美国海军受到弹道导弹进攻可以判断目标是否核弹头吗？

Examining the doctrinal text, Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi
Zhinan (A Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory)
provided more information on China’s nuclear
doctrine, force deployment, command and control,
and survivability measures than has been available in
the past. Combining the examination of authoritative
doctrinal text with materials from the Chinese press
and those obtained through the Open Source Center
helped to confirm the authenticity of the doctrinal
text and provided supporting evidence for judgments
about the nature of China’s strategic rocket forces, their
organization, readiness levels, and their control.
Another critical factor in the nuclear threat equation
faced in the United States is the calculation by the
CMC that China is able to absorb nuclear strikes with
less catastrophic effects that the United States. This
judgment is a function of China’s historical military
culture, geography, and an intentional state-directed
policy of civil defense and risk distribution.111 For the
United States, this means that Chinese leaders may
miscalculate American will and mistakenly take risky
actions.
The decision by Beijing to put nuclear and
conventional warheads on the same classes of ballistic
missiles and colocate them near each other in firing
units of the Second Artillery Corps also increases the
risk of accidental nuclear conflict. If a country with good
surveillance systems, like the United States, detects a
missile being launched, it has serious choices to make.
It can absorb a first strike, see whether it is hit with a
nuclear or conventional weapon, and retaliate in kind;
or it can decide to launch a major strike on warning. If
the nation under attack has ballistic missile defenses,
it might be able to stop an incoming missile and seek
other ways to reduce tensions and a wide war.
A critical factor in any American decision will
be the capabilities of American space-based sensor
systems. Accurate sensors may be able to determine
whether China launched a conventional or nucleartipped
missile, and such a determination could prevent
immediate escalation of a crisis or conflict.
However, some PLA officers advocate the
capability for China to ensure that foreign surveillance
assets cannot observe China from space. Indeed,
on two occasions in recent months, the PLA has
taken actions to demonstrate that it has moved from
theoretical research and simulations of space warfare
to demonstrate the capability to blind or destroy
satellites over China. Moreover, the commander of the
Second Artillery Corps has postponed a visit to the
United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) at the
invitation of the STRATCOM commander, to engage
in a strategic dialogue about such matters as a means
of threat reduction.
The discussion of the need to mass missile fire
and use missiles decisively, with surprise, in a theater
war also undermines the likelihood that China would
adhere to its own declared “no first use” policy. These
considerations also reinforce the need for the United
States to have effective ballistic missile defenses.
Perhaps the most serious questions raised in this
paper are about the PLA’s concentrated efforts to
attack a deployed, moving aircraft carrier battle group.
The PLA is coming closer to achieving that capability.
The ambiguity over what form any ballistic (or cruise)
missile attack might take creates a volatile situation in
case of any crisis over Taiwan, or between China and
Japan.
Finally, the debate inside China over the viability
of its “no first use” policy is real. At present, older
veterans of the Foreign Ministry and the PLA insist that
the policy stay unchanged. However, younger scholars,
soldiers, and diplomats will keep up the pressure to
pull back from this policy, which requires continued
attention and strategic dialogue with China’s policy
community.
At present, China has no real-time global space
surveillance capability. Therefore, warning of
impending nuclear attack must come from human
intelligence. A global surveillance capability requires a
system of relay satellites, which China is building but
has not achieved. Thus, as China’s space surveillance
improves over the next decade, its nuclear doctrine
will probably evolve.
These are serious matters for the American armed
forces. China’s nuclear forces are evolving and the way
they are used is under debate. The way that the PLA
handles its commitment to dominating space and its
commitment to being capable of attacking American
C4ISR systems affects strategic warning, missile
defenses, and command and control. For the Army,
with the responsibility to defend the United States
against missile attack, it means that watching the
evolution of this debate in China is critical to success.

……战争不止是政治行为，而是真正的政治工具，是政治交往的延续，是政治交往通过另一种手段的实现。……对求和决心影响更大的是对已经付出和即将付出的努力的认识。战争不是毫无意义的冲动行为，而是由政治目的所支配的行为，政治目的的价值决定了该付出多大、多久的牺牲。付出的努力一旦超出政治目的的价值，这个目的就会遭到摒弃，和平就会来临。

笑脸男人 发表于 2014-4-15 21:48
MD选择重启潜射中程弹道导弹项目，我觉得说明了MD希望获得快速的打击反舰弹道导弹体系的能力，也从一个侧面 ...

笑脸男人 发表于 2014-4-15 22:08
核弹头的反舰弹道导弹是冷战时候的，TG的反舰弹道导弹是常规弹头的