大西洋月刊：年轻的中国人可能不那么热衷西式民主。（转 ...

Young Chinese People May Just Not Be That Into Western-Style Democracy

年轻的中国人可能不那么热衷西方式的民主

A new study shows that the country's youth have an increasingly lukewarm attitude about democratic political systems.

一项最新调查表明国家的年轻一代对民主制度态度趋向于不温不火

Chinese economic surveys and data are everywhere. Their quarterly or annual release regularly generate excitement, fretting, and plenty of interpretation. And this last round was no exception, leading the Wall Street Journal to wryly quip that China's second quarter data release was "As eagerly awaited as the first sight of Kim Kardashian's baby, but probably less attractive..."
Far fewer surveys and data are available on Chinese politics, however, or at least in the English-speaking world. Although such studies tend to be rather obscure, they do exist, and even explore seemingly "third rail" subjects like democracy and political governance. In fact, in the mid-2000s, an official in the Translation Bureau of the Central Committee, Yu Keping, made a splash with his essay "Democracy is a Good Thing".

关于中国经济的调查和数据到处都是，我们对他们的季度年度定期发布（的数据）而兴奋，烦躁，就此还出现了大量关于数据的解译。上一轮也不例外，讽刺的是华尔街日报表明，等待中国公布第二季度的数据“就像急切等待金·卡戴珊（明星）的小孩出世，但可能不会那么有吸引力……”
然而很少有调查是针对中国的政治，至少在英语世界。尽管研究往往不声不响，但确实存在，甚至在探索继民主政治之后的第三大主题。事实上，在本世纪中期中央翻译局的一位官员俞可平（音译），他的文章《民主是个好东西》引发了轰动。

In my occasional search for contemporary Chinese political studies, I stumbled upon an interesting new study. Titled "What Kind of Democracy do Chinese Want?", it's a study from the leading state think tank in China, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhang Mingshu, the study's author, apparently hopes to distinguish between different types of "democracies". He explains thusly: "Generally speaking, one type is Western democracy. It originated from Greece ... and through the catalyst of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, produced the type of democracy we see today in the United States and England. But another type is China's democracy today, which we call "socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics."

在我研究中国政治时，偶然发现了一个有趣的东西，一篇标题为《什么样的民主是中国想要的？》的文章。该文章的作者是中国社会科学院的张明书，他显然希望有不同类型民主的区分，他解释说：“一般来说，一种是西方民主，它起源于希腊…是文艺复兴和启蒙运动催生的民主，也就是今天的美国式和英国式。但还有另一种，中国式的民主，我们称之为“有中国特色的社会主义民主政治。”

At this point, groans are emanating from astute China analysts about how such arguments typify Chinese political discourse today. What's more, Zhang goes on to say that his exploration of the kind of democracy Chinese want is largely determined by the existing political and civic culture, citing the work of American political scientist Gabriel Almond on how specific civic cultures can shape the type of political system. This, of course, sounds awfully close to the longstanding debate over the lack of suzhi -- loosely translated as civic values -- that make Chinese society unprepared for major systemic changes.
But putting aside these issues for now, some of Zhang's key findings nonetheless may offer some insight into the current state of political attitudes among Chinese, particularly of a younger generation of Chinese. [I can't vouch for the soundness of the methodology, but the author claims that he conducted a survey with 1,750 random samples across four different regions in China. Each of the participants was given a 40-question survey to fill out.]

关于这一点，由于有争论，而这决定性影响了现今中国的政治话语，中国分析家中的精英因而产生了很多抱怨。更重要的是，张继续说，他的研究关于中国想要什么样的民主，很大程度上是由现有的政治和公民文化决定的，他引述美国政治学家Gabriel Almond的话，不同公民文化可以塑造不同政治制度。当然，这听起来与素质的缺乏这一长期争论的话题（大致译为公民的价值观）非常相近—这使得中国社会对重大的系统性变化措手不及。但撇开这些问题不谈，关于中国的政治态度，张的一些研究仍然可能有所启示，尤其是对年轻一代。（不能保证该方法的合理性，但笔者认为，他在中国四个不同地区调查了1750个随机样本每个参与者填写了含四十个问题的问卷调查）

表一：民主好不好



表二：民主好不好（按照年龄）



表三：中国好还是美国好



表四：中国好还是美国好



There is plenty more data from the study (including breakdowns based on educational attainment), but a couple things stand out here. One, there is a clear generational difference, particularly between the post-1980s generation (the so-called balinghou) and those who are older and lived through a more tumultuous era in Chinese modern history. Two, there appears to be a shift to a centrist attitude, also more pronounced among the younger cohorts ("left" in China traditionally meant more hardcore communist/socialist or neo-Maoists and "right" typically meant more pro-West and pro-market). Overall, more than half of the respondents hold a more nuanced view that the Chinese political system cannot simply be compared to that of the United States, presumably implying that each has its own strengths and weaknesses.

这里有大量的研究数据（包括基于教育程度的分析），但有几个提示很明显。一，明显的年代差异，特别是“80后”（所谓的balinghou）与生活在动荡的中国近代史上的老一代相比。二，中立的态度的转移，也更突出在年轻人群（“左”在中国传统上意味着更多的铁杆共产主义/社会主义或新毛派，“右”通常意味着更多的亲西方和亲市场）。总的来说，超过一半的受访者认为很微妙，中美政治制度无法比较，两者各有利弊

In an interview with the liberal Guangdong paper Southern Weekend, the author further explains his findings (select translation below
SW: For similar questions, what was the biggest difference in results this time (Zhang had conducted a virtually identical survey in the 1980s)
Zhang: There was a new focus this time, particularly in terms of the delineation between "left, right, and center." The survey results show that the percentage on the "right" is lower, on the "left" higher, and the majority of the public seems to be moving in conjunction with the mainstream media. These three findings were contrary to my expectations. When I did the survey in 1988, there was clearly a much higher proportion of pro-West views among the respondents. That was the early reform era, and society was embracing all things Western ..
... According to these findings, 38.1 percent of the respondents are considered "left", 51.5 percent "centrist," and 8 percent "right." I was not anticipating these results. But if you calmly and rationally think about the people around you, not just those in intellectual circles, but those from your hometown or those you encounter on the street, these percentages aren't too far off.
SW: In your view, will there be some kind of collision among the three groups you identified above?
Zhang: The study shows that whether your political attitude leans toward liberalism/libertarianism (or "right") is somewhat positively correlated with the level of educational attainment. But at the same time, the higher the level of education, the higher the tendency of taking a more moderate and pragmatic political view. So we can roughly generalize that the more "cosmopolitan" the respondent, the more likely he or she will lean toward centrist or to the right ...
... The mainstream intellectual classes in China today all basically have their own vested interests. If they deviate from the mainstream path even a little bit, they will see their interests damaged. So they can only act in moderation and accommodate the current institutional arrangements.
Will the intellectual elites collide with other social classes over different political views and values? I think a lot of this is still dependent on the decision-makers in taking the initiative, in proactively understanding and incorporating both from the elites and other social classes and examining the issues comprehensively.
SW: In your findings, a large proportion is considered "political centrists." You believe that this has a strong relationship with the growth of the middle class. But in China, scholars continue to heatedly debate what kind of people are considered middle class, how many are actually in the middle class, and are the middle class' political views more radical or more conservative. In other words, can we then say that China's "political centrists" are also a highly variable group?
Zhang: Yes. For the sake of this study, we basically equated those who shared the view "They have different national conditions, can't be simply compared" to political centrists ...
.. In reality, decision-makers are by and large centrists. On some issues they may take a position slightly to the "right" and on others, they take a more "left" approach. This often amounts to murky and fuzzy policy adjustments, and that's intentional too, to prevent Chinese society from falling into the extreme conflicts of the past.

在广东报刊—南方周末的采访中，笔者进一步阐述了他的研究结果（选择翻译下）：
SW：都是一些相似的问题，这一次最大的区别是什么？（80年代张进行了一个几乎相同的调查）
张：这一次有新焦点，尤其是在划定“左，右，和中间派。”调查结果显示，右派百分比降低，“左”派在增加，多数民众似乎趋向于迎合主流媒体。这三个结果跟我的预期完全相反。1988年的时候，显然受访者中亲西方的比例更高，那是改革初期，社会接受西方的一切。
…据调查，38.1%的受访者认为“左”，51.5%的选“中间派”，8%认为是右。“我要的不是这样的结果，但是，如果你冷静、理性的考虑你的周遭，不仅在知识界，在你老家，或者大街上的路人，调查出来的百分比也不会相差太远。
SW：在你看来，以上你提到的三种人群会不会有冲突？
张：研究表明，无论你的政治态度倾向于自由主义或者自由意志主义（或右派），都跟教育水平息息相关。与此同时，受教育水平越高，支持更为温和和务实的政治倾向的可能越大。因此我们可以大致概括，更“国际化”的受访者，他或她会倾向于中立或右派的可能越大…
…在中国的主流知识分子基本上都有各自的利益，他们如果偏离主流，即使是一点点，利益也会受损，所以他们只能温和适应当前的制度。
知识精英和其他社会阶层拥有不同的政治观和价值观？我想这主要依赖于决策者的主动性，主动了解、融合精英和其他社会阶层，全面审视问题。
SW：在你的调查中，很大比例的“政治中间派",你认为这与中产阶级的增长有密切关系。但在中国，学者们仍在激烈的辩论什么是中产阶级？中产阶级又有多少？中产阶级的政治观是更激进还是更保守？换句话说，我们可不可以说，中国的“政治中间派”也都是高度可变的群体？
张：是的。我们研究的目的，其实等同于那些认为“他们国情不一样，不能作比较”的政治中间派…实际上，决策者大部分是中间派。有些事务他们可能右倾，有些事务他们更偏左。这些往往是晦暗和模糊的政策调整，当然也是故意的，以防中国的社会陷入过去的极端。
.
Now what to make of all this? Many will likely dismiss these findings as simply a study meant to provide some intellectual heft for perpetuating the current status quo. Or perhaps the official narrative and media are simply driving these attitudes. At a minimum, surveys like these bolster emerging Chinese public intellectuals who are championing Chinese exceptionalism, like Eric X. Li, contending that China needs an indigenous model, excavated from Chinese soil, not something borrowed and repackaged from the West.
Whatever the reasons or causes, I'll contend that they are somewhat irrelevant. What is more important is to further determine whether these findings are in fact representative of the prevailing political reality in China today. If this shift is indeed happening on a large, generational scale and will endure, then foreign observers may need to adjust their expectations about what kind of China we may see when the post-80s generation rise into positions of power.
Of course, nothing is preordained, and I have few answers. But I do know that grasping this political reality is as, if not more, important than whether GDP grows at 7 percent or 7.5 percent.

现在是什么主导？很多人误以为这些研究只是为了延续现状提供的一些智力的分量，或许受到官方和媒体驱使。至少，这样的调查鼓励了那些“中国优越论”的知识分子，认为中国需要土著模式，从中国本土挖掘，而不是从西方借来的和包装的。
不管有什么理由或原因，我认为与此无关。重要的是要进一步确定调查结果是否是当今中国的主流政治现状。如果确实发生了极大的时代性的规模的改变，并将持续，那么外国观察家们可能需要调整他们的期望，当80后执掌政权时中国会成为什么样子。
当然，没有什么是注定的，我有了一些答案。但我知道，把握政治现状似乎比明确GDP是增长7%还是7.5%更重要。

评论翻译:

1、Actually, I think we live in a plutocracy. The rich call all the shots.In any event, democracy ain't lookin' all that good these days, Chinese or not.

1、实际上，我认为我们是财阀统治，完全由富人左右，无论如何今天的民主看起来不是那么好，中国民不民主都一样。

2、Why would the Chinese want to emulate American democracy when they can see the total inability of our system to address the pressing problems of today?

2、当中国人看到美国民主系统完全无法解决紧迫的问题后，为什么还会想要效仿？

3、The advantages of American democracy are subtle and hidden, while its disadvantages are loud and apparent. And yes, American democracy is on the decline.

3、美国民主的优点微妙隐秘，而其缺点刺眼明显，并且美国民主的（程度）正在下滑。

4、Why can't they emulate European democracy? Besides, how does the failure of politicians equal the failure of a system. Our problem isn't the system a conceived. It's the people in the system.

4、他们怎么不效仿欧洲？此外，政客失败等同于制度失败。问题不在制度而在深陷制度里的人们。

5、Young Chinese People May Just Not Be That Into Western-Style Democracy"So they re kind of like young American people then?

5、年轻的中国人可能不那么热衷西方民主”—他们跟美国年轻人一样？

6、We have democracy and regular elections, and are stuck with a financial oligarchy that sucks us, and the economy, dry. The EU is a democratic entity only in their press releases, elected politicians act merely as the fall-guys to failed economic policies to keep the European banks solvent. India is a democracy, and corrupt down to its very core. Argentina and Venezula elect leaders who have, and will continue to, strip the wealth of their countries in favor of the political class, seemingly without end.
Chinese attitudes towards democracy aren't very useful, other than there are alot of them, they don't currently have it, and if you want stay in airy-fairy land, that's them. But it might be more useful to ask a about attitudes in countries whose democratic process actually creates positive change, and works, say Estonia, there are some other examples.

6、我们拥有民主和定期选举，而这些与金融寡头密切相连，他们吸干了我们还有我们的经济。欧盟是只在新闻稿中出现民主实体，为了还贷，政治选举成为了失败经济政策的替罪羊。印度是一个民主国家，已经腐败到核心阿，根廷和委内瑞拉选举的领导人，在政治界的支持下将继续狠抓国家财富，看似还没有底线。（调查）中国人对民主的态度是没有用的，没很多人支持，他们现在也不具备民主。如果你只是不着边际，那还差不多。去调查那些因为民主进程，而带来了积极的变化和影响的国家，可能会更有意义，比如爱沙尼亚，还有一些其他例子。

7、Argentina and Venezula elect leaders who have, and will continue to, strip the wealth of their countries in favor of the political class, seemingly without end.
It's worth noting that, between Chavez's election in 1998 and 2006, the poverty rate (% of people living on less that $2/day, purchasing power parity; World Bank stats) fell from 20% to 13%. (World Bank site doesn't have more recent stats.) Venezuela's progress on the Human Development Index has also been faster by far in the 2000s than it was in the 1980s and 1990s, especially in the area of education, where the average years of schooling a child receives has risen from 5.9 to 7.6.
Oil wealth has been invested in raising standards of living rather than simply going to the oil companies overseas. There's a reason why he, and now his successors, continue being elected: he made a genuine difference in the lives of the poor after years of neoliberal policies that neglected them.

7、“阿根廷和委内瑞拉选举的领导人，在政治界的支持下将继续狠捞国家财富，看似没有底线”—值得注意的是，在1998和2006年查韦斯的任期里，贫困率（生活水平低于2美元/天百分比的，购买力平价，世界银行统计）从20%下降到13%。（世界银行网站没有看到最近的数据。）委内瑞拉在人类发展指数的进步也很迅速，2000年与20世纪80年代和90年代相比，特别是在教育领域，儿童平均上学的年头从5.9上升到7.6。
来自石油的财富用在了提高生活水平上而不是简单的送给了海外石油公司。这就是为什么他以及他的接班人，能继续当选，在新自由主义抛弃穷人时，他为改善穷人的生活标准，做出了不一般的贡献（注释：乌戈·查韦斯，曾任委内瑞拉总统，查韦斯主张用激进的措施进行改革、削减中央集权、实行地方分权。）

8、I'd say these polls are somewhat representative of my experience in talking with people in China, except for the high numbers of youngish people saying "China is better than the US"--I've rarely found that. ("You can't compare" is much more common.) Young Chinese admire many things about America, but they don't necessarily want to become America.
Americans have this mistaken idea that Chinese think like them, and yearn for the same democratic ideals that they do. But China has a very different history than America with traditional roots and perspectives on society that go back thousands of years. America was founded, and then populated, by people unhappy with the political or economic conditions in their former country, people who valued independence and political freedom as paramount. Most Chinese see stability and families/social ties as more important than freedom and independence.
Likewise, Americans believe that given the chance, regular Chinese would overthrow their autocratic government and install a fully democratic one just like America (though whether the US is indeed "fully democratic" is a subject for another debate). That is a profound misconception based on a lack of understanding of Chinese way of thought and culture.
Certainly Chinese want more freedom of expression. But they value other things even more. They are generally happy with "knowledgeable people" making the decisions and don't yearn to play a huge part in decision-making. In a couple of generations, this may change, but not now.

8、我想说，除开“大量中国年轻人说中国比美国好”这一项外，调查结果跟我与中国人接触的经历是一致的，（无法相比较这种想法更为常见。）。在很多地方，中国年轻一代羡慕美国，但他们不一定想成为美国。美国人误以为，中国和他们想的一样，同样渴望民主。但是中国历史不同，传统平民的社会观形成已有几千年。美国成立后，由不满国家之前的政治经济体制的人落户生根，认为人的独立性和政治自由是最高价值。而在大多数中国人眼里，国家稳定和家庭社会联系比自由和独立更重要。
同样，美国人以为只要有机会，中国就会会推翻专制政府建立一个完全民主的国家（类似美国）（尽管美国是否真的“完全的民主”还存在争议）。这是由于缺乏中国思维和文化而形成的深刻的误解。当然，中国也想要更多表达的自由，他们乐于遵从智者的决策，但是并不渴望亲自参与决策。过个几代，情况可能会有所改变，但现在不可能。

9、Chinese don't want to be Americans. Now that's a shock

9、中国人不想当美国人，这太震惊了。

10、how harmful it is to sort people in to "left" "right" and put the rest in the middle. If the right means "Western democracy" and the left means "Chinese communism" ... what room is there for a meaningful debate? Same problem we have in the West obviously.
That one is disillusioned by the West should not surprise anyone. The US shows pretty shockingly that "democracy" is just a word, and the idea behind it can get lost, even if you're allowed to make a cross every four years. If it's only white old millionaires up for election, then something is going on - but it's not democracy.
On the other hand, when I read things like 'China's democracy today, which we call "socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics."' - I must think someone drank the Chinese government's Koolaid. There is no democracy, and it's by all means not socialist in any sense of the idea.
It's these lies that "intellectuals" like Eric X. Li are spreading - they are willfully destroying possible discussions.
Anyways, a little note about the survey's reliability would have been nice too - experts on the subject tend to not trust questionnaires in China... since one has to be fearful to be too honest when it's possible the government wouldn't like your answers.

10、将人划分为“左”和“右”而其他人是中间派，危害性太大了。如果右派意味着“西方民主”，左派意味着“中国共产主义“，辩论还会有什么余地？明显西方也存在这种问题
对西方的幻灭是不足为奇的，美国的“民主”只是一句话，民主背后的东西可能都将丢失，即使四年选举轮换一次，如果只有百万富翁可参选，当然选举还在继续，但它就不再是民主了。
另外，当我看到类似于“中国的民主，我们称之为“有中国特色的社会主义民主政治。”这类读物，我想肯定有人喝了中国政府的酷爱（一种以儿童为销售对象的饮料）。 他们都没有民主，怎么也称不上社会主义。
知识分子的谎言正在扩散-他们在故意破坏讨论的可能性。
不管怎么说，调查可靠性不高，专家们倾向于不相信中国的问卷调查，因为（受调查者）担心政府不喜欢，可能害怕说实话。

11、I totally agree that despite these words being used in the official country and party names, Chinese is no more "democratic" than it is "communist". "Socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics" is complete doublespeak. (Of course, we Americans have our own doublespeak as well, but that's besides the point.)
I also agree all official surveys of this sort are inherently unreliable. However, as I mentioned in another comment, I'd say they somewhat reflect my own experience in living here in China.

11、我完全同意，尽管官方政府和政党常用这句话（注：中国特色社会主义民主政治），但比起”民主“中国更“共产主义”。“具有中国特色的社会主义民主政治”完全是故弄玄虚。（当然，我们美国人也故弄玄虚，但那不是重点。）这种官方调查本质上是不可靠的。

12、"Democracy", "Productivity", and "Legitimacy" all have different meanings however. China may very well be a productive society in terms of outputs, and that may well confer some form of legitmacy to its form of government in the eyes of its citizens, but this doesn't necessarily make it a Democracy. Democracy doesn't simply mean "good."

12、”民主”，“生产力”，和“合法性”都有不同的意义，中国的（出口）生产力可能很强，在他的公民看来也是合法政权，但这并不一定使它成为民主国家。民主并不单纯指“好”。

13、No, democracy means "rule by the people". The "one man, one vote" form is just one. The hardcore Maoism of the Cultural Revolution is another. No, democracy is definitely NOT (always) good.

13、民主是指“人民统治”。一人一票是一种，硬派毛的文化革命是另一种。不，民主肯定是（常常）不好的。

14、Incomes double every ten years, 90% home ownership, peace, universal health insurance, 3 weeks mandatory paid vacation, 600 million raised from poverty, peace, security, more participation in democracy than ever in China's history, best school systems on earth.....

14、每十年收入翻一番，90%的房屋所有权、和平、全民医疗保险、三个星期的带薪假，六亿人脱离贫困、和平、安全、以及中国历史上从未出现过的民主参与性、地球上最好的教育系统.....

15、What are even you talking about? You are the one erroneously equating America and China. Just because older students can and do get around the censorship, does not mean that they haven't already been brainwashed by the regime. Even a cursory knowledge of China's netizens reveal them to be extreme nationalists. Are you so foolish as to believe that this is by accident? Or some kind of Chinese genetic quirk? It's by design

15、（译注：此条评论针对中国国旗下的宣誓、中国接受高等教育的人能避开国家审查）我的高中从没宣誓过，也不打算，你想说什么？你错误的评估了美国和中国。高年级学生能避开审查，也不意味着他们没被政府洗脑。只粗略的了解下中国网民，也能发现他们是极端民族主义者。你这么蠢，相信这是偶然吗？或者遗传特质？都是设计好的！

16、OK... people are free to criticize... until they're not. Petitioners are regularly hassled and often enough incarcerated for periods without trial. Local people without wealth or power can be roughed up by local street cops without much recourse. Rule of law is weak (though there are positive signs of change). Crackdowns and the paranoid self-censoring behavior engendered by the threat of crackdowns recur. Organization that is seen as any kind of threat to Party power is regularly squelched. Lawyers, artists, and writers are closely watched by security and know their lives can become very difficult indeed if they step over the line. Lots to praise about contemporary China, but no need to be all 五毛黨 about the PRC!

16、好吧…大家有批评的自由…直到不吵了。请愿受到滋扰，不审判就把你监禁，没有钱和权的本地人遭受到当地警察的殴打，也没地方求助。法治很弱（虽然有积极的迹象）。镇压和偏执的自我审查导致了威胁性的镇压反复出现，任何威胁政党的组织会遭到定期清理。律师，艺术家，和作家密切关注当局，他们知道如果越界，生活将会很难过，赞美中国，但没必要每个人都成为中国的五毛黨

17、China is worse than us in some of those areas and ahead of us in others – like unarmed cops who people yell at very loudly if they don't like the way they're being treated. And safe streets at night. And everyone (90%) sleeping under a roof they still own even after the GFC. And everyone, everyone, having gotten 100% raises every ten years for almost 40 years. In our, much richer, unscarred-by-200-years-occupation-and-war, country, we have been getting poorer over that time by about 1% per decade.
China's government has solved some expensive governance and financial management problems cheaply. We should study those solutions and adapt them to our needs. Instead of approaching them with negative expectations, let's see the Chinese government as its citizens see it: the best they've ever had. If you have Chinese friends you'll know that they're still heatedly discussing the Duke of Zhou's term of government. It ended 3,700 years ago.

17、某些领域中国比我们差，有些地方比我们领先。（中国）手无寸铁的警察，如果人们不喜欢他们（警察）对待他们（人们）的方式会朝警察大声骂，夜晚街道也很安全。即使是在全球金融危机后，每个人（90%）都有房子住。每个人，每一个人收入每十年会增加100%，已经有40年了。我们更富有，但在经历过200年的占领和战争后，（我们的）国家已经越来越穷，每十年下降1%，中国政府将昂贵的治理和财务管理开销精简化，我们应该学习他们。与其带着悲观的预期和他们接触，不如看看中国公民眼中的政府—是（历史上）存在过的最好的。如果你有中国朋友你会知道，他们还在热烈地讨论着周公的政治模式，而它在3700年前就已经结束了。（注释：周公认为：民意决定着天意，中国政治哲学的传统就是“民本”政治，这种传统是由周公奠定基础的。“民本”思想的实质乃是“人民主权”；而不论是我们正在建设的现代民权政治，还是中国历史上的王权政治和皇权政治，都不过是实现这种人民主权的不同方式而已。而此表现形式之变革，又无不基于中国政治哲学传统的正义原则：正当性、适宜性。因此，现代民主应仅仅被视为民本的一种特定表现形式。）
h t t p://www。ltaaa。com/wtfy/9826。html



Young Chinese People May Just Not Be That Into Western-Style Democracy

年轻的中国人可能不那么热衷西方式的民主

A new study shows that the country's youth have an increasingly lukewarm attitude about democratic political systems.

一项最新调查表明国家的年轻一代对民主制度态度趋向于不温不火

Chinese economic surveys and data are everywhere. Their quarterly or annual release regularly generate excitement, fretting, and plenty of interpretation. And this last round was no exception, leading the Wall Street Journal to wryly quip that China's second quarter data release was "As eagerly awaited as the first sight of Kim Kardashian's baby, but probably less attractive..."
Far fewer surveys and data are available on Chinese politics, however, or at least in the English-speaking world. Although such studies tend to be rather obscure, they do exist, and even explore seemingly "third rail" subjects like democracy and political governance. In fact, in the mid-2000s, an official in the Translation Bureau of the Central Committee, Yu Keping, made a splash with his essay "Democracy is a Good Thing".

关于中国经济的调查和数据到处都是，我们对他们的季度年度定期发布（的数据）而兴奋，烦躁，就此还出现了大量关于数据的解译。上一轮也不例外，讽刺的是华尔街日报表明，等待中国公布第二季度的数据“就像急切等待金·卡戴珊（明星）的小孩出世，但可能不会那么有吸引力……”
然而很少有调查是针对中国的政治，至少在英语世界。尽管研究往往不声不响，但确实存在，甚至在探索继民主政治之后的第三大主题。事实上，在本世纪中期中央翻译局的一位官员俞可平（音译），他的文章《民主是个好东西》引发了轰动。

In my occasional search for contemporary Chinese political studies, I stumbled upon an interesting new study. Titled "What Kind of Democracy do Chinese Want?", it's a study from the leading state think tank in China, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhang Mingshu, the study's author, apparently hopes to distinguish between different types of "democracies". He explains thusly: "Generally speaking, one type is Western democracy. It originated from Greece ... and through the catalyst of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, produced the type of democracy we see today in the United States and England. But another type is China's democracy today, which we call "socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics."

在我研究中国政治时，偶然发现了一个有趣的东西，一篇标题为《什么样的民主是中国想要的？》的文章。该文章的作者是中国社会科学院的张明书，他显然希望有不同类型民主的区分，他解释说：“一般来说，一种是西方民主，它起源于希腊…是文艺复兴和启蒙运动催生的民主，也就是今天的美国式和英国式。但还有另一种，中国式的民主，我们称之为“有中国特色的社会主义民主政治。”

At this point, groans are emanating from astute China analysts about how such arguments typify Chinese political discourse today. What's more, Zhang goes on to say that his exploration of the kind of democracy Chinese want is largely determined by the existing political and civic culture, citing the work of American political scientist Gabriel Almond on how specific civic cultures can shape the type of political system. This, of course, sounds awfully close to the longstanding debate over the lack of suzhi -- loosely translated as civic values -- that make Chinese society unprepared for major systemic changes.
But putting aside these issues for now, some of Zhang's key findings nonetheless may offer some insight into the current state of political attitudes among Chinese, particularly of a younger generation of Chinese. [I can't vouch for the soundness of the methodology, but the author claims that he conducted a survey with 1,750 random samples across four different regions in China. Each of the participants was given a 40-question survey to fill out.]

关于这一点，由于有争论，而这决定性影响了现今中国的政治话语，中国分析家中的精英因而产生了很多抱怨。更重要的是，张继续说，他的研究关于中国想要什么样的民主，很大程度上是由现有的政治和公民文化决定的，他引述美国政治学家Gabriel Almond的话，不同公民文化可以塑造不同政治制度。当然，这听起来与素质的缺乏这一长期争论的话题（大致译为公民的价值观）非常相近—这使得中国社会对重大的系统性变化措手不及。但撇开这些问题不谈，关于中国的政治态度，张的一些研究仍然可能有所启示，尤其是对年轻一代。（不能保证该方法的合理性，但笔者认为，他在中国四个不同地区调查了1750个随机样本每个参与者填写了含四十个问题的问卷调查）

表一：民主好不好



表二：民主好不好（按照年龄）



表三：中国好还是美国好



表四：中国好还是美国好



There is plenty more data from the study (including breakdowns based on educational attainment), but a couple things stand out here. One, there is a clear generational difference, particularly between the post-1980s generation (the so-called balinghou) and those who are older and lived through a more tumultuous era in Chinese modern history. Two, there appears to be a shift to a centrist attitude, also more pronounced among the younger cohorts ("left" in China traditionally meant more hardcore communist/socialist or neo-Maoists and "right" typically meant more pro-West and pro-market). Overall, more than half of the respondents hold a more nuanced view that the Chinese political system cannot simply be compared to that of the United States, presumably implying that each has its own strengths and weaknesses.

这里有大量的研究数据（包括基于教育程度的分析），但有几个提示很明显。一，明显的年代差异，特别是“80后”（所谓的balinghou）与生活在动荡的中国近代史上的老一代相比。二，中立的态度的转移，也更突出在年轻人群（“左”在中国传统上意味着更多的铁杆共产主义/社会主义或新毛派，“右”通常意味着更多的亲西方和亲市场）。总的来说，超过一半的受访者认为很微妙，中美政治制度无法比较，两者各有利弊

In an interview with the liberal Guangdong paper Southern Weekend, the author further explains his findings (select translation below
SW: For similar questions, what was the biggest difference in results this time (Zhang had conducted a virtually identical survey in the 1980s)
Zhang: There was a new focus this time, particularly in terms of the delineation between "left, right, and center." The survey results show that the percentage on the "right" is lower, on the "left" higher, and the majority of the public seems to be moving in conjunction with the mainstream media. These three findings were contrary to my expectations. When I did the survey in 1988, there was clearly a much higher proportion of pro-West views among the respondents. That was the early reform era, and society was embracing all things Western ..
... According to these findings, 38.1 percent of the respondents are considered "left", 51.5 percent "centrist," and 8 percent "right." I was not anticipating these results. But if you calmly and rationally think about the people around you, not just those in intellectual circles, but those from your hometown or those you encounter on the street, these percentages aren't too far off.
SW: In your view, will there be some kind of collision among the three groups you identified above?
Zhang: The study shows that whether your political attitude leans toward liberalism/libertarianism (or "right") is somewhat positively correlated with the level of educational attainment. But at the same time, the higher the level of education, the higher the tendency of taking a more moderate and pragmatic political view. So we can roughly generalize that the more "cosmopolitan" the respondent, the more likely he or she will lean toward centrist or to the right ...
... The mainstream intellectual classes in China today all basically have their own vested interests. If they deviate from the mainstream path even a little bit, they will see their interests damaged. So they can only act in moderation and accommodate the current institutional arrangements.
Will the intellectual elites collide with other social classes over different political views and values? I think a lot of this is still dependent on the decision-makers in taking the initiative, in proactively understanding and incorporating both from the elites and other social classes and examining the issues comprehensively.
SW: In your findings, a large proportion is considered "political centrists." You believe that this has a strong relationship with the growth of the middle class. But in China, scholars continue to heatedly debate what kind of people are considered middle class, how many are actually in the middle class, and are the middle class' political views more radical or more conservative. In other words, can we then say that China's "political centrists" are also a highly variable group?
Zhang: Yes. For the sake of this study, we basically equated those who shared the view "They have different national conditions, can't be simply compared" to political centrists ...
.. In reality, decision-makers are by and large centrists. On some issues they may take a position slightly to the "right" and on others, they take a more "left" approach. This often amounts to murky and fuzzy policy adjustments, and that's intentional too, to prevent Chinese society from falling into the extreme conflicts of the past.

在广东报刊—南方周末的采访中，笔者进一步阐述了他的研究结果（选择翻译下）：
SW：都是一些相似的问题，这一次最大的区别是什么？（80年代张进行了一个几乎相同的调查）
张：这一次有新焦点，尤其是在划定“左，右，和中间派。”调查结果显示，右派百分比降低，“左”派在增加，多数民众似乎趋向于迎合主流媒体。这三个结果跟我的预期完全相反。1988年的时候，显然受访者中亲西方的比例更高，那是改革初期，社会接受西方的一切。
…据调查，38.1%的受访者认为“左”，51.5%的选“中间派”，8%认为是右。“我要的不是这样的结果，但是，如果你冷静、理性的考虑你的周遭，不仅在知识界，在你老家，或者大街上的路人，调查出来的百分比也不会相差太远。
SW：在你看来，以上你提到的三种人群会不会有冲突？
张：研究表明，无论你的政治态度倾向于自由主义或者自由意志主义（或右派），都跟教育水平息息相关。与此同时，受教育水平越高，支持更为温和和务实的政治倾向的可能越大。因此我们可以大致概括，更“国际化”的受访者，他或她会倾向于中立或右派的可能越大…
…在中国的主流知识分子基本上都有各自的利益，他们如果偏离主流，即使是一点点，利益也会受损，所以他们只能温和适应当前的制度。
知识精英和其他社会阶层拥有不同的政治观和价值观？我想这主要依赖于决策者的主动性，主动了解、融合精英和其他社会阶层，全面审视问题。
SW：在你的调查中，很大比例的“政治中间派",你认为这与中产阶级的增长有密切关系。但在中国，学者们仍在激烈的辩论什么是中产阶级？中产阶级又有多少？中产阶级的政治观是更激进还是更保守？换句话说，我们可不可以说，中国的“政治中间派”也都是高度可变的群体？
张：是的。我们研究的目的，其实等同于那些认为“他们国情不一样，不能作比较”的政治中间派…实际上，决策者大部分是中间派。有些事务他们可能右倾，有些事务他们更偏左。这些往往是晦暗和模糊的政策调整，当然也是故意的，以防中国的社会陷入过去的极端。
.
Now what to make of all this? Many will likely dismiss these findings as simply a study meant to provide some intellectual heft for perpetuating the current status quo. Or perhaps the official narrative and media are simply driving these attitudes. At a minimum, surveys like these bolster emerging Chinese public intellectuals who are championing Chinese exceptionalism, like Eric X. Li, contending that China needs an indigenous model, excavated from Chinese soil, not something borrowed and repackaged from the West.
Whatever the reasons or causes, I'll contend that they are somewhat irrelevant. What is more important is to further determine whether these findings are in fact representative of the prevailing political reality in China today. If this shift is indeed happening on a large, generational scale and will endure, then foreign observers may need to adjust their expectations about what kind of China we may see when the post-80s generation rise into positions of power.
Of course, nothing is preordained, and I have few answers. But I do know that grasping this political reality is as, if not more, important than whether GDP grows at 7 percent or 7.5 percent.

现在是什么主导？很多人误以为这些研究只是为了延续现状提供的一些智力的分量，或许受到官方和媒体驱使。至少，这样的调查鼓励了那些“中国优越论”的知识分子，认为中国需要土著模式，从中国本土挖掘，而不是从西方借来的和包装的。
不管有什么理由或原因，我认为与此无关。重要的是要进一步确定调查结果是否是当今中国的主流政治现状。如果确实发生了极大的时代性的规模的改变，并将持续，那么外国观察家们可能需要调整他们的期望，当80后执掌政权时中国会成为什么样子。
当然，没有什么是注定的，我有了一些答案。但我知道，把握政治现状似乎比明确GDP是增长7%还是7.5%更重要。

评论翻译:

1、Actually, I think we live in a plutocracy. The rich call all the shots.In any event, democracy ain't lookin' all that good these days, Chinese or not.

1、实际上，我认为我们是财阀统治，完全由富人左右，无论如何今天的民主看起来不是那么好，中国民不民主都一样。

2、Why would the Chinese want to emulate American democracy when they can see the total inability of our system to address the pressing problems of today?

2、当中国人看到美国民主系统完全无法解决紧迫的问题后，为什么还会想要效仿？

3、The advantages of American democracy are subtle and hidden, while its disadvantages are loud and apparent. And yes, American democracy is on the decline.

3、美国民主的优点微妙隐秘，而其缺点刺眼明显，并且美国民主的（程度）正在下滑。

4、Why can't they emulate European democracy? Besides, how does the failure of politicians equal the failure of a system. Our problem isn't the system a conceived. It's the people in the system.

4、他们怎么不效仿欧洲？此外，政客失败等同于制度失败。问题不在制度而在深陷制度里的人们。

5、Young Chinese People May Just Not Be That Into Western-Style Democracy"So they re kind of like young American people then?

5、年轻的中国人可能不那么热衷西方民主”—他们跟美国年轻人一样？

6、We have democracy and regular elections, and are stuck with a financial oligarchy that sucks us, and the economy, dry. The EU is a democratic entity only in their press releases, elected politicians act merely as the fall-guys to failed economic policies to keep the European banks solvent. India is a democracy, and corrupt down to its very core. Argentina and Venezula elect leaders who have, and will continue to, strip the wealth of their countries in favor of the political class, seemingly without end.
Chinese attitudes towards democracy aren't very useful, other than there are alot of them, they don't currently have it, and if you want stay in airy-fairy land, that's them. But it might be more useful to ask a about attitudes in countries whose democratic process actually creates positive change, and works, say Estonia, there are some other examples.

6、我们拥有民主和定期选举，而这些与金融寡头密切相连，他们吸干了我们还有我们的经济。欧盟是只在新闻稿中出现民主实体，为了还贷，政治选举成为了失败经济政策的替罪羊。印度是一个民主国家，已经腐败到核心阿，根廷和委内瑞拉选举的领导人，在政治界的支持下将继续狠抓国家财富，看似还没有底线。（调查）中国人对民主的态度是没有用的，没很多人支持，他们现在也不具备民主。如果你只是不着边际，那还差不多。去调查那些因为民主进程，而带来了积极的变化和影响的国家，可能会更有意义，比如爱沙尼亚，还有一些其他例子。

7、Argentina and Venezula elect leaders who have, and will continue to, strip the wealth of their countries in favor of the political class, seemingly without end.
It's worth noting that, between Chavez's election in 1998 and 2006, the poverty rate (% of people living on less that $2/day, purchasing power parity; World Bank stats) fell from 20% to 13%. (World Bank site doesn't have more recent stats.) Venezuela's progress on the Human Development Index has also been faster by far in the 2000s than it was in the 1980s and 1990s, especially in the area of education, where the average years of schooling a child receives has risen from 5.9 to 7.6.
Oil wealth has been invested in raising standards of living rather than simply going to the oil companies overseas. There's a reason why he, and now his successors, continue being elected: he made a genuine difference in the lives of the poor after years of neoliberal policies that neglected them.

7、“阿根廷和委内瑞拉选举的领导人，在政治界的支持下将继续狠捞国家财富，看似没有底线”—值得注意的是，在1998和2006年查韦斯的任期里，贫困率（生活水平低于2美元/天百分比的，购买力平价，世界银行统计）从20%下降到13%。（世界银行网站没有看到最近的数据。）委内瑞拉在人类发展指数的进步也很迅速，2000年与20世纪80年代和90年代相比，特别是在教育领域，儿童平均上学的年头从5.9上升到7.6。
来自石油的财富用在了提高生活水平上而不是简单的送给了海外石油公司。这就是为什么他以及他的接班人，能继续当选，在新自由主义抛弃穷人时，他为改善穷人的生活标准，做出了不一般的贡献（注释：乌戈·查韦斯，曾任委内瑞拉总统，查韦斯主张用激进的措施进行改革、削减中央集权、实行地方分权。）

8、I'd say these polls are somewhat representative of my experience in talking with people in China, except for the high numbers of youngish people saying "China is better than the US"--I've rarely found that. ("You can't compare" is much more common.) Young Chinese admire many things about America, but they don't necessarily want to become America.
Americans have this mistaken idea that Chinese think like them, and yearn for the same democratic ideals that they do. But China has a very different history than America with traditional roots and perspectives on society that go back thousands of years. America was founded, and then populated, by people unhappy with the political or economic conditions in their former country, people who valued independence and political freedom as paramount. Most Chinese see stability and families/social ties as more important than freedom and independence.
Likewise, Americans believe that given the chance, regular Chinese would overthrow their autocratic government and install a fully democratic one just like America (though whether the US is indeed "fully democratic" is a subject for another debate). That is a profound misconception based on a lack of understanding of Chinese way of thought and culture.
Certainly Chinese want more freedom of expression. But they value other things even more. They are generally happy with "knowledgeable people" making the decisions and don't yearn to play a huge part in decision-making. In a couple of generations, this may change, but not now.

8、我想说，除开“大量中国年轻人说中国比美国好”这一项外，调查结果跟我与中国人接触的经历是一致的，（无法相比较这种想法更为常见。）。在很多地方，中国年轻一代羡慕美国，但他们不一定想成为美国。美国人误以为，中国和他们想的一样，同样渴望民主。但是中国历史不同，传统平民的社会观形成已有几千年。美国成立后，由不满国家之前的政治经济体制的人落户生根，认为人的独立性和政治自由是最高价值。而在大多数中国人眼里，国家稳定和家庭社会联系比自由和独立更重要。
同样，美国人以为只要有机会，中国就会会推翻专制政府建立一个完全民主的国家（类似美国）（尽管美国是否真的“完全的民主”还存在争议）。这是由于缺乏中国思维和文化而形成的深刻的误解。当然，中国也想要更多表达的自由，他们乐于遵从智者的决策，但是并不渴望亲自参与决策。过个几代，情况可能会有所改变，但现在不可能。

9、Chinese don't want to be Americans. Now that's a shock

9、中国人不想当美国人，这太震惊了。

10、how harmful it is to sort people in to "left" "right" and put the rest in the middle. If the right means "Western democracy" and the left means "Chinese communism" ... what room is there for a meaningful debate? Same problem we have in the West obviously.
That one is disillusioned by the West should not surprise anyone. The US shows pretty shockingly that "democracy" is just a word, and the idea behind it can get lost, even if you're allowed to make a cross every four years. If it's only white old millionaires up for election, then something is going on - but it's not democracy.
On the other hand, when I read things like 'China's democracy today, which we call "socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics."' - I must think someone drank the Chinese government's Koolaid. There is no democracy, and it's by all means not socialist in any sense of the idea.
It's these lies that "intellectuals" like Eric X. Li are spreading - they are willfully destroying possible discussions.
Anyways, a little note about the survey's reliability would have been nice too - experts on the subject tend to not trust questionnaires in China... since one has to be fearful to be too honest when it's possible the government wouldn't like your answers.

10、将人划分为“左”和“右”而其他人是中间派，危害性太大了。如果右派意味着“西方民主”，左派意味着“中国共产主义“，辩论还会有什么余地？明显西方也存在这种问题
对西方的幻灭是不足为奇的，美国的“民主”只是一句话，民主背后的东西可能都将丢失，即使四年选举轮换一次，如果只有百万富翁可参选，当然选举还在继续，但它就不再是民主了。
另外，当我看到类似于“中国的民主，我们称之为“有中国特色的社会主义民主政治。”这类读物，我想肯定有人喝了中国政府的酷爱（一种以儿童为销售对象的饮料）。 他们都没有民主，怎么也称不上社会主义。
知识分子的谎言正在扩散-他们在故意破坏讨论的可能性。
不管怎么说，调查可靠性不高，专家们倾向于不相信中国的问卷调查，因为（受调查者）担心政府不喜欢，可能害怕说实话。

11、I totally agree that despite these words being used in the official country and party names, Chinese is no more "democratic" than it is "communist". "Socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics" is complete doublespeak. (Of course, we Americans have our own doublespeak as well, but that's besides the point.)
I also agree all official surveys of this sort are inherently unreliable. However, as I mentioned in another comment, I'd say they somewhat reflect my own experience in living here in China.

11、我完全同意，尽管官方政府和政党常用这句话（注：中国特色社会主义民主政治），但比起”民主“中国更“共产主义”。“具有中国特色的社会主义民主政治”完全是故弄玄虚。（当然，我们美国人也故弄玄虚，但那不是重点。）这种官方调查本质上是不可靠的。

12、"Democracy", "Productivity", and "Legitimacy" all have different meanings however. China may very well be a productive society in terms of outputs, and that may well confer some form of legitmacy to its form of government in the eyes of its citizens, but this doesn't necessarily make it a Democracy. Democracy doesn't simply mean "good."

12、”民主”，“生产力”，和“合法性”都有不同的意义，中国的（出口）生产力可能很强，在他的公民看来也是合法政权，但这并不一定使它成为民主国家。民主并不单纯指“好”。

13、No, democracy means "rule by the people". The "one man, one vote" form is just one. The hardcore Maoism of the Cultural Revolution is another. No, democracy is definitely NOT (always) good.

13、民主是指“人民统治”。一人一票是一种，硬派毛的文化革命是另一种。不，民主肯定是（常常）不好的。

14、Incomes double every ten years, 90% home ownership, peace, universal health insurance, 3 weeks mandatory paid vacation, 600 million raised from poverty, peace, security, more participation in democracy than ever in China's history, best school systems on earth.....

14、每十年收入翻一番，90%的房屋所有权、和平、全民医疗保险、三个星期的带薪假，六亿人脱离贫困、和平、安全、以及中国历史上从未出现过的民主参与性、地球上最好的教育系统.....

15、What are even you talking about? You are the one erroneously equating America and China. Just because older students can and do get around the censorship, does not mean that they haven't already been brainwashed by the regime. Even a cursory knowledge of China's netizens reveal them to be extreme nationalists. Are you so foolish as to believe that this is by accident? Or some kind of Chinese genetic quirk? It's by design

15、（译注：此条评论针对中国国旗下的宣誓、中国接受高等教育的人能避开国家审查）我的高中从没宣誓过，也不打算，你想说什么？你错误的评估了美国和中国。高年级学生能避开审查，也不意味着他们没被政府洗脑。只粗略的了解下中国网民，也能发现他们是极端民族主义者。你这么蠢，相信这是偶然吗？或者遗传特质？都是设计好的！

16、OK... people are free to criticize... until they're not. Petitioners are regularly hassled and often enough incarcerated for periods without trial. Local people without wealth or power can be roughed up by local street cops without much recourse. Rule of law is weak (though there are positive signs of change). Crackdowns and the paranoid self-censoring behavior engendered by the threat of crackdowns recur. Organization that is seen as any kind of threat to Party power is regularly squelched. Lawyers, artists, and writers are closely watched by security and know their lives can become very difficult indeed if they step over the line. Lots to praise about contemporary China, but no need to be all 五毛黨 about the PRC!

16、好吧…大家有批评的自由…直到不吵了。请愿受到滋扰，不审判就把你监禁，没有钱和权的本地人遭受到当地警察的殴打，也没地方求助。法治很弱（虽然有积极的迹象）。镇压和偏执的自我审查导致了威胁性的镇压反复出现，任何威胁政党的组织会遭到定期清理。律师，艺术家，和作家密切关注当局，他们知道如果越界，生活将会很难过，赞美中国，但没必要每个人都成为中国的五毛黨

17、China is worse than us in some of those areas and ahead of us in others – like unarmed cops who people yell at very loudly if they don't like the way they're being treated. And safe streets at night. And everyone (90%) sleeping under a roof they still own even after the GFC. And everyone, everyone, having gotten 100% raises every ten years for almost 40 years. In our, much richer, unscarred-by-200-years-occupation-and-war, country, we have been getting poorer over that time by about 1% per decade.
China's government has solved some expensive governance and financial management problems cheaply. We should study those solutions and adapt them to our needs. Instead of approaching them with negative expectations, let's see the Chinese government as its citizens see it: the best they've ever had. If you have Chinese friends you'll know that they're still heatedly discussing the Duke of Zhou's term of government. It ended 3,700 years ago.

17、某些领域中国比我们差，有些地方比我们领先。（中国）手无寸铁的警察，如果人们不喜欢他们（警察）对待他们（人们）的方式会朝警察大声骂，夜晚街道也很安全。即使是在全球金融危机后，每个人（90%）都有房子住。每个人，每一个人收入每十年会增加100%，已经有40年了。我们更富有，但在经历过200年的占领和战争后，（我们的）国家已经越来越穷，每十年下降1%，中国政府将昂贵的治理和财务管理开销精简化，我们应该学习他们。与其带着悲观的预期和他们接触，不如看看中国公民眼中的政府—是（历史上）存在过的最好的。如果你有中国朋友你会知道，他们还在热烈地讨论着周公的政治模式，而它在3700年前就已经结束了。（注释：周公认为：民意决定着天意，中国政治哲学的传统就是“民本”政治，这种传统是由周公奠定基础的。“民本”思想的实质乃是“人民主权”；而不论是我们正在建设的现代民权政治，还是中国历史上的王权政治和皇权政治，都不过是实现这种人民主权的不同方式而已。而此表现形式之变革，又无不基于中国政治哲学传统的正义原则：正当性、适宜性。因此，现代民主应仅仅被视为民本的一种特定表现形式。）
h t t p://www。ltaaa。com/wtfy/9826。html