分享老外关于中国涡扇发动机进步及缺陷的文章的一些观点 ...

中国在军用喷气航空发动机这一关键领域的进步不均衡，整体效果小于各部分之和。
需要2-3年即可获得全面的能力，而要持续稳定地大批量生产顶级航空发动机需要5-10年。
软件是军用航空发动机的一个至关重要的方面； 当对外销售时需要严格控制和保密。航空发动机的多项性能参数是通过软件调控的， 有时通过简单的软件修改就能够大幅度改善发动机的性能，因此，发动机服务商往往向客户索取很高的费用。  在这一方面， 生产商对商用发动机和军用航空发动机的源代码采取了截然不同的态度： 商用发动机的源代码是不加米的，而军用航空发动机的源代码是加密的。 而编写一行军用航空发动机的源代码往往要花费超过上用发动机源代码20倍的时间。  
据同中国 燃气涡轮专家的交流得到 的信息， 中国在以下方面取得了长足进展：
        精密切削 ，焊接，
        特种材料叶片生产， 中国规模最大的涡轮叶片生产商，西安的航空发动机公司目前可以生产用超级合金、钛合金、钴合金和不锈钢生产叶片。 产品优良率可以超过95%。
        空心风扇冶炼生产。
        中国最近的进步多属于叶片生产有关。 但是，有关文献和专家讨论并没有设计产品稳定性。

面临的不足包括： 涡轮的铸造、粉末冶金用于生产涡轮 盘， 铸造空心钛合金部件。 虽然近来在这些方面取得了巨大的进步，但是仅不可能是从很低的基础上取得的。
中国在这一关键领域的进步不均衡，整体效果小于各部分之和。

需要2-3年即可获得全面的能力，而要持续稳定地大批量生产顶级航空发动机需要5-10年。

软件是军用航空发动机的一个至关重要的方面； 当对外销售时需要严格控制和保密。航空发动机的多项性能参数是通过软件调控的， 有时通过简单的软件修改就能够大幅度改善发动机的性能，因此，发动机服务商往往向客户索取很高的费用。  在这一方面， 生产商对商用发动机和军用航空发动机的源代码采取了截然不同的态度： 商用发动机的源代码是不加米的，而军用航空发动机的源代码是加密的。 而编写一行军用航空发动机的源代码往往要花费超过上用发动机源代码20倍的时间。  
据同中国 燃气涡轮专家的交流得到 的信息， 中国在以下方面取得了长足进展：
        精密切削，焊接，
        特种材料叶片生产， 中国规模最大的涡轮叶片生产商，西安的航空发动机公司目前可以生产用超级合金、钛合金、钴合金和不锈钢生产叶片。 产品优良率可以超过95%。
        空心风扇冶炼生产。
        中国最近的进步多属于叶片生产有关。 但是，有关文献和专家讨论并没有谈到产品稳定性。
面临的不足包括： 涡轮的铸造、粉末冶金用于生产涡轮 盘， 铸造空心钛合金部件。 虽然近来在这些方面取得了巨大的进步，但是这些进步可能是从很低的基础上取得的。
值得关注的有中国民用航空制造业和民机维护方面的中外合作对中国将军民两用技术转用于军用涡扇发动机的制造和维护是会有相当的帮助的：
如南方航空公司与德国MTU就有航空发动机维修合资企业（南方航空公司与解放军工程技术学院关于军民两用技术合作协议， 以及在大飞机项目中的  CFM发动机公司提供的配套的发动机 Leap-X1C所涉及的整体叶盘的制造等方面的合作，将会对中方获得顶级航空发动机的制造技术带来巨大帮助。

Jet Engine Development in China: Indigenous high-performance turbofans are a final step toward fully independent fighter production
Posted: 26. Jun, 2011 Last update: 30. Jul, 2011
Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Jet Engine Development in China: Indigenous high-performance turbofans are a final step toward fully independent fighter production,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 39 (26 June 2011)
China SignPost™ 洞察中国–“Clear, high-impact China analysis.”©
Deep Dive—Special In-Depth Report #2
Executive Summary:
–Engines commonly used in Chinese and other modern aircraft may be divided into several major categories: (1) low-bypass turbofans typically power military jets; (2) high-bypass turbofans typically power jet airliners; (3) turboprops typically power more fuel-efficient, usually lower-speed aircraft, including civilian commuter aircraft and military transports and surveillance and battle management aircraft; and (4) turboshafts typically power helicopters. This study will address the first category, low-bypass turbofan engines; other categories will be addressed in follow-on China SignPost™ reports.
–China’s inability to domestically mass-produce modern high-performance jet engines at a consistently high-quality standard is an enduring Achilles heel of the Chinese military aerospace sector and is likely a headwind that has slowed development and production of the J-15, J-20, and other late-generation tactical aircraft.
–The Chinese aerospace industry is driven by four key strategic imperatives as it pursues the ability to manufacture large volumes of high-performance tactical aircraft[1] engines: (1) parts dependence avoidance, (2) Russian supply unwillingness, (3) aircraft sales autonomy, and (4) poor Russian after-sales service.
–To address these shortcomings, AVIC is treating engine development as a high priority and plans to invest 10 billion RMB (US$1.53 billion) into jet engine research and development over the next 5 years.
–However, evidence still suggests that AVIC’s engine makers are having trouble maintaining consistent quality control as they scale up production of the WS-10, causing problems with reliability and keeping China’s tactical aircraft heavily reliant on imported Russian engines.
–Key weak points of the Chinese military jet engine industry include: turbine blade production and process standardization.
–Standardization and integration may be the one area in which the costs of China’s ad hoc, eclectic approach to strategic technology development truly manifest themselves. The Soviet defense industrial base failed in precisely this area: talented designers and technicians presided over balkanized design bureaus and irregularly-linked production facilities; lack of standardization and quality control rendered it “less than the sum of the parts.”
–We estimate that based on current knowledge and assuming no major setbacks or loss of mission focus, China will need ~2-3 years before it achieves comprehensive capabilities commensurate with the aggregate inputs in the jet engine sector and ~5-10 years before it is able to consistently mass produce top-notch turbofan engines for a 5th generation-type fighter.
–If China’s engine makers can attain the technical capability level that U.S. manufacturers had 20 years ago, China will be able to power its 4th generation and 5th-generation aircraft with domestically made engines (3rd and 4th-generation in Chinese nomenclature, respectively). These developments would be vital in cementing China as a formidable regional air power and deserve close attention from policymakers.
China has a clear strategic interest in developing indigenous high-performance aeroengines to power its military aircraft. This is one of the greatest aerospace engineering challenges, however, one that only a small handful of corporations worldwide have truly mastered. This should not be surprising: an engine is effectively an aircraft’s cardiovascular system; it can be transplanted but not easily modified. Unlike a human system, it can be designed and developed independently, but faces temperature, pressure, and G-force challenges that only the most advanced materials, properly machined and operated as an efficient system, can handle. While China has made progress in recent years with materials and fabrication, it appears to remain limited with respect to components and systems design, integration, and management—the keys to optimizing engine performance in practice—and to making logistical and operational plans at the force level based on reliable estimates thereof.
Based on available open source evidence, Chinese progress in this critical area remains uneven and the whole remains “less than the sum of the parts.” Given the overall capabilities inherent in China’s defense industrial base and the resources likely being applied to this problem, we expect that China will make significant strides, but barring major setbacks or loss of mission focus, it will take ~2-3 years before it achieves comprehensive capabilities commensurate with the aggregate inputs in this sector and ~5-10 years before it is able to consistently mass produce top-notch turbofan engines for a 5th generation-type fighter. When it does, however, the results will have profound strategic significance, as China will have entered an exclusive club of top producers in this area and eliminated one of the few remaining areas in which it relies on Russia technologically.
How is domestic engine production strategically relevant?  下边省略了。太长。

中国在军用喷气航空发动机这一关键领域的进步不均衡，整体效果小于各部分之和。
需要2-3年即可获得全面的能力，而要持续稳定地大批量生产顶级航空发动机需要5-10年。
软件是军用航空发动机的一个至关重要的方面； 当对外销售时需要严格控制和保密。航空发动机的多项性能参数是通过软件调控的， 有时通过简单的软件修改就能够大幅度改善发动机的性能，因此，发动机服务商往往向客户索取很高的费用。  在这一方面， 生产商对商用发动机和军用航空发动机的源代码采取了截然不同的态度： 商用发动机的源代码是不加米的，而军用航空发动机的源代码是加密的。 而编写一行军用航空发动机的源代码往往要花费超过上用发动机源代码20倍的时间。  
据同中国 燃气涡轮专家的交流得到 的信息， 中国在以下方面取得了长足进展：
        精密切削 ，焊接，
        特种材料叶片生产， 中国规模最大的涡轮叶片生产商，西安的航空发动机公司目前可以生产用超级合金、钛合金、钴合金和不锈钢生产叶片。 产品优良率可以超过95%。
        空心风扇冶炼生产。
        中国最近的进步多属于叶片生产有关。 但是，有关文献和专家讨论并没有设计产品稳定性。

面临的不足包括： 涡轮的铸造、粉末冶金用于生产涡轮 盘， 铸造空心钛合金部件。 虽然近来在这些方面取得了巨大的进步，但是仅不可能是从很低的基础上取得的。
中国在这一关键领域的进步不均衡，整体效果小于各部分之和。

需要2-3年即可获得全面的能力，而要持续稳定地大批量生产顶级航空发动机需要5-10年。

软件是军用航空发动机的一个至关重要的方面； 当对外销售时需要严格控制和保密。航空发动机的多项性能参数是通过软件调控的， 有时通过简单的软件修改就能够大幅度改善发动机的性能，因此，发动机服务商往往向客户索取很高的费用。  在这一方面， 生产商对商用发动机和军用航空发动机的源代码采取了截然不同的态度： 商用发动机的源代码是不加米的，而军用航空发动机的源代码是加密的。 而编写一行军用航空发动机的源代码往往要花费超过上用发动机源代码20倍的时间。  
据同中国 燃气涡轮专家的交流得到 的信息， 中国在以下方面取得了长足进展：
        精密切削，焊接，
        特种材料叶片生产， 中国规模最大的涡轮叶片生产商，西安的航空发动机公司目前可以生产用超级合金、钛合金、钴合金和不锈钢生产叶片。 产品优良率可以超过95%。
        空心风扇冶炼生产。
        中国最近的进步多属于叶片生产有关。 但是，有关文献和专家讨论并没有谈到产品稳定性。
面临的不足包括： 涡轮的铸造、粉末冶金用于生产涡轮 盘， 铸造空心钛合金部件。 虽然近来在这些方面取得了巨大的进步，但是这些进步可能是从很低的基础上取得的。
值得关注的有中国民用航空制造业和民机维护方面的中外合作对中国将军民两用技术转用于军用涡扇发动机的制造和维护是会有相当的帮助的：
如南方航空公司与德国MTU就有航空发动机维修合资企业（南方航空公司与解放军工程技术学院关于军民两用技术合作协议， 以及在大飞机项目中的  CFM发动机公司提供的配套的发动机 Leap-X1C所涉及的整体叶盘的制造等方面的合作，将会对中方获得顶级航空发动机的制造技术带来巨大帮助。

Jet Engine Development in China: Indigenous high-performance turbofans are a final step toward fully independent fighter production
Posted: 26. Jun, 2011 Last update: 30. Jul, 2011
Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Jet Engine Development in China: Indigenous high-performance turbofans are a final step toward fully independent fighter production,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 39 (26 June 2011)
China SignPost™ 洞察中国–“Clear, high-impact China analysis.”©
Deep Dive—Special In-Depth Report #2
Executive Summary:
–Engines commonly used in Chinese and other modern aircraft may be divided into several major categories: (1) low-bypass turbofans typically power military jets; (2) high-bypass turbofans typically power jet airliners; (3) turboprops typically power more fuel-efficient, usually lower-speed aircraft, including civilian commuter aircraft and military transports and surveillance and battle management aircraft; and (4) turboshafts typically power helicopters. This study will address the first category, low-bypass turbofan engines; other categories will be addressed in follow-on China SignPost™ reports.
–China’s inability to domestically mass-produce modern high-performance jet engines at a consistently high-quality standard is an enduring Achilles heel of the Chinese military aerospace sector and is likely a headwind that has slowed development and production of the J-15, J-20, and other late-generation tactical aircraft.
–The Chinese aerospace industry is driven by four key strategic imperatives as it pursues the ability to manufacture large volumes of high-performance tactical aircraft[1] engines: (1) parts dependence avoidance, (2) Russian supply unwillingness, (3) aircraft sales autonomy, and (4) poor Russian after-sales service.
–To address these shortcomings, AVIC is treating engine development as a high priority and plans to invest 10 billion RMB (US$1.53 billion) into jet engine research and development over the next 5 years.
–However, evidence still suggests that AVIC’s engine makers are having trouble maintaining consistent quality control as they scale up production of the WS-10, causing problems with reliability and keeping China’s tactical aircraft heavily reliant on imported Russian engines.
–Key weak points of the Chinese military jet engine industry include: turbine blade production and process standardization.
–Standardization and integration may be the one area in which the costs of China’s ad hoc, eclectic approach to strategic technology development truly manifest themselves. The Soviet defense industrial base failed in precisely this area: talented designers and technicians presided over balkanized design bureaus and irregularly-linked production facilities; lack of standardization and quality control rendered it “less than the sum of the parts.”
–We estimate that based on current knowledge and assuming no major setbacks or loss of mission focus, China will need ~2-3 years before it achieves comprehensive capabilities commensurate with the aggregate inputs in the jet engine sector and ~5-10 years before it is able to consistently mass produce top-notch turbofan engines for a 5th generation-type fighter.
–If China’s engine makers can attain the technical capability level that U.S. manufacturers had 20 years ago, China will be able to power its 4th generation and 5th-generation aircraft with domestically made engines (3rd and 4th-generation in Chinese nomenclature, respectively). These developments would be vital in cementing China as a formidable regional air power and deserve close attention from policymakers.
China has a clear strategic interest in developing indigenous high-performance aeroengines to power its military aircraft. This is one of the greatest aerospace engineering challenges, however, one that only a small handful of corporations worldwide have truly mastered. This should not be surprising: an engine is effectively an aircraft’s cardiovascular system; it can be transplanted but not easily modified. Unlike a human system, it can be designed and developed independently, but faces temperature, pressure, and G-force challenges that only the most advanced materials, properly machined and operated as an efficient system, can handle. While China has made progress in recent years with materials and fabrication, it appears to remain limited with respect to components and systems design, integration, and management—the keys to optimizing engine performance in practice—and to making logistical and operational plans at the force level based on reliable estimates thereof.
Based on available open source evidence, Chinese progress in this critical area remains uneven and the whole remains “less than the sum of the parts.” Given the overall capabilities inherent in China’s defense industrial base and the resources likely being applied to this problem, we expect that China will make significant strides, but barring major setbacks or loss of mission focus, it will take ~2-3 years before it achieves comprehensive capabilities commensurate with the aggregate inputs in this sector and ~5-10 years before it is able to consistently mass produce top-notch turbofan engines for a 5th generation-type fighter. When it does, however, the results will have profound strategic significance, as China will have entered an exclusive club of top producers in this area and eliminated one of the few remaining areas in which it relies on Russia technologically.
How is domestic engine production strategically relevant?  下边省略了。太长。