美参院情报委员会批评夸大伊拉克的威胁

IRAQ THREAT 'OVERSTATED'United States intelligence agencies have been criticised for overstating the threat of Iraqi weapons prior to last year's war.     

<P>The criticisms came in a report by a United States Senate Committee which has been looking into pre-war intelligence from Iraq.

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<P>The report also said US intelligence ignored doubts over Iraqi mobile bioweapons labs - one of the key elements cited by the administration in making its case for the war against Iraq.   

<P>It also said that US intelligence had no sources on Iraqi weapons programmes after 1998.      

<P>But the report absolved the Bush administration of charges that it pressured analysts to fit its own war policy.   

<P>Outgoing CIA director George Tenet had previously denied charges that the agency was asked to conclude that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.   

<P>The report, which ran to more than 500 pages, said that conclusions in an October 2002 national intelligence estimate on Iraqi weapons programs "either overstated or were not supported by the underlying intelligence reporting.   

<P>"A series of failures, particularly in analytical trade craft, led to the mischaracterisation of the intelligence," it said.   

<P>President George Bush relied on US intelligence suggesting that Iraq was aggressively pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs as a key justification for his decision to go to war in 2003.  

<P>Mr Tenet reportedly told Mr Bush that it was a "slam dunk" that Iraq had such weapons before the war.  

<P>The report said, "Most, if not all, of these problems stem from a broken corporate culture and poor management, and will not be solved by additional funding and personnel."  

<P>It found that US agencies relied too heavily on defectors and foreign intelligence services for information but were unable to check the reliability of such reports.  

<P>Iraqi exiles, who were eager to see the United States invade their country, have been accused of providing slanted and inaccurate information.

<P>The report added that analysts ignored or discounted conflicting information because of their assumptions that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

<P>"This 'group think' dynamic led Intelligence Community analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD programme as well as ignore or minimise evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding weapons of mass destruction programs," the report concluded. </P>
IRAQ THREAT 'OVERSTATED'United States intelligence agencies have been criticised for overstating the threat of Iraqi weapons prior to last year's war.     

<P>The criticisms came in a report by a United States Senate Committee which has been looking into pre-war intelligence from Iraq.

<P>
<P>The report also said US intelligence ignored doubts over Iraqi mobile bioweapons labs - one of the key elements cited by the administration in making its case for the war against Iraq.   

<P>It also said that US intelligence had no sources on Iraqi weapons programmes after 1998.      

<P>But the report absolved the Bush administration of charges that it pressured analysts to fit its own war policy.   

<P>Outgoing CIA director George Tenet had previously denied charges that the agency was asked to conclude that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.   

<P>The report, which ran to more than 500 pages, said that conclusions in an October 2002 national intelligence estimate on Iraqi weapons programs "either overstated or were not supported by the underlying intelligence reporting.   

<P>"A series of failures, particularly in analytical trade craft, led to the mischaracterisation of the intelligence," it said.   

<P>President George Bush relied on US intelligence suggesting that Iraq was aggressively pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs as a key justification for his decision to go to war in 2003.  

<P>Mr Tenet reportedly told Mr Bush that it was a "slam dunk" that Iraq had such weapons before the war.  

<P>The report said, "Most, if not all, of these problems stem from a broken corporate culture and poor management, and will not be solved by additional funding and personnel."  

<P>It found that US agencies relied too heavily on defectors and foreign intelligence services for information but were unable to check the reliability of such reports.  

<P>Iraqi exiles, who were eager to see the United States invade their country, have been accused of providing slanted and inaccurate information.

<P>The report added that analysts ignored or discounted conflicting information because of their assumptions that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

<P>"This 'group think' dynamic led Intelligence Community analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD programme as well as ignore or minimise evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding weapons of mass destruction programs," the report concluded. </P>
[此贴子已经被作者于2004-7-10 0:00:48编辑过]