「精品长篇」美国版“较量无声”

楼主注：由于原标题“中国的五种间谍手段”略带敏感，顾更名！望理解

链接：http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-ways-china-spies-10008?page=show

标题：Five Ways China Spies
中国的五种间谍手段
正文：
Every time a fleeing or exiled Chinese officialor public intellectual issues a warning about Chinese spies, the statements attain an immediate significance. When ousted Beijing Universityprofessor and Cato Institute visiting fellow Xia Yeliang made such remarks onFebruary 27, press the world over picked up his remarks.Dr. Xia said “Every year among those top universities there are some visitingscholars, and among them I can definitely say there are some people who areactually spies…They don’t doany research—probably they just do some surveys fortheir boss.”
每次出逃或流亡的中国官员或公共知识分子都释出与中国间谍相关的警告，这个观点颇中肯綮。2月27日被驱逐的卡托研究所客座研究员，北大教授夏业良做出过这样的评论，引用新闻上的话。夏博士说“每年这些顶尖大学都有一些学者访问，在我所接触到的，我可以肯定地说，有些人实际上是间谍，他们根本不做任何研究——估计他们只是为了他们的上司做调查“

One of the reasons such remarks garner attention is that amystique surrounds Chinese intelligence. The Chinese have not faced thesame exposure that the Russians faced when Westerners helpeddefectors like Oleg Gordievsky, Vasili Mitrokhin, and Sergei Tretyakov write about the Soviet KGB and its successors.The shroud of mystery has meant Western observers treat Chinese intelligence asa kind of inscrutable beast, operating in fundamentally different ways thantheir Western and Russian counterparts. However, security services worldwidehave uncovered a wide-ranging and familiar set of operational methods used byChinese intelligence.


这种言论引起关注的原因之一是，中国的情报机构总围绕着一种神秘感。中国没有像俄国那样公开对待西方资助的逃亡者，例如像奥列格戈德尔维斯基，瓦西里密德罗辛，还有写关于苏联克格勃与它继任者的谢尔盖戈德尔。隐秘的遮掩意味着西方的观察家把中国的情报机构看做是一种不可捉摸的猛兽，而且它运作风格与西方和俄罗斯的同行们完全不同。然而，全球的安全机构已揭开了了中国情报部门多种形式的、耳闻能详的操作手法。

One ofthe reasons Chinese intelligence operations do not seem to make sense toobservers is that they mistake intelligence for the theft of secrets. Intelligence does not mean the acquisition of “classified” or “secret”information. Intelligence is the acquisition and processing of information thatassists in formulating policy and guiding action. Classification has nothing todo with it; Beijing’s concerns do. China concerns in theUnited States go beyond U.S. policy, including overseas Chinesepopulations, democracy activists, counterintelligence, and scientificexpertise. And, as will become clear below, theChinese seem to be very comfortable with merely secondhand access to sensitiveinformation.
Here arefive important and unmistakably familiar ways that China collects foreignintelligence.



中国情报机构看起来没有设置观察组的其中原因是它们怕偷错情报。情报并不意味着是收集“机密”或“秘密”的信息，情报应该是收集并处理信息，它起的是辅助制定政策和指导作用。而且包罗万象。北京关心的是如何做到。在美国看来中国关注的不仅包括美国政策，还包括海外华人群体，民主人士，反间谍，与科学技术。问题逐渐变得清晰明了，但中国似乎更偏向于获取二手信息。
对于中国搜集外国情报，这里举出五个有影响的和常见的例子.

1. Diplomats, Defense Attachés, and Journalists
    外交官、国防官和新闻记者

Whoever said China spies in a fundamentally different way than others in thespy business got it wrong. Concealing spies within the embassy staff—the bread-and-butter of international espionage—has been and continues to be a hallmark of Chinese intelligenceoperations. In the past, these officially- or quasi-officially coveredintelligence officers have laid low, focusing on eliciting information frominteresting contacts rather than trying to recruit them. But that appears tohave changed in recent years.

谁若是说，中国间谍与其他国家的间谍一点不像，那就错了，间谍利用大使馆工作人员身份做掩护——国际间谍常见的掩护手段——它仍是中国间谍情报活动的一个标志，之前，这些官方或半官方的情报人员行事低调，他们为了方便打探情报，把精力集中都放在与中间人拉近关系，而不是试图去招募他们。但在最近几年（他们的做法）似乎已经起了变化。


A little over three years ago, Sweden convicted a Uighur refugee, BaiburMaihesuti, from China of spying on other refugees inside and outsidethe country. His Chinese case officers were a journalist anddiplomat, who paid him in exchange fortelephone numbers, travel patterns,and other personal information about his fellow Uighurs. Around the same time,German officials also expressed concern that Chinese intelligence officers wereoperating more aggressively out of their diplomatic facilities.Although it might seem odd to a Western audience for a journalist to beassociated with an embassy, Chinese journalists are state employees, givingthem no deniability if they are caught in themiddle of an operation.

就在三年前，瑞典审判了一位名叫‘百部买合苏提’的中国间谍，她以维族难民的身份逃至这个国家。来为他办案的人员是位记者和外交官，付钱给他来换取电话号，通过这种方式，得到了他的维吾尔同胞的个人信息。与此同时，德国官员还担心，中国情报人员会进一步动用外交手段，西方观众可能对记者和大使馆之间的联系似乎感到奇怪，中国记者是国有企业的员工，如果他们在活动过程中被抓，他们是不会相互推诿的。
（这神奇的一段，请各位同学参观指导一下）



2. Seeding Operations
    渗透
Chinese intelligence services have been trying to feed intelligence officersand recruited agents into the adversary’s organizationssince the 1920s. In fact, China’s first espionageheroes were the so-called “Three Heroes of the Dragon’s Lair,” who infiltrated the Kuomintang’s intelligence apparatus. When a senior Chinese Communist Party(CCP) official defected, these three officers sounded the warning that allowedthe CCP to survive. While communist intelligence employed this method withsuccess throughout the Chinese Civil War, seeding emerged only more recently inoperations against the United States.

自上世纪20年代以来，中国情报部门一直通过各种方式安插情报人员，并且招募特工进入敌对组织，事实上，中国最初的间谍英雄被叫作“龙穴三雄”，他们潜入国民党情报机构，
当有一位高级中国GCD（CCP）官员叛逃时，这三名“间谍”发出警告，才让CCP得以幸存！GCD情报部门利用该方法，让他们取得了中国内战的胜利。目前这种渗透方式已对美国展开。

Thefirst, and so far, only case to reach a U.S. courtroom was Glenn DuffieShriver, who Chinese intelligence recruited in 2004 while he was in Shanghai.In exchange for $70,000, Shriver made several attempts to join the StateDepartment and then the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. CIA’sbackground check, however, alerted security officials that something was notquite right, and further investigation revealed the connection to Chineseintelligence.

首先，到目前为止，仅有一例案列送达到美国法庭，（这个案列的主角）是格伦达菲施莱佛，2004年，他在上海期间受到中国情报部门的招募。在7万美元的诱惑下，施赖弗曾多次（利用电脑）尝试联入政府部门——中情局国家机密处。中情局暗中核查，最后，安全官警告说，有些不对劲，后来深入调查出的结果显示，这些连接直接指向中国情报部门

Shriverhowever probably was not the first such Chinese effort against the UnitedStates. In 1997, then-FBI counterintelligence chief Harry Godfrey III warnedthat “We haveseen cases where [Chinese intelligence] have encouraged people to apply to theCIA, the FBI, and Naval Investigative Service, andother Defense agencies.”


无论如何，施赖弗（这个案例）肯定不是中国第一次针对对美国的尝试。在1997年，当时联邦调查局反情报局长戈弗雷三世警告说“我们已经发现某些地区[中国情报部门]鼓励人们申请进入中央情报局、FBI、海军调查处、以及国防部”

3.Academics and Scholars
   教师与学者
It is a well-known fact that China’s intelligenceapparatus manages several think tanks to do research and analysisas well as consult with foreign officials and scholars. The most famous andbiggest are the Ministry of State Security-run China Institutes of ContemporaryInternational Relations (CICIR) and military intelligence-affiliated ChinaInstitute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) thateach have dozens of researchers. The current MSS chief, Geng Huichang, builthis career as a researcher at CICIR, rising to be its presidentin the early 1990s. And the CIISS president has always been a senior member ofmilitary intelligence—most often the serving DeputyChief of Staff with the foreign-affairs portfolio or his immediate predecessor—currently General Sun Jianguo. Their academiccredentials makes them a valuable way to reach out to retired foreign officialsand nongovernment policy analysts to get information on other countries byhosting conferences, Track II dialogues, and academic delegations.This kind of collection is nothing too nefarious, but it does get China accessto a lot of gossip, the thinking of future officials, and other nonpublic,if still unclassified information. For the most part, these “spies” are exactly who they say they are:Chinese intelligence officers with a scholarly job description.

众所周知，中国的情报部门管理者着几个智库，研究和分析如何与外国官员、学者交流。其最知名的和（规模）最大的（机构）是中国现代国际关系研究院（CICIR）和军事情报部下属单位——中国国际战略研究所（CIISS），它们都有几十名以上的研究人员。目前MSS院长，耿会昌，在CICIR作为研究员开始了自己的职业生涯，他于上个世纪90年代早期升迁至院长。他和CIISS所长一直是军事情报部门的高级会员——通常为涉外公共关系副总参谋长或他的前任孙建国提供服务。他们的学者资历使他们有足够的资格去接触退休的外国官员，还能在非官方政策分析师主办的会议上与参会学者采取双轨（双向）对话从而得到其他国家的情报。这种收集（情报的）方式不太算是阴险，但它的确让中国惹了很多闲话，以后官员们会认为，信息如未解密就没必要与他人分享。最重要的是，这些“间谍”，正是他们所说的：具有学者身份的中国情报人员。

ButChinese intelligence services also use academic and policy researchinstitutions to hide clandestine operations. Research offers a useful excuse tocommission research, hide suspicious travel, and engage a wide variety ofofficials. Scholars are naturally curious and are expected to ask questions.For example, Japanese police investigated an intelligence officer based in theChinese embassy’s economics section in Tokyo in the late 2000s. Prior to working atthe embassy, the military intelligence officer worked at the China Academy ofSocial Sciences, one of China’s most prominent thinktanks. Against the United States, one of the intelligence officers believed tobe involved in handling convicted spy, Chi Mak, worked as a researcher at auniversity in Guangzhou, capital of Guangdong Province.

然而中国情报部门还利用学术和政策研究机构来进行隐蔽的秘密行动。做研究变成了一个很实用的借口，（它能）隐藏可疑的行踪还能广泛接触各类官员。而且学者天性好奇而且会问问题。例如  2000年之前 ，日本东京警方调查的一名所属中国大使馆经济科的情报员。这名军事情报员在大使馆的工作之前，曾在在中国社会科学院工作，（这家学院）是中国最著名的智囊团。在美国，有位情报人员叫Chi Mak，他被认为参与并受操纵而被判间谍罪，他曾在广州的一所大学里作一名研究员。



4. Local Government Offices
    本地政府官员
Inside China, intelligence officials need little in the way of cover andsometimes having the overt power of the government comes in handy whenconfronting potential agents. A former security official in Tianjin, HaoFengjun, told Taiwanese press that China’s intelligenceservices use local government credentials—often linked only to a numbered but unnamed office—to approach businessmen and officials when they find themselves onthe other side of the law. For example, the MSS periodically sweeps brothels andkaraoke parlors to pick up businessmen, especially those from Taiwan, and these“local government officials”would offer assistance and a way out through espionage. At other times, these “officials” threaten to close down Taiwanesebusinesses and confiscate the investment unless the businessmen agree to assistChinese intelligence. Although only a few cases of such blackmail are known—most notably a Japanese code clerk in Shanghai—this offer of assistance to fix someone’stroubles before sending them home to spy appears tobe China’s routine approach to spyingon Taiwan.

在中国国内，情报官很少进行掩饰，并且在面对潜在代理人时（发展间谍时），为了行事方便，就会亮明政府职权身份。前安全官员郝奉军在天津时，曾对台湾媒体说，中国情报利用当地政府的证件（身份）进行工作——他们通常只用编号（代替）而且所在部门没有名称——当他们发觉某些商人和官员违法时，就会着手处理他们。例如，MSS定期扫黄和（清查）卡拉OK厅来拘捕（那些）商人，尤其是台湾来的那些人，然后这些“地方政府官员“以提供帮助和出路为条件让他们进行间谍活动。另外有些时候，这些“官员”要挟要关闭，没收台湾企业投资，除非商人同意协助中国情报机构。虽然大家知道的只有几例这类讹诈——最引人注目的是上海的日本译电员（事件）——在帮助解决这些人的麻烦之后，就把他遣送回国去进行间谍活动，似乎中国也是利用这种做法在台湾进行这种间谍活动。



5. Businesspeople at Home and Abroad
    国内外的商人

Accordingto a widely cited Hong Kong press article, Chinese military intelligenceemploys “commercial cadres” who operate like case officers despite not being officialgovernment employees. The businesspersons have government credentials and helpintelligence officials recruit foreigners that might possess valuableinformation. One such person may have introduced KuoTai-shen, a naturalized U.S. citizen and Louisiana-based businessmanarrested in 2008 for spying, to a Chinese intelligence official with theGuangzhou Friendship Association that promoted U.S.-China business ties. Afterbeing recruited himself, Kuo then recruited two U.S. Defense Departmentofficials, Gregg Bergersen and James Fondren, to provide him sensitive defenseinformation related U.S. concerns in the Asia-Pacific.
据香港媒体广泛引用的条文，中国军事情报机构聘用“商业骨干“，有些像办案人员却不是正式的政府雇员。这类商人有政府证件并帮助政府情报官员招募可能拥有重要信息的外国人。
有个人或许被介绍过他叫郭太生，美籍华人，生活在路易斯安州的商人，他在2008年以间谍罪被逮捕。（他是）一位促进美-中商业关系——广州友好协会的中国情报官员。郭被招募后，聘请了两名美国国防部官员，分别是格雷格和杰姆斯丰德伦柏格森，为他提供敏感的关于美国所关注亚太地区的国防信息

Chinaalso hides intelligence officers overseas using commercial cover—sometimes allowing them toemigrate and gain legitimate foreign documentation. Last year, Taiwanesecounterintelligence (with U.S. assistance) uncovered a high-level penetrationin Taiwan’s military. A Chinese intelligenceofficer living as an Australian businesswoman in Thailand handled General LoHsien-che—director of armytelecommunications and electronic information at the time of his arrest—while he posted in Thailand as a military attaché in the early 2000s. She and/or another Chinese intelligence officerreportedly lured Lo into a situation where he could be blackmailed and thenoffered to pay him thousands of dollars in exchange for cooperating withChinese intelligence.

中国为了隐藏海外情报人员会利用商业身份作掩护——有时会允许他们移民海外，以获得合法的海外身份。去年，台湾反情报部门（在美国的协助下）发现台湾军方高层被渗透。一名中国情报人员以澳大利亚女商人身份在泰国操纵罗贤哲（谢谢，@Rel_mayer 的提示：）——在他被捕之前是名陆军通信与电子信息主管——早在2000年他的职位就是泰国的一名军官。她和/或另一个中国的情报官员设局利诱 罗 ，当他受到利诱之后支付给他数千美元作为交换条件，（迫使他）与中国情报部门进行合作。
（完）楼主注：由于原标题“中国的五种间谍手段”略带敏感，顾更名！望理解

链接：http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-ways-china-spies-10008?page=show

标题：Five Ways China Spies
中国的五种间谍手段
正文：
Every time a fleeing or exiled Chinese officialor public intellectual issues a warning about Chinese spies, the statements attain an immediate significance. When ousted Beijing Universityprofessor and Cato Institute visiting fellow Xia Yeliang made such remarks onFebruary 27, press the world over picked up his remarks.Dr. Xia said “Every year among those top universities there are some visitingscholars, and among them I can definitely say there are some people who areactually spies…They don’t doany research—probably they just do some surveys fortheir boss.”
每次出逃或流亡的中国官员或公共知识分子都释出与中国间谍相关的警告，这个观点颇中肯綮。2月27日被驱逐的卡托研究所客座研究员，北大教授夏业良做出过这样的评论，引用新闻上的话。夏博士说“每年这些顶尖大学都有一些学者访问，在我所接触到的，我可以肯定地说，有些人实际上是间谍，他们根本不做任何研究——估计他们只是为了他们的上司做调查“

One of the reasons such remarks garner attention is that amystique surrounds Chinese intelligence. The Chinese have not faced thesame exposure that the Russians faced when Westerners helpeddefectors like Oleg Gordievsky, Vasili Mitrokhin, and Sergei Tretyakov write about the Soviet KGB and its successors.The shroud of mystery has meant Western observers treat Chinese intelligence asa kind of inscrutable beast, operating in fundamentally different ways thantheir Western and Russian counterparts. However, security services worldwidehave uncovered a wide-ranging and familiar set of operational methods used byChinese intelligence.


这种言论引起关注的原因之一是，中国的情报机构总围绕着一种神秘感。中国没有像俄国那样公开对待西方资助的逃亡者，例如像奥列格戈德尔维斯基，瓦西里密德罗辛，还有写关于苏联克格勃与它继任者的谢尔盖戈德尔。隐秘的遮掩意味着西方的观察家把中国的情报机构看做是一种不可捉摸的猛兽，而且它运作风格与西方和俄罗斯的同行们完全不同。然而，全球的安全机构已揭开了了中国情报部门多种形式的、耳闻能详的操作手法。

One ofthe reasons Chinese intelligence operations do not seem to make sense toobservers is that they mistake intelligence for the theft of secrets. Intelligence does not mean the acquisition of “classified” or “secret”information. Intelligence is the acquisition and processing of information thatassists in formulating policy and guiding action. Classification has nothing todo with it; Beijing’s concerns do. China concerns in theUnited States go beyond U.S. policy, including overseas Chinesepopulations, democracy activists, counterintelligence, and scientificexpertise. And, as will become clear below, theChinese seem to be very comfortable with merely secondhand access to sensitiveinformation.
Here arefive important and unmistakably familiar ways that China collects foreignintelligence.



中国情报机构看起来没有设置观察组的其中原因是它们怕偷错情报。情报并不意味着是收集“机密”或“秘密”的信息，情报应该是收集并处理信息，它起的是辅助制定政策和指导作用。而且包罗万象。北京关心的是如何做到。在美国看来中国关注的不仅包括美国政策，还包括海外华人群体，民主人士，反间谍，与科学技术。问题逐渐变得清晰明了，但中国似乎更偏向于获取二手信息。
对于中国搜集外国情报，这里举出五个有影响的和常见的例子.

1. Diplomats, Defense Attachés, and Journalists
    外交官、国防官和新闻记者

Whoever said China spies in a fundamentally different way than others in thespy business got it wrong. Concealing spies within the embassy staff—the bread-and-butter of international espionage—has been and continues to be a hallmark of Chinese intelligenceoperations. In the past, these officially- or quasi-officially coveredintelligence officers have laid low, focusing on eliciting information frominteresting contacts rather than trying to recruit them. But that appears tohave changed in recent years.

谁若是说，中国间谍与其他国家的间谍一点不像，那就错了，间谍利用大使馆工作人员身份做掩护——国际间谍常见的掩护手段——它仍是中国间谍情报活动的一个标志，之前，这些官方或半官方的情报人员行事低调，他们为了方便打探情报，把精力集中都放在与中间人拉近关系，而不是试图去招募他们。但在最近几年（他们的做法）似乎已经起了变化。


A little over three years ago, Sweden convicted a Uighur refugee, BaiburMaihesuti, from China of spying on other refugees inside and outsidethe country. His Chinese case officers were a journalist anddiplomat, who paid him in exchange fortelephone numbers, travel patterns,and other personal information about his fellow Uighurs. Around the same time,German officials also expressed concern that Chinese intelligence officers wereoperating more aggressively out of their diplomatic facilities.Although it might seem odd to a Western audience for a journalist to beassociated with an embassy, Chinese journalists are state employees, givingthem no deniability if they are caught in themiddle of an operation.

就在三年前，瑞典审判了一位名叫‘百部买合苏提’的中国间谍，她以维族难民的身份逃至这个国家。来为他办案的人员是位记者和外交官，付钱给他来换取电话号，通过这种方式，得到了他的维吾尔同胞的个人信息。与此同时，德国官员还担心，中国情报人员会进一步动用外交手段，西方观众可能对记者和大使馆之间的联系似乎感到奇怪，中国记者是国有企业的员工，如果他们在活动过程中被抓，他们是不会相互推诿的。
（这神奇的一段，请各位同学参观指导一下）



2. Seeding Operations
    渗透
Chinese intelligence services have been trying to feed intelligence officersand recruited agents into the adversary’s organizationssince the 1920s. In fact, China’s first espionageheroes were the so-called “Three Heroes of the Dragon’s Lair,” who infiltrated the Kuomintang’s intelligence apparatus. When a senior Chinese Communist Party(CCP) official defected, these three officers sounded the warning that allowedthe CCP to survive. While communist intelligence employed this method withsuccess throughout the Chinese Civil War, seeding emerged only more recently inoperations against the United States.

自上世纪20年代以来，中国情报部门一直通过各种方式安插情报人员，并且招募特工进入敌对组织，事实上，中国最初的间谍英雄被叫作“龙穴三雄”，他们潜入国民党情报机构，
当有一位高级中国GCD（CCP）官员叛逃时，这三名“间谍”发出警告，才让CCP得以幸存！GCD情报部门利用该方法，让他们取得了中国内战的胜利。目前这种渗透方式已对美国展开。

Thefirst, and so far, only case to reach a U.S. courtroom was Glenn DuffieShriver, who Chinese intelligence recruited in 2004 while he was in Shanghai.In exchange for $70,000, Shriver made several attempts to join the StateDepartment and then the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. CIA’sbackground check, however, alerted security officials that something was notquite right, and further investigation revealed the connection to Chineseintelligence.

首先，到目前为止，仅有一例案列送达到美国法庭，（这个案列的主角）是格伦达菲施莱佛，2004年，他在上海期间受到中国情报部门的招募。在7万美元的诱惑下，施赖弗曾多次（利用电脑）尝试联入政府部门——中情局国家机密处。中情局暗中核查，最后，安全官警告说，有些不对劲，后来深入调查出的结果显示，这些连接直接指向中国情报部门

Shriverhowever probably was not the first such Chinese effort against the UnitedStates. In 1997, then-FBI counterintelligence chief Harry Godfrey III warnedthat “We haveseen cases where [Chinese intelligence] have encouraged people to apply to theCIA, the FBI, and Naval Investigative Service, andother Defense agencies.”


无论如何，施赖弗（这个案例）肯定不是中国第一次针对对美国的尝试。在1997年，当时联邦调查局反情报局长戈弗雷三世警告说“我们已经发现某些地区[中国情报部门]鼓励人们申请进入中央情报局、FBI、海军调查处、以及国防部”

3.Academics and Scholars
   教师与学者
It is a well-known fact that China’s intelligenceapparatus manages several think tanks to do research and analysisas well as consult with foreign officials and scholars. The most famous andbiggest are the Ministry of State Security-run China Institutes of ContemporaryInternational Relations (CICIR) and military intelligence-affiliated ChinaInstitute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) thateach have dozens of researchers. The current MSS chief, Geng Huichang, builthis career as a researcher at CICIR, rising to be its presidentin the early 1990s. And the CIISS president has always been a senior member ofmilitary intelligence—most often the serving DeputyChief of Staff with the foreign-affairs portfolio or his immediate predecessor—currently General Sun Jianguo. Their academiccredentials makes them a valuable way to reach out to retired foreign officialsand nongovernment policy analysts to get information on other countries byhosting conferences, Track II dialogues, and academic delegations.This kind of collection is nothing too nefarious, but it does get China accessto a lot of gossip, the thinking of future officials, and other nonpublic,if still unclassified information. For the most part, these “spies” are exactly who they say they are:Chinese intelligence officers with a scholarly job description.

众所周知，中国的情报部门管理者着几个智库，研究和分析如何与外国官员、学者交流。其最知名的和（规模）最大的（机构）是中国现代国际关系研究院（CICIR）和军事情报部下属单位——中国国际战略研究所（CIISS），它们都有几十名以上的研究人员。目前MSS院长，耿会昌，在CICIR作为研究员开始了自己的职业生涯，他于上个世纪90年代早期升迁至院长。他和CIISS所长一直是军事情报部门的高级会员——通常为涉外公共关系副总参谋长或他的前任孙建国提供服务。他们的学者资历使他们有足够的资格去接触退休的外国官员，还能在非官方政策分析师主办的会议上与参会学者采取双轨（双向）对话从而得到其他国家的情报。这种收集（情报的）方式不太算是阴险，但它的确让中国惹了很多闲话，以后官员们会认为，信息如未解密就没必要与他人分享。最重要的是，这些“间谍”，正是他们所说的：具有学者身份的中国情报人员。

ButChinese intelligence services also use academic and policy researchinstitutions to hide clandestine operations. Research offers a useful excuse tocommission research, hide suspicious travel, and engage a wide variety ofofficials. Scholars are naturally curious and are expected to ask questions.For example, Japanese police investigated an intelligence officer based in theChinese embassy’s economics section in Tokyo in the late 2000s. Prior to working atthe embassy, the military intelligence officer worked at the China Academy ofSocial Sciences, one of China’s most prominent thinktanks. Against the United States, one of the intelligence officers believed tobe involved in handling convicted spy, Chi Mak, worked as a researcher at auniversity in Guangzhou, capital of Guangdong Province.

然而中国情报部门还利用学术和政策研究机构来进行隐蔽的秘密行动。做研究变成了一个很实用的借口，（它能）隐藏可疑的行踪还能广泛接触各类官员。而且学者天性好奇而且会问问题。例如  2000年之前 ，日本东京警方调查的一名所属中国大使馆经济科的情报员。这名军事情报员在大使馆的工作之前，曾在在中国社会科学院工作，（这家学院）是中国最著名的智囊团。在美国，有位情报人员叫Chi Mak，他被认为参与并受操纵而被判间谍罪，他曾在广州的一所大学里作一名研究员。



4. Local Government Offices
    本地政府官员
Inside China, intelligence officials need little in the way of cover andsometimes having the overt power of the government comes in handy whenconfronting potential agents. A former security official in Tianjin, HaoFengjun, told Taiwanese press that China’s intelligenceservices use local government credentials—often linked only to a numbered but unnamed office—to approach businessmen and officials when they find themselves onthe other side of the law. For example, the MSS periodically sweeps brothels andkaraoke parlors to pick up businessmen, especially those from Taiwan, and these“local government officials”would offer assistance and a way out through espionage. At other times, these “officials” threaten to close down Taiwanesebusinesses and confiscate the investment unless the businessmen agree to assistChinese intelligence. Although only a few cases of such blackmail are known—most notably a Japanese code clerk in Shanghai—this offer of assistance to fix someone’stroubles before sending them home to spy appears tobe China’s routine approach to spyingon Taiwan.

在中国国内，情报官很少进行掩饰，并且在面对潜在代理人时（发展间谍时），为了行事方便，就会亮明政府职权身份。前安全官员郝奉军在天津时，曾对台湾媒体说，中国情报利用当地政府的证件（身份）进行工作——他们通常只用编号（代替）而且所在部门没有名称——当他们发觉某些商人和官员违法时，就会着手处理他们。例如，MSS定期扫黄和（清查）卡拉OK厅来拘捕（那些）商人，尤其是台湾来的那些人，然后这些“地方政府官员“以提供帮助和出路为条件让他们进行间谍活动。另外有些时候，这些“官员”要挟要关闭，没收台湾企业投资，除非商人同意协助中国情报机构。虽然大家知道的只有几例这类讹诈——最引人注目的是上海的日本译电员（事件）——在帮助解决这些人的麻烦之后，就把他遣送回国去进行间谍活动，似乎中国也是利用这种做法在台湾进行这种间谍活动。



5. Businesspeople at Home and Abroad
    国内外的商人

Accordingto a widely cited Hong Kong press article, Chinese military intelligenceemploys “commercial cadres” who operate like case officers despite not being officialgovernment employees. The businesspersons have government credentials and helpintelligence officials recruit foreigners that might possess valuableinformation. One such person may have introduced KuoTai-shen, a naturalized U.S. citizen and Louisiana-based businessmanarrested in 2008 for spying, to a Chinese intelligence official with theGuangzhou Friendship Association that promoted U.S.-China business ties. Afterbeing recruited himself, Kuo then recruited two U.S. Defense Departmentofficials, Gregg Bergersen and James Fondren, to provide him sensitive defenseinformation related U.S. concerns in the Asia-Pacific.
据香港媒体广泛引用的条文，中国军事情报机构聘用“商业骨干“，有些像办案人员却不是正式的政府雇员。这类商人有政府证件并帮助政府情报官员招募可能拥有重要信息的外国人。
有个人或许被介绍过他叫郭太生，美籍华人，生活在路易斯安州的商人，他在2008年以间谍罪被逮捕。（他是）一位促进美-中商业关系——广州友好协会的中国情报官员。郭被招募后，聘请了两名美国国防部官员，分别是格雷格和杰姆斯丰德伦柏格森，为他提供敏感的关于美国所关注亚太地区的国防信息

Chinaalso hides intelligence officers overseas using commercial cover—sometimes allowing them toemigrate and gain legitimate foreign documentation. Last year, Taiwanesecounterintelligence (with U.S. assistance) uncovered a high-level penetrationin Taiwan’s military. A Chinese intelligenceofficer living as an Australian businesswoman in Thailand handled General LoHsien-che—director of armytelecommunications and electronic information at the time of his arrest—while he posted in Thailand as a military attaché in the early 2000s. She and/or another Chinese intelligence officerreportedly lured Lo into a situation where he could be blackmailed and thenoffered to pay him thousands of dollars in exchange for cooperating withChinese intelligence.

中国为了隐藏海外情报人员会利用商业身份作掩护——有时会允许他们移民海外，以获得合法的海外身份。去年，台湾反情报部门（在美国的协助下）发现台湾军方高层被渗透。一名中国情报人员以澳大利亚女商人身份在泰国操纵罗贤哲（谢谢，@Rel_mayer 的提示：）——在他被捕之前是名陆军通信与电子信息主管——早在2000年他的职位就是泰国的一名军官。她和/或另一个中国的情报官员设局利诱 罗 ，当他受到利诱之后支付给他数千美元作为交换条件，（迫使他）与中国情报部门进行合作。
（完）