超级军网美国和中国的核战略导弹和弹头 及 反击模型
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/28 07:41:45
从1996年 到 2017年 的情况 分析
从1996年 到 2017年 的情况 分析
从1996年 到 2017年 的情况 分析
Conclusions
Given the asymmetry in the respective number of nuclear weapons, it is hardly surprising
that our modeling shows severe structural imbalances in outcomes (see Table 12.7).
In every period, a U.S. first strike could destroy all targets with known locations with
a relatively high degree of confidence, leaving a relatively small number of missiles on
alert and therefore ostensibly not susceptible to attack. Given the small numbers of systems
that might be deployed at any given point in time, Beijing would almost certainly
have concerns about the effectiveness of its second-strike capability.
Assuming a similar level of alert for each of the periods considered, our modeling
suggests that the number of Chinese warheads that might survive a first strike has
increased over time, from four in 1996 to six in 2003, 13 in 2010, and between 15 and
27 in 2017. More importantly, the systems deployed have become more dependable
and survivable over time. In 1996, survivability depended entirely on the status of the
Xia, with silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2s (DF-5As) being in fixed locations and therefore
highly vulnerable to attack. Since 2003, however, new classes of road-mobile missiles,
the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31) and, later, the CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), have been
deployed, representing a second type of mobile asset in the Chinese inventory. Unlike
the CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A), these missiles are solid-fueled and are therefore capable of
launch on short notice. The Jin-class SSBN (Type 094), five of which are either complete
or near completion, will replace the Xia-class (Type 092) by 2017 and provide a
far more robust sea-based deterrent.
Despite these developments, however, Beijing continues to harbor concerns about
the survivability of its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders express particular unease about
the future of U.S. missile defenses and their potential impact on the nuclear balance.52
While we did not attempt to model missile defense with any fidelity, our nuclear
exchange modeling suggests that the planned number of deployed U.S. GBIs alone
(without considering the SM-3 or other systems) could continue to outnumber China’s
expected survivable second-strike warheads as late as 2017. Any expansion of the missile
defense architecture or enhancements to its capabilities, such as a move toward
multiple exo-atmospheric kill vehicles on each interceptor, would further heighten concerns
in Beijing about its retaliatory capability.
Moreover, Chinese planners may question whether the United States, with its
sophisticated space-based and air-breathing ISR assets, might be able to locate and
attack a larger portion of China’s nuclear forces than our modeling suggests. Our
model probably assumes a higher-alert posture for China than it presently practices,
though it is true that China now has much greater capability to keep a portion of its
force on alert, should it choose that course. New generations of Chinese land-based
missiles (e.g., the DF-31A) are movable but not highly mobile. Chinese analysts question
whether, in fact, SURTASS-equipped ships near China are seeking to collect
acoustic data on PLAN SSBNs to facilitate their trail and destruction during a crisis or conflict.53 And Chinese concerns about advanced conventional munitions affecting the
strategic balance are also increasingly pronounced.
The impact of the current balance of forces on crisis stability is uncertain. While
China might fear losing its nuclear forces to the United States in a U.S. first strike,
Beijing would also have little to gain—and much to lose—from striking first. Given
the much improved but still relatively thin margin of China’s survivable second-strike
capability, however, any attrition of the PLA’s nuclear capabilities during a conflict
(especially attacks on one or more SSBNs, each one of which carries a dozen missiles)
could provoke a nuclear “demonstration” firing to underline Beijing’s resolve not be
disarmed.
Issues of arms race stability also loom. Even if there is no change in China’s commitment
to a “lean and effective” nuclear force (which is broadly interpreted as a minimum
deterrent posture), Beijing will seek to ensure that it retains a secure second-strike
capability in the face of U.S. advances in the areas of ISR and missile defense. Chinese
efforts will likely take two forms. First, Beijing will continue to improve the quality of
its forces, with emphasis on mobility and penetration aids. Second, it will likely continue
to add numbers to the force. Putting MIRVs on additional platforms, especially
mobile ones, would be a relatively inexpensive way to increase the number of warheads
that might survive a disarming first strike.54 To be sure, there may also be other drivers
of Chinese nuclear force structure expansion and modernization, such as bureaucratic
imperatives and concerns about regional nuclear rivals (India, in particular). And outside
analysts will watch with interest how China proceeds once it has achieved full
confidence in its second-strike capability.
From a U.S. perspective, the model employed in this chapter suggests that
increases in China’s nuclear arsenal within the range of our 2017 estimates (including
the “high estimate” case) produce no significant reduction in U.S. second-strike survivability,
largely because of the still-sizable number of U.S. silo-based ballistic missiles. In
continuing to maintain considerable numbers of silo-based ICBMs, the United States
preserves a significant hedge against a surprise attack by forcing a potential attacker to
spend multiple warheads to destroy a single U.S. warhead. Given the 13-to-1 warhead
advantage maintained by the United States even in the 2017 “high” case for Chinese
missiles, such an attack is a nonstarter from Beijing’s perspective. Nevertheless, further moves by China to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal
could have serious consequences. Such moves could undermine U.S. and Russian
efforts to pursue further reductions in their own forces. Thus far, second-tier nuclear
powers, such as China, India, and Pakistan, have had little impact on U.S. and Russian
force planning—even as those second-tier powers increasingly interact with one
another. However, continued growth in China’s nuclear inventory will further undermine
political support for cuts beyond those required by New START; this support
is already highly uncertain in the wake of continuing Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Washington, Moscow, or both may wish to ensure that China does not make a dash for
parity while the former Cold War superpowers reduce their nuclear forces.
Even without pursuing parity, a larger Chinese nuclear inventory may complicate
future U.S. and Russian planning if either contemplates simultaneous nuclear threats
by China and another power. And finally, as China’s second-strike capability becomes
more secure—and it has many options to improve that survivability—Beijing may
become bolder in its international behavior. As the other scorecards in this report indicate,
the potential costs of a conventional military conflict with China are growing for
the United States. And as this scorecard suggests, Chinese leaders might believe that
the United States no longer has the option of escalating to the nuclear level without
suffering powerful retaliation. Hence, they may believe that the United States, without
absolute escalation dominance, will be less likely to intervene in the event of a regional
conflict.
Despite this possibility, attempting to hold Chinese nuclear forces at risk of decapitation
into the indefinite future would almost certainly be a poor idea for the United
States, not least because it is likely a losing proposition. China will probably have
more—and cheaper—options to improve the survivability of its second-strike capability
than the United States would to threaten such survivability. Moreover, efforts
to hold Chinese nuclear forces at risk would have profoundly negative consequences
for arms race stability, as well as the larger political relationship with China. Engaging
China on particular points of strategic concern to Washington will be critical to
the long-term stability of the U.S.-China strategic relationship, as well as for regional
stability more broadly.
结论
鉴于核武器的相应数量的不对称性，这是不足为奇
我们的模型显示结果的严重的结构性失衡（见表12.7）。
在每一个时期，美国第一罢工可能与已知位置摧毁所有目标
相对较高的置信度，留下了相对少量的导弹上
警惕，因此表面上不容易受到攻击。鉴于小数字的系统
该时间可能被部署在任何给定点，北京几乎肯定
有关于它的第二次打击能力的效益问题。
假设警报的各时间段的一个类似的水平考虑，我们的建模
表明中国的弹头可能存活的第一攻击数量已
在1996年，2010年随着时间而增加，从四到六个在2003年，第13，和15至
在2017年27更重要的是，部署在系统变得更可靠
和存活一段时间。 1996年，生存完全依赖的状态
夏，与井基CSS-4国防部2秒（DF-5AS）在固定位置，因此是
极易受到攻击。自2003年以来，然而，新等级的公路机动导弹，
在CSS-10国防部1（DF-31），以及后来的CSS-10国防部2（DF-31A），已
部署，代表在中国库存的第二类型移动资产的。不比
在CSS-4国防部2（DF-5A），这些导弹是固体燃料，因此能够
推出在短期的通知。金级弹道导弹核潜艇（094型），其中5个是要么完全
或接近完成，将在2017年取代夏级（092型），并提供一
更强大的海基威慑力量。
尽管取得了这些进展，但北京仍然怀有疑虑
其核力量的生存能力。中国领导人表达对特定的不安
美国导弹防御系统的未来及其对核balance.52潜在影响
虽然我们并没有试图导弹防御与任何真度模型，我们的核
交换模型表明，美国部署的GBIs计划数独
（不考虑SM-3或其他系统）可能继续高于中国的
预计可生存的第二打击弹头导弹迟至2017年任何扩大
防御体系或者改进其功能，如朝的举动
每个拦截器多大气层外拦截弹，将进一步加剧人们的担忧
在北京关于它的报复能力。
此外，中国的规划者可能会质疑美国是否，其
复杂的空间和空气呼吸的ISR资产，可能能够定位并
进攻中国的核力量的较大部分比我们的模型表明。我们
模型可能承担中国较高警戒态势比目前的做法，
虽然这是事实，中国现在有更大的能力，以保持一部分的
警戒力量，如果它选择课程。新一代的中国的陆基
导弹（如DF-31A）是可移动的，但没有流动性很大。中国分析家质疑
无论是在事实上，SURTASS配备舰艇靠近中国正在寻求收集
在计划艘声波数据，以方便他们的足迹和销毁过程中有关影响先进的常规弹药危机或conflict.53而中国关注
战略平衡也日益明显。
力量对危机的稳定电流平衡的影响是不确定的。虽然
中国可能担心在美国的第一次打击丧失其核力量的美国，
北京还将有多少好处，而且损失很大，从先发制人。鉴于
中国的可生存的第二次打击的大为改善，但仍然比较薄缘
能力，但是，在任何冲突中解放军的核能力减员
（尤其是在一个或多个艘攻击，每一个其中带有一打导弹）
可能引发核“示威”射击强调北京的决心不会
解除武装。
军备竞赛稳定性问题也织机。即使是在中国的承诺没有改变
一个“精干有效”的核力量（这是广义地理解为一个最小
威慑态势），北京将努力确保它保持一个安全的第二次打击
在美国面对能力进步ISR和导弹防御等领域。中国
努力将有可能采取两种形式。首先，北京将继续提高质量
它的力量，重点对流动性和渗透助剂。第二，它很可能会继续
添加号码给力。把在其他平台MIRVs，特别是
移动的，将是一个相对廉价的方式来增加弹头数量
这可能生存解除第一strike.54当然，还可能有其他司机
中国的核力量结构，扩建和现代化改造，如官僚主义
必要条件和有关地区核竞争对手（印度，尤其是）的担忧。外
分析师将手表带利中国如何继续一旦取得充分
信心的第二次打击能力。
从美国的角度来看，本章中所使用的模型表明，
增加了我们2017年预测的范围之内中国的核武库（包括
“高估值”的情况下）不产生显著减少美国的第二次打击生存能力，
由于美国的仍然相当数量的主要是井基弹道导弹。于
继续保持相当数量的井基洲际弹道导弹，美国
通过强制潜在的攻击者保留对偷袭一个显著对冲
花多弹头摧毁一个美国弹头。定的13比1的弹头
由美国，即使在2017年的“高”的情况下，为中国的优势保持
导弹，这种攻击是从北京的角度来看不可取。然而，进一步为中国增加其核武库的规模
可能造成严重后果。这些行动可能会破坏美国和俄罗斯
努力追求进一步削减自己的力量。到目前为止，二线核
大国，如中国，印度和巴基斯坦，都对美国和俄罗斯的影响不大
力规划，甚至那些二线的权力越来越互相作用
另一回事。然而，在中国的核库存持续增长，将进一步削弱
使用除通过新的削减战略需要削减的政治支持;这种支持
已经在持续的俄罗斯侵略乌克兰之后高度不确定性。
华盛顿，莫斯科，或者两者可能希望确保中国不会使几许
平价而前者冷战时期超级大国削减其核力量。
即使没有追求平等，更大的中国核库存可能复杂化
未来美国和俄罗斯的计划，如果任一同时考虑核威胁
由中国和其他电源。最后，作为中国的第二次打击能力变
更安全，而且它有很多的选择，以改善这种生存能力，北京可能
成为其国际行为大胆。截至本报告中的其他记分卡显示，
与中国传统军事冲突的潜在成本不断增长的
美国。而作为这个记分卡表明，中国领导人可能会认为，
美国不再有升级到核水平而不的选项
遭受强大的打击报复。因此，他们可能会认为，在美国，没有
绝对主导地位的升级，将不太可能在一个地区性的事件进行干预
冲突。
尽管有这种可能性，尝试在杀头的风险，持有中国核力量
进入不确定的未来几乎肯定会成为美国一个贫穷的想法
国家，这不仅是因为它可能是一个亏本生意。中国将可能有
更便宜选项来提高其第二次打击能力的生存能力
比美国会威胁到这样的生存能力。此外，努力
在风险来临，中国的核力量将有深刻的负面影响
对于军备竞赛的稳定性，以及与中国更大的政治关系。啮合
中国的战略关注华盛顿的特殊点，将是关键
美国 - 中国战略伙伴关系的长期稳定，以及为区域
稳定性更广泛。
Given the asymmetry in the respective number of nuclear weapons, it is hardly surprising
that our modeling shows severe structural imbalances in outcomes (see Table 12.7).
In every period, a U.S. first strike could destroy all targets with known locations with
a relatively high degree of confidence, leaving a relatively small number of missiles on
alert and therefore ostensibly not susceptible to attack. Given the small numbers of systems
that might be deployed at any given point in time, Beijing would almost certainly
have concerns about the effectiveness of its second-strike capability.
Assuming a similar level of alert for each of the periods considered, our modeling
suggests that the number of Chinese warheads that might survive a first strike has
increased over time, from four in 1996 to six in 2003, 13 in 2010, and between 15 and
27 in 2017. More importantly, the systems deployed have become more dependable
and survivable over time. In 1996, survivability depended entirely on the status of the
Xia, with silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2s (DF-5As) being in fixed locations and therefore
highly vulnerable to attack. Since 2003, however, new classes of road-mobile missiles,
the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31) and, later, the CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), have been
deployed, representing a second type of mobile asset in the Chinese inventory. Unlike
the CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A), these missiles are solid-fueled and are therefore capable of
launch on short notice. The Jin-class SSBN (Type 094), five of which are either complete
or near completion, will replace the Xia-class (Type 092) by 2017 and provide a
far more robust sea-based deterrent.
Despite these developments, however, Beijing continues to harbor concerns about
the survivability of its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders express particular unease about
the future of U.S. missile defenses and their potential impact on the nuclear balance.52
While we did not attempt to model missile defense with any fidelity, our nuclear
exchange modeling suggests that the planned number of deployed U.S. GBIs alone
(without considering the SM-3 or other systems) could continue to outnumber China’s
expected survivable second-strike warheads as late as 2017. Any expansion of the missile
defense architecture or enhancements to its capabilities, such as a move toward
multiple exo-atmospheric kill vehicles on each interceptor, would further heighten concerns
in Beijing about its retaliatory capability.
Moreover, Chinese planners may question whether the United States, with its
sophisticated space-based and air-breathing ISR assets, might be able to locate and
attack a larger portion of China’s nuclear forces than our modeling suggests. Our
model probably assumes a higher-alert posture for China than it presently practices,
though it is true that China now has much greater capability to keep a portion of its
force on alert, should it choose that course. New generations of Chinese land-based
missiles (e.g., the DF-31A) are movable but not highly mobile. Chinese analysts question
whether, in fact, SURTASS-equipped ships near China are seeking to collect
acoustic data on PLAN SSBNs to facilitate their trail and destruction during a crisis or conflict.53 And Chinese concerns about advanced conventional munitions affecting the
strategic balance are also increasingly pronounced.
The impact of the current balance of forces on crisis stability is uncertain. While
China might fear losing its nuclear forces to the United States in a U.S. first strike,
Beijing would also have little to gain—and much to lose—from striking first. Given
the much improved but still relatively thin margin of China’s survivable second-strike
capability, however, any attrition of the PLA’s nuclear capabilities during a conflict
(especially attacks on one or more SSBNs, each one of which carries a dozen missiles)
could provoke a nuclear “demonstration” firing to underline Beijing’s resolve not be
disarmed.
Issues of arms race stability also loom. Even if there is no change in China’s commitment
to a “lean and effective” nuclear force (which is broadly interpreted as a minimum
deterrent posture), Beijing will seek to ensure that it retains a secure second-strike
capability in the face of U.S. advances in the areas of ISR and missile defense. Chinese
efforts will likely take two forms. First, Beijing will continue to improve the quality of
its forces, with emphasis on mobility and penetration aids. Second, it will likely continue
to add numbers to the force. Putting MIRVs on additional platforms, especially
mobile ones, would be a relatively inexpensive way to increase the number of warheads
that might survive a disarming first strike.54 To be sure, there may also be other drivers
of Chinese nuclear force structure expansion and modernization, such as bureaucratic
imperatives and concerns about regional nuclear rivals (India, in particular). And outside
analysts will watch with interest how China proceeds once it has achieved full
confidence in its second-strike capability.
From a U.S. perspective, the model employed in this chapter suggests that
increases in China’s nuclear arsenal within the range of our 2017 estimates (including
the “high estimate” case) produce no significant reduction in U.S. second-strike survivability,
largely because of the still-sizable number of U.S. silo-based ballistic missiles. In
continuing to maintain considerable numbers of silo-based ICBMs, the United States
preserves a significant hedge against a surprise attack by forcing a potential attacker to
spend multiple warheads to destroy a single U.S. warhead. Given the 13-to-1 warhead
advantage maintained by the United States even in the 2017 “high” case for Chinese
missiles, such an attack is a nonstarter from Beijing’s perspective. Nevertheless, further moves by China to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal
could have serious consequences. Such moves could undermine U.S. and Russian
efforts to pursue further reductions in their own forces. Thus far, second-tier nuclear
powers, such as China, India, and Pakistan, have had little impact on U.S. and Russian
force planning—even as those second-tier powers increasingly interact with one
another. However, continued growth in China’s nuclear inventory will further undermine
political support for cuts beyond those required by New START; this support
is already highly uncertain in the wake of continuing Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Washington, Moscow, or both may wish to ensure that China does not make a dash for
parity while the former Cold War superpowers reduce their nuclear forces.
Even without pursuing parity, a larger Chinese nuclear inventory may complicate
future U.S. and Russian planning if either contemplates simultaneous nuclear threats
by China and another power. And finally, as China’s second-strike capability becomes
more secure—and it has many options to improve that survivability—Beijing may
become bolder in its international behavior. As the other scorecards in this report indicate,
the potential costs of a conventional military conflict with China are growing for
the United States. And as this scorecard suggests, Chinese leaders might believe that
the United States no longer has the option of escalating to the nuclear level without
suffering powerful retaliation. Hence, they may believe that the United States, without
absolute escalation dominance, will be less likely to intervene in the event of a regional
conflict.
Despite this possibility, attempting to hold Chinese nuclear forces at risk of decapitation
into the indefinite future would almost certainly be a poor idea for the United
States, not least because it is likely a losing proposition. China will probably have
more—and cheaper—options to improve the survivability of its second-strike capability
than the United States would to threaten such survivability. Moreover, efforts
to hold Chinese nuclear forces at risk would have profoundly negative consequences
for arms race stability, as well as the larger political relationship with China. Engaging
China on particular points of strategic concern to Washington will be critical to
the long-term stability of the U.S.-China strategic relationship, as well as for regional
stability more broadly.
结论
鉴于核武器的相应数量的不对称性，这是不足为奇
我们的模型显示结果的严重的结构性失衡（见表12.7）。
在每一个时期，美国第一罢工可能与已知位置摧毁所有目标
相对较高的置信度，留下了相对少量的导弹上
警惕，因此表面上不容易受到攻击。鉴于小数字的系统
该时间可能被部署在任何给定点，北京几乎肯定
有关于它的第二次打击能力的效益问题。
假设警报的各时间段的一个类似的水平考虑，我们的建模
表明中国的弹头可能存活的第一攻击数量已
在1996年，2010年随着时间而增加，从四到六个在2003年，第13，和15至
在2017年27更重要的是，部署在系统变得更可靠
和存活一段时间。 1996年，生存完全依赖的状态
夏，与井基CSS-4国防部2秒（DF-5AS）在固定位置，因此是
极易受到攻击。自2003年以来，然而，新等级的公路机动导弹，
在CSS-10国防部1（DF-31），以及后来的CSS-10国防部2（DF-31A），已
部署，代表在中国库存的第二类型移动资产的。不比
在CSS-4国防部2（DF-5A），这些导弹是固体燃料，因此能够
推出在短期的通知。金级弹道导弹核潜艇（094型），其中5个是要么完全
或接近完成，将在2017年取代夏级（092型），并提供一
更强大的海基威慑力量。
尽管取得了这些进展，但北京仍然怀有疑虑
其核力量的生存能力。中国领导人表达对特定的不安
美国导弹防御系统的未来及其对核balance.52潜在影响
虽然我们并没有试图导弹防御与任何真度模型，我们的核
交换模型表明，美国部署的GBIs计划数独
（不考虑SM-3或其他系统）可能继续高于中国的
预计可生存的第二打击弹头导弹迟至2017年任何扩大
防御体系或者改进其功能，如朝的举动
每个拦截器多大气层外拦截弹，将进一步加剧人们的担忧
在北京关于它的报复能力。
此外，中国的规划者可能会质疑美国是否，其
复杂的空间和空气呼吸的ISR资产，可能能够定位并
进攻中国的核力量的较大部分比我们的模型表明。我们
模型可能承担中国较高警戒态势比目前的做法，
虽然这是事实，中国现在有更大的能力，以保持一部分的
警戒力量，如果它选择课程。新一代的中国的陆基
导弹（如DF-31A）是可移动的，但没有流动性很大。中国分析家质疑
无论是在事实上，SURTASS配备舰艇靠近中国正在寻求收集
在计划艘声波数据，以方便他们的足迹和销毁过程中有关影响先进的常规弹药危机或conflict.53而中国关注
战略平衡也日益明显。
力量对危机的稳定电流平衡的影响是不确定的。虽然
中国可能担心在美国的第一次打击丧失其核力量的美国，
北京还将有多少好处，而且损失很大，从先发制人。鉴于
中国的可生存的第二次打击的大为改善，但仍然比较薄缘
能力，但是，在任何冲突中解放军的核能力减员
（尤其是在一个或多个艘攻击，每一个其中带有一打导弹）
可能引发核“示威”射击强调北京的决心不会
解除武装。
军备竞赛稳定性问题也织机。即使是在中国的承诺没有改变
一个“精干有效”的核力量（这是广义地理解为一个最小
威慑态势），北京将努力确保它保持一个安全的第二次打击
在美国面对能力进步ISR和导弹防御等领域。中国
努力将有可能采取两种形式。首先，北京将继续提高质量
它的力量，重点对流动性和渗透助剂。第二，它很可能会继续
添加号码给力。把在其他平台MIRVs，特别是
移动的，将是一个相对廉价的方式来增加弹头数量
这可能生存解除第一strike.54当然，还可能有其他司机
中国的核力量结构，扩建和现代化改造，如官僚主义
必要条件和有关地区核竞争对手（印度，尤其是）的担忧。外
分析师将手表带利中国如何继续一旦取得充分
信心的第二次打击能力。
从美国的角度来看，本章中所使用的模型表明，
增加了我们2017年预测的范围之内中国的核武库（包括
“高估值”的情况下）不产生显著减少美国的第二次打击生存能力，
由于美国的仍然相当数量的主要是井基弹道导弹。于
继续保持相当数量的井基洲际弹道导弹，美国
通过强制潜在的攻击者保留对偷袭一个显著对冲
花多弹头摧毁一个美国弹头。定的13比1的弹头
由美国，即使在2017年的“高”的情况下，为中国的优势保持
导弹，这种攻击是从北京的角度来看不可取。然而，进一步为中国增加其核武库的规模
可能造成严重后果。这些行动可能会破坏美国和俄罗斯
努力追求进一步削减自己的力量。到目前为止，二线核
大国，如中国，印度和巴基斯坦，都对美国和俄罗斯的影响不大
力规划，甚至那些二线的权力越来越互相作用
另一回事。然而，在中国的核库存持续增长，将进一步削弱
使用除通过新的削减战略需要削减的政治支持;这种支持
已经在持续的俄罗斯侵略乌克兰之后高度不确定性。
华盛顿，莫斯科，或者两者可能希望确保中国不会使几许
平价而前者冷战时期超级大国削减其核力量。
即使没有追求平等，更大的中国核库存可能复杂化
未来美国和俄罗斯的计划，如果任一同时考虑核威胁
由中国和其他电源。最后，作为中国的第二次打击能力变
更安全，而且它有很多的选择，以改善这种生存能力，北京可能
成为其国际行为大胆。截至本报告中的其他记分卡显示，
与中国传统军事冲突的潜在成本不断增长的
美国。而作为这个记分卡表明，中国领导人可能会认为，
美国不再有升级到核水平而不的选项
遭受强大的打击报复。因此，他们可能会认为，在美国，没有
绝对主导地位的升级，将不太可能在一个地区性的事件进行干预
冲突。
尽管有这种可能性，尝试在杀头的风险，持有中国核力量
进入不确定的未来几乎肯定会成为美国一个贫穷的想法
国家，这不仅是因为它可能是一个亏本生意。中国将可能有
更便宜选项来提高其第二次打击能力的生存能力
比美国会威胁到这样的生存能力。此外，努力
在风险来临，中国的核力量将有深刻的负面影响
对于军备竞赛的稳定性，以及与中国更大的政治关系。啮合
中国的战略关注华盛顿的特殊点，将是关键
美国 - 中国战略伙伴关系的长期稳定，以及为区域
稳定性更广泛。
没有耐心看……
机翻可耻！！！！！！
低截获概率 发表于 2015-9-18 14:38
机翻可耻！！！！！！
一直发帖求好人翻译 ，可惜就是没好人。
机翻可耻！！！！！！
一直发帖求好人翻译 ，可惜就是没好人。
轰炸机栏里明显错了，H-6K官方提示过有战术核武器的，怎么写着none
？
？邦妮和克莱德 发表于 2015-9-20 18:02
轰炸机栏里明显错了，H-6K官方提示过有战术核武器的，怎么写着none？
那就是在兰德眼里。H-6K对美本土没有核威胁性
轰炸机栏里明显错了，H-6K官方提示过有战术核武器的，怎么写着none？
那就是在兰德眼里。H-6K对美本土没有核威胁性
看不懂啊啊啊啊啊
各种数据也懒得看，只知道一点，没1000枚核弹头别想着什么反击和对抗。