超级军网风清云淡兄的文章翻译
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/28 20:37:03
The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for
structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future
U. S. military forces might be configured.
这篇文章的目的是揭示一种可能的正在建立的任务能力集合的理论,这种理
论可能将被未来的美军所使用。
From the very outset of this study group’s deliberations, we
agreed that the most useful contribution we could make would be to
attempt to reach beyond what we saw as the current and commendable
efforts, largely but not entirely within the Department of
Defense, to define concepts for strategy, doctrine, operations,
and force structure to deal with a highly uncertain future.
在小组正式开始开始研究时，我们一致认为我们所能做的最有效的贡献可能
不是来自研究当前流行的和值得赞扬的结果，而且是尽量但不完全与国防部
一致，只有这样，我们才能在面对具有高度不确定性的未来中，定义所谓的
战略，教条(?)，操作和兵力组成的概念。
In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and
actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what
may prove to be the full extent of our grasp.
在努力的过程中，我们充分的意识到当要证明我们所掌握程度时，我们所面
临的那些固有的和现实的限制和困难。
It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently
the most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a
long time to come.
当然，目前的美军的实力是世上无出其右者，而且看起来在很长时间内，也
没有人能挑战这个事实。
Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose major
excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of
military superiority?
可能有人会问，既然我国在军队实力上是独占螯头，那么为什么我们还要检
查修正甚至是企图进行大量的改革?
For reasons noted in this study, we believe that excursions are
important if only to confirm the validity of current defense
approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have led
us to this conclusion.
原因将在文章中提到，我们相信：那怕是为了证明当前防卫的有效性，也有
必要对此进行修正。有许多的过分(overrarching,没有这个词)的现实
都使我们得出了这个结论。
First, while everyone recognizes that the Cold War has ended,
there is not a consensus about what this means for more precisely
defining the nature of our future security needs.
首先，所有人都认为冷战已经结束了，但是许多人却不认为这个事实意味着
我们在未来更加的安全。
Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing
external danger, the United States is actively examining new
strategic options and choices.
另外，即使我们没有了敏锐的洞察力和明显的外来的敌人，美国也应该主动
的审视新的战略选择和对手(?)。
The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the Pentagon to deal
with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality.
五角大楼处理这种具有不确定性的现实中，这种概念上的多样性就会体现出
来。(这句话不通，是我不知道该如何说！)The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for
structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future
U. S. military forces might be configured.
这篇文章的目的是揭示一种可能的正在建立的任务能力集合的理论,这种理
论可能将被未来的美军所使用。
From the very outset of this study group’s deliberations, we
agreed that the most useful contribution we could make would be to
attempt to reach beyond what we saw as the current and commendable
efforts, largely but not entirely within the Department of
Defense, to define concepts for strategy, doctrine, operations,
and force structure to deal with a highly uncertain future.
在小组正式开始开始研究时，我们一致认为我们所能做的最有效的贡献可能
不是来自研究当前流行的和值得赞扬的结果，而且是尽量但不完全与国防部
一致，只有这样，我们才能在面对具有高度不确定性的未来中，定义所谓的
战略，教条(?)，操作和兵力组成的概念。
In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and
actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what
may prove to be the full extent of our grasp.
在努力的过程中，我们充分的意识到当要证明我们所掌握程度时，我们所面
临的那些固有的和现实的限制和困难。
It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently
the most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a
long time to come.
当然，目前的美军的实力是世上无出其右者，而且看起来在很长时间内，也
没有人能挑战这个事实。
Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose major
excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of
military superiority?
可能有人会问，既然我国在军队实力上是独占螯头，那么为什么我们还要检
查修正甚至是企图进行大量的改革?
For reasons noted in this study, we believe that excursions are
important if only to confirm the validity of current defense
approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have led
us to this conclusion.
原因将在文章中提到，我们相信：那怕是为了证明当前防卫的有效性，也有
必要对此进行修正。有许多的过分(overrarching,没有这个词)的现实
都使我们得出了这个结论。
First, while everyone recognizes that the Cold War has ended,
there is not a consensus about what this means for more precisely
defining the nature of our future security needs.
首先，所有人都认为冷战已经结束了，但是许多人却不认为这个事实意味着
我们在未来更加的安全。
Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing
external danger, the United States is actively examining new
strategic options and choices.
另外，即使我们没有了敏锐的洞察力和明显的外来的敌人，美国也应该主动
的审视新的战略选择和对手(?)。
The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the Pentagon to deal
with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality.
五角大楼处理这种具有不确定性的现实中，这种概念上的多样性就会体现出
来。(这句话不通，是我不知道该如何说！)
structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future
U. S. military forces might be configured.
这篇文章的目的是揭示一种可能的正在建立的任务能力集合的理论,这种理
论可能将被未来的美军所使用。
From the very outset of this study group’s deliberations, we
agreed that the most useful contribution we could make would be to
attempt to reach beyond what we saw as the current and commendable
efforts, largely but not entirely within the Department of
Defense, to define concepts for strategy, doctrine, operations,
and force structure to deal with a highly uncertain future.
在小组正式开始开始研究时，我们一致认为我们所能做的最有效的贡献可能
不是来自研究当前流行的和值得赞扬的结果，而且是尽量但不完全与国防部
一致，只有这样，我们才能在面对具有高度不确定性的未来中，定义所谓的
战略，教条(?)，操作和兵力组成的概念。
In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and
actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what
may prove to be the full extent of our grasp.
在努力的过程中，我们充分的意识到当要证明我们所掌握程度时，我们所面
临的那些固有的和现实的限制和困难。
It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently
the most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a
long time to come.
当然，目前的美军的实力是世上无出其右者，而且看起来在很长时间内，也
没有人能挑战这个事实。
Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose major
excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of
military superiority?
可能有人会问，既然我国在军队实力上是独占螯头，那么为什么我们还要检
查修正甚至是企图进行大量的改革?
For reasons noted in this study, we believe that excursions are
important if only to confirm the validity of current defense
approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have led
us to this conclusion.
原因将在文章中提到，我们相信：那怕是为了证明当前防卫的有效性，也有
必要对此进行修正。有许多的过分(overrarching,没有这个词)的现实
都使我们得出了这个结论。
First, while everyone recognizes that the Cold War has ended,
there is not a consensus about what this means for more precisely
defining the nature of our future security needs.
首先，所有人都认为冷战已经结束了，但是许多人却不认为这个事实意味着
我们在未来更加的安全。
Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing
external danger, the United States is actively examining new
strategic options and choices.
另外，即使我们没有了敏锐的洞察力和明显的外来的敌人，美国也应该主动
的审视新的战略选择和对手(?)。
The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the Pentagon to deal
with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality.
五角大楼处理这种具有不确定性的现实中，这种概念上的多样性就会体现出
来。(这句话不通，是我不知道该如何说！)The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for
structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future
U. S. military forces might be configured.
这篇文章的目的是揭示一种可能的正在建立的任务能力集合的理论,这种理
论可能将被未来的美军所使用。
From the very outset of this study group’s deliberations, we
agreed that the most useful contribution we could make would be to
attempt to reach beyond what we saw as the current and commendable
efforts, largely but not entirely within the Department of
Defense, to define concepts for strategy, doctrine, operations,
and force structure to deal with a highly uncertain future.
在小组正式开始开始研究时，我们一致认为我们所能做的最有效的贡献可能
不是来自研究当前流行的和值得赞扬的结果，而且是尽量但不完全与国防部
一致，只有这样，我们才能在面对具有高度不确定性的未来中，定义所谓的
战略，教条(?)，操作和兵力组成的概念。
In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and
actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what
may prove to be the full extent of our grasp.
在努力的过程中，我们充分的意识到当要证明我们所掌握程度时，我们所面
临的那些固有的和现实的限制和困难。
It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently
the most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a
long time to come.
当然，目前的美军的实力是世上无出其右者，而且看起来在很长时间内，也
没有人能挑战这个事实。
Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose major
excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of
military superiority?
可能有人会问，既然我国在军队实力上是独占螯头，那么为什么我们还要检
查修正甚至是企图进行大量的改革?
For reasons noted in this study, we believe that excursions are
important if only to confirm the validity of current defense
approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have led
us to this conclusion.
原因将在文章中提到，我们相信：那怕是为了证明当前防卫的有效性，也有
必要对此进行修正。有许多的过分(overrarching,没有这个词)的现实
都使我们得出了这个结论。
First, while everyone recognizes that the Cold War has ended,
there is not a consensus about what this means for more precisely
defining the nature of our future security needs.
首先，所有人都认为冷战已经结束了，但是许多人却不认为这个事实意味着
我们在未来更加的安全。
Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing
external danger, the United States is actively examining new
strategic options and choices.
另外，即使我们没有了敏锐的洞察力和明显的外来的敌人，美国也应该主动
的审视新的战略选择和对手(?)。
The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the Pentagon to deal
with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality.
五角大楼处理这种具有不确定性的现实中，这种概念上的多样性就会体现出
来。(这句话不通，是我不知道该如何说！)
嗬嗬，不敢说我的就全对，但意思不会错了，要认真分析句子语法结构和前后文。
这种论文的文字超过了一般大学英语要求的水平，翻译的时候不能想当然。
The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for
structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future
U. S. military forces might be configured.
这篇文章的目的是揭示一种可能的正在建立的任务能力集合的理论,这种理
论可能将被未来的美军所使用。
## 这篇文章的目的是探讨关于组建任务能力集群(MCP，这应当是类似于能
够独立作战的战斗群，如果可以自由一点翻译的话，我更倾向于特遣作战集
群这个译法)的新概念，未来的美国军事力量可能是以这种集群为中心构建的。
From the very outset of this study group’s deliberations, we
agreed that the most useful contribution we could make would be to
attempt to reach beyond what we saw as the current and commendable
efforts, largely but not entirely within the Department of
Defense, to define concepts for strategy, doctrine, operations,
and force structure to deal with a highly uncertain future.
在小组正式开始开始研究时，我们一致认为我们所能做的最有效的贡献可能
不是来自研究当前流行的和值得赞扬的结果，而且是尽量但不完全与国防部
一致，只有这样，我们才能在面对具有高度不确定性的未来中，定义所谓的
战略，教条(?)，操作和兵力组成的概念。
##自研究开始以来，我们就一致认为我们所能做的最大贡献就是超越那些我
们曾经看作是流行并值得推崇的成就，这些观念在国防部内部广泛地但不是全
部地被用来定义战略、条令、行动和武装部队的结构，用以面对极不确定的未
来。
In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and
actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what
may prove to be the full extent of our grasp.
在努力的过程中，我们充分的意识到当要证明我们所掌握程度时，我们所面
临的那些固有的和现实的限制和困难。
##在进行这种努力中，我们充分地认识到打破头脑中根深蒂固的思想的过程
存在着内在的和现实的局限和困难。
It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently
the most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a
long time to come.
当然，目前的美军的实力是世上无出其右者，而且看起来在很长时间内，也
没有人能挑战这个事实。
显然，美国军事力量理所当然是目前世界上最强大的，而且这个地位看起来
还要保持很长时间。
Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose major
excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of
military superiority?
可能有人会问，既然我国在军队实力上是独占螯头，那么为什么我们还要检
查修正甚至是企图进行大量的改革?
##很多人会问，既然美国保持着军事上的优势地位，为什么还要反思甚至提出
进行重大的转变和变革呢？
For reasons noted in this study, we believe that excursions are
important if only to confirm the validity of current defense
approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have led
us to this conclusion.
原因将在文章中提到，我们相信：那怕是为了证明当前防卫的有效性，也有
必要对此进行修正。有许多的过分(overrarching,没有这个词)的现实
都使我们得出了这个结论。
##根据文章中说明的原因，我们相信，除非能证实现行国防政策的正确性，否则
改革是重要的。我们得出这个结论是基于多个明确的事实。
First, while everyone recognizes that the Cold War has ended,
there is not a consensus about what this means for more precisely
defining the nature of our future security needs.
首先，所有人都认为冷战已经结束了，但是许多人却不认为这个事实意味着
我们在未来更加的安全。
##首先，尽管所有人都承认冷战已经结束了，但其意义还缺乏共识，即对于
我们未来国家安全需要该如何准确定义。
Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing
external danger, the United States is actively examining new
strategic options and choices.
另外，即使我们没有了敏锐的洞察力和明显的外来的敌人，美国也应该主动
的审视新的战略选择和对手(?)。
##尽管缺乏洞察力和一个明确的外部威胁，合众国仍旧主动地检验新的战略
方案和选择。
The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the Pentagon to deal
with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality.
五角大楼处理这种具有不确定性的现实中，这种概念上的多样性就会体现出
来。(这句话不通，是我不知道该如何说！)
##而五角大楼在处理这个不确定（的未来）时进行的多种概念性研究就证
明了这个现实。
这种论文的文字超过了一般大学英语要求的水平，翻译的时候不能想当然。
The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for
structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future
U. S. military forces might be configured.
这篇文章的目的是揭示一种可能的正在建立的任务能力集合的理论,这种理
论可能将被未来的美军所使用。
## 这篇文章的目的是探讨关于组建任务能力集群(MCP，这应当是类似于能
够独立作战的战斗群，如果可以自由一点翻译的话，我更倾向于特遣作战集
群这个译法)的新概念，未来的美国军事力量可能是以这种集群为中心构建的。
From the very outset of this study group’s deliberations, we
agreed that the most useful contribution we could make would be to
attempt to reach beyond what we saw as the current and commendable
efforts, largely but not entirely within the Department of
Defense, to define concepts for strategy, doctrine, operations,
and force structure to deal with a highly uncertain future.
在小组正式开始开始研究时，我们一致认为我们所能做的最有效的贡献可能
不是来自研究当前流行的和值得赞扬的结果，而且是尽量但不完全与国防部
一致，只有这样，我们才能在面对具有高度不确定性的未来中，定义所谓的
战略，教条(?)，操作和兵力组成的概念。
##自研究开始以来，我们就一致认为我们所能做的最大贡献就是超越那些我
们曾经看作是流行并值得推崇的成就，这些观念在国防部内部广泛地但不是全
部地被用来定义战略、条令、行动和武装部队的结构，用以面对极不确定的未
来。
In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and
actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what
may prove to be the full extent of our grasp.
在努力的过程中，我们充分的意识到当要证明我们所掌握程度时，我们所面
临的那些固有的和现实的限制和困难。
##在进行这种努力中，我们充分地认识到打破头脑中根深蒂固的思想的过程
存在着内在的和现实的局限和困难。
It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently
the most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a
long time to come.
当然，目前的美军的实力是世上无出其右者，而且看起来在很长时间内，也
没有人能挑战这个事实。
显然，美国军事力量理所当然是目前世界上最强大的，而且这个地位看起来
还要保持很长时间。
Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose major
excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of
military superiority?
可能有人会问，既然我国在军队实力上是独占螯头，那么为什么我们还要检
查修正甚至是企图进行大量的改革?
##很多人会问，既然美国保持着军事上的优势地位，为什么还要反思甚至提出
进行重大的转变和变革呢？
For reasons noted in this study, we believe that excursions are
important if only to confirm the validity of current defense
approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have led
us to this conclusion.
原因将在文章中提到，我们相信：那怕是为了证明当前防卫的有效性，也有
必要对此进行修正。有许多的过分(overrarching,没有这个词)的现实
都使我们得出了这个结论。
##根据文章中说明的原因，我们相信，除非能证实现行国防政策的正确性，否则
改革是重要的。我们得出这个结论是基于多个明确的事实。
First, while everyone recognizes that the Cold War has ended,
there is not a consensus about what this means for more precisely
defining the nature of our future security needs.
首先，所有人都认为冷战已经结束了，但是许多人却不认为这个事实意味着
我们在未来更加的安全。
##首先，尽管所有人都承认冷战已经结束了，但其意义还缺乏共识，即对于
我们未来国家安全需要该如何准确定义。
Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing
external danger, the United States is actively examining new
strategic options and choices.
另外，即使我们没有了敏锐的洞察力和明显的外来的敌人，美国也应该主动
的审视新的战略选择和对手(?)。
##尽管缺乏洞察力和一个明确的外部威胁，合众国仍旧主动地检验新的战略
方案和选择。
The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the Pentagon to deal
with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality.
五角大楼处理这种具有不确定性的现实中，这种概念上的多样性就会体现出
来。(这句话不通，是我不知道该如何说！)
##而五角大楼在处理这个不确定（的未来）时进行的多种概念性研究就证
明了这个现实。
呵呵,我服了!从没有见到自己的翻译是这麽差劲的说!
要不kilorocky兄接替我继续翻译那篇文章吧，我突然觉得我的水平很差的了！
怎敢在班门弄斧了！
要不kilorocky兄接替我继续翻译那篇文章吧，我突然觉得我的水平很差的了！
怎敢在班门弄斧了！
[em00][em00][em00]
很老实的说，偶看是没有问题，但翻译就完蛋了。非常感谢各位的翻译。
拿这句和大家共勉
In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and
actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what
may prove to be the full extent of our grasp.
很老实的说，偶看是没有问题，但翻译就完蛋了。非常感谢各位的翻译。
拿这句和大家共勉
In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and
actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what
may prove to be the full extent of our grasp.
诶，我也不过是帮你校正
翻译这东西就是这样，多翻译多读就出来了
可不能因噎废食呀！
翻译这东西就是这样，多翻译多读就出来了
可不能因噎废食呀！
是!!能全部翻译出来,就已经很不容易了!!
鼓励!
鼓励!
好的,我会坚持的,一定努力
At the same time, the current dominance and superiority of American military power, unencumbered by the danger of an external peer competitor, have created a period of strategic advantage during which we have the luxury of time, perhaps measured in many years, to re-examine with a margin of safety our defense posture.
与此同时,美国军事力量拥有强大的优势,且没有一个同等级的外在对手的威胁,这样我们就有了一段战略优势的时间的奢侈的时间,或许有许多年,在这段时间中,我们将能够审视我们防御中所没有注意到的安全的真空地带。
On the other hand, potential adversaries cannot be expected to ignore this predominant military capability of the United States and fail to try to exploit, bypass, or counter it.
另一方面,所有潜在的对手都不会情愿的忽略合众国的超强的军事实力,也不会放弃对于这种力量的利用,逃避,或者抵抗。
In other words, faced with American military superiority in ships, tanks, aircraft, weapons and, most importantly, in competent fighting personnel, potential adversaries may try to change the terms of future conflict and make as irrelevant as possible these current U.S. advantages.
换句话说：面对美国在战舰，坦克，飞机，而且最重要是富有作战能力的官兵这些领域的优势地位时,那些潜在的对手可能会尝试改变未来冲突的条件,使其尽可能的与当前的美军优势不相关。
We proceed at our own risk if we dismiss this possibility.
如果我们忽略了这种可能性，那么将使我们所受的威胁继续增加。
Second, it is relatively clear that current U.S. military capability will shrink.
第二点，比较清楚的是，美军的军事实力将会缩减。
Despite the pledges of the two major American political parties to maintain or expand the current level of defense capability, both the force structure and defense infrastructure are too large to be maintained at even the present levels and within the defense budgets that are likely to be approved.
尽管美国的两个主要的政党都保证维持甚至加强现有的防御力量，但是在被核准的国防预算资金内，维持庞大军事力量组织和军事防御基础到现有的水平都是不可能的。
Unless a new menace materializes, defense is headed for "less of the same."
除非有了一个新的军事威胁，否则军事力量的目标就是“逐渐减少。”
Such reductions may have no strategic consequences.
诸如此类的缩减，将不会有任何好的战略结果。
However, that is an outcome that we believe should not be left to chance.
然而，这可不是我们所期望的结果。
与此同时,美国军事力量拥有强大的优势,且没有一个同等级的外在对手的威胁,这样我们就有了一段战略优势的时间的奢侈的时间,或许有许多年,在这段时间中,我们将能够审视我们防御中所没有注意到的安全的真空地带。
On the other hand, potential adversaries cannot be expected to ignore this predominant military capability of the United States and fail to try to exploit, bypass, or counter it.
另一方面,所有潜在的对手都不会情愿的忽略合众国的超强的军事实力,也不会放弃对于这种力量的利用,逃避,或者抵抗。
In other words, faced with American military superiority in ships, tanks, aircraft, weapons and, most importantly, in competent fighting personnel, potential adversaries may try to change the terms of future conflict and make as irrelevant as possible these current U.S. advantages.
换句话说：面对美国在战舰，坦克，飞机，而且最重要是富有作战能力的官兵这些领域的优势地位时,那些潜在的对手可能会尝试改变未来冲突的条件,使其尽可能的与当前的美军优势不相关。
We proceed at our own risk if we dismiss this possibility.
如果我们忽略了这种可能性，那么将使我们所受的威胁继续增加。
Second, it is relatively clear that current U.S. military capability will shrink.
第二点，比较清楚的是，美军的军事实力将会缩减。
Despite the pledges of the two major American political parties to maintain or expand the current level of defense capability, both the force structure and defense infrastructure are too large to be maintained at even the present levels and within the defense budgets that are likely to be approved.
尽管美国的两个主要的政党都保证维持甚至加强现有的防御力量，但是在被核准的国防预算资金内，维持庞大军事力量组织和军事防御基础到现有的水平都是不可能的。
Unless a new menace materializes, defense is headed for "less of the same."
除非有了一个新的军事威胁，否则军事力量的目标就是“逐渐减少。”
Such reductions may have no strategic consequences.
诸如此类的缩减，将不会有任何好的战略结果。
However, that is an outcome that we believe should not be left to chance.
然而，这可不是我们所期望的结果。
老鹰也是牛人啊!! 厉害厉害啊!
以下是引用航天三院在2003-4-28 11:58:00的发言：
老鹰也是牛人啊!! 厉害厉害啊!
呵呵，是指雄鹰么？
This shrinkage also means that the Pentagon's good faith strategic reviews aimed at dealing with our future security needs may be caught up in the defense budget debate over downsizing and could too easily drift into becoming advocacy or marketing documents.
这样的力量萎缩同时意味着五角大楼为我们将来的安全需求所做的真诚的战略回顾将在预算讨论中迎合削减之风，而且很容易陷入鼓吹或商业文件之中。
As the services are forced into more jealously guarding a declining force structure, the tendency to "stove-pipe" and compartmentalize technology and special programs is likely to increase,
这句我看了好几个小时，但连句子结构都没看明白，5555555
thereby complicating the problem of making full use of our extraordinary technological resources.
从而复杂化我们完全发挥我们非凡的技术资源的过程。
This means that some external thinking, removed from the bureaucratic pressures and demands, may be essential to stimulating and sustaining innovation.
这意味着，一些没有官僚的压力和需求的思想将在实质上刺激和支持改革。
这样的力量萎缩同时意味着五角大楼为我们将来的安全需求所做的真诚的战略回顾将在预算讨论中迎合削减之风，而且很容易陷入鼓吹或商业文件之中。
As the services are forced into more jealously guarding a declining force structure, the tendency to "stove-pipe" and compartmentalize technology and special programs is likely to increase,
这句我看了好几个小时，但连句子结构都没看明白，5555555
thereby complicating the problem of making full use of our extraordinary technological resources.
从而复杂化我们完全发挥我们非凡的技术资源的过程。
This means that some external thinking, removed from the bureaucratic pressures and demands, may be essential to stimulating and sustaining innovation.
这意味着，一些没有官僚的压力和需求的思想将在实质上刺激和支持改革。
Third, the American commercial-industrial base is undergoing profound change propelled largely by the entrepreneurial nature of the free enterprise system and the American personality.
第三点，美国的商业工业的基础正经历意义深刻的变革，这种变革的推动力很大程度上来自于自由竞争体系中的企业家的本质和美国人的天性。
Whether in information or materials-related technology or for that matter in other areas too numerous to count, the nature of competition is driving both product breadth and improvement at rates perhaps unthinkable a decade ago.
无论是与信息还是原料相关的技术，或是与此相关的难以计数的领域，竞争的天性 在某种程度上都促进了产品广度和改进，而这在10年前或许还是无法想象的。
One sign of these trends is the reality that virtually all new jobs in this country are being created by small business.
这些趋势的一个特征就是实际上在这个国家中所有新的的工作岗位都是小公司创造的。
In the areas of commercial information and related management information systems, these changes are extraordinary and were probably unpredictable even a few years ago.
在商业信息和相关的管理信息系统中，这些改变是非同寻常的，而且可能多年前是无法预料到的。
第三点，美国的商业工业的基础正经历意义深刻的变革，这种变革的推动力很大程度上来自于自由竞争体系中的企业家的本质和美国人的天性。
Whether in information or materials-related technology or for that matter in other areas too numerous to count, the nature of competition is driving both product breadth and improvement at rates perhaps unthinkable a decade ago.
无论是与信息还是原料相关的技术，或是与此相关的难以计数的领域，竞争的天性 在某种程度上都促进了产品广度和改进，而这在10年前或许还是无法想象的。
One sign of these trends is the reality that virtually all new jobs in this country are being created by small business.
这些趋势的一个特征就是实际上在这个国家中所有新的的工作岗位都是小公司创造的。
In the areas of commercial information and related management information systems, these changes are extraordinary and were probably unpredictable even a few years ago.
在商业信息和相关的管理信息系统中，这些改变是非同寻常的，而且可能多年前是无法预料到的。
On the so-called information highway, performance is increasing dramatically and quickly while price, cost, and the time to bring to market new generation technology are diminishing.
在所谓的信息高速公路上，性能（表现）正令人瞩目和迅速的减少，与此同时，促进市场产生新一代技术的所用价格，花费，时间都在减少。
These positive trends are not matched yet in the defense-industrial base.
但是在武器工业中，这些积极的趋势还没有很好地产生。
在所谓的信息高速公路上，性能（表现）正令人瞩目和迅速的减少，与此同时，促进市场产生新一代技术的所用价格，花费，时间都在减少。
These positive trends are not matched yet in the defense-industrial base.
但是在武器工业中，这些积极的趋势还没有很好地产生。
虾米我告罪来了
就接着疾风的后面两段翻译吧...
Finally, it is clear that U.S. forces are engaged and deployed worldwide, often at operating tempos as high as or higher than during the Cold War. These demands will continue and the diversity of assigned tasks is unlikely to contract. These forces must be properly manned, equipped, and trained and must carry out their missions to standards that are both high and expected by the nation's leaders and its public. The matter of maintaining this capability while attempting to reshape the force for a changing future is a major and daunting challenge not to be underestimated.
最后一点,很明显美军正以与冷战相当或更快的行动节奏向世界范围内派遣军队.对美军派遣行动的要求将会继续,任务的多样性也不会减少.这些部队要指挥得当,配备精良,训练到位,还必须以国家领导人和公众期望为行动标准执行任务.如何在为可变未来重组部队的同时保持部队的战斗力已成为不可轻觑的主要棘手问题.
These structural realities are exciting and offer a major opportunity for real revolution and change if we are able and daring enough to exploit them. This, in turn, has led us to develop the concept of Rapid Dominance and its attendant focus on Shock and Awe. Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate these multifaceted realities and facts and apply them to the common defense at a time when uncertainty about the future is perhaps one of the few givens. We believe the principles and ideas underlying this concept are sufficiently compelling and different enough from current American defense doctrine encapsulated by "overwhelming or decisive force," "dominant battlefield awareness," and "dominant maneuver" to (warrant closer examination不明白...).
这些架构的现状让人兴奋,而且为切实的改革和改变提供了重大机会--倘若我们有足够的能力和胆量.这样,自然而然地,便出现了主要表现为震慑与畏惧的快速控制理论.快速控制寻求的是综合多方面的现状和事实,在不肯定未来是否属于假定情况之一的时候将综合所得应用于一般防御.与当今以"压倒和决定性力量","战场控制意识"和"机动控制"(来保证仔细验证???)的美国国防理论相比,我们相信快速控制的原理和概念与之有相当大的区别.
就接着疾风的后面两段翻译吧...
Finally, it is clear that U.S. forces are engaged and deployed worldwide, often at operating tempos as high as or higher than during the Cold War. These demands will continue and the diversity of assigned tasks is unlikely to contract. These forces must be properly manned, equipped, and trained and must carry out their missions to standards that are both high and expected by the nation's leaders and its public. The matter of maintaining this capability while attempting to reshape the force for a changing future is a major and daunting challenge not to be underestimated.
最后一点,很明显美军正以与冷战相当或更快的行动节奏向世界范围内派遣军队.对美军派遣行动的要求将会继续,任务的多样性也不会减少.这些部队要指挥得当,配备精良,训练到位,还必须以国家领导人和公众期望为行动标准执行任务.如何在为可变未来重组部队的同时保持部队的战斗力已成为不可轻觑的主要棘手问题.
These structural realities are exciting and offer a major opportunity for real revolution and change if we are able and daring enough to exploit them. This, in turn, has led us to develop the concept of Rapid Dominance and its attendant focus on Shock and Awe. Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate these multifaceted realities and facts and apply them to the common defense at a time when uncertainty about the future is perhaps one of the few givens. We believe the principles and ideas underlying this concept are sufficiently compelling and different enough from current American defense doctrine encapsulated by "overwhelming or decisive force," "dominant battlefield awareness," and "dominant maneuver" to (warrant closer examination不明白...).
这些架构的现状让人兴奋,而且为切实的改革和改变提供了重大机会--倘若我们有足够的能力和胆量.这样,自然而然地,便出现了主要表现为震慑与畏惧的快速控制理论.快速控制寻求的是综合多方面的现状和事实,在不肯定未来是否属于假定情况之一的时候将综合所得应用于一般防御.与当今以"压倒和决定性力量","战场控制意识"和"机动控制"(来保证仔细验证???)的美国国防理论相比,我们相信快速控制的原理和概念与之有相当大的区别.