超级军网China\'s Navy Today-Storm Clouds on the Horizon...or ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/28 05:00:09
<P>When assessing China's military potential, Western and Asian observers often tend either to view the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as an ominous storm cloud on the horizon or to casually dismiss it as a "paper tiger" faced with significant modernization and operational problems. On the one hand, there is no shortage of commentary reporting the PLAN's acquisition of sophisticated Russian-built military ships and aircraft, improvements in indigenous production, and development of a modern Marine Force. These articles point with increasing alarm to China's drive for naval domination on both sides of the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait--and for extending a menacing naval presence far out into the Pacific. Other articles, pointing to aging PLAN combatant aircraft, surface units, and submarines--and to problems with indigenous production programs--maintain that China's Navy is floundering, and that it does not pose a credible threat to neighboring countries. </P>
<P>A more balanced assessment of the PLAN's capabilities today and its potential tomorrow may be derived from a better understanding of its mission, the present state of its ships and aircraft, and its ongoing modernization program. China's best military units--estimated at approximately 10 percent of its overall forces--are being modernized at a steady pace, in keeping with the country's ongoing economic development. As Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, then-director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 2 February 1999, these select forces will have achieved a reasonably high level of proficiency in 1980s-style maneuver warfare by 2010. They will be well equipped with theater-range missiles, "late Cold War equivalent" tanks and artillery, more advanced diesel and third-generation nuclear-powered submarines, and approximately 20 new surface combatant warships. </P>
<P>An Evolving Mission </P>
<P>Historically, China's Navy has been responsible for seaward and coastal defense. During the 1950s and 1960s, the PLAN focused on defending China's mainland from amphibious assault--first from the perceived U.S. threat and, later, from the perceived threat from the Soviet Union as its relationship with that country soured. Naval acquisitions were almost solely from existing Soviet systems and platforms, and defensive tactics were largely modeled after the Soviet example. During these years, the PLA developed a large fleet of relatively inexpensive (and thus expendable) missile boats, diesel submarines, and conventional bombers, which could be used in a mass attack on amphibious units and their escorts. The few destroyer-sized combatants acquired by the PLAN during this period were modeled primarily after World War II-era Russian designs. </P>
<P>In recent years, the PLAN's maritime mission has evolved from a role of static coastal defense to one of "active offshore defense." In this capacity, the PLAN can be used both as a tactical force and to support strategic national defense. The objectives of this new strategy are to assert China's role as a regional maritime power, to protect coastal economic regions and maritime interests, and to optimize the Navy's operations for national defense. The PLAN's responsibilities now include capture and defense of islands, and protection and blockade of sea-lanes of communication. Moreover, the PLAN is increasingly viewed by senior PLA leadership as integral to resolution of the Taiwan issue--should force be required--and for safeguarding China's "Xisha" and "Nansha" islands in the South China Sea. Finally, the PLAN is likely to be increasingly used as an instrument of overseas diplomacy through participation in goodwill cruises and port visits. </P>
<P>The PLAN's evolving strategy has been described in terms of two distinct phases. The strategy's first phase is for the PLAN to develop a "green water active defense strategy" capability. This "green water" generally is described as being encompassed within an arc swung from Vladivostok to the north, to the Strait of Malacca to the south, and out to the "first island chain" (Aleutians, Kuriles, Ryukyus, Taiwan, Philippines, and Greater Sunda islands) to the east. Analysts have assessed that the PLAN is likely to attain this green water capability early in the 21st century. Open-source writings also suggest that the PLAN intends to develop a capability to operate in the "second island chain" (Bonins, Guam, Marianas, and Palau islands) by the mid-21st century. In the future, the PLAN also may expand its operations to bases in Myanmar, Burma. These bases will provide the PLAN with direct access to the Strait of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal. </P>
<P>The People's Liberation Army Navy </P>
<P>PLAN command and control are highly centralized through its headquarters in Beijing. The headquarters staff, led by Vice Adm. Shi Yunsheng, provides oversight and direction through its logistics, equipment, repair, and political departments. The PLAN consists of three major fleets, a naval aviation arm, and marine units. Fleets are strategically located to the north in Qingdao, to the east in Ningbo, and to the south in Zhanjiang--providing the Chinese Navy with direct access to the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea respectively. Each fleet consists of a number of major and minor bases, a naval air arm, and coastal-defense regions. South Sea Fleet units also include the Navy's Marine Force and its associated amphibious lift. Major surface combatant shipyards are located in Dalian, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hudong. The Wuhan shipyard is responsible for conventional submarine construction, and nuclear-powered attack and ballistic-missile submarines are built at the Huladao shipyard. </P>
<P>The PLAN is manned by approximately 268,000 officers and men, in-cluding 28,000 coastal-defense forces, 25,000 naval air forces, and some 7,000 marines. Conscripts serve for two years. Although there are recent provisions for sailors to remain in service for up to 30 years, a cadre of senior enlisted personnel is not yet well developed. PLAN academic training remains fairly basic by Western standards; however, there is an increasing emphasis on improving the quality of training through the use of automatic data-processing resources. Large-scale fleet exercises are conducted several times each year, but there is little integration between naval air and surface units, and even less integration of naval operations with units of either the PLA Air Force or Army. </P><P>When assessing China's military potential, Western and Asian observers often tend either to view the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as an ominous storm cloud on the horizon or to casually dismiss it as a "paper tiger" faced with significant modernization and operational problems. On the one hand, there is no shortage of commentary reporting the PLAN's acquisition of sophisticated Russian-built military ships and aircraft, improvements in indigenous production, and development of a modern Marine Force. These articles point with increasing alarm to China's drive for naval domination on both sides of the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait--and for extending a menacing naval presence far out into the Pacific. Other articles, pointing to aging PLAN combatant aircraft, surface units, and submarines--and to problems with indigenous production programs--maintain that China's Navy is floundering, and that it does not pose a credible threat to neighboring countries. </P>
<P>A more balanced assessment of the PLAN's capabilities today and its potential tomorrow may be derived from a better understanding of its mission, the present state of its ships and aircraft, and its ongoing modernization program. China's best military units--estimated at approximately 10 percent of its overall forces--are being modernized at a steady pace, in keeping with the country's ongoing economic development. As Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, then-director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 2 February 1999, these select forces will have achieved a reasonably high level of proficiency in 1980s-style maneuver warfare by 2010. They will be well equipped with theater-range missiles, "late Cold War equivalent" tanks and artillery, more advanced diesel and third-generation nuclear-powered submarines, and approximately 20 new surface combatant warships. </P>
<P>An Evolving Mission </P>
<P>Historically, China's Navy has been responsible for seaward and coastal defense. During the 1950s and 1960s, the PLAN focused on defending China's mainland from amphibious assault--first from the perceived U.S. threat and, later, from the perceived threat from the Soviet Union as its relationship with that country soured. Naval acquisitions were almost solely from existing Soviet systems and platforms, and defensive tactics were largely modeled after the Soviet example. During these years, the PLA developed a large fleet of relatively inexpensive (and thus expendable) missile boats, diesel submarines, and conventional bombers, which could be used in a mass attack on amphibious units and their escorts. The few destroyer-sized combatants acquired by the PLAN during this period were modeled primarily after World War II-era Russian designs. </P>
<P>In recent years, the PLAN's maritime mission has evolved from a role of static coastal defense to one of "active offshore defense." In this capacity, the PLAN can be used both as a tactical force and to support strategic national defense. The objectives of this new strategy are to assert China's role as a regional maritime power, to protect coastal economic regions and maritime interests, and to optimize the Navy's operations for national defense. The PLAN's responsibilities now include capture and defense of islands, and protection and blockade of sea-lanes of communication. Moreover, the PLAN is increasingly viewed by senior PLA leadership as integral to resolution of the Taiwan issue--should force be required--and for safeguarding China's "Xisha" and "Nansha" islands in the South China Sea. Finally, the PLAN is likely to be increasingly used as an instrument of overseas diplomacy through participation in goodwill cruises and port visits. </P>
<P>The PLAN's evolving strategy has been described in terms of two distinct phases. The strategy's first phase is for the PLAN to develop a "green water active defense strategy" capability. This "green water" generally is described as being encompassed within an arc swung from Vladivostok to the north, to the Strait of Malacca to the south, and out to the "first island chain" (Aleutians, Kuriles, Ryukyus, Taiwan, Philippines, and Greater Sunda islands) to the east. Analysts have assessed that the PLAN is likely to attain this green water capability early in the 21st century. Open-source writings also suggest that the PLAN intends to develop a capability to operate in the "second island chain" (Bonins, Guam, Marianas, and Palau islands) by the mid-21st century. In the future, the PLAN also may expand its operations to bases in Myanmar, Burma. These bases will provide the PLAN with direct access to the Strait of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal. </P>
<P>The People's Liberation Army Navy </P>
<P>PLAN command and control are highly centralized through its headquarters in Beijing. The headquarters staff, led by Vice Adm. Shi Yunsheng, provides oversight and direction through its logistics, equipment, repair, and political departments. The PLAN consists of three major fleets, a naval aviation arm, and marine units. Fleets are strategically located to the north in Qingdao, to the east in Ningbo, and to the south in Zhanjiang--providing the Chinese Navy with direct access to the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea respectively. Each fleet consists of a number of major and minor bases, a naval air arm, and coastal-defense regions. South Sea Fleet units also include the Navy's Marine Force and its associated amphibious lift. Major surface combatant shipyards are located in Dalian, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hudong. The Wuhan shipyard is responsible for conventional submarine construction, and nuclear-powered attack and ballistic-missile submarines are built at the Huladao shipyard. </P>
<P>The PLAN is manned by approximately 268,000 officers and men, in-cluding 28,000 coastal-defense forces, 25,000 naval air forces, and some 7,000 marines. Conscripts serve for two years. Although there are recent provisions for sailors to remain in service for up to 30 years, a cadre of senior enlisted personnel is not yet well developed. PLAN academic training remains fairly basic by Western standards; however, there is an increasing emphasis on improving the quality of training through the use of automatic data-processing resources. Large-scale fleet exercises are conducted several times each year, but there is little integration between naval air and surface units, and even less integration of naval operations with units of either the PLA Air Force or Army. </P>
<P>A more balanced assessment of the PLAN's capabilities today and its potential tomorrow may be derived from a better understanding of its mission, the present state of its ships and aircraft, and its ongoing modernization program. China's best military units--estimated at approximately 10 percent of its overall forces--are being modernized at a steady pace, in keeping with the country's ongoing economic development. As Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, then-director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 2 February 1999, these select forces will have achieved a reasonably high level of proficiency in 1980s-style maneuver warfare by 2010. They will be well equipped with theater-range missiles, "late Cold War equivalent" tanks and artillery, more advanced diesel and third-generation nuclear-powered submarines, and approximately 20 new surface combatant warships. </P>
<P>An Evolving Mission </P>
<P>Historically, China's Navy has been responsible for seaward and coastal defense. During the 1950s and 1960s, the PLAN focused on defending China's mainland from amphibious assault--first from the perceived U.S. threat and, later, from the perceived threat from the Soviet Union as its relationship with that country soured. Naval acquisitions were almost solely from existing Soviet systems and platforms, and defensive tactics were largely modeled after the Soviet example. During these years, the PLA developed a large fleet of relatively inexpensive (and thus expendable) missile boats, diesel submarines, and conventional bombers, which could be used in a mass attack on amphibious units and their escorts. The few destroyer-sized combatants acquired by the PLAN during this period were modeled primarily after World War II-era Russian designs. </P>
<P>In recent years, the PLAN's maritime mission has evolved from a role of static coastal defense to one of "active offshore defense." In this capacity, the PLAN can be used both as a tactical force and to support strategic national defense. The objectives of this new strategy are to assert China's role as a regional maritime power, to protect coastal economic regions and maritime interests, and to optimize the Navy's operations for national defense. The PLAN's responsibilities now include capture and defense of islands, and protection and blockade of sea-lanes of communication. Moreover, the PLAN is increasingly viewed by senior PLA leadership as integral to resolution of the Taiwan issue--should force be required--and for safeguarding China's "Xisha" and "Nansha" islands in the South China Sea. Finally, the PLAN is likely to be increasingly used as an instrument of overseas diplomacy through participation in goodwill cruises and port visits. </P>
<P>The PLAN's evolving strategy has been described in terms of two distinct phases. The strategy's first phase is for the PLAN to develop a "green water active defense strategy" capability. This "green water" generally is described as being encompassed within an arc swung from Vladivostok to the north, to the Strait of Malacca to the south, and out to the "first island chain" (Aleutians, Kuriles, Ryukyus, Taiwan, Philippines, and Greater Sunda islands) to the east. Analysts have assessed that the PLAN is likely to attain this green water capability early in the 21st century. Open-source writings also suggest that the PLAN intends to develop a capability to operate in the "second island chain" (Bonins, Guam, Marianas, and Palau islands) by the mid-21st century. In the future, the PLAN also may expand its operations to bases in Myanmar, Burma. These bases will provide the PLAN with direct access to the Strait of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal. </P>
<P>The People's Liberation Army Navy </P>
<P>PLAN command and control are highly centralized through its headquarters in Beijing. The headquarters staff, led by Vice Adm. Shi Yunsheng, provides oversight and direction through its logistics, equipment, repair, and political departments. The PLAN consists of three major fleets, a naval aviation arm, and marine units. Fleets are strategically located to the north in Qingdao, to the east in Ningbo, and to the south in Zhanjiang--providing the Chinese Navy with direct access to the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea respectively. Each fleet consists of a number of major and minor bases, a naval air arm, and coastal-defense regions. South Sea Fleet units also include the Navy's Marine Force and its associated amphibious lift. Major surface combatant shipyards are located in Dalian, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hudong. The Wuhan shipyard is responsible for conventional submarine construction, and nuclear-powered attack and ballistic-missile submarines are built at the Huladao shipyard. </P>
<P>The PLAN is manned by approximately 268,000 officers and men, in-cluding 28,000 coastal-defense forces, 25,000 naval air forces, and some 7,000 marines. Conscripts serve for two years. Although there are recent provisions for sailors to remain in service for up to 30 years, a cadre of senior enlisted personnel is not yet well developed. PLAN academic training remains fairly basic by Western standards; however, there is an increasing emphasis on improving the quality of training through the use of automatic data-processing resources. Large-scale fleet exercises are conducted several times each year, but there is little integration between naval air and surface units, and even less integration of naval operations with units of either the PLA Air Force or Army. </P><P>When assessing China's military potential, Western and Asian observers often tend either to view the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as an ominous storm cloud on the horizon or to casually dismiss it as a "paper tiger" faced with significant modernization and operational problems. On the one hand, there is no shortage of commentary reporting the PLAN's acquisition of sophisticated Russian-built military ships and aircraft, improvements in indigenous production, and development of a modern Marine Force. These articles point with increasing alarm to China's drive for naval domination on both sides of the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait--and for extending a menacing naval presence far out into the Pacific. Other articles, pointing to aging PLAN combatant aircraft, surface units, and submarines--and to problems with indigenous production programs--maintain that China's Navy is floundering, and that it does not pose a credible threat to neighboring countries. </P>
<P>A more balanced assessment of the PLAN's capabilities today and its potential tomorrow may be derived from a better understanding of its mission, the present state of its ships and aircraft, and its ongoing modernization program. China's best military units--estimated at approximately 10 percent of its overall forces--are being modernized at a steady pace, in keeping with the country's ongoing economic development. As Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, then-director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 2 February 1999, these select forces will have achieved a reasonably high level of proficiency in 1980s-style maneuver warfare by 2010. They will be well equipped with theater-range missiles, "late Cold War equivalent" tanks and artillery, more advanced diesel and third-generation nuclear-powered submarines, and approximately 20 new surface combatant warships. </P>
<P>An Evolving Mission </P>
<P>Historically, China's Navy has been responsible for seaward and coastal defense. During the 1950s and 1960s, the PLAN focused on defending China's mainland from amphibious assault--first from the perceived U.S. threat and, later, from the perceived threat from the Soviet Union as its relationship with that country soured. Naval acquisitions were almost solely from existing Soviet systems and platforms, and defensive tactics were largely modeled after the Soviet example. During these years, the PLA developed a large fleet of relatively inexpensive (and thus expendable) missile boats, diesel submarines, and conventional bombers, which could be used in a mass attack on amphibious units and their escorts. The few destroyer-sized combatants acquired by the PLAN during this period were modeled primarily after World War II-era Russian designs. </P>
<P>In recent years, the PLAN's maritime mission has evolved from a role of static coastal defense to one of "active offshore defense." In this capacity, the PLAN can be used both as a tactical force and to support strategic national defense. The objectives of this new strategy are to assert China's role as a regional maritime power, to protect coastal economic regions and maritime interests, and to optimize the Navy's operations for national defense. The PLAN's responsibilities now include capture and defense of islands, and protection and blockade of sea-lanes of communication. Moreover, the PLAN is increasingly viewed by senior PLA leadership as integral to resolution of the Taiwan issue--should force be required--and for safeguarding China's "Xisha" and "Nansha" islands in the South China Sea. Finally, the PLAN is likely to be increasingly used as an instrument of overseas diplomacy through participation in goodwill cruises and port visits. </P>
<P>The PLAN's evolving strategy has been described in terms of two distinct phases. The strategy's first phase is for the PLAN to develop a "green water active defense strategy" capability. This "green water" generally is described as being encompassed within an arc swung from Vladivostok to the north, to the Strait of Malacca to the south, and out to the "first island chain" (Aleutians, Kuriles, Ryukyus, Taiwan, Philippines, and Greater Sunda islands) to the east. Analysts have assessed that the PLAN is likely to attain this green water capability early in the 21st century. Open-source writings also suggest that the PLAN intends to develop a capability to operate in the "second island chain" (Bonins, Guam, Marianas, and Palau islands) by the mid-21st century. In the future, the PLAN also may expand its operations to bases in Myanmar, Burma. These bases will provide the PLAN with direct access to the Strait of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal. </P>
<P>The People's Liberation Army Navy </P>
<P>PLAN command and control are highly centralized through its headquarters in Beijing. The headquarters staff, led by Vice Adm. Shi Yunsheng, provides oversight and direction through its logistics, equipment, repair, and political departments. The PLAN consists of three major fleets, a naval aviation arm, and marine units. Fleets are strategically located to the north in Qingdao, to the east in Ningbo, and to the south in Zhanjiang--providing the Chinese Navy with direct access to the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea respectively. Each fleet consists of a number of major and minor bases, a naval air arm, and coastal-defense regions. South Sea Fleet units also include the Navy's Marine Force and its associated amphibious lift. Major surface combatant shipyards are located in Dalian, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hudong. The Wuhan shipyard is responsible for conventional submarine construction, and nuclear-powered attack and ballistic-missile submarines are built at the Huladao shipyard. </P>
<P>The PLAN is manned by approximately 268,000 officers and men, in-cluding 28,000 coastal-defense forces, 25,000 naval air forces, and some 7,000 marines. Conscripts serve for two years. Although there are recent provisions for sailors to remain in service for up to 30 years, a cadre of senior enlisted personnel is not yet well developed. PLAN academic training remains fairly basic by Western standards; however, there is an increasing emphasis on improving the quality of training through the use of automatic data-processing resources. Large-scale fleet exercises are conducted several times each year, but there is little integration between naval air and surface units, and even less integration of naval operations with units of either the PLA Air Force or Army. </P>
[此贴子已经被作者于2004-6-11 15:50:01编辑过]
<P>(cont.)</P>
<P>A Force for the Future </P>
<P>The PLAN is not yet a significant naval power, even when viewed solely in a regional context. PLAN surface ships, submarines, and aircraft continue to lack the sophisticated weapons and sensor systems which characterize modern first-line naval units. These shortfalls limit the PLAN's present warfighting capabilities, and Chinese naval units are not yet up to the standard attained by the navies of Japan, the Republic of Korea, or even Taiwan. There also are significant tactical and doctrinal shortfalls that the PLAN has not adequately addressed. At-sea sustainability is modest, and the PLAN has not yet demonstrated the ability to conduct complex coordinated air and surface operations. The training of individual sailors remains basic by Western standards, and the PLAN lacks a corps of experienced noncommissioned officers. From the highest echelons of the service to individual commands, control is highly centralized, with little flexibility and creativity in subordinate ranks. These shortfalls will limit the ability of the PLAN to assert a significant regional naval presence for perhaps five to ten years, and the Navy is not likely to possess the longer reach associated with a maritime power-projection capability until well into the 21st century. </P>
<P>Having noted these shortfalls, however, the PLAN has made remarkable progress in its drive for modernization over the last decade. It has demonstrated the capability to deploy naval forces as far away as South America and Australia. It has acquired modern Russian-built diesel submarines and will receive two sophisticated Russian-built destroyers within the next two to three years. Discounting at present the likely acquisition of an aircraft carrier, China's Navy has improved its strike capabilities with the introduction of more cap-able F-8II aircraft, and it will further improve these capabilities when it places the FB-7 in service. It has continued to develop and maintain a sophisticated inventory of antisurface missiles and mines. The complexity and scope of fleet training have steadily increased, as have the capabilities of the PLAN's Marines. Further, improvements in individual training and the development of a corps of noncommissioned officers offers the potential to improve the sustainability and combat effectiveness of individual units significantly. These factors point to a Navy that will become increasingly capable of accomplishing its more prominent mission to safeguard China's maritime economic interests, to defend and perhaps expand interests in the South China Sea, and--ultimately, perhaps--to support the use of force against Taiwan. </P>
<P>When viewed in this context, it would be unwise to dismiss the PLAN as a "paper tiger." In the coming de-cades, the Chinese Navy presents the real likelihood of expanding its capabilities significantly. As it does so, it also is likely that Beijing will increasingly view the Navy as a mechanism to exert pressure on China's neighbors and to assert its influence regionally. </P>
<P>While it is unlikely to develop the capability to challenge the U.S. Navy for control of the seas, it is quite possible that the PLAN will, within two decades, develop a Navy with regional capabilities second only to Japan's. The degree to which these developments constitute "storm clouds on the horizon" will depend as much on U.S. diplomacy in the coming years as on the ability of the United States and its Pacific allies to maintain a strong regional-defense posture. </P>
<P>
Cohen "Hopeful" On Military Ties
</P>
<P>Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, asked in early November to confirm news media reports that the United States and China have agreed to resume military contacts, said he remained hopeful they could be resumed in the near future. "We do hope to reestablish the kind of military-to-military contacts that we had prior to the accident in Kosovo," Cohen said, "and they have indicated that they would like to reestablish these contacts." Cohen said that the United States had not made any specific plans for carrying out what have been China's expressed intentions to resume ties. </P>
<P>China suspended military contacts with the United States last May following NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, during Operation Allied Force. The commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Adm. Dennis C. Blair, said in September that the United States was ready to resume ties. "We are prepared to resume our military-to-military relations with the PLA [People's Liberation Army] when China is ready," Blair said. "It is in the interests of both our countries." Blair, the top U.S. military commander in the Pacific region, confirmed U.S. intentions during remarks to the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. </P>
<P>U.S.-Chinese military relations did take a step forward in October. For the first time in nearly six months, a U.S. Navy warship conducted a port visit in Hong Kong. The Spruance-class destroyer USS O'Brien, stationed in Yokosuka, Japan, anchored in the former British colony on 31 October for a five-day stay. Capt. Eric Lindenbaum, O'Brien's commanding officer, sounded an upbeat note on U.S.-Chinese relations following his ship's arrival at the port city. "Our visit here is a positive and hopeful step towards normalization of our port calls to Hong Kong," he said. "After a busy deployment and many days at sea, this visit is a well-deserved time for rest and relaxation for our crew." </P>
<P>Prior to China's suspension of military contacts with the United States, between 60 and 70 U.S. Navy ships visited Hong Kong each year--a level that had remained unchanged since Hong Kong's return to Chinese rule in 1997. Since its suspension of military relations, China had approved two Navy requests for Hong Kong port calls by civilian-crewed ships of the Military Sealift Command, but the O'Brien was the first commissioned Navy ship to visit. </P>
<P>In a related development, Sen. Robert C. Smith (R-N.H.) has placed an indefinite hold on the nomination of retired Adm. Joseph W. Prueher--Blair's predecessor as CINCPAC--to be the U.S. ambassador to China. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved Prueher's nomination on 3 November, but Lisa Harrison, Smith's press secretary, told Sea Power that Smith had placed a hold on the full Senate's vote on the nomination. "He has a hold on the nomination," Harrison said, "until, at the very least, he [Smith] receives documents that he has requested from the Pentagon." Smith has been critical of the Clinton administration's policy on China. In a prepared statement, Smith said, "The administration's policy lacks a proper balance between our [U.S.] economic, political, and strategic interests; it seems to be motivated by economic considerations alone." </P>
<P>Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee last March, Blair said that China was not a military threat to the United States today and that it would be many years before the PLA fields capabilities to project significant power across the Pacific region. "Whether the Chinese armed forces ever become a threat to American interests will be a function of our overall relationship with China," Blair said in a prepared statement. "Mutual knowledge and respect on the part of the two armed forces will contribute in future years to growing military capabilities being used to promote peaceful development." Blair said that a measured military-to-military program would support U.S. goals of addressing the two country's mutual security concerns. GIP </P>
<P>A Force for the Future </P>
<P>The PLAN is not yet a significant naval power, even when viewed solely in a regional context. PLAN surface ships, submarines, and aircraft continue to lack the sophisticated weapons and sensor systems which characterize modern first-line naval units. These shortfalls limit the PLAN's present warfighting capabilities, and Chinese naval units are not yet up to the standard attained by the navies of Japan, the Republic of Korea, or even Taiwan. There also are significant tactical and doctrinal shortfalls that the PLAN has not adequately addressed. At-sea sustainability is modest, and the PLAN has not yet demonstrated the ability to conduct complex coordinated air and surface operations. The training of individual sailors remains basic by Western standards, and the PLAN lacks a corps of experienced noncommissioned officers. From the highest echelons of the service to individual commands, control is highly centralized, with little flexibility and creativity in subordinate ranks. These shortfalls will limit the ability of the PLAN to assert a significant regional naval presence for perhaps five to ten years, and the Navy is not likely to possess the longer reach associated with a maritime power-projection capability until well into the 21st century. </P>
<P>Having noted these shortfalls, however, the PLAN has made remarkable progress in its drive for modernization over the last decade. It has demonstrated the capability to deploy naval forces as far away as South America and Australia. It has acquired modern Russian-built diesel submarines and will receive two sophisticated Russian-built destroyers within the next two to three years. Discounting at present the likely acquisition of an aircraft carrier, China's Navy has improved its strike capabilities with the introduction of more cap-able F-8II aircraft, and it will further improve these capabilities when it places the FB-7 in service. It has continued to develop and maintain a sophisticated inventory of antisurface missiles and mines. The complexity and scope of fleet training have steadily increased, as have the capabilities of the PLAN's Marines. Further, improvements in individual training and the development of a corps of noncommissioned officers offers the potential to improve the sustainability and combat effectiveness of individual units significantly. These factors point to a Navy that will become increasingly capable of accomplishing its more prominent mission to safeguard China's maritime economic interests, to defend and perhaps expand interests in the South China Sea, and--ultimately, perhaps--to support the use of force against Taiwan. </P>
<P>When viewed in this context, it would be unwise to dismiss the PLAN as a "paper tiger." In the coming de-cades, the Chinese Navy presents the real likelihood of expanding its capabilities significantly. As it does so, it also is likely that Beijing will increasingly view the Navy as a mechanism to exert pressure on China's neighbors and to assert its influence regionally. </P>
<P>While it is unlikely to develop the capability to challenge the U.S. Navy for control of the seas, it is quite possible that the PLAN will, within two decades, develop a Navy with regional capabilities second only to Japan's. The degree to which these developments constitute "storm clouds on the horizon" will depend as much on U.S. diplomacy in the coming years as on the ability of the United States and its Pacific allies to maintain a strong regional-defense posture. </P>
<P>
Cohen "Hopeful" On Military Ties
</P>
<P>Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, asked in early November to confirm news media reports that the United States and China have agreed to resume military contacts, said he remained hopeful they could be resumed in the near future. "We do hope to reestablish the kind of military-to-military contacts that we had prior to the accident in Kosovo," Cohen said, "and they have indicated that they would like to reestablish these contacts." Cohen said that the United States had not made any specific plans for carrying out what have been China's expressed intentions to resume ties. </P>
<P>China suspended military contacts with the United States last May following NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, during Operation Allied Force. The commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Adm. Dennis C. Blair, said in September that the United States was ready to resume ties. "We are prepared to resume our military-to-military relations with the PLA [People's Liberation Army] when China is ready," Blair said. "It is in the interests of both our countries." Blair, the top U.S. military commander in the Pacific region, confirmed U.S. intentions during remarks to the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. </P>
<P>U.S.-Chinese military relations did take a step forward in October. For the first time in nearly six months, a U.S. Navy warship conducted a port visit in Hong Kong. The Spruance-class destroyer USS O'Brien, stationed in Yokosuka, Japan, anchored in the former British colony on 31 October for a five-day stay. Capt. Eric Lindenbaum, O'Brien's commanding officer, sounded an upbeat note on U.S.-Chinese relations following his ship's arrival at the port city. "Our visit here is a positive and hopeful step towards normalization of our port calls to Hong Kong," he said. "After a busy deployment and many days at sea, this visit is a well-deserved time for rest and relaxation for our crew." </P>
<P>Prior to China's suspension of military contacts with the United States, between 60 and 70 U.S. Navy ships visited Hong Kong each year--a level that had remained unchanged since Hong Kong's return to Chinese rule in 1997. Since its suspension of military relations, China had approved two Navy requests for Hong Kong port calls by civilian-crewed ships of the Military Sealift Command, but the O'Brien was the first commissioned Navy ship to visit. </P>
<P>In a related development, Sen. Robert C. Smith (R-N.H.) has placed an indefinite hold on the nomination of retired Adm. Joseph W. Prueher--Blair's predecessor as CINCPAC--to be the U.S. ambassador to China. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved Prueher's nomination on 3 November, but Lisa Harrison, Smith's press secretary, told Sea Power that Smith had placed a hold on the full Senate's vote on the nomination. "He has a hold on the nomination," Harrison said, "until, at the very least, he [Smith] receives documents that he has requested from the Pentagon." Smith has been critical of the Clinton administration's policy on China. In a prepared statement, Smith said, "The administration's policy lacks a proper balance between our [U.S.] economic, political, and strategic interests; it seems to be motivated by economic considerations alone." </P>
<P>Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee last March, Blair said that China was not a military threat to the United States today and that it would be many years before the PLA fields capabilities to project significant power across the Pacific region. "Whether the Chinese armed forces ever become a threat to American interests will be a function of our overall relationship with China," Blair said in a prepared statement. "Mutual knowledge and respect on the part of the two armed forces will contribute in future years to growing military capabilities being used to promote peaceful development." Blair said that a measured military-to-military program would support U.S. goals of addressing the two country's mutual security concerns. GIP </P>
今天的中国海军——笼罩在地平线上的乌云还是一只纸老虎？</P>每当评估中国的潜在军事力量时，西方或是亚太的评论家总是趋向于或是笼罩在地平线的乌云，或是轻蔑的称其为“纸老虎”，需要面对现代化改装和操作问题。另一方面也不缺少这样的分析报告， PLAN不断的从经验丰富的俄罗斯获得水面舰只和飞机，改进本国的生产，发展现代的海军力量。这些文章通常瞄准由中国对马六甲海峡、南中国海、台湾海峡的控制力增长进而向太平洋延伸军事存在带来的警报。还有一些文章指向老化的海航飞机，水面舰艇，潜艇，还有本土生产项目存在的问题——所有的一切都说明中国海军正在艰难前行，同时不会构成对邻国的可信的威胁。</P> 更公允的评估中国海军今天的能力和以后潜在的势力需要基于更加详细的理解它的使命、它的飞机和舰船的现状和它正在进行的现代化更新项目。作为中国最好的军事集群——差不多占所有力量的10%——正在稳步的进行它的现代化进程，一如这个国家正在进行的经济现代化。时任防卫情报处的主任的Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes在参议院军事委员会作证是承认到2020年这些精心挑选的部队在八十年代风格的机动作战方面将达到一个非常熟练的程度。他们将装备有相当威胁射程的导弹，后冷战时期的坦克和大炮，更加先进的柴电和第三代的核潜艇，还有接近20艘的水面舰艇。<p></p></P><p> </p></P>不断变化的使命<p></p></P>历史上，中国海军曾经承担海岸防御的使命，从50年代到60年代，PLAN集中力量于防止针对中国大陆的两栖攻击——先是美国的威胁，再就是苏联在和中国关系破裂后的威胁。PLAV只能得到现存的苏联的系统或是平台，防御的战略极大的取自于苏联模式。在那些年代，PLAN发展了大批的廉价或者说是消耗性的导弹艇，柴电潜艇，传统的能够对两栖集团和它的护卫舰队发动规模攻击轰炸机。少数的几艘驱逐舰基本上仿自二战时期的俄罗斯的设计。</P> </P>先翻这些，请各位指教<p></p></P>
<P> 把An Evolving Mission 一段翻译完,不足之处敬请原谅!</P><P>最近几年中,中国海军的海上任务已经从一个近海岸防卫的角色向"积极的海上防卫"发展.这种能力使中国海军成为一支战术力量并支持国家战略防卫.这种新策略的目的是声称中国的角色是亚太地区的海洋国家,中国海军的任务是保卫沿海经济区和中国的海上利益,并为国家防卫而最优化海军行动.现今中国海军的职责包括岛屿攻取并防卫,保护国家利益,通讯航线的封锁.此外,中国海军正逐步被中国人民解放军的高级领导层作为解决台湾问题不可缺少的一支力量--必需的力量--并捍卫在南中国海域上的西沙和南沙群岛.最后,通过善意的巡航和港口访问中国海军正逐渐被用来实现中国的海上外交.
中国海军的战略进展可以用两个阶段来描述.中国海军的第一个战略阶段是发展所谓的"未成熟水域的积极防卫战略"能力.这片未成熟水域北至符拉迪沃斯托克[苏联远东区港市]( 中国传统称海参崴),南至马六甲海峡,东至第一岛链(阿留申群岛,库那群岛,琉球群岛[位于中国台湾岛与日本九州岛之间],中国台湾,菲律宾群岛,巽他群岛外围[东南亚]).分析家们认为中国海军极有可能在21世纪初期获得在这片水域上的防卫能力.Open-source writings同样认为中国海军意图提升作战能力使其到21世纪中叶将具备在第二岛链开展军事行动的能力,第二岛链包括的岛屿群:小笠原群岛[日本],关岛（西太平洋),马里亚纳群岛(位于西太平洋)和帕劳群岛[西太平洋](即帛琉群岛).将来,中国海军也有可能在缅甸等东南亚国家扩建军事基地,这些军事基地将使中国海军直接进入马六甲海峡和孟加拉海湾.</P>
中国海军的战略进展可以用两个阶段来描述.中国海军的第一个战略阶段是发展所谓的"未成熟水域的积极防卫战略"能力.这片未成熟水域北至符拉迪沃斯托克[苏联远东区港市]( 中国传统称海参崴),南至马六甲海峡,东至第一岛链(阿留申群岛,库那群岛,琉球群岛[位于中国台湾岛与日本九州岛之间],中国台湾,菲律宾群岛,巽他群岛外围[东南亚]).分析家们认为中国海军极有可能在21世纪初期获得在这片水域上的防卫能力.Open-source writings同样认为中国海军意图提升作战能力使其到21世纪中叶将具备在第二岛链开展军事行动的能力,第二岛链包括的岛屿群:小笠原群岛[日本],关岛（西太平洋),马里亚纳群岛(位于西太平洋)和帕劳群岛[西太平洋](即帛琉群岛).将来,中国海军也有可能在缅甸等东南亚国家扩建军事基地,这些军事基地将使中国海军直接进入马六甲海峡和孟加拉海湾.</P>
人民解放军海军
中国海军的指挥和控制权高度集中于设在北京的司令部.Vice Adm. Shi Yunsheng领导下的司令部参谋机构通过所属后勤,设备,维修和行政部门向全军提供决策指导.中国海军由三大舰队,海军航空部队和水兵组成.三大舰队战略上位于北部的青岛,东部的宁波和南部的湛江--分别为中国海军直接进入黄海东海和南海提供条件.每一支舰队由为数众多的主要次要基地,一支海军航空兵和沿海岸防卫区组成.南海舰队包括了海上作战力量和联合两栖战车.主要的水面造船所位于大连,上海,广州和湖东.武汉造船厂负责生产常规潜艇而Huladao 造船厂建造弹道导弹核动力攻击潜艇.
中国海军现役286000名军官和士兵,这其中包含28000的沿海防卫兵力,25000的海军航空部队和大约7000名水兵.被征募入伍的士兵服役期为两年.虽然最近的一些条款规定现役海员的服役期长达30年,但是军中高级干部人员的征募并没有得到较好的发展.中国海军的课堂训练清楚地保留了西方标准的要素,然而通过使用自动化数据处理来提升训练质量正越来越得到重视.中国海军每年都要举行数次大规模舰队演习,但是海军航空部队和水面作战力量的综合使用并不出色,更不用说它与中国人民解放军空军或是陆军的联合作战了.
中国海军的指挥和控制权高度集中于设在北京的司令部.Vice Adm. Shi Yunsheng领导下的司令部参谋机构通过所属后勤,设备,维修和行政部门向全军提供决策指导.中国海军由三大舰队,海军航空部队和水兵组成.三大舰队战略上位于北部的青岛,东部的宁波和南部的湛江--分别为中国海军直接进入黄海东海和南海提供条件.每一支舰队由为数众多的主要次要基地,一支海军航空兵和沿海岸防卫区组成.南海舰队包括了海上作战力量和联合两栖战车.主要的水面造船所位于大连,上海,广州和湖东.武汉造船厂负责生产常规潜艇而Huladao 造船厂建造弹道导弹核动力攻击潜艇.
中国海军现役286000名军官和士兵,这其中包含28000的沿海防卫兵力,25000的海军航空部队和大约7000名水兵.被征募入伍的士兵服役期为两年.虽然最近的一些条款规定现役海员的服役期长达30年,但是军中高级干部人员的征募并没有得到较好的发展.中国海军的课堂训练清楚地保留了西方标准的要素,然而通过使用自动化数据处理来提升训练质量正越来越得到重视.中国海军每年都要举行数次大规模舰队演习,但是海军航空部队和水面作战力量的综合使用并不出色,更不用说它与中国人民解放军空军或是陆军的联合作战了.
<P>老大，这样子翻译？</P><P>好长啊，</P>
<P>楼上翻的好的多了，哈哈，向你学习</P>
海军力量<p></p></P>中国人民解放军海军是一支相对来说训练有素装备精良的拥有7000人的海军力量。这支海上力量的主要使命是在和平时期捍卫中国在南中国海的中国岛屿的主权和在战争期间夺取和保卫南中国海的这些岛屿。这支海上力量也可能被用于在包括对台湾军事封锁的军事行动中发动两栖和滩头进攻。中国海军装备有两栖坦克、装甲运输车、榴弹炮和多管火箭发射车。虽然中国海军拥有将近60辆坦克登陆舰和中型登陆舰---包括有一定运输能力的玉亭级、玉康级和玉良级--其总共只能搭载5000到10000名士兵的部队。<p></p></P>如此有限的搭载能力要支持任何大型的两栖作战是不够的。海军最近的两栖作战能力的提高包括装备了金沙级气垫船。海军对发展一种地效飞行器表现出兴趣。这种混血飞行器具有在距水面一米的高度以120海里或更快的速度巡航的能力，将来这种飞行器可能被证明具有支持两栖作战的能力。过去，解放军海军的两栖作战演习表明其与空中轰炸和海军炮火的攻击冲击波支持进行协同的尝试，但这种能力还未得到有效的提高。<p></p></P>海军航空兵<p></p></P>虽然总体数量是相当可观的，但西方的分析家认为解放军海军的飞机并不是一线的作战力量。海航的大部分飞机都是按20-30年前苏联飞机仿造的，他们不足以担当空军海上巡逻、反潜，反舰作战的使命。陈旧的轰6D的两枚C-801反舰导弹是对水面单位的主要威胁，但她独立定位和成功打击雷达视野以外的目标的能力还值得怀疑。用更先进的FB-7来替代老旧的轰6D将会提高反舰导弹的打击能力。<p></p></P>当海航开始认真实施航母发展计划时，虽然苏27K侧翼也是一个可能的选择，但FB-7也就是FBC-1的一种改进型可能是所选机种。虽然装备有700多架可以投放炸弹、火箭和地雷的攻击机，但对于装备了现代化防空系统的水面舰艇来说，除少数较新的J-8II长须鲸高空防卫战斗机外，这些飞机是没有能力进行有效打击的。还有就是，还没有表明海航能够将这些攻击机与地面和空中的打击进行有效配合。海上巡逻机，象BE-6，缺少现代化的雷达系统和传感器，也就对当今的潜艇够不上大的威胁。<p></p></P>
<P>先贴第一页：</P><P>今天的中国海军- 是国际社会的威胁或是纸老虎?</P><P> 当评估中国军事的的潜力时候,西方和亚洲的观察者在看待人民解放军海军 (PLAN)时常常有某种的倾向：要么把它看作是对国际社会的威胁，要么因为人民海军在现代化和操作过程中的问题而武断的认为它是纸老虎。一方面,目前还没有任何报告说明中国从俄国获得的成熟的战舰和飞机技术来改进国内的产品以发展一支现代化的海军力量的整个过程有任何缺陷。 这些文章对中国海军的两个发展趋势提出了不断升级的警报：中国海军将不断推进对马六甲海峡的两端、南中国海和台湾海峡的控制权,甚至它将作为一支深入太平洋的有威慑力的海军力量出现。其他的文章则指出中国海军老化的飞机、水面舰艇和潜艇以及中国军工生产中的现实问题 决定了他目前还无法对邻国构成有效的威胁。 </P><P> 对PLAN现实能力和发展潜力的一个科学的评估必须基于对PLAN的发展目标的更深入理解、它的海军军舰和飞机的现状以及它正在进行的现代化计划。中国军队的精锐，大约占其总兵力的百分之十，正在同这个国家不断发展的经济一起稳步发展。Patrick M. Hughes将军--当时防卫局代理的指导者,在1999年二月2日向叁议院武装服务委员会作证时指出,中国这些挑选出来的力量在2010之前将会成为同美国20世纪80年代相当的娴熟的机械化作战部队。他们将会装备各种射程的飞弹、先进的坦克和火炮、比较先进的常规潜艇和第三代核动力潜水艇和大约20艘新的水面战舰。 </P><P>一个进化的任务</P><P> 历史上, 中国海军对沿海防御是起了作用的。在20世纪50~60年代的时候，PLAN的计划把重心集中在防御美国对中国大陆的水陆两栖攻击，稍后也兼顾应对来自苏联的威胁。中国海军获得的装备几乎全部都是独立地从已存在的苏联装备的基础上发展起来的，而且防御的手法大量地以苏联的例子为模型。在这些年期间，PLA 发展了装备相对地廉宜的(经济上可以承受)飞弹船、柴油潜水艇和传统的轰炸机的一个大的舰队, 可以用来发动一场大规模的两栖作战和掩护登陆作战的人员。海军在这时期获得的少量有威力的装备大多数以二战时期苏联的设计为原型。</P><P> 近些年来，PLAN的作战计划已经从近岸防御过度到海上主动防御，在获得这种能力后PLAN不但是一支战术力量，而且还支撑国家的战略防御。这个新的策略目标表明了PLAN对发展成区域性的海上力量、保护沿海经济区域和海洋经济区域以及为加强国家的防卫将海军的操作最佳化的兴趣。中国海军的职责现在包括海岛的获取和防卫以及对海上通道的保护和阻断。而且，中国海军（PLAN）逐渐地被资深的PLA领导看做是解决台湾问题和南海岛屿争端必不可少的力量。PLAN越来越多的通过友好航行和港口互访来做为一种外交工具。 </P><P> PLAN的发展将分为两个阶段。第一个阶段是成为绿水海军。"绿水" 通常被描述为在弧，北面从 符拉迪沃斯托克 到更远,南方到麻六甲的海峡,向东到的"第一岛链"(阿流申群岛、库页岛、琉球群岛、台湾，菲律宾共和国、巽他群岛)。分析家估计PLAN在21世纪早期能达到绿水能力。公开的资料表明PLAN在21世纪中期想要发展成一支能在 "第二岛链"(小笠原群岛 ，关岛，马里亚纳群岛和帛琉岛) 中活动的海军。 未来，PLAN也可能以缅甸为基地向外扩张。这些基地将会提供PLAN到麻六甲海峡和孟加拉湾直接的通路。 </P><P>人民解放军海军</P><P> PLAN由设在北京的司令部实行高度集权的指挥和控制。 司令部由石云生领导,由它的物流管理，装备，修理和政治部门提供监督和发展方向。PLAN由三支主战舰队 、海军航空兵和一支海运船队组成。舰队的战略基地位于北方的青岛、东部的宁波和南方的湛江--这些基地提供中国海军到黄海、台湾海峡和南海的通路。每个舰队都有许多基地、海军航空兵和自己的海防区域。南海舰队也包括海军的海运力量和它的联合水陆两栖作战部队。PLAN主要的造船厂是大连造船厂，上海造船厂，广州造船厂和沪东造船厂。武汉造船厂负责常规潜水艇的建造，而核动力的攻击和弹道飞弹潜水艇在葫芦岛造船厂建造。 </P><P> PLAN拥有大约 268,000名官兵，在全部的作战力量中，有2500名海军航空兵和7000名运输人员。被征入伍的士兵要服二年兵役。尽管每个人的服役期限可以达到30年，但是征募有经验的军官仍然很困难。PLAN的学院教育完全以西方标准为基础；然而，自动化的数据处理资源被大量的应用以提高教育训练的质量。大规模的舰队演习每年都要进行好几次，但是海军水面舰队和航空兵的联合演习很少。至于和PLA空军以及其他军种的联合演习那就更少了。
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<P>今晚先翻这么多，明儿个早上还早起学车呢。</P><P>请高手们多多指点了！</P><P> 在去年五月的联军行动中，由于北约误炸中国驻南斯拉夫贝尔格莱德大使馆，使得中国一度中止了与</P><P>美国的军事交流。9月，美国太平洋司令部总司令，海军上将Dennis C.Blair表示美国准备恢复与中</P><P>国军方的联系：“我们时刻准备着准备恢复与解放军的军事交流，这对两国来说都有好处。”Blair</P><P>，这位美军太平洋战区最高军事长官在马来西亚科隆坡的战略与国际关系研究学院发表讲话时，肯定</P><P>了美方的意图。</P><P> 10月，中美军事交流有了进一步的发展。误炸事件六个月以后，美国军舰首次停靠香港进行访问。驻</P><P>扎在日本横须贺的Spruance级驱逐舰O'Brien号，于10月31日抵达香港这个前英国殖民地开始为期5天</P><P>的修整。指挥官Eric Lindenbaum上校在军舰抵达香港后对中美关系作出乐观表述：“这次访问是积</P><P>极的，有益于恢复对香港访问的正常化。我们的官兵在海上部署忙碌了这么些天，需要好好休息放松</P><P>一下了。”
在此之前的6、70年代，每年美国海军舰只都会停靠香港，这一举动直到1997年香港回归中国后才有</P><P>所改变。两国中止军事联系后，中方曾批准过两艘由非军事人员驾驶的补给船停靠香港的请求。而</P><P>O'Brien号是第一艘被批准来访的海军舰只。</P>
在此之前的6、70年代，每年美国海军舰只都会停靠香港，这一举动直到1997年香港回归中国后才有</P><P>所改变。两国中止军事联系后，中方曾批准过两艘由非军事人员驾驶的补给船停靠香港的请求。而</P><P>O'Brien号是第一艘被批准来访的海军舰只。</P>
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