超级军网英金融时报社评：对中国-刚果交易乐观其成
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 00:52:05
http://www.ftchinese.com/story.php?storyid=001024615
对中国-刚果交易乐观其成英国《金融时报》社评 2009-02-11
中国官员喜欢把北京与非洲之间蓬勃发展的关系形容为“双赢”。非洲赢得中国的投资、基础设施和贷款。中国则赢得非洲的市场和资源，以推动国内增长。然而，现实很少会这样简单。在刚果民主共和国，中国于2007年达成了一宗最具雄心的非洲交易，如今，各方都有沦为输家的风险。
根据中国与刚果达成的协议，中国将在刚果投资90亿美元兴建公路、铁路、学校和诊所，并重振刚果采矿业。作为交换，刚果将把一个合资项目的多数股权让与中国，以开发铜矿和钴矿。基础设施成本与矿山营业收入之间可能出现的任何差额，将由刚果政府担保补贴。
对中方来说，这是一个典型的双赢局面。刚果正从长达10年的冲突，以及之前30年的独裁中艰难地恢复。刚果的基础设施和机构与其说处于废墟状态，不如说根本不存在。迄今，没有其它投资者或者外国捐助方提出同样雄心勃勃的发展计划。在尚未开发的基础和贵重金属矿藏方面，也没有其它任何一个非洲国家比得上刚果。
在纸面上，即便细节含有一些缺陷，但这宗交易还是有望造福刚果的。如果说实际上没有做到这一点，那在很大程度上要归因于刚果与西方关系有毒的遗留问题。刚果背负着100亿美元的外部债务，这些债务是在蒙博托·塞塞·塞科(Mobutu Sese Seko)独裁时代累积起来的。巨额资金并未带来多少看得见的成果，肯定没有道路或者学校。尽管外界早就知道，蒙博托总统把钱存在瑞士银行里，这些资金是用来讨好这位冷战盟友的。然而，在刚果要按商业条款向中国借债的情况下，刚果传统上的西方债权方不愿注销历史遗留债务。
刚果政府四面受压。由于其自身管治不佳，它未能从道义上证明刚果应得到债务豁免。与任何负债累累的非洲国家一样，刚果十分需要债务豁免。短期而言，刚果政府的财务状况处于令人绝望的境地，它必须迎合传统西方捐助方。然而，中国提出的另类发展融资，看上去是更具雄心的长期方案。
应该让刚果得到两者。西方捐助方一定要刚果重启谈判，得到超出北京意愿之外的、更为优惠的条款，有可能让刚果两头落空。只不过，为刚果持续的政府失败买单的将是欧洲，而不会是北京。
译者/和风
这篇最重要的后半部分保持了FT中文网翻译一贯的糟糕水平，所以附上英文原文，有兴趣的朋友多多琢磨一下最后一段吧。
Chinese officials like to describe burgeoning relations between Beijing and Africa as “win-win.” Africa wins from Chinese investment, infrastructure and loans. China wins by gaining access to African markets and resources to fuel domestic growth. The reality, however, is rarely so simple and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where China pitched its most ambitious African deal in 2007, all sides, now risk emerging as losers.
The China-Congo deal provided for $9bn of Chinese investment in roads, railways, schools and clinics and in the rehabilitation of the mining sector. In return, Congo would cede majority rights in a joint venture to develop copper and cobalt concessions. Any difference that might emerge between the cost of infrastructure and revenues from the mines would be underwritten by the Congolese state.
For the Chinese it was a classic win-win scenario. Congo is struggling to emerge from a decade of conflict and three prior decades of dictatorship. Its infrastructure and institutions are not so much in ruins as non-existent. No other investor or foreign donor has come forward with as ambitious a development programme. Nor can any other African country match Congo's untapped reserves of base and precious metals.
On paper, even if the details contain flaws, the deal could benefit Congo. If it has not turned out so, it has much to do with the toxic legacy of Congo's relations with the west. The country is saddled with $10bn of external debt stored up from the days of Mobutu Sese Seko, the dictator. It has little to show for it, and certainly no roads or schools. This was money used to appease a cold war ally long after it became clear President Mobutu was stashing it in Swiss banks. Yet Congo's historic western creditors are reluctant to write it off only to see new debt contracted to China on commercial terms.
The Kinshasa government is squeezed on all fronts. It has failed, through poor governance of its own, to make the moral case for debt relief, which is as strong in Congo as in any indebted African country. In the short term its finances are in desperate shape, and it must curry favour from traditional western donors. Yet China's alternative development financing looks a more ambitious long-term bet.
It ought to be possible to have both. By insisting that Congo renegotiates its deal on more favourable terms than Beijing is prepared to give, western donors risk leaving Congo with neither. Yet the bill for continuing state failure will land in Europe, not Beijing.http://www.ftchinese.com/story.php?storyid=001024615
对中国-刚果交易乐观其成英国《金融时报》社评 2009-02-11
中国官员喜欢把北京与非洲之间蓬勃发展的关系形容为“双赢”。非洲赢得中国的投资、基础设施和贷款。中国则赢得非洲的市场和资源，以推动国内增长。然而，现实很少会这样简单。在刚果民主共和国，中国于2007年达成了一宗最具雄心的非洲交易，如今，各方都有沦为输家的风险。
根据中国与刚果达成的协议，中国将在刚果投资90亿美元兴建公路、铁路、学校和诊所，并重振刚果采矿业。作为交换，刚果将把一个合资项目的多数股权让与中国，以开发铜矿和钴矿。基础设施成本与矿山营业收入之间可能出现的任何差额，将由刚果政府担保补贴。
对中方来说，这是一个典型的双赢局面。刚果正从长达10年的冲突，以及之前30年的独裁中艰难地恢复。刚果的基础设施和机构与其说处于废墟状态，不如说根本不存在。迄今，没有其它投资者或者外国捐助方提出同样雄心勃勃的发展计划。在尚未开发的基础和贵重金属矿藏方面，也没有其它任何一个非洲国家比得上刚果。
在纸面上，即便细节含有一些缺陷，但这宗交易还是有望造福刚果的。如果说实际上没有做到这一点，那在很大程度上要归因于刚果与西方关系有毒的遗留问题。刚果背负着100亿美元的外部债务，这些债务是在蒙博托·塞塞·塞科(Mobutu Sese Seko)独裁时代累积起来的。巨额资金并未带来多少看得见的成果，肯定没有道路或者学校。尽管外界早就知道，蒙博托总统把钱存在瑞士银行里，这些资金是用来讨好这位冷战盟友的。然而，在刚果要按商业条款向中国借债的情况下，刚果传统上的西方债权方不愿注销历史遗留债务。
刚果政府四面受压。由于其自身管治不佳，它未能从道义上证明刚果应得到债务豁免。与任何负债累累的非洲国家一样，刚果十分需要债务豁免。短期而言，刚果政府的财务状况处于令人绝望的境地，它必须迎合传统西方捐助方。然而，中国提出的另类发展融资，看上去是更具雄心的长期方案。
应该让刚果得到两者。西方捐助方一定要刚果重启谈判，得到超出北京意愿之外的、更为优惠的条款，有可能让刚果两头落空。只不过，为刚果持续的政府失败买单的将是欧洲，而不会是北京。
译者/和风
这篇最重要的后半部分保持了FT中文网翻译一贯的糟糕水平，所以附上英文原文，有兴趣的朋友多多琢磨一下最后一段吧。
Chinese officials like to describe burgeoning relations between Beijing and Africa as “win-win.” Africa wins from Chinese investment, infrastructure and loans. China wins by gaining access to African markets and resources to fuel domestic growth. The reality, however, is rarely so simple and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where China pitched its most ambitious African deal in 2007, all sides, now risk emerging as losers.
The China-Congo deal provided for $9bn of Chinese investment in roads, railways, schools and clinics and in the rehabilitation of the mining sector. In return, Congo would cede majority rights in a joint venture to develop copper and cobalt concessions. Any difference that might emerge between the cost of infrastructure and revenues from the mines would be underwritten by the Congolese state.
For the Chinese it was a classic win-win scenario. Congo is struggling to emerge from a decade of conflict and three prior decades of dictatorship. Its infrastructure and institutions are not so much in ruins as non-existent. No other investor or foreign donor has come forward with as ambitious a development programme. Nor can any other African country match Congo's untapped reserves of base and precious metals.
On paper, even if the details contain flaws, the deal could benefit Congo. If it has not turned out so, it has much to do with the toxic legacy of Congo's relations with the west. The country is saddled with $10bn of external debt stored up from the days of Mobutu Sese Seko, the dictator. It has little to show for it, and certainly no roads or schools. This was money used to appease a cold war ally long after it became clear President Mobutu was stashing it in Swiss banks. Yet Congo's historic western creditors are reluctant to write it off only to see new debt contracted to China on commercial terms.
The Kinshasa government is squeezed on all fronts. It has failed, through poor governance of its own, to make the moral case for debt relief, which is as strong in Congo as in any indebted African country. In the short term its finances are in desperate shape, and it must curry favour from traditional western donors. Yet China's alternative development financing looks a more ambitious long-term bet.
It ought to be possible to have both. By insisting that Congo renegotiates its deal on more favourable terms than Beijing is prepared to give, western donors risk leaving Congo with neither. Yet the bill for continuing state failure will land in Europe, not Beijing.
对中国-刚果交易乐观其成英国《金融时报》社评 2009-02-11
中国官员喜欢把北京与非洲之间蓬勃发展的关系形容为“双赢”。非洲赢得中国的投资、基础设施和贷款。中国则赢得非洲的市场和资源，以推动国内增长。然而，现实很少会这样简单。在刚果民主共和国，中国于2007年达成了一宗最具雄心的非洲交易，如今，各方都有沦为输家的风险。
根据中国与刚果达成的协议，中国将在刚果投资90亿美元兴建公路、铁路、学校和诊所，并重振刚果采矿业。作为交换，刚果将把一个合资项目的多数股权让与中国，以开发铜矿和钴矿。基础设施成本与矿山营业收入之间可能出现的任何差额，将由刚果政府担保补贴。
对中方来说，这是一个典型的双赢局面。刚果正从长达10年的冲突，以及之前30年的独裁中艰难地恢复。刚果的基础设施和机构与其说处于废墟状态，不如说根本不存在。迄今，没有其它投资者或者外国捐助方提出同样雄心勃勃的发展计划。在尚未开发的基础和贵重金属矿藏方面，也没有其它任何一个非洲国家比得上刚果。
在纸面上，即便细节含有一些缺陷，但这宗交易还是有望造福刚果的。如果说实际上没有做到这一点，那在很大程度上要归因于刚果与西方关系有毒的遗留问题。刚果背负着100亿美元的外部债务，这些债务是在蒙博托·塞塞·塞科(Mobutu Sese Seko)独裁时代累积起来的。巨额资金并未带来多少看得见的成果，肯定没有道路或者学校。尽管外界早就知道，蒙博托总统把钱存在瑞士银行里，这些资金是用来讨好这位冷战盟友的。然而，在刚果要按商业条款向中国借债的情况下，刚果传统上的西方债权方不愿注销历史遗留债务。
刚果政府四面受压。由于其自身管治不佳，它未能从道义上证明刚果应得到债务豁免。与任何负债累累的非洲国家一样，刚果十分需要债务豁免。短期而言，刚果政府的财务状况处于令人绝望的境地，它必须迎合传统西方捐助方。然而，中国提出的另类发展融资，看上去是更具雄心的长期方案。
应该让刚果得到两者。西方捐助方一定要刚果重启谈判，得到超出北京意愿之外的、更为优惠的条款，有可能让刚果两头落空。只不过，为刚果持续的政府失败买单的将是欧洲，而不会是北京。
译者/和风
这篇最重要的后半部分保持了FT中文网翻译一贯的糟糕水平，所以附上英文原文，有兴趣的朋友多多琢磨一下最后一段吧。
Chinese officials like to describe burgeoning relations between Beijing and Africa as “win-win.” Africa wins from Chinese investment, infrastructure and loans. China wins by gaining access to African markets and resources to fuel domestic growth. The reality, however, is rarely so simple and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where China pitched its most ambitious African deal in 2007, all sides, now risk emerging as losers.
The China-Congo deal provided for $9bn of Chinese investment in roads, railways, schools and clinics and in the rehabilitation of the mining sector. In return, Congo would cede majority rights in a joint venture to develop copper and cobalt concessions. Any difference that might emerge between the cost of infrastructure and revenues from the mines would be underwritten by the Congolese state.
For the Chinese it was a classic win-win scenario. Congo is struggling to emerge from a decade of conflict and three prior decades of dictatorship. Its infrastructure and institutions are not so much in ruins as non-existent. No other investor or foreign donor has come forward with as ambitious a development programme. Nor can any other African country match Congo's untapped reserves of base and precious metals.
On paper, even if the details contain flaws, the deal could benefit Congo. If it has not turned out so, it has much to do with the toxic legacy of Congo's relations with the west. The country is saddled with $10bn of external debt stored up from the days of Mobutu Sese Seko, the dictator. It has little to show for it, and certainly no roads or schools. This was money used to appease a cold war ally long after it became clear President Mobutu was stashing it in Swiss banks. Yet Congo's historic western creditors are reluctant to write it off only to see new debt contracted to China on commercial terms.
The Kinshasa government is squeezed on all fronts. It has failed, through poor governance of its own, to make the moral case for debt relief, which is as strong in Congo as in any indebted African country. In the short term its finances are in desperate shape, and it must curry favour from traditional western donors. Yet China's alternative development financing looks a more ambitious long-term bet.
It ought to be possible to have both. By insisting that Congo renegotiates its deal on more favourable terms than Beijing is prepared to give, western donors risk leaving Congo with neither. Yet the bill for continuing state failure will land in Europe, not Beijing.http://www.ftchinese.com/story.php?storyid=001024615
对中国-刚果交易乐观其成英国《金融时报》社评 2009-02-11
中国官员喜欢把北京与非洲之间蓬勃发展的关系形容为“双赢”。非洲赢得中国的投资、基础设施和贷款。中国则赢得非洲的市场和资源，以推动国内增长。然而，现实很少会这样简单。在刚果民主共和国，中国于2007年达成了一宗最具雄心的非洲交易，如今，各方都有沦为输家的风险。
根据中国与刚果达成的协议，中国将在刚果投资90亿美元兴建公路、铁路、学校和诊所，并重振刚果采矿业。作为交换，刚果将把一个合资项目的多数股权让与中国，以开发铜矿和钴矿。基础设施成本与矿山营业收入之间可能出现的任何差额，将由刚果政府担保补贴。
对中方来说，这是一个典型的双赢局面。刚果正从长达10年的冲突，以及之前30年的独裁中艰难地恢复。刚果的基础设施和机构与其说处于废墟状态，不如说根本不存在。迄今，没有其它投资者或者外国捐助方提出同样雄心勃勃的发展计划。在尚未开发的基础和贵重金属矿藏方面，也没有其它任何一个非洲国家比得上刚果。
在纸面上，即便细节含有一些缺陷，但这宗交易还是有望造福刚果的。如果说实际上没有做到这一点，那在很大程度上要归因于刚果与西方关系有毒的遗留问题。刚果背负着100亿美元的外部债务，这些债务是在蒙博托·塞塞·塞科(Mobutu Sese Seko)独裁时代累积起来的。巨额资金并未带来多少看得见的成果，肯定没有道路或者学校。尽管外界早就知道，蒙博托总统把钱存在瑞士银行里，这些资金是用来讨好这位冷战盟友的。然而，在刚果要按商业条款向中国借债的情况下，刚果传统上的西方债权方不愿注销历史遗留债务。
刚果政府四面受压。由于其自身管治不佳，它未能从道义上证明刚果应得到债务豁免。与任何负债累累的非洲国家一样，刚果十分需要债务豁免。短期而言，刚果政府的财务状况处于令人绝望的境地，它必须迎合传统西方捐助方。然而，中国提出的另类发展融资，看上去是更具雄心的长期方案。
应该让刚果得到两者。西方捐助方一定要刚果重启谈判，得到超出北京意愿之外的、更为优惠的条款，有可能让刚果两头落空。只不过，为刚果持续的政府失败买单的将是欧洲，而不会是北京。
译者/和风
这篇最重要的后半部分保持了FT中文网翻译一贯的糟糕水平，所以附上英文原文，有兴趣的朋友多多琢磨一下最后一段吧。
Chinese officials like to describe burgeoning relations between Beijing and Africa as “win-win.” Africa wins from Chinese investment, infrastructure and loans. China wins by gaining access to African markets and resources to fuel domestic growth. The reality, however, is rarely so simple and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where China pitched its most ambitious African deal in 2007, all sides, now risk emerging as losers.
The China-Congo deal provided for $9bn of Chinese investment in roads, railways, schools and clinics and in the rehabilitation of the mining sector. In return, Congo would cede majority rights in a joint venture to develop copper and cobalt concessions. Any difference that might emerge between the cost of infrastructure and revenues from the mines would be underwritten by the Congolese state.
For the Chinese it was a classic win-win scenario. Congo is struggling to emerge from a decade of conflict and three prior decades of dictatorship. Its infrastructure and institutions are not so much in ruins as non-existent. No other investor or foreign donor has come forward with as ambitious a development programme. Nor can any other African country match Congo's untapped reserves of base and precious metals.
On paper, even if the details contain flaws, the deal could benefit Congo. If it has not turned out so, it has much to do with the toxic legacy of Congo's relations with the west. The country is saddled with $10bn of external debt stored up from the days of Mobutu Sese Seko, the dictator. It has little to show for it, and certainly no roads or schools. This was money used to appease a cold war ally long after it became clear President Mobutu was stashing it in Swiss banks. Yet Congo's historic western creditors are reluctant to write it off only to see new debt contracted to China on commercial terms.
The Kinshasa government is squeezed on all fronts. It has failed, through poor governance of its own, to make the moral case for debt relief, which is as strong in Congo as in any indebted African country. In the short term its finances are in desperate shape, and it must curry favour from traditional western donors. Yet China's alternative development financing looks a more ambitious long-term bet.
It ought to be possible to have both. By insisting that Congo renegotiates its deal on more favourable terms than Beijing is prepared to give, western donors risk leaving Congo with neither. Yet the bill for continuing state failure will land in Europe, not Beijing.