英文翻译：中国综合症

关于对华政策，过去几届的美国的总统们奉行的都是一种较为单一的模式：执政前，信誓旦旦扬言要来硬的;入驻白宫后，却来了个大变样。James Mann就提到过这个问题，早期的老布什在中国问题上曾经是个理想主义者，他不满于基辛格在七十年代与毛泽东的亲密接触，并深表忧虑，因为在美国的对华政策上，对于自由的宣扬没有占多大的成分。而老布什上任时，他却令人大跌眼镜的改变了策略。就算坦克开进了天安门，那个曾经中国的人权卫士却也只是发发牢骚。紧接着，就在六个月后，他便将Brent Scowcroft派往北京协调关系，因为布什发现去讨好这些中国的暴君则显得更为应景。

友谊还在继续着。1992年大选期间，比尔.克林顿的口吻和当年的老布什如初一辙，他谴责我们对于天安门事件的回应过于温和，还大放厥词，“当那些孩子们擎着自由女神，在天安门广场上，高喊自由时，我认为我们政府对此的做法显然是错误的。”他承诺对于中国的统治者不再手软，要求在未来观察中国的人权状况。然后呢？克林顿当选了，却急匆匆的变了想法，先是承认起初在处理中国问题上是个错误，然后则是对中国的人权问题置若罔闻，最后则理性的认为：在这样一个已经有一亿多人能够上网的国家，保持经济和社会的封闭式不可能的。（做总统真的很方便，他不必去对外宣扬美国式的教义，因为技术能帮他搞定。历史则让这种幼稚的想法显得无比荒谬。今天的中国有超过两亿的网名，而这个国家却并没有与政治自由沾边。）

历史的脚步和小布什来到了2000年，他也是个强硬派，尽管策略的焦点不再仅仅是人权问题，而更多的是远大的国家战略。当在2000年被拉里.金问到，“作为总统，在美国的国际政策上，那些地方亟待改进？”布什回应道，“和中国的关系。”他继续说道，“现在的总统认为这种关系是战略合作。我认为我们的关系更应该是竞争。”当小布什上任，这种对华的强硬再次软化了。诚然，9.11时间已一种无法预见的方式改变了美国的战略重心。另一方面，作为一个把堵住下在宣扬自由和民主上的总统，布什对于中国始终显得更为怜悯而手下留情---在西藏，缅甸，达尔富尔，和内部的权利滥用。在两个月之后，布什还会以参加奥运会的开幕式的方式来答谢中国，尽管大量的证据显示中国的人权问题在奥运会来临之际，变得更为糟糕。

现如今，我们又进入了新一轮的大选，而强硬派的声音也再次不绝于耳，这兴许并不知道。看看麦肯恩讲了什么，“中国造了新潜艇，扩充了战斗机，更新战略弹道导弹武器库，还在测试反卫星武器，美国有理由来质问这些挑拨性行为背后的动机----多么理想主义”。再来看看奥巴马吐了什么，“中国不是我们的敌人，但如果中国在西藏问题和苏丹问题上人一意孤行，处理不当，我们是觉不能姑息养奸----真有原则。”两位候选人也同时暗示过要和谐奥运会的开幕式。中国的统治者们并没有感到什么不安。多年来，他们早发现，那些曾经立正辞严候的选人们，一旦上位，都会变得小心翼翼，来处理与中国“朋友”的关系。在快来临的2009年1月（新总统上任），他们早预料到了那套老把戏又要来了。

我们并不希望这样。的确，美国在中国问题上牵涉很多利益，不管是战略上的，经济上的，抑或是环境上的，没有一个总统可以完全忽略这些。人权问题很多时候也会迁就于其他事务。但这么长时间里，在中国问题上，总统们始终将其他重要事务为借口，将人权问题次之对待。事到如今，对于这种惯例也该有个了断了。

下届总统可能会首先会将中国的统治者和被统治者区分开来。中国问题学者Perry Link一再强调美国的总统们总是将中国政府的声明和中国公民的心声搞混。结果，就像Link说的那样，我们政府在帮助中国人民寻求一个更为公平，透明，法治的社会方面，所尽到的责任是微乎其微。



事实上，大量的证据表明众多中国民众对于政府的丑陋行径表示鄙夷----盛行的腐败，宗教自由的限制，土地的共有政策等。这可能只是一小步，但政府的在这些问题上的强硬则反映的是我们在中美关系上的一个重要转变。Link认为美国需要更为庄严，明晰，强硬的公开声明来改进政府曾经的一些做法。这些举措并不会使政府垮台，也不会使大量的异端者出狱重获自由。但，至少，它传达的信息是我们坚定立场始终站在中国人民一边，而非那个可憎的政府。那些在世界上最大的独裁者手掌里，忍受着的亿万儿女才是我们真正的中国朋友。

对照英文：
When it comes to China policy, American presidents over the past generation have adhered to a relatively simple pattern: Talk tough before taking office, then, once in the White House, backpedal. As James Mann documents in this issue ("Senior Moments"), the first President Bush was something of an idealist on China early in his career, decrying Henry Kissinger's strategy of cozying up to Mao Zedong during the 1970s and worrying that U.S. policy toward Beijing did not give high enough priority to the promotion of freedom. By the time he became president, however, Bush had adopted a very different approach; and, when tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square, the erstwhile defender of Chinese human rights could muster only the weakest of responses. Indeed, just over six months later, Bush would dispatch Brent Scowcroft to Beijing, where the ur-realist saw fit to toast China's murderous leaders as "friends."

And friends they would remain. During the 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton sounded a lot like the young Bush Senior on China, denouncing our "very tepid response" to the Tiananmen massacre and saying, "I think it is a mistake for us to do what this administration did when all those kids went out there carrying the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square." He promised to be "firm" with China's rulers and demand that they "observe human rights in the future." And then? Clinton got elected and promptly changed his mind, admitting that his initial approach to China had been a mistake, largely ignoring Beijing's abuse of human rights, and rationalizing it all by predicting that, "when over 100 million people in China can get on the Net, it will be impossible to maintain a closed political and economic society." (How convenient for a president to argue that he needn't look out for American principles abroad because technology would do the job for him. History, of course, has made a mockery of this sentiment: Today, there are more than 220 million Chinese online, and the country is little closer to political freedom.)

Then, in 2000, along came George W. Bush, who also talked tough on China, albeit with more of a focus on grand strategy than human rights. Asked by Larry King in 2000, "What area of American international policy would you change immediately as president?" Bush responded, "Our relationship with China." He went on: "The current president has called the relationship with China a strategic partnership. I believe our relationship needs to be redefined as one of competitor." Once Bush took office, of course, this tough stance toward China melted. To be sure, September 11 altered America's strategic priorities in a way that no one could have foreseen. On the other hand, for a president who has staked his legacy on the worldwide promotion of freedom and democracy, Bush has been notably reticent to challenge China's leaders--on Tibet, Burma, Darfur, or their abuses at home. And, in two months, Bush will do China the honor of attending the Olympics, despite considerable evidence that Beijing's human rights record has actually worsened during the run-up to the Games.

Now we find ourselves in another campaign season and, wouldn't you know, once again awash in the usual tough talk (McCain: "When China builds new submarines, adds hundreds of new jet fighters, modernizes its arsenal of strategic ballistic missiles, and tests antisatellite weapons, the United States legitimately must question the intent of such provocative acts"), idealistic rhetoric (Obama: "China is not an enemy of ours. ... But whether it's the situation in Tibet or their support of the government in Khartoum that is helping to perpetrate the genocide in Darfur, we can't be silent"), and nods to principle (both candidates have suggested they would consider boycotting the Olympic opening ceremonies). Chinese leaders, however, are almost certainly not alarmed. Over the years, they must have noticed how presidential aspirants who denounced America's accommodation of China became White House occupants who dealt gingerly with their "friends" in Beijing. They surely expect that, come January 2009, the usual pattern will hold.

We hope it doesn't. It is true that America has key interests in China--strategic, economic, environmental--that no president would dream of ignoring. And of course there are times when human rights should take a backseat to these matters. For too long, however, the mere existence of other priorities has given presidents an excuse to permanently relegate human rights to second-tier status in our relationship with Beijing. This practice has to end.



The next president might start by drawing a clear distinction between the men who hold power in China and the people over whom they rule. China scholar Perry Link has persuasively argued that Americans have long tended to confuse the statements of the Chinese government with the sentiments of Chinese citizens. As a result, Link says, our government plays "a much weaker hand than it could in supporting the Chinese people in their quest for [a] ... fairer, more transparent, and more law-governed society."



There is, in fact, considerable evidence that many Chinese resent their government's ugly practices--its endemic corruption, its restrictions on religious freedom, its land confiscation policies, and so on. It may seem like a small step, but for the next president to speak forcefully and regularly about these issues would represent an important change in our relationship with the country. "The United States ... could do much more good than it is now doing by using dignified, clear, and strong public statements," argues Link--and he is right. No, such a step will not bring down the government. Nor will it necessarily lead to dissidents flooding out of jails. But it would, at the very least, signal to the Chinese people that our ultimate solidarity lies not with their odious government but with them: the billion, long-suffering men and women of the world's largest dictatorship, our true "friends" in China.关于对华政策，过去几届的美国的总统们奉行的都是一种较为单一的模式：执政前，信誓旦旦扬言要来硬的;入驻白宫后，却来了个大变样。James Mann就提到过这个问题，早期的老布什在中国问题上曾经是个理想主义者，他不满于基辛格在七十年代与毛泽东的亲密接触，并深表忧虑，因为在美国的对华政策上，对于自由的宣扬没有占多大的成分。而老布什上任时，他却令人大跌眼镜的改变了策略。就算坦克开进了天安门，那个曾经中国的人权卫士却也只是发发牢骚。紧接着，就在六个月后，他便将Brent Scowcroft派往北京协调关系，因为布什发现去讨好这些中国的暴君则显得更为应景。

友谊还在继续着。1992年大选期间，比尔.克林顿的口吻和当年的老布什如初一辙，他谴责我们对于天安门事件的回应过于温和，还大放厥词，“当那些孩子们擎着自由女神，在天安门广场上，高喊自由时，我认为我们政府对此的做法显然是错误的。”他承诺对于中国的统治者不再手软，要求在未来观察中国的人权状况。然后呢？克林顿当选了，却急匆匆的变了想法，先是承认起初在处理中国问题上是个错误，然后则是对中国的人权问题置若罔闻，最后则理性的认为：在这样一个已经有一亿多人能够上网的国家，保持经济和社会的封闭式不可能的。（做总统真的很方便，他不必去对外宣扬美国式的教义，因为技术能帮他搞定。历史则让这种幼稚的想法显得无比荒谬。今天的中国有超过两亿的网名，而这个国家却并没有与政治自由沾边。）

历史的脚步和小布什来到了2000年，他也是个强硬派，尽管策略的焦点不再仅仅是人权问题，而更多的是远大的国家战略。当在2000年被拉里.金问到，“作为总统，在美国的国际政策上，那些地方亟待改进？”布什回应道，“和中国的关系。”他继续说道，“现在的总统认为这种关系是战略合作。我认为我们的关系更应该是竞争。”当小布什上任，这种对华的强硬再次软化了。诚然，9.11时间已一种无法预见的方式改变了美国的战略重心。另一方面，作为一个把堵住下在宣扬自由和民主上的总统，布什对于中国始终显得更为怜悯而手下留情---在西藏，缅甸，达尔富尔，和内部的权利滥用。在两个月之后，布什还会以参加奥运会的开幕式的方式来答谢中国，尽管大量的证据显示中国的人权问题在奥运会来临之际，变得更为糟糕。

现如今，我们又进入了新一轮的大选，而强硬派的声音也再次不绝于耳，这兴许并不知道。看看麦肯恩讲了什么，“中国造了新潜艇，扩充了战斗机，更新战略弹道导弹武器库，还在测试反卫星武器，美国有理由来质问这些挑拨性行为背后的动机----多么理想主义”。再来看看奥巴马吐了什么，“中国不是我们的敌人，但如果中国在西藏问题和苏丹问题上人一意孤行，处理不当，我们是觉不能姑息养奸----真有原则。”两位候选人也同时暗示过要和谐奥运会的开幕式。中国的统治者们并没有感到什么不安。多年来，他们早发现，那些曾经立正辞严候的选人们，一旦上位，都会变得小心翼翼，来处理与中国“朋友”的关系。在快来临的2009年1月（新总统上任），他们早预料到了那套老把戏又要来了。

我们并不希望这样。的确，美国在中国问题上牵涉很多利益，不管是战略上的，经济上的，抑或是环境上的，没有一个总统可以完全忽略这些。人权问题很多时候也会迁就于其他事务。但这么长时间里，在中国问题上，总统们始终将其他重要事务为借口，将人权问题次之对待。事到如今，对于这种惯例也该有个了断了。

下届总统可能会首先会将中国的统治者和被统治者区分开来。中国问题学者Perry Link一再强调美国的总统们总是将中国政府的声明和中国公民的心声搞混。结果，就像Link说的那样，我们政府在帮助中国人民寻求一个更为公平，透明，法治的社会方面，所尽到的责任是微乎其微。



事实上，大量的证据表明众多中国民众对于政府的丑陋行径表示鄙夷----盛行的腐败，宗教自由的限制，土地的共有政策等。这可能只是一小步，但政府的在这些问题上的强硬则反映的是我们在中美关系上的一个重要转变。Link认为美国需要更为庄严，明晰，强硬的公开声明来改进政府曾经的一些做法。这些举措并不会使政府垮台，也不会使大量的异端者出狱重获自由。但，至少，它传达的信息是我们坚定立场始终站在中国人民一边，而非那个可憎的政府。那些在世界上最大的独裁者手掌里，忍受着的亿万儿女才是我们真正的中国朋友。

对照英文：
When it comes to China policy, American presidents over the past generation have adhered to a relatively simple pattern: Talk tough before taking office, then, once in the White House, backpedal. As James Mann documents in this issue ("Senior Moments"), the first President Bush was something of an idealist on China early in his career, decrying Henry Kissinger's strategy of cozying up to Mao Zedong during the 1970s and worrying that U.S. policy toward Beijing did not give high enough priority to the promotion of freedom. By the time he became president, however, Bush had adopted a very different approach; and, when tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square, the erstwhile defender of Chinese human rights could muster only the weakest of responses. Indeed, just over six months later, Bush would dispatch Brent Scowcroft to Beijing, where the ur-realist saw fit to toast China's murderous leaders as "friends."

And friends they would remain. During the 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton sounded a lot like the young Bush Senior on China, denouncing our "very tepid response" to the Tiananmen massacre and saying, "I think it is a mistake for us to do what this administration did when all those kids went out there carrying the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square." He promised to be "firm" with China's rulers and demand that they "observe human rights in the future." And then? Clinton got elected and promptly changed his mind, admitting that his initial approach to China had been a mistake, largely ignoring Beijing's abuse of human rights, and rationalizing it all by predicting that, "when over 100 million people in China can get on the Net, it will be impossible to maintain a closed political and economic society." (How convenient for a president to argue that he needn't look out for American principles abroad because technology would do the job for him. History, of course, has made a mockery of this sentiment: Today, there are more than 220 million Chinese online, and the country is little closer to political freedom.)

Then, in 2000, along came George W. Bush, who also talked tough on China, albeit with more of a focus on grand strategy than human rights. Asked by Larry King in 2000, "What area of American international policy would you change immediately as president?" Bush responded, "Our relationship with China." He went on: "The current president has called the relationship with China a strategic partnership. I believe our relationship needs to be redefined as one of competitor." Once Bush took office, of course, this tough stance toward China melted. To be sure, September 11 altered America's strategic priorities in a way that no one could have foreseen. On the other hand, for a president who has staked his legacy on the worldwide promotion of freedom and democracy, Bush has been notably reticent to challenge China's leaders--on Tibet, Burma, Darfur, or their abuses at home. And, in two months, Bush will do China the honor of attending the Olympics, despite considerable evidence that Beijing's human rights record has actually worsened during the run-up to the Games.

Now we find ourselves in another campaign season and, wouldn't you know, once again awash in the usual tough talk (McCain: "When China builds new submarines, adds hundreds of new jet fighters, modernizes its arsenal of strategic ballistic missiles, and tests antisatellite weapons, the United States legitimately must question the intent of such provocative acts"), idealistic rhetoric (Obama: "China is not an enemy of ours. ... But whether it's the situation in Tibet or their support of the government in Khartoum that is helping to perpetrate the genocide in Darfur, we can't be silent"), and nods to principle (both candidates have suggested they would consider boycotting the Olympic opening ceremonies). Chinese leaders, however, are almost certainly not alarmed. Over the years, they must have noticed how presidential aspirants who denounced America's accommodation of China became White House occupants who dealt gingerly with their "friends" in Beijing. They surely expect that, come January 2009, the usual pattern will hold.

We hope it doesn't. It is true that America has key interests in China--strategic, economic, environmental--that no president would dream of ignoring. And of course there are times when human rights should take a backseat to these matters. For too long, however, the mere existence of other priorities has given presidents an excuse to permanently relegate human rights to second-tier status in our relationship with Beijing. This practice has to end.



The next president might start by drawing a clear distinction between the men who hold power in China and the people over whom they rule. China scholar Perry Link has persuasively argued that Americans have long tended to confuse the statements of the Chinese government with the sentiments of Chinese citizens. As a result, Link says, our government plays "a much weaker hand than it could in supporting the Chinese people in their quest for [a] ... fairer, more transparent, and more law-governed society."



There is, in fact, considerable evidence that many Chinese resent their government's ugly practices--its endemic corruption, its restrictions on religious freedom, its land confiscation policies, and so on. It may seem like a small step, but for the next president to speak forcefully and regularly about these issues would represent an important change in our relationship with the country. "The United States ... could do much more good than it is now doing by using dignified, clear, and strong public statements," argues Link--and he is right. No, such a step will not bring down the government. Nor will it necessarily lead to dissidents flooding out of jails. But it would, at the very least, signal to the Chinese people that our ultimate solidarity lies not with their odious government but with them: the billion, long-suffering men and women of the world's largest dictatorship, our true "friends" in China.