龙腾翻译【为了忘却的纪念】 美国学者:在越战中,中国 ...

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Chinese Support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War: The Decisive Edge

越战中,中国对北越的支持起了决定性作用


“Best turn it into a bigger war…I’m afraid you really ought to send more troops to the South…Don’t be afraid of U.S. intervention, at most it’s no worse than having another Korean War. The Chinese army is prepared, and if America takes the risk of attacking North Vietnam, the Chinese army will march in at once. Our troops want a war now.” [1]
-- Mao speaking to the North Vietnamese in 1964

毛主席1964年接见北越人士的讲话:

“最好搞成大战,我认为你们应该送更多的军队去南方,不要害怕美国介入,最坏也不过再来一场朝鲜战争。中国军队已经准备好了,如果美国人冒险进攻北越,中国军队将立即开动。我们的部队现在想干上一仗”。


So why did the powerful modern nations of France and the United States lose two wars in Vietnam to a third rate military power like North Vietnam? This is the logical question that many historians have asked and attempted to answer since the Second Vietnam War ended in April 1975 with the fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese tanks. Some historians have stressed the support of the Communist party and its leadership, others point to the support of the Vietnamese people, and still other historians explain the North Vietnamese victory as an effect of the post-colonial nationalism wave that swept through Asia after the Second World War. However, few historians, with the possible exception of Qiang Zhai, among others, attribute the victory of the Vietnamese Communists in both Vietnam Wars to the considerable support provided by the communist colossus of the north, the People’s Republic of China. [2]

为什么强力的现代化国家法国和美国在两场战争中会输给越南这种三流军事能力的国家?在1975年4月当第二次越南战争以西贡沦陷于北越坦克而结束之后,很多历史学家提出了这个逻辑性问题并试图给出解答。一些历史学家强调了GCD的支持及其领导,而其他历史学家将北越的胜利看作二战后席卷亚洲的反殖民主义的胜利。然而,其他历史学家中的少数几人(包括Qiang Zhai)将越南共产主义者的胜利归功于北方共产主义巨人(中华人民共和国)提供的支持。

This Chinese military support, to include equipment, advisors and planning assistance, provided from 1949-1975, would prove in both the First and Second Indochina Wars to be decisive. This substantial military support would give the People‘s Army of Vietnam an edge to resist Western forces and eventually subjugate the Republic of South Vietnam. This support, for various reasons, has never really been acknowledged by most popular histories of the conflict. This is perhaps due to the fact that such acknowledgement of the massive Chinese military support provided challenges many cherished myths of Vietnamese Communist military brilliance and the “heroic struggle” against overwhelming western imperialists. Two recent histories bear this out. Case in point A Military History of China, edited by David A. Graff makes no mention of Chinese support for Vietnam while Bruce A. Elleman’s Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989, dismisses Chinese support in a mere two sentences. [3] However, unless this decisive Chinese support is properly understood by students of both Vietnam wars the answer to the question of why North Vietnam won will remain incomplete and misunderstood. This paper will attempt to outline the Chinese communist support in both wars and explain exactly why this support was so decisive.
1949-1975年间,在第一次和第二次印支战争中,中国提供的军事援助,包括装备、顾问及战略规划帮助,被证明是起决定性作用的。这种实质性的军事支援,给予了越南人民军一个优势,以抵抗西方力量并最终征服南越共和国。由于种种原因,该项支援从来没有被关于该冲突的大众历史文献所承认。这可能是由于:若承认大规模的中国军事支援,将挑战越南共产主义者所珍视的“推翻西方帝国主义者的辉煌而英勇的战斗”的传说。最近的两份历史文献体现了这一点。比如,由David A. Graff编写的《中国军事历史》一书没有提及中国对越南的支持,同时,Bruce A. Elleman所著的《现代中国战争》一书提及中国对越南的支持仅仅只用了两句话。然而,除非“中国在两次越战中对于北越的决定性的支援”被学者们适当的理解,否则“为什么北越会赢得战争”这个问题的答案将会是不完整的也是令人困惑的。本文试图概述中国在两次越战中对北越的支援,并说明为什么这种支援是决定性的。


Background 背景

As with most historical events one must first understand, in broad general terms, the background and context to a specific point in time. A brief review of the historical Sino-Vietnamese relationship sets the tone for more recent events, in many respects. Ties between China and Vietnam have existed for centuries; in fact, throughout history Vietnam has depended upon and looked towards China repeatedly for not only cultural but political assistance as circumstances warranted. Vietnam was considered by China to be part of her tributary system, or sphere of influence if you will, where by the lesser state, Vietnam, would acknowledge the leadership of Imperial China in return for trade and defense as required. In the 18th century, for example Chinese troops intervened in Vietnam to assist a threatened ruler and again less successfully in the latter half of the 19th century against France expanding her influence in the area, with the so-called “Black Flag” forces. This concern for Vietnam would continue with China declaring war on France on 27 August 1884, in fact, due to French expansion into Northern Vietnam. [4]
总的来说,对于大多数历史事件,人们首先需要了解某特定时刻的背景及其来龙去脉。在很多方面,简要的回顾历史上的中越关系可以为近代的事件设定基调。中国与越南的关系已经存在了几个世纪,实际上,在整个历史上,只要条件允许,越南都反复的依靠并指望中国提供文化及政治上的帮助。中国将越南作为朝贡体系的一部分,或者说是势力范围之一。作为较弱小的一方:越南,承认中华帝国的领导权,作为回报,中国可准许越南的贸易要求并给予其保护。比如,在18世纪,中国军队进入越南以帮助一位受到威胁的统治者;在19世纪下半叶,中国 “黑旗军”帮助越南抵抗法国人,法国人意图在该地区扩张影响力,不过抵抗行动不够成功。实际上,由于法国人在北越扩张,中国于1884年8月27日对法宣战。


This traditional relationship between China and Vietnam was not always harmonious as many have pointed out, since, for obvious reasons, no nation enjoys domination by a more powerful neighbor.
正如很多人已经指出的:中越之间的这种关系并不总是和谐的,原因是众所周知的,没有哪个国家乐意被一个强大得多的邻居所支配。


The Chinese Vietnamese Communist ties had existed for decades, in fact, before the first Chinese military advisor arrived in North Vietnam in 1950. The life of Nguyen That Thanh, who would ultimately be known to the world under the pseudonym Ho Chi Minh, best personifies the close relationship that existed between the two communist parties, and ultimately the two armies.

实际上,在1950年第一批中国军事顾问团抵达北越之前,中越共产主义者之间的关系已经存在了几十年。Nguyen That Thanh(最终以其化名“胡志明”而被世界所熟知)的一生,就是两党两军之间所存在的紧密联系的最佳象征。

The ties go back to right after the First World War, in fact. In 1920 Ho would be one of 285 delegates, and the only “Comrade Indochinese Delegate,” that founded the French Communist Party in Tours. [5] Ho made an impassioned speech at the conference listing France’s crimes in Vietnam “…we have not only been oppressed and exploited shamelessly, but also tortured and poisoned…we have been poisoned with opium, alcohol, etc.” [6]
实际上,中越之间的这种关系可追溯到第一次世界大战刚结束。在1920年,285名代表在卢瓦尔图省建立法国共XX,胡志明是代表之一,并是唯一的一位 “印支代表”。在听取法国在越南的犯罪行为的大会上,胡志明做了慷慨激昂的演讲:“我们不仅遭到无耻的压迫及剥削,而且遭到折磨和毒害,我们被鸦片、酒精等等所毒害”。


The following year the Chinese Communist Party would be formed in 1921. The party from the beginning would serve as a rallying point for disgruntled Vietnamese such as Ho, and others, wanting to resist French rule in Vietnam. [7] After several years of training in Moscow, Ho eventually made his way to China, the then front lines of the revolution, to assist Mikhail Borodin, the Communist International, or COMINTERN representative to the new Nationalist government of Sun Yat-sen. Organizing Vietnamese revolutionaries in Canton, Ho lectured at the famous Nationalist Whampoa Military Academy, meeting such communist luminaries such as Zhou Enlai and others, before returning to Moscow after the Chinese Nationalist-Communist split in 1927. [8] He would also organize the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930 which in time would become the Vietnamese Worker Party. A dedicated COMINTERN agent who traveled on a Soviet passport, Ho was known as Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot) during this period and would only be known as Ho Chi Minh (Ho the Enlightened ) after 1943. He would travel between Asia and Moscow before finally returning to China in 1938 to serve as an advisor to the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army, along with other senior Vietnamese revolutionaries. [9] Ho became quite proficient in Chinese and would translate Mao’s celebrated work, “On the Protracted War,” from Chinese into French. [10]

接下来,在1921年,中国共XX成立。对于试图反抗法国在越南的统治的胡志明等不满者来说,中国共XX从一开始就是他们的聚焦点。在莫斯科接受几年的训练后,胡志明来到中国并投身革命前线,当时鲍罗廷是共产国际派驻在孙中山国民党政府的代表,而胡志明是鲍罗廷的助手。胡志明在广东将越南革命者组织起来,并在著名的黄埔军校授课,还会见了中国共XX的杰出人物如周恩来等,直到1927年国共分裂,胡志明才返回莫斯科。他于1930年组建了印支共XX,即越南工人党的前身。作为献身共产国际的代表,胡志明使用苏联护照旅行,在这个阶段他以“Nguyen Ai Quoc”(爱国者Nguyen)而闻名,而在1943年之后他以“胡志明”(启迪者胡)而闻名。胡志明在亚洲与莫斯科之间穿梭,1938年他回到中国,与其他越南资深革命者一起,成为中国八路军的顾问。胡志明逐渐对中文非常熟练,并将毛泽东的名著“论持久战”由中文翻译为法语。

Second World War and French Reoccupation 二战及法国的再占领
Seasoned by years of training and his experiences China Ho would found the Viet Minh independence movement in 1941, the Vietnamese Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, the League for the Independence of Vietnam, or Viet Minh. He would spend the remainder of the war organizing in the north of Vietnam and attempting to remain out of French and Chinese jail. During the war the Viet Minh would consolidate their power in the north of Vietnam with history teacher turned General Vo Nguygen Giap building communist forces reaching some 5,000 in number. [11]

由于多年的训练以及在中国的经验,胡志明变得经验丰富,他在1941年发起了越南独立运动,或者说“越南独立联盟”,用越南话说就是“Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi”。他将战争幸存人员在北越组织起来,并使其免于落入法国或中国的监狱。在战争中,越南独立联盟在北越巩固了他们的力量,从历史老师成长为将军的武元甲建立了共产主义军队,人数达到5000人。

By the time the Second World War ended in August of 1945, with the collapse of Imperial Japan, the organized and disciplined Vietnamese communists and Ho were perfectly positioned to move into the power vacuum left in the wars wake in Vietnam. In September of 1945 Ho would proclaim the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) with American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) officers beside him in Hanoi. Nationalist Chinese and British troops that same month arrived to take the surrender of the Japanese forces, with reoccupation by the returning French soon afterwards. A period of unease settled over Vietnam with the French and Vietnamese negotiated over the future of Vietnam, with Ho at one point traveling to Paris for unsuccessful meetings with the French government. Ho would formally request military aid to include advisors and equipment from Stalin and the USSR in 1945, with no response to these requests given in return. [12] The Chinese in the future would not make the same mistake.

当二战于1945年8月结束时,随着日本帝国主义的崩溃,组织性纪律性良好的越南共产主义者占有了绝佳的位置以填补战争波浪留下的权力真空。1945年9月,在美国战略服务办公室官员的陪同下,胡志明在河内宣布成立越南民主共和国。中国国民党军队及英国军队在同月抵达河内,并解除了日本军队对其的包围,而不久之后,法国人返回并重新占领了越南。一段令人焦虑的岁月降临到越南头上,胡志明一度去巴黎与法国政府展开了不成功的会谈,以谈判越南的未来。他在1945年向斯大林正式要求军事援助,包括装备及顾问,但是苏联对于这些要求没有任何回应。中国人将来不会犯相同的错误。

First Indochina War 第一次印支战争

The First Vietnam War would finally begin in December of 1946 as the French attempted to disarm the Viet Minh Self Defense Forces in Hanoi and full scale fighting broke out. [13] By early 1947 the French had driven the Viet Minh out of the major cities throughout the country but the communists controlled the countryside in the north with a growing army of some 50,000 men capable of standing up to the best the professional French Army and Navy could throw at them. [14] The war settled down to a deadly affair of guerrilla war, ambush and counter ambush as the Vietnamese and French forces fought for control of Vietnam and the population.

1946年12月,第一次越南战争打响了,法国人试图解除越南独立联盟在河内的自卫队的武装,全面战争由此爆发。到了1947年早间,法国人已经将越南独立联盟逐出全国的主要城市,但是共产主义者控制住了北越的农村,他们的军队人数上升到5万人,可以抵挡住法国可以投放的最好的职业陆军及海军力量。战争发展成致命的游击战争,法国人与越南人展开伏击与反伏击,以控制越南及其人民。

It was during these early years of the war that the Chinese military support of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) began on a rather minor scale. This military aid started in March of 1946 as the Chinese Communist First Regiment of the Southern Guangdong People’s Force crossed into Vietnam in order to avoid Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist 46th and 64th Armies during the Chinese Civil War. [15] In addition to avoiding destruction this Chinese Regiment would begin to lay the groundwork for training and advising the less mature Vietnamese forces. This one thousand man unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, PLA, would provide officers to the Vietnamese Advanced Infantry School and Cadre Training Center in North Vietnam with some 830 personnel trained by the year 1947. [16] Direct contact to include cable traffic and funding existed at this early point between the two communist movements.
在战争的早期阶段,中国对越南人民军的支援开始从一个较小的规模起步。该军事援助始于1946年3月,当时处于中国内战期间,为避开蒋介石的国民党第46军和第64军,广东人民军共产主义第一团进入了越南。为了避免被消灭,该中国团开始为欠成熟的越南军队提供建议并打下训练的基础。中国人民解放军的这个一千人的单位为位于北越的越南高级步兵学校及干部培训中心提供官员,到1947年共培训了830人。在这两个共产主义运动的早期,就存在着这种直接的接触,包括电缆通讯及资金援助。


The strategic balance of power, in Asia and perhaps across the globe, was forever altered with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October of 1949. After two years of relatively small scale guerrilla warfare dating from 1947 in Vietnam, the conflict would now expand and become much more deadly. With the arrival of Chinese communist troops along the Sino-Vietnamese border, the inevitable end was in sight for the French in Vietnam. As General Giap would write years later, “This great historic event, which altered events in Asia and throughout the world, exerted a considerable influence on the war of liberation of the Vietnamese people. Vietnam was no longer in the grip of enemy encirclement, and was henceforth geographically linked to the socialist bloc.” [17]

亚洲及全球的战略平衡,由于1949年10月中华人民共和国的建立而被永久的改变了。在越南,从1947年开始,在经过两年规模相对较小的游击战争后,冲突规模扩大并变得更为致命。随着中国共产主义者军队到达中越边界,法国在越南的不可避免的终结已经在望了。正如武元甲将军在几年后所写:“这个历史性事件改变了亚洲及世界的事务,对于越南人民的解放战争施加了可观的影响。越南从此不再处于敌人的包围之中,而是在地理上与社会主义阵营连接在一起”。

Understandably enough Ho and the Viet Minh wasted no time in sending representatives northward to ask for support and assistance from the new communist government. Diplomatic recognition would be granted to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in January of 1950 by the PRC, the first nation to do so, followed soon by Stalin and the USSR also granting recognition. [18] Stalin, as the senior member of the communist firm, had informed Mao during meetings in Moscow soon afterwards that providing support and assistance to the Vietnamese struggle was a responsibility, and financial obligation, of the Chinese and the PRC. [19] This would not be an obligation that the Chairman would shirk from, far from it, he would honor Stalin's wishes and support the Vietnamese communist cause for the next 25 years. Mao would see Vietnam as one of three areas of Western imperialism bordering on China that threatened the PRC, the other two areas being Taiwan and Korea. Additionally Mao sincerely believed in supporting “national liberation movements in colonial nations” and fancied himself as the champion of non-European peoples across the globe. [20]

可以理解,胡志明及越南独立联盟没有浪费任何时间,立即向北派出代表,向这个新的共产主义政府寻求支援及帮助。1950年1月,中国在外交上正式承认越南民主共和国,这是世界上第一个给予这种承认的国家,随后苏联也给予正式承认。作为共产主义阵营的老大哥,在于莫斯科举行的会议中,斯大林告诉毛泽东:为越南的斗争提供支援及帮助是中国及解放军的责任及财政义务。毛主席不会推卸该项责任,远远不是,实际上他尊重斯大林的愿望并在未来的25年里支持越南共产主义事业。毛主席将越南视为帝国主义与中国接壤并威胁着人民共和国的三个地区之一,另两个地区是台湾和朝鲜。此外,毛太祖真诚的相信 “殖民地国家的民族解放运动”,并将他自己想象为全球非欧洲人的捍卫者。

For the USSR and Stalin it was a low risk gamble.  Its allies, the Chinese under Mao, and the Koreans and Vietnamese, could potentially tie down so much U.S. and Western strength in Asia that the global balance of power might shift, allowing the Soviets to strike westwards into Europe. Stalin discounted a Third World War and the west’s reaction since Germany and Japan were post-war shells, proclaiming “Should we fear this [world war]? In my opinion, we should not…If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years time.” [21] The die would be cast for warfare in Asia, and possibly elsewhere.

对于苏联及斯大林来说,这是一场低危险的赌博。它的盟军:毛太祖治下的中国、以及朝鲜人及越南人,可以在亚洲潜在的牵制大量美国及西方的力量,从而改变全球的力量平衡,使得苏联可以向西打击欧洲。由于德国及日本已是战后的空壳,斯大林轻视一场第三次世界大战,他宣称:“我们该害怕世界大战吗?在我看来,我们不应该害怕。如果战争不可避免,那么现在就打,而不是几年后再打”。死亡将由于战争而被带到亚洲,以及其他可能的地方。




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Chinese Support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War: The Decisive Edge

越战中,中国对北越的支持起了决定性作用


“Best turn it into a bigger war…I’m afraid you really ought to send more troops to the South…Don’t be afraid of U.S. intervention, at most it’s no worse than having another Korean War. The Chinese army is prepared, and if America takes the risk of attacking North Vietnam, the Chinese army will march in at once. Our troops want a war now.” [1]
-- Mao speaking to the North Vietnamese in 1964

毛主席1964年接见北越人士的讲话:

“最好搞成大战,我认为你们应该送更多的军队去南方,不要害怕美国介入,最坏也不过再来一场朝鲜战争。中国军队已经准备好了,如果美国人冒险进攻北越,中国军队将立即开动。我们的部队现在想干上一仗”。


So why did the powerful modern nations of France and the United States lose two wars in Vietnam to a third rate military power like North Vietnam? This is the logical question that many historians have asked and attempted to answer since the Second Vietnam War ended in April 1975 with the fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese tanks. Some historians have stressed the support of the Communist party and its leadership, others point to the support of the Vietnamese people, and still other historians explain the North Vietnamese victory as an effect of the post-colonial nationalism wave that swept through Asia after the Second World War. However, few historians, with the possible exception of Qiang Zhai, among others, attribute the victory of the Vietnamese Communists in both Vietnam Wars to the considerable support provided by the communist colossus of the north, the People’s Republic of China. [2]

为什么强力的现代化国家法国和美国在两场战争中会输给越南这种三流军事能力的国家?在1975年4月当第二次越南战争以西贡沦陷于北越坦克而结束之后,很多历史学家提出了这个逻辑性问题并试图给出解答。一些历史学家强调了GCD的支持及其领导,而其他历史学家将北越的胜利看作二战后席卷亚洲的反殖民主义的胜利。然而,其他历史学家中的少数几人(包括Qiang Zhai)将越南共产主义者的胜利归功于北方共产主义巨人(中华人民共和国)提供的支持。

This Chinese military support, to include equipment, advisors and planning assistance, provided from 1949-1975, would prove in both the First and Second Indochina Wars to be decisive. This substantial military support would give the People‘s Army of Vietnam an edge to resist Western forces and eventually subjugate the Republic of South Vietnam. This support, for various reasons, has never really been acknowledged by most popular histories of the conflict. This is perhaps due to the fact that such acknowledgement of the massive Chinese military support provided challenges many cherished myths of Vietnamese Communist military brilliance and the “heroic struggle” against overwhelming western imperialists. Two recent histories bear this out. Case in point A Military History of China, edited by David A. Graff makes no mention of Chinese support for Vietnam while Bruce A. Elleman’s Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989, dismisses Chinese support in a mere two sentences. [3] However, unless this decisive Chinese support is properly understood by students of both Vietnam wars the answer to the question of why North Vietnam won will remain incomplete and misunderstood. This paper will attempt to outline the Chinese communist support in both wars and explain exactly why this support was so decisive.
1949-1975年间,在第一次和第二次印支战争中,中国提供的军事援助,包括装备、顾问及战略规划帮助,被证明是起决定性作用的。这种实质性的军事支援,给予了越南人民军一个优势,以抵抗西方力量并最终征服南越共和国。由于种种原因,该项支援从来没有被关于该冲突的大众历史文献所承认。这可能是由于:若承认大规模的中国军事支援,将挑战越南共产主义者所珍视的“推翻西方帝国主义者的辉煌而英勇的战斗”的传说。最近的两份历史文献体现了这一点。比如,由David A. Graff编写的《中国军事历史》一书没有提及中国对越南的支持,同时,Bruce A. Elleman所著的《现代中国战争》一书提及中国对越南的支持仅仅只用了两句话。然而,除非“中国在两次越战中对于北越的决定性的支援”被学者们适当的理解,否则“为什么北越会赢得战争”这个问题的答案将会是不完整的也是令人困惑的。本文试图概述中国在两次越战中对北越的支援,并说明为什么这种支援是决定性的。


Background 背景

As with most historical events one must first understand, in broad general terms, the background and context to a specific point in time. A brief review of the historical Sino-Vietnamese relationship sets the tone for more recent events, in many respects. Ties between China and Vietnam have existed for centuries; in fact, throughout history Vietnam has depended upon and looked towards China repeatedly for not only cultural but political assistance as circumstances warranted. Vietnam was considered by China to be part of her tributary system, or sphere of influence if you will, where by the lesser state, Vietnam, would acknowledge the leadership of Imperial China in return for trade and defense as required. In the 18th century, for example Chinese troops intervened in Vietnam to assist a threatened ruler and again less successfully in the latter half of the 19th century against France expanding her influence in the area, with the so-called “Black Flag” forces. This concern for Vietnam would continue with China declaring war on France on 27 August 1884, in fact, due to French expansion into Northern Vietnam. [4]
总的来说,对于大多数历史事件,人们首先需要了解某特定时刻的背景及其来龙去脉。在很多方面,简要的回顾历史上的中越关系可以为近代的事件设定基调。中国与越南的关系已经存在了几个世纪,实际上,在整个历史上,只要条件允许,越南都反复的依靠并指望中国提供文化及政治上的帮助。中国将越南作为朝贡体系的一部分,或者说是势力范围之一。作为较弱小的一方:越南,承认中华帝国的领导权,作为回报,中国可准许越南的贸易要求并给予其保护。比如,在18世纪,中国军队进入越南以帮助一位受到威胁的统治者;在19世纪下半叶,中国 “黑旗军”帮助越南抵抗法国人,法国人意图在该地区扩张影响力,不过抵抗行动不够成功。实际上,由于法国人在北越扩张,中国于1884年8月27日对法宣战。


This traditional relationship between China and Vietnam was not always harmonious as many have pointed out, since, for obvious reasons, no nation enjoys domination by a more powerful neighbor.
正如很多人已经指出的:中越之间的这种关系并不总是和谐的,原因是众所周知的,没有哪个国家乐意被一个强大得多的邻居所支配。


The Chinese Vietnamese Communist ties had existed for decades, in fact, before the first Chinese military advisor arrived in North Vietnam in 1950. The life of Nguyen That Thanh, who would ultimately be known to the world under the pseudonym Ho Chi Minh, best personifies the close relationship that existed between the two communist parties, and ultimately the two armies.

实际上,在1950年第一批中国军事顾问团抵达北越之前,中越共产主义者之间的关系已经存在了几十年。Nguyen That Thanh(最终以其化名“胡志明”而被世界所熟知)的一生,就是两党两军之间所存在的紧密联系的最佳象征。

The ties go back to right after the First World War, in fact. In 1920 Ho would be one of 285 delegates, and the only “Comrade Indochinese Delegate,” that founded the French Communist Party in Tours. [5] Ho made an impassioned speech at the conference listing France’s crimes in Vietnam “…we have not only been oppressed and exploited shamelessly, but also tortured and poisoned…we have been poisoned with opium, alcohol, etc.” [6]
实际上,中越之间的这种关系可追溯到第一次世界大战刚结束。在1920年,285名代表在卢瓦尔图省建立法国共XX,胡志明是代表之一,并是唯一的一位 “印支代表”。在听取法国在越南的犯罪行为的大会上,胡志明做了慷慨激昂的演讲:“我们不仅遭到无耻的压迫及剥削,而且遭到折磨和毒害,我们被鸦片、酒精等等所毒害”。


The following year the Chinese Communist Party would be formed in 1921. The party from the beginning would serve as a rallying point for disgruntled Vietnamese such as Ho, and others, wanting to resist French rule in Vietnam. [7] After several years of training in Moscow, Ho eventually made his way to China, the then front lines of the revolution, to assist Mikhail Borodin, the Communist International, or COMINTERN representative to the new Nationalist government of Sun Yat-sen. Organizing Vietnamese revolutionaries in Canton, Ho lectured at the famous Nationalist Whampoa Military Academy, meeting such communist luminaries such as Zhou Enlai and others, before returning to Moscow after the Chinese Nationalist-Communist split in 1927. [8] He would also organize the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930 which in time would become the Vietnamese Worker Party. A dedicated COMINTERN agent who traveled on a Soviet passport, Ho was known as Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot) during this period and would only be known as Ho Chi Minh (Ho the Enlightened ) after 1943. He would travel between Asia and Moscow before finally returning to China in 1938 to serve as an advisor to the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army, along with other senior Vietnamese revolutionaries. [9] Ho became quite proficient in Chinese and would translate Mao’s celebrated work, “On the Protracted War,” from Chinese into French. [10]

接下来,在1921年,中国共XX成立。对于试图反抗法国在越南的统治的胡志明等不满者来说,中国共XX从一开始就是他们的聚焦点。在莫斯科接受几年的训练后,胡志明来到中国并投身革命前线,当时鲍罗廷是共产国际派驻在孙中山国民党政府的代表,而胡志明是鲍罗廷的助手。胡志明在广东将越南革命者组织起来,并在著名的黄埔军校授课,还会见了中国共XX的杰出人物如周恩来等,直到1927年国共分裂,胡志明才返回莫斯科。他于1930年组建了印支共XX,即越南工人党的前身。作为献身共产国际的代表,胡志明使用苏联护照旅行,在这个阶段他以“Nguyen Ai Quoc”(爱国者Nguyen)而闻名,而在1943年之后他以“胡志明”(启迪者胡)而闻名。胡志明在亚洲与莫斯科之间穿梭,1938年他回到中国,与其他越南资深革命者一起,成为中国八路军的顾问。胡志明逐渐对中文非常熟练,并将毛泽东的名著“论持久战”由中文翻译为法语。

Second World War and French Reoccupation 二战及法国的再占领
Seasoned by years of training and his experiences China Ho would found the Viet Minh independence movement in 1941, the Vietnamese Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, the League for the Independence of Vietnam, or Viet Minh. He would spend the remainder of the war organizing in the north of Vietnam and attempting to remain out of French and Chinese jail. During the war the Viet Minh would consolidate their power in the north of Vietnam with history teacher turned General Vo Nguygen Giap building communist forces reaching some 5,000 in number. [11]

由于多年的训练以及在中国的经验,胡志明变得经验丰富,他在1941年发起了越南独立运动,或者说“越南独立联盟”,用越南话说就是“Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi”。他将战争幸存人员在北越组织起来,并使其免于落入法国或中国的监狱。在战争中,越南独立联盟在北越巩固了他们的力量,从历史老师成长为将军的武元甲建立了共产主义军队,人数达到5000人。

By the time the Second World War ended in August of 1945, with the collapse of Imperial Japan, the organized and disciplined Vietnamese communists and Ho were perfectly positioned to move into the power vacuum left in the wars wake in Vietnam. In September of 1945 Ho would proclaim the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) with American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) officers beside him in Hanoi. Nationalist Chinese and British troops that same month arrived to take the surrender of the Japanese forces, with reoccupation by the returning French soon afterwards. A period of unease settled over Vietnam with the French and Vietnamese negotiated over the future of Vietnam, with Ho at one point traveling to Paris for unsuccessful meetings with the French government. Ho would formally request military aid to include advisors and equipment from Stalin and the USSR in 1945, with no response to these requests given in return. [12] The Chinese in the future would not make the same mistake.

当二战于1945年8月结束时,随着日本帝国主义的崩溃,组织性纪律性良好的越南共产主义者占有了绝佳的位置以填补战争波浪留下的权力真空。1945年9月,在美国战略服务办公室官员的陪同下,胡志明在河内宣布成立越南民主共和国。中国国民党军队及英国军队在同月抵达河内,并解除了日本军队对其的包围,而不久之后,法国人返回并重新占领了越南。一段令人焦虑的岁月降临到越南头上,胡志明一度去巴黎与法国政府展开了不成功的会谈,以谈判越南的未来。他在1945年向斯大林正式要求军事援助,包括装备及顾问,但是苏联对于这些要求没有任何回应。中国人将来不会犯相同的错误。

First Indochina War 第一次印支战争

The First Vietnam War would finally begin in December of 1946 as the French attempted to disarm the Viet Minh Self Defense Forces in Hanoi and full scale fighting broke out. [13] By early 1947 the French had driven the Viet Minh out of the major cities throughout the country but the communists controlled the countryside in the north with a growing army of some 50,000 men capable of standing up to the best the professional French Army and Navy could throw at them. [14] The war settled down to a deadly affair of guerrilla war, ambush and counter ambush as the Vietnamese and French forces fought for control of Vietnam and the population.

1946年12月,第一次越南战争打响了,法国人试图解除越南独立联盟在河内的自卫队的武装,全面战争由此爆发。到了1947年早间,法国人已经将越南独立联盟逐出全国的主要城市,但是共产主义者控制住了北越的农村,他们的军队人数上升到5万人,可以抵挡住法国可以投放的最好的职业陆军及海军力量。战争发展成致命的游击战争,法国人与越南人展开伏击与反伏击,以控制越南及其人民。

It was during these early years of the war that the Chinese military support of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) began on a rather minor scale. This military aid started in March of 1946 as the Chinese Communist First Regiment of the Southern Guangdong People’s Force crossed into Vietnam in order to avoid Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist 46th and 64th Armies during the Chinese Civil War. [15] In addition to avoiding destruction this Chinese Regiment would begin to lay the groundwork for training and advising the less mature Vietnamese forces. This one thousand man unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, PLA, would provide officers to the Vietnamese Advanced Infantry School and Cadre Training Center in North Vietnam with some 830 personnel trained by the year 1947. [16] Direct contact to include cable traffic and funding existed at this early point between the two communist movements.
在战争的早期阶段,中国对越南人民军的支援开始从一个较小的规模起步。该军事援助始于1946年3月,当时处于中国内战期间,为避开蒋介石的国民党第46军和第64军,广东人民军共产主义第一团进入了越南。为了避免被消灭,该中国团开始为欠成熟的越南军队提供建议并打下训练的基础。中国人民解放军的这个一千人的单位为位于北越的越南高级步兵学校及干部培训中心提供官员,到1947年共培训了830人。在这两个共产主义运动的早期,就存在着这种直接的接触,包括电缆通讯及资金援助。


The strategic balance of power, in Asia and perhaps across the globe, was forever altered with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October of 1949. After two years of relatively small scale guerrilla warfare dating from 1947 in Vietnam, the conflict would now expand and become much more deadly. With the arrival of Chinese communist troops along the Sino-Vietnamese border, the inevitable end was in sight for the French in Vietnam. As General Giap would write years later, “This great historic event, which altered events in Asia and throughout the world, exerted a considerable influence on the war of liberation of the Vietnamese people. Vietnam was no longer in the grip of enemy encirclement, and was henceforth geographically linked to the socialist bloc.” [17]

亚洲及全球的战略平衡,由于1949年10月中华人民共和国的建立而被永久的改变了。在越南,从1947年开始,在经过两年规模相对较小的游击战争后,冲突规模扩大并变得更为致命。随着中国共产主义者军队到达中越边界,法国在越南的不可避免的终结已经在望了。正如武元甲将军在几年后所写:“这个历史性事件改变了亚洲及世界的事务,对于越南人民的解放战争施加了可观的影响。越南从此不再处于敌人的包围之中,而是在地理上与社会主义阵营连接在一起”。

Understandably enough Ho and the Viet Minh wasted no time in sending representatives northward to ask for support and assistance from the new communist government. Diplomatic recognition would be granted to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in January of 1950 by the PRC, the first nation to do so, followed soon by Stalin and the USSR also granting recognition. [18] Stalin, as the senior member of the communist firm, had informed Mao during meetings in Moscow soon afterwards that providing support and assistance to the Vietnamese struggle was a responsibility, and financial obligation, of the Chinese and the PRC. [19] This would not be an obligation that the Chairman would shirk from, far from it, he would honor Stalin's wishes and support the Vietnamese communist cause for the next 25 years. Mao would see Vietnam as one of three areas of Western imperialism bordering on China that threatened the PRC, the other two areas being Taiwan and Korea. Additionally Mao sincerely believed in supporting “national liberation movements in colonial nations” and fancied himself as the champion of non-European peoples across the globe. [20]

可以理解,胡志明及越南独立联盟没有浪费任何时间,立即向北派出代表,向这个新的共产主义政府寻求支援及帮助。1950年1月,中国在外交上正式承认越南民主共和国,这是世界上第一个给予这种承认的国家,随后苏联也给予正式承认。作为共产主义阵营的老大哥,在于莫斯科举行的会议中,斯大林告诉毛泽东:为越南的斗争提供支援及帮助是中国及解放军的责任及财政义务。毛主席不会推卸该项责任,远远不是,实际上他尊重斯大林的愿望并在未来的25年里支持越南共产主义事业。毛主席将越南视为帝国主义与中国接壤并威胁着人民共和国的三个地区之一,另两个地区是台湾和朝鲜。此外,毛太祖真诚的相信 “殖民地国家的民族解放运动”,并将他自己想象为全球非欧洲人的捍卫者。

For the USSR and Stalin it was a low risk gamble.  Its allies, the Chinese under Mao, and the Koreans and Vietnamese, could potentially tie down so much U.S. and Western strength in Asia that the global balance of power might shift, allowing the Soviets to strike westwards into Europe. Stalin discounted a Third World War and the west’s reaction since Germany and Japan were post-war shells, proclaiming “Should we fear this [world war]? In my opinion, we should not…If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years time.” [21] The die would be cast for warfare in Asia, and possibly elsewhere.

对于苏联及斯大林来说,这是一场低危险的赌博。它的盟军:毛太祖治下的中国、以及朝鲜人及越南人,可以在亚洲潜在的牵制大量美国及西方的力量,从而改变全球的力量平衡,使得苏联可以向西打击欧洲。由于德国及日本已是战后的空壳,斯大林轻视一场第三次世界大战,他宣称:“我们该害怕世界大战吗?在我看来,我们不应该害怕。如果战争不可避免,那么现在就打,而不是几年后再打”。死亡将由于战争而被带到亚洲,以及其他可能的地方。

Chinese military support, 1950-54  1950年到54年间的中国军事支援
In 1950 a classified U.S. Central Intelligence Report, CIA, stated that “The French position in Indochina is precarious,” somewhat of an understatement at the time. [22] The war had been going badly for the French and would only get worse. Ho would formally request military aid in the nature of equipment, advisors and training for the PAVN in April of 1950. Interestingly enough he would also request Chinese commanders at the regimental and battalion level to assist the Vietnamese Army, a request wisely denied by China, who would send advisors, not commanders to the North of Vietnam. [23] Such a request for Chinese commanders of PAVN units highlights the leadership problems present at the time in the Vietnamese forces, and the prevailing lack of confidence in Vietnamese commanders.
龙腾网版权所有 http://www.ltaaa.com1950年,一份美国中情局报告陈述:“法国人在印支半岛的地位处于风雨飘摇中”,这在当时是某种不稳定因素。对于法国人来说,战争正变得糟糕,并将变得更糟。胡志明在1950年4月正式要求军事援助,包括装备、顾问及对越南人民军的训练。非常有趣的是,胡志明还要求中国提供团级以及营级指挥官以帮助越南军队,该要求被中国聪明的否决了,中国向北越提供了顾问而不是指挥官。“中国为越南人民军提供指挥官”这一要求突出显示了当时越南军队存在的领导问题,以及对越南籍指挥官的普遍不信任。

Chinese Military Advisory Group  中国军事顾问团

After this request by Ho, the PRC in April of 1950 would begin forming the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) in order to provide military assistance to the Vietnamese forces fighting the French. General Wei Guoqing would lead the CMAG to North Vietnam, along with Senior General Chen Geng, the “scholar general,” and the PRC ambassador. The Second, Third and Fourth PLA field armies were directed to select experienced officers for service in Vietnam. Some 281 officers were selected with many having command experience. [24]
在胡志明提出该要求后,解放军在1950年4月开始组建中国军事顾问团,为越南人提供军事帮助去与法国人作战。韦国清将军领导军事顾问团,而“学者型将军”陈赓大将作为驻越南大使。解放军第二、第三及第四野战军得到命令:挑选经验丰富的军官去越南服务。共挑选了281名军官,其中很多人有指挥经验。

In June, two days after the start of the Korean War, as the powerful North Korean Army crossed the 38th parallel, the Chairman spoke with his military advisors enroute to Vietnam, “It is President Ho chi Minh who has asked me for [your assistance], Who would have thought our revolution would succeed first? We should help them. It is called internationalism. You will help them to win the battles after you get to Vietnam.” [25] The advisors of the CMAG would do exactly that as the impact of these Chinese advisors and new weapons for the PAVN would soon be apparent in the war. Standard Chinese Maoist doctrine for revolutionary wars would be stressed and advisors were informed to avoid the “mentality of big-state chauvinism and not to display contempt for the Vietnamese.” [26] By 1950 the French had almost completely lost control of the border region with China with isolation garrisons in Cao Bang and Langson struggling to maintain a presence.
6月,随着强有力的北朝鲜军队越过38度线,朝鲜战争爆发了,两天之后,毛主席对即将取道越南的中国军事顾问团成员讲话:“是胡志明主席向我请求帮助的。谁曾想过我们的革命会首先成功?我们应该帮助他们。这叫做国际主义。你们到越南之后将帮助他们赢得战争”。中国顾问以及新式武器所带来的冲击很快在战争中显现出来。标准的、关于解放战争的毛泽东主义教义得到了强调,而顾问们也被提醒要避免“精神上的大国沙文主义并且表现出对越南人的轻蔑”。到了1950年,法国人几乎已经完全失去了对中越边界地区的控制,只在高平及谅山的一些孤立的要塞进行着战斗以维持在边界地区的存在。

The border region would be the first test of the new Chinese trained and equipped PAVN forces. General Chen Geng wrote in a report that “Some Vietnamese crack units are in high morale after receiving training and equipment in Yunnan and Guangxi, but Vietnamese cadres above the battalion level lack command experience in actual combat.” [27] This was an accurate statement concerning the PAVN but it was one problem about to be corrected.
边界地区将是由中国训练并装备的新越南人民军的第一个试验场。陈赓将军在一份报告中写道:“一些越南特种部队在云南和广西接受培训及装备后士气高涨,但是越南营级以上干部缺乏在实际战斗中的指挥经验”。这是关于越南人民军的一个精确的描述,不过该问题将得到改正。

The CMAG would provide planning guidance, among other things, for the upcoming Border Campaigns of 1950. This campaign would begin in September with garrison after garrison falling to the Viet Minh in the north with tremendous losses for the isolated French garrisons near the Sino-Vietnamese border. Outnumbered 8 to 1 by the Vietnamese, the French would lose immense amounts of men to include 6,000 of 10,000 men in the north, and supplies to include 13 artillery pieces, 125 mortars and 450 trucks, in what some have described as the greatest defeat in French colonial history since the French and Indian War in North America. [28]
作为各项工作之一,中国军事顾问团为即将到来的1950年边界战役提供计划指导。该战役于9月开始,中越边界地区的孤立的法国要塞一个接一个的落入越南独立联盟之手,造成了巨大的损失。由于越南人对法国人拥有8:1的人数优势,法国人损失巨大,包括北方的6000-10000人及其补给,包括13个重炮群、125门迫击炮及450辆卡车。该战役被描述为:在北美的法国-印第安战役以来,法国殖民地历史上最惨重的失败。

Within 48 hours after these successful assaults on those isolated French outposts in the north, Chinese General Chen would hold what we would call today an after action review. Chen would brief Giap and other high ranking officers for four hours on the shortcomings of the Vietnamese Army. These short comings according to Chen would include not following the order for battle and attacking late, commanders not leading assaults from the front, poor communications, and cadres making false reports to superiors.[29] One wonders how such criticism was received but such reviews are vital for an army’s subsequent growth and improvement. To General Giap “The victory shows Mao’s military thought was very applicable to Vietnam.” [30]
在对这些孤立的法国岗哨发动成功的进攻之后的48小时内,陈赓将军召集了今天称之为的“事后回顾”。陈赓用了4个小时向武元甲及其他高阶军官分析了越南军队的缺点。根据陈赓的观点,这些缺点包括:不遵守战斗命令、进攻延后、指挥官没有在前线指挥进攻、通讯不畅、干部向上级做出错误报告。人们担心这样的批评能否被接受,但是这样的回顾对于军队下一步的成长及进步是至关重要的。武元甲将军说“战役的胜利说明毛泽东军事思想在越南也非常适用”。

In addition to the training and planning guidance by the CMAG the logistical support from China began to increase steadily. The support provided was only 10-20 tons a month in 1951, increasing to 250 tons a month in 1952, further increasing to 600 tons a month in 1953 and 1,500 to 4,000 tons monthly during the last year of the war in 1954. [31] Additionally the Chinese transportation network to include roads and railways leading from China to Vietnam was improved also with some 1,000 trucks provided to the PAVN. This military aid provided by China enabled the PAVN to expand into a well armed and trained conventional force capable of defeating the French Army in large scale offensive operations. From a force in 1950 of 3 divisions the PAVN would expand two years later into a force of 7 divisions. All in all the Chinese military aid would arm a total of over 7 PAVN divisions. All this military support would not go unnoticed by the west, with the CIA, by March 1952, estimating that some 15,000 Chinese Communists were serving in Vietnam in various “technical, advisory and garrison capacities” with the PAVN against the French. [32] The Vietnamese Army now was a lethal force well equipped with small arms, machine guns, heavy 120mm mortars and 105mm howitzers, in addition to 20 and 40mm anti-aircraft guns. [33]
除中国军事顾问团提供的训练及计划指导之外,来自于中国的后期援助稳步增长。在1951年,中国每月提供的援助是10-20吨物资,到1952年增加到250吨每月,1953年进一步增加到600吨每月,战争的最后一年1954年每月援助1500到4000吨物资。此外,发展了中国到越南的公路、铁路网,也为越南人民军提供了大约1000卡车的援助。由中国提供的该军事援助,使得越南人民军有能力扩展为一支得到良好武装及训练的传统型军队,从而可以在大规模战役中击败法国军队。1950年越南人民军仅有3个师,两年后即扩展为7个师。总的来说,中国的军事援助可以武装越南人民军的所有7个师。所有这些军事援助并没有被西方忽略,美国中情局在1952年估计:大约15000名中国共产主义者在越南服务,从事“技术、顾问和修建工事”工作,以帮助越南人民军反对法国。现在,越南军队成为了一支致命的力量,装备良好,拥有轻武器、机枪、120毫米重型迫击炮和105毫米榴弹炮,此外还有20毫米及40毫米高射炮。

Decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu 决定性的奠边府战役

By 1954 “Giap and the Chinese had built a tough, well-equipped, experienced, and dedicated army-a tool awaiting a great task and a master craftsman.” [34] The great task would be the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu in western Vietnam near Laos, a battle that would end the First Vietnam War and the French presence in Indochina. Evidence suggests that the Vietnamese leadership did not see the opportunity provided by the French reoccupation of the valley until Chinese advisors alerted the Vietnamese, who initially wanted to move through Laos to invade South Vietnam, until convinced otherwise by General Wei Guoqing. [35] Additionally the CMAG would provide the Viet Mihn with a copy of the Navarre Plan, outlining French goals and objectives by the new French Commander in Vietnam.
到了1954年,武元甲和中国人已经建立了一支坚忍不拔的、良好装备的、经验丰富的并具有献身精神的军队,这是一件等待着大任务和老师傅的工具。该项大任务就是决定性的奠边府战役(奠边府位于越南西部、靠近老挝),该战役结束了第一次越南战争并终结了法国在印支半岛的存在。证据显示,最初越南领导层并没有意识到由于法国人重新占领山谷所带来的机会,他们想通过老挝进入南越,直到中国将军韦国清警告并说服了越南人。此外,中国军事顾问团还给越南独立联盟提供了纳瓦拉计划的复印件,该计划概述了新任法国驻越司令的宗旨及目标。

With the signing of the Korean Armistice in July 1953 China could and would shift additional resources to Vietnam. Specific support provided for the Dien Bien Phu campaign would include planning, logistics, engineering advisors, trucks, rocket and 75mm recoilless rifle battalions, and Soviet Katyusha Rocket Launchers or “Stalin Organs.” A combined headquarters was established as the Dien Bien Phu Campaign Command with General Giap as Commander in Chief with Chinese General Wei Guoqing as General Advisor. [36]
随着1953年7月朝鲜停战协定的签订,中国可以将更多的资源转向越南。对于奠边府战役提供的特殊援助包括:计划、后勤、工程顾问、卡车、火箭及75毫米无后坐力炮营、以及苏联喀秋莎火箭炮(号称“斯大林器官”)。中越双方共同组建了奠边府战役的司令部,武元甲为总司令、韦国清为总顾问。

Giap wrote years after the battle that “I felt there needed to be a meeting with the head of the team of friendly military experts who was also present. Generally speaking, relationships between us and friendly military experts ever since the Border Campaign had been excellent. Our friends had given us the benefit of their invaluable experience drawn from the revolutionary war in China and the anti-US war in Korea.” [37] It is interesting that in his account of the battle Giap makes no mention of Chinese material support or advice and planning assistance provided throughout this decisive last battle of the First Vietnam War. The Chinese advisors, such as General Wei Guoqing, are not identified or given any credit by Giap. Perhaps this is understandable given that one of the Chinese advisors would write later that “The greatest shortcoming of the Vietnamese Communists was their fear of letting other people know their weaknesses. They lacked Bolshevist self-criticism.” [38] The siege of Dien Bien Phu was to last 8 weeks with China providing 8,286 tons of supplies, including 4,620 tons of petroleum, 1,360 tons of ammunition, 46 tons of weapons and 1,700 tons of rice from supply depots 600 miles away. [39]
奠边府战役结束几年之后,武元甲写道:“我觉得有必要与在场的友军专家团队举行会议。总的来说,自从边界战役之后,我们与友军专家的关系非常好。我们的朋友将他们从中国解放战争及朝鲜反美战争中获得的无价的经验传授给我们”。有趣的是,在他关于该战役的描述中,武元甲没有提及中国在物资、顾问、计划方面提供的援助,而该援助贯穿了第一次越南战争的最后一仗的始终。武元甲也没有给予韦国清将军等中国顾问以任何赞誉。也许一位中国顾问后来所写的文章揭开了谜底:“越南共产主义者最大的缺点就是他们害怕让别人知道他们的虚弱。他们缺乏布尔什维克的自我牺牲精神”。围困奠边府的战役延续了8个星期,为此,中国从600英里以外的补给站向越南提供了8286吨的补给,包括:4620吨石油、1360吨弹药、46吨武器以及1700吨大米。

Chinese advisors would be involved at all levels during the battle including digging in the all important Vietnamese artillery into shellproof dugouts, experience learned the hard way in the hills of Korea. [40] In effect the battle of Dien Bien Phu would be planned and assisted by Chinese advisors and fought with Chinese trained, equipped, supplied, transported and fed PAVN troops in a military soup to nuts manner. This support is rarely mentioned as a contributing factor to the Vietnamese victory in 1954 but should be acknowledged in analyzing the battle.
战役期间,中国顾问涉及了各个层次的工作,包括为所有的重要的越南火炮修建防弹工事,这是中国顾问从艰苦的朝鲜山地战中所获得的经验。实际上,奠边府战役由中国顾问制定计划、由中国人从头到尾喂养的(训练、装备、补给、运输)越南军队所执行。在1954年,该援助很少被提及是越南获胜的贡献因素,但是在分析战役时该援助的贡献应该被承认。

Post-war support, 1955-63  1955-1963年间的战后援助

In 1954, with the ending of the First Vietnam War, and the Big Power Geneva conference, Vietnam would be split into two nations, North and South Vietnam. In the north Ho and the party’s attention would be focused; at least for several years, on consolidating power and economic development. The inevitable Communist collectivization and tribunals began with confiscations, arrests, localized uprisings and the execution of 15,000 Vietnamese before order could be restored by the PAVN. [41] The CMAG returns to China in September of 1955 having accomplished its mission, quite possibly one of the most successful advisory missions ever. [42]
1954年,随着第一次越南战争的结束,以及大国日内瓦会议的成果,越南被劈分为两个国家:北越及南越。至少在几年时间内,北越的胡志明及越共的注意力将集中在巩固政权及发展经济。在越南人民军最终恢复秩序之前,不可避免的共产主义集体化开始了,包括:没收、逮捕、局部起义以及对15000名越南人的处决。中国军事顾问团于1955年9月完成任务回国,这可能是有史以来完成的最好的顾问任务之一。

China would continue; however, to provide substantial levels of military aid for North Vietnam to the tune of $106 million from 1955 to 1963, effectively giving the North the resources needed to begin the insurgency in the South. [43] Thus, the North Vietnamese would form the National Liberation Front, NLF, in December of 1960 and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces, PLAF, the following year in 1961. Both the NLF and PLAF would be more commonly referred to as the Viet Cong, or Vietnamese Communists. [44]
然而,中国继续给予北越以实质性的军事援助,从1955到1963年期间总共提供了1.06亿美元的援助,从而有效的使得北越具有了在南越展开暴动的资源。因此,北越于1960年12月组建了国家解放阵线,并于1961年组建了人民解放武装力量。这两个组织通常都被称为“越共”。

A campaign of terror and assassination against the South Vietnamese government would soon begin as thousands of officials would be killed or kidnapped by Viet Cong insurgents. [45] The United States would not sit idly by during this period but began an ambitious program of military aid to the fragile government of South Vietnam. The stage was set, for a second war in Vietnam which would be, once again, fought largely with Chinese military aid.
一场针对南越政府官员的恐怖及暗杀活动展开了,几千名南越官员被越共叛乱分子所暗杀或绑架。在此期间,美国没有坐视不管,而是开始了一项野心勃勃的军事援助脆弱的南越政府的计划。该阶段引发了第二次越南战争,从而再一次(西方)要与中国大规模的军事援助作战。
Second Indochina War, 1964-75  1974-75年的第二次印支战争
The catalyst for the Second Vietnam War would be the controversial Gulf of Tonkin incident in August of 1964 between the U.S. Navy and North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the China Sea. [46] Perhaps convinced by President Johnson’s own words that election year that he would not expand the limited war in Vietnam by bombing the North or “committing a good many American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia,” the North continued its attacks. Now with U.S. aircraft striking targets in North Vietnam the liberation war paradigm changed. The incident greatly alarmed both the Vietnamese and Chinese Communist leadership and caused both to move closer together in responding to increased U.S. military actions in Southeast Asia. China took immediate steps to move forces south towards the border with Vietnam and sent MIG jet aircraft to Hanoi to bolster the DRV’s defensives. Perhaps due to several factors, to include possible concern over Chinese intervention, the United States would gradually adopt a strategy of attempting to limit the war in Vietnam, or gradualism, not applying the maximum force possible towards defeating an enemy on the battlefield. [47] To the north Chairman Mao remained concerned about the U.S., in his opinion “the most ferocious enemy of the people of the world.” [48] Thus, when senior North Vietnamese leaders, to include General Giap, formally requested Chinese military aid in April of 1965, the response would be swift and sure. The PRC President would tell the Vietnamese that the Chinese people and party were obligated to support the North and therefore “…we will do our best to provide you with whatever you need and whatever we have.” [49] 龙腾网版权所有 http://www.ltaaa.com
第二次越南战争的催化剂是发生在1964年的有争议的中国南海北部湾事件,事件发生在美国海军与北越鱼雷船之间。美国总统约翰逊总统说:在选举年他不会扩大有限的越南战争的规模、不会去轰炸北越、也不会“派遣很多美国小伙去打这场战争,这场战争应该由亚洲小伙来打” ,可能是相信了约翰逊的话,北越继续其攻击。现在,由于美国空军打击了北越目标,越南解放战争的模式改变了。北部湾事件极大的警醒了中越共产主义领导层,使得他们双方更紧密的团结起来,以应对美国在东南亚不断增长的军事行动。中国立即采取行动,调动军队到中越边界,并派遣米格喷气机到河内以支持越南民主共和国的防守。可能由于种种原因,包括可能考虑过中国的介入,美国在越南战场上采取了渐进主义并将战争限制在越南境内,即:并不使用最大的力量以图在战场上打败敌人。毛主席仍然保持着对美国的关注,在他看来“美国是世界人民最凶残的敌人”。因此,当1965年4月包括武元甲在内的北越领导层正式要求中国提供军事援助时,中国的反应是迅速且肯定的。太祖告诉越南人,中国人民和中国党有责任去帮助北越,因此“只要我们有,你们要什么我们就尽量给”。

Support requested and provided  要求的和提供的援助

The most immediate need was for anti-aircraft artillery, units to counter the overwhelming American air power over North Vietnam. Ho would request Chinese AAA units during a meeting with Mao in May of 1965 and PLA forces would begin flowing into North Vietnam in July of 1965 to help defend the capital of Hanoi and the transportation network to include railroad lines and bridges.[50] This movement of troops from China was not lost on the U.S. as reported in a Top Secret CIA Special Report which identified seven major PLA units in North Vietnam to include the 67th AAA Division, and an estimated 25,000 to 45,000 Chinese combat troops total. [51] Recent Chinese sources indicate that this PLA AAA Division did indeed operate in the western area of North Vietnam. [52] In addition to AAA forces the PLA also provided missiles, artillery and logistics, railroad, engineer and mine sweeping forces. These forces would not only man AAA sites but would also build and repair Vietnamese infrastructure damaged or destroyed by U.S. airstrikes. [53] Such units would have quite a bit of repair work to do given that there would be more than a million tons of bombs dropped by U.S. aircraft upon North Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. [54] The Second Vietnam War would drag on for years as a sort of operational stalemate existed in the skies over North Vietnam. The U.S. could and did bomb the North at will, but the sheer numbers of Chinese forces, to include a total of 16 AAA divisions serving with a peak strength of 170,000 troops attained in 1967, would ensure that a high price would be paid by U.S. pilots with targets often rapidly rebuilt after destruction. [55] Chinese engineering and logistics units would perform impressive feats of construction throughout their stay in North Vietnam effectively keeping the transportation network functioning.
最紧急的需求是高射炮,以抵抗在北越上空占有压倒性优势的美国空中力量。在1965年5月的一次会谈中,胡志明要求毛太祖提供顶级的援助部队,而解放军空军于1965年7月飞赴北越,以保护其首都河内以及包括铁路和桥梁在内的运输网。中国部队的移动没有被美国人忽略,在中情局一份绝密特别报告中,识别出了部署在北越的7个主要解放军单位,其中包括顶级的第67师,估计总共有25000-45000名中国作战军人在北越。根据近年来的中国消息来源所述,该解放军顶级师在北越的西部战场投入实战。除了该顶级师之外,解放军还提供了导弹部队、炮兵部队、后勤部队、铁路部队、工程部队和扫雷部队。这些部队不仅在关键地点就位,而且还修补被美国空军所摧毁或损坏的北越基础设施。考虑到1965到1972年期间美国空军在北越投掷了一百多万吨的炸弹,基础设施的修复工作量必然是巨大的。第二次越南战争拖延了数年时间,形成了一种操作性僵局。美国确实可以按自己意愿轰炸北越,但是由于大量的中国部队(1967年达到顶峰时,中国有16个顶级师共17万人的部队在越南),可以确保美国飞行员将付出高昂的代价,因为被轰炸的目标受损后可以很快的被重建。在停留在北越期间,中国工程及后勤部队表现出了令人印象深刻的绝技,有效的保证了运输网络的正常运作。

The U.S. Air Campaign over North Vietnam would thus be somewhat of a lost cause, not significantly hurting the communist North enough for Ho and the senior leadership to contemplate ending the insurgency in South Vietnam. Chinese troops in North Vietnam would eventually withdraw, for the most part, by 1970 as the Sino-Vietnamese relationship began to sour over the Paris Peace Talks, and the USSR, among other things. In addition to the AAA umbrella over the North, China would also provide the sinews of modern war that would enable the North Vietnamese Army to undertake modern, large scale offensive operations against South Vietnam in both 1972 and 1975. Chinese trucks, tanks, Surface to air missiles, MIG jet aircraft, 130mm artillery pieces, 130mm mortars, and shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles, were all moved south. The PAVN had enough first class material to launch a 20 division mechanized Easter Offensive in 1972 into South Vietnam, more divisions than ever commanded by General Patton in Europe during World War II, as one American Officer would point out. [56] The North Vietnamese would pay a terrible price for this gamble, thanks to U.S. airpower and advisors on the ground, losing an estimated 450 tanks and over 100,000 troops killed in action during the 1972 offensive. [57] China would, again, make up for much of the PAVN equipment lost, after the Paris Peace Treaty was signed, in 1973 and 1974, enabling the North Vietnamese to reconstitute units for another offensive in 1975. U.S. forces would not be present this time to help its South Vietnamese allies as 18 well trained and equipped PAVN divisions rolled to Saigon in April of 1975, effectively ending the Second Vietnam War. [58] Both Vietnam Wars, from 1946-1975, ended in victory for North Vietnam against the west, but without the massive amounts of military aid provided by the PRC, most likely the outcome would have been different. As with all what-if’s of history we shall never know.
因此,美国空军针对北越的行动没有显著的击痛胡志明及其高级领导层,从而未能使他们因考虑到空中袭击造成的损失而考虑终止在南越的暴动行动。到了1970年,由于巴黎和会以及与苏联的一些事端,中越关系变差,大部分中国军队最终撤出了越南。除了为北越提供顶级的保护伞外,中国还为北越提供了现代战争所需要的主要资源,使得北越军队可以在1972及1975年承担起针对南越的大规模进攻作战。中国的卡车、坦克、地对空导弹、米格喷气战机、130毫米重炮群、130毫米迫击炮以及肩扛式对空导弹,都运到了南方。越南人民军拥有了足够的一流的装备,可以在1972年发起针对南越的、有20个机械化师参加的“东部攻势”,正如一位美国官员所指出的,该战役参战的北越部队甚至多于巴顿将军在欧洲战场所指挥过的部队。感谢美国的空中力量及地面的顾问,在1972年攻势中北越为这场赌博付出了可怕的代价,据估计,北越在此次战役中损失了450辆坦克以及100000名军人。在1973及1974年,巴黎和平协定签订之后,中国再次补足了越南人民军的装备损失,使得北越可以重建军队并于1975年再次展开进攻。这次美国军队没能在场以帮助其南越盟友,18个得到良好训练及装备的北越师在1975年4月碾压至西贡,有效的结束了第二次越南战争。两次越南战争都以北越战胜西方而结束,但是如果没有中国提供的大量的军事援助,结果很可能会不同。不过,我们永远也不会知道“如果-怎样”的历史进程。

Analysis of support  关于援助的分析
“So the more troops they send to Vietnam, the happier we will be, for we feel that we will have them in our power, we can have their blood…They will be close to China…in our grasp. They…will be our hostages.” [59]
- - Chou En-lai speaking to Nasser, 1965
“所以,他们送越多的军队到越南,我们就越高兴,因为我们认为可以掌控他们,我们可以有他们的血。他们将靠近中国,在我们的掌握之中,成为我们的人质”。
---周恩来1965年与纳赛尔的谈话

So how does one analyze the considerable military support provided by the PRC for the DRV during the 25 year period from 1950-1975, encompassing both the First and Second Vietnam Wars? Was the military aid provided, to include equipment, advisors and planning assistance, decisive in both conflicts or would the North Vietnamese have prevailed without this Chinese military support? In retrospect it seems clear that the Chinese military support for the DRV would be crucial. This Chinese support would be, in many respects, timely, appropriate and helpful without doing the job that the North Vietnamese needed to do themselves; that is, fight and win on the ground in South Vietnam. The PRC would not conduct an intervention on the scale that it conducted in Korea, avoiding the international perception of acting in the traditional China/tributary state relationship with Vietnam, all the while providing the tools and assistance required to “tip the scales” in both conflicts against the West. The People’s Republic would be, in effect, the world’s largest unsinkable aircraft carrier and army base, a strategic advantage that Western nations thousands of miles removed from the fighting could not hope to match.
所以,该怎么分析1950-1975年期间中国提供给北越的可观的军事援助呢?该援助持续了25年、贯穿了第一次、第二次越战的始终。这种包括装备、顾问及计划的援助在两次越战中是决定性的因素吗?还是,即便没有中国的援助,北越也可以胜出?通过回顾,可以清晰的看出:中国对北越的援助是决定性的。在很多方面,中国的援助是及时的、适当的和有益的,只没有做需要越南人自己做的工作:在南越的土地上作战并取胜。中国没有象在朝鲜战场那样大规模的介入越南战争,以免国际社会形成这样的概念:中国与越南间在按照传统的朝贡体系而行动,而是在两场反对西方的战争的全过程中提供“够分量的”工具及帮助。从效果上看,中国是世界上最大的不沉航母及军事基地,这是一个战略性的优势,而西方国家距战场几千英里之外,无法匹敌中国的这种优势。

As a biographer of Chairman Mao would remark “It was having China as a secure rear and supply depot that made it possible for the Vietnamese to fight for 25 years and beat first the French and then the Americans.” [60]
正如一位毛主席的传记作者所评论的:“正是由于中国这个可靠后方及补给站,才使得越南人能打25年的仗,并先击败了法国,再击败了美国”。

The numbers would be impressive enough, of the military equipment and supplies provided by China. According to Qiang Zhai, during the period 1950-54, the PRC would provide enough weapons, 116,000 small arms and 4630 artillery pieces, to equip some 5 infantry divisions, one heavy engineering and artillery division, one direct fire anti-aircraft artillery regiment and one guards regiment. [61] This infusion of equipment for almost seven divisions worth of troops could not, and would not, be matched by the French. As one U.S. military officer would comment years later “The French politicians continued their irresolute, incoherent, and penny-pinching support of military operations in Indochina, while demanding ‘decisive solutions.’” [62] The numbers would be even more impressive in the Second Vietnam War. Chinese support provided would increase by a factor of ten with arms and equipment from uniforms to tanks to small arms on a yearly basis greater than the entire military aid provided in the early 1950’s against the French. [63] Additionally the Chinese anti-aircraft artillery troops, peaking at a total of 17 divisions and 150,000 men in 1967, would claim credit for downing 1,707 U.S. aircraft over North Vietnam. [64] These Chinese combat troops who were not to be used south of the 21st parallel in North Vietnam; however, the presence of these units secured the North’s rear, turning the nation into the most heavily defended area in the world, and allowing the DRV to use resources in South Vietnam and elsewhere that would have been devoted to homeland defense. [65] In effect the U.S. would not be able to open a second front over the skies of North Vietnam, as it had been able to so successfully over Germany in the Second World War, due to these Chinese divisions.
中国提供的军事装备及补给的数字足够令人印象深刻。根据Qiang Zhai所述,在1950-54年间,中国提供的武器包括:11600件轻武器、4630门重炮,足够装备5个步兵师、一个重型工程及炮兵师、一个防空高射炮团以及一个警卫团。这种价值差不多7个师的装备的输入,是法国人所无法匹配的。正如一位美国军官几年后所评述的:“法国政客延续着对于印支战争的优柔寡断的、不连续的、小气吝啬的援助,同时却要求(取得)决定性的胜利”。在第二次越南战争中,中国援助的数字更加令人印象深刻。按年度计算,第二次越南战争期间中国每年提供的援助是1950年代早期反法战争期间提供的援助的10倍,提供的装备从军装到坦克到轻武器等。此外,中国驻越的防空高射部队在1967年达到顶峰,有17个师共150000人,击落了1707架美军飞机。这些中国战斗部队未在北纬21度线以南使用,但是,由于这些部队的存在,保卫了北越的后方,使得北越成为世界上防守最严密的地区,从而允许北越使用南越或其他地区的资源来保家卫国。虽然美国空军在二战期间曾在德国开辟第二战线,但是由于这些中国防空师的存在,从效果上看,美国空军未能在北越上空开辟第二战线。

But the mere presence of China to the north would also be a constant “sword of Damocles” hanging over the heads of Western and South Vietnamese nations. This nearness would also ensure that the ever present possibility of massive, full scale Chinese intervention would always be a factor that had to be considered by Western political and military leaders. Any plans for taking the fight to the North Vietnamese enemy on his home field by going north could not be seriously considered given the clear warnings by the PRC that it would intervene with massive force. The Chinese took great pains to communicate this willingness to fight on behalf of North Vietnam, if seriously threatened, to the United States, communicating warnings via various channels to include ambassadorial talks in Poland, third-party leaders such as the Pakistani and Tanzania Presidents and the British ambassador in Beijing. [66] In some respects this pledge of assistance was just as valuable as the tanks, trucks and guns provided by the PRC.
仅仅中国在北越的存在,对于西方国家及南越来说,就是一把悬挂在它们头上的永恒的“达摩克利斯之剑”。这也使得西方政治及军事领袖永远需要考虑中国大规模、全面介入的可能性。任何对北越本土的打击计划都不能被认真的考虑,因为中国曾明确警告过:若如此,中国将派大部队介入。中国以极大的耐心将其意愿通报给美国:“如果受到严重威胁,中国将为越南而战”,该意愿通过多种渠道传递给美国,包括:在波兰举行的大使级会谈、第三方的领导人如巴基斯坦总统和坦桑尼亚总统、以及英国驻北京大使。在某些方面,这项承诺与中国提供的坦克、卡车及枪炮同样珍贵。

Conclusion  结论

“Why have the Americans not made a fuss about the fact that more than 100,000 Chinese troops help you building the railways, roads and airports although they knew about it?” [67]
- - Chairman Mao to Vietnamese Premier Dong, 1970
“虽然美国人知道有超过10万人的中国部队在帮助你们修建铁路、公路和机场,但为什么他们没有大惊小怪呢?”
--1970年毛主席对越南总理的讲话

In conclusion, as we can see from the considerable historical material outlined above, the military support provided by the People’s Republic of China, to include advisors, equipment and combat troops, was the decisive factor for the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam prevailing during 1949-1975 in both the First and Second Vietnam Wars. The small arms, mortars, ammunition, uniforms, tanks, artillery, radars, anti-aircraft guns, jet aircraft, trucks, and naval vessels were critical in the North Vietnamese struggle. However, what was even more critical and normally not acknowledged in the laundry list of war material is the psychological and strategic advantage provided by Communist China’s pledge to intervene in the advent of a United States invasion of North Vietnam, and communicating that pledge to the U.S. This strategic advantage in effect cannot be overstated.
总之,根据上述的重大的历史性文献的梗概,我们可以看出:中华人民共和国提供的包括顾问、装备、战斗部队等的援助,是越南民主共和国可以在1949-1975年期间取得两次越南战争胜利的决定性因素。对于北越人的斗争而言,轻武器、迫击炮、弹药、军装、坦克、火炮、雷达、防空高射炮、喷气战机、卡车以及海军舰只都是至关重要的。然而,没有列在物资清单上的、更为关键的、通常未被认识到的,是由于中国的承诺而给越南人带来的心理上和战略上的优势,中国的承诺是:如果美国入侵北越,中国将介入,该承诺被通报给美国。实际上,该战略优势无论如何高估都不为过。

As General Westmoreland’s former G-2, or Intelligence Officer would write after the Vietnam Wars “With a friendly China located adjacent to North Vietnam, there would have been little chance for a Vietnamese victory against the French, and later against the Americans and South Vietnamese.” [68] It is rather ironic that most professional historians tend to downplay or ignore China’s decisive role in North Vietnam’s victory while the military and intelligence communities, U.S. at least, are much more willing to acknowledge this fact. Perhaps this is understandable since if one acknowledges the role played by China it calls into question such Vietnam myths as the “poorly armed guerrilla” and the “military genius” of Giap, among other issues. Historians such as Xiaoming Zhang and Qiang Zhai are challenging the paradigm of accepted Vietnam history and in doing so are performing a great service.
威斯特摩兰德将军的情报官在越南战争结束几年之后写道:“由于有一个友好的中国与北越接壤,对于法国人以及后来的美国人及南越人来说,取胜的几率很小”。具有讽刺意味的是,很多职业历史学家趋向于贬低或忽略中国在越战中的关键角色,而至少美国的军事及情报人员更愿意承认该事实。也许这可以理解,因为如果越南人承认中国所扮演的角色,就将与越南神话发生冲突,诸如“装备很差的游击队员”、“军事天才武元甲”等等。Xiaoming Zhang 和 Qiang Zhai这样的历史学家正在挑战越南官方历史的范例,在从事着这一了不起的事业。

“Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy plans;” according to the learned military theorist Sun-Tzu in the Art of War. [69] In respects this is exactly what the North Vietnamese, and Chinese did in both Vietnam Wars: they successfully attacked the Western powers war plans. The considerable support for the DRV by the PRC, to include a promise to intervene with massive numbers of troops in the event of an invasion of North Vietnam, effectively eliminated this course of action, and perhaps others, as potential war winning options for the West. Thus, with the support of China, on a strategic level of war the DRV was able to remain upon the offensive throughout the war, maintaining the initiative and finally achieving victory as Saigon fell in April of 1975.
军事家孙子在《战争艺术》一书中写道“上兵伐谋”。在某些方面,这正是北越人和中国人在两次越南战争中所做的:他们成功的攻击了西方强国的战争计划。由中国提供给北越的显著的援助,包括“当美国入侵北越时,中国大部队将介入”的承诺,有效的清除了西方入侵北越的可能方案,或许还清除了西方国家潜在的、赢得战争的其它方案。因此,由于中国在战略层面上对北越的支持,使得北越可以在整个战争期间维持攻势、保持主动性,并于1975年4月使西贡沦陷从而最终获得了越战的胜利
一直到十年以后,中国痛揍猴子
国际地位是打出来的。
然而,没有列在物资清单上的、更为关键的、通常未被认识到的,是由于中国的承诺而给越南人带来的心理上和战略上的优势,中国的承诺是:如果美国入侵北越,中国将介入,该承诺被通报给美国。实际上,该战略优势无论如何高估都不为过。

被打怕了
一点也不高兴,自己花钱培养了一条白眼狼。
jiafeidemao 发表于 2012-7-27 08:52
一点也不高兴,自己花钱培养了一条白眼狼。
不高兴,没头脑
不高兴,没头脑

没头脑都知道让公鸡国待在越南,好过白头鹰待在越南。如果让南越由公鸡国控制对TG没一点坏处,说不定在公鸡国和白头鹰反脸的6、70年代还能发展一下基情。
抗美援越算是战术胜利,战略失误~
没想到南越与美军同比朝战时太差了,竟然给统一了!!
越南人认为,是中国人妨碍了他们祖国统一的进程
当初应该直接把它变成安南省
虽然是养了个白眼狼,但是当时中国的承诺是硬邦邦的,为世界列强所胆寒。这些年,我们的话语更多被当做耳边风,当然与我们埋头赚小钱钱有关系,现在真的需要一个大事件来恢复国威了。

别的不求,只求我们现在能做到,我们宣告的核心利益,就没有宵小敢冒犯。
越南在统一之后做得好过分,这就解释了,为什么邓小平那么火大了 不是苏联的屁股后面捣乱,中国至少还要围住河内再吃掉两三个师,才能稍稍解点气。
jiafeidemao 发表于 2012-7-27 09:10
没头脑都知道让公鸡国待在越南,好过白头鹰待在越南。如果让南越由公鸡国控制对TG没一点坏处,说不定在公 ...
公鸡在怎么2,可是始终是西方“自由世界”中的一员。
和我们的利益是有冲突的。
如果公鸡在越南一直没走,那美帝在越南肯定是有驻军的。
南海问题将彻底无解。

不过养了条白眼狼还是很可气。
木头猴 发表于 2012-7-27 09:14
越南人认为,是中国人妨碍了他们祖国统一的进程
那是因为他们眼中的祖国领土包括了柬埔寨和老挝,,,,
1号马甲 发表于 2012-7-27 09:12
抗美援越算是战术胜利,战略失误~
没想到南越与美军同比朝战时太差了,竟然给统一了!!
战略上美国至今没在东南亚保留任何一处常驻的军事基地,算总账还是赚的。
最近看的帖子说,中国对越援助算是尽了全力,没想到美国居然两下被打跑了。显得援助的力度有点过了。然后小越还有余力开始做支那联邦的美梦直到80+9年梦醒
49年到75年,PLA手把手的教会了安南猴子怎么打仗。作为报答,安南猴子79年后陪PLA练了将近10年的兵。
越猴处处学中国,大到国家改革,小到发言人的稿子。可越猴就是不承认。。。
真是为了忘却的纪念啊……
1号马甲 发表于 2012-7-27 09:12
抗美援越算是战术胜利,战略失误~
没想到南越与美军同比朝战时太差了,竟然给统一了!!
这个有点道理。南越实在是太菜,美帝也没有朝鲜战场的投入力度和决心
最喜欢这种翻译文章了
当年的白兔,玩国际政治还是略显稚嫩啊。。。。。。
那个时代的中国,还真挺清纯的挺天真的
TG当年确实是不希望越南统一的,否则也不会有日内瓦会议的成果了。后面用这么大力气援助,确实是高估了美国人的战斗意志,低估了朝鲜战争对于美国的阴影,但恐怕也得说有被越南人忽悠的成分。客观的说越南人真的是太祖的好徒弟,把TG当年对付苏联那一套完完整整的学过来对付TG,毕竟从越南的角度看,中国的庞大身影无论如何都会让他倍感压力,正如苏联之于中国。
thomas1987 发表于 2012-7-27 10:19
当年的白兔,玩国际政治还是略显稚嫩啊。。。。。。
那时才是高手
cgk 发表于 2012-7-27 11:09
那时才是高手
。。。。。。恕我眼拙,实在没瞧出来,看看当年勒紧裤腰带换来的“亚非拉兄弟”现在还剩下几个?
1号马甲 发表于 2012-7-27 09:12
抗美援越算是战术胜利,战略失误~
没想到南越与美军同比朝战时太差了,竟然给统一了!!
我觉得抗美援朝是战略胜利啊,统一的朝鲜半岛对TG好处不够大;
TG在越南才是战略失误,本来TG想让越南也分裂成两半的,谁知道MD太不给力;
所以后来越南想统一印支的时候,TG狠狠的扇了猴子一巴掌,破了猴子的美梦,所以猴子对TG的仇恨,你懂的~~~~人家梦想了N多年…………
thomas1987 发表于 2012-7-27 11:12
。。。。。。恕我眼拙,实在没瞧出来,看看当年勒紧裤腰带换来的“亚非拉兄弟”现在还剩下几个?

70年代末80年代后286调整了内外政策,不是186管得了的事了。。。
cgk 发表于 2012-7-27 11:20
70年代末80年代后286调整了内外政策,不是186管得了的事了。。。
我的意思就是当年单纯以意识形态和革命理想为主导的外交策略,以及用不惜工本不顾国内死活的无偿援助方式换来的所谓“友谊”,根本就是水中月雾中花,等到有朝一日不再援助的时候,这些“朋友”就全都一个个跑光,这不仅仅是286的问题,难道要286继续186的无偿援助以保持所谓”外交胜利“么?

一直骂棒子猴子忘恩负义,但是为什么就不检讨一下为什么那么多援助就换不来一个稳定的盟友?难道是一句人家忘恩负义就可以解释的了的么?

当年的外交和国际政治,确是显得幼稚,不要认为在国内阴人厉害,在国际上就混得开
老毛花300亿米刀,让公鸡国,米国在越难流血,在让越南人自己流血.

二代再给一刀,到现在月南人男人都缺.

天底下哪有这么好的事?


三个世界的外交格局,可不是意识形态和革命输出,而是根据自身力量和全球客观实际定的

三个世界的外交格局,可不是意识形态和革命输出,而是根据自身力量和全球客观实际定的
历史上中国结束了内乱,就会收拾周边小国的.

手手段花样很多

老毛支持越南可不不是共产主义.而是本能.老毛一辈子是讲实用的

老毛子看出来了

跳开意识形态,老毛其实干的不坏的.
让TG吃大亏的是棒子国.

老毛当时,没有选,手里只有人.

到了援越时,手里有了东西了,就不在直接和老美干了

操作手法要比援越要好得多.

至于,利大不到,看今后20年,

把老美排开后,TG是老大,讲了算.
所以那个年头的东西,我希望大家不要妄下结论。冷战开始,意识形态差异出现,两大阵营选边站,很多在今天看起来极端错误的决定在当时来说都是正确和必须的。

当然,也不能否认盲目的共产主义阶级情谊这类似坑爹的东东
这算是揭伤疤吗?毛周两人抛弃民族利益只讲意识形态让越南统一,死这么多人花这么多钱换来的是永远喂不饱的白眼狼。看看现在的花多少钱投到海军去堵这窟窿! 一步错棋整盘被动。
弱小的国家成为强国,共产主义与民族主义是一个好的方法啊
历史上,汉高组在内乱结束后,就向北方开片,他也没有选的

这也不是他一人可以做的决定.当然他要亲志去,那是被人湖游的

打败了,就老老实实发展经济.几十年后,就翻本了