超级军网外交家:蓝色意味着蓝水:中国的海军野心
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 15:33:40
文章刊发刊物】《外交家》（The Diplomat）
【文章刊发日期】2014年1月7日
【原文来源链接】http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/b ... tions/?allpages=yes
【原文作者】亨利·霍尔斯特（Henry Holst）
【译文作者】hsjjww
Blue Means Blue: China’s Naval Ambitions
蓝色意味着蓝水:中国的海军野心
Numerous articles in Chinese state media suggest it has an ambitious agenda for its navy.
中国官方媒体许多文章表明，中国在其海军上有着雄心勃勃的打算。
翻译：龙腾
Image Credit: REUTERS/Stringer
(图片来源：路透社/特约)
In a 2012 article published in The Diplomat, Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins claim “China seeks to develop a ‘blue water’ navy in the years to come—but one that is more ‘regional’ than ‘global’ in nature,” and that China does not intend to challenge U.S. naval hegemony. However, analyzing China’s maritime identity, a concept that will be explained below, and it becomes clear that two major long-term goals of the PLAN’s blue-water modernization are to frequently deploy outside East Asia and challenge U.S. naval dominance on the high seas.
在2012年《外交官》一篇文章上，安德鲁·埃里克森和盖柏·柯林斯宣称“中国这些年来正寻求发展其蓝水海军，但其实质上更注重‘区域性’而非‘全球性’”，并且中国也不会试图挑战美国海军霸权。然而，分析一下中国大洋角色（含义见下文），就会发现以下两个中国人民解放军海军蓝水现代化的长期主要目标：一是能够在东亚之外频繁部署；二是能够在公海上挑战美国海军霸权。
Erickson and Collins cite Chinese naval technological inferiority in areas such as anti-submarine warfare and area-air defense vis-à-vis the U.S. navy as evidence that the PLAN does not intend to challenge U.S. naval hegemony, concluding that such a military imbalance would make any challenge futile. Additionally, Erickson and Collins use the small number of PLAN deployments outside of East Asia as proof that in the future Beijing does not aim to frequently outside its immediate environs.
埃里克森和柯林斯引用了中国海军在一些领域的技术劣势来表明解放军海军无意挑战美国海军霸权，比如反潜战和对美海军的区域防空能力。因此，他们认为，在如此军事悬殊下，任何挑战都是徒劳的。此外，他们还以解放军海军东亚外为数不多的部署来证明，北京无意在中国周边之外频繁动作。
* Erickson and Collins represent a popular trend within the China watcher community; many researchers rely on current PLAN armament modernization areas and recent deployment trends as a basis to predict future PLAN strategic objectives. Yet this methodology ignores the possibility that current PLAN research and development patterns may not predict future PLAN capabilities. China has bypassed generations of military technology hurdles through unorthodox means such as theft and espionage. Moreover, military capabilities are not self-deterministic. Analyzing China’s naval modernization in a purely material perspective and overly relying on current PLAN deployment trends does not provide a useful methodology for predicting future PLAN strategic interests.
埃里克森和柯林斯代表了中国观察界的一种流行趋势。许多研究者以时下解放军海军军备现代化领域以及最近部署趋势为基础来预测解放军海军未来战略目标。但这种方法忽视了一个可能性。那就是时下的解放军海军研究和发展模式并不能预言未来解放军海军的能力。中国通过一些非正式的手段绕过了军事技术代差，比如剽窃和刺探。而且，军事能力还取决于其他方面。通过唯技术论来分析中国海军现代化和过于以解放军海军实时动向为基础，并不能提供一种有用的方式来预测未来解放军海军的战略利益。
Maritime Identity
大洋角色
Analyzing China’s maritime identity provides a superior methodology in anticipating future PLAN strategic interests. Maritime identity is a nation’s inherited maritime traditions, responsibilities, prerogatives, self-concept and strategic interests as a naval power. It frames the strategic discussion that occurs at high levels of government and therefore wields enormous influence over foreign policy. Washington’s willingness to employ naval forces in support of Libyan rebels fighting Gaddafi in 2011 reflected America’s maritime identity, which is famous for supporting democracy, human rights and self-determination worldwide. The American maritime identity is perfectly summed up in the U.S. Navy recruiting slogan: “A Global Force For Good.”In a similar way, analyzing the personality of China’s developing maritime identity is a practical method by which to gauge future Chinese naval strategic interests.
分析中国大洋角色提供了一个更好的方式来预测未来解放军海军的战略利益。大洋角色是一个国家作为一种海军力量所继承的海洋传统、责任、特权、自我概念以及战略利益。它构建了政府高层的战略讨论，因而在对外政策上具有重大影响。在2011年，华盛顿派遣海军支持利比亚反政府武装打击卡扎菲的意愿反映了美国的大洋角色。该角色以支持民主、人权和民族自决而闻名全球。美国大洋角色完美诠释了美国海军征募标语“一个为了美好事物的全球力量”。相似地，可以通过分析中国发展中的大洋角色的品格，来预测中国海军的战略利益。这是个有效的方式。
How does one ascertain China’s maritime identity? Analyzing Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-run newspaper articles in the People’s Daily provides an excellent conduit into the strategic thinking of China’s decision-making apparatus. This is because the People’s Daily serves as the mouthpiece of the CCP Standing Committee. For those unfamiliar with China’s system of government, imagine a totalitarian government having an elected body of seven individuals who wield total control over state affairs, and then broadcast their opinions directly through a controlled media body. Analyzing Chinese domestic media discussion on whether China should pursue a full-fledged blue-water navy (蓝水海军) , a pursuit both tightly bound to a country’s maritime identity and highly relevant to future PLAN strategic interests, sheds light on the strategic discussions occurring at high levels within the CCP.
人们如何确定中国大洋角色？通过分析《人民日报》上由中国GCD主导的新闻文章，可以给我们提供一个了解中国决策机构战略思想的良好渠道。这是因为《人民日报》是中共中央常委会的喉舌。对于那些不熟悉中国政体的人而言，中国政府的印象就是一个有着七人代议机构的极权政府。他们不仅全面操控国家事务，而且还通过控制媒体界来宣扬他们的观念。通过分析中国国内媒体在中国是否应该建设一支成熟的蓝水海军上的讨论，可以令我们明晰发生在中共高层的战略讨论。因为这一建设与国家大洋角色和未来解放军海军战略利益密切相关。
New Developments
新发展
The People’s Daily published few articles that discussed a blue-water navy before 2008. In 2008, China joined the international coalition that deployed ships to the Gulf of Aden in order to safeguard international shipping from Somali piracy. This operation proved to be the PLAN’s debut on the world stage. This naval deployment was an immensely popular topic in the Chinese media. After all, these anti-piracy operations were the first Chinese naval deployment outside of China’s immediate seas in 600 years. The frequency of articles discussing China’s growing blue-water naval capabilities in the People’s Daily skyrocketed. Analyzing the context of these articles helps paint a picture of China’s evolving maritime identity and offers a counterpoint to discussions of future PLAN deployment trends and strategic interests.
《人民日报》在2008年前很少刊载讨论蓝水海军的文章。在2008年，中国派遣军舰参与了亚丁湾国际联合护航行动，保护国际航运免受索马里海盗之厄。这是解放军海军在世界舞台上的初次登场。这次海军行动一度成为中国媒体中的热点话题。毕竟，这些打击海盗的行动是中国海军600年以来第一次离开中国近海的海外行动。此后，频繁讨论中国蓝水海军培养能力的文章在《人民日报》上迅速增加。分析这些文章的背景有助于为我们描绘中国发展中大洋角色的轮廓，也能为我们讨论未来解放军海军动向和战略利益提供立足点。
After December 2008, the People’s Daily justification for the PLAN’s pursuit of blue-water capabilities consistently focused on becoming the equal of and defeating the U.S. Navy. These articles almost always featured antagonistic, belligerent, and in some cases combative rhetoric. This conflicts with Erickson and Collin’s statement that,
在2008年12月后，《人民日报》认为解放军海军发展蓝水能力的正当理由，持续焦注在为了取得和美国海军相抗衡的能力上。这些文章几乎总是充斥着一定程度上的对抗性的好战言辞。这与埃里克森和柯林斯的以下陈述截然相反，
“There is currently little evidence that China is building a blue water capability to confront a modern navy like the U.S beyond the PLAN’s East/Southeast Asian home-region waters. Beijing is accruing a limited expeditionary capability, but is not preparing to go head-to-head with U.S. carrier battle groups outside of East Asia and the Western Pacific”
“目前没有证据表明在东亚和东南亚领海外，中国正在发展能够比肩美国现代化海军一样的蓝水能力。虽然北京正逐渐发展一个有限的远征能力，但并不准备同美国派遣在东亚和西太平洋的作战舰群针锋相对”
In the last several years, the People’s Daily published many articles that would seem to contradict this. Below is a sampling of these articles:
前几个月，《人民日报》刊载了许多与埃里克森和柯林斯说法相反的文章。以下内容节选自这些文章：
· “It may take years to catch up with the level of the U.S. Navy, but the trend is obvious, Beijing has determined to challenge the hegemony of the United States on the high seas and rewrite the balance of power.”
· “也许要花好几年才能赶上美国海军，但趋势已经很明显了。北京已经决定挑战美国公海霸权并重塑权力平衡。”
· “China is seeking to establish a naval force capable of contending with the United States; to have a blue-water navy capable of global operations.”
· “中国正寻求建立一支能够与美国向抗衡的海军力量；想要拥有一支能够进行全球部署的蓝水海军。”
· “[the PLAN] will become a blue-water Navy, [and] appear beside the U.S. Navy.”
· “解放军海军将变成一支蓝水海军，并将出现在美国海军卧榻之侧。”
· “China’s blue-water Navy will in a few years constitute a real challenge to the United States Navy.”
· “中国蓝水海军不久后将对美国海军造成现实挑战。”
· “Washington may have won a battle but lost the war. It is just a matter of time for the creation of a Chinese blue-water Navy.”
· “华盛顿也许会赢得一次战斗但却输掉整个战争。中国蓝水海军的建成只是时间问题。”
· “China has begun to build a blue-water Navy, it has the ability to send its forces to Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.” This is from a People’s Daily article militaristically titled U.S Media Say That China’s Military Power and Network Threats Keep U.S. Military Officials Awake at Night.
· “中国已经开始发展蓝水海军，其有能力将其武装力量投放到阿拉斯加、夏威夷和关岛。”这来自《人民日报》的一篇军国主义式标题的文章《美媒说中国军事力量和网络威胁值得美军官夙夜警惕》
It is important to note that this message has remained constant over the last five years. In all of these instances, the United States is portrayed as the target and raison d’être of a blue-water PLAN. Erickson and Collins cite current PLAN armament modernization areas as evidence that China is unable to contest U.S. naval dominance. Their argument relies on several uncertain assumptions. First, they presume that the PLAN is not seeking to challenge the U.S. Navy because it will not have the technological capability to do so in the immediate future. This conclusion disregards the reality that over the last decade the Chinese military has acquired state-of-the-art armaments at lightning speed. Who would have predicted that China would leapfrog generations of fighter aircraft and acquire and produce the J-20 mere years after the first F-22 came off the production line? In the digital age there is no reliable way to predict future military capabilities. Just last week a Chinese smuggling ring was busted for attempting to transfer radiation hardened microchips, a necessary component for ballistic missile guidance, to the PLA. China certainly has the industrial capacity to build modern aircraft and naval vessels. Therefore, the assumption that the PLAN does not seek to challenge the U.S. Navy due to current technological inferiority is flawed.
需要强调的是，这类文章在过去五年间陈出不穷。在这些所有的例子中，美国都被描绘成中国蓝水海军的目标和存在意义。埃里克森和柯林斯引用了时下解放军海军的军备现代化领域作为中国无法挑战美国海军霸权的证据。他们的论证基于几个不确定的假设。首先，他们假设解放军海军不会试图挑战美海军，因为在不久的将来解放军海军仍然没有相符的技术能力来这样做。这个推论忽视了在过去十年间，中国军队以闪电般的速度获得了高尖端的军备这一现实。有谁预见了在第一条F-22战机生产线关闭后的仅仅几年间，中国就跨越了数代战斗机获得和生产J-20？在数字化时代，没有什么可靠的方式来预测未来的军事能力。就在上周，一个中国走私集团因试图向解放军走私抗辐射微芯（弹道导弹制导所必需的一种零件）而被破获。中国确实有制造现代飞行器和海军军舰的工业能力。因此，解放军海军因其技术劣势而不会寻求挑战美国海军的假设是错误的。
An analysis of China’s maritime identity leads to the conclusion that Beijing intends to frequently deploy a future blue-water PLAN outside East Asia and the Western Pacific. In recent years the People’s Daily has often called for the creation of a blue-water PLAN to defend China’s foreign economic interests, energy security, and important maritime choke points. The party organ has often been dismayed at the fact that maritime security for China’s energy imports is currently provided, or controlled by, foreign navies. These findings conflict with Erickson and Collins’ statement that,
通过对中国大洋角色的分析，可以得出北京有意将其未来的蓝水海军部署到东亚以外和西太平洋。最近几年，《人民日报》常常呼吁建立一支解放军蓝水海军以保护中国海外经济利益、能源安全和重要的海上要冲。党报常常对这样一个事实感到气馁，那就是中国能源进口海上安全目前受制于外国海军。这些都与埃里克森和柯林斯的以下陈述相反，
“there are no reliable indications at this time that China desires a truly global blue water navy akin to that of the U.S. today, or which the Soviet Union maintained for some time, albeit at the eventual cost of strategic overextension. China does seek to develop a “blue-water” navy in the years to come – but one that is more “regional” than “global” in nature.”
“并没有确定的迹象表明中国想要为了战略性过度扩张，而不计最终成本建立一支像今天美国一般的真正的全球化蓝水海军或者说像苏联曾经维持一段时间那样。中国近些年来试图发展其蓝水海军——但其实质并非‘全球性的’而更多的是‘地区性的’”。
In the last several years, the People’s Daily has published articles stating the following:
前几个月，《人民日报》刊载的一些文章做了如下陈述：
· “China’s push for a blue-water navy comes from oil insecurity and the protection of SLOCs, along with military balancing against India… China’s oil supply lines must be protected, especially [in the event of] war with India. During a war it is no secret India will try and intercept China’s oil imports.”
· “中国发展其蓝水海军源于石油不安、对海上交通线的保护以及维持对印度的军事平衡的需要......中国输油线应当受到保护，特别是万一与印度发生战争时。毫无疑问，在战争时印度会竭力阻断中国的石油输入。”
· “China’s dependence on foreign oil in 2020 will reach 68 percent, while imports of crude oil from Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran, Sudan…bypass the Strait of Malacca on their way to China…The U.S. can easily block the Strait of Malacca at its narrowest point, [this] is the throat of China’s energy supply.”
· “中国对外石油依赖在2020年将达至68%，而从沙特阿拉伯、安哥拉、伊朗、苏丹进口......绕不开路上的马六甲海峡......美国能够在其最狭窄处，轻易扼守住马六甲海峡，这是中国能源供应的咽喉之处。”
· “With the growing concern for the safety of sea lanes, Chinese leaders will build a blue-water Navy…China’s maritime commercial interests [totaled] more than $800 billion by the end of 2008, while more than 60 percent of oil imports are transported by sea.”
· “随着对航道安全的关注提升，中国领导人将建立一支蓝水海军......中国海洋商业利益在2008年末总计超过八千亿，而其超过60%石油进口要通过海上运输。”
· “The prime objective of China’s Navy is to develop a blue-water navy to protect China’s energy and trade routes.”
· “中国海军首要目标是发展成一支能够保护中国能源与贸易路线的蓝水海军。”
· “The global layout of China’s energy security and national interests, China is in need of a powerful blue-water navy.”
· “中国能源安全及国家利益的全球布局令中国需要一支有力的蓝水海军。”
· “China relies on overseas markets and raw materials, which will strongly stimulate the Chinese intervention around the world, and require building a blue-water navy to protect sea lanes.”
· “中国对海外市场和原材料的依赖将对中国进行全球干涉产生强烈刺激。中国需要建立一支蓝水海军以保护航线。”
· “We develop the ability of the ocean-going (blue-water) navy…to maintain international trade and energy supply lines open and safe.”
· “我们需要发展海军的远洋航行（蓝水）能力......为了维持国际贸易和能源供给线的开放与安全。”
A foreign navy can blockade Chinese international trade and oil imports far outside the Strait of Malacca. This detail cannot be lost on Chinese strategic planners. The U.S and Indian navies have the ability to create a blockade near the Strait of Hormuz or the Indian Ocean. If Chinese leaders increasingly consider China’s international trade and oil imports to be a national security Achilles heel, and a blue-water PLAN is intended to protect against this dilemma, future PLAN deployments will certainly occur outside East Asia. Future deployments may focus on projecting power into the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea.
外国海军远从马六甲海峡就能扼住中国国际贸易和石油进口。这些细节不会被中国决策者忽视。美国和印度海军有能力在霍尔木兹海峡或印度洋附近制造阻碍。如果中国领导人逐渐将中国国际贸易和石油输入视为国家安全的致命弱点的话，一支解放军蓝水海军将作为对此种窘境的应对。在未来，解放军海军将确定部署于东亚之外。未来的部署也许会侧重在印度洋、孟加拉湾以及阿拉伯海上投放力量。
China has not possessed a blue-water navy for 600 years. Analyzing China’s evolving maritime identity is crucial for U.S. military planners, especially with ever dwindling budgets. Erickson and Collins are correct in writing that, “China is not working off a traditional European, Soviet, or American naval development playbook.” It would be misguided to automatically assume China will behave similarly to past world powers. Analyzing China’s maritime identity through media analysis is perhaps the best way to gauge future Chinese actions, given the closed, opaque and chaotic internal politics of the CCP.
中国600年前未曾有过一支蓝水海军。分析中国发展中的大洋角色对美国决策者至关重要，特别是在预算大幅缩水的情况下。埃里克森和柯林斯写到的“中国并不会跟随传统的欧洲、苏联或者美国的海军发展轨迹”是正确的。但这可能会误致一个自发的假设：中国将像过去的世界强国一样行动。鉴于中共内部政策的封闭性、不透明性以及混乱性，通过媒体分析来分析中国的大洋角色，也许是推测未来中国行动的最好方式。
One important caveat to all this is that the CCP often makes militaristic media statements or military actions to shore up domestic political support. One example of this was China’s recent establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In the same way, People’s Daily articles calling for a blue-water PLAN to challenge U.S. naval hegemony may be an effort to appease domestic nationalists. However, even if these articles are only meant to influence domestic politics, they nonetheless reveal changes in Chinese domestic political opinion. This in itself is still useful in gauging future PLAN deployments. This domestic political pressure may influence future PLAN actions. Whether or not People’s Daily articles truly reveal the inner-strategic dialogue of the CCP, they are still an influential factor in analyzing future PLAN strategic developments.
最为重要的一个警告就是，中共常常制造军国主义式的媒体声明或采取军事行动来获得国内政治支持。一个例子就是，最近中国划设了涵盖具有争议性的钓鱼岛在内的东海防空识别区。同样的，《人民日报》上的文章呼吁建立一支能够挑战美国海军霸权的解放军蓝水海军，也许对其国内民族主义的出现起到了推波助澜的作用。然而，即使这些文章唯一的意义在于影响其国内政治，但它们也揭露了中国国内政治观念的变化。这本身就对推测未来解放军海军部署有用。这种国内政治压力也许会影响未来解放军海军的行动。不论《人民日报》是否真实揭露了中国内部决策对话，它也仍然是分析未来解放军海军战略发展的一个重要影响因素。
Henry Holst recently finished a year-long Chinese language immersion program in Beijing (IES Abroad) and graduated with a degree in History and Chinese Language and Literature from the University of Georgia.
（作者：亨利·霍尔斯特，最近在北京（学生国际教育协会）完成了为期一年的汉语浸入式教学，并以历史、汉语及文学学位从佐治亚大学毕业。）
评论
John（January 9, 2014 at 10:31）
Rough summary of this article: Assessing naval power by counting ships is boring and empirical. There’s something called Maritime Identity which is much more exciting. America’s is: “We have a big navy and we use it for good.” China’s is: “We would like a big navy to thwart America and we’re doing our nefarious best to get one. We might have one as early as next week, so watch out.” I know this because I read the People’s Daily and I’ve been in China a whole year.
这篇文章简言之就是：“通过计算舰船数来评估海军力量是及乏味而又经验主义的，而所谓的大洋角色就有趣多了。美国人的大洋角色是‘我们有大海军，我们用它来保护美好事物’。中国人的大洋角色是‘我们想要大海军，为此不惜穷兵黩武。也许下一周我们就有了，给我当心点’。我知道这些，因为我读了《人民日报》，还在中国住了一整年。”
Anon（January 9, 2014 at 12:23）（回楼上）
I think the author meant to show how maritime identity is better than “relying on solely armaments” as the unit of analysis. He didn’t totally define China’s maritime identity, I think he/she just brought up its specific aspects relevant to the term blue water navy.
我认为作者的意思是大洋角色作为一个分析单位比“单独以军备为分析单位”更好。他并没有完全定义中国的大洋角色，我认为他/她只说了与蓝水海军有关的具体部分。
I don’t care if he/she was only there for a year. I think The article has many good points
我不关心他/她是否只住了一年。我觉得这篇文章有许多好的观点。
ScottLoar（January 9, 2014 at 13:35）
China will not reveal its defense budget or spending but its military intentions are clear: China intends to develop a military that supports state diplomacy, protects Chinese assets no matter where they may be, and is able to contend with any other power.
中国不会披露其防务预算或花费，但其军事目的很清楚：中国想要发展一支军队来支持其国家外交、保护无论处于何地的中国资产以及能够与其他国家相抗衡。
Yes, it’s that simple.
是的，就是这么简单。
Socrates（January 9, 2014 at 19:35)（回楼上）
Yes, My Man,
是的，兄弟，
The whole world seemed to misunderstand Xi’s recent declaration regarding China Dream.
整个世界似乎都误解了习主席最近关于中国梦的宣言。
China Dream that Xi meaned is NOT the prosperity , harmony, happiness for Chinese populace,But China Dream he meaned is : China shall displace the US and becomes the world hegemony because that ambition embedded in Chinese rulers minds more than 2,000 years .And every new regime takes power in China also repeats the same declaration .
习主席提的中国梦不意味着中国人民的前途、和谐和幸福，而是：中国将取代美国，寻求世界霸权，这是由于超过2000年的根深蒂固的中国统治者思想所造成的。每个取得中国权力的新政权都会发出与之相同的宣言。
As far as I’m concerned, the most recent rulers who have repeated that declaration are Sun Yat Sen, Chiang Kai Shek, Mao Ze Dong and now Xi Jingping.
据我所知，发出这类宣言的最近的统治者有孙逸仙、蒋介石、毛泽东以及现在的Xi。
Just one month after he was assigned as the first President of Republic of China, Sun Yat Sen has proudly declared that US has became superpower by chance rather than its real potential and its dominance is temporary only. And only China, with its vast territory , immense natural ,human resources plus its 5,000 civilisation foundation.Therefore, it deserves to be the long term world hegemony.
孙逸仙在就任民国第一任总统后，仅过了一个月，就骄傲地宣称美国因偶然而不是其真实潜力而成为超级大国，并且它的霸权仅是暂时的。而只有中国才是地大物博、人口众多，有其5000年文化基础。因此，中国应当长期主宰世界霸权。
Let look at China presence in Artic , Antartica ,every corner of the world and even on the moon.The you will realize that such assumption is really moronic.
看看中国在南北极、世界的每个角落甚至是月球上的表现，你就知道那种假设真是太弱智了。
Bobby Nguyen（January 9, 2014 at 02:01）
China wants a blue water navy so it can steal oil and gas-rich maritime territories from Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. Its navy is not for protecting ocean trade links, but for capturing them. I would think that, because of their history, the Chinese would be more benevolent to their smaller neighbors. Look again: China is now an imperialist pig.
中国想要蓝水海军是为了从越南、菲律宾以及日本窃走石油和富含天然气的领海。中国的海军不是为了保护远洋贸易线，而是为了控制它们。基于他们的历史，我认为中国人或许对他们周围的小邻居更友善。再来瞧瞧，如今中国已成了令人讨厌的帝国主义者。
Put thefts into cage（January 9, 2014 at 05:57）（回楼上）
Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan are petty thefts; they have been benefitting a lot on the differences and misunderstandings between USA and China. One of the purposes of “new type of great-power relationship” is to stop these thefts from enjoying stolen goods at the expenses of the relationship between great-powers.
越南、菲律宾还有日本都是小偷；他们通过中美之间的分歧误解来渔翁得利。“新型大国关系”的目标之一就是要制止这帮小偷借由大国间的摩擦来享受渔翁之利。
Big stick is needed to disperse these petty thefts from encroached lands and properties and enforce them to obey law and order.
需要大棒来将这帮小偷从已经侵占的土地和财产上赶出来，并且迫使他们遵法守序。
Kris R.（January 9, 2014 at 09:06）（回楼上）
Petty thefts. Did you mean Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan are victims of petty thefts? Or are you calling these countries thieves, like in ‘petty thieves’. Who stole what? Great powers? Do you mean that US and China are great powers ready to invade other countries just because of thievery accusations? Are you in a cage right now? You seem to be cooped in the cage of ignorance and misinformation.
小偷小摸。你的意思是越南、菲律宾还有日本是小偷小摸的受害者吧？还是或者说你觉得这些国家才是小偷。谁偷了东西？超级大国？你想说美中作为一个超级大国仅因盗窃指控便要入侵他国？难道你现在还如此闭塞？你貌似处于无知和误解的境地。
Put thefts into cage（January 10, 2014 at 00:21）（回楼上）
Kris, for your information, Vietnam and Philippines stole Chinese islands in the South China Sea, Japan stole Chinese islands as well as Ryukyu kingdom in the East China Sea in case you have been fed with misinformation from the Western black information network which includes media, education system, think tanks, government agencies, etc. for their global enslavement conquest.
Kris，未免你被西方舆论所误导，看一下资料吧，越南、菲律宾在中国南海偷占中国领土，日本和琉球从中国东海偷占中国领土。西方为了奴役征服全球，而由媒体、教育体系、智囊团、政府机构等等所组成的网络舆论抹黑阵地一直在向你传递错误消息。
AG（January 8, 2014 at 15:08）
This article is terrible, it makes no sense.
这篇文章很糟糕，一点道理都没有。
Is the retrorocket about China different in the US?
中国的火箭和美国有区别吗？
Some of the quotes reported from Chinese newspapers are sentences that the Chinese journalist quotes himself from an American source….please be serious….
这些引用自中国新闻的文段其实是中国记者引用自美国媒体的......请严谨一点吧......
tom929（January 8, 2014 at 12:35）
people keep yapping about rise of china and decline of US. just wait and the future will unfold itself . no reason to waste time making prediction
中国的崛起和美国的衰退只是时间问题，人们老是对其喋喋不休。未来有其自有的发展趋势。搞这些预测简直就是毫无理由的浪费时间。文章刊发刊物】《外交家》（The Diplomat）
【文章刊发日期】2014年1月7日
【原文来源链接】http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/b ... tions/?allpages=yes
【原文作者】亨利·霍尔斯特（Henry Holst）
【译文作者】hsjjww
Blue Means Blue: China’s Naval Ambitions
蓝色意味着蓝水:中国的海军野心
Numerous articles in Chinese state media suggest it has an ambitious agenda for its navy.
中国官方媒体许多文章表明，中国在其海军上有着雄心勃勃的打算。
翻译：龙腾
Image Credit: REUTERS/Stringer
(图片来源：路透社/特约)
In a 2012 article published in The Diplomat, Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins claim “China seeks to develop a ‘blue water’ navy in the years to come—but one that is more ‘regional’ than ‘global’ in nature,” and that China does not intend to challenge U.S. naval hegemony. However, analyzing China’s maritime identity, a concept that will be explained below, and it becomes clear that two major long-term goals of the PLAN’s blue-water modernization are to frequently deploy outside East Asia and challenge U.S. naval dominance on the high seas.
在2012年《外交官》一篇文章上，安德鲁·埃里克森和盖柏·柯林斯宣称“中国这些年来正寻求发展其蓝水海军，但其实质上更注重‘区域性’而非‘全球性’”，并且中国也不会试图挑战美国海军霸权。然而，分析一下中国大洋角色（含义见下文），就会发现以下两个中国人民解放军海军蓝水现代化的长期主要目标：一是能够在东亚之外频繁部署；二是能够在公海上挑战美国海军霸权。
Erickson and Collins cite Chinese naval technological inferiority in areas such as anti-submarine warfare and area-air defense vis-à-vis the U.S. navy as evidence that the PLAN does not intend to challenge U.S. naval hegemony, concluding that such a military imbalance would make any challenge futile. Additionally, Erickson and Collins use the small number of PLAN deployments outside of East Asia as proof that in the future Beijing does not aim to frequently outside its immediate environs.
埃里克森和柯林斯引用了中国海军在一些领域的技术劣势来表明解放军海军无意挑战美国海军霸权，比如反潜战和对美海军的区域防空能力。因此，他们认为，在如此军事悬殊下，任何挑战都是徒劳的。此外，他们还以解放军海军东亚外为数不多的部署来证明，北京无意在中国周边之外频繁动作。
* Erickson and Collins represent a popular trend within the China watcher community; many researchers rely on current PLAN armament modernization areas and recent deployment trends as a basis to predict future PLAN strategic objectives. Yet this methodology ignores the possibility that current PLAN research and development patterns may not predict future PLAN capabilities. China has bypassed generations of military technology hurdles through unorthodox means such as theft and espionage. Moreover, military capabilities are not self-deterministic. Analyzing China’s naval modernization in a purely material perspective and overly relying on current PLAN deployment trends does not provide a useful methodology for predicting future PLAN strategic interests.
埃里克森和柯林斯代表了中国观察界的一种流行趋势。许多研究者以时下解放军海军军备现代化领域以及最近部署趋势为基础来预测解放军海军未来战略目标。但这种方法忽视了一个可能性。那就是时下的解放军海军研究和发展模式并不能预言未来解放军海军的能力。中国通过一些非正式的手段绕过了军事技术代差，比如剽窃和刺探。而且，军事能力还取决于其他方面。通过唯技术论来分析中国海军现代化和过于以解放军海军实时动向为基础，并不能提供一种有用的方式来预测未来解放军海军的战略利益。
Maritime Identity
大洋角色
Analyzing China’s maritime identity provides a superior methodology in anticipating future PLAN strategic interests. Maritime identity is a nation’s inherited maritime traditions, responsibilities, prerogatives, self-concept and strategic interests as a naval power. It frames the strategic discussion that occurs at high levels of government and therefore wields enormous influence over foreign policy. Washington’s willingness to employ naval forces in support of Libyan rebels fighting Gaddafi in 2011 reflected America’s maritime identity, which is famous for supporting democracy, human rights and self-determination worldwide. The American maritime identity is perfectly summed up in the U.S. Navy recruiting slogan: “A Global Force For Good.”In a similar way, analyzing the personality of China’s developing maritime identity is a practical method by which to gauge future Chinese naval strategic interests.
分析中国大洋角色提供了一个更好的方式来预测未来解放军海军的战略利益。大洋角色是一个国家作为一种海军力量所继承的海洋传统、责任、特权、自我概念以及战略利益。它构建了政府高层的战略讨论，因而在对外政策上具有重大影响。在2011年，华盛顿派遣海军支持利比亚反政府武装打击卡扎菲的意愿反映了美国的大洋角色。该角色以支持民主、人权和民族自决而闻名全球。美国大洋角色完美诠释了美国海军征募标语“一个为了美好事物的全球力量”。相似地，可以通过分析中国发展中的大洋角色的品格，来预测中国海军的战略利益。这是个有效的方式。
How does one ascertain China’s maritime identity? Analyzing Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-run newspaper articles in the People’s Daily provides an excellent conduit into the strategic thinking of China’s decision-making apparatus. This is because the People’s Daily serves as the mouthpiece of the CCP Standing Committee. For those unfamiliar with China’s system of government, imagine a totalitarian government having an elected body of seven individuals who wield total control over state affairs, and then broadcast their opinions directly through a controlled media body. Analyzing Chinese domestic media discussion on whether China should pursue a full-fledged blue-water navy (蓝水海军) , a pursuit both tightly bound to a country’s maritime identity and highly relevant to future PLAN strategic interests, sheds light on the strategic discussions occurring at high levels within the CCP.
人们如何确定中国大洋角色？通过分析《人民日报》上由中国GCD主导的新闻文章，可以给我们提供一个了解中国决策机构战略思想的良好渠道。这是因为《人民日报》是中共中央常委会的喉舌。对于那些不熟悉中国政体的人而言，中国政府的印象就是一个有着七人代议机构的极权政府。他们不仅全面操控国家事务，而且还通过控制媒体界来宣扬他们的观念。通过分析中国国内媒体在中国是否应该建设一支成熟的蓝水海军上的讨论，可以令我们明晰发生在中共高层的战略讨论。因为这一建设与国家大洋角色和未来解放军海军战略利益密切相关。
New Developments
新发展
The People’s Daily published few articles that discussed a blue-water navy before 2008. In 2008, China joined the international coalition that deployed ships to the Gulf of Aden in order to safeguard international shipping from Somali piracy. This operation proved to be the PLAN’s debut on the world stage. This naval deployment was an immensely popular topic in the Chinese media. After all, these anti-piracy operations were the first Chinese naval deployment outside of China’s immediate seas in 600 years. The frequency of articles discussing China’s growing blue-water naval capabilities in the People’s Daily skyrocketed. Analyzing the context of these articles helps paint a picture of China’s evolving maritime identity and offers a counterpoint to discussions of future PLAN deployment trends and strategic interests.
《人民日报》在2008年前很少刊载讨论蓝水海军的文章。在2008年，中国派遣军舰参与了亚丁湾国际联合护航行动，保护国际航运免受索马里海盗之厄。这是解放军海军在世界舞台上的初次登场。这次海军行动一度成为中国媒体中的热点话题。毕竟，这些打击海盗的行动是中国海军600年以来第一次离开中国近海的海外行动。此后，频繁讨论中国蓝水海军培养能力的文章在《人民日报》上迅速增加。分析这些文章的背景有助于为我们描绘中国发展中大洋角色的轮廓，也能为我们讨论未来解放军海军动向和战略利益提供立足点。
After December 2008, the People’s Daily justification for the PLAN’s pursuit of blue-water capabilities consistently focused on becoming the equal of and defeating the U.S. Navy. These articles almost always featured antagonistic, belligerent, and in some cases combative rhetoric. This conflicts with Erickson and Collin’s statement that,
在2008年12月后，《人民日报》认为解放军海军发展蓝水能力的正当理由，持续焦注在为了取得和美国海军相抗衡的能力上。这些文章几乎总是充斥着一定程度上的对抗性的好战言辞。这与埃里克森和柯林斯的以下陈述截然相反，
“There is currently little evidence that China is building a blue water capability to confront a modern navy like the U.S beyond the PLAN’s East/Southeast Asian home-region waters. Beijing is accruing a limited expeditionary capability, but is not preparing to go head-to-head with U.S. carrier battle groups outside of East Asia and the Western Pacific”
“目前没有证据表明在东亚和东南亚领海外，中国正在发展能够比肩美国现代化海军一样的蓝水能力。虽然北京正逐渐发展一个有限的远征能力，但并不准备同美国派遣在东亚和西太平洋的作战舰群针锋相对”
In the last several years, the People’s Daily published many articles that would seem to contradict this. Below is a sampling of these articles:
前几个月，《人民日报》刊载了许多与埃里克森和柯林斯说法相反的文章。以下内容节选自这些文章：
· “It may take years to catch up with the level of the U.S. Navy, but the trend is obvious, Beijing has determined to challenge the hegemony of the United States on the high seas and rewrite the balance of power.”
· “也许要花好几年才能赶上美国海军，但趋势已经很明显了。北京已经决定挑战美国公海霸权并重塑权力平衡。”
· “China is seeking to establish a naval force capable of contending with the United States; to have a blue-water navy capable of global operations.”
· “中国正寻求建立一支能够与美国向抗衡的海军力量；想要拥有一支能够进行全球部署的蓝水海军。”
· “[the PLAN] will become a blue-water Navy, [and] appear beside the U.S. Navy.”
· “解放军海军将变成一支蓝水海军，并将出现在美国海军卧榻之侧。”
· “China’s blue-water Navy will in a few years constitute a real challenge to the United States Navy.”
· “中国蓝水海军不久后将对美国海军造成现实挑战。”
· “Washington may have won a battle but lost the war. It is just a matter of time for the creation of a Chinese blue-water Navy.”
· “华盛顿也许会赢得一次战斗但却输掉整个战争。中国蓝水海军的建成只是时间问题。”
· “China has begun to build a blue-water Navy, it has the ability to send its forces to Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.” This is from a People’s Daily article militaristically titled U.S Media Say That China’s Military Power and Network Threats Keep U.S. Military Officials Awake at Night.
· “中国已经开始发展蓝水海军，其有能力将其武装力量投放到阿拉斯加、夏威夷和关岛。”这来自《人民日报》的一篇军国主义式标题的文章《美媒说中国军事力量和网络威胁值得美军官夙夜警惕》
It is important to note that this message has remained constant over the last five years. In all of these instances, the United States is portrayed as the target and raison d’être of a blue-water PLAN. Erickson and Collins cite current PLAN armament modernization areas as evidence that China is unable to contest U.S. naval dominance. Their argument relies on several uncertain assumptions. First, they presume that the PLAN is not seeking to challenge the U.S. Navy because it will not have the technological capability to do so in the immediate future. This conclusion disregards the reality that over the last decade the Chinese military has acquired state-of-the-art armaments at lightning speed. Who would have predicted that China would leapfrog generations of fighter aircraft and acquire and produce the J-20 mere years after the first F-22 came off the production line? In the digital age there is no reliable way to predict future military capabilities. Just last week a Chinese smuggling ring was busted for attempting to transfer radiation hardened microchips, a necessary component for ballistic missile guidance, to the PLA. China certainly has the industrial capacity to build modern aircraft and naval vessels. Therefore, the assumption that the PLAN does not seek to challenge the U.S. Navy due to current technological inferiority is flawed.
需要强调的是，这类文章在过去五年间陈出不穷。在这些所有的例子中，美国都被描绘成中国蓝水海军的目标和存在意义。埃里克森和柯林斯引用了时下解放军海军的军备现代化领域作为中国无法挑战美国海军霸权的证据。他们的论证基于几个不确定的假设。首先，他们假设解放军海军不会试图挑战美海军，因为在不久的将来解放军海军仍然没有相符的技术能力来这样做。这个推论忽视了在过去十年间，中国军队以闪电般的速度获得了高尖端的军备这一现实。有谁预见了在第一条F-22战机生产线关闭后的仅仅几年间，中国就跨越了数代战斗机获得和生产J-20？在数字化时代，没有什么可靠的方式来预测未来的军事能力。就在上周，一个中国走私集团因试图向解放军走私抗辐射微芯（弹道导弹制导所必需的一种零件）而被破获。中国确实有制造现代飞行器和海军军舰的工业能力。因此，解放军海军因其技术劣势而不会寻求挑战美国海军的假设是错误的。
An analysis of China’s maritime identity leads to the conclusion that Beijing intends to frequently deploy a future blue-water PLAN outside East Asia and the Western Pacific. In recent years the People’s Daily has often called for the creation of a blue-water PLAN to defend China’s foreign economic interests, energy security, and important maritime choke points. The party organ has often been dismayed at the fact that maritime security for China’s energy imports is currently provided, or controlled by, foreign navies. These findings conflict with Erickson and Collins’ statement that,
通过对中国大洋角色的分析，可以得出北京有意将其未来的蓝水海军部署到东亚以外和西太平洋。最近几年，《人民日报》常常呼吁建立一支解放军蓝水海军以保护中国海外经济利益、能源安全和重要的海上要冲。党报常常对这样一个事实感到气馁，那就是中国能源进口海上安全目前受制于外国海军。这些都与埃里克森和柯林斯的以下陈述相反，
“there are no reliable indications at this time that China desires a truly global blue water navy akin to that of the U.S. today, or which the Soviet Union maintained for some time, albeit at the eventual cost of strategic overextension. China does seek to develop a “blue-water” navy in the years to come – but one that is more “regional” than “global” in nature.”
“并没有确定的迹象表明中国想要为了战略性过度扩张，而不计最终成本建立一支像今天美国一般的真正的全球化蓝水海军或者说像苏联曾经维持一段时间那样。中国近些年来试图发展其蓝水海军——但其实质并非‘全球性的’而更多的是‘地区性的’”。
In the last several years, the People’s Daily has published articles stating the following:
前几个月，《人民日报》刊载的一些文章做了如下陈述：
· “China’s push for a blue-water navy comes from oil insecurity and the protection of SLOCs, along with military balancing against India… China’s oil supply lines must be protected, especially [in the event of] war with India. During a war it is no secret India will try and intercept China’s oil imports.”
· “中国发展其蓝水海军源于石油不安、对海上交通线的保护以及维持对印度的军事平衡的需要......中国输油线应当受到保护，特别是万一与印度发生战争时。毫无疑问，在战争时印度会竭力阻断中国的石油输入。”
· “China’s dependence on foreign oil in 2020 will reach 68 percent, while imports of crude oil from Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran, Sudan…bypass the Strait of Malacca on their way to China…The U.S. can easily block the Strait of Malacca at its narrowest point, [this] is the throat of China’s energy supply.”
· “中国对外石油依赖在2020年将达至68%，而从沙特阿拉伯、安哥拉、伊朗、苏丹进口......绕不开路上的马六甲海峡......美国能够在其最狭窄处，轻易扼守住马六甲海峡，这是中国能源供应的咽喉之处。”
· “With the growing concern for the safety of sea lanes, Chinese leaders will build a blue-water Navy…China’s maritime commercial interests [totaled] more than $800 billion by the end of 2008, while more than 60 percent of oil imports are transported by sea.”
· “随着对航道安全的关注提升，中国领导人将建立一支蓝水海军......中国海洋商业利益在2008年末总计超过八千亿，而其超过60%石油进口要通过海上运输。”
· “The prime objective of China’s Navy is to develop a blue-water navy to protect China’s energy and trade routes.”
· “中国海军首要目标是发展成一支能够保护中国能源与贸易路线的蓝水海军。”
· “The global layout of China’s energy security and national interests, China is in need of a powerful blue-water navy.”
· “中国能源安全及国家利益的全球布局令中国需要一支有力的蓝水海军。”
· “China relies on overseas markets and raw materials, which will strongly stimulate the Chinese intervention around the world, and require building a blue-water navy to protect sea lanes.”
· “中国对海外市场和原材料的依赖将对中国进行全球干涉产生强烈刺激。中国需要建立一支蓝水海军以保护航线。”
· “We develop the ability of the ocean-going (blue-water) navy…to maintain international trade and energy supply lines open and safe.”
· “我们需要发展海军的远洋航行（蓝水）能力......为了维持国际贸易和能源供给线的开放与安全。”
A foreign navy can blockade Chinese international trade and oil imports far outside the Strait of Malacca. This detail cannot be lost on Chinese strategic planners. The U.S and Indian navies have the ability to create a blockade near the Strait of Hormuz or the Indian Ocean. If Chinese leaders increasingly consider China’s international trade and oil imports to be a national security Achilles heel, and a blue-water PLAN is intended to protect against this dilemma, future PLAN deployments will certainly occur outside East Asia. Future deployments may focus on projecting power into the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea.
外国海军远从马六甲海峡就能扼住中国国际贸易和石油进口。这些细节不会被中国决策者忽视。美国和印度海军有能力在霍尔木兹海峡或印度洋附近制造阻碍。如果中国领导人逐渐将中国国际贸易和石油输入视为国家安全的致命弱点的话，一支解放军蓝水海军将作为对此种窘境的应对。在未来，解放军海军将确定部署于东亚之外。未来的部署也许会侧重在印度洋、孟加拉湾以及阿拉伯海上投放力量。
China has not possessed a blue-water navy for 600 years. Analyzing China’s evolving maritime identity is crucial for U.S. military planners, especially with ever dwindling budgets. Erickson and Collins are correct in writing that, “China is not working off a traditional European, Soviet, or American naval development playbook.” It would be misguided to automatically assume China will behave similarly to past world powers. Analyzing China’s maritime identity through media analysis is perhaps the best way to gauge future Chinese actions, given the closed, opaque and chaotic internal politics of the CCP.
中国600年前未曾有过一支蓝水海军。分析中国发展中的大洋角色对美国决策者至关重要，特别是在预算大幅缩水的情况下。埃里克森和柯林斯写到的“中国并不会跟随传统的欧洲、苏联或者美国的海军发展轨迹”是正确的。但这可能会误致一个自发的假设：中国将像过去的世界强国一样行动。鉴于中共内部政策的封闭性、不透明性以及混乱性，通过媒体分析来分析中国的大洋角色，也许是推测未来中国行动的最好方式。
One important caveat to all this is that the CCP often makes militaristic media statements or military actions to shore up domestic political support. One example of this was China’s recent establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In the same way, People’s Daily articles calling for a blue-water PLAN to challenge U.S. naval hegemony may be an effort to appease domestic nationalists. However, even if these articles are only meant to influence domestic politics, they nonetheless reveal changes in Chinese domestic political opinion. This in itself is still useful in gauging future PLAN deployments. This domestic political pressure may influence future PLAN actions. Whether or not People’s Daily articles truly reveal the inner-strategic dialogue of the CCP, they are still an influential factor in analyzing future PLAN strategic developments.
最为重要的一个警告就是，中共常常制造军国主义式的媒体声明或采取军事行动来获得国内政治支持。一个例子就是，最近中国划设了涵盖具有争议性的钓鱼岛在内的东海防空识别区。同样的，《人民日报》上的文章呼吁建立一支能够挑战美国海军霸权的解放军蓝水海军，也许对其国内民族主义的出现起到了推波助澜的作用。然而，即使这些文章唯一的意义在于影响其国内政治，但它们也揭露了中国国内政治观念的变化。这本身就对推测未来解放军海军部署有用。这种国内政治压力也许会影响未来解放军海军的行动。不论《人民日报》是否真实揭露了中国内部决策对话，它也仍然是分析未来解放军海军战略发展的一个重要影响因素。
Henry Holst recently finished a year-long Chinese language immersion program in Beijing (IES Abroad) and graduated with a degree in History and Chinese Language and Literature from the University of Georgia.
（作者：亨利·霍尔斯特，最近在北京（学生国际教育协会）完成了为期一年的汉语浸入式教学，并以历史、汉语及文学学位从佐治亚大学毕业。）
评论
John（January 9, 2014 at 10:31）
Rough summary of this article: Assessing naval power by counting ships is boring and empirical. There’s something called Maritime Identity which is much more exciting. America’s is: “We have a big navy and we use it for good.” China’s is: “We would like a big navy to thwart America and we’re doing our nefarious best to get one. We might have one as early as next week, so watch out.” I know this because I read the People’s Daily and I’ve been in China a whole year.
这篇文章简言之就是：“通过计算舰船数来评估海军力量是及乏味而又经验主义的，而所谓的大洋角色就有趣多了。美国人的大洋角色是‘我们有大海军，我们用它来保护美好事物’。中国人的大洋角色是‘我们想要大海军，为此不惜穷兵黩武。也许下一周我们就有了，给我当心点’。我知道这些，因为我读了《人民日报》，还在中国住了一整年。”
Anon（January 9, 2014 at 12:23）（回楼上）
I think the author meant to show how maritime identity is better than “relying on solely armaments” as the unit of analysis. He didn’t totally define China’s maritime identity, I think he/she just brought up its specific aspects relevant to the term blue water navy.
我认为作者的意思是大洋角色作为一个分析单位比“单独以军备为分析单位”更好。他并没有完全定义中国的大洋角色，我认为他/她只说了与蓝水海军有关的具体部分。
I don’t care if he/she was only there for a year. I think The article has many good points
我不关心他/她是否只住了一年。我觉得这篇文章有许多好的观点。
ScottLoar（January 9, 2014 at 13:35）
China will not reveal its defense budget or spending but its military intentions are clear: China intends to develop a military that supports state diplomacy, protects Chinese assets no matter where they may be, and is able to contend with any other power.
中国不会披露其防务预算或花费，但其军事目的很清楚：中国想要发展一支军队来支持其国家外交、保护无论处于何地的中国资产以及能够与其他国家相抗衡。
Yes, it’s that simple.
是的，就是这么简单。
Socrates（January 9, 2014 at 19:35)（回楼上）
Yes, My Man,
是的，兄弟，
The whole world seemed to misunderstand Xi’s recent declaration regarding China Dream.
整个世界似乎都误解了习主席最近关于中国梦的宣言。
China Dream that Xi meaned is NOT the prosperity , harmony, happiness for Chinese populace,But China Dream he meaned is : China shall displace the US and becomes the world hegemony because that ambition embedded in Chinese rulers minds more than 2,000 years .And every new regime takes power in China also repeats the same declaration .
习主席提的中国梦不意味着中国人民的前途、和谐和幸福，而是：中国将取代美国，寻求世界霸权，这是由于超过2000年的根深蒂固的中国统治者思想所造成的。每个取得中国权力的新政权都会发出与之相同的宣言。
As far as I’m concerned, the most recent rulers who have repeated that declaration are Sun Yat Sen, Chiang Kai Shek, Mao Ze Dong and now Xi Jingping.
据我所知，发出这类宣言的最近的统治者有孙逸仙、蒋介石、毛泽东以及现在的Xi。
Just one month after he was assigned as the first President of Republic of China, Sun Yat Sen has proudly declared that US has became superpower by chance rather than its real potential and its dominance is temporary only. And only China, with its vast territory , immense natural ,human resources plus its 5,000 civilisation foundation.Therefore, it deserves to be the long term world hegemony.
孙逸仙在就任民国第一任总统后，仅过了一个月，就骄傲地宣称美国因偶然而不是其真实潜力而成为超级大国，并且它的霸权仅是暂时的。而只有中国才是地大物博、人口众多，有其5000年文化基础。因此，中国应当长期主宰世界霸权。
Let look at China presence in Artic , Antartica ,every corner of the world and even on the moon.The you will realize that such assumption is really moronic.
看看中国在南北极、世界的每个角落甚至是月球上的表现，你就知道那种假设真是太弱智了。
Bobby Nguyen（January 9, 2014 at 02:01）
China wants a blue water navy so it can steal oil and gas-rich maritime territories from Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. Its navy is not for protecting ocean trade links, but for capturing them. I would think that, because of their history, the Chinese would be more benevolent to their smaller neighbors. Look again: China is now an imperialist pig.
中国想要蓝水海军是为了从越南、菲律宾以及日本窃走石油和富含天然气的领海。中国的海军不是为了保护远洋贸易线，而是为了控制它们。基于他们的历史，我认为中国人或许对他们周围的小邻居更友善。再来瞧瞧，如今中国已成了令人讨厌的帝国主义者。
Put thefts into cage（January 9, 2014 at 05:57）（回楼上）
Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan are petty thefts; they have been benefitting a lot on the differences and misunderstandings between USA and China. One of the purposes of “new type of great-power relationship” is to stop these thefts from enjoying stolen goods at the expenses of the relationship between great-powers.
越南、菲律宾还有日本都是小偷；他们通过中美之间的分歧误解来渔翁得利。“新型大国关系”的目标之一就是要制止这帮小偷借由大国间的摩擦来享受渔翁之利。
Big stick is needed to disperse these petty thefts from encroached lands and properties and enforce them to obey law and order.
需要大棒来将这帮小偷从已经侵占的土地和财产上赶出来，并且迫使他们遵法守序。
Kris R.（January 9, 2014 at 09:06）（回楼上）
Petty thefts. Did you mean Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan are victims of petty thefts? Or are you calling these countries thieves, like in ‘petty thieves’. Who stole what? Great powers? Do you mean that US and China are great powers ready to invade other countries just because of thievery accusations? Are you in a cage right now? You seem to be cooped in the cage of ignorance and misinformation.
小偷小摸。你的意思是越南、菲律宾还有日本是小偷小摸的受害者吧？还是或者说你觉得这些国家才是小偷。谁偷了东西？超级大国？你想说美中作为一个超级大国仅因盗窃指控便要入侵他国？难道你现在还如此闭塞？你貌似处于无知和误解的境地。
Put thefts into cage（January 10, 2014 at 00:21）（回楼上）
Kris, for your information, Vietnam and Philippines stole Chinese islands in the South China Sea, Japan stole Chinese islands as well as Ryukyu kingdom in the East China Sea in case you have been fed with misinformation from the Western black information network which includes media, education system, think tanks, government agencies, etc. for their global enslavement conquest.
Kris，未免你被西方舆论所误导，看一下资料吧，越南、菲律宾在中国南海偷占中国领土，日本和琉球从中国东海偷占中国领土。西方为了奴役征服全球，而由媒体、教育体系、智囊团、政府机构等等所组成的网络舆论抹黑阵地一直在向你传递错误消息。
AG（January 8, 2014 at 15:08）
This article is terrible, it makes no sense.
这篇文章很糟糕，一点道理都没有。
Is the retrorocket about China different in the US?
中国的火箭和美国有区别吗？
Some of the quotes reported from Chinese newspapers are sentences that the Chinese journalist quotes himself from an American source….please be serious….
这些引用自中国新闻的文段其实是中国记者引用自美国媒体的......请严谨一点吧......
tom929（January 8, 2014 at 12:35）
people keep yapping about rise of china and decline of US. just wait and the future will unfold itself . no reason to waste time making prediction
中国的崛起和美国的衰退只是时间问题，人们老是对其喋喋不休。未来有其自有的发展趋势。搞这些预测简直就是毫无理由的浪费时间。
【文章刊发日期】2014年1月7日
【原文来源链接】http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/b ... tions/?allpages=yes
【原文作者】亨利·霍尔斯特（Henry Holst）
【译文作者】hsjjww
Blue Means Blue: China’s Naval Ambitions
蓝色意味着蓝水:中国的海军野心
Numerous articles in Chinese state media suggest it has an ambitious agenda for its navy.
中国官方媒体许多文章表明，中国在其海军上有着雄心勃勃的打算。
翻译：龙腾
Image Credit: REUTERS/Stringer
(图片来源：路透社/特约)
In a 2012 article published in The Diplomat, Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins claim “China seeks to develop a ‘blue water’ navy in the years to come—but one that is more ‘regional’ than ‘global’ in nature,” and that China does not intend to challenge U.S. naval hegemony. However, analyzing China’s maritime identity, a concept that will be explained below, and it becomes clear that two major long-term goals of the PLAN’s blue-water modernization are to frequently deploy outside East Asia and challenge U.S. naval dominance on the high seas.
在2012年《外交官》一篇文章上，安德鲁·埃里克森和盖柏·柯林斯宣称“中国这些年来正寻求发展其蓝水海军，但其实质上更注重‘区域性’而非‘全球性’”，并且中国也不会试图挑战美国海军霸权。然而，分析一下中国大洋角色（含义见下文），就会发现以下两个中国人民解放军海军蓝水现代化的长期主要目标：一是能够在东亚之外频繁部署；二是能够在公海上挑战美国海军霸权。
Erickson and Collins cite Chinese naval technological inferiority in areas such as anti-submarine warfare and area-air defense vis-à-vis the U.S. navy as evidence that the PLAN does not intend to challenge U.S. naval hegemony, concluding that such a military imbalance would make any challenge futile. Additionally, Erickson and Collins use the small number of PLAN deployments outside of East Asia as proof that in the future Beijing does not aim to frequently outside its immediate environs.
埃里克森和柯林斯引用了中国海军在一些领域的技术劣势来表明解放军海军无意挑战美国海军霸权，比如反潜战和对美海军的区域防空能力。因此，他们认为，在如此军事悬殊下，任何挑战都是徒劳的。此外，他们还以解放军海军东亚外为数不多的部署来证明，北京无意在中国周边之外频繁动作。
* Erickson and Collins represent a popular trend within the China watcher community; many researchers rely on current PLAN armament modernization areas and recent deployment trends as a basis to predict future PLAN strategic objectives. Yet this methodology ignores the possibility that current PLAN research and development patterns may not predict future PLAN capabilities. China has bypassed generations of military technology hurdles through unorthodox means such as theft and espionage. Moreover, military capabilities are not self-deterministic. Analyzing China’s naval modernization in a purely material perspective and overly relying on current PLAN deployment trends does not provide a useful methodology for predicting future PLAN strategic interests.
埃里克森和柯林斯代表了中国观察界的一种流行趋势。许多研究者以时下解放军海军军备现代化领域以及最近部署趋势为基础来预测解放军海军未来战略目标。但这种方法忽视了一个可能性。那就是时下的解放军海军研究和发展模式并不能预言未来解放军海军的能力。中国通过一些非正式的手段绕过了军事技术代差，比如剽窃和刺探。而且，军事能力还取决于其他方面。通过唯技术论来分析中国海军现代化和过于以解放军海军实时动向为基础，并不能提供一种有用的方式来预测未来解放军海军的战略利益。
Maritime Identity
大洋角色
Analyzing China’s maritime identity provides a superior methodology in anticipating future PLAN strategic interests. Maritime identity is a nation’s inherited maritime traditions, responsibilities, prerogatives, self-concept and strategic interests as a naval power. It frames the strategic discussion that occurs at high levels of government and therefore wields enormous influence over foreign policy. Washington’s willingness to employ naval forces in support of Libyan rebels fighting Gaddafi in 2011 reflected America’s maritime identity, which is famous for supporting democracy, human rights and self-determination worldwide. The American maritime identity is perfectly summed up in the U.S. Navy recruiting slogan: “A Global Force For Good.”In a similar way, analyzing the personality of China’s developing maritime identity is a practical method by which to gauge future Chinese naval strategic interests.
分析中国大洋角色提供了一个更好的方式来预测未来解放军海军的战略利益。大洋角色是一个国家作为一种海军力量所继承的海洋传统、责任、特权、自我概念以及战略利益。它构建了政府高层的战略讨论，因而在对外政策上具有重大影响。在2011年，华盛顿派遣海军支持利比亚反政府武装打击卡扎菲的意愿反映了美国的大洋角色。该角色以支持民主、人权和民族自决而闻名全球。美国大洋角色完美诠释了美国海军征募标语“一个为了美好事物的全球力量”。相似地，可以通过分析中国发展中的大洋角色的品格，来预测中国海军的战略利益。这是个有效的方式。
How does one ascertain China’s maritime identity? Analyzing Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-run newspaper articles in the People’s Daily provides an excellent conduit into the strategic thinking of China’s decision-making apparatus. This is because the People’s Daily serves as the mouthpiece of the CCP Standing Committee. For those unfamiliar with China’s system of government, imagine a totalitarian government having an elected body of seven individuals who wield total control over state affairs, and then broadcast their opinions directly through a controlled media body. Analyzing Chinese domestic media discussion on whether China should pursue a full-fledged blue-water navy (蓝水海军) , a pursuit both tightly bound to a country’s maritime identity and highly relevant to future PLAN strategic interests, sheds light on the strategic discussions occurring at high levels within the CCP.
人们如何确定中国大洋角色？通过分析《人民日报》上由中国GCD主导的新闻文章，可以给我们提供一个了解中国决策机构战略思想的良好渠道。这是因为《人民日报》是中共中央常委会的喉舌。对于那些不熟悉中国政体的人而言，中国政府的印象就是一个有着七人代议机构的极权政府。他们不仅全面操控国家事务，而且还通过控制媒体界来宣扬他们的观念。通过分析中国国内媒体在中国是否应该建设一支成熟的蓝水海军上的讨论，可以令我们明晰发生在中共高层的战略讨论。因为这一建设与国家大洋角色和未来解放军海军战略利益密切相关。
New Developments
新发展
The People’s Daily published few articles that discussed a blue-water navy before 2008. In 2008, China joined the international coalition that deployed ships to the Gulf of Aden in order to safeguard international shipping from Somali piracy. This operation proved to be the PLAN’s debut on the world stage. This naval deployment was an immensely popular topic in the Chinese media. After all, these anti-piracy operations were the first Chinese naval deployment outside of China’s immediate seas in 600 years. The frequency of articles discussing China’s growing blue-water naval capabilities in the People’s Daily skyrocketed. Analyzing the context of these articles helps paint a picture of China’s evolving maritime identity and offers a counterpoint to discussions of future PLAN deployment trends and strategic interests.
《人民日报》在2008年前很少刊载讨论蓝水海军的文章。在2008年，中国派遣军舰参与了亚丁湾国际联合护航行动，保护国际航运免受索马里海盗之厄。这是解放军海军在世界舞台上的初次登场。这次海军行动一度成为中国媒体中的热点话题。毕竟，这些打击海盗的行动是中国海军600年以来第一次离开中国近海的海外行动。此后，频繁讨论中国蓝水海军培养能力的文章在《人民日报》上迅速增加。分析这些文章的背景有助于为我们描绘中国发展中大洋角色的轮廓，也能为我们讨论未来解放军海军动向和战略利益提供立足点。
After December 2008, the People’s Daily justification for the PLAN’s pursuit of blue-water capabilities consistently focused on becoming the equal of and defeating the U.S. Navy. These articles almost always featured antagonistic, belligerent, and in some cases combative rhetoric. This conflicts with Erickson and Collin’s statement that,
在2008年12月后，《人民日报》认为解放军海军发展蓝水能力的正当理由，持续焦注在为了取得和美国海军相抗衡的能力上。这些文章几乎总是充斥着一定程度上的对抗性的好战言辞。这与埃里克森和柯林斯的以下陈述截然相反，
“There is currently little evidence that China is building a blue water capability to confront a modern navy like the U.S beyond the PLAN’s East/Southeast Asian home-region waters. Beijing is accruing a limited expeditionary capability, but is not preparing to go head-to-head with U.S. carrier battle groups outside of East Asia and the Western Pacific”
“目前没有证据表明在东亚和东南亚领海外，中国正在发展能够比肩美国现代化海军一样的蓝水能力。虽然北京正逐渐发展一个有限的远征能力，但并不准备同美国派遣在东亚和西太平洋的作战舰群针锋相对”
In the last several years, the People’s Daily published many articles that would seem to contradict this. Below is a sampling of these articles:
前几个月，《人民日报》刊载了许多与埃里克森和柯林斯说法相反的文章。以下内容节选自这些文章：
· “It may take years to catch up with the level of the U.S. Navy, but the trend is obvious, Beijing has determined to challenge the hegemony of the United States on the high seas and rewrite the balance of power.”
· “也许要花好几年才能赶上美国海军，但趋势已经很明显了。北京已经决定挑战美国公海霸权并重塑权力平衡。”
· “China is seeking to establish a naval force capable of contending with the United States; to have a blue-water navy capable of global operations.”
· “中国正寻求建立一支能够与美国向抗衡的海军力量；想要拥有一支能够进行全球部署的蓝水海军。”
· “[the PLAN] will become a blue-water Navy, [and] appear beside the U.S. Navy.”
· “解放军海军将变成一支蓝水海军，并将出现在美国海军卧榻之侧。”
· “China’s blue-water Navy will in a few years constitute a real challenge to the United States Navy.”
· “中国蓝水海军不久后将对美国海军造成现实挑战。”
· “Washington may have won a battle but lost the war. It is just a matter of time for the creation of a Chinese blue-water Navy.”
· “华盛顿也许会赢得一次战斗但却输掉整个战争。中国蓝水海军的建成只是时间问题。”
· “China has begun to build a blue-water Navy, it has the ability to send its forces to Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.” This is from a People’s Daily article militaristically titled U.S Media Say That China’s Military Power and Network Threats Keep U.S. Military Officials Awake at Night.
· “中国已经开始发展蓝水海军，其有能力将其武装力量投放到阿拉斯加、夏威夷和关岛。”这来自《人民日报》的一篇军国主义式标题的文章《美媒说中国军事力量和网络威胁值得美军官夙夜警惕》
It is important to note that this message has remained constant over the last five years. In all of these instances, the United States is portrayed as the target and raison d’être of a blue-water PLAN. Erickson and Collins cite current PLAN armament modernization areas as evidence that China is unable to contest U.S. naval dominance. Their argument relies on several uncertain assumptions. First, they presume that the PLAN is not seeking to challenge the U.S. Navy because it will not have the technological capability to do so in the immediate future. This conclusion disregards the reality that over the last decade the Chinese military has acquired state-of-the-art armaments at lightning speed. Who would have predicted that China would leapfrog generations of fighter aircraft and acquire and produce the J-20 mere years after the first F-22 came off the production line? In the digital age there is no reliable way to predict future military capabilities. Just last week a Chinese smuggling ring was busted for attempting to transfer radiation hardened microchips, a necessary component for ballistic missile guidance, to the PLA. China certainly has the industrial capacity to build modern aircraft and naval vessels. Therefore, the assumption that the PLAN does not seek to challenge the U.S. Navy due to current technological inferiority is flawed.
需要强调的是，这类文章在过去五年间陈出不穷。在这些所有的例子中，美国都被描绘成中国蓝水海军的目标和存在意义。埃里克森和柯林斯引用了时下解放军海军的军备现代化领域作为中国无法挑战美国海军霸权的证据。他们的论证基于几个不确定的假设。首先，他们假设解放军海军不会试图挑战美海军，因为在不久的将来解放军海军仍然没有相符的技术能力来这样做。这个推论忽视了在过去十年间，中国军队以闪电般的速度获得了高尖端的军备这一现实。有谁预见了在第一条F-22战机生产线关闭后的仅仅几年间，中国就跨越了数代战斗机获得和生产J-20？在数字化时代，没有什么可靠的方式来预测未来的军事能力。就在上周，一个中国走私集团因试图向解放军走私抗辐射微芯（弹道导弹制导所必需的一种零件）而被破获。中国确实有制造现代飞行器和海军军舰的工业能力。因此，解放军海军因其技术劣势而不会寻求挑战美国海军的假设是错误的。
An analysis of China’s maritime identity leads to the conclusion that Beijing intends to frequently deploy a future blue-water PLAN outside East Asia and the Western Pacific. In recent years the People’s Daily has often called for the creation of a blue-water PLAN to defend China’s foreign economic interests, energy security, and important maritime choke points. The party organ has often been dismayed at the fact that maritime security for China’s energy imports is currently provided, or controlled by, foreign navies. These findings conflict with Erickson and Collins’ statement that,
通过对中国大洋角色的分析，可以得出北京有意将其未来的蓝水海军部署到东亚以外和西太平洋。最近几年，《人民日报》常常呼吁建立一支解放军蓝水海军以保护中国海外经济利益、能源安全和重要的海上要冲。党报常常对这样一个事实感到气馁，那就是中国能源进口海上安全目前受制于外国海军。这些都与埃里克森和柯林斯的以下陈述相反，
“there are no reliable indications at this time that China desires a truly global blue water navy akin to that of the U.S. today, or which the Soviet Union maintained for some time, albeit at the eventual cost of strategic overextension. China does seek to develop a “blue-water” navy in the years to come – but one that is more “regional” than “global” in nature.”
“并没有确定的迹象表明中国想要为了战略性过度扩张，而不计最终成本建立一支像今天美国一般的真正的全球化蓝水海军或者说像苏联曾经维持一段时间那样。中国近些年来试图发展其蓝水海军——但其实质并非‘全球性的’而更多的是‘地区性的’”。
In the last several years, the People’s Daily has published articles stating the following:
前几个月，《人民日报》刊载的一些文章做了如下陈述：
· “China’s push for a blue-water navy comes from oil insecurity and the protection of SLOCs, along with military balancing against India… China’s oil supply lines must be protected, especially [in the event of] war with India. During a war it is no secret India will try and intercept China’s oil imports.”
· “中国发展其蓝水海军源于石油不安、对海上交通线的保护以及维持对印度的军事平衡的需要......中国输油线应当受到保护，特别是万一与印度发生战争时。毫无疑问，在战争时印度会竭力阻断中国的石油输入。”
· “China’s dependence on foreign oil in 2020 will reach 68 percent, while imports of crude oil from Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran, Sudan…bypass the Strait of Malacca on their way to China…The U.S. can easily block the Strait of Malacca at its narrowest point, [this] is the throat of China’s energy supply.”
· “中国对外石油依赖在2020年将达至68%，而从沙特阿拉伯、安哥拉、伊朗、苏丹进口......绕不开路上的马六甲海峡......美国能够在其最狭窄处，轻易扼守住马六甲海峡，这是中国能源供应的咽喉之处。”
· “With the growing concern for the safety of sea lanes, Chinese leaders will build a blue-water Navy…China’s maritime commercial interests [totaled] more than $800 billion by the end of 2008, while more than 60 percent of oil imports are transported by sea.”
· “随着对航道安全的关注提升，中国领导人将建立一支蓝水海军......中国海洋商业利益在2008年末总计超过八千亿，而其超过60%石油进口要通过海上运输。”
· “The prime objective of China’s Navy is to develop a blue-water navy to protect China’s energy and trade routes.”
· “中国海军首要目标是发展成一支能够保护中国能源与贸易路线的蓝水海军。”
· “The global layout of China’s energy security and national interests, China is in need of a powerful blue-water navy.”
· “中国能源安全及国家利益的全球布局令中国需要一支有力的蓝水海军。”
· “China relies on overseas markets and raw materials, which will strongly stimulate the Chinese intervention around the world, and require building a blue-water navy to protect sea lanes.”
· “中国对海外市场和原材料的依赖将对中国进行全球干涉产生强烈刺激。中国需要建立一支蓝水海军以保护航线。”
· “We develop the ability of the ocean-going (blue-water) navy…to maintain international trade and energy supply lines open and safe.”
· “我们需要发展海军的远洋航行（蓝水）能力......为了维持国际贸易和能源供给线的开放与安全。”
A foreign navy can blockade Chinese international trade and oil imports far outside the Strait of Malacca. This detail cannot be lost on Chinese strategic planners. The U.S and Indian navies have the ability to create a blockade near the Strait of Hormuz or the Indian Ocean. If Chinese leaders increasingly consider China’s international trade and oil imports to be a national security Achilles heel, and a blue-water PLAN is intended to protect against this dilemma, future PLAN deployments will certainly occur outside East Asia. Future deployments may focus on projecting power into the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea.
外国海军远从马六甲海峡就能扼住中国国际贸易和石油进口。这些细节不会被中国决策者忽视。美国和印度海军有能力在霍尔木兹海峡或印度洋附近制造阻碍。如果中国领导人逐渐将中国国际贸易和石油输入视为国家安全的致命弱点的话，一支解放军蓝水海军将作为对此种窘境的应对。在未来，解放军海军将确定部署于东亚之外。未来的部署也许会侧重在印度洋、孟加拉湾以及阿拉伯海上投放力量。
China has not possessed a blue-water navy for 600 years. Analyzing China’s evolving maritime identity is crucial for U.S. military planners, especially with ever dwindling budgets. Erickson and Collins are correct in writing that, “China is not working off a traditional European, Soviet, or American naval development playbook.” It would be misguided to automatically assume China will behave similarly to past world powers. Analyzing China’s maritime identity through media analysis is perhaps the best way to gauge future Chinese actions, given the closed, opaque and chaotic internal politics of the CCP.
中国600年前未曾有过一支蓝水海军。分析中国发展中的大洋角色对美国决策者至关重要，特别是在预算大幅缩水的情况下。埃里克森和柯林斯写到的“中国并不会跟随传统的欧洲、苏联或者美国的海军发展轨迹”是正确的。但这可能会误致一个自发的假设：中国将像过去的世界强国一样行动。鉴于中共内部政策的封闭性、不透明性以及混乱性，通过媒体分析来分析中国的大洋角色，也许是推测未来中国行动的最好方式。
One important caveat to all this is that the CCP often makes militaristic media statements or military actions to shore up domestic political support. One example of this was China’s recent establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In the same way, People’s Daily articles calling for a blue-water PLAN to challenge U.S. naval hegemony may be an effort to appease domestic nationalists. However, even if these articles are only meant to influence domestic politics, they nonetheless reveal changes in Chinese domestic political opinion. This in itself is still useful in gauging future PLAN deployments. This domestic political pressure may influence future PLAN actions. Whether or not People’s Daily articles truly reveal the inner-strategic dialogue of the CCP, they are still an influential factor in analyzing future PLAN strategic developments.
最为重要的一个警告就是，中共常常制造军国主义式的媒体声明或采取军事行动来获得国内政治支持。一个例子就是，最近中国划设了涵盖具有争议性的钓鱼岛在内的东海防空识别区。同样的，《人民日报》上的文章呼吁建立一支能够挑战美国海军霸权的解放军蓝水海军，也许对其国内民族主义的出现起到了推波助澜的作用。然而，即使这些文章唯一的意义在于影响其国内政治，但它们也揭露了中国国内政治观念的变化。这本身就对推测未来解放军海军部署有用。这种国内政治压力也许会影响未来解放军海军的行动。不论《人民日报》是否真实揭露了中国内部决策对话，它也仍然是分析未来解放军海军战略发展的一个重要影响因素。
Henry Holst recently finished a year-long Chinese language immersion program in Beijing (IES Abroad) and graduated with a degree in History and Chinese Language and Literature from the University of Georgia.
（作者：亨利·霍尔斯特，最近在北京（学生国际教育协会）完成了为期一年的汉语浸入式教学，并以历史、汉语及文学学位从佐治亚大学毕业。）
评论
John（January 9, 2014 at 10:31）
Rough summary of this article: Assessing naval power by counting ships is boring and empirical. There’s something called Maritime Identity which is much more exciting. America’s is: “We have a big navy and we use it for good.” China’s is: “We would like a big navy to thwart America and we’re doing our nefarious best to get one. We might have one as early as next week, so watch out.” I know this because I read the People’s Daily and I’ve been in China a whole year.
这篇文章简言之就是：“通过计算舰船数来评估海军力量是及乏味而又经验主义的，而所谓的大洋角色就有趣多了。美国人的大洋角色是‘我们有大海军，我们用它来保护美好事物’。中国人的大洋角色是‘我们想要大海军，为此不惜穷兵黩武。也许下一周我们就有了，给我当心点’。我知道这些，因为我读了《人民日报》，还在中国住了一整年。”
Anon（January 9, 2014 at 12:23）（回楼上）
I think the author meant to show how maritime identity is better than “relying on solely armaments” as the unit of analysis. He didn’t totally define China’s maritime identity, I think he/she just brought up its specific aspects relevant to the term blue water navy.
我认为作者的意思是大洋角色作为一个分析单位比“单独以军备为分析单位”更好。他并没有完全定义中国的大洋角色，我认为他/她只说了与蓝水海军有关的具体部分。
I don’t care if he/she was only there for a year. I think The article has many good points
我不关心他/她是否只住了一年。我觉得这篇文章有许多好的观点。
ScottLoar（January 9, 2014 at 13:35）
China will not reveal its defense budget or spending but its military intentions are clear: China intends to develop a military that supports state diplomacy, protects Chinese assets no matter where they may be, and is able to contend with any other power.
中国不会披露其防务预算或花费，但其军事目的很清楚：中国想要发展一支军队来支持其国家外交、保护无论处于何地的中国资产以及能够与其他国家相抗衡。
Yes, it’s that simple.
是的，就是这么简单。
Socrates（January 9, 2014 at 19:35)（回楼上）
Yes, My Man,
是的，兄弟，
The whole world seemed to misunderstand Xi’s recent declaration regarding China Dream.
整个世界似乎都误解了习主席最近关于中国梦的宣言。
China Dream that Xi meaned is NOT the prosperity , harmony, happiness for Chinese populace,But China Dream he meaned is : China shall displace the US and becomes the world hegemony because that ambition embedded in Chinese rulers minds more than 2,000 years .And every new regime takes power in China also repeats the same declaration .
习主席提的中国梦不意味着中国人民的前途、和谐和幸福，而是：中国将取代美国，寻求世界霸权，这是由于超过2000年的根深蒂固的中国统治者思想所造成的。每个取得中国权力的新政权都会发出与之相同的宣言。
As far as I’m concerned, the most recent rulers who have repeated that declaration are Sun Yat Sen, Chiang Kai Shek, Mao Ze Dong and now Xi Jingping.
据我所知，发出这类宣言的最近的统治者有孙逸仙、蒋介石、毛泽东以及现在的Xi。
Just one month after he was assigned as the first President of Republic of China, Sun Yat Sen has proudly declared that US has became superpower by chance rather than its real potential and its dominance is temporary only. And only China, with its vast territory , immense natural ,human resources plus its 5,000 civilisation foundation.Therefore, it deserves to be the long term world hegemony.
孙逸仙在就任民国第一任总统后，仅过了一个月，就骄傲地宣称美国因偶然而不是其真实潜力而成为超级大国，并且它的霸权仅是暂时的。而只有中国才是地大物博、人口众多，有其5000年文化基础。因此，中国应当长期主宰世界霸权。
Let look at China presence in Artic , Antartica ,every corner of the world and even on the moon.The you will realize that such assumption is really moronic.
看看中国在南北极、世界的每个角落甚至是月球上的表现，你就知道那种假设真是太弱智了。
Bobby Nguyen（January 9, 2014 at 02:01）
China wants a blue water navy so it can steal oil and gas-rich maritime territories from Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. Its navy is not for protecting ocean trade links, but for capturing them. I would think that, because of their history, the Chinese would be more benevolent to their smaller neighbors. Look again: China is now an imperialist pig.
中国想要蓝水海军是为了从越南、菲律宾以及日本窃走石油和富含天然气的领海。中国的海军不是为了保护远洋贸易线，而是为了控制它们。基于他们的历史，我认为中国人或许对他们周围的小邻居更友善。再来瞧瞧，如今中国已成了令人讨厌的帝国主义者。
Put thefts into cage（January 9, 2014 at 05:57）（回楼上）
Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan are petty thefts; they have been benefitting a lot on the differences and misunderstandings between USA and China. One of the purposes of “new type of great-power relationship” is to stop these thefts from enjoying stolen goods at the expenses of the relationship between great-powers.
越南、菲律宾还有日本都是小偷；他们通过中美之间的分歧误解来渔翁得利。“新型大国关系”的目标之一就是要制止这帮小偷借由大国间的摩擦来享受渔翁之利。
Big stick is needed to disperse these petty thefts from encroached lands and properties and enforce them to obey law and order.
需要大棒来将这帮小偷从已经侵占的土地和财产上赶出来，并且迫使他们遵法守序。
Kris R.（January 9, 2014 at 09:06）（回楼上）
Petty thefts. Did you mean Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan are victims of petty thefts? Or are you calling these countries thieves, like in ‘petty thieves’. Who stole what? Great powers? Do you mean that US and China are great powers ready to invade other countries just because of thievery accusations? Are you in a cage right now? You seem to be cooped in the cage of ignorance and misinformation.
小偷小摸。你的意思是越南、菲律宾还有日本是小偷小摸的受害者吧？还是或者说你觉得这些国家才是小偷。谁偷了东西？超级大国？你想说美中作为一个超级大国仅因盗窃指控便要入侵他国？难道你现在还如此闭塞？你貌似处于无知和误解的境地。
Put thefts into cage（January 10, 2014 at 00:21）（回楼上）
Kris, for your information, Vietnam and Philippines stole Chinese islands in the South China Sea, Japan stole Chinese islands as well as Ryukyu kingdom in the East China Sea in case you have been fed with misinformation from the Western black information network which includes media, education system, think tanks, government agencies, etc. for their global enslavement conquest.
Kris，未免你被西方舆论所误导，看一下资料吧，越南、菲律宾在中国南海偷占中国领土，日本和琉球从中国东海偷占中国领土。西方为了奴役征服全球，而由媒体、教育体系、智囊团、政府机构等等所组成的网络舆论抹黑阵地一直在向你传递错误消息。
AG（January 8, 2014 at 15:08）
This article is terrible, it makes no sense.
这篇文章很糟糕，一点道理都没有。
Is the retrorocket about China different in the US?
中国的火箭和美国有区别吗？
Some of the quotes reported from Chinese newspapers are sentences that the Chinese journalist quotes himself from an American source….please be serious….
这些引用自中国新闻的文段其实是中国记者引用自美国媒体的......请严谨一点吧......
tom929（January 8, 2014 at 12:35）
people keep yapping about rise of china and decline of US. just wait and the future will unfold itself . no reason to waste time making prediction
中国的崛起和美国的衰退只是时间问题，人们老是对其喋喋不休。未来有其自有的发展趋势。搞这些预测简直就是毫无理由的浪费时间。文章刊发刊物】《外交家》（The Diplomat）
【文章刊发日期】2014年1月7日
【原文来源链接】http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/b ... tions/?allpages=yes
【原文作者】亨利·霍尔斯特（Henry Holst）
【译文作者】hsjjww
Blue Means Blue: China’s Naval Ambitions
蓝色意味着蓝水:中国的海军野心
Numerous articles in Chinese state media suggest it has an ambitious agenda for its navy.
中国官方媒体许多文章表明，中国在其海军上有着雄心勃勃的打算。
翻译：龙腾
Image Credit: REUTERS/Stringer
(图片来源：路透社/特约)
In a 2012 article published in The Diplomat, Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins claim “China seeks to develop a ‘blue water’ navy in the years to come—but one that is more ‘regional’ than ‘global’ in nature,” and that China does not intend to challenge U.S. naval hegemony. However, analyzing China’s maritime identity, a concept that will be explained below, and it becomes clear that two major long-term goals of the PLAN’s blue-water modernization are to frequently deploy outside East Asia and challenge U.S. naval dominance on the high seas.
在2012年《外交官》一篇文章上，安德鲁·埃里克森和盖柏·柯林斯宣称“中国这些年来正寻求发展其蓝水海军，但其实质上更注重‘区域性’而非‘全球性’”，并且中国也不会试图挑战美国海军霸权。然而，分析一下中国大洋角色（含义见下文），就会发现以下两个中国人民解放军海军蓝水现代化的长期主要目标：一是能够在东亚之外频繁部署；二是能够在公海上挑战美国海军霸权。
Erickson and Collins cite Chinese naval technological inferiority in areas such as anti-submarine warfare and area-air defense vis-à-vis the U.S. navy as evidence that the PLAN does not intend to challenge U.S. naval hegemony, concluding that such a military imbalance would make any challenge futile. Additionally, Erickson and Collins use the small number of PLAN deployments outside of East Asia as proof that in the future Beijing does not aim to frequently outside its immediate environs.
埃里克森和柯林斯引用了中国海军在一些领域的技术劣势来表明解放军海军无意挑战美国海军霸权，比如反潜战和对美海军的区域防空能力。因此，他们认为，在如此军事悬殊下，任何挑战都是徒劳的。此外，他们还以解放军海军东亚外为数不多的部署来证明，北京无意在中国周边之外频繁动作。
* Erickson and Collins represent a popular trend within the China watcher community; many researchers rely on current PLAN armament modernization areas and recent deployment trends as a basis to predict future PLAN strategic objectives. Yet this methodology ignores the possibility that current PLAN research and development patterns may not predict future PLAN capabilities. China has bypassed generations of military technology hurdles through unorthodox means such as theft and espionage. Moreover, military capabilities are not self-deterministic. Analyzing China’s naval modernization in a purely material perspective and overly relying on current PLAN deployment trends does not provide a useful methodology for predicting future PLAN strategic interests.
埃里克森和柯林斯代表了中国观察界的一种流行趋势。许多研究者以时下解放军海军军备现代化领域以及最近部署趋势为基础来预测解放军海军未来战略目标。但这种方法忽视了一个可能性。那就是时下的解放军海军研究和发展模式并不能预言未来解放军海军的能力。中国通过一些非正式的手段绕过了军事技术代差，比如剽窃和刺探。而且，军事能力还取决于其他方面。通过唯技术论来分析中国海军现代化和过于以解放军海军实时动向为基础，并不能提供一种有用的方式来预测未来解放军海军的战略利益。
Maritime Identity
大洋角色
Analyzing China’s maritime identity provides a superior methodology in anticipating future PLAN strategic interests. Maritime identity is a nation’s inherited maritime traditions, responsibilities, prerogatives, self-concept and strategic interests as a naval power. It frames the strategic discussion that occurs at high levels of government and therefore wields enormous influence over foreign policy. Washington’s willingness to employ naval forces in support of Libyan rebels fighting Gaddafi in 2011 reflected America’s maritime identity, which is famous for supporting democracy, human rights and self-determination worldwide. The American maritime identity is perfectly summed up in the U.S. Navy recruiting slogan: “A Global Force For Good.”In a similar way, analyzing the personality of China’s developing maritime identity is a practical method by which to gauge future Chinese naval strategic interests.
分析中国大洋角色提供了一个更好的方式来预测未来解放军海军的战略利益。大洋角色是一个国家作为一种海军力量所继承的海洋传统、责任、特权、自我概念以及战略利益。它构建了政府高层的战略讨论，因而在对外政策上具有重大影响。在2011年，华盛顿派遣海军支持利比亚反政府武装打击卡扎菲的意愿反映了美国的大洋角色。该角色以支持民主、人权和民族自决而闻名全球。美国大洋角色完美诠释了美国海军征募标语“一个为了美好事物的全球力量”。相似地，可以通过分析中国发展中的大洋角色的品格，来预测中国海军的战略利益。这是个有效的方式。
How does one ascertain China’s maritime identity? Analyzing Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-run newspaper articles in the People’s Daily provides an excellent conduit into the strategic thinking of China’s decision-making apparatus. This is because the People’s Daily serves as the mouthpiece of the CCP Standing Committee. For those unfamiliar with China’s system of government, imagine a totalitarian government having an elected body of seven individuals who wield total control over state affairs, and then broadcast their opinions directly through a controlled media body. Analyzing Chinese domestic media discussion on whether China should pursue a full-fledged blue-water navy (蓝水海军) , a pursuit both tightly bound to a country’s maritime identity and highly relevant to future PLAN strategic interests, sheds light on the strategic discussions occurring at high levels within the CCP.
人们如何确定中国大洋角色？通过分析《人民日报》上由中国GCD主导的新闻文章，可以给我们提供一个了解中国决策机构战略思想的良好渠道。这是因为《人民日报》是中共中央常委会的喉舌。对于那些不熟悉中国政体的人而言，中国政府的印象就是一个有着七人代议机构的极权政府。他们不仅全面操控国家事务，而且还通过控制媒体界来宣扬他们的观念。通过分析中国国内媒体在中国是否应该建设一支成熟的蓝水海军上的讨论，可以令我们明晰发生在中共高层的战略讨论。因为这一建设与国家大洋角色和未来解放军海军战略利益密切相关。
New Developments
新发展
The People’s Daily published few articles that discussed a blue-water navy before 2008. In 2008, China joined the international coalition that deployed ships to the Gulf of Aden in order to safeguard international shipping from Somali piracy. This operation proved to be the PLAN’s debut on the world stage. This naval deployment was an immensely popular topic in the Chinese media. After all, these anti-piracy operations were the first Chinese naval deployment outside of China’s immediate seas in 600 years. The frequency of articles discussing China’s growing blue-water naval capabilities in the People’s Daily skyrocketed. Analyzing the context of these articles helps paint a picture of China’s evolving maritime identity and offers a counterpoint to discussions of future PLAN deployment trends and strategic interests.
《人民日报》在2008年前很少刊载讨论蓝水海军的文章。在2008年，中国派遣军舰参与了亚丁湾国际联合护航行动，保护国际航运免受索马里海盗之厄。这是解放军海军在世界舞台上的初次登场。这次海军行动一度成为中国媒体中的热点话题。毕竟，这些打击海盗的行动是中国海军600年以来第一次离开中国近海的海外行动。此后，频繁讨论中国蓝水海军培养能力的文章在《人民日报》上迅速增加。分析这些文章的背景有助于为我们描绘中国发展中大洋角色的轮廓，也能为我们讨论未来解放军海军动向和战略利益提供立足点。
After December 2008, the People’s Daily justification for the PLAN’s pursuit of blue-water capabilities consistently focused on becoming the equal of and defeating the U.S. Navy. These articles almost always featured antagonistic, belligerent, and in some cases combative rhetoric. This conflicts with Erickson and Collin’s statement that,
在2008年12月后，《人民日报》认为解放军海军发展蓝水能力的正当理由，持续焦注在为了取得和美国海军相抗衡的能力上。这些文章几乎总是充斥着一定程度上的对抗性的好战言辞。这与埃里克森和柯林斯的以下陈述截然相反，
“There is currently little evidence that China is building a blue water capability to confront a modern navy like the U.S beyond the PLAN’s East/Southeast Asian home-region waters. Beijing is accruing a limited expeditionary capability, but is not preparing to go head-to-head with U.S. carrier battle groups outside of East Asia and the Western Pacific”
“目前没有证据表明在东亚和东南亚领海外，中国正在发展能够比肩美国现代化海军一样的蓝水能力。虽然北京正逐渐发展一个有限的远征能力，但并不准备同美国派遣在东亚和西太平洋的作战舰群针锋相对”
In the last several years, the People’s Daily published many articles that would seem to contradict this. Below is a sampling of these articles:
前几个月，《人民日报》刊载了许多与埃里克森和柯林斯说法相反的文章。以下内容节选自这些文章：
· “It may take years to catch up with the level of the U.S. Navy, but the trend is obvious, Beijing has determined to challenge the hegemony of the United States on the high seas and rewrite the balance of power.”
· “也许要花好几年才能赶上美国海军，但趋势已经很明显了。北京已经决定挑战美国公海霸权并重塑权力平衡。”
· “China is seeking to establish a naval force capable of contending with the United States; to have a blue-water navy capable of global operations.”
· “中国正寻求建立一支能够与美国向抗衡的海军力量；想要拥有一支能够进行全球部署的蓝水海军。”
· “[the PLAN] will become a blue-water Navy, [and] appear beside the U.S. Navy.”
· “解放军海军将变成一支蓝水海军，并将出现在美国海军卧榻之侧。”
· “China’s blue-water Navy will in a few years constitute a real challenge to the United States Navy.”
· “中国蓝水海军不久后将对美国海军造成现实挑战。”
· “Washington may have won a battle but lost the war. It is just a matter of time for the creation of a Chinese blue-water Navy.”
· “华盛顿也许会赢得一次战斗但却输掉整个战争。中国蓝水海军的建成只是时间问题。”
· “China has begun to build a blue-water Navy, it has the ability to send its forces to Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.” This is from a People’s Daily article militaristically titled U.S Media Say That China’s Military Power and Network Threats Keep U.S. Military Officials Awake at Night.
· “中国已经开始发展蓝水海军，其有能力将其武装力量投放到阿拉斯加、夏威夷和关岛。”这来自《人民日报》的一篇军国主义式标题的文章《美媒说中国军事力量和网络威胁值得美军官夙夜警惕》
It is important to note that this message has remained constant over the last five years. In all of these instances, the United States is portrayed as the target and raison d’être of a blue-water PLAN. Erickson and Collins cite current PLAN armament modernization areas as evidence that China is unable to contest U.S. naval dominance. Their argument relies on several uncertain assumptions. First, they presume that the PLAN is not seeking to challenge the U.S. Navy because it will not have the technological capability to do so in the immediate future. This conclusion disregards the reality that over the last decade the Chinese military has acquired state-of-the-art armaments at lightning speed. Who would have predicted that China would leapfrog generations of fighter aircraft and acquire and produce the J-20 mere years after the first F-22 came off the production line? In the digital age there is no reliable way to predict future military capabilities. Just last week a Chinese smuggling ring was busted for attempting to transfer radiation hardened microchips, a necessary component for ballistic missile guidance, to the PLA. China certainly has the industrial capacity to build modern aircraft and naval vessels. Therefore, the assumption that the PLAN does not seek to challenge the U.S. Navy due to current technological inferiority is flawed.
需要强调的是，这类文章在过去五年间陈出不穷。在这些所有的例子中，美国都被描绘成中国蓝水海军的目标和存在意义。埃里克森和柯林斯引用了时下解放军海军的军备现代化领域作为中国无法挑战美国海军霸权的证据。他们的论证基于几个不确定的假设。首先，他们假设解放军海军不会试图挑战美海军，因为在不久的将来解放军海军仍然没有相符的技术能力来这样做。这个推论忽视了在过去十年间，中国军队以闪电般的速度获得了高尖端的军备这一现实。有谁预见了在第一条F-22战机生产线关闭后的仅仅几年间，中国就跨越了数代战斗机获得和生产J-20？在数字化时代，没有什么可靠的方式来预测未来的军事能力。就在上周，一个中国走私集团因试图向解放军走私抗辐射微芯（弹道导弹制导所必需的一种零件）而被破获。中国确实有制造现代飞行器和海军军舰的工业能力。因此，解放军海军因其技术劣势而不会寻求挑战美国海军的假设是错误的。
An analysis of China’s maritime identity leads to the conclusion that Beijing intends to frequently deploy a future blue-water PLAN outside East Asia and the Western Pacific. In recent years the People’s Daily has often called for the creation of a blue-water PLAN to defend China’s foreign economic interests, energy security, and important maritime choke points. The party organ has often been dismayed at the fact that maritime security for China’s energy imports is currently provided, or controlled by, foreign navies. These findings conflict with Erickson and Collins’ statement that,
通过对中国大洋角色的分析，可以得出北京有意将其未来的蓝水海军部署到东亚以外和西太平洋。最近几年，《人民日报》常常呼吁建立一支解放军蓝水海军以保护中国海外经济利益、能源安全和重要的海上要冲。党报常常对这样一个事实感到气馁，那就是中国能源进口海上安全目前受制于外国海军。这些都与埃里克森和柯林斯的以下陈述相反，
“there are no reliable indications at this time that China desires a truly global blue water navy akin to that of the U.S. today, or which the Soviet Union maintained for some time, albeit at the eventual cost of strategic overextension. China does seek to develop a “blue-water” navy in the years to come – but one that is more “regional” than “global” in nature.”
“并没有确定的迹象表明中国想要为了战略性过度扩张，而不计最终成本建立一支像今天美国一般的真正的全球化蓝水海军或者说像苏联曾经维持一段时间那样。中国近些年来试图发展其蓝水海军——但其实质并非‘全球性的’而更多的是‘地区性的’”。
In the last several years, the People’s Daily has published articles stating the following:
前几个月，《人民日报》刊载的一些文章做了如下陈述：
· “China’s push for a blue-water navy comes from oil insecurity and the protection of SLOCs, along with military balancing against India… China’s oil supply lines must be protected, especially [in the event of] war with India. During a war it is no secret India will try and intercept China’s oil imports.”
· “中国发展其蓝水海军源于石油不安、对海上交通线的保护以及维持对印度的军事平衡的需要......中国输油线应当受到保护，特别是万一与印度发生战争时。毫无疑问，在战争时印度会竭力阻断中国的石油输入。”
· “China’s dependence on foreign oil in 2020 will reach 68 percent, while imports of crude oil from Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran, Sudan…bypass the Strait of Malacca on their way to China…The U.S. can easily block the Strait of Malacca at its narrowest point, [this] is the throat of China’s energy supply.”
· “中国对外石油依赖在2020年将达至68%，而从沙特阿拉伯、安哥拉、伊朗、苏丹进口......绕不开路上的马六甲海峡......美国能够在其最狭窄处，轻易扼守住马六甲海峡，这是中国能源供应的咽喉之处。”
· “With the growing concern for the safety of sea lanes, Chinese leaders will build a blue-water Navy…China’s maritime commercial interests [totaled] more than $800 billion by the end of 2008, while more than 60 percent of oil imports are transported by sea.”
· “随着对航道安全的关注提升，中国领导人将建立一支蓝水海军......中国海洋商业利益在2008年末总计超过八千亿，而其超过60%石油进口要通过海上运输。”
· “The prime objective of China’s Navy is to develop a blue-water navy to protect China’s energy and trade routes.”
· “中国海军首要目标是发展成一支能够保护中国能源与贸易路线的蓝水海军。”
· “The global layout of China’s energy security and national interests, China is in need of a powerful blue-water navy.”
· “中国能源安全及国家利益的全球布局令中国需要一支有力的蓝水海军。”
· “China relies on overseas markets and raw materials, which will strongly stimulate the Chinese intervention around the world, and require building a blue-water navy to protect sea lanes.”
· “中国对海外市场和原材料的依赖将对中国进行全球干涉产生强烈刺激。中国需要建立一支蓝水海军以保护航线。”
· “We develop the ability of the ocean-going (blue-water) navy…to maintain international trade and energy supply lines open and safe.”
· “我们需要发展海军的远洋航行（蓝水）能力......为了维持国际贸易和能源供给线的开放与安全。”
A foreign navy can blockade Chinese international trade and oil imports far outside the Strait of Malacca. This detail cannot be lost on Chinese strategic planners. The U.S and Indian navies have the ability to create a blockade near the Strait of Hormuz or the Indian Ocean. If Chinese leaders increasingly consider China’s international trade and oil imports to be a national security Achilles heel, and a blue-water PLAN is intended to protect against this dilemma, future PLAN deployments will certainly occur outside East Asia. Future deployments may focus on projecting power into the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea.
外国海军远从马六甲海峡就能扼住中国国际贸易和石油进口。这些细节不会被中国决策者忽视。美国和印度海军有能力在霍尔木兹海峡或印度洋附近制造阻碍。如果中国领导人逐渐将中国国际贸易和石油输入视为国家安全的致命弱点的话，一支解放军蓝水海军将作为对此种窘境的应对。在未来，解放军海军将确定部署于东亚之外。未来的部署也许会侧重在印度洋、孟加拉湾以及阿拉伯海上投放力量。
China has not possessed a blue-water navy for 600 years. Analyzing China’s evolving maritime identity is crucial for U.S. military planners, especially with ever dwindling budgets. Erickson and Collins are correct in writing that, “China is not working off a traditional European, Soviet, or American naval development playbook.” It would be misguided to automatically assume China will behave similarly to past world powers. Analyzing China’s maritime identity through media analysis is perhaps the best way to gauge future Chinese actions, given the closed, opaque and chaotic internal politics of the CCP.
中国600年前未曾有过一支蓝水海军。分析中国发展中的大洋角色对美国决策者至关重要，特别是在预算大幅缩水的情况下。埃里克森和柯林斯写到的“中国并不会跟随传统的欧洲、苏联或者美国的海军发展轨迹”是正确的。但这可能会误致一个自发的假设：中国将像过去的世界强国一样行动。鉴于中共内部政策的封闭性、不透明性以及混乱性，通过媒体分析来分析中国的大洋角色，也许是推测未来中国行动的最好方式。
One important caveat to all this is that the CCP often makes militaristic media statements or military actions to shore up domestic political support. One example of this was China’s recent establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In the same way, People’s Daily articles calling for a blue-water PLAN to challenge U.S. naval hegemony may be an effort to appease domestic nationalists. However, even if these articles are only meant to influence domestic politics, they nonetheless reveal changes in Chinese domestic political opinion. This in itself is still useful in gauging future PLAN deployments. This domestic political pressure may influence future PLAN actions. Whether or not People’s Daily articles truly reveal the inner-strategic dialogue of the CCP, they are still an influential factor in analyzing future PLAN strategic developments.
最为重要的一个警告就是，中共常常制造军国主义式的媒体声明或采取军事行动来获得国内政治支持。一个例子就是，最近中国划设了涵盖具有争议性的钓鱼岛在内的东海防空识别区。同样的，《人民日报》上的文章呼吁建立一支能够挑战美国海军霸权的解放军蓝水海军，也许对其国内民族主义的出现起到了推波助澜的作用。然而，即使这些文章唯一的意义在于影响其国内政治，但它们也揭露了中国国内政治观念的变化。这本身就对推测未来解放军海军部署有用。这种国内政治压力也许会影响未来解放军海军的行动。不论《人民日报》是否真实揭露了中国内部决策对话，它也仍然是分析未来解放军海军战略发展的一个重要影响因素。
Henry Holst recently finished a year-long Chinese language immersion program in Beijing (IES Abroad) and graduated with a degree in History and Chinese Language and Literature from the University of Georgia.
（作者：亨利·霍尔斯特，最近在北京（学生国际教育协会）完成了为期一年的汉语浸入式教学，并以历史、汉语及文学学位从佐治亚大学毕业。）
评论
John（January 9, 2014 at 10:31）
Rough summary of this article: Assessing naval power by counting ships is boring and empirical. There’s something called Maritime Identity which is much more exciting. America’s is: “We have a big navy and we use it for good.” China’s is: “We would like a big navy to thwart America and we’re doing our nefarious best to get one. We might have one as early as next week, so watch out.” I know this because I read the People’s Daily and I’ve been in China a whole year.
这篇文章简言之就是：“通过计算舰船数来评估海军力量是及乏味而又经验主义的，而所谓的大洋角色就有趣多了。美国人的大洋角色是‘我们有大海军，我们用它来保护美好事物’。中国人的大洋角色是‘我们想要大海军，为此不惜穷兵黩武。也许下一周我们就有了，给我当心点’。我知道这些，因为我读了《人民日报》，还在中国住了一整年。”
Anon（January 9, 2014 at 12:23）（回楼上）
I think the author meant to show how maritime identity is better than “relying on solely armaments” as the unit of analysis. He didn’t totally define China’s maritime identity, I think he/she just brought up its specific aspects relevant to the term blue water navy.
我认为作者的意思是大洋角色作为一个分析单位比“单独以军备为分析单位”更好。他并没有完全定义中国的大洋角色，我认为他/她只说了与蓝水海军有关的具体部分。
I don’t care if he/she was only there for a year. I think The article has many good points
我不关心他/她是否只住了一年。我觉得这篇文章有许多好的观点。
ScottLoar（January 9, 2014 at 13:35）
China will not reveal its defense budget or spending but its military intentions are clear: China intends to develop a military that supports state diplomacy, protects Chinese assets no matter where they may be, and is able to contend with any other power.
中国不会披露其防务预算或花费，但其军事目的很清楚：中国想要发展一支军队来支持其国家外交、保护无论处于何地的中国资产以及能够与其他国家相抗衡。
Yes, it’s that simple.
是的，就是这么简单。
Socrates（January 9, 2014 at 19:35)（回楼上）
Yes, My Man,
是的，兄弟，
The whole world seemed to misunderstand Xi’s recent declaration regarding China Dream.
整个世界似乎都误解了习主席最近关于中国梦的宣言。
China Dream that Xi meaned is NOT the prosperity , harmony, happiness for Chinese populace,But China Dream he meaned is : China shall displace the US and becomes the world hegemony because that ambition embedded in Chinese rulers minds more than 2,000 years .And every new regime takes power in China also repeats the same declaration .
习主席提的中国梦不意味着中国人民的前途、和谐和幸福，而是：中国将取代美国，寻求世界霸权，这是由于超过2000年的根深蒂固的中国统治者思想所造成的。每个取得中国权力的新政权都会发出与之相同的宣言。
As far as I’m concerned, the most recent rulers who have repeated that declaration are Sun Yat Sen, Chiang Kai Shek, Mao Ze Dong and now Xi Jingping.
据我所知，发出这类宣言的最近的统治者有孙逸仙、蒋介石、毛泽东以及现在的Xi。
Just one month after he was assigned as the first President of Republic of China, Sun Yat Sen has proudly declared that US has became superpower by chance rather than its real potential and its dominance is temporary only. And only China, with its vast territory , immense natural ,human resources plus its 5,000 civilisation foundation.Therefore, it deserves to be the long term world hegemony.
孙逸仙在就任民国第一任总统后，仅过了一个月，就骄傲地宣称美国因偶然而不是其真实潜力而成为超级大国，并且它的霸权仅是暂时的。而只有中国才是地大物博、人口众多，有其5000年文化基础。因此，中国应当长期主宰世界霸权。
Let look at China presence in Artic , Antartica ,every corner of the world and even on the moon.The you will realize that such assumption is really moronic.
看看中国在南北极、世界的每个角落甚至是月球上的表现，你就知道那种假设真是太弱智了。
Bobby Nguyen（January 9, 2014 at 02:01）
China wants a blue water navy so it can steal oil and gas-rich maritime territories from Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. Its navy is not for protecting ocean trade links, but for capturing them. I would think that, because of their history, the Chinese would be more benevolent to their smaller neighbors. Look again: China is now an imperialist pig.
中国想要蓝水海军是为了从越南、菲律宾以及日本窃走石油和富含天然气的领海。中国的海军不是为了保护远洋贸易线，而是为了控制它们。基于他们的历史，我认为中国人或许对他们周围的小邻居更友善。再来瞧瞧，如今中国已成了令人讨厌的帝国主义者。
Put thefts into cage（January 9, 2014 at 05:57）（回楼上）
Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan are petty thefts; they have been benefitting a lot on the differences and misunderstandings between USA and China. One of the purposes of “new type of great-power relationship” is to stop these thefts from enjoying stolen goods at the expenses of the relationship between great-powers.
越南、菲律宾还有日本都是小偷；他们通过中美之间的分歧误解来渔翁得利。“新型大国关系”的目标之一就是要制止这帮小偷借由大国间的摩擦来享受渔翁之利。
Big stick is needed to disperse these petty thefts from encroached lands and properties and enforce them to obey law and order.
需要大棒来将这帮小偷从已经侵占的土地和财产上赶出来，并且迫使他们遵法守序。
Kris R.（January 9, 2014 at 09:06）（回楼上）
Petty thefts. Did you mean Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan are victims of petty thefts? Or are you calling these countries thieves, like in ‘petty thieves’. Who stole what? Great powers? Do you mean that US and China are great powers ready to invade other countries just because of thievery accusations? Are you in a cage right now? You seem to be cooped in the cage of ignorance and misinformation.
小偷小摸。你的意思是越南、菲律宾还有日本是小偷小摸的受害者吧？还是或者说你觉得这些国家才是小偷。谁偷了东西？超级大国？你想说美中作为一个超级大国仅因盗窃指控便要入侵他国？难道你现在还如此闭塞？你貌似处于无知和误解的境地。
Put thefts into cage（January 10, 2014 at 00:21）（回楼上）
Kris, for your information, Vietnam and Philippines stole Chinese islands in the South China Sea, Japan stole Chinese islands as well as Ryukyu kingdom in the East China Sea in case you have been fed with misinformation from the Western black information network which includes media, education system, think tanks, government agencies, etc. for their global enslavement conquest.
Kris，未免你被西方舆论所误导，看一下资料吧，越南、菲律宾在中国南海偷占中国领土，日本和琉球从中国东海偷占中国领土。西方为了奴役征服全球，而由媒体、教育体系、智囊团、政府机构等等所组成的网络舆论抹黑阵地一直在向你传递错误消息。
AG（January 8, 2014 at 15:08）
This article is terrible, it makes no sense.
这篇文章很糟糕，一点道理都没有。
Is the retrorocket about China different in the US?
中国的火箭和美国有区别吗？
Some of the quotes reported from Chinese newspapers are sentences that the Chinese journalist quotes himself from an American source….please be serious….
这些引用自中国新闻的文段其实是中国记者引用自美国媒体的......请严谨一点吧......
tom929（January 8, 2014 at 12:35）
people keep yapping about rise of china and decline of US. just wait and the future will unfold itself . no reason to waste time making prediction
中国的崛起和美国的衰退只是时间问题，人们老是对其喋喋不休。未来有其自有的发展趋势。搞这些预测简直就是毫无理由的浪费时间。
没人回啊。
野心你妹呀；蓝水尔能游，吾不能往？
哪个国家的海军没有野心？