看看GE和PW的F13６和F135的新闻

Lockheed wary of F-35 engine battle impact
Aviation Week & Space Technology


A high-stakes test of U.S. defense contractors’ willingness to defy their customer and apply political pressure to safeguard their programs is unfolding here.

While key congressional votes late last week threatened to determine the fate of the alternate engine for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the bitter battle between General Electric and Pratt & Whitney is likely to continue until Congress finalizes the Fiscal 2011 defense budget.

As industrial giants GE and United Technologies, Pratt’s parent company, expended substantial political capital to secure congressional support for their programs, the manufacturers accused each other of spreading misinformation on the performance, costs and jobs impact of the rival engines.

While companies are becoming increasingly bold in challenging the Defense Department via contract protests and no-bid threats, stakes are high in the engine battle because it might damage an F-35 program already reeling under skyrocketing cost projections.

At stake is the future of the General Electric/Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team’s F136 alternate powerplant. The Pentagon has again tried to cancel the engine, citing cost, but in its mark-up of the 2011 budget, the key House Armed Services Committee (HASC) added $485 million for development.

GE Aviation President/CEO David Joyce says competition is the only way to rein in “spiraling out-of-control costs,” citing a $2.5-billion increase in F135 development expenses. At the same time, GE and Rolls dispute the Pentagon’s $2.9-billion estimate of what it will take to complete development of the F136 and begin competitive procurement.

With $3 billion already spent on F136 development, the Pentagon’s assessment of the business case for competitive procurement has gone from negative to breakeven, but the department still argues the “extra engine” is an unaffordable luxury in today’s budget environment.

“We understand Defense Secretary Robert Gates has a number of difficult calls to make, but we disagree with him on this issue,” says Jim Guyette, president/CEO of Rolls-Royce North America. “The right answer is to invest the last 25% to complete development of F136.”

While acknowledging the JSF program was set up originally to have competitive engine procurement, publicly Lockheed Martin is staying agnostic on the issue. But a senior program official says the company’s leadership has been meeting with GE and Pratt in a bid to prevent a showdown that could damage the F-35 program.

The concern is that money for the second engine will ultimately come from somewhere in the program and further push down the ramp rate as Lockheed struggles to reach the production throughput required. In its budget mark-up, the HASC tied release of funds for the F-35 program to the Pentagon fully funding competitive engine procurement. Gates has warned the conditions could make the program “unexecutable.”

The official calls tethering F-35 funding to the F136 a “foul” on the program as Lockheed has no control over GE/Rolls’ ability to deliver. With the HASC fencing off 12 of the 42 F-35s planned in Fiscal 2011 until competitive engine procurement is guaranteed, he says the risk is that the F-35 will never achieve the required ramp-up and will remain a low-rate program with costs going up and numbers down.

At the heart of the engine battle is a dispute over estimates similar to that in which the F-35 program is embroiled. The Pentagon is now legally required to base its budget on independent cost estimates, driving large increases in projected outlays, but the manufacturers maintain they can build engines—and aircraft—for much less.

GE/Rolls disagrees with the Pentagon’s $2.9-billion projection to get to competitive procurement. The team estimates it will take $1 billion to complete F136 development and another $800 million to prepare for production. The Pentagon’s estimate also assumes higher prices for the F135 because of loss of learning as Pratt produces fewer engines, says Fighter Engine Team President Jean Lydon-Rogers. Her group’s offer of fixed prices for early production engines will eliminate that loss of learning, she says, as manufacturers will assume the risk of not meeting the projected learning curve and cost reductions.

But U.S. Air Force acquisition official Lt. Gen. Mark Shackelford has warned Congress that the Pentagon’s assessment of the business case for competitive procurement assumed GE/Rolls would be able to match Pratt’s prices, despite being five years behind, by following “a very accelerated learning curve . . . [that] is extremely difficult to achieve.”

The F135’s price target—that it should cost the same as the F-22’s F119 engine despite being bigger and heavier—is “very aggressive,” says a source close to the program. With three production batches under contract, Pratt is significantly above that target, but cites a detailed plan agreed with the Pentagon to achieve the price goal by the 250th engine, which will be delivered by 2015. “The cost-reduction plan is on track,” says Pratt & Whitney President David Hess. “We achieved a 40% cost reduction on the [F-22’s] F119 and we are following the same exact curve on the F135.”

Pratt disputes GE/Rolls’s claim that the F135 costs are out of control. But development costs have escalated. The company signed a $4.8-billion contract for the engine in 2001 and the Pentagon now estimates completing development at $7.3 billion. There have been two major price hikes on the program. The first came in 2004, when Lockheed had to redesign the F-35 to reduce the weight of the short takeoff and vertical landing (Stovl) variant. The F135 was redesigned to increase thrust and reduce weight, pushing the development toll to $5.9 billion.

The second increase came in 2008, when Pratt had to redesign the third-stage turbine, and Rolls the Stovl lift fan, which resulted in an $800-million overspend. This took development cost to the $6.7 billion now under contract. Of this, $1.6 billion has gone to Rolls-Royce to develop the Stovl lift system, which will work with the F135 and F136.

The remaining $600 million in cost growth is a Pentagon “planning number,” says the program source, an estimate of the additional expenses of supporting the 13-month extension of F-35 development under the restructured program. The work scope has not been specified or negotiated, but will not involve changes to the engine, the source says.

Pratt also points out that its contract covers development of the F135; the common hardware, including augmentor duct and exhaust nozzle, to be used with both the F135 and F136; and the lift system, which will also work with both engines. GE/Rolls “is not developing an engine, just a power module,” claims the program source.

GE/Rolls acknowledges it has refocused F136 development on the conventional takeoff and landing engine, delaying the Stovl variant, because it has received only 80% of the planned funding. Despite this shortfall, the team says it is on track to begin flight-testing the F136 in the F-35 next year. Some 1,000 hr. of ground testing has been accumulated, with another 1,000 expected by year-end, when six engines are planned to be on test.

The two rivals are also trading jabs regarding job allocations. GE/Rolls dismisses claims by Pratt that the U.S. team is sending jobs to the U.K., arguing that about 20% of both engines is being outsourced to suppliers in JSF international partner nations. Pratt says only 8% of the F135 is going offshore, including its own subsidiary Pratt & Whitney Canada.

GE/Rolls, meanwhile, says there are about 200 people working in the U.K. on the F136 and that more than 100 of those jobs will move to the U.S. when Rolls’s new blisk factory in Crosspoint, Va., opens. More jobs are expected to be created in the U.S. and U.K. as production ramps up. But, as both manufacturers use the same supplier base for 85% of their engines, the overall number is expected to be the same whether F135s, F136s or both are being produced.

Both sides of the four-year battle over the alternative engine cite recent acquisition reform efforts to bolster their arguments for or against the F136. Gates and Sen. John McCain (Ariz.), the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee and a leading sponsor of last year’s Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, stress the cost of forcing the Pentagon to spend on a program it says it does not want or need.

Curbing appetites, on Capitol Hill or in the Pentagon, is crucial to providing sustainable budgets, say independent watchdogs. “Lawmakers cite their purse-string holding rights in defending programs like the alternate engine, saying the Defense Department shouldn’t be allowed to call all the budgetary shots,” states Taxpayers for Common Sense. “This argument would be more convincing if it wasn’t so patently obvious they chose pet programs based on hometown jobs and political donors rather than national security.”

But supporters of the alternate engine cite reforms like McCain’s law and other congressional proposals to justify maintaining a choice for JSF engines. “We strongly believe that a $110-billion, non-competitive, sole-source, 25-year contract should not be permitted,” says McCain’s House counterpart, Rep. Howard (Buck) McKeon (Calif.). “Therefore, we strongly support the inclusion of funding to complete development of the F136 competitive engine for the JSF.”

The Senate must still pass its version of the Fiscal 2011 defense authorization bill. Senate consideration could occur over the next two months. After that, House and Senate authorizers go to conference to work out a compromise on the final bill—which is where the engine debate played out last year.

Gates says he will recommend President Barack Obama veto any budget with funding for the F136. If challenged by Congress, Obama’s veto decision may also depend on factors including hotly contested congressional elections in November. So the engine battle will continue for several more months; the question is how much damage will it do.Lockheed wary of F-35 engine battle impact
Aviation Week & Space Technology


A high-stakes test of U.S. defense contractors’ willingness to defy their customer and apply political pressure to safeguard their programs is unfolding here.

While key congressional votes late last week threatened to determine the fate of the alternate engine for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the bitter battle between General Electric and Pratt & Whitney is likely to continue until Congress finalizes the Fiscal 2011 defense budget.

As industrial giants GE and United Technologies, Pratt’s parent company, expended substantial political capital to secure congressional support for their programs, the manufacturers accused each other of spreading misinformation on the performance, costs and jobs impact of the rival engines.

While companies are becoming increasingly bold in challenging the Defense Department via contract protests and no-bid threats, stakes are high in the engine battle because it might damage an F-35 program already reeling under skyrocketing cost projections.

At stake is the future of the General Electric/Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team’s F136 alternate powerplant. The Pentagon has again tried to cancel the engine, citing cost, but in its mark-up of the 2011 budget, the key House Armed Services Committee (HASC) added $485 million for development.

GE Aviation President/CEO David Joyce says competition is the only way to rein in “spiraling out-of-control costs,” citing a $2.5-billion increase in F135 development expenses. At the same time, GE and Rolls dispute the Pentagon’s $2.9-billion estimate of what it will take to complete development of the F136 and begin competitive procurement.

With $3 billion already spent on F136 development, the Pentagon’s assessment of the business case for competitive procurement has gone from negative to breakeven, but the department still argues the “extra engine” is an unaffordable luxury in today’s budget environment.

“We understand Defense Secretary Robert Gates has a number of difficult calls to make, but we disagree with him on this issue,” says Jim Guyette, president/CEO of Rolls-Royce North America. “The right answer is to invest the last 25% to complete development of F136.”

While acknowledging the JSF program was set up originally to have competitive engine procurement, publicly Lockheed Martin is staying agnostic on the issue. But a senior program official says the company’s leadership has been meeting with GE and Pratt in a bid to prevent a showdown that could damage the F-35 program.

The concern is that money for the second engine will ultimately come from somewhere in the program and further push down the ramp rate as Lockheed struggles to reach the production throughput required. In its budget mark-up, the HASC tied release of funds for the F-35 program to the Pentagon fully funding competitive engine procurement. Gates has warned the conditions could make the program “unexecutable.”

The official calls tethering F-35 funding to the F136 a “foul” on the program as Lockheed has no control over GE/Rolls’ ability to deliver. With the HASC fencing off 12 of the 42 F-35s planned in Fiscal 2011 until competitive engine procurement is guaranteed, he says the risk is that the F-35 will never achieve the required ramp-up and will remain a low-rate program with costs going up and numbers down.

At the heart of the engine battle is a dispute over estimates similar to that in which the F-35 program is embroiled. The Pentagon is now legally required to base its budget on independent cost estimates, driving large increases in projected outlays, but the manufacturers maintain they can build engines—and aircraft—for much less.

GE/Rolls disagrees with the Pentagon’s $2.9-billion projection to get to competitive procurement. The team estimates it will take $1 billion to complete F136 development and another $800 million to prepare for production. The Pentagon’s estimate also assumes higher prices for the F135 because of loss of learning as Pratt produces fewer engines, says Fighter Engine Team President Jean Lydon-Rogers. Her group’s offer of fixed prices for early production engines will eliminate that loss of learning, she says, as manufacturers will assume the risk of not meeting the projected learning curve and cost reductions.

But U.S. Air Force acquisition official Lt. Gen. Mark Shackelford has warned Congress that the Pentagon’s assessment of the business case for competitive procurement assumed GE/Rolls would be able to match Pratt’s prices, despite being five years behind, by following “a very accelerated learning curve . . . [that] is extremely difficult to achieve.”

The F135’s price target—that it should cost the same as the F-22’s F119 engine despite being bigger and heavier—is “very aggressive,” says a source close to the program. With three production batches under contract, Pratt is significantly above that target, but cites a detailed plan agreed with the Pentagon to achieve the price goal by the 250th engine, which will be delivered by 2015. “The cost-reduction plan is on track,” says Pratt & Whitney President David Hess. “We achieved a 40% cost reduction on the [F-22’s] F119 and we are following the same exact curve on the F135.”

Pratt disputes GE/Rolls’s claim that the F135 costs are out of control. But development costs have escalated. The company signed a $4.8-billion contract for the engine in 2001 and the Pentagon now estimates completing development at $7.3 billion. There have been two major price hikes on the program. The first came in 2004, when Lockheed had to redesign the F-35 to reduce the weight of the short takeoff and vertical landing (Stovl) variant. The F135 was redesigned to increase thrust and reduce weight, pushing the development toll to $5.9 billion.

The second increase came in 2008, when Pratt had to redesign the third-stage turbine, and Rolls the Stovl lift fan, which resulted in an $800-million overspend. This took development cost to the $6.7 billion now under contract. Of this, $1.6 billion has gone to Rolls-Royce to develop the Stovl lift system, which will work with the F135 and F136.

The remaining $600 million in cost growth is a Pentagon “planning number,” says the program source, an estimate of the additional expenses of supporting the 13-month extension of F-35 development under the restructured program. The work scope has not been specified or negotiated, but will not involve changes to the engine, the source says.

Pratt also points out that its contract covers development of the F135; the common hardware, including augmentor duct and exhaust nozzle, to be used with both the F135 and F136; and the lift system, which will also work with both engines. GE/Rolls “is not developing an engine, just a power module,” claims the program source.

GE/Rolls acknowledges it has refocused F136 development on the conventional takeoff and landing engine, delaying the Stovl variant, because it has received only 80% of the planned funding. Despite this shortfall, the team says it is on track to begin flight-testing the F136 in the F-35 next year. Some 1,000 hr. of ground testing has been accumulated, with another 1,000 expected by year-end, when six engines are planned to be on test.

The two rivals are also trading jabs regarding job allocations. GE/Rolls dismisses claims by Pratt that the U.S. team is sending jobs to the U.K., arguing that about 20% of both engines is being outsourced to suppliers in JSF international partner nations. Pratt says only 8% of the F135 is going offshore, including its own subsidiary Pratt & Whitney Canada.

GE/Rolls, meanwhile, says there are about 200 people working in the U.K. on the F136 and that more than 100 of those jobs will move to the U.S. when Rolls’s new blisk factory in Crosspoint, Va., opens. More jobs are expected to be created in the U.S. and U.K. as production ramps up. But, as both manufacturers use the same supplier base for 85% of their engines, the overall number is expected to be the same whether F135s, F136s or both are being produced.

Both sides of the four-year battle over the alternative engine cite recent acquisition reform efforts to bolster their arguments for or against the F136. Gates and Sen. John McCain (Ariz.), the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee and a leading sponsor of last year’s Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, stress the cost of forcing the Pentagon to spend on a program it says it does not want or need.

Curbing appetites, on Capitol Hill or in the Pentagon, is crucial to providing sustainable budgets, say independent watchdogs. “Lawmakers cite their purse-string holding rights in defending programs like the alternate engine, saying the Defense Department shouldn’t be allowed to call all the budgetary shots,” states Taxpayers for Common Sense. “This argument would be more convincing if it wasn’t so patently obvious they chose pet programs based on hometown jobs and political donors rather than national security.”

But supporters of the alternate engine cite reforms like McCain’s law and other congressional proposals to justify maintaining a choice for JSF engines. “We strongly believe that a $110-billion, non-competitive, sole-source, 25-year contract should not be permitted,” says McCain’s House counterpart, Rep. Howard (Buck) McKeon (Calif.). “Therefore, we strongly support the inclusion of funding to complete development of the F136 competitive engine for the JSF.”

The Senate must still pass its version of the Fiscal 2011 defense authorization bill. Senate consideration could occur over the next two months. After that, House and Senate authorizers go to conference to work out a compromise on the final bill—which is where the engine debate played out last year.

Gates says he will recommend President Barack Obama veto any budget with funding for the F136. If challenged by Congress, Obama’s veto decision may also depend on factors including hotly contested congressional elections in November. So the engine battle will continue for several more months; the question is how much damage will it do.