赫芬顿邮报：与中国发生核战争的可能性

赫芬顿邮报：与中国发生核战争的可能性
The Risk of Nuclear War with China
作者:fallenangel1 发布日期:2012-09-23 浏览:15230
译文简介:
上周，有两项独立的研究均警告说，中国和美国如今都正在试图追求并贯彻一种可能会导致核战争的防守策略。
译文来源:
原创翻译：龙腾网 ht tp://w ww.ltaaa.com 翻译：fallenangel1 转载请注明出处

ht tp://ww w.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-kulacki/the-risk-of-nuclear-war-w_b_1903336.html
正文翻译:

本贴论坛地址：ht tp://w ww.ltaaa.com/bbs/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=88099&extra=page%3D1%26filter%3Dauthor%26orderby%3Ddateline&page=1

原标题：

The Risk of Nuclear War with China

与中国发生核战争的可能性

上周，有两项独立的研究均警告说，中国和美国如今都正在试图追求并贯彻一种可能会导致核战争的防守策略。

Last week two separate studies warned that China and the United States are pursuing military strategies and implementing defense policies that could lead to a nuclear war.

斯坦福大学的John Lewis和薛理泰两位研究人员非常详尽地总结出了一份有关中国核战争计划的说明，并在此基础上郑重地提出了如下所述的警告。

John Lewis and Xue Litai of Stanford University concluded a detailed exposition of China's nuclear war plans with a very sober warning.

“在一场常规武装冲突中，中美两国双方基于对于对方的误判，为了取得快速的胜利或者战术上的先机，将事态升级成为一场毫无预兆的核战争的风险是存在的。这种让双方都进退两难的境地不仅真实存在，而且还是非常危险的。”

"Both sides, clinging to incongruous assessments, run the risk of provoking unanticipated escalation to nuclear war by seeking a quick victory or tactical advantages in a conventional conflict. This dilemma is not only real, but perilous."

普林斯顿大学的Thomas Chirstensen也对相同的问题表达了忧虑，即在中国和美国之间发生的一场常规武装冲突有可能会以双方互扔核弹而收场。

Thomas Christensen of Princeton expressed concern about the same problem; the possibility that a conventional military conflict between the United States and China could end in a nuclear exchange.

“举例来说，如果在双方冲突中美国轰炸位于中国首都北京的政府部门、关键指挥部或者基础设施，而中国最高领导层认为这是其对其核打击能力的削弱或者认为这是美国即将发动核战的前奏的话，那么即使是反复强调‘绝不首先使用核武器’的中国也可能将冲突上升到核战争的高度。”

"For example, if strikes by the United States on China's conventional coercive capabilities or their critical command and control nodes and supporting infrastructure were to appear in Beijing as a conventional attack on its nuclear retaliatory capability or as a precursor to a nuclear first strike, even a China that generally adheres to a No-First-Use posture might escalate to the nuclear level."

然而，两项研究都没有暗示中国或美国的军政领导人主观上愿意在武装冲突的时候求胜于核武器。中国关于“在任何时间任何条件下”绝不首先使用核武器的承诺已经铭刻在中国导弹打击力量的每一个军官和士兵心中。在《第二炮兵技术实训》这本用于训练的机密教材中就这样明确写道：

Neither study suggests that the military or political leadership of China or the United States intends to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of a military conflict. China's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons "at any time under any circumstances" is drilled into the officers and soldiers of China's strategic missile forces. A classified text used to train those forces, The Science of Second Artillery Operations, unambiguously instructs,

“为了与我国在任何条件下不首先使用核武器的原则保持一致，中华人民共和国第二炮兵部队只在敌方首先对我方实行核打击之后，在中央最高领导层的指示下，对敌方施展报复性战术核武器打击。”

"In accord with our national principle not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, the Second Artillery's strategic nuclear forces can carry out a retaliatory nuclear attack against the enemy, following the command of the 'high leadership,' only after the enemy has first attacked us with nuclear weapons."

尽管美国政府并不十分愿意做出类似的承诺，但是美国在常规武器上压倒一切的力量优势以及军队的整体高质量这两大事实命中注定，美国只有在阻止中国对自己进行核打击的时候才会考虑动用核武器。在《美国核力量回顾报告》中，有关部门为了降低核武器在美国国防政策中的地位，特别声明道“美国核打击力量的主要任务，是阻止美国及其盟友和合作者收到核武器攻击。”

Although the United States is unwilling to make a similar commitment, U.S. superiority in conventional weapons and overall military capabilities makes it unlikely the United States would consider using nuclear weapons for any purpose other than preventing a Chinese nuclear attack on the United States. The most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, in an effort to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy, declared that the "fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons...is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, our allies and partners."

因此，中美两国之间核战争的真正风险来自于两国常规冲突中可能发生的潜在误判或者沟通失调。中国当前针对未来可能与美国发生常规冲突时，制定的对于常规武器和核武器使用的种种战术，都是中国有意而为之的，目的是要创造一种不确定性。中国希望这种不确定性能够约束美国的军事行动。然而不幸的是，中国的这种策略也可能导致美国对于其导弹部队的大规模袭击。

The risk of a nuclear war with China lies in the potential for misunderstanding or miscommunication during a conventional conflict. China's current strategy for employing its conventional and nuclear missile forces during a future conflict with the United States is self-consciously designed to create uncertainty, with the expectation that uncertainty will restrain U.S. military action. Unfortunately, China's strategy could also precipitate a large-scale U.S. attack on China's missile forces.

在战争时期，中国的一些军事策略可能会使美国的决策者们摸不着头脑。例如，中国的某些常规导弹部队与他们的核弹部队都驻扎在同一个军事基地中。而另一些导弹，其中的代表是东风-21，既能够装载常规弹头也可以装载核弹头。中国的常规战争计划蓝图要求对敌方的关键目标进行远距离“战术性”常规导弹攻击，这其中就包括那些驻扎在美国的盟友国家或者美国本土的军事基地。

There are several Chinese military policies that might confuse U.S. decision-makers in a time of war. Some Chinese conventional missiles are located on the same missile bases as Chinese nuclear missiles. Some Chinese missiles, particularly the DF-21, can be armed with either a conventional or a nuclear warhead. Chinese conventional war plans call for long-range "strategic" conventional missile strikes at key enemy targets, including U.S. military bases on allied soil and the continental United States.

如果这还不够让人如坠云里雾里的话，那么请看《第二炮兵技术实训》中包含的一个章节，主题是“降低使用核武器的门槛”，其中详细说明了在某些紧急情况时，用于动员核打击力量的步骤，以阻止敌军常规武器对中国某些目标的打击，例如核电设施、大坝、以及人口中心城市等。尽管《技术实训》这本教材旗帜鲜明地强调了如果动员核打击力量未能阻退敌方的袭击，中国将会坚持其“不首先使用”原则，但是美国的战争决策者们却未必会相信这一说法。为了佐证这一可能性，事实上美方发言人曾多次对中方发言人强调称他们认为中国“不首先使用核武器”的承诺是不可靠的。

If this were not confusing enough already, The Science of Second Artillery Operations contains a section on "lowering the nuclear threshold" that details procedures for alerting China's nuclear forces in a crisis for the express purpose of forcing a halt to an enemy's conventional attacks on a select group of targets, such as Chinese nuclear power plants, large dams and civilian population centers. Although the Science of Second Artillery Operations unambiguously states that if alerting China's nuclear missile forces fails to halt conventional enemy attacks China will hold firm to its "no first use" commitment, U.S. decision-makers might not believe it. Indeed, U.S. interlocutors have repeatedly told their Chinese counterparts that they do not find China's "no first use" pledge credible.

结合这几点因素，我们可以看到中美两国之间互相使用核武器不仅仅是一个幌子。如果两个国家真的被卷入一场战争的话，这的确有可能就是未来。就像Lewis和薛理泰所解释的一样：

The combination of these factors makes a nuclear exchange between the United States and China not only plausible, but also probable if the two countries were to become embroiled in a military conflict. As Lewis and Xue explain,

“在形势高度紧张的情况下，如果中国的指挥部下令使用常规导弹攻击对手作为先发防御的手段，那么敌方及其联盟将不可能获即将袭来的导弹是常规的还是核导弹。在最坏的情况下，中国的第一轮常规武器攻势将会招致对方的反击，摧毁中国的核打击力量，使得整个事态上升到发生全面核战争的可能性大大增加。”

"If, in a time of high tension, the Chinese command authorized a conventional missile attack as an act of preemptive self-defense, the enemy and its allies could not know if the incoming missiles were conventional or nuclear. In a worst-case scenario, a Chinese first-strike conventional attack could spark retaliation that destroys Chinese nuclear assets, creating a situation in which escalation to full-scale nuclear war would not just be possible, but even likely."

奥巴马政府正在重新调整美国的军事力量，作为对中国军力相对上升的回应，以便能够重新达到平衡。而中国则将这所谓的“重返亚洲”看成是对中国的遏制，尤其是在美国如“海空一体战”这样的军事政策的映衬之下更加显得明显。双方都想竭力避免发生冲突，但双方也都将对方视作潜在的敌人，并且都正在逐步增加对军事装备研发的投入，作为外交博弈手段失败后的另一种谈判方式。这些获得投资的军用技术包括那些能将战火烧到网络空间或外太空去的科技。中国与美国盟友之间的领土争端在部分地区点燃了中国民族主义者的怒火，而中国大陆因此发生政治风波的潜在可能性也或许会使得极端民族主义者上台，进而发动一场常规武器的冲突，并最终以核战争收场。

The Obama administration is "rebalancing" U.S. military forces in response to perceived relative increases in Chinese military capabilities. China sees this so-called "pivot" to Asia, especially when pared with new U.S. military strategies such as "Air-Sea Battle," as a policy of containment. Both sides downplay the risks of conflict, but they also see each other as potential adversaries, and are hedging their diplomatic bets with expensive investments in new military hardware, including new technologies that will expand the conflict into cyberspace and outer space. Territorial disputes between China and U.S. allies, rising nationalist sentiment in the region, and the potential for domestic political instability within China could produce any number of casussen belli that could trigger the conventional conflict that carries the risk of ending in a nuclear war.
正因为如此，美国和中国都无法找到一个有成效的办法能够让双方坐下来就发生核战争的风险进行讨论，这是一个十分让人恼火的事实，当然就更不要奢望双方能够携手降低这个风险了。中国政府显然过分沉迷于政治心术和军事上的不安全感，以至于这种心理上的困扰让他们制订了在面对与美国可能的冲突中依赖于各种军事不透明与军事假象的战略。而另一方面，现在的美国政府，就像Jeffrey Lewis在最近的一篇关于美国外务政策的文章中指出的那样，正在被所谓“一切尽在国军掌握”的假象所迷惑，并幻想着“能够在与中国的核武器对抗中取得最终胜利”美国不愿承认自己在中国的核打击面前有多么脆弱的事实正在催生着一场难分胜负的军备竞赛，即每一次试图实现“一切尽在掌握”的努力都会被中国军事科技的最新进步所抵消，这不禁让人想起了一场新时期的冷战。

It is disturbing, therefore, that both the United States and China have failed to find a productive way to discuss the risks of nuclear war, much less begin to take steps to mitigate those risks. The Chinese government appears trapped in a psychology of political and military insecurity that fosters a strategic dependency on secrecy and deception as its "trump card" in a potential conflict with the United States. The U.S. government, as Jeffrey Lewis points out in a recent essay in Foreign Policy, is held captive by "the illusion of the winning move" that "holds out the prospect of fighting and winning a nuclear war against China." U.S. unwillingness to admit it is vulnerable to a Chinese nuclear attack is driving a slow motion arms race, reminiscent of the Cold War, where each new U.S. effort to find the winning move is checked by the latest Chinese advance in military technology.

在中美两国进行官方对话的同时，每个国家内部的悲观主义者也都在散布一些关于对方军事实力的耸人听闻的消息和令人恐惧的传言，这给公众舆论造成了非常坏的影响，也让两国政治首脑继续深化对话交流和军事合作变得更加困难。在两个国家之间日益在战略上互不信任的表象之下，两边的政府没有哪一个会愿意接受加大这种不信任的风险，尽管这样的风险是降低战争的可能性和维护和平而言是必需的。而战争的风险，尽管微乎其微，但是仍然在增长。

On the edges of the official competition, misanthropes in both nations spread sensational and frightening disinformation that poisons public discussion, making steps towards dialog and cooperation more difficult for political leaders to take. In the face of growing strategic distrust, neither government seems willing to accept the risks for peace that are necessary to minimize the risks of war, which, while still small, continue to grow.赫芬顿邮报：与中国发生核战争的可能性
The Risk of Nuclear War with China
作者:fallenangel1 发布日期:2012-09-23 浏览:15230
译文简介:
上周，有两项独立的研究均警告说，中国和美国如今都正在试图追求并贯彻一种可能会导致核战争的防守策略。
译文来源:
原创翻译：龙腾网 ht tp://w ww.ltaaa.com 翻译：fallenangel1 转载请注明出处

ht tp://ww w.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-kulacki/the-risk-of-nuclear-war-w_b_1903336.html
正文翻译:

本贴论坛地址：ht tp://w ww.ltaaa.com/bbs/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=88099&extra=page%3D1%26filter%3Dauthor%26orderby%3Ddateline&page=1

原标题：

The Risk of Nuclear War with China

与中国发生核战争的可能性

上周，有两项独立的研究均警告说，中国和美国如今都正在试图追求并贯彻一种可能会导致核战争的防守策略。

Last week two separate studies warned that China and the United States are pursuing military strategies and implementing defense policies that could lead to a nuclear war.

斯坦福大学的John Lewis和薛理泰两位研究人员非常详尽地总结出了一份有关中国核战争计划的说明，并在此基础上郑重地提出了如下所述的警告。

John Lewis and Xue Litai of Stanford University concluded a detailed exposition of China's nuclear war plans with a very sober warning.

“在一场常规武装冲突中，中美两国双方基于对于对方的误判，为了取得快速的胜利或者战术上的先机，将事态升级成为一场毫无预兆的核战争的风险是存在的。这种让双方都进退两难的境地不仅真实存在，而且还是非常危险的。”

"Both sides, clinging to incongruous assessments, run the risk of provoking unanticipated escalation to nuclear war by seeking a quick victory or tactical advantages in a conventional conflict. This dilemma is not only real, but perilous."

普林斯顿大学的Thomas Chirstensen也对相同的问题表达了忧虑，即在中国和美国之间发生的一场常规武装冲突有可能会以双方互扔核弹而收场。

Thomas Christensen of Princeton expressed concern about the same problem; the possibility that a conventional military conflict between the United States and China could end in a nuclear exchange.

“举例来说，如果在双方冲突中美国轰炸位于中国首都北京的政府部门、关键指挥部或者基础设施，而中国最高领导层认为这是其对其核打击能力的削弱或者认为这是美国即将发动核战的前奏的话，那么即使是反复强调‘绝不首先使用核武器’的中国也可能将冲突上升到核战争的高度。”

"For example, if strikes by the United States on China's conventional coercive capabilities or their critical command and control nodes and supporting infrastructure were to appear in Beijing as a conventional attack on its nuclear retaliatory capability or as a precursor to a nuclear first strike, even a China that generally adheres to a No-First-Use posture might escalate to the nuclear level."

然而，两项研究都没有暗示中国或美国的军政领导人主观上愿意在武装冲突的时候求胜于核武器。中国关于“在任何时间任何条件下”绝不首先使用核武器的承诺已经铭刻在中国导弹打击力量的每一个军官和士兵心中。在《第二炮兵技术实训》这本用于训练的机密教材中就这样明确写道：

Neither study suggests that the military or political leadership of China or the United States intends to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of a military conflict. China's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons "at any time under any circumstances" is drilled into the officers and soldiers of China's strategic missile forces. A classified text used to train those forces, The Science of Second Artillery Operations, unambiguously instructs,

“为了与我国在任何条件下不首先使用核武器的原则保持一致，中华人民共和国第二炮兵部队只在敌方首先对我方实行核打击之后，在中央最高领导层的指示下，对敌方施展报复性战术核武器打击。”

"In accord with our national principle not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, the Second Artillery's strategic nuclear forces can carry out a retaliatory nuclear attack against the enemy, following the command of the 'high leadership,' only after the enemy has first attacked us with nuclear weapons."

尽管美国政府并不十分愿意做出类似的承诺，但是美国在常规武器上压倒一切的力量优势以及军队的整体高质量这两大事实命中注定，美国只有在阻止中国对自己进行核打击的时候才会考虑动用核武器。在《美国核力量回顾报告》中，有关部门为了降低核武器在美国国防政策中的地位，特别声明道“美国核打击力量的主要任务，是阻止美国及其盟友和合作者收到核武器攻击。”

Although the United States is unwilling to make a similar commitment, U.S. superiority in conventional weapons and overall military capabilities makes it unlikely the United States would consider using nuclear weapons for any purpose other than preventing a Chinese nuclear attack on the United States. The most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, in an effort to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy, declared that the "fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons...is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, our allies and partners."

因此，中美两国之间核战争的真正风险来自于两国常规冲突中可能发生的潜在误判或者沟通失调。中国当前针对未来可能与美国发生常规冲突时，制定的对于常规武器和核武器使用的种种战术，都是中国有意而为之的，目的是要创造一种不确定性。中国希望这种不确定性能够约束美国的军事行动。然而不幸的是，中国的这种策略也可能导致美国对于其导弹部队的大规模袭击。

The risk of a nuclear war with China lies in the potential for misunderstanding or miscommunication during a conventional conflict. China's current strategy for employing its conventional and nuclear missile forces during a future conflict with the United States is self-consciously designed to create uncertainty, with the expectation that uncertainty will restrain U.S. military action. Unfortunately, China's strategy could also precipitate a large-scale U.S. attack on China's missile forces.

在战争时期，中国的一些军事策略可能会使美国的决策者们摸不着头脑。例如，中国的某些常规导弹部队与他们的核弹部队都驻扎在同一个军事基地中。而另一些导弹，其中的代表是东风-21，既能够装载常规弹头也可以装载核弹头。中国的常规战争计划蓝图要求对敌方的关键目标进行远距离“战术性”常规导弹攻击，这其中就包括那些驻扎在美国的盟友国家或者美国本土的军事基地。

There are several Chinese military policies that might confuse U.S. decision-makers in a time of war. Some Chinese conventional missiles are located on the same missile bases as Chinese nuclear missiles. Some Chinese missiles, particularly the DF-21, can be armed with either a conventional or a nuclear warhead. Chinese conventional war plans call for long-range "strategic" conventional missile strikes at key enemy targets, including U.S. military bases on allied soil and the continental United States.

如果这还不够让人如坠云里雾里的话，那么请看《第二炮兵技术实训》中包含的一个章节，主题是“降低使用核武器的门槛”，其中详细说明了在某些紧急情况时，用于动员核打击力量的步骤，以阻止敌军常规武器对中国某些目标的打击，例如核电设施、大坝、以及人口中心城市等。尽管《技术实训》这本教材旗帜鲜明地强调了如果动员核打击力量未能阻退敌方的袭击，中国将会坚持其“不首先使用”原则，但是美国的战争决策者们却未必会相信这一说法。为了佐证这一可能性，事实上美方发言人曾多次对中方发言人强调称他们认为中国“不首先使用核武器”的承诺是不可靠的。

If this were not confusing enough already, The Science of Second Artillery Operations contains a section on "lowering the nuclear threshold" that details procedures for alerting China's nuclear forces in a crisis for the express purpose of forcing a halt to an enemy's conventional attacks on a select group of targets, such as Chinese nuclear power plants, large dams and civilian population centers. Although the Science of Second Artillery Operations unambiguously states that if alerting China's nuclear missile forces fails to halt conventional enemy attacks China will hold firm to its "no first use" commitment, U.S. decision-makers might not believe it. Indeed, U.S. interlocutors have repeatedly told their Chinese counterparts that they do not find China's "no first use" pledge credible.

结合这几点因素，我们可以看到中美两国之间互相使用核武器不仅仅是一个幌子。如果两个国家真的被卷入一场战争的话，这的确有可能就是未来。就像Lewis和薛理泰所解释的一样：

The combination of these factors makes a nuclear exchange between the United States and China not only plausible, but also probable if the two countries were to become embroiled in a military conflict. As Lewis and Xue explain,

“在形势高度紧张的情况下，如果中国的指挥部下令使用常规导弹攻击对手作为先发防御的手段，那么敌方及其联盟将不可能获即将袭来的导弹是常规的还是核导弹。在最坏的情况下，中国的第一轮常规武器攻势将会招致对方的反击，摧毁中国的核打击力量，使得整个事态上升到发生全面核战争的可能性大大增加。”

"If, in a time of high tension, the Chinese command authorized a conventional missile attack as an act of preemptive self-defense, the enemy and its allies could not know if the incoming missiles were conventional or nuclear. In a worst-case scenario, a Chinese first-strike conventional attack could spark retaliation that destroys Chinese nuclear assets, creating a situation in which escalation to full-scale nuclear war would not just be possible, but even likely."

奥巴马政府正在重新调整美国的军事力量，作为对中国军力相对上升的回应，以便能够重新达到平衡。而中国则将这所谓的“重返亚洲”看成是对中国的遏制，尤其是在美国如“海空一体战”这样的军事政策的映衬之下更加显得明显。双方都想竭力避免发生冲突，但双方也都将对方视作潜在的敌人，并且都正在逐步增加对军事装备研发的投入，作为外交博弈手段失败后的另一种谈判方式。这些获得投资的军用技术包括那些能将战火烧到网络空间或外太空去的科技。中国与美国盟友之间的领土争端在部分地区点燃了中国民族主义者的怒火，而中国大陆因此发生政治风波的潜在可能性也或许会使得极端民族主义者上台，进而发动一场常规武器的冲突，并最终以核战争收场。

The Obama administration is "rebalancing" U.S. military forces in response to perceived relative increases in Chinese military capabilities. China sees this so-called "pivot" to Asia, especially when pared with new U.S. military strategies such as "Air-Sea Battle," as a policy of containment. Both sides downplay the risks of conflict, but they also see each other as potential adversaries, and are hedging their diplomatic bets with expensive investments in new military hardware, including new technologies that will expand the conflict into cyberspace and outer space. Territorial disputes between China and U.S. allies, rising nationalist sentiment in the region, and the potential for domestic political instability within China could produce any number of casussen belli that could trigger the conventional conflict that carries the risk of ending in a nuclear war.
正因为如此，美国和中国都无法找到一个有成效的办法能够让双方坐下来就发生核战争的风险进行讨论，这是一个十分让人恼火的事实，当然就更不要奢望双方能够携手降低这个风险了。中国政府显然过分沉迷于政治心术和军事上的不安全感，以至于这种心理上的困扰让他们制订了在面对与美国可能的冲突中依赖于各种军事不透明与军事假象的战略。而另一方面，现在的美国政府，就像Jeffrey Lewis在最近的一篇关于美国外务政策的文章中指出的那样，正在被所谓“一切尽在国军掌握”的假象所迷惑，并幻想着“能够在与中国的核武器对抗中取得最终胜利”美国不愿承认自己在中国的核打击面前有多么脆弱的事实正在催生着一场难分胜负的军备竞赛，即每一次试图实现“一切尽在掌握”的努力都会被中国军事科技的最新进步所抵消，这不禁让人想起了一场新时期的冷战。

It is disturbing, therefore, that both the United States and China have failed to find a productive way to discuss the risks of nuclear war, much less begin to take steps to mitigate those risks. The Chinese government appears trapped in a psychology of political and military insecurity that fosters a strategic dependency on secrecy and deception as its "trump card" in a potential conflict with the United States. The U.S. government, as Jeffrey Lewis points out in a recent essay in Foreign Policy, is held captive by "the illusion of the winning move" that "holds out the prospect of fighting and winning a nuclear war against China." U.S. unwillingness to admit it is vulnerable to a Chinese nuclear attack is driving a slow motion arms race, reminiscent of the Cold War, where each new U.S. effort to find the winning move is checked by the latest Chinese advance in military technology.

在中美两国进行官方对话的同时，每个国家内部的悲观主义者也都在散布一些关于对方军事实力的耸人听闻的消息和令人恐惧的传言，这给公众舆论造成了非常坏的影响，也让两国政治首脑继续深化对话交流和军事合作变得更加困难。在两个国家之间日益在战略上互不信任的表象之下，两边的政府没有哪一个会愿意接受加大这种不信任的风险，尽管这样的风险是降低战争的可能性和维护和平而言是必需的。而战争的风险，尽管微乎其微，但是仍然在增长。

On the edges of the official competition, misanthropes in both nations spread sensational and frightening disinformation that poisons public discussion, making steps towards dialog and cooperation more difficult for political leaders to take. In the face of growing strategic distrust, neither government seems willing to accept the risks for peace that are necessary to minimize the risks of war, which, while still small, continue to grow.