超级军网美媒：F-35性能缩水严重 无法应付中国导弹
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/27 21:34:25
美军F-35战斗机
人民网讯：美国《外交政策》杂志称，美国军方研发和大量购进F-35战机使得美国的军费开支大大增加，并打乱了之前国防部的各种计划。
美国的空军、海军和海军陆战队计划在近十几年购买上千架F-35战机。不过根据最新消息，这个千呼万唤使出来的高性能战机正式全面列装的时间将被推迟到2018年，届时美军将装备2457架该战机，总共花费高达3850亿美元，这是美国有史以来最巨额的订单。
事实上，F-35的性能不如之前大家预料的那样鹤立鸡群，实际作战半径是584英里，远低于之前官方保证的690英里。这样的作战半径将无法应付中国防空系统的导弹攻击。这就解释了为何F-35战机的性能被吹上天并大量购置的同时，五角大楼还得拨出不少款项用于无人机的购置、维护和研发。
对于美国的盟友来说，五角大楼这大手大脚的购进可不是他们应该学习的。美国的带头模范行为让盟友们有时非常为难。
在F-35的订单中，海军陆战队也买了很多这种先进战机。原来，海军陆战队主要负责海上和地面作战。如今，海军陆战队逐渐改变自己的战斗方式。他们计划在阿富汗战争之后，增加对特殊武器的投入，空中力量的补充自然也是陆战队的一个重头戏。
文章最后分析称，如果美国决策者们把大量财政经费投入教育、医疗等国内民生领域，无孔不入的媒体监督、批评家的言论一定会让官方十分难堪。但是，如果把钱投入到军队之中，其保密和不公开透明的运作方式将让记者们找不到把柄，从而减轻政府的舆论压力。
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美军F-35战斗机
人民网讯：美国《外交政策》杂志称，美国军方研发和大量购进F-35战机使得美国的军费开支大大增加，并打乱了之前国防部的各种计划。
美国的空军、海军和海军陆战队计划在近十几年购买上千架F-35战机。不过根据最新消息，这个千呼万唤使出来的高性能战机正式全面列装的时间将被推迟到2018年，届时美军将装备2457架该战机，总共花费高达3850亿美元，这是美国有史以来最巨额的订单。
事实上，F-35的性能不如之前大家预料的那样鹤立鸡群，实际作战半径是584英里，远低于之前官方保证的690英里。这样的作战半径将无法应付中国防空系统的导弹攻击。这就解释了为何F-35战机的性能被吹上天并大量购置的同时，五角大楼还得拨出不少款项用于无人机的购置、维护和研发。
对于美国的盟友来说，五角大楼这大手大脚的购进可不是他们应该学习的。美国的带头模范行为让盟友们有时非常为难。
在F-35的订单中，海军陆战队也买了很多这种先进战机。原来，海军陆战队主要负责海上和地面作战。如今，海军陆战队逐渐改变自己的战斗方式。他们计划在阿富汗战争之后，增加对特殊武器的投入，空中力量的补充自然也是陆战队的一个重头戏。
文章最后分析称，如果美国决策者们把大量财政经费投入教育、医疗等国内民生领域，无孔不入的媒体监督、批评家的言论一定会让官方十分难堪。但是，如果把钱投入到军队之中，其保密和不公开透明的运作方式将让记者们找不到把柄，从而减轻政府的舆论压力。
这话说的很有水平。没跟黑丝比，跟我们的导弹比。伤的起
又推迟了！
锻炼身体，比命长！
锻炼身体，比命长！
文章最后分析称，如果美国决策者们把大量财政经费投入教育、医疗等国内民生领域，无孔不入的媒体监督、批评家的言论一定会让官方十分难堪。但是，如果把钱投入到军队之中，其保密和不公开透明的运作方式将让记者们找不到把柄，从而减轻政府的舆论压力。
{:soso__10208319619871088665_1:} 胖子三无。。
应该不急，22够用了
又想加价来着，可怜的盟国
还不是为了骗经费
美帝玩儿低调，其中必然有诈！ 
现在看F-35就是一鸡肋
逻辑好奇怪。。。为嘛作战半径小，就不能应对防空导弹？
越看越胖
不带外置油箱作战半径B型都有900KM+都算小？
584英里合不到1000公里，这个作战半径也忒短了点。
土鳖针对预警机、加油机等MD节点研制J20路子对头
土鳖针对预警机、加油机等MD节点研制J20路子对头
earthmanme 发表于 2011-6-3 08:56 ![]()
逻辑好奇怪。。。为嘛作战半径小，就不能应对防空导弹？
原话是“就不能应对中国防空系统的导弹攻击”
防空系统可不是只指防空导弹的射击半径！而是指防空系统的探测，侦查，跟踪范围！
逻辑好奇怪。。。为嘛作战半径小，就不能应对防空导弹？
原话是“就不能应对中国防空系统的导弹攻击”
防空系统可不是只指防空导弹的射击半径！而是指防空系统的探测，侦查，跟踪范围！
意思是不能在预警机工作范围外发动攻击？
呵呵，海里改成公里；一次空中加油的半径改成预期设定；
妓者同志一如既往得夹带私货啊;P
妓者同志一如既往得夹带私货啊;P
海里变英里？吼吼
qwe8377 发表于 2011-6-3 14:47 ![]()
原话是“就不能应对中国防空系统的导弹攻击”
防空系统可不是只指防空导弹的射击半径！而是指防空系统 ...
还是不懂，跟踪理论上除非能在地面防控系统的侦查范围之外发动攻击，才能完全避开对方防空系统的威胁，但这个跟作战半径有什么关系呢？我觉得跟武器的射程倒有很大关系，不理解的地方在这里，求指点
原话是“就不能应对中国防空系统的导弹攻击”
防空系统可不是只指防空导弹的射击半径！而是指防空系统 ...
还是不懂，跟踪理论上除非能在地面防控系统的侦查范围之外发动攻击，才能完全避开对方防空系统的威胁，但这个跟作战半径有什么关系呢？我觉得跟武器的射程倒有很大关系，不理解的地方在这里，求指点
earthmanme 发表于 2011-6-3 23:50 ![]()
还是不懂，跟踪理论上除非能在地面防控系统的侦查范围之外发动攻击，才能完全避开对方防空系统的威胁，但 ...
作战半径可是一个很重要的指标！作战半径大，说明飞机在战争时可以远距离避开对方的侦测！如作战半径大，说明作战时耗油低或载油量大，飞机做低空飞行时的距离就比较远，当然更容易避开对方地面雷达的侦测，可以长时间做低空飞行！当然好啊！
还是不懂，跟踪理论上除非能在地面防控系统的侦查范围之外发动攻击，才能完全避开对方防空系统的威胁，但 ...
作战半径可是一个很重要的指标！作战半径大，说明飞机在战争时可以远距离避开对方的侦测！如作战半径大，说明作战时耗油低或载油量大，飞机做低空飞行时的距离就比较远，当然更容易避开对方地面雷达的侦测，可以长时间做低空飞行！当然好啊！
向这样自己批评贬损自己的做法在土国还不得被拍死。
拿导弹说是，就是想再争取点经费而已。
原來F35是反導用的？？？
我也对飞机作战半径小，无法应对防空导弹表示不解
骗钱的东西而已，就是要这么一个过分先进的技术吧你们这些小弟都吸干了，然你们都没有财力自己弄了
my_107 发表于 2011-6-6 17:58 ![]()
骗钱的东西而已，就是要这么一个过分先进的技术吧你们这些小弟都吸干了，然你们都没有财力自己弄了
到目前为止f35的投资小弟们出了几个百分点啊。
实际上，小弟们等于花少量钱就获得了购买先进飞机的机会
骗钱的东西而已，就是要这么一个过分先进的技术吧你们这些小弟都吸干了，然你们都没有财力自己弄了
到目前为止f35的投资小弟们出了几个百分点啊。
实际上，小弟们等于花少量钱就获得了购买先进飞机的机会
蛮谦虚的；
初步鉴定结论：乞丐文（要钱用）。
初步鉴定结论：乞丐文（要钱用）。
无论MD如何吹。反证吹牛不上锐。我只相信我们的解放军。如果说这天下还有什么让我们放心的，那就是我们有一支天下无敌的人民子弟兵。6 7 8 十年代MD的无人机也不是牛B洪洪的。我们还不是把他给干下来。
我读高中的时候就看见这家伙了，现在我娃娃都快2岁了，他还处于试验阶段。
MD说的话就跟放屁一样，一天一个论调！
又要涨价了。。。
老计谅，要元老院银子呗！
哪一期上的？ 居然有这种狗屁不通的文章
原文如下：
Policymakers get 11th-hour second thoughts on the Joint Strike Fighter
The troubled and long-delayed F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program came under renewed scrutiny this week. The Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and many foreign partners plan to buy thousands of the fighter-attack jets over the next two decades to replace a variety of aging aircraft, but the development schedule of the stealthy fighter has slipped five years to 2018 and the projected cost to the Pentagon for 2,457 aircraft has ballooned to $385 billion, making it by far the most expensive weapons program in history.
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The Government Accountability Office reported that although Pentagon management of the program is improving, developers have only completely verified 4 percent of the F-35's capabilities. The program received another blow this week when the Senate Armed Services Committee learned that the Pentagon will likely have to spend $1 trillion over the next 50 years to operate and maintain the fleet of F-35s. Evidently reeling from sticker shock, Sen. John McCain demanded that "we at least begin considering alternatives." But is it too late to prevent the F-35 program from devouring the Pentagon's future procurement budgets?
Air Force officials themselves may now doubt the wisdom of the size of the commitment to the F-35. According to a recent Aviation Week story, Air Force Undersecretary Erin Conaton placed new emphasis on the importance of the Air Force's next-generation long-range bomber. With procurement funds sure to be tight in the decade ahead, Conaton hinted that the Air Force may have to raid the F-35's future budgets in order to help pay for the new bomber.
The rapidly changing strategic situation in Asia and the western Pacific should compel policymakers to reexamine the size of the commitment to the F-35. Yet another critical report on the F-35 from the Pentagon's acquisition office dated Dec. 31, 2010, revealed that the Air Force version of the attack jet would have a combat mission radius of 584 miles, just short of the original stated requirement of 590 miles, and significantly less than a recent expectation by program officials that the jet would be able to strike targets 690 miles away without midair refueling.
A combat radius of 584 miles leaves planners with few options when contemplating operations over the vast distances in the Asia-Pacific region. As I discussed in a recent column, China's growing inventories of ballistic and cruise missiles are already capable, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, of striking the U.S. Air Force's main bases in the region. These missiles are also putting the Navy's aircraft carriers increasingly at risk, which could compel the Navy to move the vessels out of the F-35's strike range.
The solution is combat aircraft with much longer ranges, which would operate from distant bases less vulnerable to missile attack. This would explain Conaton's increased emphasis on the new long-range bomber and the Navy's interest in a long-range combat drone that would launch from its aircraft carriers and some of its amphibious ships.
There are still significant roles for the F-35 and many of its leading-edge stealth and electronic capabilities. The F-35 can defend against enemy aircraft, can collect and distribute intelligence from over a battlefield, and can attack heavily defended targets within its range. In any case, the program is "too big to fail," or at least "too big to kill," and it is far too late in the day to now consider alternatives. But it seems increasingly likely that the Air Force and Navy will eventually truncate their planned purchases and redirect those savings into new long-range platforms. Doing so would cause the unit cost of the F-35 to spike even higher which would likely lead many foreign partners to drop out. But that regrettable consequence may be necessary if the Air Force and Navy are to have the money to buy capabilities that will actually be useful in the vast stretches of the Pacific.
Policymakers get 11th-hour second thoughts on the Joint Strike Fighter
The troubled and long-delayed F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program came under renewed scrutiny this week. The Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and many foreign partners plan to buy thousands of the fighter-attack jets over the next two decades to replace a variety of aging aircraft, but the development schedule of the stealthy fighter has slipped five years to 2018 and the projected cost to the Pentagon for 2,457 aircraft has ballooned to $385 billion, making it by far the most expensive weapons program in history.
COMMENTS (15)
SHARE:
Buzz
More...
The Government Accountability Office reported that although Pentagon management of the program is improving, developers have only completely verified 4 percent of the F-35's capabilities. The program received another blow this week when the Senate Armed Services Committee learned that the Pentagon will likely have to spend $1 trillion over the next 50 years to operate and maintain the fleet of F-35s. Evidently reeling from sticker shock, Sen. John McCain demanded that "we at least begin considering alternatives." But is it too late to prevent the F-35 program from devouring the Pentagon's future procurement budgets?
Air Force officials themselves may now doubt the wisdom of the size of the commitment to the F-35. According to a recent Aviation Week story, Air Force Undersecretary Erin Conaton placed new emphasis on the importance of the Air Force's next-generation long-range bomber. With procurement funds sure to be tight in the decade ahead, Conaton hinted that the Air Force may have to raid the F-35's future budgets in order to help pay for the new bomber.
The rapidly changing strategic situation in Asia and the western Pacific should compel policymakers to reexamine the size of the commitment to the F-35. Yet another critical report on the F-35 from the Pentagon's acquisition office dated Dec. 31, 2010, revealed that the Air Force version of the attack jet would have a combat mission radius of 584 miles, just short of the original stated requirement of 590 miles, and significantly less than a recent expectation by program officials that the jet would be able to strike targets 690 miles away without midair refueling.
A combat radius of 584 miles leaves planners with few options when contemplating operations over the vast distances in the Asia-Pacific region. As I discussed in a recent column, China's growing inventories of ballistic and cruise missiles are already capable, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, of striking the U.S. Air Force's main bases in the region. These missiles are also putting the Navy's aircraft carriers increasingly at risk, which could compel the Navy to move the vessels out of the F-35's strike range.
The solution is combat aircraft with much longer ranges, which would operate from distant bases less vulnerable to missile attack. This would explain Conaton's increased emphasis on the new long-range bomber and the Navy's interest in a long-range combat drone that would launch from its aircraft carriers and some of its amphibious ships.
There are still significant roles for the F-35 and many of its leading-edge stealth and electronic capabilities. The F-35 can defend against enemy aircraft, can collect and distribute intelligence from over a battlefield, and can attack heavily defended targets within its range. In any case, the program is "too big to fail," or at least "too big to kill," and it is far too late in the day to now consider alternatives. But it seems increasingly likely that the Air Force and Navy will eventually truncate their planned purchases and redirect those savings into new long-range platforms. Doing so would cause the unit cost of the F-35 to spike even higher which would likely lead many foreign partners to drop out. But that regrettable consequence may be necessary if the Air Force and Navy are to have the money to buy capabilities that will actually be useful in the vast stretches of the Pacific.
Defense cuts will mean more risk. Is the Marine Corps the Pentagon's best hedge?
At remarks delivered at a recent dinner sponsored by the Center for a New American Security, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Amos asserted that the Marine Corps will be one of the country's principal risk management tools in the decade ahead. Inevitable cuts to the Pentagon's budgets will require policymakers to take greater security risks, but Amos argued that the Marine Corps's unique attributes will provide a useful hedge against some of the added risks policymakers will have to assume. Amos argues that the Marine Corps's broad portfolio of capabilities and organizational culture make it particularly well-suited to respond to unknown risks. Is the Marine Corps a good hedge against strategic risk? And what can Amos and his colleagues do to improve the Corps as a risk management tool?
In an earlier column, I discussed the Marine Corps's plan for its post-Afghanistan future. That plan calls for cuts to many of the its conventional frontline combat capacities and increased investments in some specialized and irregular capabilities. Marine Corps planners are betting that they won't get bogged down in another large, open-ended campaign such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither will they have to fight another big tank battle as they did against Saddam Hussein in 1991. With the new force structure, the planners are optimizing the Corps for rapid-crisis response, dust-ups with murky but dangerous "hybrid" non-state actors, and for assisting and partnering with allied military forces around the world.
Hedging and risk management are all about preparing for surprises. Although a seemingly oxymoronic concept, leaders can promote attributes that enhance an organization's ability to rapidly adapt to surprises. Surprises are by definition unknowable. But organizations can prepare for surprise by improving their ability to adapt.
Amos asserts that the Marine Corps has a balanced portfolio of wide-ranging capabilities, which its planners can tailor to meet a variety of contingencies. The Marines train in many climates and terrain, also preparing them for numerous possibilities. And Amos explained how the Corps plans to become lighter and more mobile after Afghanistan, improving its response time during crises.
These are all helpful attributes for rapid adaptation. But the most powerful attributes of adaptation are intangible and are found within an organization's culture and human capital. For example, organizations that are "confidently paranoid" respect the threats posed by their competitors while retaining the confidence to devise effective solutions. Adaptable organizations decentralize decision-making and expect subordinates to take responsibility for solving problems with little guidance from above, even when this results in "learning mistakes" and inefficiencies. Adaptable organizations reward subordinates for creativity and resist punishing those whose ideas failed or wasted resources. Adaptable organizations tolerate "organizational entrepreneurs" and the messy organization charts that can result.
Perhaps most notably, adaptable organizations require seemingly wasteful redundancy, healthy budgets for education and rotational assignments, and experimentation, much of which will go awry. Preparing for surprise requires a willingness to accept failed approaches, recruiting and then letting go people who aren't suitable, and what will appear to be much wasted overhead.
The Marine Corps takes pride in the development of its junior leaders and in the amount of responsibility it places on them. But how much the Marine Corps has tolerated the inevitable learning mistakes, inefficiencies, and messiness required for effective adaptation has varied over time. Building an adaptable organizational culture for the Marine Corps may not be cheap. But it may be cheap if it avoids a future military disaster.
At remarks delivered at a recent dinner sponsored by the Center for a New American Security, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Amos asserted that the Marine Corps will be one of the country's principal risk management tools in the decade ahead. Inevitable cuts to the Pentagon's budgets will require policymakers to take greater security risks, but Amos argued that the Marine Corps's unique attributes will provide a useful hedge against some of the added risks policymakers will have to assume. Amos argues that the Marine Corps's broad portfolio of capabilities and organizational culture make it particularly well-suited to respond to unknown risks. Is the Marine Corps a good hedge against strategic risk? And what can Amos and his colleagues do to improve the Corps as a risk management tool?
In an earlier column, I discussed the Marine Corps's plan for its post-Afghanistan future. That plan calls for cuts to many of the its conventional frontline combat capacities and increased investments in some specialized and irregular capabilities. Marine Corps planners are betting that they won't get bogged down in another large, open-ended campaign such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither will they have to fight another big tank battle as they did against Saddam Hussein in 1991. With the new force structure, the planners are optimizing the Corps for rapid-crisis response, dust-ups with murky but dangerous "hybrid" non-state actors, and for assisting and partnering with allied military forces around the world.
Hedging and risk management are all about preparing for surprises. Although a seemingly oxymoronic concept, leaders can promote attributes that enhance an organization's ability to rapidly adapt to surprises. Surprises are by definition unknowable. But organizations can prepare for surprise by improving their ability to adapt.
Amos asserts that the Marine Corps has a balanced portfolio of wide-ranging capabilities, which its planners can tailor to meet a variety of contingencies. The Marines train in many climates and terrain, also preparing them for numerous possibilities. And Amos explained how the Corps plans to become lighter and more mobile after Afghanistan, improving its response time during crises.
These are all helpful attributes for rapid adaptation. But the most powerful attributes of adaptation are intangible and are found within an organization's culture and human capital. For example, organizations that are "confidently paranoid" respect the threats posed by their competitors while retaining the confidence to devise effective solutions. Adaptable organizations decentralize decision-making and expect subordinates to take responsibility for solving problems with little guidance from above, even when this results in "learning mistakes" and inefficiencies. Adaptable organizations reward subordinates for creativity and resist punishing those whose ideas failed or wasted resources. Adaptable organizations tolerate "organizational entrepreneurs" and the messy organization charts that can result.
Perhaps most notably, adaptable organizations require seemingly wasteful redundancy, healthy budgets for education and rotational assignments, and experimentation, much of which will go awry. Preparing for surprise requires a willingness to accept failed approaches, recruiting and then letting go people who aren't suitable, and what will appear to be much wasted overhead.
The Marine Corps takes pride in the development of its junior leaders and in the amount of responsibility it places on them. But how much the Marine Corps has tolerated the inevitable learning mistakes, inefficiencies, and messiness required for effective adaptation has varied over time. Building an adaptable organizational culture for the Marine Corps may not be cheap. But it may be cheap if it avoids a future military disaster.
PS： 太佩服这些 妓者的 私货了。。。这都它娘的什么和什么啊
文章最后分析称，如果美国决策者们把大量财政经费投入教育、医疗等国内民生领域，无孔不入的媒体监督、批评 ...
如果把这里的美国换成中国，不知道要招来多少口水!
如果把这里的美国换成中国，不知道要招来多少口水!
到目前为止f35的投资小弟们出了几个百分点啊。 实际上，小弟们等于花少量钱就获得了购买先进飞机的机会 ...
这么说，美国是慈善家?
这么说，美国是慈善家?
问题最大的还是35c 航妈的有效威慑半径对TG来说只好后退出足够的海里 话说200里的圈子是不敢进了