（个人翻译）（美航空周刊社论）持续关注上升的中国

Editorial: Remain Watchful of China's Ascent
（以下逐段翻译大意，括号内是个人吐槽）

Recent public disclosures, including the revealing article that ran in this magazine about China rolling out its first known stealth aircraft (AW&ST Jan. 3, p. 18), will keep military strategists and interested observers in the West busy for a long time trying to accurately establish the full implications—accurately being the operative word. U.S. intelligence knew about the J-20, but not that it would begin taxi tests in December.
最近透露的关于j-20的消息将让西方持续关注其含义，美国智库之前已知道有j-20存在，但不知道其会在12月试飞（按，就是说黑丝一出，西方全震精了，美国前些天表示低估了黑丝的研发进度就是这么回事）

The twin-engine, single-seat aircraft bears a striking resemblance to the F-22. Moreover, it is considerably larger than the U.S.’s most advanced air superiority fighter, implying long range, a generous internal fuel capacity and heavy weapons loads. Still to be determined is whether the aircraft is a prototype or a technology demonstrator.
这架双发单座飞机和F-22惊人的相似，但她比F-22更大，估计其航程更远，可携带武器更多。但目前还无法断定其是原型机还只是技术论证的产物（美帝有点犯酸，说小白兔山寨F-22，话说我们的功力还没到看看照片就能仿得地步吧，至于讨论研发进度，那就是你猜我猜大家猜了）

What we do know is that China attaches enormous importance to science and technology—it is educating many more engineers and scientists than any Western country, including the U.S.—and it is funneling huge amounts of money into defense. So it is not surprising that some people are unnerved by the idea that China is well down the path toward achieving a new level of technical maturity and military capability.
我们知道中国十分重视科技研发，她培养的工程师和科学家的人数远超其他西方国家，包括美国，而且她在军事领域投入了大量的资金。所以毫不意外的是一些人感到沮丧，因为在他们看来中国在科技领域和军事力量又将上一个台阶。（作为一个在读的工科研究生表示压力很大）

Some perspective is in order—both for the alarmists and those inclined to minimize the implications of the J-20.
下面的观点将阐述给那些悲观主义者和盲目自大者（戏肉来了）

For starters, it’s one thing to develop a prototype or technology demonstrator and test the aircraft. It is an entirely different matter to take such a design and perfect it into a multi-mission stealthy aircraft that can be manufactured and is as advanced as, say, the F-22 or F-35. Indeed, getting to that point will require a highly sophisticated sensor suite and advanced engines. The Chinese have tended to lag behind in airframe development. Moreover, producing a true stealth aircraft is notoriously difficult. Current estimates are that the J-20 may enter production in 8-10 years, barring technical setbacks.
致惊慌失措者：研发原型机（或技术验证机）并测试是一回事，但要完善设计，获得产品并投入量产，而且保证其像F-22或F-35一样是另一回事。事实上，要实现这一目标需要高度灵敏的传感设备和先进的引擎。中国在机身研发上还比较落后。而且要制造一架真正能隐形的战机是极其困难的，预计在克服技术难关的前提下，中国需要8-10年的时间才能让j-20投产。（还算中肯，电传和引擎的确是技术难关，高人们的分析在前，不必重复了。至于预期的时间么？大家都不知道，只有等黑丝开始漫天飞舞了才算数）

Also, China has the world’s second-largest economy, and at the current rate of growth, there can be little doubt it eventually will surpass that of the U.S. As China evolves into a global power, wielding more influence economically and in international affairs, the rest of the world should expect Beijing to continue to pursue its goal of building a 21st-century military. Like it or not, it is going to happen, and two decades of effort are starting to show results.
而且，中国是世界第二大经济体，按照目前的增长速率，迟早她会超过美国。随着中国成为一个全球性的强国，在经济领域和国际事务上施加更多的影响力， 世界各国应该预料到中国将继续向着建设一支21世纪军队的目标迈进。不管你是否喜欢这一切，该来的还是要来的，二十年的努力也到了开花结果的时候了。（中国经济……但愿好运吧，毕竟不可能一直狂飙突进的）

At the same time, it is important to recognize that China’s leaders, unlike North Korea’s, generally are not prone to reckless, self-destructive behavior. Keep in mind that China has possessed a nuclear arsenal for decades and has exercised restraint, even during periods of heightened international tensions—again, unlike its bellicose neighbor to the East. The challenge for the U.S. now and in the future will be figuring out how to engage a future superpower constructively. Doing so is both essential and doable.
与此同时，重要的是要认识到中国的领导人不像北朝鲜的容易胡来，搞玩火自焚的那一套作风。要记住中国虽然有着一个经营数十年的核武库，但中国人一直保持着克制，即使是在国际形势最紧张的时刻——和金胖子比起来好多了。对美国而言当前和今后的挑战是明确今后如何和一个将来的超级大国建设性的接触。做到这一点相当必要而且可行。

That is not to say the U.S. can blithely ignore or marginalize the rate at which China is building military capability. As the Navy’s top intelligence official concedes, “We have been pretty consistent in underestimating the delivery and initial operational capability of Chinese weapons systems.” Of course, China’s weapons modernization goes far beyond just stealth aircraft. There is the DF-21D, an anti-aircraft ballistic missile, a broad range of unmanned systems, command and control devices to target ballistic missiles, small bombs that can be carried internally on a stealth fighter, and ships suitable for a blue water navy—all within the context of virtually unlimited money for such endevors. In short, China appears to have identified all of the disconnects between its strategic ambitions and military resources, and is proceeding rapidly to fill those gaps. Even more of a concern to intelligence officials than China’s kinetic weapons is its non-kinetic threat such as electronic attack and cyberwarfare.
这并不是说我们可以无视或低估中国扩充军事实力的速率，就像海军高层所言：“我们曾经低估了中国武器系统的投送能力和规模（翻译的不好，望斧正）”，当然，中国的武器现代化远远不止隐形战机：东风21D，防空弹道导弹，无人机系统，弹道导弹的控制导航系统，隐形战机的携带炸弹，还有为远洋海军所设计的军舰，所有的项目都得到几乎无穷无尽的资金支持。概而言之，中国似乎在找出其战略意图和军事实力直接的差距并在以一种惊人的速度弥补这一切。让分析人员较常规武器更担忧的是中国的非对称威胁，包括电子攻击和信息战。（蓝翔技校威武……）

Regardless of whether the J-20 is a prototype or technology demonstrator, it is one more sign of growing expertise, an indication that it is starting to realize its ambition to counter adversaries across a range of domains. Will China flex its growing military muscle when Beijing feels its strategic interests are being challenged—strategic interests that may be in direct conflict with those of the U.S.? We cannot rule out that possibility, if not probability, whether it is Taiwan, North Korea, their “near seas” or competition for strategic resources anywhere in the world.
不论J20本质如何，她代表着一种增长的技术力量，一种正在增长的在各个领域对抗竞争者的雄心。如果国家的战略利益遇到挑战，中国会动用自己增长的军事力量吗？——如果中美之间的战略利益发生冲突的话。我们不能排除这种可能性，无论在台湾，北朝鲜，或者邻近海域，乃至世界任何一个可能发生战略资源争夺事件的地方。（还是根深蒂固的不信任）

For China, balancing international interests with nationalistic sentiments—including the pride that comes with increased respect on much of the world stage—will be difficult. But its leaders will need to figure out how to navigate that minefield or risk conflict and put at risk much of what the country has built.
对于中国而言，平衡其国际利益和民族主义倾向——如因为在国际舞台上与日俱增的尊重所带来的骄傲——会相当困难。但她的领导人需要学会踏过这个雷区，否则一旦卷入冲突，中国的立国之本将处于危险之中。（最后一句有点暧昧，是说tg的合法性将有危险，还是说中国的经济建设基础将毁于战火？）

If there is a lesson in this latest eye-opener from China, it is this: the U.S. absolutely must maintain robust investment in research and development in both kinetic and non-kinetic weapons, not to mention adequate spending on intelligence-gathering tools and specialists. While that will not be easy, given the tremendous pressure on the defense budget, the U.S. has no choice. The alternative is to be surprised not just by the latest weapon system China chooses to unveil, but in how China chooses to leverage its arsenal as an extension of foreign policy in five or 10 years. The White House and Congress would be well advised to ponder that eventuality as they take the paring knife to government spending.
对于积极关注中国的人而言最重要的心得是：美国必须保持对常规武器和非对称武器研发的投入，同时应投入足够的资金用于信息的搜集和分析。即使相当困难，防务支出已经相当庞大了，美国也别无选择。否则的话美国人将不仅为中国披露的下一件新式武器系统而震惊，而且将为中国如何在5~10年内改变军备的同时变化外交政策而吃惊。白宫和国会应该在大刀砍向财政预算的同时仔细考虑带来的后果。
（到了后面终于暴露了，终于忍不住要向元老院要钱了 社论就是四平八稳，私货在后半段，大概就是居安思危的意思，赶快投钱，小心优势不保）

原帖地址：http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/g ... tchful%20of%20China
后面的评论很欢乐……

Editorial: Remain Watchful of China's Ascent
（以下逐段翻译大意，括号内是个人吐槽）

Recent public disclosures, including the revealing article that ran in this magazine about China rolling out its first known stealth aircraft (AW&ST Jan. 3, p. 18), will keep military strategists and interested observers in the West busy for a long time trying to accurately establish the full implications—accurately being the operative word. U.S. intelligence knew about the J-20, but not that it would begin taxi tests in December.
最近透露的关于j-20的消息将让西方持续关注其含义，美国智库之前已知道有j-20存在，但不知道其会在12月试飞（按，就是说黑丝一出，西方全震精了，美国前些天表示低估了黑丝的研发进度就是这么回事）

The twin-engine, single-seat aircraft bears a striking resemblance to the F-22. Moreover, it is considerably larger than the U.S.’s most advanced air superiority fighter, implying long range, a generous internal fuel capacity and heavy weapons loads. Still to be determined is whether the aircraft is a prototype or a technology demonstrator.
这架双发单座飞机和F-22惊人的相似，但她比F-22更大，估计其航程更远，可携带武器更多。但目前还无法断定其是原型机还只是技术论证的产物（美帝有点犯酸，说小白兔山寨F-22，话说我们的功力还没到看看照片就能仿得地步吧，至于讨论研发进度，那就是你猜我猜大家猜了）

What we do know is that China attaches enormous importance to science and technology—it is educating many more engineers and scientists than any Western country, including the U.S.—and it is funneling huge amounts of money into defense. So it is not surprising that some people are unnerved by the idea that China is well down the path toward achieving a new level of technical maturity and military capability.
我们知道中国十分重视科技研发，她培养的工程师和科学家的人数远超其他西方国家，包括美国，而且她在军事领域投入了大量的资金。所以毫不意外的是一些人感到沮丧，因为在他们看来中国在科技领域和军事力量又将上一个台阶。（作为一个在读的工科研究生表示压力很大）

Some perspective is in order—both for the alarmists and those inclined to minimize the implications of the J-20.
下面的观点将阐述给那些悲观主义者和盲目自大者（戏肉来了）

For starters, it’s one thing to develop a prototype or technology demonstrator and test the aircraft. It is an entirely different matter to take such a design and perfect it into a multi-mission stealthy aircraft that can be manufactured and is as advanced as, say, the F-22 or F-35. Indeed, getting to that point will require a highly sophisticated sensor suite and advanced engines. The Chinese have tended to lag behind in airframe development. Moreover, producing a true stealth aircraft is notoriously difficult. Current estimates are that the J-20 may enter production in 8-10 years, barring technical setbacks.
致惊慌失措者：研发原型机（或技术验证机）并测试是一回事，但要完善设计，获得产品并投入量产，而且保证其像F-22或F-35一样是另一回事。事实上，要实现这一目标需要高度灵敏的传感设备和先进的引擎。中国在机身研发上还比较落后。而且要制造一架真正能隐形的战机是极其困难的，预计在克服技术难关的前提下，中国需要8-10年的时间才能让j-20投产。（还算中肯，电传和引擎的确是技术难关，高人们的分析在前，不必重复了。至于预期的时间么？大家都不知道，只有等黑丝开始漫天飞舞了才算数）

Also, China has the world’s second-largest economy, and at the current rate of growth, there can be little doubt it eventually will surpass that of the U.S. As China evolves into a global power, wielding more influence economically and in international affairs, the rest of the world should expect Beijing to continue to pursue its goal of building a 21st-century military. Like it or not, it is going to happen, and two decades of effort are starting to show results.
而且，中国是世界第二大经济体，按照目前的增长速率，迟早她会超过美国。随着中国成为一个全球性的强国，在经济领域和国际事务上施加更多的影响力， 世界各国应该预料到中国将继续向着建设一支21世纪军队的目标迈进。不管你是否喜欢这一切，该来的还是要来的，二十年的努力也到了开花结果的时候了。（中国经济……但愿好运吧，毕竟不可能一直狂飙突进的）

At the same time, it is important to recognize that China’s leaders, unlike North Korea’s, generally are not prone to reckless, self-destructive behavior. Keep in mind that China has possessed a nuclear arsenal for decades and has exercised restraint, even during periods of heightened international tensions—again, unlike its bellicose neighbor to the East. The challenge for the U.S. now and in the future will be figuring out how to engage a future superpower constructively. Doing so is both essential and doable.
与此同时，重要的是要认识到中国的领导人不像北朝鲜的容易胡来，搞玩火自焚的那一套作风。要记住中国虽然有着一个经营数十年的核武库，但中国人一直保持着克制，即使是在国际形势最紧张的时刻——和金胖子比起来好多了。对美国而言当前和今后的挑战是明确今后如何和一个将来的超级大国建设性的接触。做到这一点相当必要而且可行。

That is not to say the U.S. can blithely ignore or marginalize the rate at which China is building military capability. As the Navy’s top intelligence official concedes, “We have been pretty consistent in underestimating the delivery and initial operational capability of Chinese weapons systems.” Of course, China’s weapons modernization goes far beyond just stealth aircraft. There is the DF-21D, an anti-aircraft ballistic missile, a broad range of unmanned systems, command and control devices to target ballistic missiles, small bombs that can be carried internally on a stealth fighter, and ships suitable for a blue water navy—all within the context of virtually unlimited money for such endevors. In short, China appears to have identified all of the disconnects between its strategic ambitions and military resources, and is proceeding rapidly to fill those gaps. Even more of a concern to intelligence officials than China’s kinetic weapons is its non-kinetic threat such as electronic attack and cyberwarfare.
这并不是说我们可以无视或低估中国扩充军事实力的速率，就像海军高层所言：“我们曾经低估了中国武器系统的投送能力和规模（翻译的不好，望斧正）”，当然，中国的武器现代化远远不止隐形战机：东风21D，防空弹道导弹，无人机系统，弹道导弹的控制导航系统，隐形战机的携带炸弹，还有为远洋海军所设计的军舰，所有的项目都得到几乎无穷无尽的资金支持。概而言之，中国似乎在找出其战略意图和军事实力直接的差距并在以一种惊人的速度弥补这一切。让分析人员较常规武器更担忧的是中国的非对称威胁，包括电子攻击和信息战。（蓝翔技校威武……）

Regardless of whether the J-20 is a prototype or technology demonstrator, it is one more sign of growing expertise, an indication that it is starting to realize its ambition to counter adversaries across a range of domains. Will China flex its growing military muscle when Beijing feels its strategic interests are being challenged—strategic interests that may be in direct conflict with those of the U.S.? We cannot rule out that possibility, if not probability, whether it is Taiwan, North Korea, their “near seas” or competition for strategic resources anywhere in the world.
不论J20本质如何，她代表着一种增长的技术力量，一种正在增长的在各个领域对抗竞争者的雄心。如果国家的战略利益遇到挑战，中国会动用自己增长的军事力量吗？——如果中美之间的战略利益发生冲突的话。我们不能排除这种可能性，无论在台湾，北朝鲜，或者邻近海域，乃至世界任何一个可能发生战略资源争夺事件的地方。（还是根深蒂固的不信任）

For China, balancing international interests with nationalistic sentiments—including the pride that comes with increased respect on much of the world stage—will be difficult. But its leaders will need to figure out how to navigate that minefield or risk conflict and put at risk much of what the country has built.
对于中国而言，平衡其国际利益和民族主义倾向——如因为在国际舞台上与日俱增的尊重所带来的骄傲——会相当困难。但她的领导人需要学会踏过这个雷区，否则一旦卷入冲突，中国的立国之本将处于危险之中。（最后一句有点暧昧，是说tg的合法性将有危险，还是说中国的经济建设基础将毁于战火？）

If there is a lesson in this latest eye-opener from China, it is this: the U.S. absolutely must maintain robust investment in research and development in both kinetic and non-kinetic weapons, not to mention adequate spending on intelligence-gathering tools and specialists. While that will not be easy, given the tremendous pressure on the defense budget, the U.S. has no choice. The alternative is to be surprised not just by the latest weapon system China chooses to unveil, but in how China chooses to leverage its arsenal as an extension of foreign policy in five or 10 years. The White House and Congress would be well advised to ponder that eventuality as they take the paring knife to government spending.
对于积极关注中国的人而言最重要的心得是：美国必须保持对常规武器和非对称武器研发的投入，同时应投入足够的资金用于信息的搜集和分析。即使相当困难，防务支出已经相当庞大了，美国也别无选择。否则的话美国人将不仅为中国披露的下一件新式武器系统而震惊，而且将为中国如何在5~10年内改变军备的同时变化外交政策而吃惊。白宫和国会应该在大刀砍向财政预算的同时仔细考虑带来的后果。
（到了后面终于暴露了，终于忍不住要向元老院要钱了 社论就是四平八稳，私货在后半段，大概就是居安思危的意思，赶快投钱，小心优势不保）

原帖地址：http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/g ... tchful%20of%20China
后面的评论很欢乐……