超级军网老外也开始看空三哥：金砖四国中，印度财政状况最令人 ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/05/03 10:02:31
希腊债务危机以后，全世界都开始关注主权债务风险，各国的财政状况被拿到放大镜下挨个检视。
最近还有点纳闷三哥为什么上窜下跳的要跟中国比GDP增速，原来他的财政问题已经被一些老外的投行和基金开始注意了，要知道国际热钱对三哥的经济是至关重要的。
大家都知道金融危机的本质是因为美国人借钱消费入不敷出，但三哥的财政赤字占GDP比例是12%，比美国人的9%还要高，这里面不知道有多少老毛子宰三哥的功劳。现在欧美为了怂恿印度在南亚牵制中国，放了大量热钱进印度给他鼓虚火。一旦阿三的问题被媒体开始报道，老美的随便那个评级机构给三哥的主权债务评级稍微下调一下，热钱一哄而散，以三哥的财政情况，还真可能出问题。希腊债务危机以后，全世界都开始关注主权债务风险，各国的财政状况被拿到放大镜下挨个检视。
最近还有点纳闷三哥为什么上窜下跳的要跟中国比GDP增速，原来他的财政问题已经被一些老外的投行和基金开始注意了，要知道国际热钱对三哥的经济是至关重要的。
大家都知道金融危机的本质是因为美国人借钱消费入不敷出，但三哥的财政赤字占GDP比例是12%，比美国人的9%还要高，这里面不知道有多少老毛子宰三哥的功劳。现在欧美为了怂恿印度在南亚牵制中国，放了大量热钱进印度给他鼓虚火。一旦阿三的问题被媒体开始报道，老美的随便那个评级机构给三哥的主权债务评级稍微下调一下，热钱一哄而散，以三哥的财政情况，还真可能出问题。
最近还有点纳闷三哥为什么上窜下跳的要跟中国比GDP增速，原来他的财政问题已经被一些老外的投行和基金开始注意了，要知道国际热钱对三哥的经济是至关重要的。
大家都知道金融危机的本质是因为美国人借钱消费入不敷出，但三哥的财政赤字占GDP比例是12%，比美国人的9%还要高，这里面不知道有多少老毛子宰三哥的功劳。现在欧美为了怂恿印度在南亚牵制中国，放了大量热钱进印度给他鼓虚火。一旦阿三的问题被媒体开始报道，老美的随便那个评级机构给三哥的主权债务评级稍微下调一下，热钱一哄而散，以三哥的财政情况，还真可能出问题。希腊债务危机以后，全世界都开始关注主权债务风险，各国的财政状况被拿到放大镜下挨个检视。
最近还有点纳闷三哥为什么上窜下跳的要跟中国比GDP增速，原来他的财政问题已经被一些老外的投行和基金开始注意了，要知道国际热钱对三哥的经济是至关重要的。
大家都知道金融危机的本质是因为美国人借钱消费入不敷出，但三哥的财政赤字占GDP比例是12%，比美国人的9%还要高，这里面不知道有多少老毛子宰三哥的功劳。现在欧美为了怂恿印度在南亚牵制中国，放了大量热钱进印度给他鼓虚火。一旦阿三的问题被媒体开始报道，老美的随便那个评级机构给三哥的主权债务评级稍微下调一下，热钱一哄而散，以三哥的财政情况，还真可能出问题。
PrudentBear：国家风险卷土重来 2010-02-23 10:10:23
提要：2008年爆发的全球金融危机将全球经济拖入衰退泥潭，各国政府纷纷推出财政和货币刺激政策进行自救，导致全球主权债务风险不断积聚。这将促使不同国家借贷成本的差距再次扩大，从而加剧国家风险的分化。这种情况下，希腊已陷入债务危机，而近年来财政赤字持续激增的英国、美国和日本债务违约风险最高。这表明，各国政府需要在宽松货币政策同沉重债务之间探寻新的经济发展途径。
希腊债务危机以及欧盟出手相救凸显出一个现实的问题，即在财政和货币刺激计划大行其道的时代，能够令债券投资者寝食难安的不只是银行。希腊国债并不比雷曼兄弟公司发售的债券更安全，事实上英国国债也并不比美林证券发售的债券更安全。这对全球经济产生的影响令人担忧，但并非全是负面影响。
刺激政策引发全球债务激增
最主要的影响在于，自1995年美国开始推行货币扩张主义以来被填平的不同国家借贷成本的差距将再度出现。这并不完全是坏事。此前，过低的债券收益率促使投资者转向主权信用等级更低的经济体，以寻求获取更高的投资收益。
在一些情况下，例如在越南，这拉动了经济增长。而且与较为平衡的经济体系相比，这能够让一个国家更快地踏上繁荣之路。
但是，在更多情况下，例如在希腊、阿根廷、哈萨克斯坦和俄罗斯，这让蚕食中产阶级资产和大大延长财富再分配时间的那些僵化和腐朽机制能够继续存在。因而，国家风险分化加剧总体上是值得欢迎的。
不过，即将出现的新一轮国家风险分化将与20世纪90年代中期的情形有所不同。1997年亚洲金融危机后，因贫穷或资本需求强烈而支付了更高借贷成本的许多亚洲国家这次将拥有充裕的资金。此后再未遭遇危机的韩国在融资方面有能力抵御新一轮信贷紧缩的影响，因为韩国没有事实大规模财政刺激计划，或是采取超宽松货币政策。
印尼的融资也将不会受到重大影响。自1998年金融危机以来，印尼对经济和政治体制进行了重大改革，在2009年金融危机中采取了稳妥以及趋于保守的政策。鉴于腐败问题严重，在印尼投资的风险仍然很大，但对寻求分享新兴市场长期高速增长成果、并希望规避投资过度集中于金砖四国的风险的投资者而言，印尼仍不失为一个具有吸引力的投资目标。
越南可能会遭遇短期困难，但将是一个继续全面蓬勃发展的新兴经济体。越南经济总体运行情况良好，但资本流入推高了越南汇率，导致越南在2007－08年期间背负了巨额国际收支赤字。因而，随着风险投资资本退却以及风险溢价升高，越南将会承受短期之痛。越南取得的成就、其无可争议的成本优势以及良好的国内投资状况将在长期内继续推动经济繁荣发展。
英美日债务违约风险最高
信贷市场收紧的最大受害者是故意将自身推向破产之路的富裕国家。这些国家越是热衷于人为的“刺激”计划，付出的经济代价将越惨重。同希腊一样早在2007年之前便过度透支公共支出的英国、美国和日本将面临最大的风险。由于这三个国家的货币不同，影响自然也将不尽相同。至少在短期内，上述国家出现债务违约的可能性要小于希腊，但陷入长期严重衰退可能性则同样很高。
造成富裕国家财政失衡的风险溢价可能会继续上升，这不仅仅是由于这些国家政府的借贷成本上升。这将是因果报应，除非出现债务长期不断增长的情况，否则这些国家的居民部门将很少受到影响。不过，同这些国家的政府一样，这些国家私人企业的借贷成本将会上升，而私人企业融资规模将会下降。这种影响已经在日本显现，因为愚蠢的麻生太郎和鸠山政府已经推翻了小泉纯一郎的稳健政策，让日本公共部门推行缺乏可持续性的“刺激”政策。与其他国家不同的是，日本高额预算赤字引发国内物价水平大幅下跌，陷入通缩，从而使得政府长期债券的实际利率自2008年秋天以来累计上升了4个百分点以上。日本已从跻身全球信用最佳和最健康之列的经济体沦为一个超大型的希腊，其债务状况已变得具有不可持续性，而且私人部门处于借贷无门的窘境。
而且，“刺激”计划的危害也已开始在美国显现，超量发行国债和政府担保房屋抵押债券已让银行家们得救。银行通过投资这些毫无风险的债券赚取了丰厚的收益。另一方面，银行业对小型企业惜贷，令后者陷入困境。
金砖四国中印度财政状况最令人担忧
在融资成本之差扩大的背景下，金砖四国命运将各不相同。中国虽然推出了“经济刺激”计划，但前提是中国财政状况非常健康而且外债很少。因而，中国短期内没有债务违约之忧。当前中国正在全力应对正在破灭的房地产泡沫，中国面临的问题是银行体系资产多属不良资产。不过，中国领导层很好地把握了经济中更复杂的领域，已上调法定准备金率来化解房地产泡沫。
而腐败猖獗和公共部门寻租问题严重的印度则是一个加强版的希腊。印度选民做出了让国大党继续执政的愚蠢决定，在短期内将会自食恶果，因为印度高达12%的财政赤字－GDP比率和较低的储蓄率将把经济再度拖入金融危机，经济增速将降至接近独立后40年间低下的“印度式经济增长率”。最终，让12亿印度国民看到改善生活水平希望、成就斐然的印度私人企业部门无疑将在这场灾难中遭受最大打击。
俄罗斯和巴西财政状况比印度健康。由于大宗商品价格高企，俄罗斯经济将会平稳运行，但经济增速不可避免地放缓将推升风险溢价，进而引发俄罗斯经济动荡，而且可能重蹈1998年债务危机的覆辙。作为10年前全球利差上升的主要受害者之一，巴西财政状况已经大有改观。巴西异常稳健的货币政策确保了其实际利率维持高位运行，从而有效避免了国内消费过度膨胀。目前，巴西或许需要推进政府改革，以确保知识产权不受侵害和公共支出继续维持在可控水平，进而避免大宗商品价格高企带来的财富被糟蹋。
至于受希腊债务危机直接影响最深的欧元区，其命运可能不会比其他地区更差，因为一些欧元区国家并未大力推行“刺激”政策，尤其是经济运行稳健的德国。实际上德国曾经抨击“刺激”政策是“愚蠢的凯恩斯主义”政策。欧元区命运将取决于迫使希腊约束自身行为、大幅精简腐败而臃肿的公共部门、向本国居民征税以及稳固财政状况等方面的成效。
如果欧盟条约迫使希腊民众摒弃数十年的养成的腐败恶习，一切都将向好的方向发展。在这种情况下，希腊遭遇种种苦难的消息将会传至葡萄牙、西班牙、意大利以及冰岛，迫使这些国家因害怕遭遇同样的灾难而进行痛苦的改革。
反之，如果救助成为欧盟运营的主旋律，那么，欧元区将会陷入真正的麻烦。这种情况下，欧盟将会沦落为寻租的乐园，一旦经济规模更大的西班牙、意大利和英国加入求助阵营，欧盟可能将会彻底瓦解。
希腊债务危机似乎已将我们推入一个新世界。总体而言，这是一件好事。
PrudentBear：国家风险卷土重来 2010-02-23 10:10:23
提要：2008年爆发的全球金融危机将全球经济拖入衰退泥潭，各国政府纷纷推出财政和货币刺激政策进行自救，导致全球主权债务风险不断积聚。这将促使不同国家借贷成本的差距再次扩大，从而加剧国家风险的分化。这种情况下，希腊已陷入债务危机，而近年来财政赤字持续激增的英国、美国和日本债务违约风险最高。这表明，各国政府需要在宽松货币政策同沉重债务之间探寻新的经济发展途径。
希腊债务危机以及欧盟出手相救凸显出一个现实的问题，即在财政和货币刺激计划大行其道的时代，能够令债券投资者寝食难安的不只是银行。希腊国债并不比雷曼兄弟公司发售的债券更安全，事实上英国国债也并不比美林证券发售的债券更安全。这对全球经济产生的影响令人担忧，但并非全是负面影响。
刺激政策引发全球债务激增
最主要的影响在于，自1995年美国开始推行货币扩张主义以来被填平的不同国家借贷成本的差距将再度出现。这并不完全是坏事。此前，过低的债券收益率促使投资者转向主权信用等级更低的经济体，以寻求获取更高的投资收益。
在一些情况下，例如在越南，这拉动了经济增长。而且与较为平衡的经济体系相比，这能够让一个国家更快地踏上繁荣之路。
但是，在更多情况下，例如在希腊、阿根廷、哈萨克斯坦和俄罗斯，这让蚕食中产阶级资产和大大延长财富再分配时间的那些僵化和腐朽机制能够继续存在。因而，国家风险分化加剧总体上是值得欢迎的。
不过，即将出现的新一轮国家风险分化将与20世纪90年代中期的情形有所不同。1997年亚洲金融危机后，因贫穷或资本需求强烈而支付了更高借贷成本的许多亚洲国家这次将拥有充裕的资金。此后再未遭遇危机的韩国在融资方面有能力抵御新一轮信贷紧缩的影响，因为韩国没有事实大规模财政刺激计划，或是采取超宽松货币政策。
印尼的融资也将不会受到重大影响。自1998年金融危机以来，印尼对经济和政治体制进行了重大改革，在2009年金融危机中采取了稳妥以及趋于保守的政策。鉴于腐败问题严重，在印尼投资的风险仍然很大，但对寻求分享新兴市场长期高速增长成果、并希望规避投资过度集中于金砖四国的风险的投资者而言，印尼仍不失为一个具有吸引力的投资目标。
越南可能会遭遇短期困难，但将是一个继续全面蓬勃发展的新兴经济体。越南经济总体运行情况良好，但资本流入推高了越南汇率，导致越南在2007－08年期间背负了巨额国际收支赤字。因而，随着风险投资资本退却以及风险溢价升高，越南将会承受短期之痛。越南取得的成就、其无可争议的成本优势以及良好的国内投资状况将在长期内继续推动经济繁荣发展。
英美日债务违约风险最高
信贷市场收紧的最大受害者是故意将自身推向破产之路的富裕国家。这些国家越是热衷于人为的“刺激”计划，付出的经济代价将越惨重。同希腊一样早在2007年之前便过度透支公共支出的英国、美国和日本将面临最大的风险。由于这三个国家的货币不同，影响自然也将不尽相同。至少在短期内，上述国家出现债务违约的可能性要小于希腊，但陷入长期严重衰退可能性则同样很高。
造成富裕国家财政失衡的风险溢价可能会继续上升，这不仅仅是由于这些国家政府的借贷成本上升。这将是因果报应，除非出现债务长期不断增长的情况，否则这些国家的居民部门将很少受到影响。不过，同这些国家的政府一样，这些国家私人企业的借贷成本将会上升，而私人企业融资规模将会下降。这种影响已经在日本显现，因为愚蠢的麻生太郎和鸠山政府已经推翻了小泉纯一郎的稳健政策，让日本公共部门推行缺乏可持续性的“刺激”政策。与其他国家不同的是，日本高额预算赤字引发国内物价水平大幅下跌，陷入通缩，从而使得政府长期债券的实际利率自2008年秋天以来累计上升了4个百分点以上。日本已从跻身全球信用最佳和最健康之列的经济体沦为一个超大型的希腊，其债务状况已变得具有不可持续性，而且私人部门处于借贷无门的窘境。
而且，“刺激”计划的危害也已开始在美国显现，超量发行国债和政府担保房屋抵押债券已让银行家们得救。银行通过投资这些毫无风险的债券赚取了丰厚的收益。另一方面，银行业对小型企业惜贷，令后者陷入困境。
金砖四国中印度财政状况最令人担忧
在融资成本之差扩大的背景下，金砖四国命运将各不相同。中国虽然推出了“经济刺激”计划，但前提是中国财政状况非常健康而且外债很少。因而，中国短期内没有债务违约之忧。当前中国正在全力应对正在破灭的房地产泡沫，中国面临的问题是银行体系资产多属不良资产。不过，中国领导层很好地把握了经济中更复杂的领域，已上调法定准备金率来化解房地产泡沫。
而腐败猖獗和公共部门寻租问题严重的印度则是一个加强版的希腊。印度选民做出了让国大党继续执政的愚蠢决定，在短期内将会自食恶果，因为印度高达12%的财政赤字－GDP比率和较低的储蓄率将把经济再度拖入金融危机，经济增速将降至接近独立后40年间低下的“印度式经济增长率”。最终，让12亿印度国民看到改善生活水平希望、成就斐然的印度私人企业部门无疑将在这场灾难中遭受最大打击。
俄罗斯和巴西财政状况比印度健康。由于大宗商品价格高企，俄罗斯经济将会平稳运行，但经济增速不可避免地放缓将推升风险溢价，进而引发俄罗斯经济动荡，而且可能重蹈1998年债务危机的覆辙。作为10年前全球利差上升的主要受害者之一，巴西财政状况已经大有改观。巴西异常稳健的货币政策确保了其实际利率维持高位运行，从而有效避免了国内消费过度膨胀。目前，巴西或许需要推进政府改革，以确保知识产权不受侵害和公共支出继续维持在可控水平，进而避免大宗商品价格高企带来的财富被糟蹋。
至于受希腊债务危机直接影响最深的欧元区，其命运可能不会比其他地区更差，因为一些欧元区国家并未大力推行“刺激”政策，尤其是经济运行稳健的德国。实际上德国曾经抨击“刺激”政策是“愚蠢的凯恩斯主义”政策。欧元区命运将取决于迫使希腊约束自身行为、大幅精简腐败而臃肿的公共部门、向本国居民征税以及稳固财政状况等方面的成效。
如果欧盟条约迫使希腊民众摒弃数十年的养成的腐败恶习，一切都将向好的方向发展。在这种情况下，希腊遭遇种种苦难的消息将会传至葡萄牙、西班牙、意大利以及冰岛，迫使这些国家因害怕遭遇同样的灾难而进行痛苦的改革。
反之，如果救助成为欧盟运营的主旋律，那么，欧元区将会陷入真正的麻烦。这种情况下，欧盟将会沦落为寻租的乐园，一旦经济规模更大的西班牙、意大利和英国加入求助阵营，欧盟可能将会彻底瓦解。
希腊债务危机似乎已将我们推入一个新世界。总体而言，这是一件好事。
印度的财政赤字和高通胀，确实是两大问题。股市也有泡沫。卢比该贬值了。:D
PrudentBear是世界规模最大的做空基金，资产规模大约12亿美元。该基金不仅卖空股指期货，也卖空基金经理认为要下跌的单只股票。PrudentBear还做多一些其认为在经济状况不景气时表现不错的股票例如黄金采掘股票。
英文原文：The return of country risk
Greece's near default and rescue by the European Union has brought one reality starkly into relief: in an age of fiscal and monetary stimulus, it isn't only banks that can give debt investors sleepless nights. Greece is no more "risk-free" than was Lehman Brothers, and indeed Britain is no more "risk free" than Merrill Lynch. The implications of this for the global economy are disturbing, but not all negative.
The principal implication is that the differentials in borrowing costs between countries, which had been suppressed since U.S. monetary inflationism began in 1995, are about to reappear. This is not entirely a bad thing. Excessively low bond yields had led investors to chase higher returns through pushing out to less and less creditworthy countries.
In a few cases, such as Vietnam, this jump-started economic growth and put the country on the road to prosperity at rate faster than could have been achieved in a more balanced economic system.
In more cases, however, such as Greece, but also including notably Argentina, Kazakhstan and Russia, it allowed incompetent and unpleasant regimes to get away with plundering their middle classes and redistributing the wealth to themselves for much longer than should have been possible. Thus an increase in country risk differentials is generally to be welcomed.
The country risk differentials that are now bound to reappear will however be different from those that governed in the middle 1990s. Many Asian countries, which in the period after the Asian crisis of 1997 paid premiums to borrow because of their poverty or high capital needs, will find money readily available this time around. South Korea, which should never have got into trouble even then, will find its ability to borrow little affected by the new tightening, as it has not engaged in major "fiscal stimulus" nor run an excessively accommodating monetary policy.
At a lower income level, there is also no reason why Indonesia should find its access to capital significantly affected. It has substantially reformed both its economy and its political system since the crash of 1998 and in the 2009 crisis pursued well thought out, conservative policies. The risk of investment in Indonesia is still significant, because of the corruption remaining in the country, but it remains an attractive diversification for investors seeking higher long term growth in emerging markets without putting all their eggs in breakable BRIC （Brazil, Russia, India and China） baskets.
One emerging market which should continue to prosper generally but may find life difficult for a while is Vietnam. Vietnam is generally economically well run, but ran a colossal balance of payments deficit in 2007-08 as its exchange rate was pushed up by a tsunami of foreign investment, both in hard assets and from "hot money." It will thus suffer short-term as the flow of risk-seeking capital lessens and risk premiums widen. However, the progress Vietnam has made and its undoubted cost advantages, together with its healthy level of domestic capital formation, should allow it to continue to prosper in the long run, albeit with a higher （and healthier） domestic proportion of capital in its growing industries.
The principle losers from tightening credit markets will be the rich countries that have deliberately put themselves on a path to bankruptcy, even if delayed bankruptcy, under the impression that this would in some magical way lessen the impact of the 2008-09 recession. The more artificial "stimulus" they indulged in, the greater the economic price they will have to pay. Countries like Britain, the United States and Japan that were like Greece already grossly over-indulging their public sectors before 2007 will be in the greatest danger. Naturally, the effect will be different, because all three countries have independent currencies. Their chance of default - at least in the short term - is less than Greece's but their likelihood of prolonged and debilitating recession is equally high.
The likely increase of risk premiums for wealthy countries that have unbalanced their fiscal positions will not simply be reflected in higher borrowing costs for their governments. That would be poetic justice, and would affect few inhabitants of those countries, except in the very long term as debts piled up. However, as well as their governments, the costs of borrowing will rise for private businesses based in those countries, and their availability of finance will diminish. We have already seen this effect in Japan as the foolish Aso and Hatoyama governments reversed the sound policies of Junichiro Koizumi and pointed the Japanese public sector towards more unsustainable "stimulus." Unlike in other countries, the huge budget deficits in Japan have caused a collapse in domestic prices, genuine deflation, so real government long-term bond rates, including the reduction in prices, have increased by more than 4% since the autumn of 2008. Japan has moved from being one of the world's finest credits and soundest economies, because of its citizens' hard work, excellent education and savings habits, to an oversized Greece, with a debt position that has become unsustainable and a private sector that is being starved of finance.
As I wrote here last week, the damage from "stimulus" has also begun to appear in the United States, where the excessive issuance of Treasury bonds and government guaranteed housing bonds has made bankers put their feet up on the desk, collect the large leveraged returns for risk-free and brain-free investment in those securities, and abandon the small business sector to an unpleasant fate.
In a world of higher funding cost differentials, the fortunes of the BRIC countries will diverge. China, although engaging in "stimulus," did so from the basis of a very sound fiscal position and with low foreign debt. It is thus in no immediate danger of government default. It is currently struggling with a real estate bubble that is in the process of bursting, and it has the problem of a banking system much of whose assets are bad. However, China's leadership has an unexpectedly good grasp of even the more complex areas of economics - as evidenced by its decision this week to raise reserve requirements in its banking system to cool its real estate bubble. This is in contrast to Ben Bernanke's "trial balloon" this week of abolishing minimum reserves altogether - he appears to have missed the point that fractional reserve banking is unsustainable, bound to crash in ruin and hyper-inflation, if you make the denominator of the fraction zero and money creation thereby infinite.
India on the other hand is largely a much larger version of Greece, highly corrupt and with a public sector devoted almost entirely to rent seeking. The Indian electorate's foolish decision last May to re-elect the Congress party, creators of this ghastly system, will reap its reward in the relatively short run, as India's consolidated fiscal deficit of 12% of GDP and relatively low savings rate collapses the economy once again into a financial crisis similar to those that limited it to the "Hindu rate of growth" for forty years from independence. Needless to say, the splendid Indian private sector, which had finally allowed 1.2 billion people to see the possibility of better living standards, will be the worst sufferers from this disaster.
Russia and Brazil are less interesting. Russia will do fine while commodities prices are high, but the inevitable growth slowdown that increasing risk premiums will produce will destabilize Russia's economic position, probably producing another default like that of 1998. Brazil, which a decade ago would have been a major sufferer from an increase in global spreads, has greatly improved its position. Its exceptionally sound monetary policy has kept real interest rates high, prevented excessive domestic consumption, government or private, and built the country's domestic savings base. At this point, Brazil could probably do with a change in government, to ensure that property rights are not eroded and public spending remains under control, so that the bonanza from high commodity prices is not wasted.
As for the Eurozone, most directly affected by Greece's problems, its likely fate is no worse than elsewhere, since a number of its members, notably the soundly run Germany, did not engage in "stimulus", indeed denouncing it as the "crass Keynesianism" that it was. Its fate from here on depends on how effectively it forces Greece to behave itself, sharply downsize its corrupt and bloated public sector, collect taxes from its citizens and right its fiscal ship.
If EU discipline reminds older Greeks of the Nazi occupation, with thuggish all-powerful sadists with monocles and black leather uniforms forcing the locals to clean up all the corruption rackets that they have enjoyed for decades, all will be well. In that case, news of the horrors afflicting Athens would spread to Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland, forcing them towards unpleasant reform on their own for fear of the same scourge arriving in their own countries.
If on the other hand the bailout resembles most EU operations, with polyglot socialist bureaucrats drafting 1,000-page reports, while deceiving themselves as to the theft that is going on under their very noses, then the Eurozone is in real trouble. In the latter case, in spite of the common sense exhibited by Germans and Scandinavians alike, the EU will dissolve into an orgy of rent-seeking, probably collapsing completely when the much larger Spain, Italy and Britain demand access to the bailout gravy train. （Britain would presumably be refused, thus causing both economic collapse and a tsunami of anti-EU sentiment, forcing the country to leave the EU and seek its fortune elsewhere; out of evil can come good!）
The Greek crisis appears to have pushed us into a new world. On the whole, this is a good thing.
来源：PrudentBear，2010.02.15，作者：Martin Hutchinson
Greece's near default and rescue by the European Union has brought one reality starkly into relief: in an age of fiscal and monetary stimulus, it isn't only banks that can give debt investors sleepless nights. Greece is no more "risk-free" than was Lehman Brothers, and indeed Britain is no more "risk free" than Merrill Lynch. The implications of this for the global economy are disturbing, but not all negative.
The principal implication is that the differentials in borrowing costs between countries, which had been suppressed since U.S. monetary inflationism began in 1995, are about to reappear. This is not entirely a bad thing. Excessively low bond yields had led investors to chase higher returns through pushing out to less and less creditworthy countries.
In a few cases, such as Vietnam, this jump-started economic growth and put the country on the road to prosperity at rate faster than could have been achieved in a more balanced economic system.
In more cases, however, such as Greece, but also including notably Argentina, Kazakhstan and Russia, it allowed incompetent and unpleasant regimes to get away with plundering their middle classes and redistributing the wealth to themselves for much longer than should have been possible. Thus an increase in country risk differentials is generally to be welcomed.
The country risk differentials that are now bound to reappear will however be different from those that governed in the middle 1990s. Many Asian countries, which in the period after the Asian crisis of 1997 paid premiums to borrow because of their poverty or high capital needs, will find money readily available this time around. South Korea, which should never have got into trouble even then, will find its ability to borrow little affected by the new tightening, as it has not engaged in major "fiscal stimulus" nor run an excessively accommodating monetary policy.
At a lower income level, there is also no reason why Indonesia should find its access to capital significantly affected. It has substantially reformed both its economy and its political system since the crash of 1998 and in the 2009 crisis pursued well thought out, conservative policies. The risk of investment in Indonesia is still significant, because of the corruption remaining in the country, but it remains an attractive diversification for investors seeking higher long term growth in emerging markets without putting all their eggs in breakable BRIC （Brazil, Russia, India and China） baskets.
One emerging market which should continue to prosper generally but may find life difficult for a while is Vietnam. Vietnam is generally economically well run, but ran a colossal balance of payments deficit in 2007-08 as its exchange rate was pushed up by a tsunami of foreign investment, both in hard assets and from "hot money." It will thus suffer short-term as the flow of risk-seeking capital lessens and risk premiums widen. However, the progress Vietnam has made and its undoubted cost advantages, together with its healthy level of domestic capital formation, should allow it to continue to prosper in the long run, albeit with a higher （and healthier） domestic proportion of capital in its growing industries.
The principle losers from tightening credit markets will be the rich countries that have deliberately put themselves on a path to bankruptcy, even if delayed bankruptcy, under the impression that this would in some magical way lessen the impact of the 2008-09 recession. The more artificial "stimulus" they indulged in, the greater the economic price they will have to pay. Countries like Britain, the United States and Japan that were like Greece already grossly over-indulging their public sectors before 2007 will be in the greatest danger. Naturally, the effect will be different, because all three countries have independent currencies. Their chance of default - at least in the short term - is less than Greece's but their likelihood of prolonged and debilitating recession is equally high.
The likely increase of risk premiums for wealthy countries that have unbalanced their fiscal positions will not simply be reflected in higher borrowing costs for their governments. That would be poetic justice, and would affect few inhabitants of those countries, except in the very long term as debts piled up. However, as well as their governments, the costs of borrowing will rise for private businesses based in those countries, and their availability of finance will diminish. We have already seen this effect in Japan as the foolish Aso and Hatoyama governments reversed the sound policies of Junichiro Koizumi and pointed the Japanese public sector towards more unsustainable "stimulus." Unlike in other countries, the huge budget deficits in Japan have caused a collapse in domestic prices, genuine deflation, so real government long-term bond rates, including the reduction in prices, have increased by more than 4% since the autumn of 2008. Japan has moved from being one of the world's finest credits and soundest economies, because of its citizens' hard work, excellent education and savings habits, to an oversized Greece, with a debt position that has become unsustainable and a private sector that is being starved of finance.
As I wrote here last week, the damage from "stimulus" has also begun to appear in the United States, where the excessive issuance of Treasury bonds and government guaranteed housing bonds has made bankers put their feet up on the desk, collect the large leveraged returns for risk-free and brain-free investment in those securities, and abandon the small business sector to an unpleasant fate.
In a world of higher funding cost differentials, the fortunes of the BRIC countries will diverge. China, although engaging in "stimulus," did so from the basis of a very sound fiscal position and with low foreign debt. It is thus in no immediate danger of government default. It is currently struggling with a real estate bubble that is in the process of bursting, and it has the problem of a banking system much of whose assets are bad. However, China's leadership has an unexpectedly good grasp of even the more complex areas of economics - as evidenced by its decision this week to raise reserve requirements in its banking system to cool its real estate bubble. This is in contrast to Ben Bernanke's "trial balloon" this week of abolishing minimum reserves altogether - he appears to have missed the point that fractional reserve banking is unsustainable, bound to crash in ruin and hyper-inflation, if you make the denominator of the fraction zero and money creation thereby infinite.
India on the other hand is largely a much larger version of Greece, highly corrupt and with a public sector devoted almost entirely to rent seeking. The Indian electorate's foolish decision last May to re-elect the Congress party, creators of this ghastly system, will reap its reward in the relatively short run, as India's consolidated fiscal deficit of 12% of GDP and relatively low savings rate collapses the economy once again into a financial crisis similar to those that limited it to the "Hindu rate of growth" for forty years from independence. Needless to say, the splendid Indian private sector, which had finally allowed 1.2 billion people to see the possibility of better living standards, will be the worst sufferers from this disaster.
Russia and Brazil are less interesting. Russia will do fine while commodities prices are high, but the inevitable growth slowdown that increasing risk premiums will produce will destabilize Russia's economic position, probably producing another default like that of 1998. Brazil, which a decade ago would have been a major sufferer from an increase in global spreads, has greatly improved its position. Its exceptionally sound monetary policy has kept real interest rates high, prevented excessive domestic consumption, government or private, and built the country's domestic savings base. At this point, Brazil could probably do with a change in government, to ensure that property rights are not eroded and public spending remains under control, so that the bonanza from high commodity prices is not wasted.
As for the Eurozone, most directly affected by Greece's problems, its likely fate is no worse than elsewhere, since a number of its members, notably the soundly run Germany, did not engage in "stimulus", indeed denouncing it as the "crass Keynesianism" that it was. Its fate from here on depends on how effectively it forces Greece to behave itself, sharply downsize its corrupt and bloated public sector, collect taxes from its citizens and right its fiscal ship.
If EU discipline reminds older Greeks of the Nazi occupation, with thuggish all-powerful sadists with monocles and black leather uniforms forcing the locals to clean up all the corruption rackets that they have enjoyed for decades, all will be well. In that case, news of the horrors afflicting Athens would spread to Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland, forcing them towards unpleasant reform on their own for fear of the same scourge arriving in their own countries.
If on the other hand the bailout resembles most EU operations, with polyglot socialist bureaucrats drafting 1,000-page reports, while deceiving themselves as to the theft that is going on under their very noses, then the Eurozone is in real trouble. In the latter case, in spite of the common sense exhibited by Germans and Scandinavians alike, the EU will dissolve into an orgy of rent-seeking, probably collapsing completely when the much larger Spain, Italy and Britain demand access to the bailout gravy train. （Britain would presumably be refused, thus causing both economic collapse and a tsunami of anti-EU sentiment, forcing the country to leave the EU and seek its fortune elsewhere; out of evil can come good!）
The Greek crisis appears to have pushed us into a new world. On the whole, this is a good thing.
来源：PrudentBear，2010.02.15，作者：Martin Hutchinson
要打仗了
谁能科普一下做空基金？
歼击机07 发表于 2010-3-10 15:22 
凤凰卫视上看到过
先借来股票，然后卖空是股价下跌，在买入，这时候的价格就比借来时低得多，争取差价
好像是这
凤凰卫视上看到过
先借来股票，然后卖空是股价下跌，在买入，这时候的价格就比借来时低得多，争取差价
好像是这
就是这样。比如借10000股（单价10元）卖出，得100000元收入，然后约定比如3个月之后还10000股，到时候再买入只花70000元（假定此时单价7元）。净赚30000元。然后还要交多少不等的手续费，比如借3个月的话假定是10%的手续费即要额外再还1000股，即共花77000元，净赚23000元。
通胀高企，
三哥还整天唱高调，烦人的很。:D
三哥还整天唱高调，烦人的很。:D
打吧，
退潮了才知道谁没穿裤衩。;P
难道不是中国崩溃论的印度版？
既非鬼又非人 发表于 2010-3-10 14:50
难道是华尔街做完英镑又想着卢布？！
是不是还想着RMB啊？！
{:yi:}
难道是华尔街做完英镑又想着卢布？！
是不是还想着RMB啊？！
{:yi:}
super_hero 发表于 2010-3-10 17:36
占GDP12%的债务比例可不是好玩的。
比美国还高！美国可是有铸币权的。
占GDP12%的债务比例可不是好玩的。
比美国还高！美国可是有铸币权的。
三哥正准备超越中国呢
最新福布斯全球十大富翁排行：
1º Carlos Slim (mexicano),
2º Bill Gates (yankee),
3º Warren Buffett (yankee),
4º Mukesh Ambani (indio),
5º Lakshmi Mittal (indio),
6º Larry Ellison (yankee),
7º Bernard Arnault (frances),
8º Eike Batista (brasilero),
9º Amancio Ortega (español),
10º Karl Albrecht (aleman).
第4，第5名都是印度人。
1º Carlos Slim (mexicano),
2º Bill Gates (yankee),
3º Warren Buffett (yankee),
4º Mukesh Ambani (indio),
5º Lakshmi Mittal (indio),
6º Larry Ellison (yankee),
7º Bernard Arnault (frances),
8º Eike Batista (brasilero),
9º Amancio Ortega (español),
10º Karl Albrecht (aleman).
第4，第5名都是印度人。
印度能挺到现在，也还是有点儿能水儿:D
不知道会怎么样
现在看来手握大量外汇储备就是等这种关键时候用吧，不知道印度外汇储备在金融危机的时候能坚持多久？
歼击机07 发表于 2010-3-10 15:22
1、持有某个市场上的股票
2、通过股票期货、或者股指期货建立空仓，就是看跌
3、通过一些金牌分析师放出利空消息
4、在股票市场把所持股票卖掉，引领下跌，但该机构已经赚到钱了
5、在期货方面，平仓，也是大赚
这是当年某机构的典型玩法，其中3、4 两步几乎同时进行。
这还只是在股票以及股票相关标的物的期货市场上，如果加上外汇、大宗商品等等市场，玩法花着呢
1、持有某个市场上的股票
2、通过股票期货、或者股指期货建立空仓，就是看跌
3、通过一些金牌分析师放出利空消息
4、在股票市场把所持股票卖掉，引领下跌，但该机构已经赚到钱了
5、在期货方面，平仓，也是大赚
这是当年某机构的典型玩法，其中3、4 两步几乎同时进行。
这还只是在股票以及股票相关标的物的期货市场上，如果加上外汇、大宗商品等等市场，玩法花着呢
印度垮了，MD能吃个半饱
印度垮了
三哥为米帝办事，办实事，才会不垮；如果三哥为米帝办完事，没达到效果，或者三哥长期扭扭捏捏，不愿意出全力为米帝办事，那三哥前景不容乐观。
要是TG的通胀率和负债率达到印度的水准，西方媒体早已吵翻天，声嘶力竭说TG要崩溃了。估计赤膊上阵，打赌的人都有。:D:D
是的，他现在全靠外资来支撑，外贸长期逆差的
大侧斜螺旋桨 发表于 2010-3-11 16:53
不是所有的资本家都这么讲政 治
不是所有的资本家都这么讲政 治
这个英文很深奥啊，翻译的人功力不错。
跨之前都会挣扎一下，转移下矛盾的，更不要说米毛欧都等着找事情给中国下绊子，未来几年米国欧洲毛子卖给印度的武器必定大得多的让人吃惊，准备战争吧。
跨之前都会挣扎一下，转移下矛盾的，更不要说米毛欧都等着找事情给中国下绊子，未来几年米国欧洲毛子卖给印度的武器必定大得多的让人吃惊，准备战争吧。
小打小闹的是机构，国家之家要玩就玩长线，以10年为期，不断逢低买入，就等着那一天的到来。