米淫对二毛局势的另类观点

http://www.guancha.cn/Greg-Cusack/2014_03_07_211658.shtml

The Ukraine Situation: One American’s Perspective

        Greg Cusack

        The turmoil in Ukraine in recent weeks, heightened by Russia’s dispatching of military forces to Crimea, has prompted predictable cries of outrage from right-wing American politicians accusing U.S. President Obama of “weakness” for not responding more forcefully. My own reaction is decidedly more mixed. While I think Russian President Putin’s decision to send forces into Crimea increased tensions and introduced unnecessary risks, I also share the Russian perspective that recent developments in the Ukraine appear to be outside the law.

Just a couple of weeks ago, Russia participated with other European representatives in brokering a layered agreement between representatives of protestors in Kyiv and Ukraine’s president, Mr. Yanukovich. (Russia had for some time been expressing its concern that many of the street protestors represented far-right nationalists who in no way represented the sentiments of the peoples of eastern and southern Ukraine.) This agreement allowed Mr. Yanukovich to remain in power, but also contained many reform measures, including holding an election for the presidency before 2014 ended. Only a few days later, however, this arrangement collapsed and the president fled the capital. It is important to remember that it was not Mr. Yanukovich who reneged on the agreement.

Russian President Mr. Putin alleges that this was clearly an instance of “mob rule,” and that the subsequent deposition of Mr. Yanukovich lacked legal standing. Concurrently, many citizens of the eastern and southern portions of Ukraine began calling for Russian assistance to counter this usurpation of power.

Unfortunately, rather than joining Mr. Putin in calling for a return to the terms of the brokered agreement, Western nations welcomed the turn of events by acknowledging the legitimacy of the new government in Kiev and the deposition of Mr. Yanukovich. I suspect that if it had been President Yanukovich who had broken the agreement, the West’s reaction would have been quite different. This, coupled with America’s lecturing Russia about violating international law by invading another country – despite America’s invasions and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – had to have struck Mr. Putin as the height of hypocrisy.

Does Russia Have Cause to be Suspicious of Western Intentions?

In international affairs, memories are long and perceived, unresolved slights can fester. One does not have to be a defender of Mr. Putin to understand that – from Russia’s point of view – this incident is yet another instance where the United States and other Western powers have behaved as if Russia’s concerns were, at best, of secondary importance.

Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Russian leaders believe they received what they thought was a firm promise that NATO would not expand eastward to welcome as member states former members of the Soviet Union. As recently as 2009, former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev angrily repeated the charge that the West had broken its promise. While Mr. Medvedev’s recollection of events may not be correct in every detail, some of the key players involved at the time thought that, indeed, just such a promise had been made. [See “NATO’s Eastward Expansion: Did the West Break Its Promise to Moscow,” Der Spiegel, November 26, 2009.]

Furthermore, when the United States announced that it would station in Poland missiles capable of intercepting any warheads that might be launched from Iran, Russia objected that this system could also be used against Russia’s missile force. While the United States acknowledged this concern, it neither partnered with Russia for an alternative solution nor cancelled its deployment plans.

Historical Realities and Russian Memories

The Ukrainian and Russian peoples’ cultural and historical ties are complex, having begun over a thousand years ago with a grouping of Slavic peoples organized as the Kievan Rus’, the precursor to the nation of Russia. A good part of what is modern Ukraine was this peoples’ homeland. By the 16th and 17th centuries, however, the cultural divide between the western portion of Ukraine – seeking closer ties with the West – and the eastern and southern portions – with historically closer ties to Russia – had already developed. Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union in 1922 as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. During the chaos of the Second World War, many Ukrainians fought against both the Nazis and the Soviets in a desperate struggle for national independence. In 1945, those efforts having failed, the Ukrainian SSR was one of the founding members of the United Nations; it remained part of the Soviet Union until the latter’s dissolution in 1991.

One of Stalin’s key concerns following WW II was to make certain that neighboring countries through which the West had twice invaded Russia – France in 1812 and Germany in 1941 – were dependably allied with Russia. While the autocratic nature of these states caused alarm in the West and led to the onset of the period known as the Cold War, the West has apparently forgotten why Russia wants reliably friendly neighboring states.

In truth, why should Russia be any more passive in this respect than the United States? Other nations certainly remember the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, when the American president essentially told the rest of the world to keep its hands off the entire Western Hemisphere. And, as the United States gained in economic and military power, it became even more aggressive in asserting its right to ensure that countries in its hemisphere were friendly to it. As recently as the early 1960s the U.S. and Russia came to the brink of nuclear war because of Russian missiles in Cuba and, in the 1970s America funded the Contra forces warring against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. My point here is not that past American violations of international law warrant similar behavior by other states today but, rather, that knowledge of our past ought to infuse America’s diplomatic efforts with greater wisdom and a generous heaping of humility.

Conclusion

What is the best outcome we can hope for in Ukraine? Well, for one thing, we can all celebrate the remarkable fact that, so far at least, this has been a bloodless confrontation. Praise to all involved! Moving forward, the West should take every opportunity to reassure Russia – and remind Ukraine’s leadership – that the West respects and supports Ukraine’s special relationship with Russia. This should not be an “either/or” tug of war between Russia and the West. There is every reason for all parties involved to celebrate the many diverse cultures and their histories in Ukraine. Greater Europe (including Russia) is richer for it.

But there may have to be some political changes. For instance, Ukraine could adopt a more federal structure, allowing greater autonomy of, and representation to, its various regions. Doing so might lesson the otherwise secessionist impulses of many in the eastern and southern portions of the Ukraine. Nonetheless, if the citizens of Crimea, for instance, vote to secede from Ukraine and petition to be annexed by Russia, the Ukrainian leadership may well have to choose between swallowing hard and allowing it, or initiating military force to attempt to stop it.

I do not pretend to know what the wisest option might be. Of this I am certain, however: Violence is never a satisfactory answer. Only the slow, laborious process of seeking mutual respect, understanding, and the pursuit of collective self-interest holds the promise of breaking the cycle of rivalry, anger and recrimination. And this process can best be facilitated if all parties would truly work for solutions that would best honor the interests of both Ukraine and Russia.

I have noticed that China’s government, while neither endorsing nor condemning Russia’s actions, has called for restraint and consultation on all sides. Perhaps China could offer her services as just the kind of “honest broker” this situation needs. This is one of the heavy burdens that nations with world power status must occasionally assume.

     

   【观察者网按】乌克兰纷乱继续，西方各国骑虎难下，普京在记者会上从容表态、踌躇满志，奥巴马政府却只能依靠一味提高调门来维持均衡。但一些美国有识之士开始认真考虑情况。爱荷华州前议员Greg Cusack希望通过Shanghai Daily和观察者网来表达他被奥巴马忽视的意见。作为老一代statesman，Cusack能秉承传统政治实用主义伦理——在必须认输的情况下就认真认输，不拘泥于抽象意识形态。当意识到普京一手好牌，他表示应该理解俄罗斯的做法，尤其回顾历史，俄罗斯被北约欺骗是事实。美国人有门罗主义，为什么俄罗斯不能考虑自己的核心利益。政治不能依靠极端手段，只能依靠艰苦具体的努力。

        我们当然知道美国政客不是每时每刻都会想起公道。他要提醒的是，在劣势情况下还要坚持骑虎不下是非常不对的。他最后谈到中国政府态度不明确，呼吁中国政府担当“真诚的调停者”。但我们相信Cusack先生一定能够理解，正如他所说的，非此即彼的“明确”态度并不能解决问题，要相信中国政府通过艰苦努力和智慧博弈来推动世界和平与发展的能力。本文由《上海日报》独家合作英文供稿。

【全文如下】：

        俄罗斯军队开进克里米亚，使近几周来持续紧张的乌克兰局势趋于白热化。可以预见，震怒的美国右翼政客们纷纷指责奥巴马总统在克里米亚问题上过于“软弱”。在这个问题上，我个人的看法比较复杂。一方面，我认为俄罗斯总统普京做出进军克里米亚的决定，激化了当地紧张局势，带来了不必要的风险；另一方面，我能够理解俄罗斯的立场——乌克兰局势近来不断升级，确实超出了宪法的约束。

        就在数周前，在俄罗斯与欧洲多国代表的共同斡旋下，尚未被解除总统职务的亚努科维奇与反对派代表达成了分层协议（俄罗斯早先就已对乌克兰反对派队伍中极右翼民族主义势力表达过关切，认为他们完全无法代表乌东部和南部地区人民的意愿）。基辅协议允许亚努科维奇在接受多项改革措施的前提下继续掌权，但必须在2014年年底前举行总统大选。仅仅几日后，该项协议便成为一纸空文，亚努科维奇逃离首都。然而，背弃协议的不是亚努科维奇，这一点我们必须搞清楚。

        俄罗斯总统普京宣称，发生在乌克兰的事件是一场违宪政变，是“暴民统治”，议会罢黜亚努科维奇缺少合法性。与此同时，乌克兰东部和南部地区大批公民请求俄罗斯支援，与武力篡权者抗衡。

        不幸的是，西方国家非但没有与普京一起呼吁各方重新回到谈判桌上，反而迫不及待地认定了亚努科维奇的免职，并承认了乌克兰新政府的合法性。如果违反基辅协议的是亚努科维奇，西方的反应想必大不相同。在批评俄罗斯入侵别国有违国际法的同时，美国何不反省自身当初在伊拉克和阿富汗的侵略行径？西方政客如此虚伪，普京怎能不嗤之以鼻？

        俄罗斯是否应当怀疑西方的目的？

        在国际事务中，历史的记忆是长久的，影响是深远的。小问题不解决好总会出大乱子。我并非为普京辩护，但从俄罗斯的立场出发，乌克兰事件是美国和其他西方国家无视或轻视俄罗斯利益的又一例证。

        1991年苏联解体后，俄罗斯领导人们本以为获得了北约不向苏联加盟共和国扩张的许诺。可就在2009年，时任俄罗斯总统的梅德韦杰夫愤怒地指责西方背弃承诺。虽然梅氏对往事的回忆在细节上不一定完全准确，但一些关键性的历史参与者们表示，西方确实对俄罗斯做出过这样的承诺。（参见《明镜周刊》2009年11月26日刊文“北约东扩：西方是否背弃了对莫斯科的承诺”）

        此外，当美国公布东欧反导计划时，俄罗斯明确表示反对，因为俄认为美国部署在波兰的反导导弹虽是为了拦截伊朗可能发射的带核弹头的弹道导弹，但也可能被用以针对俄罗斯的导弹力量。美国虽然表示理解俄罗斯的担心，但既没有与俄罗斯共同研究新方案，也没有取消部署计划。

        历史的现实与俄罗斯的记忆

         一千多年前，当东斯拉夫人建立起俄罗斯的前身——基辅罗斯的时候，乌克兰民族便与俄罗斯民族结下了爱恨交织的深厚渊源。当今乌克兰国土的很大一部分，是罗斯人的故园。16、17世纪时，乌克兰的东西部之间已经出现了巨大的文化差异——西部亲欧、东部亲俄。1922年，乌克兰苏维埃社会主义共和国加盟苏联。在第二次世界大战中，许多乌克兰民族主义者不顾一切地争取民族独立，既抗击纳粹又与苏军作战。1945年，乌克兰人争取独立的斗争终告失败，乌克兰苏维埃社会主义共和国成为联合国创始成员国之一。直到1991年苏联解体后，乌克兰才获取独立。

        二战结束后，斯大林最关心的事，是促使周边盟国依附于俄罗斯，确保它们不再成为欧洲国家侵俄（法国1812年、德国1941年）的跳板。冷战揭幕时，西方国家对苏联附属国政权的专制性质充满警惕，已全然忘记苏俄需要友好邻邦的根本原因。

        事实上，在乌克兰问题上，俄罗斯有理由比美国表现得更加积极。其他国家应该对美国于1823年提出的门罗主义记忆犹新，时任总统的门罗相当于对全世界下了禁令，宣布其他国家不得干涉整个西半球的事务。随着经济和军事实力的增强，美国在维护势力范围内的友盟关系时，变得越来越具有攻击性。上世纪六十年代初，由于古巴导弹危机，美国和苏联之间几乎爆发核战争；七十年代，美国扶植尼加拉瓜反动派打击桑地诺民族解放阵线的革命斗争。我想说明的是，美国过去违反国际法的行径，固然不能成为其他国家今天的借口，但美国外交人员如能以史为鉴，应能更智慧和谦卑地处理当今的外交事务。

        结语

        对乌克兰来说，什么样的结局才是最好的？我不敢妄言，但我们应该为对峙双方的克制感到庆幸，至少没有爆发大规模流血冲突。相关各方都应得到赞赏。未来，西方国家应当尽所有可能，让俄罗斯确信西方将尊重并支持乌克兰与俄罗斯的特殊关系；同时也要让乌克兰当局明白这一点。这不应是一场俄罗斯与西方之间非此即彼的角力。相关各方都应维护乌克兰文化与历史的多样性，包括俄罗斯在内的大欧罗巴地区更应理解这一点。

        但是，乌克兰政治已经到了不得不改变的地步。乌克兰未来的政治结构或许可以参考联邦制，允许各地区获得更大的自治权和代表权。这样做可以让乌克兰东部和南部的分离主义者得到教训。不过，如果克里米亚人民真的投票决定脱乌入俄，乌克兰当局除了被迫接受和武装干预外，也没有更多选择的余地。

        我不知道什么是最明智的选择，但我确信一点：使用暴力绝对得不到令人满意的结果。只有在相互尊重、相互理解的基础上，通过艰苦漫长的谈判，追求共同利益，才有希望打破彼此敌视、怨恨、指责的恶性循环。只有相关各方真诚合作，才能促使乌克兰与俄罗斯拿出符合双方利益的解决方案。

        我注意到，中国政府对俄罗斯的行动既未表示支持，也未明确反对，而是呼吁各方保持克制、进行磋商。乌克兰需要一个“真诚的调停者”，或许中国可以扮演这个角色。这是世界大国偶尔必须承担的沉重包袱之一。

     （英文原文见《上海日报》（Shanghai Daily）2014年3月7日。作者Greg Cusack曾做过历史和政治学教师，美国国家天主教乡村生活会主任；曾任爱荷华州众议院议员，已于2004年退出公共服务领域。本文由观察者网杨晗轶翻译。） http://www.guancha.cn/Greg-Cusack/2014_03_07_211658.shtml

The Ukraine Situation: One American’s Perspective

        Greg Cusack

        The turmoil in Ukraine in recent weeks, heightened by Russia’s dispatching of military forces to Crimea, has prompted predictable cries of outrage from right-wing American politicians accusing U.S. President Obama of “weakness” for not responding more forcefully. My own reaction is decidedly more mixed. While I think Russian President Putin’s decision to send forces into Crimea increased tensions and introduced unnecessary risks, I also share the Russian perspective that recent developments in the Ukraine appear to be outside the law.

Just a couple of weeks ago, Russia participated with other European representatives in brokering a layered agreement between representatives of protestors in Kyiv and Ukraine’s president, Mr. Yanukovich. (Russia had for some time been expressing its concern that many of the street protestors represented far-right nationalists who in no way represented the sentiments of the peoples of eastern and southern Ukraine.) This agreement allowed Mr. Yanukovich to remain in power, but also contained many reform measures, including holding an election for the presidency before 2014 ended. Only a few days later, however, this arrangement collapsed and the president fled the capital. It is important to remember that it was not Mr. Yanukovich who reneged on the agreement.

Russian President Mr. Putin alleges that this was clearly an instance of “mob rule,” and that the subsequent deposition of Mr. Yanukovich lacked legal standing. Concurrently, many citizens of the eastern and southern portions of Ukraine began calling for Russian assistance to counter this usurpation of power.

Unfortunately, rather than joining Mr. Putin in calling for a return to the terms of the brokered agreement, Western nations welcomed the turn of events by acknowledging the legitimacy of the new government in Kiev and the deposition of Mr. Yanukovich. I suspect that if it had been President Yanukovich who had broken the agreement, the West’s reaction would have been quite different. This, coupled with America’s lecturing Russia about violating international law by invading another country – despite America’s invasions and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – had to have struck Mr. Putin as the height of hypocrisy.

Does Russia Have Cause to be Suspicious of Western Intentions?

In international affairs, memories are long and perceived, unresolved slights can fester. One does not have to be a defender of Mr. Putin to understand that – from Russia’s point of view – this incident is yet another instance where the United States and other Western powers have behaved as if Russia’s concerns were, at best, of secondary importance.

Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Russian leaders believe they received what they thought was a firm promise that NATO would not expand eastward to welcome as member states former members of the Soviet Union. As recently as 2009, former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev angrily repeated the charge that the West had broken its promise. While Mr. Medvedev’s recollection of events may not be correct in every detail, some of the key players involved at the time thought that, indeed, just such a promise had been made. [See “NATO’s Eastward Expansion: Did the West Break Its Promise to Moscow,” Der Spiegel, November 26, 2009.]

Furthermore, when the United States announced that it would station in Poland missiles capable of intercepting any warheads that might be launched from Iran, Russia objected that this system could also be used against Russia’s missile force. While the United States acknowledged this concern, it neither partnered with Russia for an alternative solution nor cancelled its deployment plans.

Historical Realities and Russian Memories

The Ukrainian and Russian peoples’ cultural and historical ties are complex, having begun over a thousand years ago with a grouping of Slavic peoples organized as the Kievan Rus’, the precursor to the nation of Russia. A good part of what is modern Ukraine was this peoples’ homeland. By the 16th and 17th centuries, however, the cultural divide between the western portion of Ukraine – seeking closer ties with the West – and the eastern and southern portions – with historically closer ties to Russia – had already developed. Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union in 1922 as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. During the chaos of the Second World War, many Ukrainians fought against both the Nazis and the Soviets in a desperate struggle for national independence. In 1945, those efforts having failed, the Ukrainian SSR was one of the founding members of the United Nations; it remained part of the Soviet Union until the latter’s dissolution in 1991.

One of Stalin’s key concerns following WW II was to make certain that neighboring countries through which the West had twice invaded Russia – France in 1812 and Germany in 1941 – were dependably allied with Russia. While the autocratic nature of these states caused alarm in the West and led to the onset of the period known as the Cold War, the West has apparently forgotten why Russia wants reliably friendly neighboring states.

In truth, why should Russia be any more passive in this respect than the United States? Other nations certainly remember the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, when the American president essentially told the rest of the world to keep its hands off the entire Western Hemisphere. And, as the United States gained in economic and military power, it became even more aggressive in asserting its right to ensure that countries in its hemisphere were friendly to it. As recently as the early 1960s the U.S. and Russia came to the brink of nuclear war because of Russian missiles in Cuba and, in the 1970s America funded the Contra forces warring against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. My point here is not that past American violations of international law warrant similar behavior by other states today but, rather, that knowledge of our past ought to infuse America’s diplomatic efforts with greater wisdom and a generous heaping of humility.

Conclusion

What is the best outcome we can hope for in Ukraine? Well, for one thing, we can all celebrate the remarkable fact that, so far at least, this has been a bloodless confrontation. Praise to all involved! Moving forward, the West should take every opportunity to reassure Russia – and remind Ukraine’s leadership – that the West respects and supports Ukraine’s special relationship with Russia. This should not be an “either/or” tug of war between Russia and the West. There is every reason for all parties involved to celebrate the many diverse cultures and their histories in Ukraine. Greater Europe (including Russia) is richer for it.

But there may have to be some political changes. For instance, Ukraine could adopt a more federal structure, allowing greater autonomy of, and representation to, its various regions. Doing so might lesson the otherwise secessionist impulses of many in the eastern and southern portions of the Ukraine. Nonetheless, if the citizens of Crimea, for instance, vote to secede from Ukraine and petition to be annexed by Russia, the Ukrainian leadership may well have to choose between swallowing hard and allowing it, or initiating military force to attempt to stop it.

I do not pretend to know what the wisest option might be. Of this I am certain, however: Violence is never a satisfactory answer. Only the slow, laborious process of seeking mutual respect, understanding, and the pursuit of collective self-interest holds the promise of breaking the cycle of rivalry, anger and recrimination. And this process can best be facilitated if all parties would truly work for solutions that would best honor the interests of both Ukraine and Russia.

I have noticed that China’s government, while neither endorsing nor condemning Russia’s actions, has called for restraint and consultation on all sides. Perhaps China could offer her services as just the kind of “honest broker” this situation needs. This is one of the heavy burdens that nations with world power status must occasionally assume.

     

   【观察者网按】乌克兰纷乱继续，西方各国骑虎难下，普京在记者会上从容表态、踌躇满志，奥巴马政府却只能依靠一味提高调门来维持均衡。但一些美国有识之士开始认真考虑情况。爱荷华州前议员Greg Cusack希望通过Shanghai Daily和观察者网来表达他被奥巴马忽视的意见。作为老一代statesman，Cusack能秉承传统政治实用主义伦理——在必须认输的情况下就认真认输，不拘泥于抽象意识形态。当意识到普京一手好牌，他表示应该理解俄罗斯的做法，尤其回顾历史，俄罗斯被北约欺骗是事实。美国人有门罗主义，为什么俄罗斯不能考虑自己的核心利益。政治不能依靠极端手段，只能依靠艰苦具体的努力。

        我们当然知道美国政客不是每时每刻都会想起公道。他要提醒的是，在劣势情况下还要坚持骑虎不下是非常不对的。他最后谈到中国政府态度不明确，呼吁中国政府担当“真诚的调停者”。但我们相信Cusack先生一定能够理解，正如他所说的，非此即彼的“明确”态度并不能解决问题，要相信中国政府通过艰苦努力和智慧博弈来推动世界和平与发展的能力。本文由《上海日报》独家合作英文供稿。

【全文如下】：

        俄罗斯军队开进克里米亚，使近几周来持续紧张的乌克兰局势趋于白热化。可以预见，震怒的美国右翼政客们纷纷指责奥巴马总统在克里米亚问题上过于“软弱”。在这个问题上，我个人的看法比较复杂。一方面，我认为俄罗斯总统普京做出进军克里米亚的决定，激化了当地紧张局势，带来了不必要的风险；另一方面，我能够理解俄罗斯的立场——乌克兰局势近来不断升级，确实超出了宪法的约束。

        就在数周前，在俄罗斯与欧洲多国代表的共同斡旋下，尚未被解除总统职务的亚努科维奇与反对派代表达成了分层协议（俄罗斯早先就已对乌克兰反对派队伍中极右翼民族主义势力表达过关切，认为他们完全无法代表乌东部和南部地区人民的意愿）。基辅协议允许亚努科维奇在接受多项改革措施的前提下继续掌权，但必须在2014年年底前举行总统大选。仅仅几日后，该项协议便成为一纸空文，亚努科维奇逃离首都。然而，背弃协议的不是亚努科维奇，这一点我们必须搞清楚。

        俄罗斯总统普京宣称，发生在乌克兰的事件是一场违宪政变，是“暴民统治”，议会罢黜亚努科维奇缺少合法性。与此同时，乌克兰东部和南部地区大批公民请求俄罗斯支援，与武力篡权者抗衡。

        不幸的是，西方国家非但没有与普京一起呼吁各方重新回到谈判桌上，反而迫不及待地认定了亚努科维奇的免职，并承认了乌克兰新政府的合法性。如果违反基辅协议的是亚努科维奇，西方的反应想必大不相同。在批评俄罗斯入侵别国有违国际法的同时，美国何不反省自身当初在伊拉克和阿富汗的侵略行径？西方政客如此虚伪，普京怎能不嗤之以鼻？

        俄罗斯是否应当怀疑西方的目的？

        在国际事务中，历史的记忆是长久的，影响是深远的。小问题不解决好总会出大乱子。我并非为普京辩护，但从俄罗斯的立场出发，乌克兰事件是美国和其他西方国家无视或轻视俄罗斯利益的又一例证。

        1991年苏联解体后，俄罗斯领导人们本以为获得了北约不向苏联加盟共和国扩张的许诺。可就在2009年，时任俄罗斯总统的梅德韦杰夫愤怒地指责西方背弃承诺。虽然梅氏对往事的回忆在细节上不一定完全准确，但一些关键性的历史参与者们表示，西方确实对俄罗斯做出过这样的承诺。（参见《明镜周刊》2009年11月26日刊文“北约东扩：西方是否背弃了对莫斯科的承诺”）

        此外，当美国公布东欧反导计划时，俄罗斯明确表示反对，因为俄认为美国部署在波兰的反导导弹虽是为了拦截伊朗可能发射的带核弹头的弹道导弹，但也可能被用以针对俄罗斯的导弹力量。美国虽然表示理解俄罗斯的担心，但既没有与俄罗斯共同研究新方案，也没有取消部署计划。

        历史的现实与俄罗斯的记忆

         一千多年前，当东斯拉夫人建立起俄罗斯的前身——基辅罗斯的时候，乌克兰民族便与俄罗斯民族结下了爱恨交织的深厚渊源。当今乌克兰国土的很大一部分，是罗斯人的故园。16、17世纪时，乌克兰的东西部之间已经出现了巨大的文化差异——西部亲欧、东部亲俄。1922年，乌克兰苏维埃社会主义共和国加盟苏联。在第二次世界大战中，许多乌克兰民族主义者不顾一切地争取民族独立，既抗击纳粹又与苏军作战。1945年，乌克兰人争取独立的斗争终告失败，乌克兰苏维埃社会主义共和国成为联合国创始成员国之一。直到1991年苏联解体后，乌克兰才获取独立。

        二战结束后，斯大林最关心的事，是促使周边盟国依附于俄罗斯，确保它们不再成为欧洲国家侵俄（法国1812年、德国1941年）的跳板。冷战揭幕时，西方国家对苏联附属国政权的专制性质充满警惕，已全然忘记苏俄需要友好邻邦的根本原因。

        事实上，在乌克兰问题上，俄罗斯有理由比美国表现得更加积极。其他国家应该对美国于1823年提出的门罗主义记忆犹新，时任总统的门罗相当于对全世界下了禁令，宣布其他国家不得干涉整个西半球的事务。随着经济和军事实力的增强，美国在维护势力范围内的友盟关系时，变得越来越具有攻击性。上世纪六十年代初，由于古巴导弹危机，美国和苏联之间几乎爆发核战争；七十年代，美国扶植尼加拉瓜反动派打击桑地诺民族解放阵线的革命斗争。我想说明的是，美国过去违反国际法的行径，固然不能成为其他国家今天的借口，但美国外交人员如能以史为鉴，应能更智慧和谦卑地处理当今的外交事务。

        结语

        对乌克兰来说，什么样的结局才是最好的？我不敢妄言，但我们应该为对峙双方的克制感到庆幸，至少没有爆发大规模流血冲突。相关各方都应得到赞赏。未来，西方国家应当尽所有可能，让俄罗斯确信西方将尊重并支持乌克兰与俄罗斯的特殊关系；同时也要让乌克兰当局明白这一点。这不应是一场俄罗斯与西方之间非此即彼的角力。相关各方都应维护乌克兰文化与历史的多样性，包括俄罗斯在内的大欧罗巴地区更应理解这一点。

        但是，乌克兰政治已经到了不得不改变的地步。乌克兰未来的政治结构或许可以参考联邦制，允许各地区获得更大的自治权和代表权。这样做可以让乌克兰东部和南部的分离主义者得到教训。不过，如果克里米亚人民真的投票决定脱乌入俄，乌克兰当局除了被迫接受和武装干预外，也没有更多选择的余地。

        我不知道什么是最明智的选择，但我确信一点：使用暴力绝对得不到令人满意的结果。只有在相互尊重、相互理解的基础上，通过艰苦漫长的谈判，追求共同利益，才有希望打破彼此敌视、怨恨、指责的恶性循环。只有相关各方真诚合作，才能促使乌克兰与俄罗斯拿出符合双方利益的解决方案。

        我注意到，中国政府对俄罗斯的行动既未表示支持，也未明确反对，而是呼吁各方保持克制、进行磋商。乌克兰需要一个“真诚的调停者”，或许中国可以扮演这个角色。这是世界大国偶尔必须承担的沉重包袱之一。

     （英文原文见《上海日报》（Shanghai Daily）2014年3月7日。作者Greg Cusack曾做过历史和政治学教师，美国国家天主教乡村生活会主任；曾任爱荷华州众议院议员，已于2004年退出公共服务领域。本文由观察者网杨晗轶翻译。）