1999年关于中国窃取美国核技术的采访，源自美国大使馆文 ...

05/25/99
UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT: DOD BRIEFING, "OPERATION ALLIED FORCE" 5/25
(KFOR, refugees, Yugoslavia/power plants, FYROM/Albania, KLA, Milosevic, China/missiles, NATO ops/results, refugee support, oil embargo, diplomacy)
Pentagon Spokesman Kenneth Bacon and General Charles Wald briefed.
Following is an unofficial transcript from Legi-Slate:
(begin transcript)
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRIEFING
BRIEFER: KENNETH BACON
ALSO BRIEFING ON NATO'S KOSOVO OPERATION:
MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES F. WALD, DIRECTOR, PENTAGON STRATEGIC PLANNING
THE PENTAGON
2:09 P.M. EDT
TUESDAY, MAY 25, 1999

Q: A few days after the Chinese embassy was bombed in Belgrade, Secretary Cohen said, in congressional testimony, that he has planned to go to China in June but he was unsure how that event would affect his plans. Has that been clarified? Is he still planning to go in June, or --
BACON: He did have tentative plans to go in June, and he has postponed any trip until some later date -- not canceled it, but postponed it. I think the primary reason for that is that, right now, he feels that his place is here in Washington, devoting as much time as possible to running the U.S. participation in the air campaign in Kosovo, preparing for the peacekeeping force, et cetera.
But also, it probably is not the easiest time to visit China. China, as you know, has broken off military-to-military relations temporarily, with the United States. And he feels that it may be better to go later. He remains of course steadfastly committed to engagement with China as a long-term policy.
Q: The Chinese have not rejected this trip --
BACON: I am not aware that they have. This was a decision that he made, mainly in light of his duties here in Washington. As you know, he has canceled many other trips over the last two months.
Q: And speaking of --
Q: (Inaudible) -- you indicated that the break-off in military-to-military is only temporary?
BACON: Yes, that is what they have announced.
Q: Speaking of China -- it is a big story -- it appears that the Chinese have -- (inaudible) -- the designs for all of the U.S.nuclear warheads, designed in, I guess, the last 50 years, some of our rockets. How do you respond to the Cox report?
And does the United States military wish that the U.S. DOE, and others responsible for developing these weapons, would develop more advanced weapons and missiles to distance the U.S. from the Chinese?
BACON: Well, first of all, the distance between the U.S. and the Chinese is huge. We have a strategic nuclear arsenal of about, I think, more than -- around 6,000 nuclear weapons at this stage. They have approximately 20 missiles that may be able to strike the United States. So there's a huge imbalance.
Second, as you know, the CIA did an analysis that came out last month in which they tried to assess the damage from the spying that China has done, really over the last 20 years or so, through a variety of administrations, and they said that it was very difficult to determine what sort of contribution the fruits of their spying may have made to their nuclear force. They did not find that their program to acquire nuclear secrets in the U.S. had resulted in any apparent modernization to their deployed strategic force. So I think it's important to look at what the impact of this spying has been so far on the Chinese force, at least as seen by the CIA.
Obviously, this is a matter of huge concern to this administration and to this Congress. The Clinton administration has already taken a number of rules to tighten security in the DOD labs. And the Defense Department has -- although it wasn't the focal point of this investigation -- has taken recently a number of steps to improve security in the Department of Defense labs as well. We have been cooperating fully at the Defense Department with the Cox commission over the last several months, provided a lot of information to them, everything they've sought, and we've tried to be very responsive to their needs and also to their recommendations.
Q: Has the PRC gained in a qualitative way by acquisition of these nuclear secrets? I understand in a quantitative way they're still way behind, but in a qualitative way, are they catching up rapidly because of this?
BACON: Well, as I said, the CIA found, in April, that their acquisition of nuclear secrets does not appear to have resulted in modernization of their deployed strategic forces. So I think I'll just leave that assessment with the CIA.
Q: But they have a new generation of weapons that they have been working on for some time; a land-based mobile and a sea-based that are basically the same thing, that appear to be -- it's about the specs of a Trident missile, for example, and that -- do you have any estimate on when they are going to deploy that?
BACON: I do not, no.
Q: Have they tested that in a MIRV-ed version, to your knowledge?
BACON: I'm not aware that they have, but we'll check further on that.
Q: Ken, the committee recommended that -- I think they recommended that DOD take responsibility for security at satellite launch sites in China, saying that security had been inadequate. Apparently, privately, you know, they -- I don't know whether they rent security or what from the United States. And they recommended that the DOD take over security to make sure that things are not, you know, taken, and satellite launches. Would you be comfortable with that?
BACON: Well, we already have done that. That was required in the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999. It said that DOD should establish a new organization called the Space Launch Monitoring Division, and we're in the process of doing that. This would be a core of experts who would monitor U.S. space launches in China, and they would provide, basically, a chain of custody to make sure that U.S. technology was always secure before it was launched.
What happens is that a private company hired to launch a satellite will ship the satellite over there, and it remains there for awhile as it's put on the rocket and the launch preparations take place. Not only would the monitors be present for every stage of such a launch, to make sure that the U.S. technology was secure, but they would also be required to be in all meetings between U.S. and Chinese authorities, U.S. corporate and Chinese authorities, to make sure that no technological information was exchanged improperly during those meetings. That is under way.
Q: How is that different from what happened before, because I thought they were doing that now?
BACON: It was required to happen before, but there were some problems and there were some glitches. And as you know, one of the things that came out in the course of the early investigation was that there had been some alleged improprieties in meetings between corporate officials and Chinese officials. Monitors had not been present. Some technology had been exchanged improperly. And that's still being investigated by the Justice Department -- those allegations are being investigated by the Justice Department. But one of the things that the Congress concluded was that we needed a more seamless system that applied without doubt to all launches, and that there were an adequate number of trained U.S. monitors available to make sure that all space launches were properly covered.
Q: Ken, the U.S. is a superpower, the only superpower in the world today. But China is stealing all the U.S. secrets. And do you see the future that the Chinese are the world police, or to the U.S.?
BACON: Well, first of all, I think it would be overstating it to say that China is stealing all the U.S. secrets. And I don't believe that's what the Cox Commission concluded. So it's important to be careful about what the Chinese have done and what they haven't done.
China is clearly putting more investment into its military. But remember that the military was one of the four modernizations announced by Deng Xiaoping. And it was really the last modernization to be funded of the four. It's catching up now to some of the modernization programs in agriculture and industry. They still have a long way to go in the size and the sophistication of their force. But they are clearly making an investment to modernize their force.
Our goal has been to engage with China in a way that would allow our two countries to work together in pursuit of our national interests in ways that might make an arms build-up, any arms build-up, an -- one, to minimize the need for an arms build-up in Asia; and two, to try to find ways to make any arms build-up that did occur to be less threatening and more transparent to other countries in the area. And we'll continue that effort despite some bumps along the way.
Q: From the military viewpoint, do you agree with the Cox report?
BACON: I haven't read the Cox report. It's 700 pages long. I suppose it's something we should all read, maybe over the Memorial Day weekend.
Q: Did you, does DOD find the extent of this espionage surprising? I assume that you all had access to the information earlier than we did. As the totality of it became revealed to you, was it surprising? Or do you guys pretty much assume that this stuff goes on all the time, and it's a manageable level?
BACON: Obviously, any successful espionage effort is disturbing, and we devote a lot of resources to blocking espionage by a variety of countries. We understand that it is part of national life -- espionage; it does occur. The Republic of Venice was built on espionage; it was one of the keys to their power, going back to more than a thousand years ago. And espionage has always been a factor in military life; we are aware of that. We will continue to do our very best to interrupt, interdict and stop espionage efforts directed against the United States.
Q: But was the extent surprising?
BACON: I said the extent was certainly disturbing.
Q: Will the military exchanges and contacts between DOD and the Chinese military, will that be reviewed now or in any way looked at again in light of these disclosures?
BACON: Well first of all, we believe these exchanges were, although important, not the type of exchanges that allowed any classified information to be transmitted one way or another. And we were really trying to get to know the Chinese military a little better and allow them to get to know our military a little better so we could avoid misunderstandings today and in the future. And I don't think that these were programs that had any sort of threat of a -- of transferring sensitive information from the U.S. to China.
Let me turn this over to General Wald because he's got an important briefing today.05/25/99
UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT: DOD BRIEFING, "OPERATION ALLIED FORCE" 5/25
(KFOR, refugees, Yugoslavia/power plants, FYROM/Albania, KLA, Milosevic, China/missiles, NATO ops/results, refugee support, oil embargo, diplomacy)
Pentagon Spokesman Kenneth Bacon and General Charles Wald briefed.
Following is an unofficial transcript from Legi-Slate:
(begin transcript)
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRIEFING
BRIEFER: KENNETH BACON
ALSO BRIEFING ON NATO'S KOSOVO OPERATION:
MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES F. WALD, DIRECTOR, PENTAGON STRATEGIC PLANNING
THE PENTAGON
2:09 P.M. EDT
TUESDAY, MAY 25, 1999

Q: A few days after the Chinese embassy was bombed in Belgrade, Secretary Cohen said, in congressional testimony, that he has planned to go to China in June but he was unsure how that event would affect his plans. Has that been clarified? Is he still planning to go in June, or --
BACON: He did have tentative plans to go in June, and he has postponed any trip until some later date -- not canceled it, but postponed it. I think the primary reason for that is that, right now, he feels that his place is here in Washington, devoting as much time as possible to running the U.S. participation in the air campaign in Kosovo, preparing for the peacekeeping force, et cetera.
But also, it probably is not the easiest time to visit China. China, as you know, has broken off military-to-military relations temporarily, with the United States. And he feels that it may be better to go later. He remains of course steadfastly committed to engagement with China as a long-term policy.
Q: The Chinese have not rejected this trip --
BACON: I am not aware that they have. This was a decision that he made, mainly in light of his duties here in Washington. As you know, he has canceled many other trips over the last two months.
Q: And speaking of --
Q: (Inaudible) -- you indicated that the break-off in military-to-military is only temporary?
BACON: Yes, that is what they have announced.
Q: Speaking of China -- it is a big story -- it appears that the Chinese have -- (inaudible) -- the designs for all of the U.S.nuclear warheads, designed in, I guess, the last 50 years, some of our rockets. How do you respond to the Cox report?
And does the United States military wish that the U.S. DOE, and others responsible for developing these weapons, would develop more advanced weapons and missiles to distance the U.S. from the Chinese?
BACON: Well, first of all, the distance between the U.S. and the Chinese is huge. We have a strategic nuclear arsenal of about, I think, more than -- around 6,000 nuclear weapons at this stage. They have approximately 20 missiles that may be able to strike the United States. So there's a huge imbalance.
Second, as you know, the CIA did an analysis that came out last month in which they tried to assess the damage from the spying that China has done, really over the last 20 years or so, through a variety of administrations, and they said that it was very difficult to determine what sort of contribution the fruits of their spying may have made to their nuclear force. They did not find that their program to acquire nuclear secrets in the U.S. had resulted in any apparent modernization to their deployed strategic force. So I think it's important to look at what the impact of this spying has been so far on the Chinese force, at least as seen by the CIA.
Obviously, this is a matter of huge concern to this administration and to this Congress. The Clinton administration has already taken a number of rules to tighten security in the DOD labs. And the Defense Department has -- although it wasn't the focal point of this investigation -- has taken recently a number of steps to improve security in the Department of Defense labs as well. We have been cooperating fully at the Defense Department with the Cox commission over the last several months, provided a lot of information to them, everything they've sought, and we've tried to be very responsive to their needs and also to their recommendations.
Q: Has the PRC gained in a qualitative way by acquisition of these nuclear secrets? I understand in a quantitative way they're still way behind, but in a qualitative way, are they catching up rapidly because of this?
BACON: Well, as I said, the CIA found, in April, that their acquisition of nuclear secrets does not appear to have resulted in modernization of their deployed strategic forces. So I think I'll just leave that assessment with the CIA.
Q: But they have a new generation of weapons that they have been working on for some time; a land-based mobile and a sea-based that are basically the same thing, that appear to be -- it's about the specs of a Trident missile, for example, and that -- do you have any estimate on when they are going to deploy that?
BACON: I do not, no.
Q: Have they tested that in a MIRV-ed version, to your knowledge?
BACON: I'm not aware that they have, but we'll check further on that.
Q: Ken, the committee recommended that -- I think they recommended that DOD take responsibility for security at satellite launch sites in China, saying that security had been inadequate. Apparently, privately, you know, they -- I don't know whether they rent security or what from the United States. And they recommended that the DOD take over security to make sure that things are not, you know, taken, and satellite launches. Would you be comfortable with that?
BACON: Well, we already have done that. That was required in the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999. It said that DOD should establish a new organization called the Space Launch Monitoring Division, and we're in the process of doing that. This would be a core of experts who would monitor U.S. space launches in China, and they would provide, basically, a chain of custody to make sure that U.S. technology was always secure before it was launched.
What happens is that a private company hired to launch a satellite will ship the satellite over there, and it remains there for awhile as it's put on the rocket and the launch preparations take place. Not only would the monitors be present for every stage of such a launch, to make sure that the U.S. technology was secure, but they would also be required to be in all meetings between U.S. and Chinese authorities, U.S. corporate and Chinese authorities, to make sure that no technological information was exchanged improperly during those meetings. That is under way.
Q: How is that different from what happened before, because I thought they were doing that now?
BACON: It was required to happen before, but there were some problems and there were some glitches. And as you know, one of the things that came out in the course of the early investigation was that there had been some alleged improprieties in meetings between corporate officials and Chinese officials. Monitors had not been present. Some technology had been exchanged improperly. And that's still being investigated by the Justice Department -- those allegations are being investigated by the Justice Department. But one of the things that the Congress concluded was that we needed a more seamless system that applied without doubt to all launches, and that there were an adequate number of trained U.S. monitors available to make sure that all space launches were properly covered.
Q: Ken, the U.S. is a superpower, the only superpower in the world today. But China is stealing all the U.S. secrets. And do you see the future that the Chinese are the world police, or to the U.S.?
BACON: Well, first of all, I think it would be overstating it to say that China is stealing all the U.S. secrets. And I don't believe that's what the Cox Commission concluded. So it's important to be careful about what the Chinese have done and what they haven't done.
China is clearly putting more investment into its military. But remember that the military was one of the four modernizations announced by Deng Xiaoping. And it was really the last modernization to be funded of the four. It's catching up now to some of the modernization programs in agriculture and industry. They still have a long way to go in the size and the sophistication of their force. But they are clearly making an investment to modernize their force.
Our goal has been to engage with China in a way that would allow our two countries to work together in pursuit of our national interests in ways that might make an arms build-up, any arms build-up, an -- one, to minimize the need for an arms build-up in Asia; and two, to try to find ways to make any arms build-up that did occur to be less threatening and more transparent to other countries in the area. And we'll continue that effort despite some bumps along the way.
Q: From the military viewpoint, do you agree with the Cox report?
BACON: I haven't read the Cox report. It's 700 pages long. I suppose it's something we should all read, maybe over the Memorial Day weekend.
Q: Did you, does DOD find the extent of this espionage surprising? I assume that you all had access to the information earlier than we did. As the totality of it became revealed to you, was it surprising? Or do you guys pretty much assume that this stuff goes on all the time, and it's a manageable level?
BACON: Obviously, any successful espionage effort is disturbing, and we devote a lot of resources to blocking espionage by a variety of countries. We understand that it is part of national life -- espionage; it does occur. The Republic of Venice was built on espionage; it was one of the keys to their power, going back to more than a thousand years ago. And espionage has always been a factor in military life; we are aware of that. We will continue to do our very best to interrupt, interdict and stop espionage efforts directed against the United States.
Q: But was the extent surprising?
BACON: I said the extent was certainly disturbing.
Q: Will the military exchanges and contacts between DOD and the Chinese military, will that be reviewed now or in any way looked at again in light of these disclosures?
BACON: Well first of all, we believe these exchanges were, although important, not the type of exchanges that allowed any classified information to be transmitted one way or another. And we were really trying to get to know the Chinese military a little better and allow them to get to know our military a little better so we could avoid misunderstandings today and in the future. And I don't think that these were programs that had any sort of threat of a -- of transferring sensitive information from the U.S. to China.
Let me turn this over to General Wald because he's got an important briefing today.