GZJY速度进——你爹要玩民族主义了

论美国的民族主义
The Case for American Nationalism

http://nationalinterest.org/arti ... ism-10297?page=show
正文翻译:龙腾


THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAS lost its mind. To put it more precisely, the United States has lost its collective institutional memory. America achieved its present global preeminence by means of values and strategies that Washington’s current bipartisan elite chooses to repress from memory or actively stigmatize. Foremost among the repressed memories in what Gore Vidal called the United States of Amnesia is nationalism—including self-confident, unapologetic American nationalism.

美国失去理智了。更准确点说，美国已经丧失了自己的集体制度性记忆。通过现有两党精英不愿面对和积极污蔑的价值观和战略思想，使得美国奠定了在现今世界上的杰出地位。正如戈尔韦达尔所提到，在所有美国健忘症中最被压抑的要数国家主义了——这样的国家主义包含了自信的却又死不认错的美国民族主义精神。

Until recently, the United States was both the modern liberal nation-state par excellence and the major champion of national self-determination around the world. The country owed its very existence to a war of national liberation from the British Empire. Subsequently, the United States preserved its existence in the Civil War by crushing the South’s attempt to secede from the American nation-state. At the same time, long before Woodrow Wilson included the principle of national self-determination in his Fourteen Points address and Franklin Roosevelt invoked it in the Atlantic Charter, Americans championed the right of ethnocultural nations to secede from multinational empires and form their own (preferably, but not necessarily, democratic) nation-states.

直到最近，美国仍是最卓越的现代自由主义民族国家，也是拥有最大自决权的民族国家。美国的存在归功于脱离大英帝国的独立战争。之后，美国通过南北战争覆灭了南方脱离联邦的企图，从而延续了自身的存在。同时，早在威尔逊关于国家自主决策十四点内容的就职演说以及罗斯福的大西洋宪章的民族自决权内容之前，美国人就已经支持民族国家要从跨国帝国中脱离出来并形成自己的民族国家（最好是形成民主的国家，但也不一定非要如此）。


Americans gave moral and rhetorical, though not material, support to Latin Americans who broke away from colonial-era Spain, to Greek patriots opposing the Ottoman Empire, and to the Poles and other rebellious nations in the revolutions of 1848. Americans had scant respect for the British Empire they had exited. They failed to conquer Canada in the War of 1812, but through much of the nineteenth century it was hoped that Canadians would one day voluntarily join the United States. During the two world wars, America championed the rights of small nations against empires—including its imperial allies like Britain—and during the Cold War Americans sympathized with the “captive nations” of the Soviet bloc.

美国为拉丁美洲脱离西班牙殖民统治提供了道义和言论支持（虽然没有物质帮助），为希腊抗击奥斯曼帝国提供支持，为1848革命中年波兰和其他国家的反压迫革命提供帮助。美国对被自己赶走的大英帝国缺乏敬意。虽然没能在1812年战争中夺取加拿大，但整个19世纪期间人们普遍相信加拿大有朝一日会自愿加入美国联邦。在两次世界大战中，美国捍卫了小国家抵抗帝国主义（包括其帝国盟友英国）的权利，在冷战中美国也非常体恤受到苏联“奴役的国家”。

At the same time, the United States practiced the liberal nationalism that it preached. In its security strategy, Washington for most of its history has been guided by self-interested nationalism. By means of the Louisiana Purchase, the Mexican-American War and the defeat of Southern secession, America’s leaders ensured that North America, which for centuries had been a battleground for European empires, would henceforth be dominated by a regional hegemon. As John Mearsheimer has observed, the United States, while jealously guarding its own regional hegemony in North America, ensured that no other great power would be able to enjoy a similar status in Europe or Asia.

与此同时，美国积极实践其宣讲的自由国家主义。在其防卫战略中，美国政府在其大部分历史时间里崇尚自我利益为中心的民族主义。通过购买路易斯安那、美墨战争以及南北战争，美国领导人将数百年来一直作为欧洲帝国主义战场的北美变成以美国为霸权的地区。正如米尔斯所看到的，美国一方面确立了自己在北美的霸权，同时又阻止其他任何强权在欧洲或者亚洲确立类似的霸权。


Since the end of the Cold War, however, the United States has abandoned enlightened nationalism in order to pursue permanent American global hegemony while preaching a new doctrine of postnationalism. This grand strategy has undermined the very morality, liberty and security it was supposed to enhance. And so, after several misconceived wars and interventions, Washington must repudiate its post–Cold War commitment to global hegemony and the ideology of postnationalism that justifies it, and it must embark upon a wholesale revision of military, trade and immigration policy in the national interest. None of these measures would endanger world order or subvert American ideals. Rather, they would enhance them. It is time, in short, for a new nationalism.

然而，从冷战结束起，美国为追求永久的全球性霸权，便摒弃了具有进步性的国家主义，而宣讲一种新的后国家主义教条思想。这种宏大的战略恰恰破坏了本应得到弘扬的道德、自由和防卫理念。因此在经历数场错误的战争和军事冲突后，美国政府必须批判其冷战后的全球霸权主义和后国家主义思想，必须为了国家利益对军事、贸易以及移民政策方面做出全面修整。这些做法将不会威胁世界秩序或颠覆美国人的理想。反而会起到促进作用。总之是时候应当建立新的民族主义思想了。

FOR MUCH OF ITS HISTORY, Washington has pursued a security strategy by means that look more like cold, calculating nationalism than crusading idealism. In both world wars, the United States assumed the role of an “offshore balancer,” allowing its allies to suffer tremendous losses of life and wealth before belatedly entering the conflict to tip the balance at a minimum cost in American blood and treasure. With the exception of the wars in Korea and Vietnam, the United States waged the Cold War on the cheap, preferring to subsidize and advise enemies of Communist regimes while using embargoes and arms races to bankrupt the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union may have spent up to a third of its GDP on the military, America during the Cold War never spent more than around 15 percent, even at the height of the war in Korea; it never mobilized its peacetime industries; and it never adopted a universal draft, relying instead on a limited “selective service” lottery draft. The losses of life in Korea and Vietnam, horrifically disproportionate to the strategic value of the objectives as they may have been, were extremely limited compared to the price paid by the United States for victory in the wars with Germany—a price which, in turn, was much lower than that paid by the other great powers in the world wars.

纵观美国历史，美国政府一直在追求的防卫战略是比劳师远征更加冷酷又精于算计的民族主义思想。在两次世界大战中，美国都起到了“离岸平衡主义”的作用，在其盟友经历了巨大的人员和财产损失后，才缓慢地加入战局从而利用最小的牺牲和代价打破了战争平衡。除了朝鲜和越南战争直接出兵外，美国在冷战期间只是向共产主义政权的敌对方提供了少量物质帮助和顾问，而利用禁运和军备竞赛便拖垮了苏联。当苏联投入GDP的三分之一用于发展军事时，美国的军备投入从未超过GDP的15%。即使在朝鲜战争达到最顶峰之时，美国也从未动摇过其和平时期的产业发展。从未采取过普遍兵役制，而仅依赖于有限的“选拔”制兵役。在朝鲜和越南战争中的人员损失与所实现的战略价值远不成比例，与美国在二战中与德国作战付出的牺牲也无法比拟，而相应的二战中美国遭受的损失与其他大国相比更是微乎其微。


Cold War America, like America during the world wars, championed the right of national self-determination of small nations like those of Eastern Europe and Taiwan against regional empires, in order to undermine the legitimacy of its Soviet and Chinese rivals. Indeed, during most of the past century, the United States made national self-determination a higher priority than democracy.

正如世界大战中的美国，冷战中的美国为了破坏其对手中国和苏联执政的合法性，支持一些像东欧、台湾这样的小地方行使民族自决权以对抗地区霸权。实际上，在过去的近百年间，美国将民族自决而不是民主放在了首要位置。

This approach was encoded in the fifth of Wilson’s Fourteen Points. To a greater extent than has usually been acknowledged, it became the DNA of American foreign policy. Wilson demanded
a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty. The interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

这种手段反映在威尔逊的《十四点和平原则》的第五条里。而实际上，这一条成为了美国外交政策的核心。威尔逊倡导对所有殖民地的请求做出一个自由的、开放的、公正的调整，这种调整是建立在在解决主权问题时严格遵守此条原则的基础之上。其中涉及到的人民的利益必须与那些尚不知归属的政府的公平诉求占有同样的重要性。

Free elections everywhere in the world are not mentioned in the Fourteen Points. Nor is there any mention of internal democracy in the Atlantic Charter, which declared that all peoples had a right to self-determination in world politics. Franklin Roosevelt also left the right to vote in free elections out of his Four Freedoms. This ranking of priorities did not reflect any hostility to democracy; Wilson and Roosevelt would have agreed that liberal democracy is the best form of government for an independent nation-state. Rather, the emphasis on national independence rather than internal democracy reflected the recognition that a world of many sovereign nation-states, most of which are small and weak, is safer for the United States than a world of a few powerful multinational empires.

《十四点和平原则》中并未提及世界各地的选举自由。《大西洋宪章》中也没有提及内部民主，但提到所有民族在世界政治事务中均享有的民族自决权。富兰克林·罗斯福同样的也并未将选举自由列入他的四大自由中。这种排名的优先并不是对民主的敌意；恰恰相反，威尔逊和罗斯福会认为自由民主对独立国家而言是最好的民主形式。但是，美国对民族独立而非内部民主的强调表明了对美国而言，一个充满主权国家（大多数都是弱小的国家）的世界比一个拥有少数几个强大的跨国帝国的世界来说更安全。


Neither Woodrow Wilson nor Franklin Roosevelt was a postnational globalist in the contemporary sense. Quite the contrary. They were both old-fashioned liberal nationalists in the tradition of Giuseppe Mazzini, John Stuart Mill and William Gladstone, for whom international organizations were intended to coordinate—not replace—sovereign nation-states. After all, the word “nations” is found in the titles of the international organizations they founded. The League of Nations was not the League of Citizens of the World, just as the United Nations is not United Humanity.

伍德罗威尔逊和富兰克林罗斯福都并非现代意义上的后民族全球主义者。恰恰相反，两人是老派的自由主义民族主义者，具有朱塞佩马志尼（意大利政治思想家，作家，革命家）、约翰斯图尔特密尔以及威廉葛莱斯顿等人的特征。对于这些人来说，国际组织并非用来替代主权国家，而是用来协调主权国家的。毕竟，在她们所成立的国际性组织的名称中我们依然可以找到“nation"(国家）这个字眼。比如，”国际联盟“（英文中含有“国家”字眼），而非”世界公民联盟“，就好比”联合国“，而非“联合人类”。

The Nuremberg trials and the UN Charter focused on banning not only genocide but also “aggressive war.” Indeed, the central norm of the United Nations is the norm against the violation of state sovereignty by outside powers—a norm that postnational champions of “humanitarian intervention” and “liberal imperialism” lamented and sought to alter in the Cold War’s aftermath.

纽伦堡审判和联合国宪章不仅要禁止大屠杀，还要禁止“侵略战争”。确实，联合国的核心原则就是反对外部力量侵略任何一个主权国家。而这一原则也正是冷战后那些“人道主义干预”和“自由的帝国主义”的后国家胜利者们所哀悼和致力于改变的。

During the world wars and the Cold War, the United States did not allow its preference for liberal democracy to interfere with its self-interested national strategy. Before and during World War II, the Roosevelt administration pursued a policy of appeasement toward dictatorial regimes in Latin America in the hope of minimizing Axis influence in America’s neighborhood. During the Cold War, the United States pragmatically allied itself with military dictators and royal autocrats in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East as well as with Communist China against the immediate threat of the Soviet Union. Only with the end of the Cold War did the United States push for democratization in South Korea, the Philippines and Latin America—when the geopolitical risk involved in doing so was greatly reduced.

在世界大战和冷战期间，美国也没有让自己偏爱的自由主义民主妨碍到其自私的国家战略。在二战前和期间，罗斯福政府对拉丁美洲的独裁政权实施的是绥靖政策，希望以此最大化的削弱邪恶轴心对美国后院的影响力。而在冷战期间，美国与拉丁美洲、亚洲、非洲、中东以及共产主义中国的军事独裁者和皇家独裁者结盟，以此对抗苏联的威胁。只有在冷战后，美国才在韩国，菲律宾以及拉丁美洲推行民主——因为这时推行民主的地缘政治风险已经大大降低了。


IN ITS ECONOMIC STRATEGY as well as its security strategy, America traditionally has pursued policies of enlightened, self-interested nationalism. Many otherwise educated people today believe that the United States has always championed free trade and free markets. Nothing could be further from the truth.

在经济和防卫战略方面，传统意义上美国追求开明的自我利益为中心的民族主义政策。今天很多其他知识分子认为美国一直在捍卫自由贸易和自由市场。除此之外都是假的。

From America’s founding until World War II, the country used tariffs not only for revenue but also to protect “infant industries” from competition with exports from industrial rivals like Britain. In its rise from a postcolonial agrarian backwater to the world’s leading industrial power, the United States successfully used protectionism (in the form of tariffs), state capitalism (for example, subsidies to the private contractors who built the transcontinental railroad), and public research and development (such as government-funded research for the telegraph, agriculture and aviation). During this period, free trade was chiefly championed by the agrarians of the South and West, many of whom would have been content for the United States to specialize as a second-tier, commodity-exporting nation.

从建国后到二战，美国除了把关税作为财政来源而且用于保护“新生工业”，防止受到来自像英国一样的工业化竞争对手出口的冲击。在从一个后殖民时代农业国发展为世界顶尖工业化国家的过程中，美国成功的运用了保护主义（以关税形式），国家资本主义（例如对承建跨大陆铁路的私人承包商提供补贴）以及公共研究和发展等手段（例如政府投资研究电报机、农业和航空产品）。在这一时期，主要是南部和西部的农场主们捍卫了自由贸易。他们中很多人本就满足于美国的政策，使美国专注于成为第二流的商品出口国。


America’s repudiation of free-market ideology in favor of an American version of the developmental capitalist state extended to the intellectual sphere. To justify government policies to help U.S. industry catch up with British industry, American nationalists in the tradition of Alexander Hamilton and Henry Clay contrasted the “American School” of “national economy” with the “English School” of free-market liberalism. As an exile in the United States, the German liberal nationalist Friedrich List absorbed American nationalist economic doctrines and publicized them in Europe. Thanks partly to List, the American model of economic nationalism inspired the state-sponsored industrialization of Bismarck’s Germany and Meiji Japan, as well as economic nationalists in other countries.

美国拒绝自由市场思想的同时支持建立一种美国版的资本主义发展模式，并延伸到知识领域。为了更好地解释政策如何帮助美国工业赶超英国，包括汉密尔顿和克莱在内的美国传统民族主义者将“国家经济主义”的“美国学院”与自由市场主义的“英国学院”进行了对比。作为来到美国的流亡者，德国自由民族主义者李斯特对美国民族主义经济规律进行了研究，并且撰写文章在欧洲发表。部分归功于李斯特，美国模式的民族经济鼓舞了德国和日本以及其他国家的民族主义经济的发展。

Having successfully used protectionism and state capitalism to industrialize the United States behind a wall of tariffs, the U.S. government then adopted a different—but equally self-interested—strategy of reciprocal trade liberalization in the first half of the twentieth century. By that time, America’s powerful, mature industries were better served by a federal policy of seeking to open foreign consumer markets than by further protection from import competition. America was now ready to battle the other industrial powers for market share in their own markets. To the distress of British and French imperialists, the United States used its power and wealth after World War II to force the rapid dismantling of colonial empires and their replacement with an integrated global economy centered on New York and Washington, DC. As Britain had done in the 1840s, the United States became a champion of free trade only in the 1940s, when its industrial supremacy seemed assured.

将保护主义和国家资本主义手段的成功运用使美国在关税保护下实现了工业化。在20世纪上半叶，美国政府实施了一种不完全以自我利益为中心的战略，实现互惠的贸易自由化。当时，美国强大而又成熟的工业企业受惠于优越的联邦政策，寻求占领开放的国外消费市场而又不对进口过度保护。使得美国企业做好了与其他列强的竞争准备，在他们国家的市场中觅得一席之地。令英法帝国主义国家沮丧的是，美国利用其实力和财富在二战后迫使他们的殖民帝国迅速瓦解，实现了以纽约和华盛顿为中心的全球一体化经济。正如英国十九世纪40年代一样，当美国在二十世纪40年代工业霸主地位似乎已成为定势，从此成为自由贸易的领袖。


IF ENLIGHTENED LIBERAL NATIONALISM served the country so well for two centuries, how is it that “nationalism”—including American nationalism—is now frequently identified as the evil that all right-minded Americans are supposed to oppose?

如果开明的自由民族主义为这个国家服务了两个多世纪，那么这种“民族主义”——包括美国的民族主义——现在是怎样经常被有正义感的美国人当成邪恶的东西呢？

In hindsight, the shift from American liberal nationalism to American postnationalism took place between the Nixon and Clinton administrations. A case can be made that Nixonian nationalism represented the makings of an alternate grand strategy that was ultimately rejected.

随后，在尼克松和克林顿在任期间，美国的自由民族主义也在向后民族主义转变。事实证明以尼克松式民族主义为代表的另一个伟大战略最终被否决。

What I am calling Nixonian nationalism was a response to the perception of American military overextension and relative economic decline. Like Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon sought to wind down an unpopular, expensive proxy war with the Soviets in Asia begun under Democratic predecessors. In his inaugural address, John F. Kennedy had declared, “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” Nixon implicitly rejected Kennedy’s grandiose vision. Instead, Nixon sought to achieve security at a reduced cost by means of détente—a divide-and-rule strategy, pitting China against the Soviet Union—and the “Nixon Doctrine,” according to which America’s client states and allies would be expected to do their own fighting, rather than relying on American soldiers to fight their battles for them. In his address to the nation on the war in Vietnam of November 3, 1969, Nixon declared:

我所说的尼克松式的民族主义是由美国军事过度扩张和与经济相对衰退这一认知产生的。与艾森豪威尔一样，理查德·尼克松试图逐步结束由民主党前辈们发动的在亚洲与苏联的那场不得人心且耗费巨大的傀儡战争。约翰·肯尼迪在他的就职宣誓典礼上就曾发表宣言，“我要让每一个国家，无论他们对我们抱着善意还是敌意，我们将付出所有代价、担负所有责任、面对所有艰难、支持所有朋友，对抗所有敌人，来确保自由的生存与成功。”尼克松委婉地拒绝肯尼迪的宏伟愿景。并力图通过改善国际关系——一种“分而治之”的政策，用中国来对抗苏联——和“尼克松主义”，以更小的代价来确保国家安全。根据尼克松主义，美国的附庸国家和盟国将自己为自己国家作战，而不是依靠美国的士兵为他们作战。在1969年，11月3日，尼克松对越南战争的国家发表讲话中宣布：

In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

如果遭受了其他形式的侵略，我们将根据协议承诺为那些请求帮助的国家提供军事和经济援助。但是我们希望那些受到直接威胁的国家能够承担起提供作战人员的主要责任。


Like his security strategy, Nixon’s economic strategy put the American national interest first. During the 1950s and 1960s, following the loss of Japan’s Chinese market and Germany’s Eastern European and Russian markets, the United States unilaterally opened its prosperous market to help its Cold War allies and protectorates export their way to recovery, while turning a blind eye to mercantilist policies that discriminated against American exporters or investors. By the Nixon years, however, the costs of this generous policy were apparent. Japan and West Germany had recovered, and the United States was beginning to run the chronic merchandise trade deficits that continue to this day.

和他的安全策略一样，尼克松的经济策略将美国的国家利益放在了第一位。在20世纪五六十年代期间，随着日本失去了中国市场，德国失去了东欧市场及俄国市场，美国为了帮助冷战同盟及它的受保护国家恢复经济单方面打开了繁荣的美国市场，与此同时，又对歧视美国出口商和投资者的重商主义视而不见。然而，在尼克松在任期间，这种慷慨的政策所付出的代价也是相当大的。日本和德国的经济恢复了，但是美国却开始陷入商品贸易赤字困局，直至今天仍是如此。

The Nixon administration responded by trying to defend the interests of American industry, by means of policies that included delinking the dollar from gold and imposing quotas on Japanese imports. Whatever the merits of these particular measures, they illustrated a recognition that the post-1945 policy of sacrificing national economic interests for the purpose of holding together Cold War alliances allowed free-riding trading partners to prosper at America’s expense.

为了捍卫美国产业的利益，尼克松在任时做出了回应，通过一些列的政策，包括将美元与黄金脱钩和对日本进口实行配额。不管这些特殊措施的优点是什么，但都表明美国人意识到了1945年后这些为团结冷战盟友而牺牲国家经济利益的政策是以牺牲美国为代价来让贸易伙伴们繁荣的。

Unfortunately, the Nixonian nationalist turn in American security and economic policy did not last. The realpolitik of Nixon and Henry Kissinger was denounced as amoral by many on the left and right alike. On the center-left, Jimmy Carter sought to make the promotion of human rights central to U.S. foreign policy at the price of undermining allies like the shah of Iran and Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza. On the center-right, the neoconservatives—some of them former Democrats—denounced realism as amoral appeasement and argued for a grand strategy of crusades for global democracy, showing a Kennedyesque insouciance toward costs.

不幸的是，尼克松民族主义在美国安防以及经济上没有坚持多久。尼克松和亨利 基辛格的权利政治被左派和右派的人同时指责为不道德。而在中左翼政治领域，吉米 卡特致力于将人权作为美国外交政策的中心，但这样做的代价是会削弱美国与盟友的关系，比如伊朗国王和尼阿拉瓜的摩索查加西亚。而在中右翼政治领域，新保守党表现出了肯尼迪式的漠视代价的苗头——他们中有许多人曾是前民主党派人士——批评现实主义就是姑息不道德，并要求为了全球的民主而采取大胆的行动。


The Reagan administration was divided between neocons and those who might be described as realists, including Vice President George H. W. Bush, James Baker and Brent Scowcroft. In economic policy, too, the Reagan administration was of two minds—defending U.S. manufacturers against Japanese mercantilism while simultaneously preaching free trade and free markets. The one-term administration of George H. W. Bush tilted even more toward realism in its sober and prudent foreign policy. Although he presided over the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, the elder Bush refrained from the American triumphalism that became a staple of neoconservatism and helped inspire the 2003 Iraq War.

里根政府分裂为新保守主义者和现实主义者，这些现实主义者包括副总统乔治 • H•W•布什、詹姆斯•贝克和斯考克罗夫特。在经济政策上，里根政府有两种思维组成——为了保护美国制造商而反对日本重商主义，于此同时又鼓吹自由贸易和自由市场。 乔治 • H•W• 布什那一届政府更倾向于采取现实主义的冷静和审慎的外交政策。虽然他主导了冷战结束和苏联解体，老布什并不具备美国必胜的信念，而美国必胜信念是新保守主义的主要产物并怂恿了2003年的伊拉克战争。

American realism went into decline in the 1990s, largely because an increasingly favorable global environment altered the calculation of costs and benefits. Nixonian nationalism had been the policy of an embattled United States confronted by rising powers—an increasingly sophisticated and assertive Soviet Union and China in the security realm, and increasingly competitive trade rivals in Japan and West Germany. In the 1990s, both security and trade threats temporarily receded. The Soviet Union collapsed. Post-Maoist China was viewed as a huge potential consumer market for American corporations, rather than as a serious rival. The puncturing of the Japanese real-estate and stock-market bubbles plunged the Japanese economy into decades of stagnation. Germany was plagued by a decade of slow growth because of the costs of absorbing the former East Germany.

美国的现实主义在上世纪90年代出现衰弱，很大程度上是因为越来越有利的全球环境改变了成本和收益的算计。在被新兴大国包围的情况下，美国采用的政策是尼克松的民族主义政策——在安全领域上来自于苏联和中国，而在贸易领域里，竞争对手主要是日本和西德 。而到了90年代，来自于安全和贸易的威胁暂时消退。苏联解体了。后毛时代的中国被美国公司视为一个巨大的潜在消费市场而非强劲的竞争对手。日本房地产崩盘和股市泡沫的破灭使日本经济陷入了数十年的停滞。而德国为吸收前东德地区付出了代价，遭受了十年的缓慢经济增长 。


Meanwhile, the United States was the sole remaining superpower and the initial beneficiary of the information-technology revolution, identified with Silicon Valley. The ease with which the United States defeated the armed forces of Saddam Hussein and the Serbs in the Balkans added to the giddy triumphalism of America’s foreign-policy elites. Talk of the limits of American power—and of the need to balance commitments against resources—was seen as passé. It became an article of faith that Washington could afford quick, high-tech and relatively bloodless wars to promote democracy and human rights, like the Gulf War and the Balkan wars. At the same time, the Nixon-era concern about predatory trade and currency policies by other countries gave way, in the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, to complacency about foreign mercantilism.

同时，美国成为现存的唯一超级大国和以矽谷为代表的信息化革命的最初受益者。轻松打败萨达姆和塞尔维亚令美国外交政策精英们信心爆棚。限制美国的势力以及平衡能源需要的言论似乎是陈腐之谈。华盛顿能够通过像海湾战争和巴尔干战争一样高科技闪电战以及流血相对较少的战争来推动民主和人权发展，这成为了一种信条。与此同时尼克松时代有关其他国家会实施掠夺性贸易和货币政策的担忧也烟消云散，取而代之的是克林顿和小布什政府对外国重商主义的自鸣得意。

THE POST–COLD WAR GRAND STRATEGY of American global hegemony, shared by mainstream elites in both parties, was buttressed by a new ideology of postnational globalism. Unlike the old-fashioned internationalism of Wilson and Roosevelt, the new postnationalism argued that the American national interest and the interest of humanity were one and the same.

冷战后美国两党主流精英们共同倡导的全球霸权大战略得到后民族全球主义主义新观念的支撑。与威尔逊和罗斯福倡导的老式国际主义不同，新的后民族主义认为美国的国家利益和人类利益同为一体。

In U.S. national-security policy, the new postnationalism meant rejecting America’s traditional support for national self-determination in favor of a policy of freezing arbitrary, European-drawn colonial borders forever. The United States initially opposed the breakup of the Soviet Union, the partition of Yugoslavia, the secession of Eritrea and the division of Sudan. American policy makers did not seriously consider the partition of Iraq or Afghanistan, arbitrary territorial states that combine antagonistic nationalities.

在美国国家安全策略中，新的后民族主义意味着美国不再像以前那样支持国家的自我裁决，而是支持永远保留欧洲之前随意划定的殖民地范围。美国最初反对苏联、南斯拉夫、厄立特里亚以及苏丹的解体和分裂。美国的政策制定者们也没有仔细考虑过要去分裂伊拉克或阿富汗，这两个都是专制的地域性国家，国内都含有对抗性的民族。


While the new postnationalists reflexively opposed the redrawing of borders and national secessionist movements, they favored weakening state sovereignty to legitimate U.S. bombings, invasions and other forms of intervention. Postnationalists called for a new norm in which the United States and its allies could annul state sovereignty at will, not only in cases in which governments sought to carry out genocide (as in the post–World War II United Nations system) but also in cases in which a government failed to carry out its “responsibility to protect” (R2P) its citizens. The R2P doctrine had the potential to serve as a hunting license for the United States and its dependent allies to intervene militarily in purely internal conflicts unrelated either to genocide or cross-border aggression. This was postnationalism, not internationalism.

新的后民族主义者反对重新划定边界和国家分裂运动的同时，他们却倾向于削弱国家主权以赋予美国轰炸、入侵以及其他形式的干预以合法性。后民族主义号召建立令美国及其盟友可以随意废除其他国家主权的新规则，不仅当这些国家实施了大屠杀（正如二战后联合国的运作方式）之时，而且在这些国家没能尽到公民的“保护责任”时。“保护责任”规则成为的潜在通行证，使美国及其盟友们能对那些没有实施大屠杀或越境侵略行为的国家进行军事干预。这就是后民族主义，而不是国际主义。

In trade policy, postnationalists favored continuing and extending America’s Cold War policy of unilateral free trade—allowing other countries like China access to America’s market, even if they used various mercantilist techniques to keep American goods and services out of their own. Critics of foreign mercantilism were marginalized and derided as protectionists.

在贸易政策方面，后民族主义者提倡继续并延伸美国冷战时期的单边自由贸易政策，允许像中国一样的其他国家进入美国市场，即使他们会利用各种商业手段排斥美国产品和服务进入他们的国家。对外商业政策方面的批评声往往被边缘化并且被嘲笑为保护主义。

In immigration policy, the refusal of presidents and members of Congress of both parties to enforce immigration law seriously created a de facto open-borders policy in which the number of illegal immigrants ballooned to more than ten million. At the same time, the traditional idea of the melting pot was abandoned for “multiculturalism”—the notion that the United States was not a diverse nation-state, but rather a collection of separate ethnically or racially defined nations. Not only radical leftists but also centrist pundits compared immigration limits to racial segregation. The traditional American idea that immigrants should be expected to assimilate to the American majority’s language and culture in time was often stigmatized as repressive and illiberal.

在移民政策方面，总统和两党的国会议员们拒绝强化移民法，实际上形成了边境开放，导致非法移民数量迅速膨胀到一千多万。与此同时，传统的熔炉思想被“文化多元化”所替代。“文化多元化”意味着美国不是丰富多彩的单一民族国家，而是各个种族或者民族国家的集合体。无论左派种族主义者还是中间派人士都将限制移民比作种族隔离。传统的美国理念希望移民融入美国主流语言和文化，最后总被指责为带有压迫性和过于狭隘。


This new postnationalist consensus, however, was found only among the American elite, not among the general public, who, except during the brief panic following 9/11, remained suspicious of foreign wars, supportive of policies to defend American manufacturing industries and hostile to illegal immigration.
然而，这种新型后民族主义共识仅存在于美国精英阶层当中，而并非普通大众，民众们经历了911带来的短暂恐慌，仍然对海外战争存有疑虑，支持捍卫美国制造业的政策并且敌视非法移民。

The appeal of the post–Cold War American hegemony strategy had rested on the widespread belief that Washington enjoyed overwhelming advantages in military power and economic strength. The U.S. military was so advanced and powerful, the thinking went, that the United States could police the world and intervene in local conflict after local conflict in which it had little or no stake at minimal cost in American lives and dollars. And America was so rich, or so it was often assumed, that it could easily shed “old” industries like manufacturing for new “sunrise” industries like software, even as it easily absorbed huge numbers of poor, low-skilled immigrants.

冷战后美国霸权战略的吸引力是基于这样一种广泛的观念，即美国在军事力量和经济实力方面的具有压倒性的优势。这种观念认为美军如此先进如此强大，以至于美国能够统治全世界，并且以微小的人员和经济代价干预一个又一个地区冲突，尽管这些地区与美国一点关系都没有。并且人们总是设想，美国如此富有，可以轻易摒弃掉类似制造业一类的“陈旧”工业，取而代之的是诸如软件业一类的新兴“朝阳”产业，正如美国可以轻易地吸收大量贫穷的低技能移民。

By the second decade of the twenty-first century, the post–Cold War fantasy of limitless American power collided with reality, in the form of the Iraq and Afghan wars, the Great Recession and—most important of all—the rise of China. Of all the trends forcing a reconsideration of the fashionable postnationalist consensus, none may be of greater significance than the rise of China as both an economic and military power. In the 1990s, optimists predicted that China’s entry into the world economy would lead the world’s most populous nation to adopt free-market capitalism and multiparty democracy. Not so. On both the economic and strategic fronts, China has grown more aggressive in recent years—taking a harsher line with foreign corporations and alarming Japan and other neighbors by means of a military buildup and attempts at unilateral redefinition of its regional security prerogatives.

21世纪第二个十年，冷战后美国具有无限实力的幻想与现实产生碰撞，体现在伊拉克和阿富汗战争、经济大萧条以及最重要的是中国的崛起中。在所有迫使美国重新思考一贯流行的后民族主义共识的趋势中，中国在经济和军事方面崛起无疑是最重要的考量因素。90年代，乐观主义者预计中国加入世界经济圈意味着这个世界上人口最多的国家将接受自由市场资本主义和多党民主。事实并非如此。近些年中国在经济和战略前沿的发展都表现得更具有进攻性，包括：对外国企业采取更严格的管控措施，通过军事建设和企图重新划定单边区域安全边界来警告日本和其他邻邦。


As a giant nation-state, the United States has enjoyed significant advantages over medium-sized nation-states whose hopes for enduring great-power status depended on possessing foreign empires, like Britain, France, Germany, Japan and Russia. Likewise, the United States is not threatened by the feeble, multiheaded hydra of the European Union, even if on paper the EU rivals America in population and GDP. And with the exception of China, the other countries that will have the greatest populations in the generations ahead, such as India, Nigeria and Pakistan, are multinational agglomerations, some or all of which in the future might split into more homogeneous successor nation-states. Only China rivals America in combining a majority population whose members share a strong sense of common national identity with a huge domestic market and a high level of industrialization. The fact that China has surpassed the United States already as the world’s leading manufacturing power—and will soon surpass it in total GDP—makes the triumphalist American vision of a unipolar world in which other great powers like China forever accept the subordinate status of American Cold War satellites like Japan and the former West Germany appear even more delusional.

作为一个民族国家，相对于其他中型民族国家而言，美国拥有巨大的优势，这些中型国家要想维持大国的地位就得建立强大的跨国帝国，比如英国，法国，英国，日本以及俄罗斯。同样的，美国并不受到微弱的欧盟所威胁，尽管纸面上欧盟在人口和GDP方面可与美国匹敌。除了中国以外，那些拥有众多人口的国家，比如印度，尼日利亚，巴基斯坦，都是多民族的结合体，其中的有些国家或者说全部在未来很有可能分裂成同质的单一民族国家。只有中国在多数人口上可与美国匹敌，中国的这些多数人口共享强烈的民族认同感，而且国内市场巨大，具备高度的工业化水平。中国已经超越美国成为世界最大的制造业国家，也将在GDP总量上超越美国，所以，要想中国像冷战时期德日那样服从美国领导，这免费也太过痴心妄想。

When confronted with any challenge to their newly minted orthodoxy, postnationalists often try to foreclose debate by claiming that the only alternative to their grand strategy of American hegemony is retreat into the bad old days of isolationism, protectionism and nativism. But one can reject the project of a hugely expensive American global hegemony without favoring a return to pre–World War II isolation. Likewise, one can reject the policy of allowing other industrial nations to export their way to riches and military power by exploiting one-way access to the American consumer market and U.S. technological innovations without favoring a revival of nineteenth-century infant industry tariffs. And one can reject the combination of lax immigration enforcement with multiculturalism without embracing xenophobia or rejecting immigration tout court.

当新的经典理论遭遇挑战时，后民族主义者总是试图平息争论，宣称实现美国霸权的伟大战略的唯一替代选择就是退回到旧时的孤立主义、保护主义和本土主义。然而拒绝美国昂贵的全球霸权计划，并不需要回到二战前的孤立状态；同样的，人们可以选择不用恢复19世纪的新生工业关税制度，而拒绝那种允许其他工业国家通过单方面出口美国消费市场换得经济和军事发展的政策；人们可以选择不支持排外思想或排斥移民的政策，而拒绝带有文化多元化的宽松移民政策。


A new strategy of enlightened nationalism would revive the Nixon-era themes of shifting more of the burden of defense to America’s allies and clients and treating the country’s remaining manufacturing industries as national-security assets to be defended against foreign mercantilist assault, not as bribes to be given away to American allies and protectorates.

一种新型进步的民族主义战略将复兴尼克松时代的主题，将更多的防御重任转移给美国的盟友和附属国，将现存的制造企业作为国家保护资产来对待，防止受到国外重商主义者的攻击，而不把这些作为利诱给予美国的盟友和受保护国。

INSTEAD OF SEEKING GLOBAL HEGEMONY, the United States should seek what Samuel P. Huntington called primacy, as the primus inter pares in a world of multiple great powers. The hegemony strategy is based on the idea that the best way for the country to prevent hostile hegemons from dominating Europe, Asia and the Middle East is for the United States itself to be the hegemon of Europe, the hegemon of Asia and the hegemon of the Middle East. The hegemony strategy not only permits but also encourages free riding by America’s European and Asian allies, which, relieved of much of the burden of defense spending, can devote greater resources to investment in economy-growing infrastructure, civilian industry and generous social-welfare spending.

与寻求全球霸权相反，美国应当追求亨廷顿所谓的领先地位，即成为多极世界中的领头人。霸权战略的中心思想是如果想阻止某些富有敌意的霸权国家统治欧洲、亚洲和中东的话，那么美国自己就要成为这些地区的霸权国家。霸权战略不仅允许而且鼓励美国在欧洲和亚洲的盟友们投机取巧，从而减轻了这些国家的大部分国防开支负担，这些盟友们从而能够将更多的资源投入到促进经济增长的基础建设、民用产业和慷慨的社会福利中去。



论美国的民族主义
The Case for American Nationalism

http://nationalinterest.org/arti ... ism-10297?page=show
正文翻译:龙腾


THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAS lost its mind. To put it more precisely, the United States has lost its collective institutional memory. America achieved its present global preeminence by means of values and strategies that Washington’s current bipartisan elite chooses to repress from memory or actively stigmatize. Foremost among the repressed memories in what Gore Vidal called the United States of Amnesia is nationalism—including self-confident, unapologetic American nationalism.

美国失去理智了。更准确点说，美国已经丧失了自己的集体制度性记忆。通过现有两党精英不愿面对和积极污蔑的价值观和战略思想，使得美国奠定了在现今世界上的杰出地位。正如戈尔韦达尔所提到，在所有美国健忘症中最被压抑的要数国家主义了——这样的国家主义包含了自信的却又死不认错的美国民族主义精神。

Until recently, the United States was both the modern liberal nation-state par excellence and the major champion of national self-determination around the world. The country owed its very existence to a war of national liberation from the British Empire. Subsequently, the United States preserved its existence in the Civil War by crushing the South’s attempt to secede from the American nation-state. At the same time, long before Woodrow Wilson included the principle of national self-determination in his Fourteen Points address and Franklin Roosevelt invoked it in the Atlantic Charter, Americans championed the right of ethnocultural nations to secede from multinational empires and form their own (preferably, but not necessarily, democratic) nation-states.

直到最近，美国仍是最卓越的现代自由主义民族国家，也是拥有最大自决权的民族国家。美国的存在归功于脱离大英帝国的独立战争。之后，美国通过南北战争覆灭了南方脱离联邦的企图，从而延续了自身的存在。同时，早在威尔逊关于国家自主决策十四点内容的就职演说以及罗斯福的大西洋宪章的民族自决权内容之前，美国人就已经支持民族国家要从跨国帝国中脱离出来并形成自己的民族国家（最好是形成民主的国家，但也不一定非要如此）。


Americans gave moral and rhetorical, though not material, support to Latin Americans who broke away from colonial-era Spain, to Greek patriots opposing the Ottoman Empire, and to the Poles and other rebellious nations in the revolutions of 1848. Americans had scant respect for the British Empire they had exited. They failed to conquer Canada in the War of 1812, but through much of the nineteenth century it was hoped that Canadians would one day voluntarily join the United States. During the two world wars, America championed the rights of small nations against empires—including its imperial allies like Britain—and during the Cold War Americans sympathized with the “captive nations” of the Soviet bloc.

美国为拉丁美洲脱离西班牙殖民统治提供了道义和言论支持（虽然没有物质帮助），为希腊抗击奥斯曼帝国提供支持，为1848革命中年波兰和其他国家的反压迫革命提供帮助。美国对被自己赶走的大英帝国缺乏敬意。虽然没能在1812年战争中夺取加拿大，但整个19世纪期间人们普遍相信加拿大有朝一日会自愿加入美国联邦。在两次世界大战中，美国捍卫了小国家抵抗帝国主义（包括其帝国盟友英国）的权利，在冷战中美国也非常体恤受到苏联“奴役的国家”。

At the same time, the United States practiced the liberal nationalism that it preached. In its security strategy, Washington for most of its history has been guided by self-interested nationalism. By means of the Louisiana Purchase, the Mexican-American War and the defeat of Southern secession, America’s leaders ensured that North America, which for centuries had been a battleground for European empires, would henceforth be dominated by a regional hegemon. As John Mearsheimer has observed, the United States, while jealously guarding its own regional hegemony in North America, ensured that no other great power would be able to enjoy a similar status in Europe or Asia.

与此同时，美国积极实践其宣讲的自由国家主义。在其防卫战略中，美国政府在其大部分历史时间里崇尚自我利益为中心的民族主义。通过购买路易斯安那、美墨战争以及南北战争，美国领导人将数百年来一直作为欧洲帝国主义战场的北美变成以美国为霸权的地区。正如米尔斯所看到的，美国一方面确立了自己在北美的霸权，同时又阻止其他任何强权在欧洲或者亚洲确立类似的霸权。


Since the end of the Cold War, however, the United States has abandoned enlightened nationalism in order to pursue permanent American global hegemony while preaching a new doctrine of postnationalism. This grand strategy has undermined the very morality, liberty and security it was supposed to enhance. And so, after several misconceived wars and interventions, Washington must repudiate its post–Cold War commitment to global hegemony and the ideology of postnationalism that justifies it, and it must embark upon a wholesale revision of military, trade and immigration policy in the national interest. None of these measures would endanger world order or subvert American ideals. Rather, they would enhance them. It is time, in short, for a new nationalism.

然而，从冷战结束起，美国为追求永久的全球性霸权，便摒弃了具有进步性的国家主义，而宣讲一种新的后国家主义教条思想。这种宏大的战略恰恰破坏了本应得到弘扬的道德、自由和防卫理念。因此在经历数场错误的战争和军事冲突后，美国政府必须批判其冷战后的全球霸权主义和后国家主义思想，必须为了国家利益对军事、贸易以及移民政策方面做出全面修整。这些做法将不会威胁世界秩序或颠覆美国人的理想。反而会起到促进作用。总之是时候应当建立新的民族主义思想了。

FOR MUCH OF ITS HISTORY, Washington has pursued a security strategy by means that look more like cold, calculating nationalism than crusading idealism. In both world wars, the United States assumed the role of an “offshore balancer,” allowing its allies to suffer tremendous losses of life and wealth before belatedly entering the conflict to tip the balance at a minimum cost in American blood and treasure. With the exception of the wars in Korea and Vietnam, the United States waged the Cold War on the cheap, preferring to subsidize and advise enemies of Communist regimes while using embargoes and arms races to bankrupt the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union may have spent up to a third of its GDP on the military, America during the Cold War never spent more than around 15 percent, even at the height of the war in Korea; it never mobilized its peacetime industries; and it never adopted a universal draft, relying instead on a limited “selective service” lottery draft. The losses of life in Korea and Vietnam, horrifically disproportionate to the strategic value of the objectives as they may have been, were extremely limited compared to the price paid by the United States for victory in the wars with Germany—a price which, in turn, was much lower than that paid by the other great powers in the world wars.

纵观美国历史，美国政府一直在追求的防卫战略是比劳师远征更加冷酷又精于算计的民族主义思想。在两次世界大战中，美国都起到了“离岸平衡主义”的作用，在其盟友经历了巨大的人员和财产损失后，才缓慢地加入战局从而利用最小的牺牲和代价打破了战争平衡。除了朝鲜和越南战争直接出兵外，美国在冷战期间只是向共产主义政权的敌对方提供了少量物质帮助和顾问，而利用禁运和军备竞赛便拖垮了苏联。当苏联投入GDP的三分之一用于发展军事时，美国的军备投入从未超过GDP的15%。即使在朝鲜战争达到最顶峰之时，美国也从未动摇过其和平时期的产业发展。从未采取过普遍兵役制，而仅依赖于有限的“选拔”制兵役。在朝鲜和越南战争中的人员损失与所实现的战略价值远不成比例，与美国在二战中与德国作战付出的牺牲也无法比拟，而相应的二战中美国遭受的损失与其他大国相比更是微乎其微。


Cold War America, like America during the world wars, championed the right of national self-determination of small nations like those of Eastern Europe and Taiwan against regional empires, in order to undermine the legitimacy of its Soviet and Chinese rivals. Indeed, during most of the past century, the United States made national self-determination a higher priority than democracy.

正如世界大战中的美国，冷战中的美国为了破坏其对手中国和苏联执政的合法性，支持一些像东欧、台湾这样的小地方行使民族自决权以对抗地区霸权。实际上，在过去的近百年间，美国将民族自决而不是民主放在了首要位置。

This approach was encoded in the fifth of Wilson’s Fourteen Points. To a greater extent than has usually been acknowledged, it became the DNA of American foreign policy. Wilson demanded
a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty. The interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

这种手段反映在威尔逊的《十四点和平原则》的第五条里。而实际上，这一条成为了美国外交政策的核心。威尔逊倡导对所有殖民地的请求做出一个自由的、开放的、公正的调整，这种调整是建立在在解决主权问题时严格遵守此条原则的基础之上。其中涉及到的人民的利益必须与那些尚不知归属的政府的公平诉求占有同样的重要性。

Free elections everywhere in the world are not mentioned in the Fourteen Points. Nor is there any mention of internal democracy in the Atlantic Charter, which declared that all peoples had a right to self-determination in world politics. Franklin Roosevelt also left the right to vote in free elections out of his Four Freedoms. This ranking of priorities did not reflect any hostility to democracy; Wilson and Roosevelt would have agreed that liberal democracy is the best form of government for an independent nation-state. Rather, the emphasis on national independence rather than internal democracy reflected the recognition that a world of many sovereign nation-states, most of which are small and weak, is safer for the United States than a world of a few powerful multinational empires.

《十四点和平原则》中并未提及世界各地的选举自由。《大西洋宪章》中也没有提及内部民主，但提到所有民族在世界政治事务中均享有的民族自决权。富兰克林·罗斯福同样的也并未将选举自由列入他的四大自由中。这种排名的优先并不是对民主的敌意；恰恰相反，威尔逊和罗斯福会认为自由民主对独立国家而言是最好的民主形式。但是，美国对民族独立而非内部民主的强调表明了对美国而言，一个充满主权国家（大多数都是弱小的国家）的世界比一个拥有少数几个强大的跨国帝国的世界来说更安全。


Neither Woodrow Wilson nor Franklin Roosevelt was a postnational globalist in the contemporary sense. Quite the contrary. They were both old-fashioned liberal nationalists in the tradition of Giuseppe Mazzini, John Stuart Mill and William Gladstone, for whom international organizations were intended to coordinate—not replace—sovereign nation-states. After all, the word “nations” is found in the titles of the international organizations they founded. The League of Nations was not the League of Citizens of the World, just as the United Nations is not United Humanity.

伍德罗威尔逊和富兰克林罗斯福都并非现代意义上的后民族全球主义者。恰恰相反，两人是老派的自由主义民族主义者，具有朱塞佩马志尼（意大利政治思想家，作家，革命家）、约翰斯图尔特密尔以及威廉葛莱斯顿等人的特征。对于这些人来说，国际组织并非用来替代主权国家，而是用来协调主权国家的。毕竟，在她们所成立的国际性组织的名称中我们依然可以找到“nation"(国家）这个字眼。比如，”国际联盟“（英文中含有“国家”字眼），而非”世界公民联盟“，就好比”联合国“，而非“联合人类”。

The Nuremberg trials and the UN Charter focused on banning not only genocide but also “aggressive war.” Indeed, the central norm of the United Nations is the norm against the violation of state sovereignty by outside powers—a norm that postnational champions of “humanitarian intervention” and “liberal imperialism” lamented and sought to alter in the Cold War’s aftermath.

纽伦堡审判和联合国宪章不仅要禁止大屠杀，还要禁止“侵略战争”。确实，联合国的核心原则就是反对外部力量侵略任何一个主权国家。而这一原则也正是冷战后那些“人道主义干预”和“自由的帝国主义”的后国家胜利者们所哀悼和致力于改变的。

During the world wars and the Cold War, the United States did not allow its preference for liberal democracy to interfere with its self-interested national strategy. Before and during World War II, the Roosevelt administration pursued a policy of appeasement toward dictatorial regimes in Latin America in the hope of minimizing Axis influence in America’s neighborhood. During the Cold War, the United States pragmatically allied itself with military dictators and royal autocrats in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East as well as with Communist China against the immediate threat of the Soviet Union. Only with the end of the Cold War did the United States push for democratization in South Korea, the Philippines and Latin America—when the geopolitical risk involved in doing so was greatly reduced.

在世界大战和冷战期间，美国也没有让自己偏爱的自由主义民主妨碍到其自私的国家战略。在二战前和期间，罗斯福政府对拉丁美洲的独裁政权实施的是绥靖政策，希望以此最大化的削弱邪恶轴心对美国后院的影响力。而在冷战期间，美国与拉丁美洲、亚洲、非洲、中东以及共产主义中国的军事独裁者和皇家独裁者结盟，以此对抗苏联的威胁。只有在冷战后，美国才在韩国，菲律宾以及拉丁美洲推行民主——因为这时推行民主的地缘政治风险已经大大降低了。


IN ITS ECONOMIC STRATEGY as well as its security strategy, America traditionally has pursued policies of enlightened, self-interested nationalism. Many otherwise educated people today believe that the United States has always championed free trade and free markets. Nothing could be further from the truth.

在经济和防卫战略方面，传统意义上美国追求开明的自我利益为中心的民族主义政策。今天很多其他知识分子认为美国一直在捍卫自由贸易和自由市场。除此之外都是假的。

From America’s founding until World War II, the country used tariffs not only for revenue but also to protect “infant industries” from competition with exports from industrial rivals like Britain. In its rise from a postcolonial agrarian backwater to the world’s leading industrial power, the United States successfully used protectionism (in the form of tariffs), state capitalism (for example, subsidies to the private contractors who built the transcontinental railroad), and public research and development (such as government-funded research for the telegraph, agriculture and aviation). During this period, free trade was chiefly championed by the agrarians of the South and West, many of whom would have been content for the United States to specialize as a second-tier, commodity-exporting nation.

从建国后到二战，美国除了把关税作为财政来源而且用于保护“新生工业”，防止受到来自像英国一样的工业化竞争对手出口的冲击。在从一个后殖民时代农业国发展为世界顶尖工业化国家的过程中，美国成功的运用了保护主义（以关税形式），国家资本主义（例如对承建跨大陆铁路的私人承包商提供补贴）以及公共研究和发展等手段（例如政府投资研究电报机、农业和航空产品）。在这一时期，主要是南部和西部的农场主们捍卫了自由贸易。他们中很多人本就满足于美国的政策，使美国专注于成为第二流的商品出口国。


America’s repudiation of free-market ideology in favor of an American version of the developmental capitalist state extended to the intellectual sphere. To justify government policies to help U.S. industry catch up with British industry, American nationalists in the tradition of Alexander Hamilton and Henry Clay contrasted the “American School” of “national economy” with the “English School” of free-market liberalism. As an exile in the United States, the German liberal nationalist Friedrich List absorbed American nationalist economic doctrines and publicized them in Europe. Thanks partly to List, the American model of economic nationalism inspired the state-sponsored industrialization of Bismarck’s Germany and Meiji Japan, as well as economic nationalists in other countries.

美国拒绝自由市场思想的同时支持建立一种美国版的资本主义发展模式，并延伸到知识领域。为了更好地解释政策如何帮助美国工业赶超英国，包括汉密尔顿和克莱在内的美国传统民族主义者将“国家经济主义”的“美国学院”与自由市场主义的“英国学院”进行了对比。作为来到美国的流亡者，德国自由民族主义者李斯特对美国民族主义经济规律进行了研究，并且撰写文章在欧洲发表。部分归功于李斯特，美国模式的民族经济鼓舞了德国和日本以及其他国家的民族主义经济的发展。

Having successfully used protectionism and state capitalism to industrialize the United States behind a wall of tariffs, the U.S. government then adopted a different—but equally self-interested—strategy of reciprocal trade liberalization in the first half of the twentieth century. By that time, America’s powerful, mature industries were better served by a federal policy of seeking to open foreign consumer markets than by further protection from import competition. America was now ready to battle the other industrial powers for market share in their own markets. To the distress of British and French imperialists, the United States used its power and wealth after World War II to force the rapid dismantling of colonial empires and their replacement with an integrated global economy centered on New York and Washington, DC. As Britain had done in the 1840s, the United States became a champion of free trade only in the 1940s, when its industrial supremacy seemed assured.

将保护主义和国家资本主义手段的成功运用使美国在关税保护下实现了工业化。在20世纪上半叶，美国政府实施了一种不完全以自我利益为中心的战略，实现互惠的贸易自由化。当时，美国强大而又成熟的工业企业受惠于优越的联邦政策，寻求占领开放的国外消费市场而又不对进口过度保护。使得美国企业做好了与其他列强的竞争准备，在他们国家的市场中觅得一席之地。令英法帝国主义国家沮丧的是，美国利用其实力和财富在二战后迫使他们的殖民帝国迅速瓦解，实现了以纽约和华盛顿为中心的全球一体化经济。正如英国十九世纪40年代一样，当美国在二十世纪40年代工业霸主地位似乎已成为定势，从此成为自由贸易的领袖。


IF ENLIGHTENED LIBERAL NATIONALISM served the country so well for two centuries, how is it that “nationalism”—including American nationalism—is now frequently identified as the evil that all right-minded Americans are supposed to oppose?

如果开明的自由民族主义为这个国家服务了两个多世纪，那么这种“民族主义”——包括美国的民族主义——现在是怎样经常被有正义感的美国人当成邪恶的东西呢？

In hindsight, the shift from American liberal nationalism to American postnationalism took place between the Nixon and Clinton administrations. A case can be made that Nixonian nationalism represented the makings of an alternate grand strategy that was ultimately rejected.

随后，在尼克松和克林顿在任期间，美国的自由民族主义也在向后民族主义转变。事实证明以尼克松式民族主义为代表的另一个伟大战略最终被否决。

What I am calling Nixonian nationalism was a response to the perception of American military overextension and relative economic decline. Like Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon sought to wind down an unpopular, expensive proxy war with the Soviets in Asia begun under Democratic predecessors. In his inaugural address, John F. Kennedy had declared, “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” Nixon implicitly rejected Kennedy’s grandiose vision. Instead, Nixon sought to achieve security at a reduced cost by means of détente—a divide-and-rule strategy, pitting China against the Soviet Union—and the “Nixon Doctrine,” according to which America’s client states and allies would be expected to do their own fighting, rather than relying on American soldiers to fight their battles for them. In his address to the nation on the war in Vietnam of November 3, 1969, Nixon declared:

我所说的尼克松式的民族主义是由美国军事过度扩张和与经济相对衰退这一认知产生的。与艾森豪威尔一样，理查德·尼克松试图逐步结束由民主党前辈们发动的在亚洲与苏联的那场不得人心且耗费巨大的傀儡战争。约翰·肯尼迪在他的就职宣誓典礼上就曾发表宣言，“我要让每一个国家，无论他们对我们抱着善意还是敌意，我们将付出所有代价、担负所有责任、面对所有艰难、支持所有朋友，对抗所有敌人，来确保自由的生存与成功。”尼克松委婉地拒绝肯尼迪的宏伟愿景。并力图通过改善国际关系——一种“分而治之”的政策，用中国来对抗苏联——和“尼克松主义”，以更小的代价来确保国家安全。根据尼克松主义，美国的附庸国家和盟国将自己为自己国家作战，而不是依靠美国的士兵为他们作战。在1969年，11月3日，尼克松对越南战争的国家发表讲话中宣布：

In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

如果遭受了其他形式的侵略，我们将根据协议承诺为那些请求帮助的国家提供军事和经济援助。但是我们希望那些受到直接威胁的国家能够承担起提供作战人员的主要责任。


Like his security strategy, Nixon’s economic strategy put the American national interest first. During the 1950s and 1960s, following the loss of Japan’s Chinese market and Germany’s Eastern European and Russian markets, the United States unilaterally opened its prosperous market to help its Cold War allies and protectorates export their way to recovery, while turning a blind eye to mercantilist policies that discriminated against American exporters or investors. By the Nixon years, however, the costs of this generous policy were apparent. Japan and West Germany had recovered, and the United States was beginning to run the chronic merchandise trade deficits that continue to this day.

和他的安全策略一样，尼克松的经济策略将美国的国家利益放在了第一位。在20世纪五六十年代期间，随着日本失去了中国市场，德国失去了东欧市场及俄国市场，美国为了帮助冷战同盟及它的受保护国家恢复经济单方面打开了繁荣的美国市场，与此同时，又对歧视美国出口商和投资者的重商主义视而不见。然而，在尼克松在任期间，这种慷慨的政策所付出的代价也是相当大的。日本和德国的经济恢复了，但是美国却开始陷入商品贸易赤字困局，直至今天仍是如此。

The Nixon administration responded by trying to defend the interests of American industry, by means of policies that included delinking the dollar from gold and imposing quotas on Japanese imports. Whatever the merits of these particular measures, they illustrated a recognition that the post-1945 policy of sacrificing national economic interests for the purpose of holding together Cold War alliances allowed free-riding trading partners to prosper at America’s expense.

为了捍卫美国产业的利益，尼克松在任时做出了回应，通过一些列的政策，包括将美元与黄金脱钩和对日本进口实行配额。不管这些特殊措施的优点是什么，但都表明美国人意识到了1945年后这些为团结冷战盟友而牺牲国家经济利益的政策是以牺牲美国为代价来让贸易伙伴们繁荣的。

Unfortunately, the Nixonian nationalist turn in American security and economic policy did not last. The realpolitik of Nixon and Henry Kissinger was denounced as amoral by many on the left and right alike. On the center-left, Jimmy Carter sought to make the promotion of human rights central to U.S. foreign policy at the price of undermining allies like the shah of Iran and Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza. On the center-right, the neoconservatives—some of them former Democrats—denounced realism as amoral appeasement and argued for a grand strategy of crusades for global democracy, showing a Kennedyesque insouciance toward costs.

不幸的是，尼克松民族主义在美国安防以及经济上没有坚持多久。尼克松和亨利 基辛格的权利政治被左派和右派的人同时指责为不道德。而在中左翼政治领域，吉米 卡特致力于将人权作为美国外交政策的中心，但这样做的代价是会削弱美国与盟友的关系，比如伊朗国王和尼阿拉瓜的摩索查加西亚。而在中右翼政治领域，新保守党表现出了肯尼迪式的漠视代价的苗头——他们中有许多人曾是前民主党派人士——批评现实主义就是姑息不道德，并要求为了全球的民主而采取大胆的行动。


The Reagan administration was divided between neocons and those who might be described as realists, including Vice President George H. W. Bush, James Baker and Brent Scowcroft. In economic policy, too, the Reagan administration was of two minds—defending U.S. manufacturers against Japanese mercantilism while simultaneously preaching free trade and free markets. The one-term administration of George H. W. Bush tilted even more toward realism in its sober and prudent foreign policy. Although he presided over the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, the elder Bush refrained from the American triumphalism that became a staple of neoconservatism and helped inspire the 2003 Iraq War.

里根政府分裂为新保守主义者和现实主义者，这些现实主义者包括副总统乔治 • H•W•布什、詹姆斯•贝克和斯考克罗夫特。在经济政策上，里根政府有两种思维组成——为了保护美国制造商而反对日本重商主义，于此同时又鼓吹自由贸易和自由市场。 乔治 • H•W• 布什那一届政府更倾向于采取现实主义的冷静和审慎的外交政策。虽然他主导了冷战结束和苏联解体，老布什并不具备美国必胜的信念，而美国必胜信念是新保守主义的主要产物并怂恿了2003年的伊拉克战争。

American realism went into decline in the 1990s, largely because an increasingly favorable global environment altered the calculation of costs and benefits. Nixonian nationalism had been the policy of an embattled United States confronted by rising powers—an increasingly sophisticated and assertive Soviet Union and China in the security realm, and increasingly competitive trade rivals in Japan and West Germany. In the 1990s, both security and trade threats temporarily receded. The Soviet Union collapsed. Post-Maoist China was viewed as a huge potential consumer market for American corporations, rather than as a serious rival. The puncturing of the Japanese real-estate and stock-market bubbles plunged the Japanese economy into decades of stagnation. Germany was plagued by a decade of slow growth because of the costs of absorbing the former East Germany.

美国的现实主义在上世纪90年代出现衰弱，很大程度上是因为越来越有利的全球环境改变了成本和收益的算计。在被新兴大国包围的情况下，美国采用的政策是尼克松的民族主义政策——在安全领域上来自于苏联和中国，而在贸易领域里，竞争对手主要是日本和西德 。而到了90年代，来自于安全和贸易的威胁暂时消退。苏联解体了。后毛时代的中国被美国公司视为一个巨大的潜在消费市场而非强劲的竞争对手。日本房地产崩盘和股市泡沫的破灭使日本经济陷入了数十年的停滞。而德国为吸收前东德地区付出了代价，遭受了十年的缓慢经济增长 。


Meanwhile, the United States was the sole remaining superpower and the initial beneficiary of the information-technology revolution, identified with Silicon Valley. The ease with which the United States defeated the armed forces of Saddam Hussein and the Serbs in the Balkans added to the giddy triumphalism of America’s foreign-policy elites. Talk of the limits of American power—and of the need to balance commitments against resources—was seen as passé. It became an article of faith that Washington could afford quick, high-tech and relatively bloodless wars to promote democracy and human rights, like the Gulf War and the Balkan wars. At the same time, the Nixon-era concern about predatory trade and currency policies by other countries gave way, in the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, to complacency about foreign mercantilism.

同时，美国成为现存的唯一超级大国和以矽谷为代表的信息化革命的最初受益者。轻松打败萨达姆和塞尔维亚令美国外交政策精英们信心爆棚。限制美国的势力以及平衡能源需要的言论似乎是陈腐之谈。华盛顿能够通过像海湾战争和巴尔干战争一样高科技闪电战以及流血相对较少的战争来推动民主和人权发展，这成为了一种信条。与此同时尼克松时代有关其他国家会实施掠夺性贸易和货币政策的担忧也烟消云散，取而代之的是克林顿和小布什政府对外国重商主义的自鸣得意。

THE POST–COLD WAR GRAND STRATEGY of American global hegemony, shared by mainstream elites in both parties, was buttressed by a new ideology of postnational globalism. Unlike the old-fashioned internationalism of Wilson and Roosevelt, the new postnationalism argued that the American national interest and the interest of humanity were one and the same.

冷战后美国两党主流精英们共同倡导的全球霸权大战略得到后民族全球主义主义新观念的支撑。与威尔逊和罗斯福倡导的老式国际主义不同，新的后民族主义认为美国的国家利益和人类利益同为一体。

In U.S. national-security policy, the new postnationalism meant rejecting America’s traditional support for national self-determination in favor of a policy of freezing arbitrary, European-drawn colonial borders forever. The United States initially opposed the breakup of the Soviet Union, the partition of Yugoslavia, the secession of Eritrea and the division of Sudan. American policy makers did not seriously consider the partition of Iraq or Afghanistan, arbitrary territorial states that combine antagonistic nationalities.

在美国国家安全策略中，新的后民族主义意味着美国不再像以前那样支持国家的自我裁决，而是支持永远保留欧洲之前随意划定的殖民地范围。美国最初反对苏联、南斯拉夫、厄立特里亚以及苏丹的解体和分裂。美国的政策制定者们也没有仔细考虑过要去分裂伊拉克或阿富汗，这两个都是专制的地域性国家，国内都含有对抗性的民族。


While the new postnationalists reflexively opposed the redrawing of borders and national secessionist movements, they favored weakening state sovereignty to legitimate U.S. bombings, invasions and other forms of intervention. Postnationalists called for a new norm in which the United States and its allies could annul state sovereignty at will, not only in cases in which governments sought to carry out genocide (as in the post–World War II United Nations system) but also in cases in which a government failed to carry out its “responsibility to protect” (R2P) its citizens. The R2P doctrine had the potential to serve as a hunting license for the United States and its dependent allies to intervene militarily in purely internal conflicts unrelated either to genocide or cross-border aggression. This was postnationalism, not internationalism.

新的后民族主义者反对重新划定边界和国家分裂运动的同时，他们却倾向于削弱国家主权以赋予美国轰炸、入侵以及其他形式的干预以合法性。后民族主义号召建立令美国及其盟友可以随意废除其他国家主权的新规则，不仅当这些国家实施了大屠杀（正如二战后联合国的运作方式）之时，而且在这些国家没能尽到公民的“保护责任”时。“保护责任”规则成为的潜在通行证，使美国及其盟友们能对那些没有实施大屠杀或越境侵略行为的国家进行军事干预。这就是后民族主义，而不是国际主义。

In trade policy, postnationalists favored continuing and extending America’s Cold War policy of unilateral free trade—allowing other countries like China access to America’s market, even if they used various mercantilist techniques to keep American goods and services out of their own. Critics of foreign mercantilism were marginalized and derided as protectionists.

在贸易政策方面，后民族主义者提倡继续并延伸美国冷战时期的单边自由贸易政策，允许像中国一样的其他国家进入美国市场，即使他们会利用各种商业手段排斥美国产品和服务进入他们的国家。对外商业政策方面的批评声往往被边缘化并且被嘲笑为保护主义。

In immigration policy, the refusal of presidents and members of Congress of both parties to enforce immigration law seriously created a de facto open-borders policy in which the number of illegal immigrants ballooned to more than ten million. At the same time, the traditional idea of the melting pot was abandoned for “multiculturalism”—the notion that the United States was not a diverse nation-state, but rather a collection of separate ethnically or racially defined nations. Not only radical leftists but also centrist pundits compared immigration limits to racial segregation. The traditional American idea that immigrants should be expected to assimilate to the American majority’s language and culture in time was often stigmatized as repressive and illiberal.

在移民政策方面，总统和两党的国会议员们拒绝强化移民法，实际上形成了边境开放，导致非法移民数量迅速膨胀到一千多万。与此同时，传统的熔炉思想被“文化多元化”所替代。“文化多元化”意味着美国不是丰富多彩的单一民族国家，而是各个种族或者民族国家的集合体。无论左派种族主义者还是中间派人士都将限制移民比作种族隔离。传统的美国理念希望移民融入美国主流语言和文化，最后总被指责为带有压迫性和过于狭隘。


This new postnationalist consensus, however, was found only among the American elite, not among the general public, who, except during the brief panic following 9/11, remained suspicious of foreign wars, supportive of policies to defend American manufacturing industries and hostile to illegal immigration.
然而，这种新型后民族主义共识仅存在于美国精英阶层当中，而并非普通大众，民众们经历了911带来的短暂恐慌，仍然对海外战争存有疑虑，支持捍卫美国制造业的政策并且敌视非法移民。

The appeal of the post–Cold War American hegemony strategy had rested on the widespread belief that Washington enjoyed overwhelming advantages in military power and economic strength. The U.S. military was so advanced and powerful, the thinking went, that the United States could police the world and intervene in local conflict after local conflict in which it had little or no stake at minimal cost in American lives and dollars. And America was so rich, or so it was often assumed, that it could easily shed “old” industries like manufacturing for new “sunrise” industries like software, even as it easily absorbed huge numbers of poor, low-skilled immigrants.

冷战后美国霸权战略的吸引力是基于这样一种广泛的观念，即美国在军事力量和经济实力方面的具有压倒性的优势。这种观念认为美军如此先进如此强大，以至于美国能够统治全世界，并且以微小的人员和经济代价干预一个又一个地区冲突，尽管这些地区与美国一点关系都没有。并且人们总是设想，美国如此富有，可以轻易摒弃掉类似制造业一类的“陈旧”工业，取而代之的是诸如软件业一类的新兴“朝阳”产业，正如美国可以轻易地吸收大量贫穷的低技能移民。

By the second decade of the twenty-first century, the post–Cold War fantasy of limitless American power collided with reality, in the form of the Iraq and Afghan wars, the Great Recession and—most important of all—the rise of China. Of all the trends forcing a reconsideration of the fashionable postnationalist consensus, none may be of greater significance than the rise of China as both an economic and military power. In the 1990s, optimists predicted that China’s entry into the world economy would lead the world’s most populous nation to adopt free-market capitalism and multiparty democracy. Not so. On both the economic and strategic fronts, China has grown more aggressive in recent years—taking a harsher line with foreign corporations and alarming Japan and other neighbors by means of a military buildup and attempts at unilateral redefinition of its regional security prerogatives.

21世纪第二个十年，冷战后美国具有无限实力的幻想与现实产生碰撞，体现在伊拉克和阿富汗战争、经济大萧条以及最重要的是中国的崛起中。在所有迫使美国重新思考一贯流行的后民族主义共识的趋势中，中国在经济和军事方面崛起无疑是最重要的考量因素。90年代，乐观主义者预计中国加入世界经济圈意味着这个世界上人口最多的国家将接受自由市场资本主义和多党民主。事实并非如此。近些年中国在经济和战略前沿的发展都表现得更具有进攻性，包括：对外国企业采取更严格的管控措施，通过军事建设和企图重新划定单边区域安全边界来警告日本和其他邻邦。


As a giant nation-state, the United States has enjoyed significant advantages over medium-sized nation-states whose hopes for enduring great-power status depended on possessing foreign empires, like Britain, France, Germany, Japan and Russia. Likewise, the United States is not threatened by the feeble, multiheaded hydra of the European Union, even if on paper the EU rivals America in population and GDP. And with the exception of China, the other countries that will have the greatest populations in the generations ahead, such as India, Nigeria and Pakistan, are multinational agglomerations, some or all of which in the future might split into more homogeneous successor nation-states. Only China rivals America in combining a majority population whose members share a strong sense of common national identity with a huge domestic market and a high level of industrialization. The fact that China has surpassed the United States already as the world’s leading manufacturing power—and will soon surpass it in total GDP—makes the triumphalist American vision of a unipolar world in which other great powers like China forever accept the subordinate status of American Cold War satellites like Japan and the former West Germany appear even more delusional.

作为一个民族国家，相对于其他中型民族国家而言，美国拥有巨大的优势，这些中型国家要想维持大国的地位就得建立强大的跨国帝国，比如英国，法国，英国，日本以及俄罗斯。同样的，美国并不受到微弱的欧盟所威胁，尽管纸面上欧盟在人口和GDP方面可与美国匹敌。除了中国以外，那些拥有众多人口的国家，比如印度，尼日利亚，巴基斯坦，都是多民族的结合体，其中的有些国家或者说全部在未来很有可能分裂成同质的单一民族国家。只有中国在多数人口上可与美国匹敌，中国的这些多数人口共享强烈的民族认同感，而且国内市场巨大，具备高度的工业化水平。中国已经超越美国成为世界最大的制造业国家，也将在GDP总量上超越美国，所以，要想中国像冷战时期德日那样服从美国领导，这免费也太过痴心妄想。

When confronted with any challenge to their newly minted orthodoxy, postnationalists often try to foreclose debate by claiming that the only alternative to their grand strategy of American hegemony is retreat into the bad old days of isolationism, protectionism and nativism. But one can reject the project of a hugely expensive American global hegemony without favoring a return to pre–World War II isolation. Likewise, one can reject the policy of allowing other industrial nations to export their way to riches and military power by exploiting one-way access to the American consumer market and U.S. technological innovations without favoring a revival of nineteenth-century infant industry tariffs. And one can reject the combination of lax immigration enforcement with multiculturalism without embracing xenophobia or rejecting immigration tout court.

当新的经典理论遭遇挑战时，后民族主义者总是试图平息争论，宣称实现美国霸权的伟大战略的唯一替代选择就是退回到旧时的孤立主义、保护主义和本土主义。然而拒绝美国昂贵的全球霸权计划，并不需要回到二战前的孤立状态；同样的，人们可以选择不用恢复19世纪的新生工业关税制度，而拒绝那种允许其他工业国家通过单方面出口美国消费市场换得经济和军事发展的政策；人们可以选择不支持排外思想或排斥移民的政策，而拒绝带有文化多元化的宽松移民政策。


A new strategy of enlightened nationalism would revive the Nixon-era themes of shifting more of the burden of defense to America’s allies and clients and treating the country’s remaining manufacturing industries as national-security assets to be defended against foreign mercantilist assault, not as bribes to be given away to American allies and protectorates.

一种新型进步的民族主义战略将复兴尼克松时代的主题，将更多的防御重任转移给美国的盟友和附属国，将现存的制造企业作为国家保护资产来对待，防止受到国外重商主义者的攻击，而不把这些作为利诱给予美国的盟友和受保护国。

INSTEAD OF SEEKING GLOBAL HEGEMONY, the United States should seek what Samuel P. Huntington called primacy, as the primus inter pares in a world of multiple great powers. The hegemony strategy is based on the idea that the best way for the country to prevent hostile hegemons from dominating Europe, Asia and the Middle East is for the United States itself to be the hegemon of Europe, the hegemon of Asia and the hegemon of the Middle East. The hegemony strategy not only permits but also encourages free riding by America’s European and Asian allies, which, relieved of much of the burden of defense spending, can devote greater resources to investment in economy-growing infrastructure, civilian industry and generous social-welfare spending.

与寻求全球霸权相反，美国应当追求亨廷顿所谓的领先地位，即成为多极世界中的领头人。霸权战略的中心思想是如果想阻止某些富有敌意的霸权国家统治欧洲、亚洲和中东的话，那么美国自己就要成为这些地区的霸权国家。霸权战略不仅允许而且鼓励美国在欧洲和亚洲的盟友们投机取巧，从而减轻了这些国家的大部分国防开支负担，这些盟友们从而能够将更多的资源投入到促进经济增长的基础建设、民用产业和慷慨的社会福利中去。