超级军网哪位懂英国鸟语的高物来翻译一下
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國防新聞周刊：中國ZUBR氣墊船的新能力
China’s Gator Navy Makes Marginal Strides
Amphibious Exercises Tested New Capabilities
By Wendell Minnick
TAIPEI — During 10 years of naval modernization, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has largely ignored its amphibious capabilities in favor of adding frigates, destroyers and submarines.
The lack of interest in amphibi­ous operations is suspect, since China has a stated policy of invading Taiwan if the island declares independence, but the evidence is clear. China has modernized its gator Navy and built more vessels, but it has largely maintained the same capability over the past decade.
In 1997, China was capable of landing one division on Taiwan’s beaches, said Dennis Blasko, a former U.S. Army attaché based in Beijing. By 2008, PLAN had not expanded that capability.
“Despite the recent construction of amphibious craft, the actual lift capability has not improved in over a decade,” said Blasko, author of “The Chinese Army Today.”
“The implications are the construction that has gone on is best described as a ‘modernization’ of the amphibious fleet, not necessarily a ‘buildup.’”
Limited Lift
New amphibious lift vessels have been commissioned, older ships have been retired, and yet the PLAN still lacks sufficient lift for anything but a relatively small amphibious operation, Blasko said.
“From my perspective, I don’t see any startling new developments in amphibious warfare or amphibious capabilities,” said Larry Wortzel, a former U.S. Army attaché in Beijing.
“The ability to support amphibious operations with ‘over the beach’ craft [hover­craft] has improved, but it is an evolutionary improvement and not revolutionary.”
China has recently begun building an air-cushioned hovercraft with a design based on the U.S. Navy’s Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC) and the Russian Zubr-class LCAC, with a capability of transporting 60 tons of equipment, said Andrei Chang, a China military specialist with the Kanwa Information Center.
The hovercraft will be deployed on the new Type 071 landing platform dock (LPD), which can carry up to four hovercraft. The first Type 071 (998 Kunlun Shan), commissioned in November 2007, is based at Zhanjiang Naval Base in Guangdong Province in southern China.
China procured four engines from Ukrainian-based Zorya­Mashproekt; established in 2001, the company makes gas turbine engines, Chang said.
China has improved and expanded its amphibious landing exercises, but PLAN still faces huge logistics and operational problems. Blasko estimates that roughly “one-third of PLA ground force infantry and armored divisions and brigades have conducted amphibious training to some extent, but not all units have equal capabilities.”
Most of China’s amphibious training takes place in the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions (MRs), which contain the first echelon of assault troops in a Taiwan scenario, followed now by an increase in amphibious training in the Jinan MR.
“There is no doubt the level of proficiency for amphibious operations has increased over the past decade, but all units that have practiced amphibious operations are not at the same level of training proficiency,” Blasko said.
Unique Exercises
In 2008, two amphibious landing exercises were closely watched by outsider observers, the Lianhe­2008 (Joint 2008) and the Libing­2008 (Sharpening 2008).
These two exercises were unusual in that they were both “transregional” and conducted at the same time.
Lianhe-2008 was conducted by the 138th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 26th Group Army, Jinan MR in September.
“The brigade started in Jinan MR and moved by sea to Shenyang MR for the ground phase in a joint operation with the Navy and Air Force support,” Blasko said.
Then another transregional exercise, Libing-2008, started out of the Jinan MR with the 58th Light Mechanized Brigade/20th Group Army moving to the Beijing MR combined arms training center.
“Thus, the Military Region headquarters planned for and executed the deployment of two brigades from different group armies outside of the MR borders simultaneously. It is a relatively rare event for a single unit to deploy outside its MR boundaries,” Blasko said.
This also tested the MR headquarters C3 skills and “replicated the type of real-world events that Jinan MR might have to conduct in its role as strategic reserve for the PLA,” he said.
The exercises exposed overall shortfalls in the PLA training system and served as a “stepping­stone in gradually improving PLA capabilities.”
As China-Taiwan relations improve, the likelihood of armed conflict between the two diminishes. However, as China begins to take on the challenges of becoming a global military power, it will no doubt have to improve its amphibious capabilities.
“For the future, the things to watch will be naval presence operations, such as the one initiated by the deployment to the Gulf of Aden,” Wortzel said. “If the PLA is serious about wanting to be able to respond to kidnappings and piracy, then some limited forced-entry capability will need to be added to its repertoire.”國防新聞周刊：中國ZUBR氣墊船的新能力
China’s Gator Navy Makes Marginal Strides
Amphibious Exercises Tested New Capabilities
By Wendell Minnick
TAIPEI — During 10 years of naval modernization, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has largely ignored its amphibious capabilities in favor of adding frigates, destroyers and submarines.
The lack of interest in amphibi­ous operations is suspect, since China has a stated policy of invading Taiwan if the island declares independence, but the evidence is clear. China has modernized its gator Navy and built more vessels, but it has largely maintained the same capability over the past decade.
In 1997, China was capable of landing one division on Taiwan’s beaches, said Dennis Blasko, a former U.S. Army attaché based in Beijing. By 2008, PLAN had not expanded that capability.
“Despite the recent construction of amphibious craft, the actual lift capability has not improved in over a decade,” said Blasko, author of “The Chinese Army Today.”
“The implications are the construction that has gone on is best described as a ‘modernization’ of the amphibious fleet, not necessarily a ‘buildup.’”
Limited Lift
New amphibious lift vessels have been commissioned, older ships have been retired, and yet the PLAN still lacks sufficient lift for anything but a relatively small amphibious operation, Blasko said.
“From my perspective, I don’t see any startling new developments in amphibious warfare or amphibious capabilities,” said Larry Wortzel, a former U.S. Army attaché in Beijing.
“The ability to support amphibious operations with ‘over the beach’ craft [hover­craft] has improved, but it is an evolutionary improvement and not revolutionary.”
China has recently begun building an air-cushioned hovercraft with a design based on the U.S. Navy’s Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC) and the Russian Zubr-class LCAC, with a capability of transporting 60 tons of equipment, said Andrei Chang, a China military specialist with the Kanwa Information Center.
The hovercraft will be deployed on the new Type 071 landing platform dock (LPD), which can carry up to four hovercraft. The first Type 071 (998 Kunlun Shan), commissioned in November 2007, is based at Zhanjiang Naval Base in Guangdong Province in southern China.
China procured four engines from Ukrainian-based Zorya­Mashproekt; established in 2001, the company makes gas turbine engines, Chang said.
China has improved and expanded its amphibious landing exercises, but PLAN still faces huge logistics and operational problems. Blasko estimates that roughly “one-third of PLA ground force infantry and armored divisions and brigades have conducted amphibious training to some extent, but not all units have equal capabilities.”
Most of China’s amphibious training takes place in the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions (MRs), which contain the first echelon of assault troops in a Taiwan scenario, followed now by an increase in amphibious training in the Jinan MR.
“There is no doubt the level of proficiency for amphibious operations has increased over the past decade, but all units that have practiced amphibious operations are not at the same level of training proficiency,” Blasko said.
Unique Exercises
In 2008, two amphibious landing exercises were closely watched by outsider observers, the Lianhe­2008 (Joint 2008) and the Libing­2008 (Sharpening 2008).
These two exercises were unusual in that they were both “transregional” and conducted at the same time.
Lianhe-2008 was conducted by the 138th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 26th Group Army, Jinan MR in September.
“The brigade started in Jinan MR and moved by sea to Shenyang MR for the ground phase in a joint operation with the Navy and Air Force support,” Blasko said.
Then another transregional exercise, Libing-2008, started out of the Jinan MR with the 58th Light Mechanized Brigade/20th Group Army moving to the Beijing MR combined arms training center.
“Thus, the Military Region headquarters planned for and executed the deployment of two brigades from different group armies outside of the MR borders simultaneously. It is a relatively rare event for a single unit to deploy outside its MR boundaries,” Blasko said.
This also tested the MR headquarters C3 skills and “replicated the type of real-world events that Jinan MR might have to conduct in its role as strategic reserve for the PLA,” he said.
The exercises exposed overall shortfalls in the PLA training system and served as a “stepping­stone in gradually improving PLA capabilities.”
As China-Taiwan relations improve, the likelihood of armed conflict between the two diminishes. However, as China begins to take on the challenges of becoming a global military power, it will no doubt have to improve its amphibious capabilities.
“For the future, the things to watch will be naval presence operations, such as the one initiated by the deployment to the Gulf of Aden,” Wortzel said. “If the PLA is serious about wanting to be able to respond to kidnappings and piracy, then some limited forced-entry capability will need to be added to its repertoire.”
China’s Gator Navy Makes Marginal Strides
Amphibious Exercises Tested New Capabilities
By Wendell Minnick
TAIPEI — During 10 years of naval modernization, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has largely ignored its amphibious capabilities in favor of adding frigates, destroyers and submarines.
The lack of interest in amphibi­ous operations is suspect, since China has a stated policy of invading Taiwan if the island declares independence, but the evidence is clear. China has modernized its gator Navy and built more vessels, but it has largely maintained the same capability over the past decade.
In 1997, China was capable of landing one division on Taiwan’s beaches, said Dennis Blasko, a former U.S. Army attaché based in Beijing. By 2008, PLAN had not expanded that capability.
“Despite the recent construction of amphibious craft, the actual lift capability has not improved in over a decade,” said Blasko, author of “The Chinese Army Today.”
“The implications are the construction that has gone on is best described as a ‘modernization’ of the amphibious fleet, not necessarily a ‘buildup.’”
Limited Lift
New amphibious lift vessels have been commissioned, older ships have been retired, and yet the PLAN still lacks sufficient lift for anything but a relatively small amphibious operation, Blasko said.
“From my perspective, I don’t see any startling new developments in amphibious warfare or amphibious capabilities,” said Larry Wortzel, a former U.S. Army attaché in Beijing.
“The ability to support amphibious operations with ‘over the beach’ craft [hover­craft] has improved, but it is an evolutionary improvement and not revolutionary.”
China has recently begun building an air-cushioned hovercraft with a design based on the U.S. Navy’s Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC) and the Russian Zubr-class LCAC, with a capability of transporting 60 tons of equipment, said Andrei Chang, a China military specialist with the Kanwa Information Center.
The hovercraft will be deployed on the new Type 071 landing platform dock (LPD), which can carry up to four hovercraft. The first Type 071 (998 Kunlun Shan), commissioned in November 2007, is based at Zhanjiang Naval Base in Guangdong Province in southern China.
China procured four engines from Ukrainian-based Zorya­Mashproekt; established in 2001, the company makes gas turbine engines, Chang said.
China has improved and expanded its amphibious landing exercises, but PLAN still faces huge logistics and operational problems. Blasko estimates that roughly “one-third of PLA ground force infantry and armored divisions and brigades have conducted amphibious training to some extent, but not all units have equal capabilities.”
Most of China’s amphibious training takes place in the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions (MRs), which contain the first echelon of assault troops in a Taiwan scenario, followed now by an increase in amphibious training in the Jinan MR.
“There is no doubt the level of proficiency for amphibious operations has increased over the past decade, but all units that have practiced amphibious operations are not at the same level of training proficiency,” Blasko said.
Unique Exercises
In 2008, two amphibious landing exercises were closely watched by outsider observers, the Lianhe­2008 (Joint 2008) and the Libing­2008 (Sharpening 2008).
These two exercises were unusual in that they were both “transregional” and conducted at the same time.
Lianhe-2008 was conducted by the 138th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 26th Group Army, Jinan MR in September.
“The brigade started in Jinan MR and moved by sea to Shenyang MR for the ground phase in a joint operation with the Navy and Air Force support,” Blasko said.
Then another transregional exercise, Libing-2008, started out of the Jinan MR with the 58th Light Mechanized Brigade/20th Group Army moving to the Beijing MR combined arms training center.
“Thus, the Military Region headquarters planned for and executed the deployment of two brigades from different group armies outside of the MR borders simultaneously. It is a relatively rare event for a single unit to deploy outside its MR boundaries,” Blasko said.
This also tested the MR headquarters C3 skills and “replicated the type of real-world events that Jinan MR might have to conduct in its role as strategic reserve for the PLA,” he said.
The exercises exposed overall shortfalls in the PLA training system and served as a “stepping­stone in gradually improving PLA capabilities.”
As China-Taiwan relations improve, the likelihood of armed conflict between the two diminishes. However, as China begins to take on the challenges of becoming a global military power, it will no doubt have to improve its amphibious capabilities.
“For the future, the things to watch will be naval presence operations, such as the one initiated by the deployment to the Gulf of Aden,” Wortzel said. “If the PLA is serious about wanting to be able to respond to kidnappings and piracy, then some limited forced-entry capability will need to be added to its repertoire.”國防新聞周刊：中國ZUBR氣墊船的新能力
China’s Gator Navy Makes Marginal Strides
Amphibious Exercises Tested New Capabilities
By Wendell Minnick
TAIPEI — During 10 years of naval modernization, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has largely ignored its amphibious capabilities in favor of adding frigates, destroyers and submarines.
The lack of interest in amphibi­ous operations is suspect, since China has a stated policy of invading Taiwan if the island declares independence, but the evidence is clear. China has modernized its gator Navy and built more vessels, but it has largely maintained the same capability over the past decade.
In 1997, China was capable of landing one division on Taiwan’s beaches, said Dennis Blasko, a former U.S. Army attaché based in Beijing. By 2008, PLAN had not expanded that capability.
“Despite the recent construction of amphibious craft, the actual lift capability has not improved in over a decade,” said Blasko, author of “The Chinese Army Today.”
“The implications are the construction that has gone on is best described as a ‘modernization’ of the amphibious fleet, not necessarily a ‘buildup.’”
Limited Lift
New amphibious lift vessels have been commissioned, older ships have been retired, and yet the PLAN still lacks sufficient lift for anything but a relatively small amphibious operation, Blasko said.
“From my perspective, I don’t see any startling new developments in amphibious warfare or amphibious capabilities,” said Larry Wortzel, a former U.S. Army attaché in Beijing.
“The ability to support amphibious operations with ‘over the beach’ craft [hover­craft] has improved, but it is an evolutionary improvement and not revolutionary.”
China has recently begun building an air-cushioned hovercraft with a design based on the U.S. Navy’s Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC) and the Russian Zubr-class LCAC, with a capability of transporting 60 tons of equipment, said Andrei Chang, a China military specialist with the Kanwa Information Center.
The hovercraft will be deployed on the new Type 071 landing platform dock (LPD), which can carry up to four hovercraft. The first Type 071 (998 Kunlun Shan), commissioned in November 2007, is based at Zhanjiang Naval Base in Guangdong Province in southern China.
China procured four engines from Ukrainian-based Zorya­Mashproekt; established in 2001, the company makes gas turbine engines, Chang said.
China has improved and expanded its amphibious landing exercises, but PLAN still faces huge logistics and operational problems. Blasko estimates that roughly “one-third of PLA ground force infantry and armored divisions and brigades have conducted amphibious training to some extent, but not all units have equal capabilities.”
Most of China’s amphibious training takes place in the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions (MRs), which contain the first echelon of assault troops in a Taiwan scenario, followed now by an increase in amphibious training in the Jinan MR.
“There is no doubt the level of proficiency for amphibious operations has increased over the past decade, but all units that have practiced amphibious operations are not at the same level of training proficiency,” Blasko said.
Unique Exercises
In 2008, two amphibious landing exercises were closely watched by outsider observers, the Lianhe­2008 (Joint 2008) and the Libing­2008 (Sharpening 2008).
These two exercises were unusual in that they were both “transregional” and conducted at the same time.
Lianhe-2008 was conducted by the 138th Motorized Infantry Brigade, 26th Group Army, Jinan MR in September.
“The brigade started in Jinan MR and moved by sea to Shenyang MR for the ground phase in a joint operation with the Navy and Air Force support,” Blasko said.
Then another transregional exercise, Libing-2008, started out of the Jinan MR with the 58th Light Mechanized Brigade/20th Group Army moving to the Beijing MR combined arms training center.
“Thus, the Military Region headquarters planned for and executed the deployment of two brigades from different group armies outside of the MR borders simultaneously. It is a relatively rare event for a single unit to deploy outside its MR boundaries,” Blasko said.
This also tested the MR headquarters C3 skills and “replicated the type of real-world events that Jinan MR might have to conduct in its role as strategic reserve for the PLA,” he said.
The exercises exposed overall shortfalls in the PLA training system and served as a “stepping­stone in gradually improving PLA capabilities.”
As China-Taiwan relations improve, the likelihood of armed conflict between the two diminishes. However, as China begins to take on the challenges of becoming a global military power, it will no doubt have to improve its amphibious capabilities.
“For the future, the things to watch will be naval presence operations, such as the one initiated by the deployment to the Gulf of Aden,” Wortzel said. “If the PLA is serious about wanting to be able to respond to kidnappings and piracy, then some limited forced-entry capability will need to be added to its repertoire.”
机器翻译的，凑合着看吧。
中国的Gator海军有少量的进步 两栖锻炼测试了新的能力 Wendell Minnick 台北-在10年海军现代化期间，中国的人民解放军海军(计划)主要忽略了它的两栖能力倾向于增加大型驱逐舰、驱逐舰和潜水艇。 缺乏兴趣在两栖作战上是嫌疑的，因为中国有侵略台湾一项陈述的政策，如果海岛宣称独立，但是证据是清楚的。 中国现代化了它的gator海军并且修造了更多船，但是它在过去十年中主要维护了同一能力。 在1997年，中国有能力在台湾的海滩的着陆一分裂上，说丹尼斯Blasko，在北京根据的一前美军attaché。 在2008年之前，计划未扩展那能力。 “尽管两栖工艺的最近建筑，实际推力能力未改善完全成功在十年”，今天作者说Blasko， “中国军队的”。 “涵义是继续最好不一定被描述作为两栖舰队`modernization， `积累的建筑。‘” 有限的推力 新的两栖运输能力船被委任了，更旧的船退休了，仍然计划仍然缺乏任何东西的充足的推力，但是一次相对地小两栖作战， Blasko说。 “从我的方面，我不看在两栖战争的任何使震惊的新发展计划或两栖能力”，在北京一前美军attaché说拉里Wortzel。 “能力支持与`的两栖作战在beach工艺[气垫船]改善了，但是它是而不是一个演变改善革命家”。 中国从根据美国海军的登陆艇，空气的设计最近开始制造一艘air-cushioned气垫船被缓冲(LCAC)，并且俄国Zubr类LCAC，以运输60吨的能力设备，说Andrei Chang，有Kanwa情报中心的中国军事专家。 气垫船在新型071登陆的平台船坞(LPD)将部署，可能运载四气垫船。 第一个类型071 (998个Kunlun掸人)，委任在2007年11月，根据在广东省的湛江海军基地在南中国。 中国获得了从基于乌克兰的ZoryaMashproekt的四个引擎; 在2001年建立，公司做汽轮机引擎， Chang说。 中国改进了并且扩展了它的两栖着陆锻炼，但是计划仍然面对巨大的后勤学和操作的问题。 Blasko估计PLA地面部队步兵的大致“三分之一和装甲部队和旅团在某种程度上举办了两栖训练，但是不是所有的单位有相等的能力”。 大多数中国的两栖训练在南京和广州军事地区(夫人)，发生在台湾情景包含第一个梯形编队攻击队伍，现在跟随由在两栖训练的增量在济南先生 “没有熟练的水平两栖作战的在过去十年中增加了的疑义，但是实践了两栖作战的所有单位不在训练熟练的同一个水平”， Blasko说。 独特的锻炼 在2008年，二两栖着陆锻炼由局外人观察员、Lianhe2008 (联接2008)和Libing2008严密地观看(削尖2008)。 这两锻炼是异常的他们两“跨地区”和同时举办。 Lianhe-2008由138th动力化的步兵旅团，第26支小组军队，济南先生举办在9月。 “旅团在济南先生开始了并且由海移动了向地面阶段的沈阳先生在与海军的一次联合作战，并且空军支持”， Blasko说。 然后另一跨地区锻炼， Libing-2008，开始了在有移动向北京先生联合部队培训中心的第58只轻的机械化军团或第20支小组军队的济南先生外面。 “因而，军事地区总部计划了为并且同时执行了二个旅团的部署从不同的小组军队的在先生边界外面。 它是一个单一单元的一个相对地罕见的事件能部署在它的先生界限之外”， Blasko说。 这也测试了先生总部C3技能，并且“复制了真实世界的事件的种类济南先生在它的角色也许必须举办作为PLA的战略储备”，他说。 锻炼暴露了在PLA培训系统的整体赤字并且担当了在逐渐改进PLA能力的一块“垫脚石”。 当中国台湾联系改善，武力冲突可能在二之间的减少。 然而，因为中国开始承担成为的挑战全球性军事力量，它无疑将必须改进它的两栖能力。 “为将来，观看的事将是海军存在操作，例如部署创始的那个对阿吨海湾”， Wortzel说。 “如果PLA对想要是严肃的能反应绑架和海盗行为，然后一些有限的牵强词条能力将需要增加到它的保留节目”。
中国的Gator海军有少量的进步 两栖锻炼测试了新的能力 Wendell Minnick 台北-在10年海军现代化期间，中国的人民解放军海军(计划)主要忽略了它的两栖能力倾向于增加大型驱逐舰、驱逐舰和潜水艇。 缺乏兴趣在两栖作战上是嫌疑的，因为中国有侵略台湾一项陈述的政策，如果海岛宣称独立，但是证据是清楚的。 中国现代化了它的gator海军并且修造了更多船，但是它在过去十年中主要维护了同一能力。 在1997年，中国有能力在台湾的海滩的着陆一分裂上，说丹尼斯Blasko，在北京根据的一前美军attaché。 在2008年之前，计划未扩展那能力。 “尽管两栖工艺的最近建筑，实际推力能力未改善完全成功在十年”，今天作者说Blasko， “中国军队的”。 “涵义是继续最好不一定被描述作为两栖舰队`modernization， `积累的建筑。‘” 有限的推力 新的两栖运输能力船被委任了，更旧的船退休了，仍然计划仍然缺乏任何东西的充足的推力，但是一次相对地小两栖作战， Blasko说。 “从我的方面，我不看在两栖战争的任何使震惊的新发展计划或两栖能力”，在北京一前美军attaché说拉里Wortzel。 “能力支持与`的两栖作战在beach工艺[气垫船]改善了，但是它是而不是一个演变改善革命家”。 中国从根据美国海军的登陆艇，空气的设计最近开始制造一艘air-cushioned气垫船被缓冲(LCAC)，并且俄国Zubr类LCAC，以运输60吨的能力设备，说Andrei Chang，有Kanwa情报中心的中国军事专家。 气垫船在新型071登陆的平台船坞(LPD)将部署，可能运载四气垫船。 第一个类型071 (998个Kunlun掸人)，委任在2007年11月，根据在广东省的湛江海军基地在南中国。 中国获得了从基于乌克兰的ZoryaMashproekt的四个引擎; 在2001年建立，公司做汽轮机引擎， Chang说。 中国改进了并且扩展了它的两栖着陆锻炼，但是计划仍然面对巨大的后勤学和操作的问题。 Blasko估计PLA地面部队步兵的大致“三分之一和装甲部队和旅团在某种程度上举办了两栖训练，但是不是所有的单位有相等的能力”。 大多数中国的两栖训练在南京和广州军事地区(夫人)，发生在台湾情景包含第一个梯形编队攻击队伍，现在跟随由在两栖训练的增量在济南先生 “没有熟练的水平两栖作战的在过去十年中增加了的疑义，但是实践了两栖作战的所有单位不在训练熟练的同一个水平”， Blasko说。 独特的锻炼 在2008年，二两栖着陆锻炼由局外人观察员、Lianhe2008 (联接2008)和Libing2008严密地观看(削尖2008)。 这两锻炼是异常的他们两“跨地区”和同时举办。 Lianhe-2008由138th动力化的步兵旅团，第26支小组军队，济南先生举办在9月。 “旅团在济南先生开始了并且由海移动了向地面阶段的沈阳先生在与海军的一次联合作战，并且空军支持”， Blasko说。 然后另一跨地区锻炼， Libing-2008，开始了在有移动向北京先生联合部队培训中心的第58只轻的机械化军团或第20支小组军队的济南先生外面。 “因而，军事地区总部计划了为并且同时执行了二个旅团的部署从不同的小组军队的在先生边界外面。 它是一个单一单元的一个相对地罕见的事件能部署在它的先生界限之外”， Blasko说。 这也测试了先生总部C3技能，并且“复制了真实世界的事件的种类济南先生在它的角色也许必须举办作为PLA的战略储备”，他说。 锻炼暴露了在PLA培训系统的整体赤字并且担当了在逐渐改进PLA能力的一块“垫脚石”。 当中国台湾联系改善，武力冲突可能在二之间的减少。 然而，因为中国开始承担成为的挑战全球性军事力量，它无疑将必须改进它的两栖能力。 “为将来，观看的事将是海军存在操作，例如部署创始的那个对阿吨海湾”， Wortzel说。 “如果PLA对想要是严肃的能反应绑架和海盗行为，然后一些有限的牵强词条能力将需要增加到它的保留节目”。
[:a1:] 看起来还是有点吃力，不过也大至懂得意思了
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“said Andrei Chang, a China military specialist with the Kanwa Information Center”，出口转内销的东东，就是说中国海军开始制造与霉菌LCAC相仿的气垫登陆舰了，在加强主力舰队后，终于着手提供两栖登陆能力。
反正外国人觉得TG在首轮抢滩中只能运至多一个师，10年前如此，现在亦如此
他们认为TG第一波只能搭载一个师的理由无外乎是中国海军仅有这么少的登陆舰艇，但不会看到大量民用船只的作用，在这么窄的一条海峡中民用船只还是可以用于登陆作战的
那好啊,就这样让他们认为去把