原创翻译Red Tide Just how strong is China\'s navy, re ...

适逢我国第一艘自主研发的航母分段出现，海军又掀起了新一轮的发展高潮，我们可以借此看看西方军事学者对中国海军力量以及战略的理解与看法，话说知己知彼，才能百战百胜。西方如此密切关注中国海军力量建设，我们也应该礼尚往来吧。
原文发表在美国外交政策网站上，新华社貌似也刊登了这篇文章的部分译文，但是我仔细看了看，翻译得很粗略，只翻了一半的内容，而且可能出于发稿截至日期，以及排版等其他考虑，很多地方漏译，删译，导致没能完全表达出作者的意图与看法。所以我自己完整翻译了文章全文。

原文链接：http://www.foreignpolicy.com/art ... chinese_navy?page=0,1&wp_login_redirect=0

Red Tide
Just how strong is China's navy, really?
红潮——中国海军实力到底有多强？

BY JAMES HOLMES | AUGUST 12, 2013

In late July, Chinese President Xi Jinping shared his views on sea power and maritime territorial disputes. Beijing is amenable to "shelving disputes and carrying out joint development" in waters such as the South China Sea, where, according to the official line, it enjoys "indisputable sovereignty." It will employ "peaceful means and negotiations to settle disputes and strive to safeguard peace and stability," but it won't "abandon its legitimate rights and interests." Beijing asserts sovereignty over the waters, islands, and atolls within what it calls the "nine-dashed line," a line that encloses the vast majority of the South China Sea, including huge swaths of the exclusive economic zones belonging to Southeast Asian states.
今年7月下旬，中国国家主席习近平就海权与海洋领土争端发表了自己的看法。虽然中国的官方立场认为，其对南海拥有无可争辩的主权，但是北京在南中国海等海域愿意采取"搁置争议，共同开发”的策略，还会通过“和平的手段与谈判来解决领土争议问题，并尽力维护和平与稳定”，但“绝不会放弃自身合法权益”。北京声称对其所谓的“九段线”（这条线囊括了绝大部分南中国海域，多个东南亚国家大片经济专属区也包括其中）内的水域，岛屿与环形珊瑚岛礁拥有主权。

Xi appears to be saying that China is prepared to postpone resolution of these disputes for the sake of working alongside Southeast Asians to tap the region's natural resources, and that it is willing to negotiate. That sounds reasonable. But he also seems to be saying that China has ruled out compromise and will continue building up its maritime strength to enforce its will. If Xi is sincere in all these statements, then the only real question left is when Asian powers will acquiesce meekly. In other words, China's neighbors need not formally surrender control of the waters and features within the nine-dashed line yet -- but in the end Beijing will give no ground. I suppose making Asians an offer they can't refuse is one way of getting to yes.
习的意思看上去是说中国为了能一道与东南亚各国开发利用南海地区的自然资源，准备搁置争议，愿意就相关问题进行谈判。这一建议看似合情合理。但是他又表示中国绝不妥协，为了施加自己的意志还会继续进行海上力量的建设。如果习的这番表态是真心实意的话，那么剩下的唯一疑问就是——亚洲各国何时会乖乖服从呢？我的意思是，表面上看，中国的邻国无需将九段线内水域与岛礁拱手让出，北京最终也不会让步。或许给邻国一个无法拒绝的建议，也可以让它们说yes吧。（我对作者这段话的理解，搁置争议，共同开发，大家都有好处拿，表面上看，没有哪个国家真的放弃了领土争议要求，中国也是恩威并施，并未显示出妥协的弱势，其他的邻国因为中国绝不让步的态度 只能接受。）

Levity aside, there's little reason to doubt Xi's sincerity about the importance China affixes to "core interests": shorthand for the interests for which the nation is prepared to fight, such as Taiwan and Tibet. And it is building up the capacity to fight and win. While there are many unknowns regarding the quality of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's equipment and crews, it boasts the most potential of any Asian navy.
玩笑归玩笑。中国对于“核心利益”高度重视，而“核心利益”可以粗略地表达为中国愿意为之一战的利益，如台湾与西藏问题。因此没有理由怀疑习对于这方面讲话的份量。目前中国正不断提高打赢的能力，虽然解放军海军是潜力最大的亚洲海上力量，然而其装备性能与人员素质却依然存在诸多不明朗的因素。

China's maritime project is hurtling along at breakneck velocity. The PLA Navy's first aircraft carrier has taken to the seas. Shipyards are apparently starting to fabricate a second one, while the naval leadership has evidently settled on a design for guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), which ride shotgun with any carrier task force to defend against air, surface, and subsurface threats. The navy also has help from non-naval services. The nation's first unified coast guard debuted in July and immediately set sail to enforce Beijing's claims to islands and waters in the East and South China seas.
中国的海上力量建设正以飞快的速度直线飙升。解放军海军的第一艘航空母舰已经驶向大海。显然，中国的船厂开始建造第二艘航母，现有的证据也表明，中国海军领导层已经确定了新一代导弹驱逐舰的设计方案，届时这些驱逐舰将像带刀护卫一般保护航母特遣舰队抵御来自空中，海面预计水下的威胁。此外中国海军还得到了其他非军事部门的协助。中国首个合并后的海岸警卫组织于7月亮相，并立即出航以强化北京在东海和南中国海内水域与岛屿的领土声索权。

The major unknowns concern the quality of PLA Navy equipment and crews. First consider the hardware: You can flip open Jane's Fighting Ships or visit the fine folks at the consultancyGlobalSecurity to find estimates of what various armed services plan to procure, as well as technical characteristics -- ranges, payloads, rates of fire, and so forth -- illustrating how military gear should perform. We can estimate, for example, that by 2020, China will field over 70 conventional and nuclear-powered attack submarines, along with 84 destroyers and frigates, two aircraft carriers, and an assortment of smaller but still lethal craft. But it's impossible to tell in advance how weaponry and platforms will function until put to the test of combat. (This is true even of your own hardware. Having been part of the first combat use of Tomahawk cruise missiles, I can tell you we heaved a small sigh of relief when that first volley of missiles went off as advertised.) Unable to test adversaries' equipment, foreign observers rely mostly on guesswork to foresee how enemy armaments will perform under real-world conditions and thus how great a threat they pose.
解放军海军装备性能与人员素质是主要的未知因素之一。让我们先来看看硬件建设方面：大家可以翻查《简氏战舰年鉴》或者拜读GlobalSecurity咨询公司专家们写的有关文章来大致了解各国海军力量的采购计划，以及相关装备的技术特点：如射程，载荷，射速等参数，这些都是能显示军事装备所应的有性能的指标。例如，到2020年中国海军估计将拥有超过70艘的常规与核动力攻击潜艇，84艘驱护舰，两艘航母以及一支由吨位较小但同样致命的各种舰艇混合组成的舰队。但是这些武器与平台的性能如果不经历实战检验，很难预估它们的实际性能（哪个国家的硬件建设也是同样的道理，我本人就亲身经历了战斧巡航导弹的首次实战，当战斧的第一轮齐射像广告宣传片中那样成功地飞离后，我们大伙才略微舒了口气。）由于无法检验对手的装备，外国观察家们主要靠猜测来估计敌方武备在真实战斗条件下的性能，以及其造成的相应威胁程度。
For instance, Chinese naval specialists have been touting the PLA Navy's latest DDG designs as comparable to the U.S. Navy's Aegis ships, which carry state-of-the-art systems in air and missile defense. Are they? This possibility spooks U.S. maritime strategists. China's naval ambitions remain largely confined to the China seas and Western Pacific, within reach not just of the fleet but of an array of land-based weapons. Used with submarines, missile-armed patrol craft, shore-based tactical aircraft, and anti-ship missiles, an Aegis-equivalent warship would establish a serious Chinese deterrent capability in East Asian waters.
再举个例子，中国的海军专家们一直在吹捧解放军海军最新型导弹驱逐舰的设计能跟装备有最先进防空反导系统的美国海军宙斯盾舰相媲美。情况果真如此么？不过这种可能性倒是把美国海上战略制定者们给吓坏了。中国的海洋雄心很大程度上依旧仅限于中国临近的海域与西太平洋，此范围内其海军以及多种陆基武器射程都能覆盖。一艘与神盾级相当的战斗舰艇如果和潜艇，配备导弹的巡逻机，岸基战术飞机，反舰导弹配合作战的话，必将在东亚海域构成一股不可小觑的威慑力量。

Aegis is a combined radar, computer, and fire-control system that has been around for 30 years, ever since USS Ticonderoga, the U.S. Navy's first Aegis cruiser, put to sea. But since then the U.S. Navy has made constant improvements to the system. It's entirely plausible that Chinese DDGs -- most notably the Type 052D DDG unveiled in 2012 -- are equivalent to some generation of Aegis. But is the Type 052D a 1980s, 1990s, or more recent Aegis vintage? If it's a Ticonderoga equivalent, it poses only modest cause for concern. If Chinese weaponeers have managed to leap to near parity, however, the new DDG represents an ominous development indeed.
自美国海军首艘装备宙斯盾系统的提康德罗加级巡洋舰服役以来，宙斯盾已经有30年的历史了，这是一种由雷达，计算机以及火控系统组成的综合武器系统。这段时间内，美军一直对其不断改进。中国的导弹驱逐舰，尤其是最出名的052D型（2012年露面）如果拥有与某一世代的宙斯盾驱逐舰相比肩的性能，也完全是可能的。但问题是052D型是相当于上世纪80年代，还是90年代宙斯盾的水平？或者是跟更新型的宙斯盾舰同级？如果其仅仅相当于提康德罗加级的水平的话，那么052D构成的威胁无需多虑。要是中国武器研发人员成功实现了跃进式发展，使中国的新型驱逐舰接近了美国最新型的水平的话，那么情况确实不妙。

Until the PLA Navy starts operating at sea more and using its hardware under realistic conditions, it will be tough for outsiders to glimpse inside these black boxes. This is true not just of DDGs but of stealth fighters, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and myriad other PLA systems that appear impressive but remain mostly untried. Many unknowns linger.
在解放军海军开始加大海上活动强度，并在实战情况下运用其硬件前，外界人士很对其拥有的那些“黑盒子”舰艇（詹姆斯.霍姆斯在另一篇文章中引用美国军事战略分析家，军史学家E.Luttwak的观点，把未经实战考验的新型装备称之为“黑盒子”，其性能往往达不到原先对它们乐观的估计）的真实情况有个大概了解。不仅仅是驱逐舰，隐身战斗机，反舰弹道导弹以及解放军其他大量表面上看起来光鲜亮丽，但未经实战检验的武器装备也同样如此。因此解放军海军实力长期存在诸多未知因素。

The human factor is another difficult variable to track. Strategic competition and war are human endeavors. The finest ship, airplane, or missile is no better than its user. How mariners perform amid the stresses of battle decides the outcomes of struggles on the high seas, but to excel in battle demands constant training and practice in peacetime. Sailors need to go to sea, a lot, to hone their skills. Yet PLA Navy operations are sporadic compared with the hectic deployment schedules customary for U.S. seafarers. Long intervals in port interrupted by the occasional short cruise provide too little experience to make seamanship, tactics, and technical proficiency second nature. Performance suffers. It's especially tough to maintain a fighting edge when one considers how seldom full-blown naval engagements take place. The U.S. Navy last battled a peer navy in 1944, when it fought Japan at Leyte Gulf. The PLA Navy has never taken on a great-power opponent.
人力因素也是另一个难以判断的变量。战略竞争以及战争都是人类行为。再先进的舰艇，飞机或导弹也无法与使用它们的人相提并论。水兵在战斗的压力环境下的表现将决定海上战斗的结果。要想在战斗中取胜，就需要持之以恒的训练和练习。海员需要经常出海训练以磨练相关技能。美国海军对于忙碌的行动日程早就习以为常，而中国海军活动强度与之相比比较零散。中国海军舰艇长期停靠在港内，只是偶尔进行短期的巡航任务，这不仅使官兵很难获得足够的经验以提高航海技术，战术素养，而且也不利于他们熟练运用技术装备以达到习惯成自然的程度。因此中国海军的战斗能力肯定会受到影响。如果一个国家很少考虑爆发全面大海战的可能性，其海军更加难以保持战斗优势。美国海军上次棋逢对手还是在1944年的莱特湾海战，敌人是日本海军。而中国海军从未与任何一个强国交过手。

Presently, there's reason to question the PLA Navy's battle-worthiness. If the PLA Navy operates at a higher tempo over the next decade, keeping task forces at sea for weeks or months at a time, it will evolve into a formidable force. Prospective adversaries can judge how formidable by monitoring its performance during exercises and routine at-sea operations, much as Western forces kept watch on the Soviet Navy in its heyday. Navies encounter each other at sea by chance during routine operations. Such encounters afford the opportunity to take a prospective adversary's measure, examining everything from whether its ships' hulls are rusty -- a sure sign of a poorly maintained ship and an apathetic crew -- to how smartly the officers handle their vessels on the high seas. If the PLA Navy participates in the 2014 U.S.-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise, this will furnish another such opportunity. Bean-counting, then, is easy. Measuring combat effectiveness is a task of a higher, more subjective order.
所以人们目前有理由对中国海军的战斗能力表示怀疑。未来十年里，解放军海军如果能加快行动的节奏，使特遣舰队一次出海的任务时间能维持在数周或者数月之久，那么其将演变成一支令人生畏的力量。中国的潜在对手们可以像以往西方军队密切监视鼎盛时期的苏联海军一样通过观察中国海军在演习以及例行海上行动中的表现来判断其实力到底多强。在执行例行行动时，各国海军经常不期而遇也是司空见惯的现象。这使得大家相互有机会了解自己的潜在对手。可以从以下方面来进行判断：1.对手舰艇是否有生锈现象，如果有的话，可以肯定其装备保养状况糟糕，官兵精神面貌萎靡，2.在公海执行任务时，其军官能否迅速利落地驾驭舰艇。如果2014年解放军海军参加以美国为主导的环太平洋军演，外界将又有另一个机会来审视其实力。单纯统计装备数量相对容易（这里作者用了bean-counting,bean-counter在英文中指那些关心数字的财会，这里结合上下文理解为统计装备数量，不一定正确）,而衡量对手的战斗效能则是项更艰巨，主观性更强的任务。

But there's another, hidden variable at play. Whereas U.S. sea power is the domain of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, Beijing thinks about its maritime power more holistically. It's not just the PLA Navy and coast guard, but merchant shipping and even the country's massive fishing fleet. And the Chinese military backs up that fleet with shore-based implements of sea power, including anti-ship ballistic missiles furnished by the army's Second Artillery Corps and tactical aircraft from the PLA Air Force. It may appear whimsical to depict a fishing trawler as a threat to a warship bristling with guns and missiles, but fishermen can gather intelligence on foreign navies. Any U.S. Navy mariner of Cold War vintage will tell you about the Soviet AGIs, or trawlers packed with high-tech electronic sensors, that used to lurk off American seaports. When a U.S. task force emerged, the AGI would dutifully follow along, monitoring the force's movements, recording its electronic emissions, and gleaning all the data it could. Fishing fleets can also lay and clear sea mines, one of the most elusive menaces to modern navies. These are useful craft around the margins.
但是还存在另一个影响战斗力的潜在变量。美国海权的维系是由美国海军，海军陆战队，海岸警卫队共同负责，而北京则用更为整体的观点来看待海权。不仅中国海军，海警而且其商船甚至规模庞大的渔船队都参与其中。中国军方用岸基兵器（包括第二炮兵部队的反舰弹道导弹和解放军空军的战术航空器）充当渔船队的后盾。有人说区区拖网渔船也能威胁到用导弹和舰炮武装到牙齿的现代化战舰，这听起来有些天方夜谭，但是它们却能搜集外国海军的情报。美国海军任何一位冷战时期服役的老兵都对前苏联的情报搜集船耳熟能详，它们是遍布高科技电子传感器才拖网渔船，时常潜伏在美国海港附近。每当美国特遣舰队出现时，这些间谍船们总是忠实地跟在后面，监听着前者的一举一动，每个电子信号辐射与数据都不放过。此外渔船队还能执行埋设与清理水雷（现代海军最防不胜防的威胁之一）任务。这些任务都是利用这些小船打擦边球。

This all-encompassing concept of sea power lets Beijing dial up or down the degree of force it brings to bear at sea, as circumstances and competitors' actions dictate. Nor is this approach new or radical. Maoist China considered the PLA Navy a force for waging "people's war at sea," a coastal defense force meant to make things tough on powerful adversaries should they approach China's coasts. For a weak China obsessed with protecting its land, it only made sense to use every seagoing asset available to mount a seaward defense. Communist China, like imperial China before it, regards the fishing fleet and the global shipping fleet as an irregular naval auxiliary. Fishermen in particular are a sort of seagoing militia. For instance, Beijing touted their contribution to victory over South Vietnam's Navy during a 1974 clash in the Paracel Islands. This way of thinking about maritime defense persists even as the PLA Navy matures into a world-class force.
北京对海权这种全方位的理解，使其可以根据形势以及对手的行动情况来决定运用到海上力量烈度的高低。这种策略并不激进，也算不上什么新意。其早在毛时代就考虑用发动“海上人民战争”来运用解放军海军————一旦有强大的敌人接近中国的海岸，就用岸基防卫部队让其吃尽苦头。当时的中国实力弱，痴迷于陆地领土的防守，因此利用一切能出海的装备发动对海防御是合情合理的。共产中国与以前的中华帝国一样，将渔船对与全球商船队看成是附属于海军的非正规力量。特别是渔民，他们类似于海上民兵。例如，1974年 中国在与越南海军在西沙群岛的战斗中取得了胜利，北京对民兵予以高度评价，认为此役他们功不可没。即使目前解放军在其海军不断成熟，正向世界级海上力量迈进的情况下，也未放弃这种海防思想。

Case in point: Chinese fishing boats represented the vanguard of Chinese sea power at Scarborough Shoal in 2012, when China took possession of an atoll deep within the Philippine exclusive economic zone. Chinese fishermen were first on scene. Only when a Philippine Navy frigate tried to arrest them for poaching did Beijing dispatch unarmed or lightly armed maritime-enforcement vessels -- the forerunners to today's coast guard -- to deter further Philippine action. A protracted standoff ensued, but ultimately the Philippine contingent withdrew -- leaving Scarborough Shoal in Chinese hands. Chinese hulls -- civilian, coast guard, and navy -- reportedly encase the atoll like a"cabbage," daring Manila to try to retake it.
现在也有相关例证，2012年中国在对斯卡伯勒礁（即我国的黄岩岛）的争夺中（中国占领了深入菲律宾专属经济区中的一块环形礁石区域），就用渔船作为本国海上力量的先锋。当时首先出马的是中国渔船，只是等到菲律宾海军护卫舰试图对它们进行抓捕时，北京才出动了无武装或者配备轻武器的海事执法船（现在中国海警的前身）进行阻吓。随后双方进行了长期的对峙，但最终菲律宾撤走了其船只，斯卡伯勒礁（即黄岩岛）落入中国之手。据报导，中国的船只，无论是民船，海监船，还是海军舰艇后来将那块礁石像“卷心菜”一样包围了起来，以此来挑衅马尼拉重新夺礁的努力。

That's textbook Chinese maritime strategy: minimal force, deployed by naval or nonnaval platforms as the situation and the naval balance warrant. China has stayed true to its Maoist traditions. It has kept its inventory of small craft strong and numerous, furthering both commercial and military purposes, even as it fills out the upper end of an oceangoing fleet with glitzy platforms like aircraft carriers and new destroyers. This continuum -- spanning from lowly fishing boats and patrol craft able to face off against weak Asian navies (like the Philippine Navy) to blue-water combatants able to duel peer navies (like the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force) on an equal footing -- is deeply embedded in China's maritime culture. While an economic downturn could slow down acquisitions, Beijing's basic approach will last as far into the future as the mariner's eye can see.
这是中国采取的经典海上策略：根据实际情况以及海上对峙平衡需要，派出海军或者非海军船只，运用最低限度的力量。尽管航母和新型驱逐舰等绚丽的高端武器服役，填补了海军远洋舰队的空白，中国一直坚持毛泽东传统思想，依然维持了一支实力强大，数量庞大的小型船队来实现军商两用的目的。这种连续统一的思想（包括用低端的渔船与巡逻船与像菲律宾这样实力弱小的亚洲国家海军对峙，用蓝海战斗舰艇与像日本海上自卫队这样同等级别的海军力量进行势均力敌的较量）已经深深根植于中国海洋文化之中。虽然当前中国低迷的经济增长可能会减缓其采购先进武器的步伐，但是北京的这种基本策略将在可预见的未来继续延续下去。

The PLA Navy, backed by the Chinese coast guard, shore-based air and missile forces, and unconventional auxiliaries from the commercial sector, can already make it tough and expensive for a peer navy to operate in China's geographical backyard. This is a force that could induce rivals to think twice before bucking China's will, and it outclasses lesser Asian navies by a wide margin. But will the Chinese navy venture outside Asia in force, mounting a standing presence in faraway theaters? Doubtful. Asserting control of China's environs is job No. 1. If Beijing's naval buildup continues along its current trajectory, the resulting force may let the nation put steel behind themany commitments it has taken on in the China seas, from the confrontation with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to the north through the Malacca Strait to the south.
解放军海军在海警，岸基航空和导弹力量以及商船队的支持下，能让任何一支在中国后院作战的海军陷入苦战甚至付出沉重代价。其实力更是远超亚洲那些弱小国家海军。任何胆敢与中国意志作对的对手，在这样一股力量面前都将三思而后行。但是，这是否意味着中国海军去敢于向亚洲海域以外的范围大举进发，在离本土遥远的战区保持存在呢？我对此表示怀疑。因为解放军海军目前的第一要务是保证中国外围环境的安全。如果北京能继续按目前的轨迹建设海军，那么其将能投入更多的舰艇遂行以下任务：在北边与日本就尖阁列岛或钓鱼岛问题进行对抗，南边保证马六甲海峡的安全。


A successful naval buildup might leave ships to spare for a modest forward presence in the next-most-important theater: the Indian Ocean, the shipping lane for Persian Gulf energy supplies. Beijing sees no pressing need to venture beyond East and South Asia. So you're not about to see Chinese frigates patrolling the Mediterranean or Atlantic. Chinese leaders evince little appetite to help police an international system they deem unfair and irrational -- an artifact of Western dominance that China must amend over time. What Chinese want, and what Xi has said China will get, lies in Asia. From fighting ships to fishing boats, Beijing increasingly has the sea power to get it.
中国海军建设如果取得成功的话，那么其可能还会有多余舰艇部署到次重要的印度洋海域（运送波斯湾能源的重要航道），以保持适度的前沿存在。北京认为目前并无紧迫的需要向东、南亚以外的范围进军。因此，我们暂时不会看到中国护卫舰在地中海或者大西洋巡逻的身影。中国领导人对充当维持国际秩序（他们认为它既不公正也不合理，是西方霸权时代的典型产物，日后必定会对其改变)的警察毫无兴趣。从习讲话中可以看出，中国意在亚洲。靠着战舰，渔船等硬件资源，北京的海洋实力不断增强，使其有能力实现自己的意图。

适逢我国第一艘自主研发的航母分段出现，海军又掀起了新一轮的发展高潮，我们可以借此看看西方军事学者对中国海军力量以及战略的理解与看法，话说知己知彼，才能百战百胜。西方如此密切关注中国海军力量建设，我们也应该礼尚往来吧。
原文发表在美国外交政策网站上，新华社貌似也刊登了这篇文章的部分译文，但是我仔细看了看，翻译得很粗略，只翻了一半的内容，而且可能出于发稿截至日期，以及排版等其他考虑，很多地方漏译，删译，导致没能完全表达出作者的意图与看法。所以我自己完整翻译了文章全文。

原文链接：http://www.foreignpolicy.com/art ... chinese_navy?page=0,1&wp_login_redirect=0

Red Tide
Just how strong is China's navy, really?
红潮——中国海军实力到底有多强？

BY JAMES HOLMES | AUGUST 12, 2013

In late July, Chinese President Xi Jinping shared his views on sea power and maritime territorial disputes. Beijing is amenable to "shelving disputes and carrying out joint development" in waters such as the South China Sea, where, according to the official line, it enjoys "indisputable sovereignty." It will employ "peaceful means and negotiations to settle disputes and strive to safeguard peace and stability," but it won't "abandon its legitimate rights and interests." Beijing asserts sovereignty over the waters, islands, and atolls within what it calls the "nine-dashed line," a line that encloses the vast majority of the South China Sea, including huge swaths of the exclusive economic zones belonging to Southeast Asian states.
今年7月下旬，中国国家主席习近平就海权与海洋领土争端发表了自己的看法。虽然中国的官方立场认为，其对南海拥有无可争辩的主权，但是北京在南中国海等海域愿意采取"搁置争议，共同开发”的策略，还会通过“和平的手段与谈判来解决领土争议问题，并尽力维护和平与稳定”，但“绝不会放弃自身合法权益”。北京声称对其所谓的“九段线”（这条线囊括了绝大部分南中国海域，多个东南亚国家大片经济专属区也包括其中）内的水域，岛屿与环形珊瑚岛礁拥有主权。

Xi appears to be saying that China is prepared to postpone resolution of these disputes for the sake of working alongside Southeast Asians to tap the region's natural resources, and that it is willing to negotiate. That sounds reasonable. But he also seems to be saying that China has ruled out compromise and will continue building up its maritime strength to enforce its will. If Xi is sincere in all these statements, then the only real question left is when Asian powers will acquiesce meekly. In other words, China's neighbors need not formally surrender control of the waters and features within the nine-dashed line yet -- but in the end Beijing will give no ground. I suppose making Asians an offer they can't refuse is one way of getting to yes.
习的意思看上去是说中国为了能一道与东南亚各国开发利用南海地区的自然资源，准备搁置争议，愿意就相关问题进行谈判。这一建议看似合情合理。但是他又表示中国绝不妥协，为了施加自己的意志还会继续进行海上力量的建设。如果习的这番表态是真心实意的话，那么剩下的唯一疑问就是——亚洲各国何时会乖乖服从呢？我的意思是，表面上看，中国的邻国无需将九段线内水域与岛礁拱手让出，北京最终也不会让步。或许给邻国一个无法拒绝的建议，也可以让它们说yes吧。（我对作者这段话的理解，搁置争议，共同开发，大家都有好处拿，表面上看，没有哪个国家真的放弃了领土争议要求，中国也是恩威并施，并未显示出妥协的弱势，其他的邻国因为中国绝不让步的态度 只能接受。）

Levity aside, there's little reason to doubt Xi's sincerity about the importance China affixes to "core interests": shorthand for the interests for which the nation is prepared to fight, such as Taiwan and Tibet. And it is building up the capacity to fight and win. While there are many unknowns regarding the quality of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's equipment and crews, it boasts the most potential of any Asian navy.
玩笑归玩笑。中国对于“核心利益”高度重视，而“核心利益”可以粗略地表达为中国愿意为之一战的利益，如台湾与西藏问题。因此没有理由怀疑习对于这方面讲话的份量。目前中国正不断提高打赢的能力，虽然解放军海军是潜力最大的亚洲海上力量，然而其装备性能与人员素质却依然存在诸多不明朗的因素。

China's maritime project is hurtling along at breakneck velocity. The PLA Navy's first aircraft carrier has taken to the seas. Shipyards are apparently starting to fabricate a second one, while the naval leadership has evidently settled on a design for guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), which ride shotgun with any carrier task force to defend against air, surface, and subsurface threats. The navy also has help from non-naval services. The nation's first unified coast guard debuted in July and immediately set sail to enforce Beijing's claims to islands and waters in the East and South China seas.
中国的海上力量建设正以飞快的速度直线飙升。解放军海军的第一艘航空母舰已经驶向大海。显然，中国的船厂开始建造第二艘航母，现有的证据也表明，中国海军领导层已经确定了新一代导弹驱逐舰的设计方案，届时这些驱逐舰将像带刀护卫一般保护航母特遣舰队抵御来自空中，海面预计水下的威胁。此外中国海军还得到了其他非军事部门的协助。中国首个合并后的海岸警卫组织于7月亮相，并立即出航以强化北京在东海和南中国海内水域与岛屿的领土声索权。

The major unknowns concern the quality of PLA Navy equipment and crews. First consider the hardware: You can flip open Jane's Fighting Ships or visit the fine folks at the consultancyGlobalSecurity to find estimates of what various armed services plan to procure, as well as technical characteristics -- ranges, payloads, rates of fire, and so forth -- illustrating how military gear should perform. We can estimate, for example, that by 2020, China will field over 70 conventional and nuclear-powered attack submarines, along with 84 destroyers and frigates, two aircraft carriers, and an assortment of smaller but still lethal craft. But it's impossible to tell in advance how weaponry and platforms will function until put to the test of combat. (This is true even of your own hardware. Having been part of the first combat use of Tomahawk cruise missiles, I can tell you we heaved a small sigh of relief when that first volley of missiles went off as advertised.) Unable to test adversaries' equipment, foreign observers rely mostly on guesswork to foresee how enemy armaments will perform under real-world conditions and thus how great a threat they pose.
解放军海军装备性能与人员素质是主要的未知因素之一。让我们先来看看硬件建设方面：大家可以翻查《简氏战舰年鉴》或者拜读GlobalSecurity咨询公司专家们写的有关文章来大致了解各国海军力量的采购计划，以及相关装备的技术特点：如射程，载荷，射速等参数，这些都是能显示军事装备所应的有性能的指标。例如，到2020年中国海军估计将拥有超过70艘的常规与核动力攻击潜艇，84艘驱护舰，两艘航母以及一支由吨位较小但同样致命的各种舰艇混合组成的舰队。但是这些武器与平台的性能如果不经历实战检验，很难预估它们的实际性能（哪个国家的硬件建设也是同样的道理，我本人就亲身经历了战斧巡航导弹的首次实战，当战斧的第一轮齐射像广告宣传片中那样成功地飞离后，我们大伙才略微舒了口气。）由于无法检验对手的装备，外国观察家们主要靠猜测来估计敌方武备在真实战斗条件下的性能，以及其造成的相应威胁程度。
For instance, Chinese naval specialists have been touting the PLA Navy's latest DDG designs as comparable to the U.S. Navy's Aegis ships, which carry state-of-the-art systems in air and missile defense. Are they? This possibility spooks U.S. maritime strategists. China's naval ambitions remain largely confined to the China seas and Western Pacific, within reach not just of the fleet but of an array of land-based weapons. Used with submarines, missile-armed patrol craft, shore-based tactical aircraft, and anti-ship missiles, an Aegis-equivalent warship would establish a serious Chinese deterrent capability in East Asian waters.
再举个例子，中国的海军专家们一直在吹捧解放军海军最新型导弹驱逐舰的设计能跟装备有最先进防空反导系统的美国海军宙斯盾舰相媲美。情况果真如此么？不过这种可能性倒是把美国海上战略制定者们给吓坏了。中国的海洋雄心很大程度上依旧仅限于中国临近的海域与西太平洋，此范围内其海军以及多种陆基武器射程都能覆盖。一艘与神盾级相当的战斗舰艇如果和潜艇，配备导弹的巡逻机，岸基战术飞机，反舰导弹配合作战的话，必将在东亚海域构成一股不可小觑的威慑力量。

Aegis is a combined radar, computer, and fire-control system that has been around for 30 years, ever since USS Ticonderoga, the U.S. Navy's first Aegis cruiser, put to sea. But since then the U.S. Navy has made constant improvements to the system. It's entirely plausible that Chinese DDGs -- most notably the Type 052D DDG unveiled in 2012 -- are equivalent to some generation of Aegis. But is the Type 052D a 1980s, 1990s, or more recent Aegis vintage? If it's a Ticonderoga equivalent, it poses only modest cause for concern. If Chinese weaponeers have managed to leap to near parity, however, the new DDG represents an ominous development indeed.
自美国海军首艘装备宙斯盾系统的提康德罗加级巡洋舰服役以来，宙斯盾已经有30年的历史了，这是一种由雷达，计算机以及火控系统组成的综合武器系统。这段时间内，美军一直对其不断改进。中国的导弹驱逐舰，尤其是最出名的052D型（2012年露面）如果拥有与某一世代的宙斯盾驱逐舰相比肩的性能，也完全是可能的。但问题是052D型是相当于上世纪80年代，还是90年代宙斯盾的水平？或者是跟更新型的宙斯盾舰同级？如果其仅仅相当于提康德罗加级的水平的话，那么052D构成的威胁无需多虑。要是中国武器研发人员成功实现了跃进式发展，使中国的新型驱逐舰接近了美国最新型的水平的话，那么情况确实不妙。

Until the PLA Navy starts operating at sea more and using its hardware under realistic conditions, it will be tough for outsiders to glimpse inside these black boxes. This is true not just of DDGs but of stealth fighters, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and myriad other PLA systems that appear impressive but remain mostly untried. Many unknowns linger.
在解放军海军开始加大海上活动强度，并在实战情况下运用其硬件前，外界人士很对其拥有的那些“黑盒子”舰艇（詹姆斯.霍姆斯在另一篇文章中引用美国军事战略分析家，军史学家E.Luttwak的观点，把未经实战考验的新型装备称之为“黑盒子”，其性能往往达不到原先对它们乐观的估计）的真实情况有个大概了解。不仅仅是驱逐舰，隐身战斗机，反舰弹道导弹以及解放军其他大量表面上看起来光鲜亮丽，但未经实战检验的武器装备也同样如此。因此解放军海军实力长期存在诸多未知因素。

The human factor is another difficult variable to track. Strategic competition and war are human endeavors. The finest ship, airplane, or missile is no better than its user. How mariners perform amid the stresses of battle decides the outcomes of struggles on the high seas, but to excel in battle demands constant training and practice in peacetime. Sailors need to go to sea, a lot, to hone their skills. Yet PLA Navy operations are sporadic compared with the hectic deployment schedules customary for U.S. seafarers. Long intervals in port interrupted by the occasional short cruise provide too little experience to make seamanship, tactics, and technical proficiency second nature. Performance suffers. It's especially tough to maintain a fighting edge when one considers how seldom full-blown naval engagements take place. The U.S. Navy last battled a peer navy in 1944, when it fought Japan at Leyte Gulf. The PLA Navy has never taken on a great-power opponent.
人力因素也是另一个难以判断的变量。战略竞争以及战争都是人类行为。再先进的舰艇，飞机或导弹也无法与使用它们的人相提并论。水兵在战斗的压力环境下的表现将决定海上战斗的结果。要想在战斗中取胜，就需要持之以恒的训练和练习。海员需要经常出海训练以磨练相关技能。美国海军对于忙碌的行动日程早就习以为常，而中国海军活动强度与之相比比较零散。中国海军舰艇长期停靠在港内，只是偶尔进行短期的巡航任务，这不仅使官兵很难获得足够的经验以提高航海技术，战术素养，而且也不利于他们熟练运用技术装备以达到习惯成自然的程度。因此中国海军的战斗能力肯定会受到影响。如果一个国家很少考虑爆发全面大海战的可能性，其海军更加难以保持战斗优势。美国海军上次棋逢对手还是在1944年的莱特湾海战，敌人是日本海军。而中国海军从未与任何一个强国交过手。

Presently, there's reason to question the PLA Navy's battle-worthiness. If the PLA Navy operates at a higher tempo over the next decade, keeping task forces at sea for weeks or months at a time, it will evolve into a formidable force. Prospective adversaries can judge how formidable by monitoring its performance during exercises and routine at-sea operations, much as Western forces kept watch on the Soviet Navy in its heyday. Navies encounter each other at sea by chance during routine operations. Such encounters afford the opportunity to take a prospective adversary's measure, examining everything from whether its ships' hulls are rusty -- a sure sign of a poorly maintained ship and an apathetic crew -- to how smartly the officers handle their vessels on the high seas. If the PLA Navy participates in the 2014 U.S.-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise, this will furnish another such opportunity. Bean-counting, then, is easy. Measuring combat effectiveness is a task of a higher, more subjective order.
所以人们目前有理由对中国海军的战斗能力表示怀疑。未来十年里，解放军海军如果能加快行动的节奏，使特遣舰队一次出海的任务时间能维持在数周或者数月之久，那么其将演变成一支令人生畏的力量。中国的潜在对手们可以像以往西方军队密切监视鼎盛时期的苏联海军一样通过观察中国海军在演习以及例行海上行动中的表现来判断其实力到底多强。在执行例行行动时，各国海军经常不期而遇也是司空见惯的现象。这使得大家相互有机会了解自己的潜在对手。可以从以下方面来进行判断：1.对手舰艇是否有生锈现象，如果有的话，可以肯定其装备保养状况糟糕，官兵精神面貌萎靡，2.在公海执行任务时，其军官能否迅速利落地驾驭舰艇。如果2014年解放军海军参加以美国为主导的环太平洋军演，外界将又有另一个机会来审视其实力。单纯统计装备数量相对容易（这里作者用了bean-counting,bean-counter在英文中指那些关心数字的财会，这里结合上下文理解为统计装备数量，不一定正确）,而衡量对手的战斗效能则是项更艰巨，主观性更强的任务。

But there's another, hidden variable at play. Whereas U.S. sea power is the domain of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, Beijing thinks about its maritime power more holistically. It's not just the PLA Navy and coast guard, but merchant shipping and even the country's massive fishing fleet. And the Chinese military backs up that fleet with shore-based implements of sea power, including anti-ship ballistic missiles furnished by the army's Second Artillery Corps and tactical aircraft from the PLA Air Force. It may appear whimsical to depict a fishing trawler as a threat to a warship bristling with guns and missiles, but fishermen can gather intelligence on foreign navies. Any U.S. Navy mariner of Cold War vintage will tell you about the Soviet AGIs, or trawlers packed with high-tech electronic sensors, that used to lurk off American seaports. When a U.S. task force emerged, the AGI would dutifully follow along, monitoring the force's movements, recording its electronic emissions, and gleaning all the data it could. Fishing fleets can also lay and clear sea mines, one of the most elusive menaces to modern navies. These are useful craft around the margins.
但是还存在另一个影响战斗力的潜在变量。美国海权的维系是由美国海军，海军陆战队，海岸警卫队共同负责，而北京则用更为整体的观点来看待海权。不仅中国海军，海警而且其商船甚至规模庞大的渔船队都参与其中。中国军方用岸基兵器（包括第二炮兵部队的反舰弹道导弹和解放军空军的战术航空器）充当渔船队的后盾。有人说区区拖网渔船也能威胁到用导弹和舰炮武装到牙齿的现代化战舰，这听起来有些天方夜谭，但是它们却能搜集外国海军的情报。美国海军任何一位冷战时期服役的老兵都对前苏联的情报搜集船耳熟能详，它们是遍布高科技电子传感器才拖网渔船，时常潜伏在美国海港附近。每当美国特遣舰队出现时，这些间谍船们总是忠实地跟在后面，监听着前者的一举一动，每个电子信号辐射与数据都不放过。此外渔船队还能执行埋设与清理水雷（现代海军最防不胜防的威胁之一）任务。这些任务都是利用这些小船打擦边球。

This all-encompassing concept of sea power lets Beijing dial up or down the degree of force it brings to bear at sea, as circumstances and competitors' actions dictate. Nor is this approach new or radical. Maoist China considered the PLA Navy a force for waging "people's war at sea," a coastal defense force meant to make things tough on powerful adversaries should they approach China's coasts. For a weak China obsessed with protecting its land, it only made sense to use every seagoing asset available to mount a seaward defense. Communist China, like imperial China before it, regards the fishing fleet and the global shipping fleet as an irregular naval auxiliary. Fishermen in particular are a sort of seagoing militia. For instance, Beijing touted their contribution to victory over South Vietnam's Navy during a 1974 clash in the Paracel Islands. This way of thinking about maritime defense persists even as the PLA Navy matures into a world-class force.
北京对海权这种全方位的理解，使其可以根据形势以及对手的行动情况来决定运用到海上力量烈度的高低。这种策略并不激进，也算不上什么新意。其早在毛时代就考虑用发动“海上人民战争”来运用解放军海军————一旦有强大的敌人接近中国的海岸，就用岸基防卫部队让其吃尽苦头。当时的中国实力弱，痴迷于陆地领土的防守，因此利用一切能出海的装备发动对海防御是合情合理的。共产中国与以前的中华帝国一样，将渔船对与全球商船队看成是附属于海军的非正规力量。特别是渔民，他们类似于海上民兵。例如，1974年 中国在与越南海军在西沙群岛的战斗中取得了胜利，北京对民兵予以高度评价，认为此役他们功不可没。即使目前解放军在其海军不断成熟，正向世界级海上力量迈进的情况下，也未放弃这种海防思想。

Case in point: Chinese fishing boats represented the vanguard of Chinese sea power at Scarborough Shoal in 2012, when China took possession of an atoll deep within the Philippine exclusive economic zone. Chinese fishermen were first on scene. Only when a Philippine Navy frigate tried to arrest them for poaching did Beijing dispatch unarmed or lightly armed maritime-enforcement vessels -- the forerunners to today's coast guard -- to deter further Philippine action. A protracted standoff ensued, but ultimately the Philippine contingent withdrew -- leaving Scarborough Shoal in Chinese hands. Chinese hulls -- civilian, coast guard, and navy -- reportedly encase the atoll like a"cabbage," daring Manila to try to retake it.
现在也有相关例证，2012年中国在对斯卡伯勒礁（即我国的黄岩岛）的争夺中（中国占领了深入菲律宾专属经济区中的一块环形礁石区域），就用渔船作为本国海上力量的先锋。当时首先出马的是中国渔船，只是等到菲律宾海军护卫舰试图对它们进行抓捕时，北京才出动了无武装或者配备轻武器的海事执法船（现在中国海警的前身）进行阻吓。随后双方进行了长期的对峙，但最终菲律宾撤走了其船只，斯卡伯勒礁（即黄岩岛）落入中国之手。据报导，中国的船只，无论是民船，海监船，还是海军舰艇后来将那块礁石像“卷心菜”一样包围了起来，以此来挑衅马尼拉重新夺礁的努力。

That's textbook Chinese maritime strategy: minimal force, deployed by naval or nonnaval platforms as the situation and the naval balance warrant. China has stayed true to its Maoist traditions. It has kept its inventory of small craft strong and numerous, furthering both commercial and military purposes, even as it fills out the upper end of an oceangoing fleet with glitzy platforms like aircraft carriers and new destroyers. This continuum -- spanning from lowly fishing boats and patrol craft able to face off against weak Asian navies (like the Philippine Navy) to blue-water combatants able to duel peer navies (like the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force) on an equal footing -- is deeply embedded in China's maritime culture. While an economic downturn could slow down acquisitions, Beijing's basic approach will last as far into the future as the mariner's eye can see.
这是中国采取的经典海上策略：根据实际情况以及海上对峙平衡需要，派出海军或者非海军船只，运用最低限度的力量。尽管航母和新型驱逐舰等绚丽的高端武器服役，填补了海军远洋舰队的空白，中国一直坚持毛泽东传统思想，依然维持了一支实力强大，数量庞大的小型船队来实现军商两用的目的。这种连续统一的思想（包括用低端的渔船与巡逻船与像菲律宾这样实力弱小的亚洲国家海军对峙，用蓝海战斗舰艇与像日本海上自卫队这样同等级别的海军力量进行势均力敌的较量）已经深深根植于中国海洋文化之中。虽然当前中国低迷的经济增长可能会减缓其采购先进武器的步伐，但是北京的这种基本策略将在可预见的未来继续延续下去。

The PLA Navy, backed by the Chinese coast guard, shore-based air and missile forces, and unconventional auxiliaries from the commercial sector, can already make it tough and expensive for a peer navy to operate in China's geographical backyard. This is a force that could induce rivals to think twice before bucking China's will, and it outclasses lesser Asian navies by a wide margin. But will the Chinese navy venture outside Asia in force, mounting a standing presence in faraway theaters? Doubtful. Asserting control of China's environs is job No. 1. If Beijing's naval buildup continues along its current trajectory, the resulting force may let the nation put steel behind themany commitments it has taken on in the China seas, from the confrontation with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to the north through the Malacca Strait to the south.
解放军海军在海警，岸基航空和导弹力量以及商船队的支持下，能让任何一支在中国后院作战的海军陷入苦战甚至付出沉重代价。其实力更是远超亚洲那些弱小国家海军。任何胆敢与中国意志作对的对手，在这样一股力量面前都将三思而后行。但是，这是否意味着中国海军去敢于向亚洲海域以外的范围大举进发，在离本土遥远的战区保持存在呢？我对此表示怀疑。因为解放军海军目前的第一要务是保证中国外围环境的安全。如果北京能继续按目前的轨迹建设海军，那么其将能投入更多的舰艇遂行以下任务：在北边与日本就尖阁列岛或钓鱼岛问题进行对抗，南边保证马六甲海峡的安全。


A successful naval buildup might leave ships to spare for a modest forward presence in the next-most-important theater: the Indian Ocean, the shipping lane for Persian Gulf energy supplies. Beijing sees no pressing need to venture beyond East and South Asia. So you're not about to see Chinese frigates patrolling the Mediterranean or Atlantic. Chinese leaders evince little appetite to help police an international system they deem unfair and irrational -- an artifact of Western dominance that China must amend over time. What Chinese want, and what Xi has said China will get, lies in Asia. From fighting ships to fishing boats, Beijing increasingly has the sea power to get it.
中国海军建设如果取得成功的话，那么其可能还会有多余舰艇部署到次重要的印度洋海域（运送波斯湾能源的重要航道），以保持适度的前沿存在。北京认为目前并无紧迫的需要向东、南亚以外的范围进军。因此，我们暂时不会看到中国护卫舰在地中海或者大西洋巡逻的身影。中国领导人对充当维持国际秩序（他们认为它既不公正也不合理，是西方霸权时代的典型产物，日后必定会对其改变)的警察毫无兴趣。从习讲话中可以看出，中国意在亚洲。靠着战舰，渔船等硬件资源，北京的海洋实力不断增强，使其有能力实现自己的意图。