超级军网大西洋月刊: 中国的一胎化政策和房地产市场泡沫之间的连 ...
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大西洋月刊: 中国的一胎化政策和房地产市场泡沫之间的连接
大西洋月刊 Gwynn Guilford Sep 19 2013, 11:48 AM ET
单身汉激烈竞争买房已经扭曲了市场，可能会威胁到整体经济操作。
自1979年以来实行的中国的一胎化政策，限制大多数中国夫妇只生一个孩子，因加速中国的老龄化率而臭名昭着。它也创造了许多过剩的青年男子，找不到妻子;到2020年，光棍有3千万到3.5千万的光棍，这相当于加拿大的人口。
中国严厉的人口控制，失恋的追求者是不是唯一的受害者。北京大学经济学家张小波说，“我刚刚从华盛顿返回北京，住房价格是华盛顿的三倍”。 “如果你注意所有的指标，都指向房地产泡沫。尽管非常低的经济回报，但是人们継续[购买] 。”
究其原因？婚姻市场上的激烈竞争，张说。“原因是，人们不得不为了结婚买房子， ”他说，并解释说，大多数丈母娘只接受有房子的男子，可以追求他们的女儿。
张说，这是高不可攀买不起住房价格（北京一个小两居室约330,614美元，是北京人均在32年的收入）。而且，具有讽刺意味的是，一胎化的政策最终将扭转这一趋势，让房价直落到地。
根据张和两位同事进行的研究，2003年至2009年的35个主要城市的住房价格的上升，中国的性别比例失衡，贡献了30 ％至48％的因素。年轻男人比女人越多的城市，房价的増幅越大。
如图（ “男女比和住房价格”魏尚进，张晓波和银柳）:
横轴为5-19岁的性别比在纵轴上的比例是家庭收入的住房价值在2004年。
张和他的同事们发现，这不只是在城市。即使在农村，农民积极投资在房产。当地媒人说他们的儿子，如果想娶必须有房子，或付当地的“新娘的价格 ”。在西方女方付婚嫁钱，在中国娶媳妇新郎必须付钱。 （现在这个价格在一些省份超过$ 20,000 。 ）
如果媒人告诉他们，需要建立一个比邻居高一点点的房子，张说，他们会建两层或三层楼的房子，但如果你去二楼或三楼，郄没有任何家具，它只是为了炫耀自己的财富，以确保他们的儿子结婚。 ”
因为他们缺乏兄弟姐妹，绝大多数中国34岁以下夫妇的将是4名家长的财富的唯一继承者。当他们死了，他们的后代获得至少两个多余的房子（依投资趋势，可能更多）。这个额外的供应将压低价格，张说，因为一胎化政策，中国将有太少的年轻人需要房子。
这房价会于2020年左右下沉。但政策可能会影响市场，甚至更早。中国最有可能的新的购房者的劳动年龄人口开始下降（官方统计说，在2012年达到顶峰，联合国说，2015年） 。
与此同时，中国的性别比例在2005年达到顶峰。只有孩子离巢迁入父母的额外的套房会降低新房的需求。
当然众所周知，中国的住房市场是不可预知的。但是，如果张和他的同事们是正确的，婚姻市场的竞争支撑房屋价值，那么中国将有更后悔它的一胎化政策。
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Connection Between China's One-Child Policy and Its Housing Bubble
The fierce competition among bachelors to purchase homes has distorted a market in a way that could threaten the economy as a whole.
The Atlantic Gwynn Guilford Sep 19 2013, 11:48 AM ET
China’s one-child policy, which since 1979 has limited most Chinese couples to a single child, is notorious for having accelerated the rate of China’s aging. It’s also created a glut of young men who can’t find Chinese wives; by 2020, bachelor ranks will swell to between 30 million and 35 million—equal to the population of Canada.
But lovelorn suitors aren’t the only fallout from China’s draconian population controls, says Zhang Xiaobo, a Peking University economist. “I just returned to Beijing [from Washington, DC], and housing prices are three times that of DC,” Zhang said. ”If you look at all the indicators there’s a housing bubble. But despite the very low economic returns, people [keep buying].”
The reason? Intensified marriage market competition, says Zhang. ”The reason is that people have to buy a house in order to get married,” he says, explaining that the mothers of most brides will accept only grooms who can provide a home for their daughter.
This, says Zhang, is what has made home prices so unaffordable (a small Beijing two-bedroom is about $330,614—what an average Beijinger earns in 32 years). And, ironically, the one-child policy will eventually reverse this trend, knocking the floor out of the market.
China’s gender imbalance contributed 30 percent to 48 percent of the rise in real home prices in 35 major cities from 2003 to 2009, according to research Zhang and two colleagues conducted. Home values rose more sharply in cities with many more young men than young women.
On the horizontal axis is the sex ratio of those aged 5-19; on the vertical axis is the ratio of housing value to household income in 2004. ("Status Competition and Housing Prices," Shang-Jin Wei, Xiaobo Zhang and Yin Liu)
And this wasn’t just in cities. Even in rural areas, Zhang and his colleagues found farmers aggressively investing in homes for their sons, usually either because a local matchmaker said they needed to if they wanted to attract a wife, or because of rising local “bride prices,” the reverse-dowry that grooms must pay. (That price now exceeds $20,000 in some provinces.)
“If the matchmaker tells them they need to build a taller house, they make it a little bit taller than neighbors,” says Zhang. “Families are building two-story or three-story houses, but if you go to second or third floor, there’s no furniture at all—it’s only to show off their wealth … to make sure their son will get married.”
Because they lack siblings, the vast majority of Chinese couples 34 and younger are the sole inheritors of four parents’ wealth. When they die, their offspring get at least two extra homes (and, given investment trends, likely more). This extra supply will drive down prices, says Zhang, and because of the one-child policy, China will have too few young people to absorb the overspill.
This will sink in by around 2020. But the policy could affect the market even sooner. China’s working age population—the most likely new homebuyers—is about to start falling (official statistics say it peaked in 2012; the UN says 2015).
Meanwhile, China’s sex ratio peaked in 2005. Only children leaving the nest and move into their parents’ extra apartments and cooling bachelor competition will lower demand for new homes.
Of course, China’s housing market is notoriously unpredictable. But if Zhang and his colleagues are right—that marriage market competition is propping up home values—then China will have even more to regret about the one-child policy than it already does.
http://www.theatlantic.com/china ... sing-bubble/279830/
大西洋月刊大西洋月刊: 中国的一胎化政策和房地产市场泡沫之间的连接
大西洋月刊 Gwynn Guilford Sep 19 2013, 11:48 AM ET
单身汉激烈竞争买房已经扭曲了市场，可能会威胁到整体经济操作。
自1979年以来实行的中国的一胎化政策，限制大多数中国夫妇只生一个孩子，因加速中国的老龄化率而臭名昭着。它也创造了许多过剩的青年男子，找不到妻子;到2020年，光棍有3千万到3.5千万的光棍，这相当于加拿大的人口。
中国严厉的人口控制，失恋的追求者是不是唯一的受害者。北京大学经济学家张小波说，“我刚刚从华盛顿返回北京，住房价格是华盛顿的三倍”。 “如果你注意所有的指标，都指向房地产泡沫。尽管非常低的经济回报，但是人们継续[购买] 。”
究其原因？婚姻市场上的激烈竞争，张说。“原因是，人们不得不为了结婚买房子， ”他说，并解释说，大多数丈母娘只接受有房子的男子，可以追求他们的女儿。
张说，这是高不可攀买不起住房价格（北京一个小两居室约330,614美元，是北京人均在32年的收入）。而且，具有讽刺意味的是，一胎化的政策最终将扭转这一趋势，让房价直落到地。
根据张和两位同事进行的研究，2003年至2009年的35个主要城市的住房价格的上升，中国的性别比例失衡，贡献了30 ％至48％的因素。年轻男人比女人越多的城市，房价的増幅越大。
如图（ “男女比和住房价格”魏尚进，张晓波和银柳）:
横轴为5-19岁的性别比在纵轴上的比例是家庭收入的住房价值在2004年。
张和他的同事们发现，这不只是在城市。即使在农村，农民积极投资在房产。当地媒人说他们的儿子，如果想娶必须有房子，或付当地的“新娘的价格 ”。在西方女方付婚嫁钱，在中国娶媳妇新郎必须付钱。 （现在这个价格在一些省份超过$ 20,000 。 ）
如果媒人告诉他们，需要建立一个比邻居高一点点的房子，张说，他们会建两层或三层楼的房子，但如果你去二楼或三楼，郄没有任何家具，它只是为了炫耀自己的财富，以确保他们的儿子结婚。 ”
因为他们缺乏兄弟姐妹，绝大多数中国34岁以下夫妇的将是4名家长的财富的唯一继承者。当他们死了，他们的后代获得至少两个多余的房子（依投资趋势，可能更多）。这个额外的供应将压低价格，张说，因为一胎化政策，中国将有太少的年轻人需要房子。
这房价会于2020年左右下沉。但政策可能会影响市场，甚至更早。中国最有可能的新的购房者的劳动年龄人口开始下降（官方统计说，在2012年达到顶峰，联合国说，2015年） 。
与此同时，中国的性别比例在2005年达到顶峰。只有孩子离巢迁入父母的额外的套房会降低新房的需求。
当然众所周知，中国的住房市场是不可预知的。但是，如果张和他的同事们是正确的，婚姻市场的竞争支撑房屋价值，那么中国将有更后悔它的一胎化政策。
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Connection Between China's One-Child Policy and Its Housing Bubble
The fierce competition among bachelors to purchase homes has distorted a market in a way that could threaten the economy as a whole.
The Atlantic Gwynn Guilford Sep 19 2013, 11:48 AM ET
China’s one-child policy, which since 1979 has limited most Chinese couples to a single child, is notorious for having accelerated the rate of China’s aging. It’s also created a glut of young men who can’t find Chinese wives; by 2020, bachelor ranks will swell to between 30 million and 35 million—equal to the population of Canada.
But lovelorn suitors aren’t the only fallout from China’s draconian population controls, says Zhang Xiaobo, a Peking University economist. “I just returned to Beijing [from Washington, DC], and housing prices are three times that of DC,” Zhang said. ”If you look at all the indicators there’s a housing bubble. But despite the very low economic returns, people [keep buying].”
The reason? Intensified marriage market competition, says Zhang. ”The reason is that people have to buy a house in order to get married,” he says, explaining that the mothers of most brides will accept only grooms who can provide a home for their daughter.
This, says Zhang, is what has made home prices so unaffordable (a small Beijing two-bedroom is about $330,614—what an average Beijinger earns in 32 years). And, ironically, the one-child policy will eventually reverse this trend, knocking the floor out of the market.
China’s gender imbalance contributed 30 percent to 48 percent of the rise in real home prices in 35 major cities from 2003 to 2009, according to research Zhang and two colleagues conducted. Home values rose more sharply in cities with many more young men than young women.
On the horizontal axis is the sex ratio of those aged 5-19; on the vertical axis is the ratio of housing value to household income in 2004. ("Status Competition and Housing Prices," Shang-Jin Wei, Xiaobo Zhang and Yin Liu)
And this wasn’t just in cities. Even in rural areas, Zhang and his colleagues found farmers aggressively investing in homes for their sons, usually either because a local matchmaker said they needed to if they wanted to attract a wife, or because of rising local “bride prices,” the reverse-dowry that grooms must pay. (That price now exceeds $20,000 in some provinces.)
“If the matchmaker tells them they need to build a taller house, they make it a little bit taller than neighbors,” says Zhang. “Families are building two-story or three-story houses, but if you go to second or third floor, there’s no furniture at all—it’s only to show off their wealth … to make sure their son will get married.”
Because they lack siblings, the vast majority of Chinese couples 34 and younger are the sole inheritors of four parents’ wealth. When they die, their offspring get at least two extra homes (and, given investment trends, likely more). This extra supply will drive down prices, says Zhang, and because of the one-child policy, China will have too few young people to absorb the overspill.
This will sink in by around 2020. But the policy could affect the market even sooner. China’s working age population—the most likely new homebuyers—is about to start falling (official statistics say it peaked in 2012; the UN says 2015).
Meanwhile, China’s sex ratio peaked in 2005. Only children leaving the nest and move into their parents’ extra apartments and cooling bachelor competition will lower demand for new homes.
Of course, China’s housing market is notoriously unpredictable. But if Zhang and his colleagues are right—that marriage market competition is propping up home values—then China will have even more to regret about the one-child policy than it already does.
http://www.theatlantic.com/china ... sing-bubble/279830/
大西洋月刊
大西洋月刊 Gwynn Guilford Sep 19 2013, 11:48 AM ET
单身汉激烈竞争买房已经扭曲了市场，可能会威胁到整体经济操作。
自1979年以来实行的中国的一胎化政策，限制大多数中国夫妇只生一个孩子，因加速中国的老龄化率而臭名昭着。它也创造了许多过剩的青年男子，找不到妻子;到2020年，光棍有3千万到3.5千万的光棍，这相当于加拿大的人口。
中国严厉的人口控制，失恋的追求者是不是唯一的受害者。北京大学经济学家张小波说，“我刚刚从华盛顿返回北京，住房价格是华盛顿的三倍”。 “如果你注意所有的指标，都指向房地产泡沫。尽管非常低的经济回报，但是人们継续[购买] 。”
究其原因？婚姻市场上的激烈竞争，张说。“原因是，人们不得不为了结婚买房子， ”他说，并解释说，大多数丈母娘只接受有房子的男子，可以追求他们的女儿。
张说，这是高不可攀买不起住房价格（北京一个小两居室约330,614美元，是北京人均在32年的收入）。而且，具有讽刺意味的是，一胎化的政策最终将扭转这一趋势，让房价直落到地。
根据张和两位同事进行的研究，2003年至2009年的35个主要城市的住房价格的上升，中国的性别比例失衡，贡献了30 ％至48％的因素。年轻男人比女人越多的城市，房价的増幅越大。
如图（ “男女比和住房价格”魏尚进，张晓波和银柳）:
横轴为5-19岁的性别比在纵轴上的比例是家庭收入的住房价值在2004年。
张和他的同事们发现，这不只是在城市。即使在农村，农民积极投资在房产。当地媒人说他们的儿子，如果想娶必须有房子，或付当地的“新娘的价格 ”。在西方女方付婚嫁钱，在中国娶媳妇新郎必须付钱。 （现在这个价格在一些省份超过$ 20,000 。 ）
如果媒人告诉他们，需要建立一个比邻居高一点点的房子，张说，他们会建两层或三层楼的房子，但如果你去二楼或三楼，郄没有任何家具，它只是为了炫耀自己的财富，以确保他们的儿子结婚。 ”
因为他们缺乏兄弟姐妹，绝大多数中国34岁以下夫妇的将是4名家长的财富的唯一继承者。当他们死了，他们的后代获得至少两个多余的房子（依投资趋势，可能更多）。这个额外的供应将压低价格，张说，因为一胎化政策，中国将有太少的年轻人需要房子。
这房价会于2020年左右下沉。但政策可能会影响市场，甚至更早。中国最有可能的新的购房者的劳动年龄人口开始下降（官方统计说，在2012年达到顶峰，联合国说，2015年） 。
与此同时，中国的性别比例在2005年达到顶峰。只有孩子离巢迁入父母的额外的套房会降低新房的需求。
当然众所周知，中国的住房市场是不可预知的。但是，如果张和他的同事们是正确的，婚姻市场的竞争支撑房屋价值，那么中国将有更后悔它的一胎化政策。
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Connection Between China's One-Child Policy and Its Housing Bubble
The fierce competition among bachelors to purchase homes has distorted a market in a way that could threaten the economy as a whole.
The Atlantic Gwynn Guilford Sep 19 2013, 11:48 AM ET
China’s one-child policy, which since 1979 has limited most Chinese couples to a single child, is notorious for having accelerated the rate of China’s aging. It’s also created a glut of young men who can’t find Chinese wives; by 2020, bachelor ranks will swell to between 30 million and 35 million—equal to the population of Canada.
But lovelorn suitors aren’t the only fallout from China’s draconian population controls, says Zhang Xiaobo, a Peking University economist. “I just returned to Beijing [from Washington, DC], and housing prices are three times that of DC,” Zhang said. ”If you look at all the indicators there’s a housing bubble. But despite the very low economic returns, people [keep buying].”
The reason? Intensified marriage market competition, says Zhang. ”The reason is that people have to buy a house in order to get married,” he says, explaining that the mothers of most brides will accept only grooms who can provide a home for their daughter.
This, says Zhang, is what has made home prices so unaffordable (a small Beijing two-bedroom is about $330,614—what an average Beijinger earns in 32 years). And, ironically, the one-child policy will eventually reverse this trend, knocking the floor out of the market.
China’s gender imbalance contributed 30 percent to 48 percent of the rise in real home prices in 35 major cities from 2003 to 2009, according to research Zhang and two colleagues conducted. Home values rose more sharply in cities with many more young men than young women.
On the horizontal axis is the sex ratio of those aged 5-19; on the vertical axis is the ratio of housing value to household income in 2004. ("Status Competition and Housing Prices," Shang-Jin Wei, Xiaobo Zhang and Yin Liu)
And this wasn’t just in cities. Even in rural areas, Zhang and his colleagues found farmers aggressively investing in homes for their sons, usually either because a local matchmaker said they needed to if they wanted to attract a wife, or because of rising local “bride prices,” the reverse-dowry that grooms must pay. (That price now exceeds $20,000 in some provinces.)
“If the matchmaker tells them they need to build a taller house, they make it a little bit taller than neighbors,” says Zhang. “Families are building two-story or three-story houses, but if you go to second or third floor, there’s no furniture at all—it’s only to show off their wealth … to make sure their son will get married.”
Because they lack siblings, the vast majority of Chinese couples 34 and younger are the sole inheritors of four parents’ wealth. When they die, their offspring get at least two extra homes (and, given investment trends, likely more). This extra supply will drive down prices, says Zhang, and because of the one-child policy, China will have too few young people to absorb the overspill.
This will sink in by around 2020. But the policy could affect the market even sooner. China’s working age population—the most likely new homebuyers—is about to start falling (official statistics say it peaked in 2012; the UN says 2015).
Meanwhile, China’s sex ratio peaked in 2005. Only children leaving the nest and move into their parents’ extra apartments and cooling bachelor competition will lower demand for new homes.
Of course, China’s housing market is notoriously unpredictable. But if Zhang and his colleagues are right—that marriage market competition is propping up home values—then China will have even more to regret about the one-child policy than it already does.
http://www.theatlantic.com/china ... sing-bubble/279830/
大西洋月刊大西洋月刊: 中国的一胎化政策和房地产市场泡沫之间的连接
大西洋月刊 Gwynn Guilford Sep 19 2013, 11:48 AM ET
单身汉激烈竞争买房已经扭曲了市场，可能会威胁到整体经济操作。
自1979年以来实行的中国的一胎化政策，限制大多数中国夫妇只生一个孩子，因加速中国的老龄化率而臭名昭着。它也创造了许多过剩的青年男子，找不到妻子;到2020年，光棍有3千万到3.5千万的光棍，这相当于加拿大的人口。
中国严厉的人口控制，失恋的追求者是不是唯一的受害者。北京大学经济学家张小波说，“我刚刚从华盛顿返回北京，住房价格是华盛顿的三倍”。 “如果你注意所有的指标，都指向房地产泡沫。尽管非常低的经济回报，但是人们継续[购买] 。”
究其原因？婚姻市场上的激烈竞争，张说。“原因是，人们不得不为了结婚买房子， ”他说，并解释说，大多数丈母娘只接受有房子的男子，可以追求他们的女儿。
张说，这是高不可攀买不起住房价格（北京一个小两居室约330,614美元，是北京人均在32年的收入）。而且，具有讽刺意味的是，一胎化的政策最终将扭转这一趋势，让房价直落到地。
根据张和两位同事进行的研究，2003年至2009年的35个主要城市的住房价格的上升，中国的性别比例失衡，贡献了30 ％至48％的因素。年轻男人比女人越多的城市，房价的増幅越大。
sex-ratio-to-housing-value-to-income.png (25.27 KB, 下载次数: 0)
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如图（ “男女比和住房价格”魏尚进，张晓波和银柳）:
横轴为5-19岁的性别比在纵轴上的比例是家庭收入的住房价值在2004年。
张和他的同事们发现，这不只是在城市。即使在农村，农民积极投资在房产。当地媒人说他们的儿子，如果想娶必须有房子，或付当地的“新娘的价格 ”。在西方女方付婚嫁钱，在中国娶媳妇新郎必须付钱。 （现在这个价格在一些省份超过$ 20,000 。 ）
如果媒人告诉他们，需要建立一个比邻居高一点点的房子，张说，他们会建两层或三层楼的房子，但如果你去二楼或三楼，郄没有任何家具，它只是为了炫耀自己的财富，以确保他们的儿子结婚。 ”
因为他们缺乏兄弟姐妹，绝大多数中国34岁以下夫妇的将是4名家长的财富的唯一继承者。当他们死了，他们的后代获得至少两个多余的房子（依投资趋势，可能更多）。这个额外的供应将压低价格，张说，因为一胎化政策，中国将有太少的年轻人需要房子。
这房价会于2020年左右下沉。但政策可能会影响市场，甚至更早。中国最有可能的新的购房者的劳动年龄人口开始下降（官方统计说，在2012年达到顶峰，联合国说，2015年） 。
china-s-working-age-population-percent-of-total-population_chartbuilder-1.png (79.75 KB, 下载次数: 0)
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与此同时，中国的性别比例在2005年达到顶峰。只有孩子离巢迁入父母的额外的套房会降低新房的需求。
当然众所周知，中国的住房市场是不可预知的。但是，如果张和他的同事们是正确的，婚姻市场的竞争支撑房屋价值，那么中国将有更后悔它的一胎化政策。
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The Connection Between China's One-Child Policy and Its Housing Bubble
The fierce competition among bachelors to purchase homes has distorted a market in a way that could threaten the economy as a whole.
The Atlantic Gwynn Guilford Sep 19 2013, 11:48 AM ET
China’s one-child policy, which since 1979 has limited most Chinese couples to a single child, is notorious for having accelerated the rate of China’s aging. It’s also created a glut of young men who can’t find Chinese wives; by 2020, bachelor ranks will swell to between 30 million and 35 million—equal to the population of Canada.
But lovelorn suitors aren’t the only fallout from China’s draconian population controls, says Zhang Xiaobo, a Peking University economist. “I just returned to Beijing [from Washington, DC], and housing prices are three times that of DC,” Zhang said. ”If you look at all the indicators there’s a housing bubble. But despite the very low economic returns, people [keep buying].”
The reason? Intensified marriage market competition, says Zhang. ”The reason is that people have to buy a house in order to get married,” he says, explaining that the mothers of most brides will accept only grooms who can provide a home for their daughter.
This, says Zhang, is what has made home prices so unaffordable (a small Beijing two-bedroom is about $330,614—what an average Beijinger earns in 32 years). And, ironically, the one-child policy will eventually reverse this trend, knocking the floor out of the market.
China’s gender imbalance contributed 30 percent to 48 percent of the rise in real home prices in 35 major cities from 2003 to 2009, according to research Zhang and two colleagues conducted. Home values rose more sharply in cities with many more young men than young women.
On the horizontal axis is the sex ratio of those aged 5-19; on the vertical axis is the ratio of housing value to household income in 2004. ("Status Competition and Housing Prices," Shang-Jin Wei, Xiaobo Zhang and Yin Liu)
And this wasn’t just in cities. Even in rural areas, Zhang and his colleagues found farmers aggressively investing in homes for their sons, usually either because a local matchmaker said they needed to if they wanted to attract a wife, or because of rising local “bride prices,” the reverse-dowry that grooms must pay. (That price now exceeds $20,000 in some provinces.)
“If the matchmaker tells them they need to build a taller house, they make it a little bit taller than neighbors,” says Zhang. “Families are building two-story or three-story houses, but if you go to second or third floor, there’s no furniture at all—it’s only to show off their wealth … to make sure their son will get married.”
Because they lack siblings, the vast majority of Chinese couples 34 and younger are the sole inheritors of four parents’ wealth. When they die, their offspring get at least two extra homes (and, given investment trends, likely more). This extra supply will drive down prices, says Zhang, and because of the one-child policy, China will have too few young people to absorb the overspill.
This will sink in by around 2020. But the policy could affect the market even sooner. China’s working age population—the most likely new homebuyers—is about to start falling (official statistics say it peaked in 2012; the UN says 2015).
Meanwhile, China’s sex ratio peaked in 2005. Only children leaving the nest and move into their parents’ extra apartments and cooling bachelor competition will lower demand for new homes.
Of course, China’s housing market is notoriously unpredictable. But if Zhang and his colleagues are right—that marriage market competition is propping up home values—then China will have even more to regret about the one-child policy than it already does.
http://www.theatlantic.com/china ... sing-bubble/279830/
大西洋月刊
这个逻辑很有道理！所谓成也风云，败也风云。
第一幅图是说性别比最高时，房价/收入比并不是最高时？
jj607 发表于 2013-9-20 08:11
第一幅图是说性别比最高时，房价/收入比并不是最高时？
长大成人需要时间啊，不会每个家长都在小时候就给儿子把房准备好吧
第一幅图是说性别比最高时，房价/收入比并不是最高时？
长大成人需要时间啊，不会每个家长都在小时候就给儿子把房准备好吧
过几年中国人富了，还需要在国内娶老婆吗？
SSGN518 发表于 2013-9-21 00:48
长大成人需要时间啊，不会每个家长都在小时候就给儿子把房准备好吧
如此说来，还要涨？
长大成人需要时间啊，不会每个家长都在小时候就给儿子把房准备好吧
如此说来，还要涨？
城市人口不超过总人口80%的情况下房价降不下去的，现在地方政府没钱了，养老金发不下来了，房租很可能是很多老人未来唯一的稳定收入，房价停止上涨（仅仅是停止上涨而已）起码又会向后推迟20年