超级军网看了这么多关于LRS-B的帖子，都不在点上。其实LRS-B是和 ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/05/03 09:04:40
看了这么多关于LRS-B的帖子，都不在点上。其实LRS-B是和RQ180关系密切的。这篇航空周刊的《为什么是诺格赢》的文章里还记述了对采办局长对这个项目的独家采访。（PS：也是这家媒体最先曝光了RQ180）
这就是文章的连接：http://m.aviationweek.com/defense/lrs-b-why-northrop-grumman-won-next-us-bomber
看了这么多关于LRS-B的帖子，都不在点上。其实LRS-B是和RQ180关系密切的。这篇航空周刊的《为什么是诺格赢》的文章里还记述了对采办局长对这个项目的独家采访。（PS：也是这家媒体最先曝光了RQ180）
这就是文章的连接：http://m.aviationweek.com/defense/lrs-b-why-northrop-grumman-won-next-us-bomber
全文贴在这里：
LRS-B: Why Northrop Grumman Won Next U.S. Bomber
Aviation Week & Space Technology
Bill Sweetman
Oct 27, 2015
Northrop Grumman is the winner of the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) contest, beating a rival team with six times its annual sales.
The U.S. Air Force announced Oct. 27 that Northrop Grumman beat a Boeing/Lockheed Martin team in a competition to develop and build 100 of the bombers, which are expected to reach initial operational capability in the mid-2020s. The Pentagon says the next phase of the work, engineering and manufacturing development (EMD), should cost $21.4 billion in 2010 dollars, including the delivery of an unspecified number of test aircraft.
Another $1.9 billion has already been spent on risk reduction, bringing both competing teams through the initial design phase. In 2016 dollars, the estimated EMD cost is $23.5 billion, the Pentagon says. The B-2 cost $37.2 billion to develop in 2016 dollars.
The Air Force also says that the average procurement unit cost for the Northrop Grumman bomber (which does not have a formal designation yet) will be $511 million in 2010 dollars, assuming a 100-aircraft buy ($564 million in 2016 dollars). This figure, the result of two independent Pentagon estimates, is lower than the $550 million (2010 dollars) goal that was set in 2011, when then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates approved the start if the program.
See Also
The Road to the New Bomber
Next-Generation Bomber Paved Way For LRS-B
LRS-B's Industrial Base Ramifications Will Slowly Unfold
Northrop Grumman’s contract includes fixed-price incentive options for the first five batches of low-rate initial production aircraft, comprising 21 bombers. The price for those aircraft (which will be higher than the average) has not been disclosed. Through production, the program has been estimated to represent $80 billion in business. The LRS-B is expected to be operational in the mid-2020s. The exact date will depend on initial operational capability criteria, such as a certain number of aircraft in service, which are still to be determined by the Air Force’s Global Strike Command.
The stakes for LRS-B were so huge that industry analysts have long predicted that the losing bidder would protest the award. Boeing is no stranger to that tactic. In 2008, the company successfully protested the Air Force’s 2008 award of a contract for refueling tankers to a Northrop-EADS team and ultimately won the contract in a second competition. Boeing and Lockheed Martin said in a joint statement that they were “disappointed by today’s announcement (and) interested in knowing how the competition was scored in terms of price and risk.” The Air Force says it will start debriefing the loser on Friday, and there is a 100-day period in which to lodge a protest.
“The Air Force has made the right decision for our nation’s security,” said Wes Bush, Northrop Grumman president, chairman and CEO. “Our team has the resources in place to execute this important program.”
For the time being, however, the make-up of Northrop Grumman’s team is a secret, as are most attributes of the program. Not even the engine subcontractor is disclosed, although the Air Force said today that all major subsystems have been selected. Although most analysts agree it is overwhelmingly likely that the bomber will resemble a smaller cousin of the B-2, a blended wing-body aircraft with two engines and an unrefueled radius of action of around 2,500 nm, no such details have been confirmed.
Popular Now
The Road to the New Bomber
NASA’s Ash Trials: Engine Survives, Provides Insight
LRS-B's Industrial Base Ramifications Will Slowly Unfold
Details of the selection process also remain highly classified, but it is likely that the winning bid rested on Northrop Grumman's operational experience with wide-band, all-aspect stealth technology on the B-2 bomber and the still-secret RQ-180 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) unmanned air vehicle.
A concept of an early Northrop Grumman Next-Generation Bomber design prepared for Aviation Week by Jozef Gatial in 2008.
But the winning formula was most likely not just a question of delivering more stealth or more range. In LRS-B, the winner had to meet a complex set of requirements that stress risk reduction, an open systems architecture, agile management and manufacturing technology.
The LRS-B contest was unique in three particularly important ways. First, the requirement had emerged from the ashes of the previous Next-Generation Bomber program (NGB), canceled in April 2009, with its goals scaled down and schedule stretched out, and unit cost as a key performance parameter (KPP).
Second, rather than funding demonstration programs, the Pentagon supported two teams through preliminary design review (PDR), probably for almost two years, 2013-15.
A third key feature of the LRS-B is that its management has been assigned to the Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO), which, Air Force acquisition chief William LaPlante said Oct. 21, has “an incredible track record of delivering eye-watering capabilities—not just one-offs, but things going into production.”
Significantly, LaPlante describes the 80-strong LRS-B project office within the RCO as like the team that produced the Lockheed F-117 stealth fighter 35 years ago: “A small empowered group of warfighters, acquisition people and maintainers.” Although the RCO’s only acknowledged aerospace platform is the Boeing X-37B spaceplane, its technical focus can be gauged by the fact that a 2012 recruitment notice for its deputy director identified only three mandatory areas of “significant experience . . . low-observables, counter low-observables and electronic warfare.” Like the F-117, the LRS-B is apparently designed to meet its goals with mature subsystems in a new platform.
However, LaPlante added, the RCO team has substantial oversight from the Pentagon, Congress and Government Accountability Office, and the program incorporates red team/blue team exercises to validate it against possible threats.
The LRS-B contest set an average procurement unit cost of $550 million—in fiscal 2010 dollars based on building 100 aircraft—as a KPP. “The risk is that you pick the wrong number. If you have firm requirements and do the analytics, you have a shot at pulling that off,” LaPlante says.
Some of the key technologies in the LRS-B are both secret and mature. “Not only have some technologies been wind-tunnel-tested, prototyped or flown—some of them have been used operationally,” LaPlante said Oct. 21.
However, LaPlante also emphasized that delays and overruns cannot be eliminated. “Integration is always a risk,” he said, “and we have put together a schedule with the right margins to accommodate delays.”
LRS-B, too, is planned to be upgraded easily and competitively, “with space and weight provision for things we can’t imagine today,” LaPlante said. Open architecture, he said, could allow the Pentagon to procure a new or upgraded subsystem competitively, “provide it to the prime and say, integrate this.” Along with the cost of maintaining the bomber’s low-observable systems, upgrades will account for a large proportion of the bomber’s life-cycle cost—which will be much greater than its procurement bill.
There is one other way in which LRS-B will differ from other programs: its production rate. The number is based on a “fundable profile, without the big ramp-up you see on F-35,” LaPlante said. “We have set it up to be resilient,” with affordable annual funding. “That would be $550 million times your production rate, which might be seven or eight per year,” he said. The rate is much lower than recent combat aircraft programs but also means the line will be moving until almost 2040. Many bomber advocates quietly argue that if LRS-B delivers, and Asia-Pacific operations remain important, the Air Force will need more than 100 of the bombers.
Northrop Grumman is less than one-sixth the size of the Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon team, with total revenues of $160 billion. Boeing and Lockheed Martin agreed to team on NGB in early 2007 and revealed that arrangement in January 2008. The team re-formed for LRS-B, adding Raytheon. Together, Lockheed Martin and Boeing have been prime contractors on almost every combat aircraft in U.S. service today, while Lockheed Martin has been the prime contractor on four out of five production stealth programs.
But the fact that they were allowed to team for NGB and then re-form the team for LRS-B indicated that the Pentagon leadership did not see this as an impediment to a fair fight. Rules have changed, too. Briefing reporters Oct. 21, LaPlante emphasized the importance of independent cost estimates—produced by the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) directorate—under the 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act. “All programs have an independent estimate, and we are funded to that level,” LaPlante said. Nor is the estimate a single review process: The program office has been briefing CAPE estimators from the outset.
The development cost quoted today is the independent cost estimate, not the winner’s or program office’s estimate. The goal is to make underbidding less likely and less effective.
Not only did Boeing and Lockheed Martin outgun their rival fiscally, but they were also teamed on a government-funded demonstrator aircraft, identified as the Next-Generation Long-Ranger Strike Demonstrator, under an effort that started in the early days of NGB and continued after the ambitious bomber was canceled. The stealth-technology group within Boeing’s Phantom Works, headed by Alan Wiechman, led the low-observables side of the program, although Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works built the airframe.
Alongside stealth, Phantom Works pioneered the use of new manufacturing technology. This has led to the closely held Boeing-wide initiative known as Black Diamond, which was identified this summer as a possible major competitive advantage in LRS-B.
Lockheed Martin brought its experience with stealth systems integration to the party. But the history of the F-22—where upgrades have been constrained by a tightly integrated architecture, so that every change requires painstaking regression testing to ensure that other functions are not affected—was exactly what the LRS-B program’s open architecture is designed to avoid.
While Northrop Grumman may have shared some NGLRS-D technology, the most important experience that company brought to the table may well have been the RQ-180. From conversations with industry sources, it appears that one of the major breakthroughs in the design of this very stealthy, high-altitude UAV was its combination of stealth with aerodynamic and propulsive efficiency, largely the result of better computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and computational electromagnetics (CEM).
The B-2 had achieved a high level of stealth, but the design was a difficult compromise between stealth and aerodynamics, and the complex shape of the center body and wing section, with strongly three-dimensional stream and shock patterns, pushed the state of the art in both computer modeling and testing. Given its high fuel fraction, its 6,000-nm unrefueled range showed that, at best, its efficiency was no better than that of the B-52.
In sharp contrast, some early-2000s Northrop Grumman designs were described by one engineer as having “sailplane-like” efficiency. While the RQ-180 will almost certainly be shown to be a much lighter aircraft than the LRS-B, its wingspan is likely quite close to that of the bomber, and its development will have validated the CFD and CEM codes used in the design, along with radar-absorbent materials and coatings. The UAV will also be providing operational experience with new stealth technologies, underpinning Northrop Grumman estimates of the LRS-B’s operating cost.
While Lockheed Martin’s RQ-170 UAV is widely considered to have been an RCO program, meaning that all three aircraft companies in the LRS-B competition have worked with RCO, the RQ-180 experience would be most relevant.
Despite the B-2’s reputation for high cost, Northrop Grumman says its experience with the program was a plus. “It is behaving like a legacy aircraft now,” says one company executive, with flight-hour costs that are not out of line with other small-volume fleets of large aircraft in the Air Force. Operating costs for such aircraft, the company says, seem to be driven by fixed costs and by the inevitably slow learning curve for depot-maintenance visits. Each B-2 today goes into depot for 12 months every nine years. At the same time, the B-2’s signatures “have improved significantly” through the use of new materials.
Northrop Grumman has also made a radical move to contain its costs, although its impact on the LRS-B bid is uncertain: Under the codename Project Magellan, it has established a manned-aircraft center of excellence in Melbourne, Florida. Across the U.S. combat-aircraft business, this represents a reversal of a decades-long consolidation that has seen major engineering locations dwindle to three centers: Los Angeles/Palmdale, St. Louis and Fort Worth. The company has already opened a new 220,000-sq.-ft. building in Melbourne and has plans for another new 500,000-sq.-ft., 1,500-person facility by 2019.
LRS-B: Why Northrop Grumman Won Next U.S. Bomber
Aviation Week & Space Technology
Bill Sweetman
Oct 27, 2015
Northrop Grumman is the winner of the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) contest, beating a rival team with six times its annual sales.
The U.S. Air Force announced Oct. 27 that Northrop Grumman beat a Boeing/Lockheed Martin team in a competition to develop and build 100 of the bombers, which are expected to reach initial operational capability in the mid-2020s. The Pentagon says the next phase of the work, engineering and manufacturing development (EMD), should cost $21.4 billion in 2010 dollars, including the delivery of an unspecified number of test aircraft.
Another $1.9 billion has already been spent on risk reduction, bringing both competing teams through the initial design phase. In 2016 dollars, the estimated EMD cost is $23.5 billion, the Pentagon says. The B-2 cost $37.2 billion to develop in 2016 dollars.
The Air Force also says that the average procurement unit cost for the Northrop Grumman bomber (which does not have a formal designation yet) will be $511 million in 2010 dollars, assuming a 100-aircraft buy ($564 million in 2016 dollars). This figure, the result of two independent Pentagon estimates, is lower than the $550 million (2010 dollars) goal that was set in 2011, when then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates approved the start if the program.
See Also
The Road to the New Bomber
Next-Generation Bomber Paved Way For LRS-B
LRS-B's Industrial Base Ramifications Will Slowly Unfold
Northrop Grumman’s contract includes fixed-price incentive options for the first five batches of low-rate initial production aircraft, comprising 21 bombers. The price for those aircraft (which will be higher than the average) has not been disclosed. Through production, the program has been estimated to represent $80 billion in business. The LRS-B is expected to be operational in the mid-2020s. The exact date will depend on initial operational capability criteria, such as a certain number of aircraft in service, which are still to be determined by the Air Force’s Global Strike Command.
The stakes for LRS-B were so huge that industry analysts have long predicted that the losing bidder would protest the award. Boeing is no stranger to that tactic. In 2008, the company successfully protested the Air Force’s 2008 award of a contract for refueling tankers to a Northrop-EADS team and ultimately won the contract in a second competition. Boeing and Lockheed Martin said in a joint statement that they were “disappointed by today’s announcement (and) interested in knowing how the competition was scored in terms of price and risk.” The Air Force says it will start debriefing the loser on Friday, and there is a 100-day period in which to lodge a protest.
“The Air Force has made the right decision for our nation’s security,” said Wes Bush, Northrop Grumman president, chairman and CEO. “Our team has the resources in place to execute this important program.”
For the time being, however, the make-up of Northrop Grumman’s team is a secret, as are most attributes of the program. Not even the engine subcontractor is disclosed, although the Air Force said today that all major subsystems have been selected. Although most analysts agree it is overwhelmingly likely that the bomber will resemble a smaller cousin of the B-2, a blended wing-body aircraft with two engines and an unrefueled radius of action of around 2,500 nm, no such details have been confirmed.
Popular Now
The Road to the New Bomber
NASA’s Ash Trials: Engine Survives, Provides Insight
LRS-B's Industrial Base Ramifications Will Slowly Unfold
Details of the selection process also remain highly classified, but it is likely that the winning bid rested on Northrop Grumman's operational experience with wide-band, all-aspect stealth technology on the B-2 bomber and the still-secret RQ-180 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) unmanned air vehicle.
A concept of an early Northrop Grumman Next-Generation Bomber design prepared for Aviation Week by Jozef Gatial in 2008.
But the winning formula was most likely not just a question of delivering more stealth or more range. In LRS-B, the winner had to meet a complex set of requirements that stress risk reduction, an open systems architecture, agile management and manufacturing technology.
The LRS-B contest was unique in three particularly important ways. First, the requirement had emerged from the ashes of the previous Next-Generation Bomber program (NGB), canceled in April 2009, with its goals scaled down and schedule stretched out, and unit cost as a key performance parameter (KPP).
Second, rather than funding demonstration programs, the Pentagon supported two teams through preliminary design review (PDR), probably for almost two years, 2013-15.
A third key feature of the LRS-B is that its management has been assigned to the Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO), which, Air Force acquisition chief William LaPlante said Oct. 21, has “an incredible track record of delivering eye-watering capabilities—not just one-offs, but things going into production.”
Significantly, LaPlante describes the 80-strong LRS-B project office within the RCO as like the team that produced the Lockheed F-117 stealth fighter 35 years ago: “A small empowered group of warfighters, acquisition people and maintainers.” Although the RCO’s only acknowledged aerospace platform is the Boeing X-37B spaceplane, its technical focus can be gauged by the fact that a 2012 recruitment notice for its deputy director identified only three mandatory areas of “significant experience . . . low-observables, counter low-observables and electronic warfare.” Like the F-117, the LRS-B is apparently designed to meet its goals with mature subsystems in a new platform.
However, LaPlante added, the RCO team has substantial oversight from the Pentagon, Congress and Government Accountability Office, and the program incorporates red team/blue team exercises to validate it against possible threats.
The LRS-B contest set an average procurement unit cost of $550 million—in fiscal 2010 dollars based on building 100 aircraft—as a KPP. “The risk is that you pick the wrong number. If you have firm requirements and do the analytics, you have a shot at pulling that off,” LaPlante says.
Some of the key technologies in the LRS-B are both secret and mature. “Not only have some technologies been wind-tunnel-tested, prototyped or flown—some of them have been used operationally,” LaPlante said Oct. 21.
However, LaPlante also emphasized that delays and overruns cannot be eliminated. “Integration is always a risk,” he said, “and we have put together a schedule with the right margins to accommodate delays.”
LRS-B, too, is planned to be upgraded easily and competitively, “with space and weight provision for things we can’t imagine today,” LaPlante said. Open architecture, he said, could allow the Pentagon to procure a new or upgraded subsystem competitively, “provide it to the prime and say, integrate this.” Along with the cost of maintaining the bomber’s low-observable systems, upgrades will account for a large proportion of the bomber’s life-cycle cost—which will be much greater than its procurement bill.
There is one other way in which LRS-B will differ from other programs: its production rate. The number is based on a “fundable profile, without the big ramp-up you see on F-35,” LaPlante said. “We have set it up to be resilient,” with affordable annual funding. “That would be $550 million times your production rate, which might be seven or eight per year,” he said. The rate is much lower than recent combat aircraft programs but also means the line will be moving until almost 2040. Many bomber advocates quietly argue that if LRS-B delivers, and Asia-Pacific operations remain important, the Air Force will need more than 100 of the bombers.
Northrop Grumman is less than one-sixth the size of the Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon team, with total revenues of $160 billion. Boeing and Lockheed Martin agreed to team on NGB in early 2007 and revealed that arrangement in January 2008. The team re-formed for LRS-B, adding Raytheon. Together, Lockheed Martin and Boeing have been prime contractors on almost every combat aircraft in U.S. service today, while Lockheed Martin has been the prime contractor on four out of five production stealth programs.
But the fact that they were allowed to team for NGB and then re-form the team for LRS-B indicated that the Pentagon leadership did not see this as an impediment to a fair fight. Rules have changed, too. Briefing reporters Oct. 21, LaPlante emphasized the importance of independent cost estimates—produced by the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) directorate—under the 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act. “All programs have an independent estimate, and we are funded to that level,” LaPlante said. Nor is the estimate a single review process: The program office has been briefing CAPE estimators from the outset.
The development cost quoted today is the independent cost estimate, not the winner’s or program office’s estimate. The goal is to make underbidding less likely and less effective.
Not only did Boeing and Lockheed Martin outgun their rival fiscally, but they were also teamed on a government-funded demonstrator aircraft, identified as the Next-Generation Long-Ranger Strike Demonstrator, under an effort that started in the early days of NGB and continued after the ambitious bomber was canceled. The stealth-technology group within Boeing’s Phantom Works, headed by Alan Wiechman, led the low-observables side of the program, although Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works built the airframe.
Alongside stealth, Phantom Works pioneered the use of new manufacturing technology. This has led to the closely held Boeing-wide initiative known as Black Diamond, which was identified this summer as a possible major competitive advantage in LRS-B.
Lockheed Martin brought its experience with stealth systems integration to the party. But the history of the F-22—where upgrades have been constrained by a tightly integrated architecture, so that every change requires painstaking regression testing to ensure that other functions are not affected—was exactly what the LRS-B program’s open architecture is designed to avoid.
While Northrop Grumman may have shared some NGLRS-D technology, the most important experience that company brought to the table may well have been the RQ-180. From conversations with industry sources, it appears that one of the major breakthroughs in the design of this very stealthy, high-altitude UAV was its combination of stealth with aerodynamic and propulsive efficiency, largely the result of better computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and computational electromagnetics (CEM).
The B-2 had achieved a high level of stealth, but the design was a difficult compromise between stealth and aerodynamics, and the complex shape of the center body and wing section, with strongly three-dimensional stream and shock patterns, pushed the state of the art in both computer modeling and testing. Given its high fuel fraction, its 6,000-nm unrefueled range showed that, at best, its efficiency was no better than that of the B-52.
In sharp contrast, some early-2000s Northrop Grumman designs were described by one engineer as having “sailplane-like” efficiency. While the RQ-180 will almost certainly be shown to be a much lighter aircraft than the LRS-B, its wingspan is likely quite close to that of the bomber, and its development will have validated the CFD and CEM codes used in the design, along with radar-absorbent materials and coatings. The UAV will also be providing operational experience with new stealth technologies, underpinning Northrop Grumman estimates of the LRS-B’s operating cost.
While Lockheed Martin’s RQ-170 UAV is widely considered to have been an RCO program, meaning that all three aircraft companies in the LRS-B competition have worked with RCO, the RQ-180 experience would be most relevant.
Despite the B-2’s reputation for high cost, Northrop Grumman says its experience with the program was a plus. “It is behaving like a legacy aircraft now,” says one company executive, with flight-hour costs that are not out of line with other small-volume fleets of large aircraft in the Air Force. Operating costs for such aircraft, the company says, seem to be driven by fixed costs and by the inevitably slow learning curve for depot-maintenance visits. Each B-2 today goes into depot for 12 months every nine years. At the same time, the B-2’s signatures “have improved significantly” through the use of new materials.
Northrop Grumman has also made a radical move to contain its costs, although its impact on the LRS-B bid is uncertain: Under the codename Project Magellan, it has established a manned-aircraft center of excellence in Melbourne, Florida. Across the U.S. combat-aircraft business, this represents a reversal of a decades-long consolidation that has seen major engineering locations dwindle to three centers: Los Angeles/Palmdale, St. Louis and Fort Worth. The company has already opened a new 220,000-sq.-ft. building in Melbourne and has plans for another new 500,000-sq.-ft., 1,500-person facility by 2019.
多谢kuaileywg兄提供资料
个人也还是认为RQ180这个项目和LRS-B项目高度重合
个人也还是认为RQ180这个项目和LRS-B项目高度重合
kuaileywg 发表于 2015-10-28 17:58
全文贴在这里：
LRS-B: Why Northrop Grumman Won Next U.S. Bomber
诺格的设计应该在开放性架构（方便升级和成本控制）和廉价的高度隐身性能（整体式免维护涂层蒙皮等等)上有明显优势...
至于飞翼体气动构型。。。现在在西方技术圈里真的已经白菜化了。。。
全文贴在这里：
LRS-B: Why Northrop Grumman Won Next U.S. Bomber
诺格的设计应该在开放性架构（方便升级和成本控制）和廉价的高度隐身性能（整体式免维护涂层蒙皮等等)上有明显优势...
至于飞翼体气动构型。。。现在在西方技术圈里真的已经白菜化了。。。
l55 发表于 2015-11-3 15:35
诺格的设计应该在开放性架构（方便升级和成本控制）和廉价的高度隐身性能（整体式免维护涂层蒙皮等等)上 ...
飞翼的气动构型和控制技术，也还是有高下之分的吧。
比如X47B用的人字形飞翼布局，就是在飞行可控性方面更好、
而且未来上舰之后，人字形部分还可以折叠，神经元的三角翼飞翼布局就很难做到这一点了。
另外，在尾喷口方面，诺格的沟槽式尾喷口很明显有着更好的红外隐身效果，因为加了内衬层和气流分隔，发动机末端扇叶的遮蔽效果很好了。
欧洲的神经元无人机，隐身设计也是很到位的，不过这个尾喷口的红外隐身估计比较麻烦
英国的雷神则是明显的二流水平
l55 发表于 2015-11-3 15:35
诺格的设计应该在开放性架构（方便升级和成本控制）和廉价的高度隐身性能（整体式免维护涂层蒙皮等等)上 ...
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飞翼的气动构型和控制技术，也还是有高下之分的吧。
比如X47B用的人字形飞翼布局，就是在飞行可控性方面更好、
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而且未来上舰之后，人字形部分还可以折叠，神经元的三角翼飞翼布局就很难做到这一点了。
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另外，在尾喷口方面，诺格的沟槽式尾喷口很明显有着更好的红外隐身效果，因为加了内衬层和气流分隔，发动机末端扇叶的遮蔽效果很好了。
欧洲的神经元无人机，隐身设计也是很到位的，不过这个尾喷口的红外隐身估计比较麻烦
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EA9F8D5C4253DF77EA3D7C84C8E99C0B.jpg (104.61 KB, 下载次数: 0)
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英国的雷神则是明显的二流水平
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现任空军部长已经说过这个问题了：
Writing this year in Aviation Week & Space Technology, Wynne’s successor, Michael Donley, underscored the changes in thinking: “In 2010, the Air Force and DoD reviewed over 28 studies conducted since 1995,” Donley wrote. “We focused on setting affordable, realistic and achievable requirements up front.”
Most importantly, “we took a ‘family of systems’ approach, recognizing that the bomber did not have to do everything itself and would be part of a larger joint portfolio of ISR, communications, electronic warfare and weapon programs and capabilities essential to long-range strike,” he wrote. The LRS-B would be a penetrating, not highly persistent bomber, used in conjunction with the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) nuclear and conventional strategic cruise missile, an RQ-180-type ISR asset and new electronic attack means.
Writing this year in Aviation Week & Space Technology, Wynne’s successor, Michael Donley, underscored the changes in thinking: “In 2010, the Air Force and DoD reviewed over 28 studies conducted since 1995,” Donley wrote. “We focused on setting affordable, realistic and achievable requirements up front.”
Most importantly, “we took a ‘family of systems’ approach, recognizing that the bomber did not have to do everything itself and would be part of a larger joint portfolio of ISR, communications, electronic warfare and weapon programs and capabilities essential to long-range strike,” he wrote. The LRS-B would be a penetrating, not highly persistent bomber, used in conjunction with the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) nuclear and conventional strategic cruise missile, an RQ-180-type ISR asset and new electronic attack means.
波音利用90年代初期军工大合并浪潮和收购麦道，几乎置诺斯罗普，格鲁曼与死地。但是正所谓真金不怕火炼，是金子永远是闪光地。这20多年来，波音自己不思进取，技术落伍，终于让诺格有了翻身之日。
波音利用90年代初期军工大合并浪潮和收购麦道，几乎置诺斯罗普，格鲁曼与死地。但是正所谓真金不怕火炼， ...
波音技术不差，问题是它太大了，大型军机全包了还想吃诺格的肉
波音技术不差，问题是它太大了，大型军机全包了还想吃诺格的肉
美帝的新轰炸机和新潜艇都很务实，不是一味堆砌高科技。这说明美军可能从治安战的泥沼里脱身，全力应对跟其它国家的正规战。
这些东西很可能是为中国量身打造的。
这些东西很可能是为中国量身打造的。
诺斯罗普公司赢得美国新型隐身轰炸机LRS-B项目竞标
10月27日，五角大楼发表声明宣布诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司赢得了美国空军下一代远程打击轰炸机（LRS-B）项目竞标，这一项目被认为是对未来美国军工产业格局有深远影响。
B3?,,,,诺斯罗普公司赢得美国新型隐身轰炸机LRS-B项目竞标
诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司绘制的LRS-B想象图
美国《防务新闻》网站报道，诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司是世界第六大军工制造企业，据五角大楼的声明，该公司已经赢得了LRS-B轰炸机项目竞标。
27日美国金融市场休市后，美国国防部长卡特和空军官方联合宣布诺斯罗普在与波音和洛克希德·马丁公司的竞标中获胜，赢得了预计价值550亿美元的新一代轰炸机合同。这是自洛克希德·马丁十多年前赢得联合打击战斗机（JSF）后美国最大的军机订单。
五角大楼将支持诺斯罗普公司制造一种用于取代空军年事已高的B-52和B-1轰炸机的新型轰炸机。该公司是B-2隐身轰炸机的主承包商，在这次广受关注，并被延期了数个月的竞争中，诺斯罗普击败的是波音和洛马两家公司的合作团队。
据国防部声明，空军部长德布拉·李·詹姆斯说，新型轰炸机将“允许空军在未来的高威胁环境中实施行动。”并称赞了选型工作，这似乎是为波音和洛马对此次竞标的抗议打预防针。
詹姆斯说，国防采购官方已经“仔细考虑了”两个团队所提出的方案，整个项目的执行过程“与产业界合作伙伴们进行了深度的交流……我们相信我们的决定将为国家带来最大的利益。”
新的合同将分为两个部分——首先是今天授予的可增支的研发费用合同，随后将再单独签署5份低速预生产批次飞机的合同，这些预生产合同将是定额合同。5个生产批次合同将涉及生产21架轰炸机。
美国军方邀请了两名独立的政府成本精算团队来监督项目。按照他们的结论，如果生产100架飞机，每架轰炸机估计成本为5.11亿美元（按2010年美元计算）。空军官方周二对记者说，前国防部长罗伯特·盖茨说设定的目标成本是每架5.5亿美元，换算成2016年的美元为5.64亿美元。
LRS-B轰炸机的单价将超过B-1轰炸机，但是这显然要比B-2轰炸机的15亿美元要低得多。即使考虑上总开发成本，LRS-B的价格也要远低于B-2项目当年的235亿美元。
美国空军暂未公开周二签署的合同的价值.
[据美国空军网站2015年10月27日报道]2015年10月27日，美国国防部长阿什顿·卡特、美国空军部长黛博拉·李·詹姆斯和美国空军参谋长韦尔什上将在一场新闻简报会上宣布，授予美国诺斯罗普·格鲁门公司（下称诺格公司）美国空军“远程打击轰炸机”（LRS-B）项目“工程与制造发展”（EMD）合同。詹姆斯部长表示，LRS-B项目对于美国国家安全而言是关键，也是美国空军的最高优先级项目；在走完了15年错综复杂的程序后，美国空军终于为自己选定了下一代轰炸机。洛克希德·马丁公司，波音公司和诺斯罗普财团为了争夺这块大肥肉进行了艰苦的斗争。昨日，诺格笑到了最后，成为赢家。
在新闻发布会上，美国空军透露了一下几点信息：
1、飞机采用整体承包体制，包括发动机和子系统，空军不会讨论所使用的发动机或是哪家制造商的产品。
2、该机单价5.64亿美元。
3、初始作战能力设为2025年。
4、传言会有4架EMD（工程制造发展）阶段原型机，不过美国空军在新闻发布会没有给出细节。
5、飞机还没有正式编号。
6、两个独立机构对该项目进行了成本分析，他们的结果只相差2%。
7、在做出决策时并没有急于对美国航空工业的担忧。
8、合同规定研发采用成本加成模式，最初的低速率生产机型为固定价格
10月27日，五角大楼发表声明宣布诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司赢得了美国空军下一代远程打击轰炸机（LRS-B）项目竞标，这一项目被认为是对未来美国军工产业格局有深远影响。
B3?,,,,诺斯罗普公司赢得美国新型隐身轰炸机LRS-B项目竞标
诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司绘制的LRS-B想象图
美国《防务新闻》网站报道，诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司是世界第六大军工制造企业，据五角大楼的声明，该公司已经赢得了LRS-B轰炸机项目竞标。
27日美国金融市场休市后，美国国防部长卡特和空军官方联合宣布诺斯罗普在与波音和洛克希德·马丁公司的竞标中获胜，赢得了预计价值550亿美元的新一代轰炸机合同。这是自洛克希德·马丁十多年前赢得联合打击战斗机（JSF）后美国最大的军机订单。
五角大楼将支持诺斯罗普公司制造一种用于取代空军年事已高的B-52和B-1轰炸机的新型轰炸机。该公司是B-2隐身轰炸机的主承包商，在这次广受关注，并被延期了数个月的竞争中，诺斯罗普击败的是波音和洛马两家公司的合作团队。
据国防部声明，空军部长德布拉·李·詹姆斯说，新型轰炸机将“允许空军在未来的高威胁环境中实施行动。”并称赞了选型工作，这似乎是为波音和洛马对此次竞标的抗议打预防针。
詹姆斯说，国防采购官方已经“仔细考虑了”两个团队所提出的方案，整个项目的执行过程“与产业界合作伙伴们进行了深度的交流……我们相信我们的决定将为国家带来最大的利益。”
新的合同将分为两个部分——首先是今天授予的可增支的研发费用合同，随后将再单独签署5份低速预生产批次飞机的合同，这些预生产合同将是定额合同。5个生产批次合同将涉及生产21架轰炸机。
美国军方邀请了两名独立的政府成本精算团队来监督项目。按照他们的结论，如果生产100架飞机，每架轰炸机估计成本为5.11亿美元（按2010年美元计算）。空军官方周二对记者说，前国防部长罗伯特·盖茨说设定的目标成本是每架5.5亿美元，换算成2016年的美元为5.64亿美元。
LRS-B轰炸机的单价将超过B-1轰炸机，但是这显然要比B-2轰炸机的15亿美元要低得多。即使考虑上总开发成本，LRS-B的价格也要远低于B-2项目当年的235亿美元。
美国空军暂未公开周二签署的合同的价值.
[据美国空军网站2015年10月27日报道]2015年10月27日，美国国防部长阿什顿·卡特、美国空军部长黛博拉·李·詹姆斯和美国空军参谋长韦尔什上将在一场新闻简报会上宣布，授予美国诺斯罗普·格鲁门公司（下称诺格公司）美国空军“远程打击轰炸机”（LRS-B）项目“工程与制造发展”（EMD）合同。詹姆斯部长表示，LRS-B项目对于美国国家安全而言是关键，也是美国空军的最高优先级项目；在走完了15年错综复杂的程序后，美国空军终于为自己选定了下一代轰炸机。洛克希德·马丁公司，波音公司和诺斯罗普财团为了争夺这块大肥肉进行了艰苦的斗争。昨日，诺格笑到了最后，成为赢家。
在新闻发布会上，美国空军透露了一下几点信息：
1、飞机采用整体承包体制，包括发动机和子系统，空军不会讨论所使用的发动机或是哪家制造商的产品。
2、该机单价5.64亿美元。
3、初始作战能力设为2025年。
4、传言会有4架EMD（工程制造发展）阶段原型机，不过美国空军在新闻发布会没有给出细节。
5、飞机还没有正式编号。
6、两个独立机构对该项目进行了成本分析，他们的结果只相差2%。
7、在做出决策时并没有急于对美国航空工业的担忧。
8、合同规定研发采用成本加成模式，最初的低速率生产机型为固定价格
波音技术不差，问题是它太大了，大型军机全包了还想吃诺格的肉
我还是转引其他坛友的观点吧:
项目强调技术成熟可靠
列举下所需要的技术:
飞翼布局:诺格有b2/x47a、b 和rq180，而且在这方面的经验最丰富
长航时无人机(导航、控制):诺格有rq4和rq180
机载雷达:b2/b1的雷达斗士最近由诺格更新的
对地侦查相关的传感器:e8联合星和rq4全球鹰
发动机:普惠已经公布pw9000, 说是结合了f135的低速飞行发动机和pw1000齿轮传动发动机技术
我还是转引其他坛友的观点吧:
项目强调技术成熟可靠
列举下所需要的技术:
飞翼布局:诺格有b2/x47a、b 和rq180，而且在这方面的经验最丰富
长航时无人机(导航、控制):诺格有rq4和rq180
机载雷达:b2/b1的雷达斗士最近由诺格更新的
对地侦查相关的传感器:e8联合星和rq4全球鹰
发动机:普惠已经公布pw9000, 说是结合了f135的低速飞行发动机和pw1000齿轮传动发动机技术
来自:关于超级大本营
克林霉素磷酸钠 发表于 2015-11-4 04:08
然并卵，现在两家没有代差了
来自:关于超级大本营
新轰炸机还是有代差。
航电的能力 -- 态势感应、电子攻击、网络作战，这都是这几年才有的。
应该说兼容了很多F-35的技术。
然并卵，现在两家没有代差了
来自:关于超级大本营
新轰炸机还是有代差。
航电的能力 -- 态势感应、电子攻击、网络作战，这都是这几年才有的。
应该说兼容了很多F-35的技术。
ltsb 是批量服役的网络中心战第二款战机，f35是第一款
甚至隐性能，都有代差，新一代的隐身更强调易于维护
ltsb 是批量服役的网络中心战第二款战机，f35是第一款
甚至隐性能，都有代差，新一代的隐身更强调易于维护
来自:关于超级大本营
rq180到现在也没有见过