity will not, in itself, produce rapid, sustained, and balanced Pakistani growth. In the long term, economic interaction with India — the restoration of traditional regional ties and natural economic affinities in the subcontinent — will almost certainly be more decisive.

诚然,北京在战略上与巴基斯坦联系密切而且中国外交过于腼腆,以至于在任何情况下都不会抛弃过去的战友。但中国也不大可能成为一个百依百顺的金主。因此,中国将不情愿为伊斯兰堡所钟爱的宏大基础建设买单。此外,中国未来经济活动的范围和规模将不会独力造就一个高速的、可持续的和均衡的巴基斯坦成长期。从长远来看,印巴经济互动——区域传统纽带及次大陆天然经济亲好的恢复——对于巴基斯坦成长几乎是决定性的。

The bottom line is that China will not simply “bail out” Pakistan with loans, investment, and new untied aid, as commentators watching the deterioration of relations between the United States and Pakistan seem to expect. Rather, China’s involvement in the country will closely reflect Beijing’s own priorities and evolving risk assessments.

底线是,与目睹美巴交恶的评论家们所预测的不同,中国将不会简单地运用贷款、投资和无条件援助来"拯救"巴基斯坦。相反地,中国在巴投资将紧密地反映北京的轻重缓急和不断演进的风险评估。

For its part, the United States, which has failed to induce greater Chinese “pressure” on Islamabad, may be able to take advantage of China’s new calculus to pursue complementary approaches focused on economics and finance. Countervailing interests, including China’s effort to hedge against a growing U.S.-Indian partnership, will continue to obstruct strategic coordination between the United States and China in Pakistan, especially on anti-India and Kashmir-focused militant groups. But the more the two countries’ economic threat assessments converge, the more Beijing and Washington should be able to turn a shared but abstract interest in Pakistan’s “stability” into more complementary policies.

美国劝说中国向巴施加更大压力的努力已告失败,对于美国而言,它或许可以利用中国的新考量来寻求注重于经济和金融的、相辅相成的策略。中美相互抵触的利益——包括中国旨在抵销美印伙伴关系的努力——仍将阻碍中美在巴基斯坦问题上联手,尤其是那些针对印度和喀什米尔地区的武装组织。但是,中美两国在经济风险评估上的交集越大,北京与华盛顿就越有可能将它们在巴基斯坦共同的但却抽象的利益,即"稳定",转化成相辅相成的策略。

《外交事务》链接http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ar ... -pakistan-conundrum

China’s Pakistan Conundrum

中国的巴基斯坦谜题

The End of the All-Weather Friendship
全天候友谊的终结

原文作者Evan A. Feigenbaum,于01年至09年任美国副助理国务卿,负责中亚、南亚事务。

China is often called an “all-weather friend” to Pakistan — a strategic partner, a reliable source of trade and aid, and Islamabad’s closest military ally. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has described the friendship between the two countries as “higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey.” In September, he told the visiting Chinese Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, “Your friends are our friends,” continuing, “your enemies are our enemies, and your security is our security.”

中国常被称为巴基斯坦的"全天候朋友"——一名战略伙伴、可信赖的贸易与援助源泉、伊斯兰堡最亲密的军事盟友。巴基斯坦首相Yousef Raza Gilani 曾将两国间的友谊形容为"比山还高、比海还深、比钢还强、比蜜还甜"。九月份,他向到访的中国公安部长孟 建柱表示:"你们的朋友就是我们的朋友,你们的敌人就是我们的敌人,你们的安全就是我们的安全。"

But do things look so straightforward when viewed from Beijing? To be sure, Chinese money pours into places Western cash fears to tread. But Beijing is not oblivious to risk. In fact, Chinese money flows disproportionately to investments that carry little to no risk and deliver returns that, however modest, are predictable. Moreover, at least some Chinese companies have proved willing to abandon investments as their perception of risk has risen. In September, for example, Kingho, a large private Chinese miner, is reported to have abandoned a proposed $19 billion investment to build a coal mine and power and chemical plants in Pakistan’s Sindh province after reassessing the investment and security environment.

但在北京的眼里事情就这么简单吗?诚然,中国资金蜂拥至西方资本不敢涉足之处,但北京对风险并非无动于衷。事实上,中国资金绝大部分流向低风险或零风险的投资项目,无论收益如何微薄,回报总是可预期的。此外,在感到风险増加时,至少有一部分中国公司情愿放弃投资。例如,中国大型矿业私企Kingho据称在对投资与安全环境进行重新评估之后,于今年九月放弃一个位于巴基斯坦Sindh省的、高达190亿美元的煤矿、电力及化工厂拟议投资项目。

Indeed, Beijing’s investment calculus is increasingly based on a sophisticated balancing of three types of risk: geopolitical, political, and financial.

确实,北京的投资考虑正日益建立在对三类风险进行综合权衡的基础之上:地缘、政治、金融。

Geopolitical risk (not least China’s rivalry with India) has long led Beijing to support Islamabad through thick and thin. Friendly ties between the two help satisfy four Chinese strategic objectives: They ensure security and stability in China’s western provinces and along its continental Asian border; anchor China’s poorer western provinces in a web of cross-border economic activity; bottle up India in the subcontinent, forestalling the emergence of a continental-sized rival and precluding more extensive Indian security activities in East Asia; and assure that no other major power, particularly the United States, advances its interests in continental Asia at China’s expense through, for instance, military deployments or permanent access arrangements.

地缘风险(不仅仅限于中印之争)让北京对伊斯兰堡的支持始终不渝。中巴友好有助于实现中方四大战略目标:确保中国西部省份及其与亚洲大陆邻国交界地区的安全稳定;将中国西部贫困省份纳入国际经济活动网络;将印度遏制于亚洲次大陆,扼制一个大陆级别敌手的崛起,并防止印度在东亚有更大的安全动作;确保其它强国(尤其是美国)不能通过驻军、永久进入权等手段在亚洲大陆扩张、损及中国利益。

In recent years, these four objectives have become ever more pressing, reinforcing Beijing’s inclination to support Pakistan. Take the issue of securing China’s western border. The drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan will, unavoidably, prompt serious questions in Beijing about Kabul’s capacity to maintain security. That, in turn, will prompt still larger questions about whether Pakistan and Central Asian governments can suppress extremist groups and ideologies that may emanate from Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas and bleed across the Chinese frontier.

近几年,这四大目标已变得更为紧迫,促使北京更倾向于支持巴基斯坦。例如中国西部边界的安全问题。美国减少在阿富汗的驻军必将引起北京对喀布尔维安能力的质疑。这又将进一步引发一个更大范围的疑问,即巴基斯坦及中亚诸国政府能否镇压那些有可能从阿富汗和巴基斯坦部族地区向中国渗透的极端组织和意识形态。

Beijing also aims to use Islamabad to box out New Delhi in Afghanistan and the broader region. Thus, India’s expanding reach into East Asia is no doubt reinforcing China’s reflexive tilt toward Pakistan. Until now, India has been, at most, a third-tier Chinese strategic concern — distantly behind internal insecurity and challenges in the East Asian littoral. But India’s rapid economic growth has given it a growing strategic profile beyond South Asia. India is becoming an Asian power and a global player. It is deepening defense ties with Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam, four countries that are wary of China’s rise and also are increasingly close to the United States. And New Delhi has signed free trade agreements with South Korea, Singapore, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as a comprehensive economic partnership with Japan. As India’s strategic reach expands, a continuing rivalry with Pakistan that preoccupies its diplomacy and pulls its attention back to its own neighborhood remains a net positive for Beijing.

北京还寄希望于利用伊斯兰堡将新德里拒于阿富汗及更广阔区域之外。因此,印度在东亚的扩张无疑促使中国条件反射式地倒向巴基斯坦。在此之前,印度充其量不过是中国的第三等战略考量——远远排在国内安定与东亚沿海挑战之后。但快速成长的印度经济使其在南亚之外也形成了不断增强的战略气场。印度正成为一个亚洲强国和一支全球性力量,它与澳大利亚、日本、新加坡、越南等四个因中国崛起而备感不安的国家加强了军备联系,还与美国愈行愈近。同时,印度与韩国、新加坡及东南亚国家联盟签订了自由贸易协定,并与日本缔结了综合经济伙伴关系。在印度战略触角对外扩张之时,印巴间的持续敌对不断拖累印度外交且将印度注意力拉回本地区,对北京而言乃纯粹利好。

Through this traditional geopolitical prism, then, Beijing’s relationship with Islamabad appears unassailable. But Beijing no longer has the luxury of looking exclusively through this single lens. Increasingly, it also balances political, and especially financial, risks to its interests as well.

透过这一传统的地缘棱镜,中巴关系似乎固若金汤。但北京再也无福仅仅从这一视角观察事物,中国愈加考虑政治风险,特别是金融风险。

Chinese nationals in Pakistan have come under unprecedented attack in recent years. And Beijing is ever more sensitive to protecting those citizens — mostly engineers and other skilled workers — abroad. Libya proved a watershed in this regard because of the scope and sheer scale of the Chinese presence there. The onset of violence yielded a robust debate in China about the state’s responsibilities to its citizens overseas. Sensitive to domestic perceptions and pressures, Beijing undertook its largest ever noncombatant evacuation, removing some 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya by chartered merchant vessels, chartered and military aircraft, and overland buses. The Chinese navy also dispatched a frigate to support the operation, an unprecedented long-range operational deployment.

近年来,中国人在巴基斯坦遭受到了史无前例的袭击。而北京也从未像今天这样用心地保护海外国民(多为工程师和熟练工人)。由于中国驻员的范围和庞大规模,利比亚已成为此类事件的分水岭,当地暴乱在中国国内引发了一场关于国家对海外国民责任的激烈辩论。有感于国内民意和压力,北京实施了该国历史上最大规模的非战斗撤侨,动用包船、包机、军用机及大巴将约三万五千名中国公民撤出利比亚。中国海军也派出一艘护卫舰支援撤侨行动,这是空前的远程任务调遣。

This means that Islamabad cannot forever presume that Chinese workers and money will stay in Pakistan if those assets come under attack on a larger scale. Beijing has shown little stomach for telling Islamabad to rein in anti-India insurgent groups that operate from Pakistan, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. But those groups that have killed or kidnapped Chinese nationals are another matter. And China appears to have begun sorting and distinguishing these anti-India proxies from domestically focused groups, such as the Baloch separatists or pro-Taliban elements that could pose a more existential threat to Chinese interests. Balochistan has seen repeated attacks on Chinese nationals, including a 2004 bombing that killed three engineers working at the Gwadar port and a 2006 attack on a bus near Hub. In response to one kidnapping case, conducted by elements associated with the Lal Masjid in Islamabad, Beijing placed ferocious pressure on the Pakistan army to intervene.

这意味着伊斯兰堡不能永远指望中国工人和资金在遭受大规模袭击的危急关头仍会驻守在巴基斯坦。北京没有兴趣告诫伊斯兰堡约束处于其境内的诸如Lashkar-e-Taiba等反印叛乱组织,但对那些杀害或绑架过中国公民的组织则另当别论。中国似乎将反印组织和专门针对巴基斯坦国内的组织区分开来,例如Baloch分裂势力和塔利班支持分子等有可能危及中国利益的团伙。Baloch已多次袭击中国公民,其中包括在04年炸死三名参与建设Gwadar港的工程师及06年在Hub附近攻击一辆大巴。当与伊斯兰堡Lal Masjid有关联的势力实施一起绑架案时,北京向巴基斯坦军方施以猛烈压力,要求其予以干预。

But it is investment risks, not geopolitical or political ones, that are more likely to alter China’s long-standing calculus in Pakistan. Chinese money generally follows the flag, yet global trends suggest that Beijing is becoming vastly more sensitive to investment constraints and macroeconomic conditions. It is often taken for granted that Chinese companies can bear more risk than their Western counterparts and that Beijing will underwrite the kinds of investments from which most other governments and firms would shy away. But as China’s global reach has grown, so, too, has its economic incentive to revisit these practices.

但投资风险相较地缘或政治风险而言则更有可能改变中国对巴基斯坦的长期态度。中国资本通常紧跟政府的大旗,全球大势似乎暗示着北京对投资困境和宏观经济环境愈加敏感。人们经常想当然地认为中国公司比西方公司更能承受风险,并且北京会为那些大多数其它政府和公司望而却步的投资项目提供担保。但是,随着中国在世界范围内的触角不断延伸,重新考虑以往作法的利益驱动也变得愈发强烈。

There are, for example, intriguing parallels between China’s conundrum in Pakistan and the problem it faces in Europe. In both cases, debt-laden economies have aggressively sought to attract a portion of Beijing’s considerable stock of investment capital — its $3 trillion pool of foreign exchange reserves. But Beijing is weighing such activities against the many problems it must now manage at home. Investment in such environments has grown more difficult to sell domestically. As one pithy post put it on Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter): “Better to save [debt-burdened] Wenzhou than to rescue [debt-burdened] Europe!” And when China does invest abroad, it is under enormous pressure to ensure a positive return.

例如,中国在巴基斯坦的困境与其在欧洲遇到的问题有微妙的相似之处。两个被债务缠身的经济体正积极争取北京可观的投资资本:高达三万亿美元的外汇储备。但北京正将这些活动(按:指对外投资)与国内诸多问题的处理相权衡。在此环境下的对外投资愈发难以说服国内民众,正如微博(中国版推特)上一帖子精辟地指出:"救欧洲不如救温州!"中国在海外投资时,必须有所斩获的压力极大。

So it matters more than ever that Pakistan faces an array of economic constraints, including a debt-to-GDP ratio that crossed 60 percent in 2010; painful debt service obligations to its creditors; a large fiscal deficit; double-digit inflation; a depreciating rupee; a trade deficit worsened by high global commodity prices; and above all, the lack of a credible growth strategy. Chinese financiers will be increasingly skeptical of the returns on investment into such an economy. And here, too, domestic politics come into play. Most of China’s population has been left out of the growth miracle of the reform era, and the resultant income and development gap is economically and politically unsustainable. To address the problem, Beijing has been trying to redistribute resources to less wealthy inland provinces that are increasingly important to political stability. Road and infrastructure construction in Pakistan, as well as a bilateral free trade agreement, are tied to Beijing’s effort to develop these regions. But these projects will increasingly need to meet higher expectations for returns than did China’s traditional low-strings approach to aid.

因此,巴基斯坦面临一系列经济困难的事实比以往更为紧要:2010年巴基斯坦债务占到GDP的60%、周转债务的巨痛、大量财政赤字、两位数的通涨、正在贬值的卢比、因国际原材料涨价而恶化的逆差、最重要的是缺乏可信的经济增长策略。中国金融家们会日渐质疑向这样的经济体投资的回报前景。此外,中国国内政治也前来搅局,大多数中国人口被改革时期的增长奇迹抛在一旁,由此产生的收入和发展鸿沟无论在经济上或政治上都无法持续。为应对这一问题,北京已试图将资源再分配到对政治稳定日渐重要的内陆落后省份。在巴基斯坦修建公路和其它基础设施,以及双边自由贸易协定均与中国內陆的发展挂钩。但与中国传统的低附加条件不同,这些项目将不得不满足高涨的回报预期。

All this means that China’s calculus in Pakistan is becoming more diverse. The central question will be the extent to which political, and especially investment, risks begin to complicate the straightforward geopolitical calculus that has long yielded a remarkable intimacy between Beijing and Islamabad.

这一切意味着中国在巴基斯坦的考量不再铁板一块。核心问题是对于政治风险尤其是投资风险的考虑会在多大程度上影响简单的、长期以来促进中巴交好的地缘关系考量。

To be sure, Beijing is too strategically tied to Pakistan — and too timid in its diplomacy, in any case — to off-load an erstwhile ally. But China is unlikely to be such an accommodating patron, either. Thus, it will prove less willing to fund the ambitious infrastructure development schemes Islamabad favors. And what is more, the scope and scale of future Chinese economic activity will not, in itself, produce rapid, sustained, and balanced Pakistani growth. In the long term, economic interaction with India — the restoration of traditional regional ties and natural economic affinities in the subcontinent — will almost certainly be more decisive.

诚然,北京在战略上与巴基斯坦联系密切而且中国外交过于腼腆,以至于在任何情况下都不会抛弃过去的战友。但中国也不大可能成为一个百依百顺的金主。因此,中国将不情愿为伊斯兰堡所钟爱的宏大基础建设买单。此外,中国未来经济活动的范围和规模将不会独力造就一个高速的、可持续的和均衡的巴基斯坦成长期。从长远来看,印巴经济互动——区域传统纽带及次大陆天然经济亲好的恢复——对于巴基斯坦成长几乎是决定性的。

The bottom line is that China will not simply “bail out” Pakistan with loans, investment, and new untied aid, as commentators watching the deterioration of relations between the United States and Pakistan seem to expect. Rather, China’s involvement in the country will closely reflect Beijing’s own priorities and evolving risk assessments.

底线是,与目睹美巴交恶的评论家们所预测的不同,中国将不会简单地运用贷款、投资和无条件援助来"拯救"巴基斯坦。相反地,中国在巴投资将紧密地反映北京的轻重缓急和不断演进的风险评估。

For its part, the United States, which has failed to induce greater Chinese “pressure” on Islamabad, may be able to take advantage of China’s new calculus to pursue complementary approaches focused on economics and finance. Countervailing interests, including China’s effort to hedge against a growing U.S.-Indian partnership, will continue to obstruct strategic coordination between the United States and China in Pakistan, especially on anti-India and Kashmir-focused militant groups. But the more the two countries’ economic threat assessments converge, the more Beijing and Washington should be able to turn a shared but abstract interest in Pakistan’s “stability” into more complementary policies.

美国劝说中国向巴施加更大压力的努力已告失败,对于美国而言,它或许可以利用中国的新考量来寻求注重于经济和金融的、相辅相成的策略。中美相互抵触的利益——包括中国旨在抵销美印伙伴关系的努力——仍将阻碍中美在巴基斯坦问题上联手,尤其是那些针对印度和喀什米尔地区的武装组织。但是,中美两国在经济风险评估上的交集越大,北京与华盛顿就越有可能将它们在巴基斯坦共同的但却抽象的利益,即"稳定",转化成相辅相成的策略。

《外交事务》链接http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ar ... -pakistan-conundrum
好文好真相
好长的文章啊,楼主辛苦
美国的意思是,巴基斯坦兄弟遭难了,酒肉朋友都应该纷纷退散了。
问题是,中国跟巴基斯坦是真兄弟,不是酒肉朋友。
私货太多,以至于文不对题
难得的好文章  LZ翻译辛苦
把中国换成美国可能更合适
一个以误炸威胁别的国家的MD评论文章真是狗屁不通。
我发现不论是国内还是国外,这种文章一般都是先扔个惊悚的大标题,然后东拉西扯、云遮雾罩,到最后驴唇不对马嘴,你都不知道他到底想说什么。吐糟不能。
美国劝说中国向巴施加更大压力的努力已告失败

按照小学语文老师教我的方法,我终于找出了全文的中心思想,就是上面这一句。其他的文字都是对这一句的感想... ...
没看明白是啥意思。
其实说白了,朋友归朋友,利益上面还是得说清楚,这没什么不好。

所以,归根到底这文章还是标题党。
falqs50 发表于 2011-12-31 13:11
美国劝说中国向巴施加更大压力的努力已告失败

按照小学语文老师教我的方法,我终于找出了全文的中心思想 ...
兄弟高见,看得晕乎乎的哦宛如醍醐灌顶......
20121212 发表于 2011-12-31 12:39
好文好真相
好身材好头像
没有标题党吧,这文章挺中肯的啊,和巴基斯坦发展平等互利、友好合作的外交关系才符合中国的长远利益嘛
这篇文章是写给米国内部看的…核心观点是,土鳖越来越重视对外援助的各种风险评估,以及在这种情况下米国外交的策略……
非常好的一篇文章,无脑贬低对手没有任何用处…
典型的误把期望当现实
CD需要去除些浮躁的气氛…整天小白兔腹黑威武…真要处处腹黑威武,也不会有今天这么多问题…
这文章私货太多了。
搞半天也说不出个啥。

中巴肯定是长期的战略伙伴,只要印度一天不死,中巴就站一条线

falqs50 发表于 2011-12-31 13:11
美国劝说中国向巴施加更大压力的努力已告失败

按照小学语文老师教我的方法,我终于找出了全文的中心思想 ...


从长远来看,印巴经济互动——区域传统纽带及次大陆天然经济亲好的恢复——对于巴基斯坦成长几乎是决定性的。

美帝在兜售希拉里版本的新丝绸之路:印度--巴基斯坦--阿富汗--伊朗/中亚--土耳其--地中海。

按目前的地缘格局,这是一条货真价实的自虐之路。
falqs50 发表于 2011-12-31 13:11
美国劝说中国向巴施加更大压力的努力已告失败

按照小学语文老师教我的方法,我终于找出了全文的中心思想 ...


从长远来看,印巴经济互动——区域传统纽带及次大陆天然经济亲好的恢复——对于巴基斯坦成长几乎是决定性的。

美帝在兜售希拉里版本的新丝绸之路:印度--巴基斯坦--阿富汗--伊朗/中亚--土耳其--地中海。

按目前的地缘格局,这是一条货真价实的自虐之路。
算是不同的视角的中巴关系!
LZ翻译辛苦
这篇文章不是说巴基斯坦的,而是以巴和利为例子,说明土鳖外交风格在转变,以及在这种转变下米国外交的对策……这本期刊本来就是面对米国国内,不是对外宣传挑拨的脑残文……
米地瓜写的,懒得看了。
作者的身份决定此文的重要价值。
中国外交过于腼腆,以至于在任何情况下都不会抛弃过去的战友。  这是赞扬国人讲义气呢,还是批评我国政策不够灵活呢。。。确实,西方那种前一分钟还称兄道弟、后一分钟就开片的变脸技能我国还真是学不来啊。。。
不就是说中国已经彻底抛弃了以往的冤大头式经济援助罢了……即使是对最有价值的战略盟友……
不过作者考虑中缺乏了一点,就是现在中国的经济援助投资对其战略盟友(例如朝鲜)都是存在一条底线的,即确保其经济生存能力。
MD想从小巴破局,中国压力很大。挑拨离间
a19881919 发表于 2011-12-31 13:55
中国外交过于腼腆,以至于在任何情况下都不会抛弃过去的战友。  这是赞扬国人讲义气呢,还是批评我国政策不 ...
哈哈,毛子、猴子压力很大
gohorse 发表于 2011-12-31 13:59
哈哈,毛子、猴子压力很大
比起西方对老卡的变脸速度。。。国人该惭愧啊,皿煮国家果然厚黑。。。
zhzq1 发表于 2011-12-31 13:41
这篇文章不是说巴基斯坦的,而是以巴和利为例子,说明土鳖外交风格在转变,以及在这种转变下米国外交的对策 ...
外交  杂志的作者很多都是现在的高官和潜在的高官【美国的官学经转换门】
以后不会出现对越南,对阿尔巴尼亚一样的无条件的援助~~~是好事儿啊
我看了第一句就没往下看了  拉倒吧
很无聊
LZ翻译辛苦了。中巴关系,各方均有利益判断并依此指导自己的行动。
典型的西方人思维,他们不懂中国的底蕴。
zhzq1 发表于 2011-12-31 13:28
这篇文章是写给米国内部看的…核心观点是,土鳖越来越重视对外援助的各种风险评估,以及在这种情况下米国外 ...

有些文章还得看它写在什么时间的,12月4日, 真是不早不晚刚刚好啊...
全天候友谊的终结

踏浪逐辰 发表于 2011-12-31 14:06
以后不会出现对越南,对阿尔巴尼亚一样的无条件的援助~~~是好事儿啊
世界的明灯
因为我们有共同的敌人“印度”!