超级军网关于租借法案的问题 T-34在美国生产的可能性
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 05:11:28
二战时的租借法案 让美国充分发挥了其世界第一工业强国的实力。在战争过程中，美国可以凭许可证生产性能优越的英国墨林发动机， 可以为中国生产7.92毫米子弹。那为什么不引进T-34，美国生产的精工版的T-34战斗力应该大大优于盟军手里的其他中型坦克。二战时的租借法案 让美国充分发挥了其世界第一工业强国的实力。在战争过程中，美国可以凭许可证生产性能优越的英国墨林发动机， 可以为中国生产7.92毫米子弹。那为什么不引进T-34，美国生产的精工版的T-34战斗力应该大大优于盟军手里的其他中型坦克。
美国人可不是这么认为的
回复 2# agein
苏联人为什么不在美国买下几个工厂专门生产自己的装备呢
苏联人为什么不在美国买下几个工厂专门生产自己的装备呢
异想天开
前提都站不住脚
前提都站不住脚
回复 4# 万字军骑士
不完全是异想天开 ， 标准化是现代工业的基础，也是现代战争的基础。统一装备，统一后勤，这可以更加充分的发挥美国的民主国家兵工厂的潜力。
不完全是异想天开 ， 标准化是现代工业的基础，也是现代战争的基础。统一装备，统一后勤，这可以更加充分的发挥美国的民主国家兵工厂的潜力。
正是粗糙才是T34的关键啊，要是MD生产那只会复杂化…
Evaluation Of The T-34 And Kv Tanks By Engineers Of The Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Submitted By Firms, Officers And Members Of Military Commissions Responsible For Testing Tanks
The tanks were given to the U.S. by the Soviets at the end of 1942 for familiarization.
The condition of the tanks
The T-34 medium tank after driving 343 km, became completely disabled and that could not be fixed. The reason: owing to the extremely poor air filter system on the diesel, a large quantity of dirt got into the engine and a breakdown occurred, as a result of which the pistons and cylinders were damaged to such a degree that they were impossible to fix. The tank was withdrawn from tests and was to be shelled by the KV and American 3" gun of the M-10 tank [M10 «Wolverine» SP antitank gun]. After that, it would be sent to Aberdeen, where it would be analyzed and kept as an exhibit.
The heavy tank KV-1 is still functional. Tests were continued, although it had many mechanical defects.
The silhouette/configuration of the tanks
Everyone, without exception, approves of the shape of the hull of our tanks. The T-34's is particularly good. All are of the opinion that the shape of the T-34's hull is better than that of any American tank. The KV's is worse than on any current American tank.
Armor
A chemical analysis of the armor showed that on both tanks the armor plating has a shallow surface tempering, whereas the main mass of the armored plating is made of soft steel.
In this regard the Americans consider that by changing the technology used to temper the armored plating, it would be possible to significantly reduce its thickness while preserving its protective ability. As a result the weight of the tank could be decreased by 8-10%, with all the resulting benefits (an increase in speed, reduction in ground pressure, etc.)
Hull
The main deficiency is the permeability to water of the lower hull during a water crossings, as well as the upper hull during a rain. In a heavy rain lots of water flows through chinks/cracks, which leads to the disabling of the electrical equipment and even the ammunition.
The Americans liked how the ammunition is stowed.
Turret
The main weakness is that it is very tight. The Americans couldn't understand how our tankers could fit inside during a winter, when they wear sheepskin jackets [The Americans tested T-34 Model 1941 with a two-men turret]. The electrical mechanism for rotating the turret is very bad. The motor is weak, very overloaded and sparks horribly, as a result of which the device regulating the speed of the rotation burns out, and the teeth of the cogwheels break into pieces. They recommend replace it with a hydraulic or simply manual system.
Armament
The F-34 gun is a very good. It is simple, very reliable and easy to service. Its weakness is that the muzzle velocity of AP round is significantly inferior to the American 3" gun (3200 feet versus 5700 feet per second).
Optic
The general opinion: the best construction in the world. Incomparable with any existing tanks or any under development.
Tracks
The Americans like very much the idea of a steel tracks. But they believe that until they receive the results of the comparative performance of steel vs rubber tracks on American tanks in Tunis and other active fronts, there is no reason for changing from the American solution of rubber bushings and pads.
The deficiencies in our tracks from their viewpoint results from the lightness of their construction. They can easily be damaged by small-calibre and mortar rounds. The pins are extremely poorly tempered and made of a poor steel. As a result, they quickly wear and the track often breaks. The idea of having loose track pins that are held in place by a cam welded to the side of the hull, at first was greatly liked by the Americans. But when in use under certain operating conditions, the pins would become bent which often resulted in the track rupturing. The Americans consider that if the armour is reduced in thickness the resultant weight saving can be used to make the tracks heavier and more reliable.
Suspension
On the T-34, it is poor. The Christie's suspension was tested long time ago by the Americans, and unconditionally rejected. On our tanks, as a result of the poor steel on the springs, it very quickly (unclear word) and as a result clearance is noticeably reduced. On the KV the suspension is very good.
Engine
The diesel is good and light. The idea of using diesel engines on tanks is shared in full by American specialists and military personnel. Unfortunately, diesel engines produced in U.S. factories are used by the navy and, therefore, the army is deprived of the possibility of installing diesels in its tanks.
The deficiency of our diesels is the criminally poor air cleaners on the T-34. The Americans consider that only a saboteur could have constructed such a device. They also don't understand why in our manuals it is called oil-bath. Their tests in a laboratory showed that:
the air cleaner doesn't clean at all the air which is drawn into the motor;
its capacity does not allow for the flow of the necessary quantity of air, even when the motor is idling. As a result, the motor does not achieve its full capacity. Dirt getting into the cylinders leads them to quickly wear out, compression drops, and the engine loses even more power. In addition, the filter was manufactured, from a mechanical point of view, extremely primitively: in places the spot-welding of the electric welding has burned through the metal, leading to leakage of oil etc [this claim was noticed and later variants of T-34 received the new «Cyclon» filter]. On the KV the filter is better manufactured, but it does not secure the flow in sufficient quantity of normal cleaned air. On both motors the starters are poor, being weak and of unreliable construction.
Transmission
Without a doubt, poor. An interesting thing happened. Those working on the transmission of the KV were struck that it was very much like those transmissions on which they had worked 12–15 years ago. The firm was questioned. The firm sent the blueprints of their transmission type A-23. To everyone's surprise, the blueprints of our transmission turned out to be a copy of those sent. The Americans were surprised not that we were copying their design, but that we were copying a design that they had rejected 15–20 years ago. The Americans consider that, from the point of view of the designer, installing such a transmission in the tank would create an inhuman harshness for the driver (hard to work). On the T-34 the transmission is also very poor. When it was being operated, the cogs completely fell to pieces (on all the cogwheels). A chemical analysis of the cogs on the cogwheels showed that their thermal treatment is very poor and does not in any way meet American standards for such mechanisms.
Side friction clutches
Out of a doubt, very poor. In USA, they rejected the installation of friction clutches, even on tractors (never mind tanks), several years ago. In addition to the fallaciousness of the very principle, our friction clutches are extremely carelessly machined from low-quality steel, which quickly causes wear and tear, accelerates the penetration of dirt into the drum and in no way ensures reliable functioning.
General comments
From the American point of view, our tanks are slow [Americans got the T-34 with a 4-speed gearbox. With a such gearbox T-34 could use the 4th speed on a firm and even surface — i.e. on paved roads. Thus, the max speed on the cross-country was 25.6 km/h. On later modifications there was a 5-speed gearbox to be installed. This gearbox allowed to drive with a 30.5 km/h]. Both our tanks can climb an incline better than any American tank. The welding of the armor plating is extremely crude and careless. The radio sets in laboratory tests turned out to be not bad. However, because of poor shielding and poor protection, after installation in the tanks the sets did not manage to establish normal communications at distances greater than 10 miles. The compactness of the radio sets and their intelligent placement in the tanks was pleasing. The machining of equipment components and parts was, with few exceptions, very poor. In particular, the Americans were troubled by the disgraceful design and extremely poor work on the transmission links on the T-34. After much torment they made a new ones and replaced ours. All the tanks mechanisms demand very frequent fine-tuning.
Conclusions, suggestions
On both tanks, quickly replace the air cleaners with models with greater capacity capable of actually cleaning the air.
The technology for tempering the armor plating should be changed. This would increase the protectiveness of the armor, either by using an equivalent thickness or, by reducing the thickness, lowering the weight and, accordingly, the use of metal.
Make the tracks thicker.
Replace the existing transmission of outdated design with the American «Final Drive,» which would significantly increase the tanks manoeuvrability.
Abandon the use of friction clutches.
Simplify the construction of small components, increase their reliability and decrease to the maximum extent possible the need to constantly make adjustments.
Comparing American and Russian tanks, it is clear that driving Russian tanks is much harder. A virtuosity is demanded of Russian drivers in changing gear on the move, special experience in using friction clutches, great experience as a mechanic, and the ability to keep tanks in working condition (adjustments and repairs of components, which are constantly becoming disabled). This greatly complicates the training of tankers and drivers.
Judging by samples, Russians when producing tanks pay little attention to careful machining or the finishing and technology of small parts and components, which leads to the loss of the advantage what would otherwise accrue from what on the whole are well designed tanks.
Despite the advantages of the use of diesel, the good contours of the tanks, thick armor, good and reliable armaments, the successful design of the tracks etc., Russian tanks are significantly inferior to American tanks in their simplicity of driving, manoeuvrability, the strength of firing (reference to muzzle velocity), speed, the reliability of mechanical construction and the ease of keeping them running.
The head of the 2nd Department of the Main Intelligence Department of the Red Army, major-general Khlopov
The tanks were given to the U.S. by the Soviets at the end of 1942 for familiarization.
The condition of the tanks
The T-34 medium tank after driving 343 km, became completely disabled and that could not be fixed. The reason: owing to the extremely poor air filter system on the diesel, a large quantity of dirt got into the engine and a breakdown occurred, as a result of which the pistons and cylinders were damaged to such a degree that they were impossible to fix. The tank was withdrawn from tests and was to be shelled by the KV and American 3" gun of the M-10 tank [M10 «Wolverine» SP antitank gun]. After that, it would be sent to Aberdeen, where it would be analyzed and kept as an exhibit.
The heavy tank KV-1 is still functional. Tests were continued, although it had many mechanical defects.
The silhouette/configuration of the tanks
Everyone, without exception, approves of the shape of the hull of our tanks. The T-34's is particularly good. All are of the opinion that the shape of the T-34's hull is better than that of any American tank. The KV's is worse than on any current American tank.
Armor
A chemical analysis of the armor showed that on both tanks the armor plating has a shallow surface tempering, whereas the main mass of the armored plating is made of soft steel.
In this regard the Americans consider that by changing the technology used to temper the armored plating, it would be possible to significantly reduce its thickness while preserving its protective ability. As a result the weight of the tank could be decreased by 8-10%, with all the resulting benefits (an increase in speed, reduction in ground pressure, etc.)
Hull
The main deficiency is the permeability to water of the lower hull during a water crossings, as well as the upper hull during a rain. In a heavy rain lots of water flows through chinks/cracks, which leads to the disabling of the electrical equipment and even the ammunition.
The Americans liked how the ammunition is stowed.
Turret
The main weakness is that it is very tight. The Americans couldn't understand how our tankers could fit inside during a winter, when they wear sheepskin jackets [The Americans tested T-34 Model 1941 with a two-men turret]. The electrical mechanism for rotating the turret is very bad. The motor is weak, very overloaded and sparks horribly, as a result of which the device regulating the speed of the rotation burns out, and the teeth of the cogwheels break into pieces. They recommend replace it with a hydraulic or simply manual system.
Armament
The F-34 gun is a very good. It is simple, very reliable and easy to service. Its weakness is that the muzzle velocity of AP round is significantly inferior to the American 3" gun (3200 feet versus 5700 feet per second).
Optic
The general opinion: the best construction in the world. Incomparable with any existing tanks or any under development.
Tracks
The Americans like very much the idea of a steel tracks. But they believe that until they receive the results of the comparative performance of steel vs rubber tracks on American tanks in Tunis and other active fronts, there is no reason for changing from the American solution of rubber bushings and pads.
The deficiencies in our tracks from their viewpoint results from the lightness of their construction. They can easily be damaged by small-calibre and mortar rounds. The pins are extremely poorly tempered and made of a poor steel. As a result, they quickly wear and the track often breaks. The idea of having loose track pins that are held in place by a cam welded to the side of the hull, at first was greatly liked by the Americans. But when in use under certain operating conditions, the pins would become bent which often resulted in the track rupturing. The Americans consider that if the armour is reduced in thickness the resultant weight saving can be used to make the tracks heavier and more reliable.
Suspension
On the T-34, it is poor. The Christie's suspension was tested long time ago by the Americans, and unconditionally rejected. On our tanks, as a result of the poor steel on the springs, it very quickly (unclear word) and as a result clearance is noticeably reduced. On the KV the suspension is very good.
Engine
The diesel is good and light. The idea of using diesel engines on tanks is shared in full by American specialists and military personnel. Unfortunately, diesel engines produced in U.S. factories are used by the navy and, therefore, the army is deprived of the possibility of installing diesels in its tanks.
The deficiency of our diesels is the criminally poor air cleaners on the T-34. The Americans consider that only a saboteur could have constructed such a device. They also don't understand why in our manuals it is called oil-bath. Their tests in a laboratory showed that:
the air cleaner doesn't clean at all the air which is drawn into the motor;
its capacity does not allow for the flow of the necessary quantity of air, even when the motor is idling. As a result, the motor does not achieve its full capacity. Dirt getting into the cylinders leads them to quickly wear out, compression drops, and the engine loses even more power. In addition, the filter was manufactured, from a mechanical point of view, extremely primitively: in places the spot-welding of the electric welding has burned through the metal, leading to leakage of oil etc [this claim was noticed and later variants of T-34 received the new «Cyclon» filter]. On the KV the filter is better manufactured, but it does not secure the flow in sufficient quantity of normal cleaned air. On both motors the starters are poor, being weak and of unreliable construction.
Transmission
Without a doubt, poor. An interesting thing happened. Those working on the transmission of the KV were struck that it was very much like those transmissions on which they had worked 12–15 years ago. The firm was questioned. The firm sent the blueprints of their transmission type A-23. To everyone's surprise, the blueprints of our transmission turned out to be a copy of those sent. The Americans were surprised not that we were copying their design, but that we were copying a design that they had rejected 15–20 years ago. The Americans consider that, from the point of view of the designer, installing such a transmission in the tank would create an inhuman harshness for the driver (hard to work). On the T-34 the transmission is also very poor. When it was being operated, the cogs completely fell to pieces (on all the cogwheels). A chemical analysis of the cogs on the cogwheels showed that their thermal treatment is very poor and does not in any way meet American standards for such mechanisms.
Side friction clutches
Out of a doubt, very poor. In USA, they rejected the installation of friction clutches, even on tractors (never mind tanks), several years ago. In addition to the fallaciousness of the very principle, our friction clutches are extremely carelessly machined from low-quality steel, which quickly causes wear and tear, accelerates the penetration of dirt into the drum and in no way ensures reliable functioning.
General comments
From the American point of view, our tanks are slow [Americans got the T-34 with a 4-speed gearbox. With a such gearbox T-34 could use the 4th speed on a firm and even surface — i.e. on paved roads. Thus, the max speed on the cross-country was 25.6 km/h. On later modifications there was a 5-speed gearbox to be installed. This gearbox allowed to drive with a 30.5 km/h]. Both our tanks can climb an incline better than any American tank. The welding of the armor plating is extremely crude and careless. The radio sets in laboratory tests turned out to be not bad. However, because of poor shielding and poor protection, after installation in the tanks the sets did not manage to establish normal communications at distances greater than 10 miles. The compactness of the radio sets and their intelligent placement in the tanks was pleasing. The machining of equipment components and parts was, with few exceptions, very poor. In particular, the Americans were troubled by the disgraceful design and extremely poor work on the transmission links on the T-34. After much torment they made a new ones and replaced ours. All the tanks mechanisms demand very frequent fine-tuning.
Conclusions, suggestions
On both tanks, quickly replace the air cleaners with models with greater capacity capable of actually cleaning the air.
The technology for tempering the armor plating should be changed. This would increase the protectiveness of the armor, either by using an equivalent thickness or, by reducing the thickness, lowering the weight and, accordingly, the use of metal.
Make the tracks thicker.
Replace the existing transmission of outdated design with the American «Final Drive,» which would significantly increase the tanks manoeuvrability.
Abandon the use of friction clutches.
Simplify the construction of small components, increase their reliability and decrease to the maximum extent possible the need to constantly make adjustments.
Comparing American and Russian tanks, it is clear that driving Russian tanks is much harder. A virtuosity is demanded of Russian drivers in changing gear on the move, special experience in using friction clutches, great experience as a mechanic, and the ability to keep tanks in working condition (adjustments and repairs of components, which are constantly becoming disabled). This greatly complicates the training of tankers and drivers.
Judging by samples, Russians when producing tanks pay little attention to careful machining or the finishing and technology of small parts and components, which leads to the loss of the advantage what would otherwise accrue from what on the whole are well designed tanks.
Despite the advantages of the use of diesel, the good contours of the tanks, thick armor, good and reliable armaments, the successful design of the tracks etc., Russian tanks are significantly inferior to American tanks in their simplicity of driving, manoeuvrability, the strength of firing (reference to muzzle velocity), speed, the reliability of mechanical construction and the ease of keeping them running.
The head of the 2nd Department of the Main Intelligence Department of the Red Army, major-general Khlopov
那么美国需要大批量造柴油机、85炮 额 就算初期用76炮 那也要新造一种76炮
M4和原来的M3都用一样的76炮 发动机也是航发汽油机改过来的 对已有生产设施能够最大限度利用
如果真的能够特许T34 那炮也是用回M3的76 而后期苏联85炮显然没有17磅好 而且 苏式武器是公制尺寸 美国仿制起来还得换算英制 很有点麻烦
M4和原来的M3都用一样的76炮 发动机也是航发汽油机改过来的 对已有生产设施能够最大限度利用
如果真的能够特许T34 那炮也是用回M3的76 而后期苏联85炮显然没有17磅好 而且 苏式武器是公制尺寸 美国仿制起来还得换算英制 很有点麻烦
:L楼上的，M4和原来的M3都用一样的75炮，不是后来的76炮。76是在高炮的基础上改的。装76的M4一点儿也不比T34-85差，而且后期型的M4/76比T34-85的防护强多了。
baoheyi 发表于 2010-3-18 10:59 
复杂化那是德国佬，美帝连自由轮这样粗糙的东西都敢造，美帝的精髓就是大规模快速生产，如果造出的T34是美帝自用，那大概会把火炮和发动机换成自家的产品，然后用更多的T34去淹没西线，如果是造了送到苏联去，那生产方式会进一步简化，然后老毛子还觉得比自家造的好
复杂化那是德国佬，美帝连自由轮这样粗糙的东西都敢造，美帝的精髓就是大规模快速生产，如果造出的T34是美帝自用，那大概会把火炮和发动机换成自家的产品，然后用更多的T34去淹没西线，如果是造了送到苏联去，那生产方式会进一步简化，然后老毛子还觉得比自家造的好
楼上的，M4和原来的M3都用一样的75炮，不是后来的76炮。76是在高炮的基础上改的。装76的M4一点儿也不比T3 ...
ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 12:27
除了突击版本E2，没哪个M4敢说防护吃定T-34-85。个人认为T-34-85的防护比后期非E2版本的普通M4好很多。不服咱们可以PK下...
楼上的，M4和原来的M3都用一样的75炮，不是后来的76炮。76是在高炮的基础上改的。装76的M4一点儿也不比T3 ...
ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 12:27
除了突击版本E2，没哪个M4敢说防护吃定T-34-85。个人认为T-34-85的防护比后期非E2版本的普通M4好很多。不服咱们可以PK下...
M4有用柴油机的型号啊
而且是数十缸的星形柴油机........
而且是数十缸的星形柴油机........
回复 11# dply
PK就PK，44年上半年开始普及M4/7，达到平均每个排都有1辆的水平，而淘汰下来的M4/75也在战地就不断的被改造为M4/76。到44年底投入战斗的美军就有全M4/76的装甲师了。当然，这些师战斗损失的补充是有什么补什么，经常包括M4/75。远距离上用76的高速穿甲弹秒死你，等你接近到可以发挥威力的距离上还能剩下多少？不知是T34-85多，还是围观的M4/76多。当然，我指的是视野良好的平原交战状态。
PK就PK，44年上半年开始普及M4/7，达到平均每个排都有1辆的水平，而淘汰下来的M4/75也在战地就不断的被改造为M4/76。到44年底投入战斗的美军就有全M4/76的装甲师了。当然，这些师战斗损失的补充是有什么补什么，经常包括M4/75。远距离上用76的高速穿甲弹秒死你，等你接近到可以发挥威力的距离上还能剩下多少？不知是T34-85多，还是围观的M4/76多。当然，我指的是视野良好的平原交战状态。
反正有足够的M4了，换t34也不见得有啥质的飞跃，何苦折腾呢!
ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 13:46
我在说防护。:L
我在说防护。:L
回复 dply
PK就PK，44年上半年开始普及M4/7，达到平均每个排都有1辆的水平，而淘汰下来的M4/75也在战地就不断的被改造为M4/76。到44年底投入战斗的美军就有全M4/76的装甲师了。当然，这些师战斗损失的补充是有什么补什么，经常包括M4/75。远距离上用76的高速穿甲弹秒死你，等你接近到可以发挥威力的距离上还能剩下多少？不知是T34-85多，还是围观的M4/76多。当然，我指的是视野良好的平原交战状态。
ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 13:46
二战结束时苏联共生产了22559辆T-34/85，同期美国共生产了3748辆M-4/76。
回复 dply
PK就PK，44年上半年开始普及M4/7，达到平均每个排都有1辆的水平，而淘汰下来的M4/75也在战地就不断的被改造为M4/76。到44年底投入战斗的美军就有全M4/76的装甲师了。当然，这些师战斗损失的补充是有什么补什么，经常包括M4/75。远距离上用76的高速穿甲弹秒死你，等你接近到可以发挥威力的距离上还能剩下多少？不知是T34-85多，还是围观的M4/76多。当然，我指的是视野良好的平原交战状态。
ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 13:46
二战结束时苏联共生产了22559辆T-34/85，同期美国共生产了3748辆M-4/76。
Fan1 发表于 2010-3-18 14:51
朋友，M4/76并不都是全新生产的，很多都是原来的M4/75在战地升级而来，前面的那个朋友提到的重装甲防护型的M4A3E2“Jumbo”，新生产的也只有254辆而已，但后方的军械所用老的M4升级改装了至少200多辆。
朋友，M4/76并不都是全新生产的，很多都是原来的M4/75在战地升级而来，前面的那个朋友提到的重装甲防护型的M4A3E2“Jumbo”，新生产的也只有254辆而已，但后方的军械所用老的M4升级改装了至少200多辆。
友，M4/76并不都是全新生产的，很多都是原来的M4/75在战地升级而来，前面的那个朋友提到的重装甲防护型的M4A3E2“Jumbo”，新生产的也只有254辆而已，但后方的军械所用老的M4升级改装了至少200多辆。ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 15:19
T-34/85的产量是22559辆，M-4的总产量是48000-50000辆左右，其中大约22246辆提供给其他盟国，美军自己大概有20000-25000辆左右。你认为前线军械所或者集团军及集团军群的军械单位有能力将这些的坦克改装过来吗？能在前线改出500辆就已经算是很了不起的事了。
友，M4/76并不都是全新生产的，很多都是原来的M4/75在战地升级而来，前面的那个朋友提到的重装甲防护型的M4A3E2“Jumbo”，新生产的也只有254辆而已，但后方的军械所用老的M4升级改装了至少200多辆。ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 15:19
T-34/85的产量是22559辆，M-4的总产量是48000-50000辆左右，其中大约22246辆提供给其他盟国，美军自己大概有20000-25000辆左右。你认为前线军械所或者集团军及集团军群的军械单位有能力将这些的坦克改装过来吗？能在前线改出500辆就已经算是很了不起的事了。
朋友，M4/76并不都是全新生产的，很多都是原来的M4/75在战地升级而来，前面的那个朋友提到的重装甲防护型的M4A3E2“Jumbo”，新生产的也只有254辆而已，但后方的军械所用老的M4升级改装了至少200多辆。ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 15:19
粗略地翻了两本关于M4的书，鱼鹰的<Sherman Medium Tank 1942-45>和Hunnicutt 所著<Sherman>，M4A3E2部分都没有提到红字所述....
朋友，M4/76并不都是全新生产的，很多都是原来的M4/75在战地升级而来，前面的那个朋友提到的重装甲防护型的M4A3E2“Jumbo”，新生产的也只有254辆而已，但后方的军械所用老的M4升级改装了至少200多辆。ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 15:19
粗略地翻了两本关于M4的书，鱼鹰的<Sherman Medium Tank 1942-45>和Hunnicutt 所著<Sherman>，M4A3E2部分都没有提到红字所述....
投入实战的中型坦克包括：M3“格兰特”中型坦克、M4“谢尔曼”中型坦克（75毫米炮）、M4“谢尔曼”中型坦克（76毫米炮）、M26“潘兴”中型坦克（译者注：战时分为重型坦克）。诺曼底登陆时，所有坦克营都装备75毫米炮的M4中型坦克。1944年6月底至7月初，一批76毫米炮的M4中型坦克投入战场，开始替代75毫米炮的M4。被替换下来的75毫米炮的M4在条件允许时就由军械工场换装76毫米炮。到1944年末，通常每个排都有1辆76毫米炮的M4。当第8、9、10和11装甲师于1944年底抵达的时候全部装备76毫米炮的M4。1945年到达的第12、13、14、16和20装甲师同样如此。当然，这些师战斗损失的补充是有什么补什么，经常包括75毫米炮的M4。
M4一个重要改型是M4A3E2“Jumbo”突击坦克。这种改型拥有厚重的装甲（尽管全部生产型出厂时都装备75毫米炮）。新生产的Jumbo很少，只有254辆，但美国第一集团军和第三集团军的军械工场成功将许多M4改装成Jumbo（1945年1-3月，第三集团军“生产”了108辆改装Jumbo，1944年“生产”了大约100辆）。Jumbo的发放是混杂的。通常是分配给装甲师，但第一集团军的独立坦克营中也能找到它们的身影。一般来说，每个连拥有的Jumbo不超过1辆，但部分装甲师把它们集中组成坦克营中1个全Jumbo连。
M4一个重要改型是M4A3E2“Jumbo”突击坦克。这种改型拥有厚重的装甲（尽管全部生产型出厂时都装备75毫米炮）。新生产的Jumbo很少，只有254辆，但美国第一集团军和第三集团军的军械工场成功将许多M4改装成Jumbo（1945年1-3月，第三集团军“生产”了108辆改装Jumbo，1944年“生产”了大约100辆）。Jumbo的发放是混杂的。通常是分配给装甲师，但第一集团军的独立坦克营中也能找到它们的身影。一般来说，每个连拥有的Jumbo不超过1辆，但部分装甲师把它们集中组成坦克营中1个全Jumbo连。
:hug:但愿我找的资料是错误的
Fan1 发表于 2010-3-18 19:39
:D我有说过战地改造的M4/76的数量么？你的理解能力怎么这样啊。
以前找到的资料，不知真假：
M4谢尔曼中型坦克：1942年8017辆，1943年21231辆，1944年3504辆，1945年651辆
M4谢尔曼（76）中型坦克：1944年7135辆，1945年3748辆
M4谢尔曼自行火炮：1944年2286辆，1945年2394辆
M10狼獾坦克歼击车：1942年639辆，1943年6067辆
M36强击者坦克歼击车：1944年1400辆，1945年924辆
M7牧师自行火炮：1942年2028辆，1943年786辆，1944年1164辆，1945年338辆
M12自行火炮：1942年60辆，1943年40辆
============================
可以确认的是M7、M10、M36中有相当大的比例是利用M4坦克底盘改装而成，M4/75改装成M4/76并不困难，而且的确有相当数量的M4/75被改装为M4/76。
:D我有说过战地改造的M4/76的数量么？你的理解能力怎么这样啊。
以前找到的资料，不知真假：
M4谢尔曼中型坦克：1942年8017辆，1943年21231辆，1944年3504辆，1945年651辆
M4谢尔曼（76）中型坦克：1944年7135辆，1945年3748辆
M4谢尔曼自行火炮：1944年2286辆，1945年2394辆
M10狼獾坦克歼击车：1942年639辆，1943年6067辆
M36强击者坦克歼击车：1944年1400辆，1945年924辆
M7牧师自行火炮：1942年2028辆，1943年786辆，1944年1164辆，1945年338辆
M12自行火炮：1942年60辆，1943年40辆
============================
可以确认的是M7、M10、M36中有相当大的比例是利用M4坦克底盘改装而成，M4/75改装成M4/76并不困难，而且的确有相当数量的M4/75被改装为M4/76。
ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 13:46
再次说一句前提是你的高速穿甲弹已经完善到能够打到敌人了才有远距离接战的可能，而事实上这种数据上逆天的高速穿甲弹是一种打出去就会被风吹的乱飘得家伙，距离越远情况越严重更本就不能施展它逆天的本领。
再次说一句前提是你的高速穿甲弹已经完善到能够打到敌人了才有远距离接战的可能，而事实上这种数据上逆天的高速穿甲弹是一种打出去就会被风吹的乱飘得家伙，距离越远情况越严重更本就不能施展它逆天的本领。
baoheyi 发表于 2010-3-18 10:59
m4不见得精细到哪里，除了水套。
m4不见得精细到哪里，除了水套。
7楼的资料不错，看来美国在生产技术方面给苏联提供一些资料，就可以大大提高T34的作战效能啊
post3030 发表于 2010-3-18 20:47
原来可以在2200公尺打穿110毫米以上垂直装甲的76毫米高速穿甲弹的实际效果那么差啊，谢谢科普。我就说嘛，76 毫米坦克炮的威力怎么可能好到哪儿去呢？能从正面击毁老虎算什么本事啊，对吧
原来可以在2200公尺打穿110毫米以上垂直装甲的76毫米高速穿甲弹的实际效果那么差啊，谢谢科普。我就说嘛，76 毫米坦克炮的威力怎么可能好到哪儿去呢？能从正面击毁老虎算什么本事啊，对吧
且不说高速轻弹二公里外都不知道飘哪去了,HVAP这种弹药一遇到倾斜装甲非常容易弹飞....
看看纸面数据各种无敌的英米鬼畜高速弹在黑豹倾斜前甲上的表现
U.S. Army Firing Tests conducted August 1944 by 12th U.S. Army Group at Isigny, France.
Board of Officers
APO 655
30 August 1944
SUBJECT: Final report of board of officers appointed to determine comparative effectiveness of ammunition of 76mm gun and 17pdr gun.
TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group.
1. The board convened pursuant to the attached order at the firing range established by First U.S. Army near Isigny, France at 1030 hours, 19 August 1944 and conducted firing tests against the front plate of German Panther Tanks. The firing was continued, as the weather and the availability of target tanks permitted, on 20 and 21 August 1944. Because of the urgency of the test, a preliminary report, dated 21 August 1944, was submitted on 22 August 1944.
... ...中间无关省略，下面是重点... ...
(1) At 600 yards, 17pdr APCBC penetrated the lower nose of tank No.1 (average plate), while 76mm HVAP failed to penetrate.
(2) At 400 yards, one round out of four fair hits of 17pdr SABOT penetrated the glacis of tank No.2 (best plate). This was the only penetration of this plate by a fair hit with any of the ammunitions (including 76mm HVAP w/17pdr APBC propellant, 76mm HVAP w/17pdr SABOT propellant) at ranges 200 yards and over.
(3) At 400 yards, one round out of one fair hit with 17pdr APCBC and one round out of one hit with 17pdr SABOT penetrated the lower nose of tank No.2 (best plate). Both rounds of 76mm APC, M62 failed to penetrate, and one round of 76mm HVAP penetrated while the second round failed to penetrate. Two rounds out of two hits of 76mm HVAP w/17pdr SABOT propellant also penetrated.
(4) At 200 yards one fair hit with each of the standard ammunitions failed to penetrate the glacis of tank No.2 (best plate). The relative depths of the partial penetrations at this range were as follows:
(a) 17pdr APCBC - 2"
(b) 17pdr SABOT - 1 7/8"
(c) 76mm HVAP - 1 5/16"
(d) 76mm APC, M62 - 1"
(5) At 200 yards firing at the glacis of tank No.3 (average plate) one round out of four fair hits with 76mm HVAP penetrated, this round, after partially penetrating, ...[illegible word]... and penetrated the plate ...[illegible word]... . One round of 17pdr SABOT penetrated and one round failed to penetrate at this range. One fair hit with 17pdr APCBC failed to penetrate, but cracked the plate. The second round striking within 6" of the first round penetrated.
(6) In contrast to the results obtained in this teast with 17pdr SABOT, in firing conducted by First U.S. Army at Balleroy on 10 July 44, 5 rounds were fired at the front plate of a Panther tank at 700 yards. Examination of pictures of this firing indicates that the first round struck the mantlet, the second between the track and the nose plate, the third at the junction of the nose and glacis and penetrated. The fourth and fifth were fair hits on the glacis and both penetrated. The conflict between these results and those obtained by the board is expalined by Col. A. G. Cole, Deputy Director of Artillery, Ministry of Supply. Col. Cole witnessed part of the test and states that the ammunition lot furnished the board had not been proof fired. He further states that, in his opinion, the lot is of sub-standard manufacture and if proof fired would not have been accepted.
(7) 76mm APC, M62 fair hits which failed to penetrate caused no cracking of the plate of average quality. 76mm HVAP, 17pdr SABOT, and 17pdr APCBC caused cracking in varying degrees. In general, 17pdr APCBC caused greater damage to the plate than 17pdr SABOT or 76mm HVAP.
看看纸面数据各种无敌的英米鬼畜高速弹在黑豹倾斜前甲上的表现
U.S. Army Firing Tests conducted August 1944 by 12th U.S. Army Group at Isigny, France.
Board of Officers
APO 655
30 August 1944
SUBJECT: Final report of board of officers appointed to determine comparative effectiveness of ammunition of 76mm gun and 17pdr gun.
TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group.
1. The board convened pursuant to the attached order at the firing range established by First U.S. Army near Isigny, France at 1030 hours, 19 August 1944 and conducted firing tests against the front plate of German Panther Tanks. The firing was continued, as the weather and the availability of target tanks permitted, on 20 and 21 August 1944. Because of the urgency of the test, a preliminary report, dated 21 August 1944, was submitted on 22 August 1944.
... ...中间无关省略，下面是重点... ...
(1) At 600 yards, 17pdr APCBC penetrated the lower nose of tank No.1 (average plate), while 76mm HVAP failed to penetrate.
(2) At 400 yards, one round out of four fair hits of 17pdr SABOT penetrated the glacis of tank No.2 (best plate). This was the only penetration of this plate by a fair hit with any of the ammunitions (including 76mm HVAP w/17pdr APBC propellant, 76mm HVAP w/17pdr SABOT propellant) at ranges 200 yards and over.
(3) At 400 yards, one round out of one fair hit with 17pdr APCBC and one round out of one hit with 17pdr SABOT penetrated the lower nose of tank No.2 (best plate). Both rounds of 76mm APC, M62 failed to penetrate, and one round of 76mm HVAP penetrated while the second round failed to penetrate. Two rounds out of two hits of 76mm HVAP w/17pdr SABOT propellant also penetrated.
(4) At 200 yards one fair hit with each of the standard ammunitions failed to penetrate the glacis of tank No.2 (best plate). The relative depths of the partial penetrations at this range were as follows:
(a) 17pdr APCBC - 2"
(b) 17pdr SABOT - 1 7/8"
(c) 76mm HVAP - 1 5/16"
(d) 76mm APC, M62 - 1"
(5) At 200 yards firing at the glacis of tank No.3 (average plate) one round out of four fair hits with 76mm HVAP penetrated, this round, after partially penetrating, ...[illegible word]... and penetrated the plate ...[illegible word]... . One round of 17pdr SABOT penetrated and one round failed to penetrate at this range. One fair hit with 17pdr APCBC failed to penetrate, but cracked the plate. The second round striking within 6" of the first round penetrated.
(6) In contrast to the results obtained in this teast with 17pdr SABOT, in firing conducted by First U.S. Army at Balleroy on 10 July 44, 5 rounds were fired at the front plate of a Panther tank at 700 yards. Examination of pictures of this firing indicates that the first round struck the mantlet, the second between the track and the nose plate, the third at the junction of the nose and glacis and penetrated. The fourth and fifth were fair hits on the glacis and both penetrated. The conflict between these results and those obtained by the board is expalined by Col. A. G. Cole, Deputy Director of Artillery, Ministry of Supply. Col. Cole witnessed part of the test and states that the ammunition lot furnished the board had not been proof fired. He further states that, in his opinion, the lot is of sub-standard manufacture and if proof fired would not have been accepted.
(7) 76mm APC, M62 fair hits which failed to penetrate caused no cracking of the plate of average quality. 76mm HVAP, 17pdr SABOT, and 17pdr APCBC caused cracking in varying degrees. In general, 17pdr APCBC caused greater damage to the plate than 17pdr SABOT or 76mm HVAP.
还不如送两辆缴获的黑豹去让美国人山寨呢，以美国的工业水准，月产1000也不是不可能的
ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 21:00
不知你是正话反说还是反话正说，不管了，能够击毁老虎不错乍看上是如此，但是实际使用还是得坦克兵说话，美英鬼畜从来都是避免正面与虎豹对抗的，面对虎豹坦克兵更愿意绕开他，绕不开也调来谢尔曼105从远距离轰击，只有万不得已的情况下才会相信不靠谱的高速轻弹，应该这样说，作为第一代高速穿甲弹没有问题那个才叫逆天呢。
不知你是正话反说还是反话正说，不管了，能够击毁老虎不错乍看上是如此，但是实际使用还是得坦克兵说话，美英鬼畜从来都是避免正面与虎豹对抗的，面对虎豹坦克兵更愿意绕开他，绕不开也调来谢尔曼105从远距离轰击，只有万不得已的情况下才会相信不靠谱的高速轻弹，应该这样说，作为第一代高速穿甲弹没有问题那个才叫逆天呢。
[:a10:]只知道M4/76谢尔曼的乘员专门弄来M10自行反坦克炮用的76钨芯弹保命用
iamsb 发表于 2010-3-18 11:04
纠正一下，作为反坦克武器17磅远优于85炮不假，但是17磅的榴弹就是一杯具，考虑到坦克部队的突破作战，总体还是85好一点。要是17磅真的打遍天下软硬通吃，萤火虫也没必要非跟短管谢尔曼混编到排
纠正一下，作为反坦克武器17磅远优于85炮不假，但是17磅的榴弹就是一杯具，考虑到坦克部队的突破作战，总体还是85好一点。要是17磅真的打遍天下软硬通吃，萤火虫也没必要非跟短管谢尔曼混编到排
ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 21:54
76炮啥时候跟3英寸炮通用弹药了？炮弹块头差好多撒
76炮啥时候跟3英寸炮通用弹药了？炮弹块头差好多撒
回复 7# dply
依稀记得这个文章是www.battlefield.ru上的，是吗？
依稀记得这个文章是www.battlefield.ru上的，是吗？
二战时的租借法案 让美国充分发挥了其世界第一工业强国的实力。在战争过程中，美国可以凭许可证生产性能优越的英国墨林发动机， 可以为中国生产7.92毫米子弹。那为什么不引进T-34，美国生产的精工版的T-34战斗力应该大大优于盟军手里的其他中型坦克。 ...
sszzrr 发表于 2010-3-18 10:20
因为美帝有可靠性更好的M4系列。
同期的M4什么时候比T-34差了？
二战时的租借法案 让美国充分发挥了其世界第一工业强国的实力。在战争过程中，美国可以凭许可证生产性能优越的英国墨林发动机， 可以为中国生产7.92毫米子弹。那为什么不引进T-34，美国生产的精工版的T-34战斗力应该大大优于盟军手里的其他中型坦克。 ...
sszzrr 发表于 2010-3-18 10:20
因为美帝有可靠性更好的M4系列。
同期的M4什么时候比T-34差了？
我有说过战地改造的M4/76的数量么？你的理解能力怎么这样啊。
以前找到的资料，不知真假：
M4谢尔曼中型坦克：1942年8017辆，1943年21231辆，1944年3504辆，1945年651辆
M4谢尔曼（76）中型坦克：1944年7135辆，1945年3748辆
M4谢尔曼自行火炮：1944年2286辆，1945年2394辆
M10狼獾坦克歼击车：1942年639辆，1943年6067辆
M36强击者坦克歼击车：1944年1400辆，1945年924辆
M7牧师自行火炮：1942年2028辆，1943年786辆，1944年1164辆，1945年338辆
M12自行火炮：1942年60辆，1943年40辆
============================
可以确认的是M7、M10、M36中有相当大的比例是利用M4坦克底盘改装而成，M4/75改装成M4/76并不困难，而且的确有相当数量的M4/75被改装为M4/76。ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 20:34
维基上有这组数据。我承认一时眼花把1944年的产量看漏了。有M4/75改M4/76的数据吗？
我有说过战地改造的M4/76的数量么？你的理解能力怎么这样啊。
以前找到的资料，不知真假：
M4谢尔曼中型坦克：1942年8017辆，1943年21231辆，1944年3504辆，1945年651辆
M4谢尔曼（76）中型坦克：1944年7135辆，1945年3748辆
M4谢尔曼自行火炮：1944年2286辆，1945年2394辆
M10狼獾坦克歼击车：1942年639辆，1943年6067辆
M36强击者坦克歼击车：1944年1400辆，1945年924辆
M7牧师自行火炮：1942年2028辆，1943年786辆，1944年1164辆，1945年338辆
M12自行火炮：1942年60辆，1943年40辆
============================
可以确认的是M7、M10、M36中有相当大的比例是利用M4坦克底盘改装而成，M4/75改装成M4/76并不困难，而且的确有相当数量的M4/75被改装为M4/76。ztz99a 发表于 2010-3-18 20:34
维基上有这组数据。我承认一时眼花把1944年的产量看漏了。有M4/75改M4/76的数据吗？
C2的潘泽尔四万 发表于 2010-3-19 07:38
恩。。。
恩。。。
且不说高速轻弹二公里外都不知道飘哪去了,HVAP这种弹药一遇到倾斜装甲非常容易弹飞....
dply 发表于 2010-3-18 21:08
按俄国人自己的测试，美制76炮穿甲威力胜于苏制85炮——当然前提是使用美国弹药。
另外，无论76还是85，绝大多数情况下都不会在2公里距离上就对敌开火，二战坦克交火距离普遍在1000米以下。
且不说高速轻弹二公里外都不知道飘哪去了,HVAP这种弹药一遇到倾斜装甲非常容易弹飞....
dply 发表于 2010-3-18 21:08
按俄国人自己的测试，美制76炮穿甲威力胜于苏制85炮——当然前提是使用美国弹药。
另外，无论76还是85，绝大多数情况下都不会在2公里距离上就对敌开火，二战坦克交火距离普遍在1000米以下。
papop 发表于 2010-3-19 08:28
貌似刚登陆诺曼底的那批美军的M4不算好吧。。。。。
貌似刚登陆诺曼底的那批美军的M4不算好吧。。。。。
C2的潘泽尔四万 发表于 2010-3-19 07:32
3英寸M7炮和76毫米M1炮不通弹药？{:3_82:}
3英寸M7炮和76毫米M1炮不通弹药？{:3_82:}