【原创翻译】1982年黎巴嫩战争中的叙利亚坦克猎手

译者按：这篇文章是一篇比较老的反映1982年黎巴嫩战争的文章，来自ACIG.org archives网站，早先曾经被国内多家知名军事期刊发掘并翻译转载，在北京出版的《兵器》杂志2010年12月号还发表以该文为基础，作者署名“远懿”的《贝卡谷地坦克战》一文。
由于国内对于1982年黎巴嫩战争仍然缺乏相关的外文研究资料，因此这篇文章对国内军事爱好者们来说目前依然有重要的参考价值，所以笔者尝试翻译此文，仅供感兴趣的军事爱好者参考。

另外，特别感谢sc论坛“观星者”网友提供原文链接。

译文：

Syrian-Tank-Hunter in Lebanon,1982
1982年黎巴嫩战争中的叙利亚坦克猎手
One of little-known aspects of the Lebanon War, fought between Israel, PLO, and Syria, in June 1982, was a complex anti-tank battle fought by helicopters of both sides. While at least some details about Israeli attack helicopters were published ever since, almost nothing is known about the Syrians, regardless how interesting and innovative some their tactics was.
了解一点黎巴嫩战争常识的人都知道，1982年6月发生在以色列、巴解组织、叙利亚之间的战斗，一场复杂的反坦克战来自双方的直升机，当少数一些有关以色列武装直升机在战争中的细节早早被披露，叙利亚的方面的情况却鲜为人知，无论如何，它们某些战术是创新和有趣的。
Syrian Attack Helicopters
In the early 1980s the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) operated one brigade with four squadrons of SA.342L/M Gazelles (976, 977, 988, and an unknown unit – probably 989 Sqn), and one wing of three squadrons equipped with Mi-25s (765, 766, and 767). Both brigades had units based at Marj al-Sultan and al-Jdaydeh airfields, but part of Mi-24s was permanently deployed to Sueda AB as well.
叙利亚武装直升机
在1980年代的早期叙利亚阿拉伯空军有一个旅下辖4个中队SA.342L“小羚羊”直升机，（976、977、988，和一个不明单位的989中队）还有一个旅有三个配备mi-25s的中队（第765、766、767中队），两个旅的基地分别位于Marj al-Sultan 和 al-Jdaydeh机场，但部分mi-24s长期作为预备队部署在sueda.
Syria was a relatively new operator of combat helicopters, having obtained the first 18 French-built Aérospatiale SA.342 Gazelles only in 1977, in response to Israeli acquisition of Bell AH-1 Cobras. These 18 Gazelles entered service with the 976 Attack Helicopter Squadron, based at al-Jdaydeh AB, and were originally equipped with AS.12 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Later on, additional SA.342s were supplied, enabling the SyAAF to organize a full brigade of three squadrons, and one unit used for liaison and cooperation with police. Also supplied to Syria by France were HOT ATGMs. HOT is essentially a French-German equivalent to the US-made TOW, this designation actually standing for “Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube” – or “high-subsonic optical remote-guided fired from a tube”, with semi-automatic command-to-line of sight (SACLOS) guidance, with guidance inputs being transferred via a thin wire connecting the missile with the helicopter. As delivered to Syrians, the HOT was considered one of the most advanced ATGMs world-wide, claimed as capable of penetrating 700mm of steel armour at 0° and 288mm armour at 65°. The missile was delivered in tubes, of which each Gazelle could carry four, mounted on stubs behind the cockpit.
叙利亚比较新式的武装直升机，在1977年已获得第一批18架法国宇航公司制造的SA.342L“小羚羊”直升机，以对付以色列购买的贝尔AH-1眼镜蛇武装直升机，这批“小羚羊”配属给第976攻击直升机中队，基地位于al-Jdaydeh机场，原本配备AS-12反坦克导弹，稍后，额外的SA.342S到货，可动用叙利亚空军一个包括三个中队的满编旅，以及一个和警方共同联络合作的部队，同时提供法制“霍特”反坦克导弹，“霍特”是由法国和德国联合研制的，与美制“陶”式反坦克导弹相当，这其实是指“Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube”-或者“高亚音速光学制导发射筒”，采取半自动目视导线制导方式(SACLOS)引导，指令通过导线传送给机载导弹，作为交付给叙利亚人的“霍特”，被认为是当时世界上最先进的反坦克导弹之一，据称能以0°法线角击穿700mm的钢装甲，或者以65°法线角击穿288 mm的钢装甲。导弹存储在发射筒交付，每架“小羚羊”能够携带4枚，安装在驾驶舱后根部。
Given that SyAAF purchased no Western-built aircraft or helicopters already since the late 1950s, the acquisition of Gazelles was quite surprising for many observers in the West. But, the fact was that this deal came as a result of Saudi efforts to orient as many Arab states towards West as possible, as well as Soviet inability to supply the number of Mil Mi-24 (ASCC-Code “Hind”) helicopters required by Syria. The Soviets needed any Hind they could get at the time for their units based in East Germany. Nevertheless, once the French started delivering Gazelles to Syria, the Soviets followed the suit, and in spring of 1981 the first squadron of four - later to rise to 12 - Mi-25s was organized at al-Mezzeh AB, near Damascus, followed by another unit, then based in al-Ladahiqiyah. The Mi-25 was considered a “monkey” version of the Mi-24, a downgraded variant supplied to “less reliable” customers. Its main anti-tank armament was the 9M17 Skorpion from the Falanga family of ATGMs (ASCC-Code “AT-2 Swatter”). This was a relatively primitive but simple ATGM with MCLOS radio-guidance. Each Mi-25 could mount four Swatters on launch rails mounted bellow wing-tips. The AT-2 was supplied in several variants, of which the B was sold to Syria. This version could reach targets out to a range of 3.500m, and had a claimed capability of armour penetration of over 500mm at 0°. Arabic Mi-25-pilots in generaly considered it useless, foremost because of its poor reliability. In addition, the Mi-25 was equipped with the YakB-12,7 machine-gun, mounted in a barbette underneath the front cockpit, as well as UB-32-57 rocket launchers for unguided rockets.

鉴于叙利亚阿拉伯空军在1950年代后期以来没有购买过西方制造的固定翼飞机或直升机，因此购买“小羚羊”在西方观察家看来十分意外，但实际上，作为这项交易的努力的后果，沙特阿拉伯最大可能的促进了阿拉伯国家的团结，同时由于苏联无力提供叙利亚所要求的具有同等性能Mi-24直升机，他们需要优先保证他们在东德的基地，不过，一旦法国开始向叙利亚提供“小羚羊”，苏联会紧随其后，在1981年的春季，第一个4架编制的mi-25s中队，（后来增至12架）被部署在al-Mezzeh机场，在首都大马士革附近还部署有另一个单位，当时基地设在al-Ladahiqiyah，mi-25被认为是mi-24的“猴”版（或称简化版），一类低档版被提供给“不可靠”的用户，它的主要反坦克武器是9M17“Skorpion”，来自Falanga家族的反坦克导弹，（北约绰号AT-2”蝇拍”），这是一种相对落后但却简单的反坦克导弹，采取无线电指令制导，每架mi-25能够携带4枚”蝇拍”，在发射导轨上接受指令提示，AT-2包括几种改进型，其中“B”型被出售给叙利亚，这种型号有效射程为3500m,有说法称其能以0°法线角击穿超过500mm的钢装甲，但一般驾驶mi-25的阿拉伯飞行员不相信这种说法，首先是因为它的可靠性差。另外，mi-25配备了yak-B12.7mm机枪，安装在座舱下方的炮塔内，其他武备包括多联装32mm或57mm无制导火箭发射器。
After closely monitoring the Iraqi experiences with Mi-25s, the Syrians relatively early dropped the use of AT-2 almost completely, and were arming their Mi-25s with machine-guns and unguided rockets, or bombs only. For various reasons that stood in no relation directly to the SyAAF, the introduction of Gazelles and Mi-25s in service with SyAAF was not entirely complete by spring of 1982. In fact, eventually the Syrian Hinds were not to see any kind of combat service during the fighting against Israelis. Consequently, although there is a number of reports of the contrary – especially in the Russian and Ukrainian, but also in specialized Western publications - the SyAAF Mi-25s did not fly even a single combat sortie in 1982: when it comes to the SyAAF anti-tank operations Gazelles fought almost alone.
在密切关注了mi-25在伊拉克的使用经验之后，叙利亚人很早就放弃了使用AT-2，并为他们的mi-25s安装了机枪和火箭发射器，还有炸弹，这些情况对叙利亚空军没有多少影响，引进“小羚羊”和mi-25s的任务在1982年春天没能够完全完成，实际上，最终叙利亚没能看到它们在与以色列战争中的每一次战斗中都出场，因此，虽然存在某些相反的报告---尤其是来自俄罗斯和乌克兰的，但在西方的专门出版物中，在1982年叙利亚的mi-25s却无法战斗执勤甚至没有一个战例，叙利亚空军的反坦克作战中“小羚羊”几乎是单独作战。

Hunter-Killer Tactics
By early 1982 the Syrians were expecting some kind of a new Israeli operation in southern Lebanon. Their commanders calculated that the IDF would most likely launch an attack similar to the Operation “Litani”, from 1978, when the Israelis drove only some 40km deep into Lebanon in a search for Palestinian terrorists. However, the Syrians knew that in the case the Israelis would not stop on the Litani River a major clash with IDF was inevitable. Yet, with most of Syrian Army important units being deployed either along the Golan Heights or in Damascus, and given the burden of sustaining a sizeable force inside Lebanon already since 1976, as well as because of their commitment in the local civil war, Damascus lacked assets and space to build a strong front-line stretching over whole width of Lebanon. In fact, by early June 1982 the majority of Syrian units in Lebanon was deployed in centre of the country, between Beirut and Zahle, with established defences only around specific points of interest - along the highway Beirut-Damascus, and especially in the area of the village of as-Sultan Yac'ub at Tanta.
猎杀者的战术
1982年初，叙利亚期待以色列在南黎巴嫩的新行动，他们的指挥者估计以色列国防军将发起一次类似1978年“利塔尼”行动的进攻，当时以军仅仅因为搜索巴勒斯坦恐怖分子而开进了黎巴嫩境内纵深大约40km,然而，叙利亚人清楚，他们将不可避免的在利塔尼河一线与以军发生大规模的冲突，为此，许多叙利亚精锐部队沿戈兰高地至大马士革一线部署；而自从1976年以来，叙利亚便在黎巴嫩驻扎着相当数量的部队，这是由于他们介入黎巴嫩内战的承诺，大马士革缺少金钱和空间建设一条强大的前线以涵盖整个黎巴嫩，实际上，在1982年的6月初，多数叙利亚部队部署在这个国家的中部，在贝鲁特和扎赫勒之间，建立防御仅围绕着具体的问题沿戈兰—贝鲁特—大马士革一线，特别在坦塔的as-Sultan Yac'ub一带的乡村地区。
Studying the local terrain, roads, dozens of villages in southern Lebanon and possible routes along which the Israelis could approach, the Syrians developed simple but effective tactics. This called for co-ordination between SyAAF helicopters and specially trained “hunter-killer teams” of the Syrian Army. The aim was to ambush and tie down Israeli mechanized formations by ground-forces, preferably at short range and within urban areas, and then hit them by attack helicopters that would approach using local hilly terrain.
研究该地区的地形、道路、南黎巴嫩的数十个村庄和以色列能够采用可能的途径，叙利亚制定了简单但有效的策略，这就是叙利亚直升机和受过专门训练的叙利亚陆军的“猎杀小组”协调一致，目的是凭借地面部队伏击和牵制以色列的装甲部队，最好在近距离和城市地区，然后凭借当地的丘陵地形用武装直升机攻击以军。
By early June 1982 the SA had the whole 20 Commando Battalion with a total of 50 hunter-killer teams deployed in Lebanon, mainly in the areas south and west of Beirut, but also in eastern and southern suburbs of the city. Each of Syrian teams consisted of between four and six men, armed with some of the best Western and Soviet anti-tank weapons of the time, including RPG-7s, RPG-18s (disposable 64 mm antitank rocket launcher), AT-4 Spigot ATGMs (only early-production 9P135 units), and MILAN ATGMs from France. Usually there were two shooters and two loaders in each team. Every six-man team had two additional members equipped with SA-7 MANPADS. Syrian anti-tank troops were older, more experienced soldiers of the SA, showing strong military skills and determination, and were later described by the Israelis as having a very professional attitude towards their mission. They operated with predilection in urban areas, where narrow streets of Lebanese towns and villages could easily be turned into shooting galleries for Israeli tanks.
在1982年6月初，叙利亚陆军有合计20个突击营与总共50个猎杀小组部署在黎巴嫩，主要分布在西贝鲁特及其以南地区，但在城市的西郊与南郊也有部署，每个叙利亚猎杀小组包括4-6人，拥有当时西方和苏联最好的反坦克武器，包括RPG-7s，RPG-18s（一次性使用的64mm反坦克火箭发射器），AT-4“塞子”反坦克导弹（仅有早期生产的9P-135型号）和来自法国的“米兰”反坦克导弹，通常在每个小组有两名射手和两名装填手，每个6人小组配备2名携带SA-7便携式防空导弹的成员，叙利亚反坦克小组都是老兵，有很多经验的士兵
流露出较强的军事素养和战斗意志，战后以色列人描述他们对他们的任务有着专业的态度，他们偏爱在城区出击，因为黎巴嫩城镇与乡村狭窄的街道能够轻而易举的变成攻击以色列坦克的射击场。
Of conventional fighting forces the major Syrian units in Lebanon were the 10th and the 3rd Armoured Divisions. The 10th Armoured Division was deployed south of the Beirtu-Damascus road, and inside Beirut, and consisted of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades – equipped with T-62s and BMP-1s – and the 85th Mechanized Brigade, equipped with T-55s and BTR-60s. This division was in control of the 20 Commando Battalion as well. The 3rd Armoured Division included the 58th Mechanized Brigade and the 62nd Brigade, as well as two armoured brigades with T-62 tanks. This unit controlled an additional Commando Battalion, and defended the Beirut-Damascus road, as well as three SAM-brigades with a total of 19 SAM-sites, deployed mainly in the area near Zahle, along the Syrian border.
叙利亚在黎巴嫩的主要作战部队是第10和第3装甲师，第10装甲师部署在拜耳图-大马士革公路以南，在贝鲁特，包括76和第91装甲旅—装备t-62s坦克和BMP-1s步兵战车，以及第85机械化旅，装备t-55s坦克和BTR-60s装甲输送车。第10装甲师负责指挥第20突击营，第3 装甲师包括第58机械化旅和第62旅，以及2个装备T-62坦克的装甲旅，这支部队控制另一个突击营，负责防守贝鲁特-大马士革公路，还有总计拥有19个SAM导弹营的3个SAM导弹旅，沿着叙利亚边境部署在扎赫勒附近。
The Three Days Battle: Day One, 8 June
The war actually began already on 1 June 1982, with massive Israeli air strikes against PLO bases and ammunition depots along the Mediterranean coast. On the ground, however, the Israelis drove into southern Lebanon only around 11:00hrs of 6 June.
三日战役：第一天，6月8日
实际上，战争在1982年6月1日已经开始，以色列大规模空袭地中海沿岸的巴解基地和弹药库，不过，在地面，以色列军队直到6月6日上午11时才开进南黎巴嫩。

For Syrian troops stationed in the country, however, the fighting began two days later, near Jazzin, in central Lebanon, as the IDF Task Force Vardi – a specially configured task force under command of Brig.Gen. Danni Vardi, the task of which was to take Jazzin and then push north along the eastern side of Lake Qaroun towards the Beirut-Damascus highway – attacked positions of the 76th Syrian Tank Brigade.
因为叙利亚军队驻扎在黎巴嫩，然而，战斗在两天后才开始，在黎巴嫩中部的杰津附近，作为以色列国防军vardi特遣队---一支在巴拉克.丹尼.瓦迪指挥下的特别部队，任务是拿下杰津，然后向北沿着可卡鲁恩湖的西岸向贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路推进---攻击叙利亚第76坦克旅。
While Vardi's force opened the attack on the 76th Brigade, in his rear Brig.Gen. Menachem Einan’s 162 Ugda was moving along narrow roads from south towards south-west, passing Jazzin with objective Beit en-Din, in the Shouf Mountains. Hampered by several massive traffic jams and fuel shortages Einan had experienced massive difficulties in organizing his movement so far and now his problems were to increase by a magnitude: shortly after 14:00hrs, the two lead columns of his unit that travelled on two parallel roads opened fire at each other in a case of mistaken identity. The results of this clash remain unknown, but it took Einan at least an hour to solve the chaos.
当vardi特遣队开始进攻叙利亚第76装甲旅时，在其后方的贝尔格.梅纳赫姆.埃南的162师级战斗队，沿着狭窄的道路向从南向西南方向推进，经过杰津前往目标Beit en-Din，在舒夫山脉，埃南的162师级战斗队受阻于交通拥堵和燃料短缺，他在组织调动方面遇到了很大的困难，他的麻烦增加了，稍后在14:00，他的部队中在两条平行道路上前进的前两列纵队开火误击了另一个自己人的基地，冲突的原因仍然鲜为人知，但它让埃南花了至少半小时解决混乱。

Barely that the 162 Ugda began to move again, around 15:30hrs, several of its vehicles suddenly received heavy hits. Four SA.342s of the 977 Sqn SyAAF approached Einan’s columns flying between hills and trees before taking positions and then firing their HOTs before their presence was ever detected. An unknown number of Israeli tanks and armoured personnel carriers was hit in this attack, but the IDF subsequently reported only slight casualties (four injured, one of which seriously). Barely one hour later, Task Force Vardi was also attacked by SyAAF fighter bombers, the pilots of which reported, "leaving several tanks afire".
162师级战斗队刚开始再次移动，大约15:30，有几部车辆受到了重击，4架叙利亚空军977中队的“小羚羊”突然在以军反应之前，在山和林木之间飞近埃南的行军纵队，然后在现场的人们发现它们之前发射它们携带的“霍特”反坦克导弹，一些数目不详的以军坦克和装甲输送车在此次袭击中被击中，但以色列后来的报道称只有轻微的伤亡，（4人受伤，其中1人重伤）仅仅一小时后，vardi特遣队也遭到叙利亚空军战斗轰炸机的袭击，叙利亚空军飞行员报告，有数辆坦克起火。
In fact Einan's Ugda was attacked by only the second section of SyAAF helicopters that had a contact with enemy on that day. The first section was active over Lebanon already around 14:00hrs. It sneaked upon the Israelis by flying at low level along the canyons on north-western side of Mt. Hermon/Mt. Jabel Sheikh, and then attacked a column of the Special Manoeuvre Force, commanded by Brig.Gen. Yossi Peled, which consisted of two brigades of paratroops and infantry configured for anti-tank operations, and had a task of reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway along the Syrian border, thus outflanking Syrian positions in the Beka'a Valley. Syrian helicopters launched their attack when the Israelis were stopped by elements of the 91st Syrian Tank Brigade on the road from Hasabaiya towards Rashayya, but its results remain unknown.
实际上，埃南师级战斗队遭遇袭击仅仅是叙利亚直升机当天第二次与对手接触，首次行动是在黎巴嫩当地时间大约14:00，它们沿着马特-赫蒙/马特-宰赫谢山谷的西北侧 低空潜入以军纵队上空，然后攻击以军由贝尔格.贝纳佩莱德指挥包括两个空降旅和配属的反坦克步兵的特遣队，该部的任务是沿着叙利亚边境贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路向纵深推进，包抄叙利亚部署在贝卡谷地的部队，当以军被叙利亚精锐的第91坦克旅从哈塞拜亚到热撒亚一线的公路上所阻止时，叙利亚直升机发动了进攻，但战果仍然不详。
The final Gazelle strike of the day was delivered around 17:30hrs, by two pairs that executed a pincer attack against mechanized IDF units on the road from Shab’a to Rashayya and from Barouch to Ayn Dara. The results of all these operations remain unknown, but in general the Israelis denied suffering any losses.
这一天“小羚羊”最后的进攻在17:30进行，两队出动对以军机械化纵队进行了夹击，从沙巴到热撒亚和Barouch到安达，所有的行动结果均不详，但一般以色列否认受到任何损失。
Day Two, 9 June
Around midnight of 9 June, the 162 Ugda reached the Druze village Ayn-Zhalta, in the middle of the Shouf Mountains, and only some 15km south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. With this, the two armoured brigades of the Syrian 10th Division south of Lake Karoun were encircled. However, as the leading M-60s of 162 Ugda rolled down the road into the village they suddenly detected several T-62s: within seconds a fierce battle at close quarters developed in which a number of tanks from both sides - including three T-62s - was hit. As the Israelis pulled back to re-group the Syrian commandos attacked, engulfing the column in a barrage of RPGs. Namely, Einan’s Ugda drove directly into the centre of the Syrian 58th Mechanized Brigade, part of the the 3rd Armoured Division. The results of this initial clash are uncertain, then there is no reliable data about the Israeli casualties: the Syrians are said to have lost at least three T-62s and 20 soldiers, while the Israelis pulled back to Barouch. Certain is also that the Syrian resistance was fierce enough to cause the IDF in the morning to move a part of the Task Force Vardi with help of CH-53D helicopters behind the right flank of the Syrian position. As the Israeli paras - driving M-151 jeeps armed with TOW-ATGMs – were concentrating along the Ayn Zhalta–Barouch road, around 09:30hrs they were hit by the next SyAAF Gazelle attack that left several M-151 jeeps destroyed. However, Vardi managed to reorganize his force and deploy it in three blocking positions north and east of Barouch. At least in theory, Vardi’s force was now also only 15km away from the Beirut-Damascus highway. If it could reach it, it would not only cut off the Syrian units in the Beirut area from supply bases in Syria, but also have an open way into the rear of the 1st Syrian Armoured Division.
第二天，6月9日
6月9日全天，162师级战斗队搜索德鲁兹村庄Ayn-Zhalta，在舒夫山脉的中央，距离贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路以南仅15公里，叙利亚第十装甲师的两个装甲旅卡鲁湖以南被包围，作为拥有m-60s的师级战斗队，开下公路进入村庄之后，突然遭遇几辆T-62s,并发生了短暂的近距离战斗，双方的一些坦克，包括3辆T-62s被击中，以军回撤过程中再遭叙利亚突击队的袭击，行军纵队被一连串RPG攻击，换句话说，162师级战斗队闯进了叙利亚第3装甲师一部—第58机械化旅的中央，这场战斗的结果无法确认，因为没有以色列伤亡的统计数据，叙利亚承认至少失去了3辆T-62s和20名士兵，而以军折回barouch,叙利亚激烈抵抗的是因为vardi特遣队当天早晨在ch-53直升机的帮助下向叙利亚军队右翼侧背的运动取得了一些进展，随以军开进的M-151吉普，携带“陶”式反坦克导弹，被集中于Ayn-Zhalta-barouch沿途，9:30，它们中掉队的车辆遭遇了下一波叙利亚“小羚羊”的攻击，然而，vardi重组了他的部队，部署在barouch的西面和南面的三道拦阻阵地里，至少理论上，vardi特遣队现在仅距贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路仅仅15km,假如它能控制它，那它不仅能够切断在贝鲁特叙军与叙利亚后勤基地的联系，还能够打开一条进入叙利亚第一装甲师后方的通路。

The problem was that the Israelis could not advance, at least not immediately: the 162 Ugda continued battling Syrians in Ayn Zhalta – in part because of another Gazelle-attack that left six Israeli tanks destroyed - until evening. It was only then that Einan’s units broke through towards Ayn Dara, a village only few kilometres south of the strategic highway. However, while advancing the Israelis were first ambushed by elements of the Syrian 51st Brigade and several anti-tank teams that went after M-60s and Merkava tanks for the most part: in a series of sharp clashes they hit a number of vehicles.
但问题是，以军无法前进，至少不能马上做到，162师级战斗队继续在Ayn-Zhalta与叙军交战，部分原因是另外的“小羚羊”攻击，左翼六辆坦克在晚间被摧毁，这只是到那时，埃南的部队才打通达拉泉，一个仅仅距离战略高速路几千米的村庄，然而，前进中的以军首次被叙利亚第51旅的部队和反坦克小分队伏击，通常尾追m-60s和“梅卡瓦”坦克，这一系列的冲突中，他们击毁了一些车辆。

Meanwhile, furhter to souther-east, two Syrian armour brigades encircled south of Lake Karoun were fighting for their naked survival, keeping the main group of Israeli forces busy. In the words of Syrian officers that survived this battle, the fighting was savage: the two front T-62-companies from his battalion were completely destroyed, and his company lost several tanks as well. In return, the Syrians destroyed six and captured three M-60s. By the noon, their situation worsened when surviving Syrian tanks began to run out of ammunition and fuel while under increasing Israeli pressure. Concerned with the situaiton of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades, the Syrian General Headquarters ordered a brigade of the 1st Armoured Division, equipped with T-72 tanks, and moving along the road from Damascus towards the Lebanese border, to move straight ahead, cross the border and hit the right flank of the Israeli units advancing along the eastern side of Beka'a.
与此同时，进一步朝西南方向扩展，两个叙利亚装甲旅正在卡鲁恩湖的南面进行处境艰难战斗，忙碌的以军纵队保持主要编队，在幸存的叙利亚军官的回忆中，这一战是惨烈的：来自他的营的两个先头连的T-62被彻底摧毁，他的连也失去了好几辆坦克，作为回报，叙利亚摧毁6辆并击伤3辆m-60s,到了中午，当以色列的压力越来越大，当幸存的叙利亚坦克耗尽了他们的弹药和燃料后，他们的情况恶化了，关注着第76和第91坦克旅情况的叙军总部命令第1装甲师的一个装备T-72坦克的装甲旅，沿着大马士革的公路朝黎巴嫩边界移动，径直前行，穿越边界后打击沿着贝卡谷地东侧前进的以军的右翼。
The Syrian counterattack that came from east towards west, passing few kilometres north of Rashayya, is described as the "most savage tank battle of the whole war" by Syrian veterans. The T-72s clashed with several companies of M-60s, destroying some of these in process while suffering only a few losses in exchange: in fact, the officer in command of one of leading Syrian companies was subsequently decorated for his unit successfully penetrated the Israeli ring around the 76th and 91st Brigades, without loosing a single tank in the process. During the Syrian breakthrough south and east of Lake Karoun, on the afternoon of 9 June, several officers noticed an Israeli F-16A falling in flames behind the Israeli lines, the pilot ejecting in the process - only to be recovered by IDF ground troops. The cause of this loss remains unclear until today, but no local air-defence units claimed any kills, while a number of Syrian veterans - interviewed independently - recall this event very vividly.
叙利亚的反击是从东朝西，经过Rashayya北面的附近，被叙利亚退伍军人描述为“整个战争中最激烈的坦克战”， T-72与几个连的m-60s展开战斗，摧毁了它们中的一些，在这个交换过程中仅遭受了一点损失：实际上，一位叙利亚指挥官因为他的部队成功突破以军对76和91装甲旅的包围而做了夸张，叙军在突破卡鲁恩湖的东面和南面期间没有损失一辆坦克，在6月9日的下午，几位叙利亚军官注意到，一架着火的以色列F-16A战斗机坠落在以军战线的后方，在这一过程中飞行员弹出，仅仅被以色列陆军所救回，损失的原因被以色列解释为非战斗损失，但没有一个当地防空部队声称击落，这是几名接受独立采访的叙利亚退伍军人非常生动的回忆。
Despite the Syrian success, and the fact that the two armoured brigades managed to escape throught the corridor that remained open for several hours, the 10th Armoured Division of the Syrian Army paid a heavy price, losing almost 200 T-62s in the course of the fighting. At least 90 of these were captured intact. Eventually, this unit has had to be pulled back and swiftly re-armed with T-55 tanks from strategic reserve stocks. In turn, the 1st Armoured Division was ordered back behind the Syrian border, to regroup and continue its trip to Zahle.
In the meantime, around 12:30hrs of 9 June, a strike package of four SyAAF MiG-23BNs bombed the Israeli HQs set up in Samaqiyah, which was detected by tracking Israeli radio communications and already under heavy pressure by Syrian artillery. Additional Syrian strikes were flown in support of the 1st Armoured Division's counterattack to relieve the armoured brigades besieged south of the Karoun Lake.
尽管叙利亚取得了成功，两个装甲旅通过这个开放了几个小时的走廊事实上逃脱了，但叙军的第10装甲师却付出了沉重的代价，在战斗过程中损失了差不多200辆T-62s,它们中至少有90辆被完整的俘获，这支部队被调回并用来自战略储备物资的T-55坦克迅速重新武装，反过来，第1装甲师被命令返回叙利亚边界后方，重组后继续继续它前往扎赫勒的行程，在那个重要时刻，6月9日的12:30，一攻击波共4架叙利亚空军的米格-23BN战斗机轰炸了设置在萨玛奇亚的以军总部，通过检测被跟踪的以军无线电通讯，得知已经受到了叙利亚炮兵的重压，另外的叙还以的空中打击支援了叙军第1装甲师营救卡鲁恩湖南侧两个装甲旅的行动。
Two hours later, in order to be able to better support their ground troops in fighting Syrians, the IDF/AF launched the Operation Drugstore – a concentrated attack against the Syrian SAM-sites in the area between Zahle and the Syrian border. This operation was highly successful and resulted not only in the neutralization of the Syrian SAMs, but also in downing of 23 SyAAF fighter-bombers scrambled into the Lebanese skies.
两个小时以后，战斗中的叙利亚陆军得到了更好的支援，以色列陆军和空军开始了行动方案，一次密集针对性的攻击叙利亚位于扎赫勒和叙利亚边界之间的萨姆导弹阵地，这次行动获得了圆满成功，结果不仅瓦解了叙利亚的萨姆防空导弹网，还击落了进入黎巴嫩领空的23架叙利亚战斗轰炸机。

With Syrian SAMs neutralized, an IDF corps under command of Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal, consisting of Ugdas 90 and 252, opened a major, three-pronged offensive against the remnants of the 10th Syrian Armoured Division, as well as forward elements of the 3rd Armoured Division in the Beka’a Valley.
随着叙利亚萨姆防空网的瓦解，以军指挥官Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal下达命令，以第90和第252师级战斗队的全部，进行一次大规模的三管齐下的攻击，进攻叙利亚第10装甲师的残部，以及在贝卡谷地的叙利亚第3装甲师的小股部队。

译者按：这篇文章是一篇比较老的反映1982年黎巴嫩战争的文章，来自ACIG.org archives网站，早先曾经被国内多家知名军事期刊发掘并翻译转载，在北京出版的《兵器》杂志2010年12月号还发表以该文为基础，作者署名“远懿”的《贝卡谷地坦克战》一文。
由于国内对于1982年黎巴嫩战争仍然缺乏相关的外文研究资料，因此这篇文章对国内军事爱好者们来说目前依然有重要的参考价值，所以笔者尝试翻译此文，仅供感兴趣的军事爱好者参考。

另外，特别感谢sc论坛“观星者”网友提供原文链接。

译文：

Syrian-Tank-Hunter in Lebanon,1982
1982年黎巴嫩战争中的叙利亚坦克猎手
One of little-known aspects of the Lebanon War, fought between Israel, PLO, and Syria, in June 1982, was a complex anti-tank battle fought by helicopters of both sides. While at least some details about Israeli attack helicopters were published ever since, almost nothing is known about the Syrians, regardless how interesting and innovative some their tactics was.
了解一点黎巴嫩战争常识的人都知道，1982年6月发生在以色列、巴解组织、叙利亚之间的战斗，一场复杂的反坦克战来自双方的直升机，当少数一些有关以色列武装直升机在战争中的细节早早被披露，叙利亚的方面的情况却鲜为人知，无论如何，它们某些战术是创新和有趣的。
Syrian Attack Helicopters
In the early 1980s the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) operated one brigade with four squadrons of SA.342L/M Gazelles (976, 977, 988, and an unknown unit – probably 989 Sqn), and one wing of three squadrons equipped with Mi-25s (765, 766, and 767). Both brigades had units based at Marj al-Sultan and al-Jdaydeh airfields, but part of Mi-24s was permanently deployed to Sueda AB as well.
叙利亚武装直升机
在1980年代的早期叙利亚阿拉伯空军有一个旅下辖4个中队SA.342L“小羚羊”直升机，（976、977、988，和一个不明单位的989中队）还有一个旅有三个配备mi-25s的中队（第765、766、767中队），两个旅的基地分别位于Marj al-Sultan 和 al-Jdaydeh机场，但部分mi-24s长期作为预备队部署在sueda.
Syria was a relatively new operator of combat helicopters, having obtained the first 18 French-built Aérospatiale SA.342 Gazelles only in 1977, in response to Israeli acquisition of Bell AH-1 Cobras. These 18 Gazelles entered service with the 976 Attack Helicopter Squadron, based at al-Jdaydeh AB, and were originally equipped with AS.12 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Later on, additional SA.342s were supplied, enabling the SyAAF to organize a full brigade of three squadrons, and one unit used for liaison and cooperation with police. Also supplied to Syria by France were HOT ATGMs. HOT is essentially a French-German equivalent to the US-made TOW, this designation actually standing for “Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube” – or “high-subsonic optical remote-guided fired from a tube”, with semi-automatic command-to-line of sight (SACLOS) guidance, with guidance inputs being transferred via a thin wire connecting the missile with the helicopter. As delivered to Syrians, the HOT was considered one of the most advanced ATGMs world-wide, claimed as capable of penetrating 700mm of steel armour at 0° and 288mm armour at 65°. The missile was delivered in tubes, of which each Gazelle could carry four, mounted on stubs behind the cockpit.
叙利亚比较新式的武装直升机，在1977年已获得第一批18架法国宇航公司制造的SA.342L“小羚羊”直升机，以对付以色列购买的贝尔AH-1眼镜蛇武装直升机，这批“小羚羊”配属给第976攻击直升机中队，基地位于al-Jdaydeh机场，原本配备AS-12反坦克导弹，稍后，额外的SA.342S到货，可动用叙利亚空军一个包括三个中队的满编旅，以及一个和警方共同联络合作的部队，同时提供法制“霍特”反坦克导弹，“霍特”是由法国和德国联合研制的，与美制“陶”式反坦克导弹相当，这其实是指“Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube”-或者“高亚音速光学制导发射筒”，采取半自动目视导线制导方式(SACLOS)引导，指令通过导线传送给机载导弹，作为交付给叙利亚人的“霍特”，被认为是当时世界上最先进的反坦克导弹之一，据称能以0°法线角击穿700mm的钢装甲，或者以65°法线角击穿288 mm的钢装甲。导弹存储在发射筒交付，每架“小羚羊”能够携带4枚，安装在驾驶舱后根部。
Given that SyAAF purchased no Western-built aircraft or helicopters already since the late 1950s, the acquisition of Gazelles was quite surprising for many observers in the West. But, the fact was that this deal came as a result of Saudi efforts to orient as many Arab states towards West as possible, as well as Soviet inability to supply the number of Mil Mi-24 (ASCC-Code “Hind”) helicopters required by Syria. The Soviets needed any Hind they could get at the time for their units based in East Germany. Nevertheless, once the French started delivering Gazelles to Syria, the Soviets followed the suit, and in spring of 1981 the first squadron of four - later to rise to 12 - Mi-25s was organized at al-Mezzeh AB, near Damascus, followed by another unit, then based in al-Ladahiqiyah. The Mi-25 was considered a “monkey” version of the Mi-24, a downgraded variant supplied to “less reliable” customers. Its main anti-tank armament was the 9M17 Skorpion from the Falanga family of ATGMs (ASCC-Code “AT-2 Swatter”). This was a relatively primitive but simple ATGM with MCLOS radio-guidance. Each Mi-25 could mount four Swatters on launch rails mounted bellow wing-tips. The AT-2 was supplied in several variants, of which the B was sold to Syria. This version could reach targets out to a range of 3.500m, and had a claimed capability of armour penetration of over 500mm at 0°. Arabic Mi-25-pilots in generaly considered it useless, foremost because of its poor reliability. In addition, the Mi-25 was equipped with the YakB-12,7 machine-gun, mounted in a barbette underneath the front cockpit, as well as UB-32-57 rocket launchers for unguided rockets.

鉴于叙利亚阿拉伯空军在1950年代后期以来没有购买过西方制造的固定翼飞机或直升机，因此购买“小羚羊”在西方观察家看来十分意外，但实际上，作为这项交易的努力的后果，沙特阿拉伯最大可能的促进了阿拉伯国家的团结，同时由于苏联无力提供叙利亚所要求的具有同等性能Mi-24直升机，他们需要优先保证他们在东德的基地，不过，一旦法国开始向叙利亚提供“小羚羊”，苏联会紧随其后，在1981年的春季，第一个4架编制的mi-25s中队，（后来增至12架）被部署在al-Mezzeh机场，在首都大马士革附近还部署有另一个单位，当时基地设在al-Ladahiqiyah，mi-25被认为是mi-24的“猴”版（或称简化版），一类低档版被提供给“不可靠”的用户，它的主要反坦克武器是9M17“Skorpion”，来自Falanga家族的反坦克导弹，（北约绰号AT-2”蝇拍”），这是一种相对落后但却简单的反坦克导弹，采取无线电指令制导，每架mi-25能够携带4枚”蝇拍”，在发射导轨上接受指令提示，AT-2包括几种改进型，其中“B”型被出售给叙利亚，这种型号有效射程为3500m,有说法称其能以0°法线角击穿超过500mm的钢装甲，但一般驾驶mi-25的阿拉伯飞行员不相信这种说法，首先是因为它的可靠性差。另外，mi-25配备了yak-B12.7mm机枪，安装在座舱下方的炮塔内，其他武备包括多联装32mm或57mm无制导火箭发射器。
After closely monitoring the Iraqi experiences with Mi-25s, the Syrians relatively early dropped the use of AT-2 almost completely, and were arming their Mi-25s with machine-guns and unguided rockets, or bombs only. For various reasons that stood in no relation directly to the SyAAF, the introduction of Gazelles and Mi-25s in service with SyAAF was not entirely complete by spring of 1982. In fact, eventually the Syrian Hinds were not to see any kind of combat service during the fighting against Israelis. Consequently, although there is a number of reports of the contrary – especially in the Russian and Ukrainian, but also in specialized Western publications - the SyAAF Mi-25s did not fly even a single combat sortie in 1982: when it comes to the SyAAF anti-tank operations Gazelles fought almost alone.
在密切关注了mi-25在伊拉克的使用经验之后，叙利亚人很早就放弃了使用AT-2，并为他们的mi-25s安装了机枪和火箭发射器，还有炸弹，这些情况对叙利亚空军没有多少影响，引进“小羚羊”和mi-25s的任务在1982年春天没能够完全完成，实际上，最终叙利亚没能看到它们在与以色列战争中的每一次战斗中都出场，因此，虽然存在某些相反的报告---尤其是来自俄罗斯和乌克兰的，但在西方的专门出版物中，在1982年叙利亚的mi-25s却无法战斗执勤甚至没有一个战例，叙利亚空军的反坦克作战中“小羚羊”几乎是单独作战。

Hunter-Killer Tactics
By early 1982 the Syrians were expecting some kind of a new Israeli operation in southern Lebanon. Their commanders calculated that the IDF would most likely launch an attack similar to the Operation “Litani”, from 1978, when the Israelis drove only some 40km deep into Lebanon in a search for Palestinian terrorists. However, the Syrians knew that in the case the Israelis would not stop on the Litani River a major clash with IDF was inevitable. Yet, with most of Syrian Army important units being deployed either along the Golan Heights or in Damascus, and given the burden of sustaining a sizeable force inside Lebanon already since 1976, as well as because of their commitment in the local civil war, Damascus lacked assets and space to build a strong front-line stretching over whole width of Lebanon. In fact, by early June 1982 the majority of Syrian units in Lebanon was deployed in centre of the country, between Beirut and Zahle, with established defences only around specific points of interest - along the highway Beirut-Damascus, and especially in the area of the village of as-Sultan Yac'ub at Tanta.
猎杀者的战术
1982年初，叙利亚期待以色列在南黎巴嫩的新行动，他们的指挥者估计以色列国防军将发起一次类似1978年“利塔尼”行动的进攻，当时以军仅仅因为搜索巴勒斯坦恐怖分子而开进了黎巴嫩境内纵深大约40km,然而，叙利亚人清楚，他们将不可避免的在利塔尼河一线与以军发生大规模的冲突，为此，许多叙利亚精锐部队沿戈兰高地至大马士革一线部署；而自从1976年以来，叙利亚便在黎巴嫩驻扎着相当数量的部队，这是由于他们介入黎巴嫩内战的承诺，大马士革缺少金钱和空间建设一条强大的前线以涵盖整个黎巴嫩，实际上，在1982年的6月初，多数叙利亚部队部署在这个国家的中部，在贝鲁特和扎赫勒之间，建立防御仅围绕着具体的问题沿戈兰—贝鲁特—大马士革一线，特别在坦塔的as-Sultan Yac'ub一带的乡村地区。
Studying the local terrain, roads, dozens of villages in southern Lebanon and possible routes along which the Israelis could approach, the Syrians developed simple but effective tactics. This called for co-ordination between SyAAF helicopters and specially trained “hunter-killer teams” of the Syrian Army. The aim was to ambush and tie down Israeli mechanized formations by ground-forces, preferably at short range and within urban areas, and then hit them by attack helicopters that would approach using local hilly terrain.
研究该地区的地形、道路、南黎巴嫩的数十个村庄和以色列能够采用可能的途径，叙利亚制定了简单但有效的策略，这就是叙利亚直升机和受过专门训练的叙利亚陆军的“猎杀小组”协调一致，目的是凭借地面部队伏击和牵制以色列的装甲部队，最好在近距离和城市地区，然后凭借当地的丘陵地形用武装直升机攻击以军。
By early June 1982 the SA had the whole 20 Commando Battalion with a total of 50 hunter-killer teams deployed in Lebanon, mainly in the areas south and west of Beirut, but also in eastern and southern suburbs of the city. Each of Syrian teams consisted of between four and six men, armed with some of the best Western and Soviet anti-tank weapons of the time, including RPG-7s, RPG-18s (disposable 64 mm antitank rocket launcher), AT-4 Spigot ATGMs (only early-production 9P135 units), and MILAN ATGMs from France. Usually there were two shooters and two loaders in each team. Every six-man team had two additional members equipped with SA-7 MANPADS. Syrian anti-tank troops were older, more experienced soldiers of the SA, showing strong military skills and determination, and were later described by the Israelis as having a very professional attitude towards their mission. They operated with predilection in urban areas, where narrow streets of Lebanese towns and villages could easily be turned into shooting galleries for Israeli tanks.
在1982年6月初，叙利亚陆军有合计20个突击营与总共50个猎杀小组部署在黎巴嫩，主要分布在西贝鲁特及其以南地区，但在城市的西郊与南郊也有部署，每个叙利亚猎杀小组包括4-6人，拥有当时西方和苏联最好的反坦克武器，包括RPG-7s，RPG-18s（一次性使用的64mm反坦克火箭发射器），AT-4“塞子”反坦克导弹（仅有早期生产的9P-135型号）和来自法国的“米兰”反坦克导弹，通常在每个小组有两名射手和两名装填手，每个6人小组配备2名携带SA-7便携式防空导弹的成员，叙利亚反坦克小组都是老兵，有很多经验的士兵
流露出较强的军事素养和战斗意志，战后以色列人描述他们对他们的任务有着专业的态度，他们偏爱在城区出击，因为黎巴嫩城镇与乡村狭窄的街道能够轻而易举的变成攻击以色列坦克的射击场。
Of conventional fighting forces the major Syrian units in Lebanon were the 10th and the 3rd Armoured Divisions. The 10th Armoured Division was deployed south of the Beirtu-Damascus road, and inside Beirut, and consisted of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades – equipped with T-62s and BMP-1s – and the 85th Mechanized Brigade, equipped with T-55s and BTR-60s. This division was in control of the 20 Commando Battalion as well. The 3rd Armoured Division included the 58th Mechanized Brigade and the 62nd Brigade, as well as two armoured brigades with T-62 tanks. This unit controlled an additional Commando Battalion, and defended the Beirut-Damascus road, as well as three SAM-brigades with a total of 19 SAM-sites, deployed mainly in the area near Zahle, along the Syrian border.
叙利亚在黎巴嫩的主要作战部队是第10和第3装甲师，第10装甲师部署在拜耳图-大马士革公路以南，在贝鲁特，包括76和第91装甲旅—装备t-62s坦克和BMP-1s步兵战车，以及第85机械化旅，装备t-55s坦克和BTR-60s装甲输送车。第10装甲师负责指挥第20突击营，第3 装甲师包括第58机械化旅和第62旅，以及2个装备T-62坦克的装甲旅，这支部队控制另一个突击营，负责防守贝鲁特-大马士革公路，还有总计拥有19个SAM导弹营的3个SAM导弹旅，沿着叙利亚边境部署在扎赫勒附近。
The Three Days Battle: Day One, 8 June
The war actually began already on 1 June 1982, with massive Israeli air strikes against PLO bases and ammunition depots along the Mediterranean coast. On the ground, however, the Israelis drove into southern Lebanon only around 11:00hrs of 6 June.
三日战役：第一天，6月8日
实际上，战争在1982年6月1日已经开始，以色列大规模空袭地中海沿岸的巴解基地和弹药库，不过，在地面，以色列军队直到6月6日上午11时才开进南黎巴嫩。

For Syrian troops stationed in the country, however, the fighting began two days later, near Jazzin, in central Lebanon, as the IDF Task Force Vardi – a specially configured task force under command of Brig.Gen. Danni Vardi, the task of which was to take Jazzin and then push north along the eastern side of Lake Qaroun towards the Beirut-Damascus highway – attacked positions of the 76th Syrian Tank Brigade.
因为叙利亚军队驻扎在黎巴嫩，然而，战斗在两天后才开始，在黎巴嫩中部的杰津附近，作为以色列国防军vardi特遣队---一支在巴拉克.丹尼.瓦迪指挥下的特别部队，任务是拿下杰津，然后向北沿着可卡鲁恩湖的西岸向贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路推进---攻击叙利亚第76坦克旅。
While Vardi's force opened the attack on the 76th Brigade, in his rear Brig.Gen. Menachem Einan’s 162 Ugda was moving along narrow roads from south towards south-west, passing Jazzin with objective Beit en-Din, in the Shouf Mountains. Hampered by several massive traffic jams and fuel shortages Einan had experienced massive difficulties in organizing his movement so far and now his problems were to increase by a magnitude: shortly after 14:00hrs, the two lead columns of his unit that travelled on two parallel roads opened fire at each other in a case of mistaken identity. The results of this clash remain unknown, but it took Einan at least an hour to solve the chaos.
当vardi特遣队开始进攻叙利亚第76装甲旅时，在其后方的贝尔格.梅纳赫姆.埃南的162师级战斗队，沿着狭窄的道路向从南向西南方向推进，经过杰津前往目标Beit en-Din，在舒夫山脉，埃南的162师级战斗队受阻于交通拥堵和燃料短缺，他在组织调动方面遇到了很大的困难，他的麻烦增加了，稍后在14:00，他的部队中在两条平行道路上前进的前两列纵队开火误击了另一个自己人的基地，冲突的原因仍然鲜为人知，但它让埃南花了至少半小时解决混乱。

Barely that the 162 Ugda began to move again, around 15:30hrs, several of its vehicles suddenly received heavy hits. Four SA.342s of the 977 Sqn SyAAF approached Einan’s columns flying between hills and trees before taking positions and then firing their HOTs before their presence was ever detected. An unknown number of Israeli tanks and armoured personnel carriers was hit in this attack, but the IDF subsequently reported only slight casualties (four injured, one of which seriously). Barely one hour later, Task Force Vardi was also attacked by SyAAF fighter bombers, the pilots of which reported, "leaving several tanks afire".
162师级战斗队刚开始再次移动，大约15:30，有几部车辆受到了重击，4架叙利亚空军977中队的“小羚羊”突然在以军反应之前，在山和林木之间飞近埃南的行军纵队，然后在现场的人们发现它们之前发射它们携带的“霍特”反坦克导弹，一些数目不详的以军坦克和装甲输送车在此次袭击中被击中，但以色列后来的报道称只有轻微的伤亡，（4人受伤，其中1人重伤）仅仅一小时后，vardi特遣队也遭到叙利亚空军战斗轰炸机的袭击，叙利亚空军飞行员报告，有数辆坦克起火。
In fact Einan's Ugda was attacked by only the second section of SyAAF helicopters that had a contact with enemy on that day. The first section was active over Lebanon already around 14:00hrs. It sneaked upon the Israelis by flying at low level along the canyons on north-western side of Mt. Hermon/Mt. Jabel Sheikh, and then attacked a column of the Special Manoeuvre Force, commanded by Brig.Gen. Yossi Peled, which consisted of two brigades of paratroops and infantry configured for anti-tank operations, and had a task of reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway along the Syrian border, thus outflanking Syrian positions in the Beka'a Valley. Syrian helicopters launched their attack when the Israelis were stopped by elements of the 91st Syrian Tank Brigade on the road from Hasabaiya towards Rashayya, but its results remain unknown.
实际上，埃南师级战斗队遭遇袭击仅仅是叙利亚直升机当天第二次与对手接触，首次行动是在黎巴嫩当地时间大约14:00，它们沿着马特-赫蒙/马特-宰赫谢山谷的西北侧 低空潜入以军纵队上空，然后攻击以军由贝尔格.贝纳佩莱德指挥包括两个空降旅和配属的反坦克步兵的特遣队，该部的任务是沿着叙利亚边境贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路向纵深推进，包抄叙利亚部署在贝卡谷地的部队，当以军被叙利亚精锐的第91坦克旅从哈塞拜亚到热撒亚一线的公路上所阻止时，叙利亚直升机发动了进攻，但战果仍然不详。
The final Gazelle strike of the day was delivered around 17:30hrs, by two pairs that executed a pincer attack against mechanized IDF units on the road from Shab’a to Rashayya and from Barouch to Ayn Dara. The results of all these operations remain unknown, but in general the Israelis denied suffering any losses.
这一天“小羚羊”最后的进攻在17:30进行，两队出动对以军机械化纵队进行了夹击，从沙巴到热撒亚和Barouch到安达，所有的行动结果均不详，但一般以色列否认受到任何损失。
Day Two, 9 June
Around midnight of 9 June, the 162 Ugda reached the Druze village Ayn-Zhalta, in the middle of the Shouf Mountains, and only some 15km south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. With this, the two armoured brigades of the Syrian 10th Division south of Lake Karoun were encircled. However, as the leading M-60s of 162 Ugda rolled down the road into the village they suddenly detected several T-62s: within seconds a fierce battle at close quarters developed in which a number of tanks from both sides - including three T-62s - was hit. As the Israelis pulled back to re-group the Syrian commandos attacked, engulfing the column in a barrage of RPGs. Namely, Einan’s Ugda drove directly into the centre of the Syrian 58th Mechanized Brigade, part of the the 3rd Armoured Division. The results of this initial clash are uncertain, then there is no reliable data about the Israeli casualties: the Syrians are said to have lost at least three T-62s and 20 soldiers, while the Israelis pulled back to Barouch. Certain is also that the Syrian resistance was fierce enough to cause the IDF in the morning to move a part of the Task Force Vardi with help of CH-53D helicopters behind the right flank of the Syrian position. As the Israeli paras - driving M-151 jeeps armed with TOW-ATGMs – were concentrating along the Ayn Zhalta–Barouch road, around 09:30hrs they were hit by the next SyAAF Gazelle attack that left several M-151 jeeps destroyed. However, Vardi managed to reorganize his force and deploy it in three blocking positions north and east of Barouch. At least in theory, Vardi’s force was now also only 15km away from the Beirut-Damascus highway. If it could reach it, it would not only cut off the Syrian units in the Beirut area from supply bases in Syria, but also have an open way into the rear of the 1st Syrian Armoured Division.
第二天，6月9日
6月9日全天，162师级战斗队搜索德鲁兹村庄Ayn-Zhalta，在舒夫山脉的中央，距离贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路以南仅15公里，叙利亚第十装甲师的两个装甲旅卡鲁湖以南被包围，作为拥有m-60s的师级战斗队，开下公路进入村庄之后，突然遭遇几辆T-62s,并发生了短暂的近距离战斗，双方的一些坦克，包括3辆T-62s被击中，以军回撤过程中再遭叙利亚突击队的袭击，行军纵队被一连串RPG攻击，换句话说，162师级战斗队闯进了叙利亚第3装甲师一部—第58机械化旅的中央，这场战斗的结果无法确认，因为没有以色列伤亡的统计数据，叙利亚承认至少失去了3辆T-62s和20名士兵，而以军折回barouch,叙利亚激烈抵抗的是因为vardi特遣队当天早晨在ch-53直升机的帮助下向叙利亚军队右翼侧背的运动取得了一些进展，随以军开进的M-151吉普，携带“陶”式反坦克导弹，被集中于Ayn-Zhalta-barouch沿途，9:30，它们中掉队的车辆遭遇了下一波叙利亚“小羚羊”的攻击，然而，vardi重组了他的部队，部署在barouch的西面和南面的三道拦阻阵地里，至少理论上，vardi特遣队现在仅距贝鲁特-大马士革高速公路仅仅15km,假如它能控制它，那它不仅能够切断在贝鲁特叙军与叙利亚后勤基地的联系，还能够打开一条进入叙利亚第一装甲师后方的通路。

The problem was that the Israelis could not advance, at least not immediately: the 162 Ugda continued battling Syrians in Ayn Zhalta – in part because of another Gazelle-attack that left six Israeli tanks destroyed - until evening. It was only then that Einan’s units broke through towards Ayn Dara, a village only few kilometres south of the strategic highway. However, while advancing the Israelis were first ambushed by elements of the Syrian 51st Brigade and several anti-tank teams that went after M-60s and Merkava tanks for the most part: in a series of sharp clashes they hit a number of vehicles.
但问题是，以军无法前进，至少不能马上做到，162师级战斗队继续在Ayn-Zhalta与叙军交战，部分原因是另外的“小羚羊”攻击，左翼六辆坦克在晚间被摧毁，这只是到那时，埃南的部队才打通达拉泉，一个仅仅距离战略高速路几千米的村庄，然而，前进中的以军首次被叙利亚第51旅的部队和反坦克小分队伏击，通常尾追m-60s和“梅卡瓦”坦克，这一系列的冲突中，他们击毁了一些车辆。

Meanwhile, furhter to souther-east, two Syrian armour brigades encircled south of Lake Karoun were fighting for their naked survival, keeping the main group of Israeli forces busy. In the words of Syrian officers that survived this battle, the fighting was savage: the two front T-62-companies from his battalion were completely destroyed, and his company lost several tanks as well. In return, the Syrians destroyed six and captured three M-60s. By the noon, their situation worsened when surviving Syrian tanks began to run out of ammunition and fuel while under increasing Israeli pressure. Concerned with the situaiton of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades, the Syrian General Headquarters ordered a brigade of the 1st Armoured Division, equipped with T-72 tanks, and moving along the road from Damascus towards the Lebanese border, to move straight ahead, cross the border and hit the right flank of the Israeli units advancing along the eastern side of Beka'a.
与此同时，进一步朝西南方向扩展，两个叙利亚装甲旅正在卡鲁恩湖的南面进行处境艰难战斗，忙碌的以军纵队保持主要编队，在幸存的叙利亚军官的回忆中，这一战是惨烈的：来自他的营的两个先头连的T-62被彻底摧毁，他的连也失去了好几辆坦克，作为回报，叙利亚摧毁6辆并击伤3辆m-60s,到了中午，当以色列的压力越来越大，当幸存的叙利亚坦克耗尽了他们的弹药和燃料后，他们的情况恶化了，关注着第76和第91坦克旅情况的叙军总部命令第1装甲师的一个装备T-72坦克的装甲旅，沿着大马士革的公路朝黎巴嫩边界移动，径直前行，穿越边界后打击沿着贝卡谷地东侧前进的以军的右翼。
The Syrian counterattack that came from east towards west, passing few kilometres north of Rashayya, is described as the "most savage tank battle of the whole war" by Syrian veterans. The T-72s clashed with several companies of M-60s, destroying some of these in process while suffering only a few losses in exchange: in fact, the officer in command of one of leading Syrian companies was subsequently decorated for his unit successfully penetrated the Israeli ring around the 76th and 91st Brigades, without loosing a single tank in the process. During the Syrian breakthrough south and east of Lake Karoun, on the afternoon of 9 June, several officers noticed an Israeli F-16A falling in flames behind the Israeli lines, the pilot ejecting in the process - only to be recovered by IDF ground troops. The cause of this loss remains unclear until today, but no local air-defence units claimed any kills, while a number of Syrian veterans - interviewed independently - recall this event very vividly.
叙利亚的反击是从东朝西，经过Rashayya北面的附近，被叙利亚退伍军人描述为“整个战争中最激烈的坦克战”， T-72与几个连的m-60s展开战斗，摧毁了它们中的一些，在这个交换过程中仅遭受了一点损失：实际上，一位叙利亚指挥官因为他的部队成功突破以军对76和91装甲旅的包围而做了夸张，叙军在突破卡鲁恩湖的东面和南面期间没有损失一辆坦克，在6月9日的下午，几位叙利亚军官注意到，一架着火的以色列F-16A战斗机坠落在以军战线的后方，在这一过程中飞行员弹出，仅仅被以色列陆军所救回，损失的原因被以色列解释为非战斗损失，但没有一个当地防空部队声称击落，这是几名接受独立采访的叙利亚退伍军人非常生动的回忆。
Despite the Syrian success, and the fact that the two armoured brigades managed to escape throught the corridor that remained open for several hours, the 10th Armoured Division of the Syrian Army paid a heavy price, losing almost 200 T-62s in the course of the fighting. At least 90 of these were captured intact. Eventually, this unit has had to be pulled back and swiftly re-armed with T-55 tanks from strategic reserve stocks. In turn, the 1st Armoured Division was ordered back behind the Syrian border, to regroup and continue its trip to Zahle.
In the meantime, around 12:30hrs of 9 June, a strike package of four SyAAF MiG-23BNs bombed the Israeli HQs set up in Samaqiyah, which was detected by tracking Israeli radio communications and already under heavy pressure by Syrian artillery. Additional Syrian strikes were flown in support of the 1st Armoured Division's counterattack to relieve the armoured brigades besieged south of the Karoun Lake.
尽管叙利亚取得了成功，两个装甲旅通过这个开放了几个小时的走廊事实上逃脱了，但叙军的第10装甲师却付出了沉重的代价，在战斗过程中损失了差不多200辆T-62s,它们中至少有90辆被完整的俘获，这支部队被调回并用来自战略储备物资的T-55坦克迅速重新武装，反过来，第1装甲师被命令返回叙利亚边界后方，重组后继续继续它前往扎赫勒的行程，在那个重要时刻，6月9日的12:30，一攻击波共4架叙利亚空军的米格-23BN战斗机轰炸了设置在萨玛奇亚的以军总部，通过检测被跟踪的以军无线电通讯，得知已经受到了叙利亚炮兵的重压，另外的叙还以的空中打击支援了叙军第1装甲师营救卡鲁恩湖南侧两个装甲旅的行动。
Two hours later, in order to be able to better support their ground troops in fighting Syrians, the IDF/AF launched the Operation Drugstore – a concentrated attack against the Syrian SAM-sites in the area between Zahle and the Syrian border. This operation was highly successful and resulted not only in the neutralization of the Syrian SAMs, but also in downing of 23 SyAAF fighter-bombers scrambled into the Lebanese skies.
两个小时以后，战斗中的叙利亚陆军得到了更好的支援，以色列陆军和空军开始了行动方案，一次密集针对性的攻击叙利亚位于扎赫勒和叙利亚边界之间的萨姆导弹阵地，这次行动获得了圆满成功，结果不仅瓦解了叙利亚的萨姆防空导弹网，还击落了进入黎巴嫩领空的23架叙利亚战斗轰炸机。

With Syrian SAMs neutralized, an IDF corps under command of Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal, consisting of Ugdas 90 and 252, opened a major, three-pronged offensive against the remnants of the 10th Syrian Armoured Division, as well as forward elements of the 3rd Armoured Division in the Beka’a Valley.
随着叙利亚萨姆防空网的瓦解，以军指挥官Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal下达命令，以第90和第252师级战斗队的全部，进行一次大规模的三管齐下的攻击，进攻叙利亚第10装甲师的残部，以及在贝卡谷地的叙利亚第3装甲师的小股部队。