[原创翻译]航空周刊社论----时刻警惕兔子势力抬头

让不让人活了，这都惊动到上社论的地步了。毕竟人家文章里面没说中帝二字，虽然明着暗着都是这么个意思，咱也不太好意思把标题太过于发挥。
暂时改回兔子的称呼，帝什么帝的自己心里有数就可以
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/awst/2011/01/10/AW_01_10_2011_p58-280833.xml&headline=Editorial:%20Remain%20Watchful%20of%20China%27s%20Ascent&channel=defense
社论----时刻警惕兔子势力抬头
Editorial: Remain Watchful of China's Ascent
湿意版本：
鉴于TG最近在公开场合晒妹子的行为，不明真相的群众赶快去看本刊一月号第三期十八页的文章，这让西方业界大叔和有着奇怪癖好在一边视[哔----]的家伙左手和右手忙得不亦乐乎----哎呀呀，咱的意思是说他们还在适应奸两洞妹子带来的喜悦。阿妹例假国的情报机构知道TG后宫添新人，只是没想到TG这么禽兽过年都等不及就开始调教了。

奸两洞----顾名思义有两个洞可以插，但是每次限骑一人----卧草泥马TG和阿妹例假怎么都好这口，和爱抚娘娘调教出来的性癖一模一样。不过奸两洞身材明显比阿妹例假的当家花旦大了整整n圈，说不定在暗示用户：她可以[哔----]更远，体内富含更多的妹汁，可以容纳更多的蛋蛋。只是目前诸位大叔还无从判断这是原型体还是试验体。

TG对于塞淫诗和特萝姬两个小萝莉垂涎欲滴的程度已经是司马昭之心路人皆知，每年教育出来的萝莉控的数量只怕是比阿妹例假国在内的任何一家西方国家都多。而且TG在安全措施上也很舍得花钱。所以某些大法师一想到TG将来会成为更高级别的后宫王，坐拥娴熟的技巧与超强的把妹实力，心中深感羡慕嫉妒恨空虚寂寞冷什么的一点也不让我们感到奇怪啦啦啦~~~

至于某些人说话绝对是收了钱的----管他是五毛还是五美分五便士五卢布.......

痛批TG禽兽第一条，目前奸两洞妹子还未成年呢！！大家看到的只是原型体或者是试验体，造个妹子出来是一回事，把她调教成四十八手样样精通合格，像爱抚娘娘和爱抚三无那样随时可以抛弃羞耻心的X奴是另外一回事。达到这个程度必须要把身体周围的敏感区域好好开发一番，也少不了粗壮的圆柱长条形物体的猛烈喷射。TG这两方面水准还有点欠缺，更别说量产克隆计划有多困难。所以呐，大概8-10年以后才会有奸两洞的量产体出现。

痛批TG禽兽第二条，目前兔子已经是全球第二号财主了，而且迟早要超越阿妹例假成为头号财主。届时各路小三主动投怀送抱，嘴里喊着“爸爸爸爸我还要”“老公老公有人欺负我”，要是TG没个像样的把妹队伍反而说不过去了。管你嘴上说不要不要还是身体说还要还要，TG把妹趋势不可阻挡，现在只不过是二十年的光源计划成果初显。

痛批TG禽兽第三条，兔子腹黑的很，和棒子家里的非主流完全不一样。兔子手持和谐棒已经好几年了，但是一向很低调，哪怕是你一不留神点错了好感度-20的选项也看不出黑化表现----要是金胖子恐怕直接给你上演鲜血的始末了。所以阿妹例假现在必须要找金手指密码好知道以后遇到TG的选择支的时候应该选什么，这样才能保证最后的Good End。

不过要是以为阿妹例假可以把兔子当成路人甲npc那可是大错特错。海军部某个负责偷窥的头头承认：“长期以来一直严重低估兔子的腹黑程度”。显然腹黑兔整天扎小纸人画圈圈的成果不单单只有隐形战姬。可以打妈妈船的蛋蛋，可以打飞机的蛋蛋，不需要别人就可以自己跳的蛋蛋，专门打别人蛋蛋的蛋蛋，小小的可以塞进隐形战姬体内的蛋蛋，还有可以跑到大洋里面装满蛋蛋的军舰----各个都是兔子花大力气扯出来的蛋蛋。简而言之，小白兔正在变身美少女战士。对于专业偷窥的ws男而言，比起会咬人得常规兔，电子兔和网络兔更加让人担心。

不管奸两洞是原型体还是试验体，她都是兔子准备出门啃嫩草的一个信号。要是TG觉得自家窝边草被人看上了----假如说兔子和阿妹例假指着同一垛草说这是我的窝边草，TG是否也会再玩一次羞耻PLAY？比如福摩沙，北棒，兔子家门口的水塘，甚至随便哪个地方发现新鲜妹汁。哎呀呀，我们只是说说而已，不要太紧张，又没下结论。

对于TG而言，他在T形台上越被人看越性奋，羞耻心和快感可是很难平衡的，要是一不留神就可能玩脱鸟~~~

要是说最近刚刚去过天上人间的那老头学到啥了，那就是：阿妹例假必须保证给自家后宫足够的开销，还要花钱请侦探。明明已经养了一群败家女希尔顿了，可是阿妹例假也没得选择。否则不光等着被TG晒妹子的闪闪金光亮瞎狗眼，将来5-10年还会看着某些毫无节操的小三和TG眉来眼去搞暧昧。白宫和国会肯定要感叹：哎，当家难啊！

普通版本：
最近中国公布其目前首架隐性战机，本刊一月号第三期十八页也刊登文章披露，着实让西方军事战略家与感兴趣的观察者们忙上好一阵子----说准确些是评估其全面影响。美国情报机构对J-20有所了解，但是没料到十二月就开始做滑行测试了。

该战机为双发单座，与F-22出人意料的相像。然而它明显的比美国当下最先进的空优战机还要大，可能暗含更长的作战半径，更大容量内油箱以及更多载弹量。目前还无从判断该机为原型机还是技术验证机

我们都知道的是，中国对科学技术十分看重----培育的工程师与科学家比美国在内的任何一个西方国家都多----并且中国在国防上也投入大笔资金。所以一想到中国顺着这条路走下去，技术发展与军事实力达到一个新的层次，有人会感到泄气无力也不奇怪。

某些言论是出于某种不可告人的目的----不论是危言耸听的还是力图将J-20的影响大事化小的。

首先，该机目前处于原型机或是验证机的阶段。设计一台是一回事，改进完善为可以批量生产的多功能隐性战机，以达到F-22 F-35的先进水平是另外一回事。事实上，这还需要高度成熟的传感系统及先进的发动机。目前中国这方面能力滞后于飞机的研发进度。遑论实际生产隐形战机的难度高的出名。考虑到技术上的困难，目前估计可能8-10年后J-20可能开始投产。

其次，中国是世界第二大经济体，并且以目前的增长速度来看，其经济超越美国已鲜有异议。待到中国逐步成为全球级别的大国，在经济与国际事务中影响力与日俱增，其他国家也会认为北京力求实现其建设21世纪的现代军备是理所当然。不论喜欢与否，这都是大势所趋。而现在是中国二十年的努力开始展现成效了。

与此同时，人们还应该意识到中国的领导与北棒不同，鲜有鲁莽恣意、自暴自弃的倾向。人们须知，中国掌握核武已经几十年了，却一向表现的很克制，即使在国际关系高度紧张的时期也是如此----这点又一次与他东边暴躁好斗的邻居成对比。找出如何积极面对一个未来强权的方法，乃是美国当下和未来一段时间的难题。这点既是很有必要也是切实可行。

这绝不是说，美国可以草率的无视或轻描淡写中国建设军力的速度。美海军情报高官承认：“我们长期以来一直严重低估中国武器系统交付与形成初步作战的能力。”显然，中国的武器现代化发展远远不止隐形战机。DF-21D，防空导弹，各式各样的无人系统，用于锁定弹道导弹的控制设备，可供隐形战机携带的小型炸弹，还有适合蓝水海军的战舰----都是数不尽的资金和努力砸出来的成果。简而言之，中国开始逐渐意识到其战略企图与军力之间的差距，正在迅速的将中间的空白填满。对于情报官员而言，比起中国的常规武器，其在电子战和网络战的能力更具威胁。

J-20是原型机也好验证机也好，不光是一个展示技术进步的信号，也暗示中国开始展现远征千里对抗对手的决心。当北京感到其战略利益受到挑战的时候----即使是由于中美战略利益冲突，中国是否也会秀日渐发达的肌肉？比如台湾，北棒，中国的“沿海”，甚至世界任何一处的战略资源，尽管只是理论上可能，我们不能妄下定论。

对于中国，在其世界舞台上的地位日益显赫的同时民族主义的自尊自负也在水涨船高，平衡国外利益和敏感的民族主义将不是一件容易的事。但是中国的领导人必须要找到如何不踩雷区，否则就要面临冲突以及本国自身产生的危机。

如果说去了中国大开眼界的那谁谁谁学到了什么的话，他刚刚被上了一课就是：美国必须保证在常规武器和非常规武器上的研发维持绝对足够的投入，更别提在情报工具和专家上的大量开销。背着国防支出的巨大压力，美国知道这很困难可也别无选择。否则不光在中国揭示新武器的时候被友邦惊诧一番，在未来5-10年内中国的外交政策也会充分利用其军事实力。白宫和国会在裁减政府支出的时候最好深思熟虑。

Recent public disclosures, including the revealing article that ran in this magazine about China rolling out its first known stealth aircraft (AW&ST Jan. 3, p. 18), will keep military strategists and interested observers in the West busy for a long time trying to accurately establish the full implications—accurately being the operative word. U.S. intelligence knew about the J-20, but not that it would begin taxi tests in December.
The twin-engine, single-seat aircraft bears a striking resemblance to the F-22. Moreover, it is considerably larger than the U.S.’s most advanced air superiority fighter, implying long range, a generous internal fuel capacity and heavy weapons loads. Still to be determined is whether the aircraft is a prototype or a technology demonstrator.
What we do know is that China attaches enormous importance to science and technology—it is educating many more engineers and scientists than any Western country, including the U.S.—and it is funneling huge amounts of money into defense. So it is not surprising that some people are unnerved by the idea that China is well down the path toward achieving a new level of technical maturity and military capability.
Some perspective is in order—both for the alarmists and those inclined to minimize the implications of the J-20.
For starters, it’s one thing to develop a prototype or technology demonstrator and test the aircraft. It is an entirely different matter to take such a design and perfect it into a multi-mission stealthy aircraft that can be manufactured and is as advanced as, say, the F-22 or F-35. Indeed, getting to that point will require a highly sophisticated sensor suite and advanced engines. The Chinese have tended to lag behind in airframe development. Moreover, producing a true stealth aircraft is notoriously difficult. Current estimates are that the J-20 may enter production in 8-10 years, barring technical setbacks.
Also, China has the world’s second-largest economy, and at the current rate of growth, there can be little doubt it eventually will surpass that of the U.S. As China evolves into a global power, wielding more influence economically and in international affairs, the rest of the world should expect Beijing to continue to pursue its goal of building a 21st-century military. Like it or not, it is going to happen, and two decades of effort are starting to show results.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that China’s leaders, unlike North Korea’s, generally are not prone to reckless, self-destructive behavior. Keep in mind that China has possessed a nuclear arsenal for decades and has exercised restraint, even during periods of heightened international tensions—again, unlike its bellicose neighbor to the East. The challenge for the U.S. now and in the future will be figuring out how to engage a future superpower constructively. Doing so is both essential and doable.
That is not to say the U.S. can blithely ignore or marginalize the rate at which China is building military capability. As the Navy’s top intelligence official concedes, “We have been pretty consistent in underestimating the delivery and initial operational capability of Chinese weapons systems.” Of course, China’s weapons modernization goes far beyond just stealth aircraft. There is the DF-21D, an anti-aircraft ballistic missile, a broad range of unmanned systems, command and control devices to target ballistic missiles, small bombs that can be carried internally on a stealth fighter, and ships suitable for a blue water navy—all within the context of virtually unlimited money for such endevors. In short, China appears to have identified all of the disconnects between its strategic ambitions and military resources, and is proceeding rapidly to fill those gaps. Even more of a concern to intelligence officials than China’s kinetic weapons is its non-kinetic threat such as electronic attack and cyberwarfare.
Regardless of whether the J-20 is a prototype or technology demonstrator, it is one more sign of growing expertise, an indication that it is starting to realize its ambition to counter adversaries across a range of domains. Will China flex its growing military muscle when Beijing feels its strategic interests are being challenged—strategic interests that may be in direct conflict with those of the U.S.? We cannot rule out that possibility, if not probability, whether it is Taiwan, North Korea, their “near seas” or competition for strategic resources anywhere in the world.
For China, balancing international interests with nationalistic sentiments—including the pride that comes with increased respect on much of the world stage—will be difficult. But its leaders will need to figure out how to navigate that minefield or risk conflict and put at risk much of what the country has built.
If there is a lesson in this latest eye-opener from China, it is this: the U.S. absolutely must maintain robust investment in research and development in both kinetic and non-kinetic weapons, not to mention adequate spending on intelligence-gathering tools and specialists. While that will not be easy, given the tremendous pressure on the defense budget, the U.S. has no choice. The alternative is to be surprised not just by the latest weapon system China chooses to unveil, but in how China chooses to leverage its arsenal as an extension of foreign policy in five or 10 years. The White House and Congress would be well advised to ponder that eventuality as they take the paring knife to government spending.

让不让人活了，这都惊动到上社论的地步了。毕竟人家文章里面没说中帝二字，虽然明着暗着都是这么个意思，咱也不太好意思把标题太过于发挥。
暂时改回兔子的称呼，帝什么帝的自己心里有数就可以
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/awst/2011/01/10/AW_01_10_2011_p58-280833.xml&headline=Editorial:%20Remain%20Watchful%20of%20China%27s%20Ascent&channel=defense
社论----时刻警惕兔子势力抬头
Editorial: Remain Watchful of China's Ascent
湿意版本：
鉴于TG最近在公开场合晒妹子的行为，不明真相的群众赶快去看本刊一月号第三期十八页的文章，这让西方业界大叔和有着奇怪癖好在一边视[哔----]的家伙左手和右手忙得不亦乐乎----哎呀呀，咱的意思是说他们还在适应奸两洞妹子带来的喜悦。阿妹例假国的情报机构知道TG后宫添新人，只是没想到TG这么禽兽过年都等不及就开始调教了。

奸两洞----顾名思义有两个洞可以插，但是每次限骑一人----卧草泥马TG和阿妹例假怎么都好这口，和爱抚娘娘调教出来的性癖一模一样。不过奸两洞身材明显比阿妹例假的当家花旦大了整整n圈，说不定在暗示用户：她可以[哔----]更远，体内富含更多的妹汁，可以容纳更多的蛋蛋。只是目前诸位大叔还无从判断这是原型体还是试验体。

TG对于塞淫诗和特萝姬两个小萝莉垂涎欲滴的程度已经是司马昭之心路人皆知，每年教育出来的萝莉控的数量只怕是比阿妹例假国在内的任何一家西方国家都多。而且TG在安全措施上也很舍得花钱。所以某些大法师一想到TG将来会成为更高级别的后宫王，坐拥娴熟的技巧与超强的把妹实力，心中深感羡慕嫉妒恨空虚寂寞冷什么的一点也不让我们感到奇怪啦啦啦~~~

至于某些人说话绝对是收了钱的----管他是五毛还是五美分五便士五卢布.......

痛批TG禽兽第一条，目前奸两洞妹子还未成年呢！！大家看到的只是原型体或者是试验体，造个妹子出来是一回事，把她调教成四十八手样样精通合格，像爱抚娘娘和爱抚三无那样随时可以抛弃羞耻心的X奴是另外一回事。达到这个程度必须要把身体周围的敏感区域好好开发一番，也少不了粗壮的圆柱长条形物体的猛烈喷射。TG这两方面水准还有点欠缺，更别说量产克隆计划有多困难。所以呐，大概8-10年以后才会有奸两洞的量产体出现。

痛批TG禽兽第二条，目前兔子已经是全球第二号财主了，而且迟早要超越阿妹例假成为头号财主。届时各路小三主动投怀送抱，嘴里喊着“爸爸爸爸我还要”“老公老公有人欺负我”，要是TG没个像样的把妹队伍反而说不过去了。管你嘴上说不要不要还是身体说还要还要，TG把妹趋势不可阻挡，现在只不过是二十年的光源计划成果初显。

痛批TG禽兽第三条，兔子腹黑的很，和棒子家里的非主流完全不一样。兔子手持和谐棒已经好几年了，但是一向很低调，哪怕是你一不留神点错了好感度-20的选项也看不出黑化表现----要是金胖子恐怕直接给你上演鲜血的始末了。所以阿妹例假现在必须要找金手指密码好知道以后遇到TG的选择支的时候应该选什么，这样才能保证最后的Good End。

不过要是以为阿妹例假可以把兔子当成路人甲npc那可是大错特错。海军部某个负责偷窥的头头承认：“长期以来一直严重低估兔子的腹黑程度”。显然腹黑兔整天扎小纸人画圈圈的成果不单单只有隐形战姬。可以打妈妈船的蛋蛋，可以打飞机的蛋蛋，不需要别人就可以自己跳的蛋蛋，专门打别人蛋蛋的蛋蛋，小小的可以塞进隐形战姬体内的蛋蛋，还有可以跑到大洋里面装满蛋蛋的军舰----各个都是兔子花大力气扯出来的蛋蛋。简而言之，小白兔正在变身美少女战士。对于专业偷窥的ws男而言，比起会咬人得常规兔，电子兔和网络兔更加让人担心。

不管奸两洞是原型体还是试验体，她都是兔子准备出门啃嫩草的一个信号。要是TG觉得自家窝边草被人看上了----假如说兔子和阿妹例假指着同一垛草说这是我的窝边草，TG是否也会再玩一次羞耻PLAY？比如福摩沙，北棒，兔子家门口的水塘，甚至随便哪个地方发现新鲜妹汁。哎呀呀，我们只是说说而已，不要太紧张，又没下结论。

对于TG而言，他在T形台上越被人看越性奋，羞耻心和快感可是很难平衡的，要是一不留神就可能玩脱鸟~~~

要是说最近刚刚去过天上人间的那老头学到啥了，那就是：阿妹例假必须保证给自家后宫足够的开销，还要花钱请侦探。明明已经养了一群败家女希尔顿了，可是阿妹例假也没得选择。否则不光等着被TG晒妹子的闪闪金光亮瞎狗眼，将来5-10年还会看着某些毫无节操的小三和TG眉来眼去搞暧昧。白宫和国会肯定要感叹：哎，当家难啊！

普通版本：
最近中国公布其目前首架隐性战机，本刊一月号第三期十八页也刊登文章披露，着实让西方军事战略家与感兴趣的观察者们忙上好一阵子----说准确些是评估其全面影响。美国情报机构对J-20有所了解，但是没料到十二月就开始做滑行测试了。

该战机为双发单座，与F-22出人意料的相像。然而它明显的比美国当下最先进的空优战机还要大，可能暗含更长的作战半径，更大容量内油箱以及更多载弹量。目前还无从判断该机为原型机还是技术验证机

我们都知道的是，中国对科学技术十分看重----培育的工程师与科学家比美国在内的任何一个西方国家都多----并且中国在国防上也投入大笔资金。所以一想到中国顺着这条路走下去，技术发展与军事实力达到一个新的层次，有人会感到泄气无力也不奇怪。

某些言论是出于某种不可告人的目的----不论是危言耸听的还是力图将J-20的影响大事化小的。

首先，该机目前处于原型机或是验证机的阶段。设计一台是一回事，改进完善为可以批量生产的多功能隐性战机，以达到F-22 F-35的先进水平是另外一回事。事实上，这还需要高度成熟的传感系统及先进的发动机。目前中国这方面能力滞后于飞机的研发进度。遑论实际生产隐形战机的难度高的出名。考虑到技术上的困难，目前估计可能8-10年后J-20可能开始投产。

其次，中国是世界第二大经济体，并且以目前的增长速度来看，其经济超越美国已鲜有异议。待到中国逐步成为全球级别的大国，在经济与国际事务中影响力与日俱增，其他国家也会认为北京力求实现其建设21世纪的现代军备是理所当然。不论喜欢与否，这都是大势所趋。而现在是中国二十年的努力开始展现成效了。

与此同时，人们还应该意识到中国的领导与北棒不同，鲜有鲁莽恣意、自暴自弃的倾向。人们须知，中国掌握核武已经几十年了，却一向表现的很克制，即使在国际关系高度紧张的时期也是如此----这点又一次与他东边暴躁好斗的邻居成对比。找出如何积极面对一个未来强权的方法，乃是美国当下和未来一段时间的难题。这点既是很有必要也是切实可行。

这绝不是说，美国可以草率的无视或轻描淡写中国建设军力的速度。美海军情报高官承认：“我们长期以来一直严重低估中国武器系统交付与形成初步作战的能力。”显然，中国的武器现代化发展远远不止隐形战机。DF-21D，防空导弹，各式各样的无人系统，用于锁定弹道导弹的控制设备，可供隐形战机携带的小型炸弹，还有适合蓝水海军的战舰----都是数不尽的资金和努力砸出来的成果。简而言之，中国开始逐渐意识到其战略企图与军力之间的差距，正在迅速的将中间的空白填满。对于情报官员而言，比起中国的常规武器，其在电子战和网络战的能力更具威胁。

J-20是原型机也好验证机也好，不光是一个展示技术进步的信号，也暗示中国开始展现远征千里对抗对手的决心。当北京感到其战略利益受到挑战的时候----即使是由于中美战略利益冲突，中国是否也会秀日渐发达的肌肉？比如台湾，北棒，中国的“沿海”，甚至世界任何一处的战略资源，尽管只是理论上可能，我们不能妄下定论。

对于中国，在其世界舞台上的地位日益显赫的同时民族主义的自尊自负也在水涨船高，平衡国外利益和敏感的民族主义将不是一件容易的事。但是中国的领导人必须要找到如何不踩雷区，否则就要面临冲突以及本国自身产生的危机。

如果说去了中国大开眼界的那谁谁谁学到了什么的话，他刚刚被上了一课就是：美国必须保证在常规武器和非常规武器上的研发维持绝对足够的投入，更别提在情报工具和专家上的大量开销。背着国防支出的巨大压力，美国知道这很困难可也别无选择。否则不光在中国揭示新武器的时候被友邦惊诧一番，在未来5-10年内中国的外交政策也会充分利用其军事实力。白宫和国会在裁减政府支出的时候最好深思熟虑。

Recent public disclosures, including the revealing article that ran in this magazine about China rolling out its first known stealth aircraft (AW&ST Jan. 3, p. 18), will keep military strategists and interested observers in the West busy for a long time trying to accurately establish the full implications—accurately being the operative word. U.S. intelligence knew about the J-20, but not that it would begin taxi tests in December.
The twin-engine, single-seat aircraft bears a striking resemblance to the F-22. Moreover, it is considerably larger than the U.S.’s most advanced air superiority fighter, implying long range, a generous internal fuel capacity and heavy weapons loads. Still to be determined is whether the aircraft is a prototype or a technology demonstrator.
What we do know is that China attaches enormous importance to science and technology—it is educating many more engineers and scientists than any Western country, including the U.S.—and it is funneling huge amounts of money into defense. So it is not surprising that some people are unnerved by the idea that China is well down the path toward achieving a new level of technical maturity and military capability.
Some perspective is in order—both for the alarmists and those inclined to minimize the implications of the J-20.
For starters, it’s one thing to develop a prototype or technology demonstrator and test the aircraft. It is an entirely different matter to take such a design and perfect it into a multi-mission stealthy aircraft that can be manufactured and is as advanced as, say, the F-22 or F-35. Indeed, getting to that point will require a highly sophisticated sensor suite and advanced engines. The Chinese have tended to lag behind in airframe development. Moreover, producing a true stealth aircraft is notoriously difficult. Current estimates are that the J-20 may enter production in 8-10 years, barring technical setbacks.
Also, China has the world’s second-largest economy, and at the current rate of growth, there can be little doubt it eventually will surpass that of the U.S. As China evolves into a global power, wielding more influence economically and in international affairs, the rest of the world should expect Beijing to continue to pursue its goal of building a 21st-century military. Like it or not, it is going to happen, and two decades of effort are starting to show results.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that China’s leaders, unlike North Korea’s, generally are not prone to reckless, self-destructive behavior. Keep in mind that China has possessed a nuclear arsenal for decades and has exercised restraint, even during periods of heightened international tensions—again, unlike its bellicose neighbor to the East. The challenge for the U.S. now and in the future will be figuring out how to engage a future superpower constructively. Doing so is both essential and doable.
That is not to say the U.S. can blithely ignore or marginalize the rate at which China is building military capability. As the Navy’s top intelligence official concedes, “We have been pretty consistent in underestimating the delivery and initial operational capability of Chinese weapons systems.” Of course, China’s weapons modernization goes far beyond just stealth aircraft. There is the DF-21D, an anti-aircraft ballistic missile, a broad range of unmanned systems, command and control devices to target ballistic missiles, small bombs that can be carried internally on a stealth fighter, and ships suitable for a blue water navy—all within the context of virtually unlimited money for such endevors. In short, China appears to have identified all of the disconnects between its strategic ambitions and military resources, and is proceeding rapidly to fill those gaps. Even more of a concern to intelligence officials than China’s kinetic weapons is its non-kinetic threat such as electronic attack and cyberwarfare.
Regardless of whether the J-20 is a prototype or technology demonstrator, it is one more sign of growing expertise, an indication that it is starting to realize its ambition to counter adversaries across a range of domains. Will China flex its growing military muscle when Beijing feels its strategic interests are being challenged—strategic interests that may be in direct conflict with those of the U.S.? We cannot rule out that possibility, if not probability, whether it is Taiwan, North Korea, their “near seas” or competition for strategic resources anywhere in the world.
For China, balancing international interests with nationalistic sentiments—including the pride that comes with increased respect on much of the world stage—will be difficult. But its leaders will need to figure out how to navigate that minefield or risk conflict and put at risk much of what the country has built.
If there is a lesson in this latest eye-opener from China, it is this: the U.S. absolutely must maintain robust investment in research and development in both kinetic and non-kinetic weapons, not to mention adequate spending on intelligence-gathering tools and specialists. While that will not be easy, given the tremendous pressure on the defense budget, the U.S. has no choice. The alternative is to be surprised not just by the latest weapon system China chooses to unveil, but in how China chooses to leverage its arsenal as an extension of foreign policy in five or 10 years. The White House and Congress would be well advised to ponder that eventuality as they take the paring knife to government spending.