爬山虎原创翻译——奥巴马的核按钮

Obama's Turn on Nuclear Weapons
奥巴马接掌核武器

作者Joseph Cirincione为Ploughshares基金会主席。

《外交事务》2012年2月2日 



When U.S. President Barack Obama took to the podium during a rare visit to the Pentagon early last month, he announced a new strategy for the country's military posture abroad. The United States would shift from being able to fight two major wars simultaneously to increasing its focus on Asia. But the president also explained that reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be key to future defense: "We will continue to get rid of outdated Cold War-era systems," he said, "so that we can invest in the capabilities we need for the future."

上个月早些时候，美国总统奥巴马罕见地造访五角大楼，他在发言中公布了美国未来海外军事姿态新策略。美国将从＂可同时进行两场主要战争＂转变成＂将重心向亚洲倾斜＂。奥巴马同时指出，裁减美国核武库将是未来防务的关键：＂我们将继续退役那些冷战时期的陈旧系统，从而能够向那些未来所需的军事能力进行投资。＂

Policy, meet budget. After having been separated for a decade, as the Pentagon operated essentially free from fiscal considerations, the two have been reunited in Washington's new age of austerity. On nuclear weapons, that fact should work in Obama's favor. In his first major foreign policy speech, delivered in Prague in April 2009, he vowed to "put an end to Cold War thinking" and "reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same." Obama negotiated the New START agreement with Russia, which both countries signed a year later. It lowered the ceiling for deployed U.S. and Russian strategic warheads by 30 percent and restored reciprocal inspections, vital to verifying the reductions. Obama also oversaw a Nuclear Posture Review, which formalized his Prague goals as policy.

政策与预算的交汇。由于五角大楼几乎不受财政考虑的限制，两者在长达十年的时间里处于分离状态，现在终于在华盛顿的紧巴日子里重合了。在核武器问题上，政策与预算的结合对奥巴马有利。2009年4月，奥巴马在布拉格发表首个外交事务重要演说，他发誓要＂终结冷战思维＂并＂减少核武器在美国国家安全事务上所扮演的角色，同时敦促其它国家效仿＂。奥巴马与俄罗斯就《战略武器裁减新条约》进行了谈判，并于一年之后签署。该条约将美俄部置之核弹数量上限削减了百分之三十，双方还可重新互派对核实裁军十分重要的观察员。此外奥巴马还主持了一份《核战略评论》，其布拉格设想正式成文。

But in the past year, Republican opponents and a resistant nuclear bureaucracy have stymied further progress. Contracts raced ahead of policy -- Congress pushed through budgets to develop a new generation of nuclear arms before the president and the Pentagon could agree on the specifics of the new course. Unless this is reversed, in the coming decade Washington may actually spend more on the country's nuclear weapons programs than it has in the past. If the president wants to reduce the country's costly nuclear weapons burden he now has a chance. Last summer, as part of the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Pentagon started compiling a new, highly classified report with options for the structure and size of the nuclear force -- how it is composed, who and what it targets, and whether it continues to be postured to launch a devastating first strike on multiple states. 

但在去年，共和党反对人士及不情愿的核部门阻碍了核裁军的前进步伐。合同跑在了政策之前——在总统与五角大楼能够就核裁具体事宜达成一致之前，国会匆忙通过了用于研发新一代核武器的预算。除非国会预算被推翻，否则在未来十年内，华盛顿在核武器上的开销将增大。如果奥巴马希望减轻本国的核负担，他眼前就有这么一次机遇。去年夏天，作为2010年4月《核战略评论》的一部分，五角大楼开始汇编一份新的绝密报告，其中列明了美国核力量结构与规模的多种选择：核力量的组成；瞄准目标；以及是否继续保持对多个国家发起毁灭性首轮打击的姿态。

Now, the National Security Council staff at the White House is working with the Defense Department and other agencies to further shape policy options for the president's consideration. The package will likely be ready for him this month. Whatever Obama decides will then be codified in a presidential policy directive that will form the basis of the country's new strategic nuclear war plan. Since the end of the Cold War, every U.S. president has done this once. This is Obama's turn.

现在，白宫国家安全顾问职员正与五角大楼及其它机构合作，以形成多个政策备选项供总统定夺。这一系列选项很有可能在本月准备停当。无论奥巴马如何选择，其决定将形成正式的总统政策法令，成为美国战略核武新计划的基础。自从冷战结束以来，毎位总统都曾做出过一次选择，现在轮到奥巴马了。

Most observers have not expected much from this process. Amy Woolf, a nuclear weapons analyst at the Congressional Research Service, told a Washington audience last month that "any changes you see now are going to be modest." Russia is waiting to see if Obama is re-elected before committing to any new negotiated reductions. The president's political advisers also want protection during an election year -- when national security issues traditionally skew rightward -- and hesitate to give his opponents any fodder for the "weak and naive" meme. Finally, there are far more entrenched officials and contractors that benefit from the sprawling nuclear complex than officials who believe in the president's stated vision. To put it simply, Obama has let the bureaucracy suffocate his plan to move step by step toward, as he said in Prague, "the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."

大多数观察家们对这一过程无甚期许。国会研究服务机构的核武分析师Amy Woolf上个月在华盛顿的一次演讲中指出：＂任何改变都将是轻微的。＂而俄罗斯在做进一步核裁之前也在观望奥巴马能否连任成功。每逢总统大选，国家安全的议题总会传统性地向右倒，总统顾问们也想保护奥巴马，不愿授以政敌＂羸弱、天真＂的口实。最后，那些得益于美国庞大核武体系的官场老手与承包商要远远多于赞同奥巴马设想的官员。简言之，奥巴马正纵容官僚们扼杀其在布拉格提出的步步迈向＂无核世界之和平与安全＂的计划。

Although modesty may reign, there will likely be some options for deep cuts in the arsenal. These flow from the consensus formed in recent years among the core of America's security elite -- one that underpinned the Obama vision of 2009 -- that the United States has room to cut. Undersecretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy echoed this view at the Pentagon last month, when she said, "We can maintain deterrence at lower levels of forces." Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, went further, telling reporters last month, "Nuclear weapons are way overdone, we have way more than are needed to carry out their mission." The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, conducted by the Defense Department, reported that "the massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War era of bipolar military confrontation is poorly suited to address the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly regimes seeking nuclear weapons."

尽管谨慎当道，但对核武库进行大规模裁减的选项还是很有可能出现，这源于近年来美国安全问题核心精英的共识。这一认为美国核武库尚有裁减空间的共识是奥巴马2009年设想的基础。上个月，副国防部长Michèle Flournoy也赞同这一观点，她指出：＂即便降低军力水平，我们也能保持威慑力。＂参议院军事委员会主席、来自密歇根州的参议员、民主党人Carl Levin则更进一步，他在上个月对记者表示：＂核武器多过头了，要完成任务根本无需这么多的弹头。＂由国防部操刀的2010年《核战略评论》曾报道称：＂我们从两强对峙的冷战时期继承下来的庞大核武库难以应对当今之挑战，诸如自杀式恐怖分子以及寻求核武器的非友好政权等。＂

Ever since President Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. presidents upon taking office have asked the same question: Why does the country need so many nuclear weapons? The short answer is targeting. Current guidance requires the U.S. military to be prepared at any moment to unleash a first strike against targets in five countries: Russia, China, Iran, Syria, and North Korea. This thinking dates back to the targeting guidance developed by the Defense Department in the 1950s. The 1974 guidance, the most recent to be de-classified, details in 18 pages the types of facilities to be destroyed, including nuclear weapons and bases, conventional military installations, military and civilian command-and-control centers, and political and economic resources. In 1974, this included training "at least one weapon on an industrial facility in the top 250 urban areas in the Soviet Union and in the top 125 urban areas in the People's Republic of China," so as "to prolong their post-war recovery." This is the strategy that justifies the approximately 5,000 weapons in the U.S. arsenal today.

自艾森豪威尔总统以降，美国总统上台之际都会问同一个问题：为什么我们需要这么多的核武器？一个简短的答案：瞄准。目前的指令规定，美军应随时准备向五个国家的目标发起首轮打击：俄罗斯、中国、伊朗、叙利亚和朝鲜。这一思维可追溯至国防部在上世纪五十年代制定的瞄准指令。在最新一个被解密的指令（1974年版）中，国防部在18页纸中详细列明了需摧毁的目标种类，其中包括核武器及其基地、常规军队设施、军民指挥和控制中心、政治与经济资源。在1974年，这包括用＂至少一枚核弹瞄准每一个位于苏联前250名、中国前125名城市中的工业设施，以延长其战后恢复期。＂这就是为什么美国核武库现有约五千件核武器。

Here is where the budget squeeze could give nuclear reductions a new impetus. Current nuclear policy is very expensive. Each leg of the United States' nuclear triad -- long-range missiles, bombers, and submarines -- is reaching the end of its expected operational life. The Pentagon estimates that the U.S. Navy will have to spend $350 billion to build and operate a new fleet of 12 nuclear-armed submarines that it plans to slip into the water starting around 2030. The Office of Management and Budget recommended last December that the Navy build only ten, and some outside experts have suggested that eight would suffice. But the Navy argues that since submarines need time to get to and from port and undergo routine maintenance, it needs at least 12 subs to keep five on station at all times. Why would the Navy have to keep five of these new subs (two in the Atlantic and three in the Pacific), each with 16 missiles carrying up to eight nuclear warheads apiece, at sea ready to fire? Because the current nuclear policy guidance says it must.

预算吃紧给核裁军提供了新动力，目前的核策略耗资巨大。美国核武三剑客——远程导弹、轰炸机、潜艇都正在临近退役年限。据五角大楼估计，如要在2030年左右建成并投入使用由12艘核潜艇组成的新舰队，海军须花费3500亿美元。管理与预算办公室在去年12月建议海军将潜艇数量降为10艘，而外界专家认为8艘足矣。但海军驳斥称，由于潜艇出入港和定期维护等原因，它需要至少12艘潜艇以确保有5艘随时就位待命。为什么美军必须保证有5艘核潜艇（2艘位于大西洋、3艘位于太平洋、每艘装载16枚导弹、每枚导弹最多可装有8枚弹头）随时保持战备状态？因为这是目前核战略指令的规定。

That need not be the case. Obama could rewrite those policies to shrink the target list, eliminate the need to launch weapons in minutes, and make other common-sense improvements. For example, by dropping the requirement to launch approximately 1,000 weapons at targets within 20 minutes, he could reduce the number of submarines required on station, allowing for a secure submarine force of eight boats. That would save $20 billion over ten years and $120 billion over the life of the program. Delaying the new strategic bomber would save $18 billion over ten years, and canceling it, $68 billion over 20 to 30 years. Reducing the current arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles from 420 to 300 would save billions more, although no one is sure how much, because the government has never done what most businesses do routinely -- that is, cost out the options. 

完全不必如此。奥巴马可以重写这些政策以缩短目标清单，取消必须在数分钟之內完成发射的要求，并做出其它合乎常理的改变。比方说，放弃在20分钟内向目标发射约1千枚导弹的规定，奥巴马即可减少值班核潜艇数目，8艘足以满足周转。这一举措将在未来十年节省开支200亿美元，并在潜艇服役期内节省1200亿美元。若将新型战略轰炸机项目压后，可在十年内节省180亿美元，取消该项目则可在20至50年内节省680亿美元。若将洲际导弹的数量从目前的420枚减少至300枚，可再节省数十亿美元，当然无人可知确切的金额，因为政府与绝大多数企业不同，军队玩核无需打算盘。

Whatever Obama decides will remain secret. But the results will speak for themselves in budget submissions, program schedules, and whether the United States accelerates reductions required under the New START treaty. Rightsizing the nuclear force would strengthen U.S. global leadership, enhance the country's ability to deter new nuclear weapon states, accelerate efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, and greatly reduce the danger of the use of nuclear weapons from miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accident. It would make us all safer. More than budget decisions, these are fundamental security issues that tell the world a great deal about U.S. leadership, intentions, and values. Updating the nuclear posture from that of the Cold War era could be one of the most lasting legacies of the Obama presidency. He has already made promises; the time has come to deliver on them.

无论奥巴马如何选择，其决定将成为国家机密，旁人无可知晓。但我们可以从预算案、项目进度、以及美国是否加紧依照《战略武器裁减新条约》行事等感受其后果。适当调整核武规模可加强美国的全球领导力；增强美国对新拥核国家的威慑力；加快阻止恐怖组织获取核武器；并极大地减少因误判、误读或事故而动用核武器的风险。这将使我们更安全。奥巴马的选择不光光是预算决定，它是根本性的安全问题，更能向全世界展示美国的领导力、意图和价值。将核战略从冷战时期的版本升级，或可成为奥巴马总统最大的历史功绩。他已经作出承诺，现在到了兑现的时刻了。

《外交事务》原文http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ar ... -on-nuclear-weaponsObama's Turn on Nuclear Weapons
奥巴马接掌核武器

作者Joseph Cirincione为Ploughshares基金会主席。

《外交事务》2012年2月2日 



When U.S. President Barack Obama took to the podium during a rare visit to the Pentagon early last month, he announced a new strategy for the country's military posture abroad. The United States would shift from being able to fight two major wars simultaneously to increasing its focus on Asia. But the president also explained that reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be key to future defense: "We will continue to get rid of outdated Cold War-era systems," he said, "so that we can invest in the capabilities we need for the future."

上个月早些时候，美国总统奥巴马罕见地造访五角大楼，他在发言中公布了美国未来海外军事姿态新策略。美国将从＂可同时进行两场主要战争＂转变成＂将重心向亚洲倾斜＂。奥巴马同时指出，裁减美国核武库将是未来防务的关键：＂我们将继续退役那些冷战时期的陈旧系统，从而能够向那些未来所需的军事能力进行投资。＂

Policy, meet budget. After having been separated for a decade, as the Pentagon operated essentially free from fiscal considerations, the two have been reunited in Washington's new age of austerity. On nuclear weapons, that fact should work in Obama's favor. In his first major foreign policy speech, delivered in Prague in April 2009, he vowed to "put an end to Cold War thinking" and "reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same." Obama negotiated the New START agreement with Russia, which both countries signed a year later. It lowered the ceiling for deployed U.S. and Russian strategic warheads by 30 percent and restored reciprocal inspections, vital to verifying the reductions. Obama also oversaw a Nuclear Posture Review, which formalized his Prague goals as policy.

政策与预算的交汇。由于五角大楼几乎不受财政考虑的限制，两者在长达十年的时间里处于分离状态，现在终于在华盛顿的紧巴日子里重合了。在核武器问题上，政策与预算的结合对奥巴马有利。2009年4月，奥巴马在布拉格发表首个外交事务重要演说，他发誓要＂终结冷战思维＂并＂减少核武器在美国国家安全事务上所扮演的角色，同时敦促其它国家效仿＂。奥巴马与俄罗斯就《战略武器裁减新条约》进行了谈判，并于一年之后签署。该条约将美俄部置之核弹数量上限削减了百分之三十，双方还可重新互派对核实裁军十分重要的观察员。此外奥巴马还主持了一份《核战略评论》，其布拉格设想正式成文。

But in the past year, Republican opponents and a resistant nuclear bureaucracy have stymied further progress. Contracts raced ahead of policy -- Congress pushed through budgets to develop a new generation of nuclear arms before the president and the Pentagon could agree on the specifics of the new course. Unless this is reversed, in the coming decade Washington may actually spend more on the country's nuclear weapons programs than it has in the past. If the president wants to reduce the country's costly nuclear weapons burden he now has a chance. Last summer, as part of the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Pentagon started compiling a new, highly classified report with options for the structure and size of the nuclear force -- how it is composed, who and what it targets, and whether it continues to be postured to launch a devastating first strike on multiple states. 

但在去年，共和党反对人士及不情愿的核部门阻碍了核裁军的前进步伐。合同跑在了政策之前——在总统与五角大楼能够就核裁具体事宜达成一致之前，国会匆忙通过了用于研发新一代核武器的预算。除非国会预算被推翻，否则在未来十年内，华盛顿在核武器上的开销将增大。如果奥巴马希望减轻本国的核负担，他眼前就有这么一次机遇。去年夏天，作为2010年4月《核战略评论》的一部分，五角大楼开始汇编一份新的绝密报告，其中列明了美国核力量结构与规模的多种选择：核力量的组成；瞄准目标；以及是否继续保持对多个国家发起毁灭性首轮打击的姿态。

Now, the National Security Council staff at the White House is working with the Defense Department and other agencies to further shape policy options for the president's consideration. The package will likely be ready for him this month. Whatever Obama decides will then be codified in a presidential policy directive that will form the basis of the country's new strategic nuclear war plan. Since the end of the Cold War, every U.S. president has done this once. This is Obama's turn.

现在，白宫国家安全顾问职员正与五角大楼及其它机构合作，以形成多个政策备选项供总统定夺。这一系列选项很有可能在本月准备停当。无论奥巴马如何选择，其决定将形成正式的总统政策法令，成为美国战略核武新计划的基础。自从冷战结束以来，毎位总统都曾做出过一次选择，现在轮到奥巴马了。

Most observers have not expected much from this process. Amy Woolf, a nuclear weapons analyst at the Congressional Research Service, told a Washington audience last month that "any changes you see now are going to be modest." Russia is waiting to see if Obama is re-elected before committing to any new negotiated reductions. The president's political advisers also want protection during an election year -- when national security issues traditionally skew rightward -- and hesitate to give his opponents any fodder for the "weak and naive" meme. Finally, there are far more entrenched officials and contractors that benefit from the sprawling nuclear complex than officials who believe in the president's stated vision. To put it simply, Obama has let the bureaucracy suffocate his plan to move step by step toward, as he said in Prague, "the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."

大多数观察家们对这一过程无甚期许。国会研究服务机构的核武分析师Amy Woolf上个月在华盛顿的一次演讲中指出：＂任何改变都将是轻微的。＂而俄罗斯在做进一步核裁之前也在观望奥巴马能否连任成功。每逢总统大选，国家安全的议题总会传统性地向右倒，总统顾问们也想保护奥巴马，不愿授以政敌＂羸弱、天真＂的口实。最后，那些得益于美国庞大核武体系的官场老手与承包商要远远多于赞同奥巴马设想的官员。简言之，奥巴马正纵容官僚们扼杀其在布拉格提出的步步迈向＂无核世界之和平与安全＂的计划。

Although modesty may reign, there will likely be some options for deep cuts in the arsenal. These flow from the consensus formed in recent years among the core of America's security elite -- one that underpinned the Obama vision of 2009 -- that the United States has room to cut. Undersecretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy echoed this view at the Pentagon last month, when she said, "We can maintain deterrence at lower levels of forces." Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, went further, telling reporters last month, "Nuclear weapons are way overdone, we have way more than are needed to carry out their mission." The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, conducted by the Defense Department, reported that "the massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War era of bipolar military confrontation is poorly suited to address the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly regimes seeking nuclear weapons."

尽管谨慎当道，但对核武库进行大规模裁减的选项还是很有可能出现，这源于近年来美国安全问题核心精英的共识。这一认为美国核武库尚有裁减空间的共识是奥巴马2009年设想的基础。上个月，副国防部长Michèle Flournoy也赞同这一观点，她指出：＂即便降低军力水平，我们也能保持威慑力。＂参议院军事委员会主席、来自密歇根州的参议员、民主党人Carl Levin则更进一步，他在上个月对记者表示：＂核武器多过头了，要完成任务根本无需这么多的弹头。＂由国防部操刀的2010年《核战略评论》曾报道称：＂我们从两强对峙的冷战时期继承下来的庞大核武库难以应对当今之挑战，诸如自杀式恐怖分子以及寻求核武器的非友好政权等。＂

Ever since President Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. presidents upon taking office have asked the same question: Why does the country need so many nuclear weapons? The short answer is targeting. Current guidance requires the U.S. military to be prepared at any moment to unleash a first strike against targets in five countries: Russia, China, Iran, Syria, and North Korea. This thinking dates back to the targeting guidance developed by the Defense Department in the 1950s. The 1974 guidance, the most recent to be de-classified, details in 18 pages the types of facilities to be destroyed, including nuclear weapons and bases, conventional military installations, military and civilian command-and-control centers, and political and economic resources. In 1974, this included training "at least one weapon on an industrial facility in the top 250 urban areas in the Soviet Union and in the top 125 urban areas in the People's Republic of China," so as "to prolong their post-war recovery." This is the strategy that justifies the approximately 5,000 weapons in the U.S. arsenal today.

自艾森豪威尔总统以降，美国总统上台之际都会问同一个问题：为什么我们需要这么多的核武器？一个简短的答案：瞄准。目前的指令规定，美军应随时准备向五个国家的目标发起首轮打击：俄罗斯、中国、伊朗、叙利亚和朝鲜。这一思维可追溯至国防部在上世纪五十年代制定的瞄准指令。在最新一个被解密的指令（1974年版）中，国防部在18页纸中详细列明了需摧毁的目标种类，其中包括核武器及其基地、常规军队设施、军民指挥和控制中心、政治与经济资源。在1974年，这包括用＂至少一枚核弹瞄准每一个位于苏联前250名、中国前125名城市中的工业设施，以延长其战后恢复期。＂这就是为什么美国核武库现有约五千件核武器。

Here is where the budget squeeze could give nuclear reductions a new impetus. Current nuclear policy is very expensive. Each leg of the United States' nuclear triad -- long-range missiles, bombers, and submarines -- is reaching the end of its expected operational life. The Pentagon estimates that the U.S. Navy will have to spend $350 billion to build and operate a new fleet of 12 nuclear-armed submarines that it plans to slip into the water starting around 2030. The Office of Management and Budget recommended last December that the Navy build only ten, and some outside experts have suggested that eight would suffice. But the Navy argues that since submarines need time to get to and from port and undergo routine maintenance, it needs at least 12 subs to keep five on station at all times. Why would the Navy have to keep five of these new subs (two in the Atlantic and three in the Pacific), each with 16 missiles carrying up to eight nuclear warheads apiece, at sea ready to fire? Because the current nuclear policy guidance says it must.

预算吃紧给核裁军提供了新动力，目前的核策略耗资巨大。美国核武三剑客——远程导弹、轰炸机、潜艇都正在临近退役年限。据五角大楼估计，如要在2030年左右建成并投入使用由12艘核潜艇组成的新舰队，海军须花费3500亿美元。管理与预算办公室在去年12月建议海军将潜艇数量降为10艘，而外界专家认为8艘足矣。但海军驳斥称，由于潜艇出入港和定期维护等原因，它需要至少12艘潜艇以确保有5艘随时就位待命。为什么美军必须保证有5艘核潜艇（2艘位于大西洋、3艘位于太平洋、每艘装载16枚导弹、每枚导弹最多可装有8枚弹头）随时保持战备状态？因为这是目前核战略指令的规定。

That need not be the case. Obama could rewrite those policies to shrink the target list, eliminate the need to launch weapons in minutes, and make other common-sense improvements. For example, by dropping the requirement to launch approximately 1,000 weapons at targets within 20 minutes, he could reduce the number of submarines required on station, allowing for a secure submarine force of eight boats. That would save $20 billion over ten years and $120 billion over the life of the program. Delaying the new strategic bomber would save $18 billion over ten years, and canceling it, $68 billion over 20 to 30 years. Reducing the current arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles from 420 to 300 would save billions more, although no one is sure how much, because the government has never done what most businesses do routinely -- that is, cost out the options. 

完全不必如此。奥巴马可以重写这些政策以缩短目标清单，取消必须在数分钟之內完成发射的要求，并做出其它合乎常理的改变。比方说，放弃在20分钟内向目标发射约1千枚导弹的规定，奥巴马即可减少值班核潜艇数目，8艘足以满足周转。这一举措将在未来十年节省开支200亿美元，并在潜艇服役期内节省1200亿美元。若将新型战略轰炸机项目压后，可在十年内节省180亿美元，取消该项目则可在20至50年内节省680亿美元。若将洲际导弹的数量从目前的420枚减少至300枚，可再节省数十亿美元，当然无人可知确切的金额，因为政府与绝大多数企业不同，军队玩核无需打算盘。

Whatever Obama decides will remain secret. But the results will speak for themselves in budget submissions, program schedules, and whether the United States accelerates reductions required under the New START treaty. Rightsizing the nuclear force would strengthen U.S. global leadership, enhance the country's ability to deter new nuclear weapon states, accelerate efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, and greatly reduce the danger of the use of nuclear weapons from miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accident. It would make us all safer. More than budget decisions, these are fundamental security issues that tell the world a great deal about U.S. leadership, intentions, and values. Updating the nuclear posture from that of the Cold War era could be one of the most lasting legacies of the Obama presidency. He has already made promises; the time has come to deliver on them.

无论奥巴马如何选择，其决定将成为国家机密，旁人无可知晓。但我们可以从预算案、项目进度、以及美国是否加紧依照《战略武器裁减新条约》行事等感受其后果。适当调整核武规模可加强美国的全球领导力；增强美国对新拥核国家的威慑力；加快阻止恐怖组织获取核武器；并极大地减少因误判、误读或事故而动用核武器的风险。这将使我们更安全。奥巴马的选择不光光是预算决定，它是根本性的安全问题，更能向全世界展示美国的领导力、意图和价值。将核战略从冷战时期的版本升级，或可成为奥巴马总统最大的历史功绩。他已经作出承诺，现在到了兑现的时刻了。

《外交事务》原文http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ar ... -on-nuclear-weapons