F-35的价格是如何翻了将近一番（而你还不知道的原因）

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On June 14 — FlagDay, of all days — the Government Accountability Office released a new oversight report on the F-35:Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further EnhanceRestructuring and Address Affordability Risks. As usual, it contained someimportant information on growing costs and other problems. Also as usual, thepress covered the new report, albeit a bitsparsely.
Fresh bad news on the F-35 has apparently become so routine that thefundamental problems in the program are plowed right over. One gets theimpression, especially from GAO’s own title to its report, that we shouldexpect the bad news, make some minor adjustments, and then move on. But adeeper dive into the report offers more profound, and disturbing, bottom line.

6月14日美国国旗纪念日，美国审计总署公布一份关于F-35的监督报告《联合攻击战斗机：国防部需要采取行动进一步提高应变能力和应对预算压力能力》。和往常一样，报告提及了很多关于费用增加和其他问题在内的一些重要信息。还是和往常一样，只有很少的媒体关注这份新的报告。

关于F-35新的坏消息已经变得如此的司空见惯，该计划中的问题被不断提起。我们有了这种印象，尤其是在审计总署报告标题中得到这样的信息后，我们必须准备接受坏消息，做出某些微调而后继续前行。但是如果认真看完这份报告，就会发现更多有深度、令人不安且涉及到底线的问题。

译注：根据2004年美国审计总署人力资源改革法案修正案，自2004年7月7日，美国审计总署（以下简称GAO）正式更名。具有83年历史的GAO改变了其机构名称的用词，从GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 变为GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE。前者直译为总会计办公室，后者直译为政府责任办公室。更名后的美国审计总署名称缩写仍为GAO。这一措辞上的变化是美国审计总署近年来业务内容转换的结果，也反映了美国审计总署未来的发展方向。更多内容点链接：http://forum.defence.org.cn/view ... &extra=page%3D1

Notorious forburying its more important findings in the body of a report — I know; I workedthere for nearly a decade – GAO understates its own results onacquisition cost growth in its one-page summary, which—sadly—is probably whatmost read to get what they think is the bottom line.
In that one-page summary, GAO states the F-35 program now projects “costsof $395.7 billion, an increase of $117.2 billion (42 percent) from the prior2007 baseline.” The much more complete story is in this table from thereport:

审计总署以在报告中隐藏（淡化）重要信息而臭名昭著，而我深知这点，我曾经在审计总署工作了将近10年。审计总署在它的简短一页的摘要中对F-35的购买价格轻描淡写一笔提过，但是很悲哀的是，这对于阅读者来说这最关乎他们的底线问题。

在这简短一页的摘要中，审计总署说明F-35项目目前“耗资3957亿美元，和2007年的预算相比增长了1172亿美元（42%）”。更详细的信息在报告中的张图表中： 译注：Nunn-McCurdy修正法案，是以上院武装军兵种委员会前主席Sam Nunn（D-Ga）和下院情报委员会前主席兼下院武装军兵种委员会成员Rep. Dave McCurdy(D-Okla.)的名字命名的。按照Nunn-McCurdy有选择采购报告（SAR）的规定，如果主要的防御采购计划（major defense acquisition program）的单位成本增加达到或超过15%，就构成一次违规。这时，有关的军兵种部长就得向国会就此项违规通报国会。如果单位成本增长25%或更多，国防部部长就必须向国会提出证明，表明这项计划对于国家安全有多么的重要，说明不存在能够提供相当能力或更大能力的成本又较小的其它替代方案，证明新的成本估计如何有道理，以及证明项目的管理能够控制成本。按照Nunn-McCurdy有选择采购报告（SAR）的规定，向国会递交有关成本超限的通报之后的30天内，如果国防部还要继续该项目，就必须向国会提供上述证明材料。

The summaryuses the wrong baseline. As F-35 observers know and as the table shows,the cost documentation of the F-35 program started in 2001, not 2007. There has been a lot more cost growth than the “$117.2 billion (42 percent)”stated.
Set in 2001, the total acquisition cost of the F-35 was to be $233.0billion. Compare that to the current estimate of $395.7 billion: cost growthhas been $162.7 billion, or 70%: a lot more than what GAO stated in itssummary.

而摘要使用了错误的基数。作为F-35项目的观察者和查看了那个图标的人明白，F-35项目预算是开始于2001年而不是2007年。因此增加的预算成本根本就不止“1172亿美元（42%）”。

如果把时间定格在2001年，F-35项目总预算是2330亿美元。和目前的预算3957亿美元相比：预算增加了1627亿美元约为70%，比审计总署在图表中所说的高多了。 However, the original $233 billion was supposed to buy 2,866 aircraft, notthe 2,457 currently planned: making it $162 billion, or 70%, more for 409, or14%, fewer aircraft. Adjusting for the shrinkage in the fleet, I calculate thecost growth for a fleet of 2,457 aircraft to be $190.8 billion, or 93%.

再者，原本这2330亿美元的预算是要购买2866架飞机的，而不是当前计划中的2457架：多出了1620亿美元约合70%，少了409架飞机约合14%。调整这些数据之后，我核算出采购这2457架飞机的预算成本增加了1908亿美元约合93%。 The cost of theprogram has almost doubled over the original baseline; it is not anincrease of 42%.
Now, you know why DOD loves the rubber baseline. Reset the baseline, andyou can pretend a catastrophe is half its actual size.
When assessing the other, even larger, “sustainability” cost implicationsof the F-35, GAO makes what I regard as a major methodological error.

和基数相比，项目预算耗资将近翻番，不是什么42%。
现在你知道为什么国防部喜欢用这种可变动的基数了。重新设定一个基数，你就可以把一场大灾难假想为其实际规模的一半大小了。
当谈到其他事项时，在更大的问题——F-35项目“可接受”成本上，审计总署犯了另外一个错误，而我称之为方法错误。 On page 11, GAO cites DOD’s goal for the additional operating, logisticsand support costs (“sustainment”) of the F-35. GAO focuses on the Air Force’sconventional take-off and landing (CTOL) variant and cites the new, March 2012goal: $35,200 per flight hour, compared to $22,500 for the F-16. For years, DODhas cited the F-16 as the comparison aircraft for calculating costs to operatethe F-35; now it is hoping the F-35 will be only 56% more than the cost tosustain the F-16. 在11页上，审计总署引用了国防部关于F-35其他额外预算如后勤保障的开支。审计总署关注到了空军常规起降成本并提出新的2012年3月的目标：35200美元/飞行小时，而F-16的费用则是22500美元/飞行小时。之前国防部还拿F-16作比较，认为使用F-35更加经济；但如今他们把F-35的维护开销比F-16只多出56%都当成努力完成的目标。 GAO, quite properly, offers some skepticism that this goal can be met. Itstates that the CTOL version is not achieving its own criteria for meantimebetween failures, falling 30% short in 2011 (page 30); GAO reports thatoperational testers said “JSF is not on track to meet …operational suitabilityrequirements” (page 17), and finally, GAO says the program is experiencing“excessive time for low observable repair and restoration, low reliability, andpoor maintainability performance” (page 17). After all that, GAO politelycalls the sustainability cost goal “a significant challenge” (page 31). 审计总署很合理地对这个目标能否实现提出了一些质疑。它声明常规起降成本没有达到预期目标，和2011年制定的目标相比差了30%（第30页）；审计总署报告称操作测试人员表示“联合攻击战斗机没有达到……作战使用性要求”（第17页）；最后审计总署表示该项目“常规检修时间过长、低可靠性、可维护性差”（第17页）。在这些陈述之后，审计总署客气地表示维护成本目标“面临巨大挑战”（第31页）。 GAO is also correct to point out DOD management’s declaration that thecurrent F-35 operating cost estimate, “$1.1 Trillion for all three variantsbased on a 30-year service life,” (page 10) is “unaffordable and simplyunacceptable in the current fiscal environment” (page 11). 审计总署也正确地指出，国防部宣称F-35项目的运行费用“3种机型30年服役期内总共耗资1.1万亿美元”“在当前财政状况下是无法承受和完全不可接受的”。

However, comparingthe F-35 to the F-16 is a major error; associating those two aircraft is simplyimplausible. The two have very, very little in common. While they bothare single engine aircraft that were planned to cost less than theircontemporary higher cost complements (the F-15 and the F-22 respectively), thebasic similarity stops there. The F-16 was conceived as a visual-range air toair fighter in the 1970s; it is a far, far more simple design, and it met itsinherent affordability goal. The F-35A is a multi-role, multi-service designwith stealth and many other highly complex (so-called “5th Generation”) attributes added in. It is afar, far more intricate aircraft and, as a result, failed to meet anyaffordability goal. 把F-35和F-16简单对比是不对的：把这两种飞机放在一起讨论都是不科学的。两者之间没什么共性。但是它们两者都是单发战机，计划作为同时代的耗资更高的飞机（分别是F-15和F-22）的补充的，它们的相同点仅止于此。在20世纪70年代，F-16的构想是一种视距内对空战斗机；这是一个非常简单的构想，而它也达到了它的设计要求。而F-35A则被设计为一个多用途、多功能、具备隐身性能和其他高技术复杂技术（称之为5代）的战机。这是一个更加复杂、复杂的多的战机，因此，它的各项设计目标没一项真正实现。 The F-35A has much more in common with its Lockheed stablemate, the F-22.While the F-22 may be more complex in some respects (twin-engine withdivertible thrust; earlier generation stealth coatings); in other respects theF-35 is the more complex aircraft of the two (basic multi-role design woveninto a STOVL-capable, multi-service airframe, even more complex communications,sensor and display systems, and much more software and complexity of systemintegration). F-35A和洛马公司旗下它的同胞兄弟F-22战机更相像。当然从某种程度上来说F-22可能更加复杂（矢量推力双发；新型隐身涂料）；而从另外一个角度来说F-35才是更加复杂的机型（多用途设计：要有短距起降能力、多用途机身、更复杂的通讯系统、侦测和显示系统、更多的应用软件和更复杂的系统兼容性）。 The F-35’sfundamentally complicated (“5th generation”)design makes its comparison to the F-16 inappropriate in any effort tounderstand F-35 operating costs. It should be compared to the F-22 where thesimilarities abound, for the most part. To better predict unknown F-35 costs, weshould start with known F-22 operating costs.
The Air Force hasbeen recording costs per flying hour for the F-22 since 2003. Six years after2005 when the Air Force declared “initial operating capability” (IOC or thepresumed ability to deploy and fight) for the F-22, the Air Forceofficiallycalculated an“ownership” cost per-flying-hour for the F-22 at $128,389 [best todownload this with Google's Chrome browser]. That amount, however, isan outlier: the F-22 was grounded for more than four months that year, therebydistorting upwards the per-flying-hour cost. F-35与生俱来的复杂（5代机）设计使得将它和F-16相比较来考虑它的运行成本是不可行的。应该把它和具有最多共同点F-22来进行对比。在预测无法确定的F-35成本时，我们应该首先从已知的F-22运行成本着手。
空军从2003年开始就记录F-22每飞行小时的成本。在2005年空军宣称“具备初步作战能力”（IOC或者称为具备部署和战斗能力）的6年后（译注：即2011年），空军计算出F-22每飞行小时耗费12万8389美元。这个数据是比较业余的结论：F-22那年停飞了4个多月，因此每飞行小时的耗费是显然被高估了的。

There were no F-22 groundings or other significant flight limitations in2010; the data for that year reflect known sustainment costs, per hour, afterfive years of deployability, thereby reflecting any learning curve in F-22maintenance and support. The Air Force’s “ownership” cost per flying hourfor the F-22 in 2010 was $63,929: half the 2011 cost. 2010年F-22没有停飞也没有什么大的飞行限制，这一年的数据才能真实反映它的每飞行小时运行成本。在正式列装5年后，这个数据能够真实反映它的实际维护和运行成本。空军统计F-22在2010年的每飞行小时耗费是63929美元：2011年的一半。 It is that amount that should serve as the starting point for consideringplausible F-35 operating costs. Optimistically speaking, a downward adjustmentcan be made for the F-35: Lockheed is attempting to reduce the cost andmaintenance hours needed for the F-35’s version of stealth coatings, whichcomprises a large portion of F-22 operating costs, and an allowance should alsobe made for the single engine design of the F-35. 这个数据可以作为F-35运行成本的比较基数。乐观预计F-35的成本应该更低一些：洛马正在努力降低F-35隐身版本战绩的维护时间和成本，而这个维护时间占了F-22运行时间的很大一部分，而且F-35作为单发战机它的费用自然应该更低一些。 However, it is currently unknowable whether the lesser stealth cost goalwill be achieved (as noted above, GAO found the F-35 is encountering problems),and it is also unknowable if the single engine design compensates, or not, forthe added operating costs for the more complex communications, sensors,displays and software integration. While highly optimistic, perhaps a 20%improvement over the F-22 can be analytically useful. 但是，目前而言无法得知降低隐身蒙皮成本的目标是否能够实现（正如上面所提到的，审计总署发现F-35遇到了一些问题），而且现在也不从了解单发是否能够降低成本——因为它增加了更加复杂的通信、侦测、显示和软件集成系统。从很乐观的角度来判断，成本上相对F-22有20%的降低是一个比较可行的分析。 Assuming that 20% cost per-flying-hour improvement over the F-22, the F-35would cost $51,143 per hour to fly. Rather than an F-35A operating cost that is56% more than the non-analogous F-16; it is more plausible, and analyticallyconservative, to calculate an operating cost that is 80% less than the highlycomparable F-22—even if the improvement has not yet been demonstrated. The question should not be whether the F-35 can achieve 156% of the operatingcost of the F-16; it should be whether it can achieve 80% of the operatingcosts of the F-22. 假定每飞行小时的成本相比F-22降低20%，那么F-35将是51143美元每小时。和没有太多共同点的F-16相比，F-35A的消耗多出了56%；保守分析来看F-35A和更相似的F-22相比耗资大概略少于80%——当然这个改善还无法得到确认。因此问题不是F-35的运行成本是否降到F-16的156%，而是是否能够降到F-22的80%。 Posing the question in that manner, however, presents a serious dilemma:if the currently projected estimate of operating costs for the complete fleetof all three F-35 variants of $1.1 trillion is “unaffordable and simplyunacceptable,” what is the meaning of a plausible—even if optimistic—operatingcost that is well above that unsustainable $1.1 trillion? 从这个角度来考虑就会产生一个很大的问题：如果现行的F-35的3个型号飞机总共耗资为1.1万亿美元是“无法承受和绝对不能接受的”，那么一个大概准确的—甚至还是乐观的—（判断）总共耗资远远超过不能承受的1.1万亿那该怎么办？ During the nine years I worked in GAO’s methodology division, specializingin national-security evaluations, we took very seriously the selection ofreasonable criteria for the purposes of comparing DOD systems. When DOD’scriteria were biased, we selected more appropriate ones. In this recent report,GAO failed to take that step. 我在审计总署的9年工作期间专门负责国防安全评估，我们采用非常公允的准则对国防部的项目进行评估。当国防部自身所采用的标准有偏颇时，我们会采用更加公允的其他准则。而在最近的这份报告上，审计总署没有采用这样的方式。

We also used tojoke in the cafeteria about the tepid titles senior management would give thereports we wrote. This new GAO report, Joint Strike Fighter: DODActions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and Address Affordability Risksisvery unfortunate example: it does not simply understate the message the dataconvey; it misstates what the data say. The cost growth inherent in the F-35program is huge and still growing: far more than to “enhance restructuring”and “address affordability” is needed. 我们还经常会对高层领导给我们提交的报告拟的比较温和的标题开玩笑。审计总署的这份新报告《联合攻击战斗机：国防部需要采取行动进一步提高应变能力和应对预算压力能力》很不幸是一个典范：它不只是对文章内容的轻描淡写，而是在对文章内容所反映的实质问题做虚假陈述。F-35项目耗资的增长是非常巨大的，而且仍在不断增长：它不仅需要“提高应变能力”和“应对预算压力能力”。 The F-35 shouldnow be officially called “unaffordable and simply unacceptable.” All that islacking is a management that will accept — and act — on thatfinding. F-35项目应该公开承认为“无法承受和绝对不可接受”的。我们唯一欠缺的就是一个接受该事实并采取行动应对的管理部门。

关于无人机的使用仍然没有定论。尽管无人机的使用已经带来很多战术上的胜利，但还不能完全证明它们能够起到关键性的战略决定作用。而F-35的问题和这个很相似：材料应用上的领先使得F-35这样的项目具有战术上的优势，但即便具有这样的战术优势仍然有可能在运行和战略层面上失败。这些项目耗资是如此的巨大，因为它们从这么一个错误的观点出发：美国所花的每一分钱最终都能产生价值。无人机还没有经历过真正地空中实战，它们仍然会因为我们目前“大到不能倒”的军购模式而面临衰落。 Kevin Brent This story does a good job of explaining'how' the numbers are fudged, but it still does not tell the 'why'. And, thewhy is Lock-Mart's Union Thuggery. Costs a lot of money to pay some imbecile$30 per hour with full benefits and a parking space to sweep the floor of the factory. 这篇文章很好地解释了这些金额是“如何”被捏造的，但并没有告诉我们“为什么”。还有，原因其实就是洛马公司的工会在谋财害命。给那些扫地的傻X每小时30美元的报酬和全额保险金加停车位是很大一笔开销。 Starshiprarity
Oh yes, lets blame the unions instead ofthe inherent corruption of the military industrial complex. 好的，我们开始喷工会吧，而不是军工企业联合体身上固有的贪污腐败。 Christopher Kidwell Bottom line in the world today is thatif you have nukes, you are golden. NO other country in the world is going totry to invade your country with the threat of M.A.D. hanging over their heads. 如果这个世界的信条就是如果你有核武器，你就牛X。在相互确保摧毁的威胁之下，没有哪个国家还会有入侵的想法。
BjammindD
Fools, don't you know contracts are forplebians?
The military-industrial machine willcharge what it damn well wants to charge and your going to like it. 傻X，你不知道合同这玩意都是为普通人准备的吗？军工企业联合体想开多高价格就开多高，你只能去接受。



http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/forum.p ... D111%26typeid%3D111


On June 14 — FlagDay, of all days — the Government Accountability Office released a new oversight report on the F-35:Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further EnhanceRestructuring and Address Affordability Risks. As usual, it contained someimportant information on growing costs and other problems. Also as usual, thepress covered the new report, albeit a bitsparsely.
Fresh bad news on the F-35 has apparently become so routine that thefundamental problems in the program are plowed right over. One gets theimpression, especially from GAO’s own title to its report, that we shouldexpect the bad news, make some minor adjustments, and then move on. But adeeper dive into the report offers more profound, and disturbing, bottom line.

6月14日美国国旗纪念日，美国审计总署公布一份关于F-35的监督报告《联合攻击战斗机：国防部需要采取行动进一步提高应变能力和应对预算压力能力》。和往常一样，报告提及了很多关于费用增加和其他问题在内的一些重要信息。还是和往常一样，只有很少的媒体关注这份新的报告。

关于F-35新的坏消息已经变得如此的司空见惯，该计划中的问题被不断提起。我们有了这种印象，尤其是在审计总署报告标题中得到这样的信息后，我们必须准备接受坏消息，做出某些微调而后继续前行。但是如果认真看完这份报告，就会发现更多有深度、令人不安且涉及到底线的问题。

译注：根据2004年美国审计总署人力资源改革法案修正案，自2004年7月7日，美国审计总署（以下简称GAO）正式更名。具有83年历史的GAO改变了其机构名称的用词，从GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 变为GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE。前者直译为总会计办公室，后者直译为政府责任办公室。更名后的美国审计总署名称缩写仍为GAO。这一措辞上的变化是美国审计总署近年来业务内容转换的结果，也反映了美国审计总署未来的发展方向。更多内容点链接：http://forum.defence.org.cn/view ... &extra=page%3D1

Notorious forburying its more important findings in the body of a report — I know; I workedthere for nearly a decade – GAO understates its own results onacquisition cost growth in its one-page summary, which—sadly—is probably whatmost read to get what they think is the bottom line.
In that one-page summary, GAO states the F-35 program now projects “costsof $395.7 billion, an increase of $117.2 billion (42 percent) from the prior2007 baseline.” The much more complete story is in this table from thereport:

审计总署以在报告中隐藏（淡化）重要信息而臭名昭著，而我深知这点，我曾经在审计总署工作了将近10年。审计总署在它的简短一页的摘要中对F-35的购买价格轻描淡写一笔提过，但是很悲哀的是，这对于阅读者来说这最关乎他们的底线问题。

在这简短一页的摘要中，审计总署说明F-35项目目前“耗资3957亿美元，和2007年的预算相比增长了1172亿美元（42%）”。更详细的信息在报告中的张图表中： 译注：Nunn-McCurdy修正法案，是以上院武装军兵种委员会前主席Sam Nunn（D-Ga）和下院情报委员会前主席兼下院武装军兵种委员会成员Rep. Dave McCurdy(D-Okla.)的名字命名的。按照Nunn-McCurdy有选择采购报告（SAR）的规定，如果主要的防御采购计划（major defense acquisition program）的单位成本增加达到或超过15%，就构成一次违规。这时，有关的军兵种部长就得向国会就此项违规通报国会。如果单位成本增长25%或更多，国防部部长就必须向国会提出证明，表明这项计划对于国家安全有多么的重要，说明不存在能够提供相当能力或更大能力的成本又较小的其它替代方案，证明新的成本估计如何有道理，以及证明项目的管理能够控制成本。按照Nunn-McCurdy有选择采购报告（SAR）的规定，向国会递交有关成本超限的通报之后的30天内，如果国防部还要继续该项目，就必须向国会提供上述证明材料。

The summaryuses the wrong baseline. As F-35 observers know and as the table shows,the cost documentation of the F-35 program started in 2001, not 2007. There has been a lot more cost growth than the “$117.2 billion (42 percent)”stated.
Set in 2001, the total acquisition cost of the F-35 was to be $233.0billion. Compare that to the current estimate of $395.7 billion: cost growthhas been $162.7 billion, or 70%: a lot more than what GAO stated in itssummary.

而摘要使用了错误的基数。作为F-35项目的观察者和查看了那个图标的人明白，F-35项目预算是开始于2001年而不是2007年。因此增加的预算成本根本就不止“1172亿美元（42%）”。

如果把时间定格在2001年，F-35项目总预算是2330亿美元。和目前的预算3957亿美元相比：预算增加了1627亿美元约为70%，比审计总署在图表中所说的高多了。 However, the original $233 billion was supposed to buy 2,866 aircraft, notthe 2,457 currently planned: making it $162 billion, or 70%, more for 409, or14%, fewer aircraft. Adjusting for the shrinkage in the fleet, I calculate thecost growth for a fleet of 2,457 aircraft to be $190.8 billion, or 93%.

再者，原本这2330亿美元的预算是要购买2866架飞机的，而不是当前计划中的2457架：多出了1620亿美元约合70%，少了409架飞机约合14%。调整这些数据之后，我核算出采购这2457架飞机的预算成本增加了1908亿美元约合93%。 The cost of theprogram has almost doubled over the original baseline; it is not anincrease of 42%.
Now, you know why DOD loves the rubber baseline. Reset the baseline, andyou can pretend a catastrophe is half its actual size.
When assessing the other, even larger, “sustainability” cost implicationsof the F-35, GAO makes what I regard as a major methodological error.

和基数相比，项目预算耗资将近翻番，不是什么42%。
现在你知道为什么国防部喜欢用这种可变动的基数了。重新设定一个基数，你就可以把一场大灾难假想为其实际规模的一半大小了。
当谈到其他事项时，在更大的问题——F-35项目“可接受”成本上，审计总署犯了另外一个错误，而我称之为方法错误。 On page 11, GAO cites DOD’s goal for the additional operating, logisticsand support costs (“sustainment”) of the F-35. GAO focuses on the Air Force’sconventional take-off and landing (CTOL) variant and cites the new, March 2012goal: $35,200 per flight hour, compared to $22,500 for the F-16. For years, DODhas cited the F-16 as the comparison aircraft for calculating costs to operatethe F-35; now it is hoping the F-35 will be only 56% more than the cost tosustain the F-16. 在11页上，审计总署引用了国防部关于F-35其他额外预算如后勤保障的开支。审计总署关注到了空军常规起降成本并提出新的2012年3月的目标：35200美元/飞行小时，而F-16的费用则是22500美元/飞行小时。之前国防部还拿F-16作比较，认为使用F-35更加经济；但如今他们把F-35的维护开销比F-16只多出56%都当成努力完成的目标。 GAO, quite properly, offers some skepticism that this goal can be met. Itstates that the CTOL version is not achieving its own criteria for meantimebetween failures, falling 30% short in 2011 (page 30); GAO reports thatoperational testers said “JSF is not on track to meet …operational suitabilityrequirements” (page 17), and finally, GAO says the program is experiencing“excessive time for low observable repair and restoration, low reliability, andpoor maintainability performance” (page 17). After all that, GAO politelycalls the sustainability cost goal “a significant challenge” (page 31). 审计总署很合理地对这个目标能否实现提出了一些质疑。它声明常规起降成本没有达到预期目标，和2011年制定的目标相比差了30%（第30页）；审计总署报告称操作测试人员表示“联合攻击战斗机没有达到……作战使用性要求”（第17页）；最后审计总署表示该项目“常规检修时间过长、低可靠性、可维护性差”（第17页）。在这些陈述之后，审计总署客气地表示维护成本目标“面临巨大挑战”（第31页）。 GAO is also correct to point out DOD management’s declaration that thecurrent F-35 operating cost estimate, “$1.1 Trillion for all three variantsbased on a 30-year service life,” (page 10) is “unaffordable and simplyunacceptable in the current fiscal environment” (page 11). 审计总署也正确地指出，国防部宣称F-35项目的运行费用“3种机型30年服役期内总共耗资1.1万亿美元”“在当前财政状况下是无法承受和完全不可接受的”。

However, comparingthe F-35 to the F-16 is a major error; associating those two aircraft is simplyimplausible. The two have very, very little in common. While they bothare single engine aircraft that were planned to cost less than theircontemporary higher cost complements (the F-15 and the F-22 respectively), thebasic similarity stops there. The F-16 was conceived as a visual-range air toair fighter in the 1970s; it is a far, far more simple design, and it met itsinherent affordability goal. The F-35A is a multi-role, multi-service designwith stealth and many other highly complex (so-called “5th Generation”) attributes added in. It is afar, far more intricate aircraft and, as a result, failed to meet anyaffordability goal. 把F-35和F-16简单对比是不对的：把这两种飞机放在一起讨论都是不科学的。两者之间没什么共性。但是它们两者都是单发战机，计划作为同时代的耗资更高的飞机（分别是F-15和F-22）的补充的，它们的相同点仅止于此。在20世纪70年代，F-16的构想是一种视距内对空战斗机；这是一个非常简单的构想，而它也达到了它的设计要求。而F-35A则被设计为一个多用途、多功能、具备隐身性能和其他高技术复杂技术（称之为5代）的战机。这是一个更加复杂、复杂的多的战机，因此，它的各项设计目标没一项真正实现。 The F-35A has much more in common with its Lockheed stablemate, the F-22.While the F-22 may be more complex in some respects (twin-engine withdivertible thrust; earlier generation stealth coatings); in other respects theF-35 is the more complex aircraft of the two (basic multi-role design woveninto a STOVL-capable, multi-service airframe, even more complex communications,sensor and display systems, and much more software and complexity of systemintegration). F-35A和洛马公司旗下它的同胞兄弟F-22战机更相像。当然从某种程度上来说F-22可能更加复杂（矢量推力双发；新型隐身涂料）；而从另外一个角度来说F-35才是更加复杂的机型（多用途设计：要有短距起降能力、多用途机身、更复杂的通讯系统、侦测和显示系统、更多的应用软件和更复杂的系统兼容性）。 The F-35’sfundamentally complicated (“5th generation”)design makes its comparison to the F-16 inappropriate in any effort tounderstand F-35 operating costs. It should be compared to the F-22 where thesimilarities abound, for the most part. To better predict unknown F-35 costs, weshould start with known F-22 operating costs.
The Air Force hasbeen recording costs per flying hour for the F-22 since 2003. Six years after2005 when the Air Force declared “initial operating capability” (IOC or thepresumed ability to deploy and fight) for the F-22, the Air Forceofficiallycalculated an“ownership” cost per-flying-hour for the F-22 at $128,389 [best todownload this with Google's Chrome browser]. That amount, however, isan outlier: the F-22 was grounded for more than four months that year, therebydistorting upwards the per-flying-hour cost. F-35与生俱来的复杂（5代机）设计使得将它和F-16相比较来考虑它的运行成本是不可行的。应该把它和具有最多共同点F-22来进行对比。在预测无法确定的F-35成本时，我们应该首先从已知的F-22运行成本着手。
空军从2003年开始就记录F-22每飞行小时的成本。在2005年空军宣称“具备初步作战能力”（IOC或者称为具备部署和战斗能力）的6年后（译注：即2011年），空军计算出F-22每飞行小时耗费12万8389美元。这个数据是比较业余的结论：F-22那年停飞了4个多月，因此每飞行小时的耗费是显然被高估了的。

There were no F-22 groundings or other significant flight limitations in2010; the data for that year reflect known sustainment costs, per hour, afterfive years of deployability, thereby reflecting any learning curve in F-22maintenance and support. The Air Force’s “ownership” cost per flying hourfor the F-22 in 2010 was $63,929: half the 2011 cost. 2010年F-22没有停飞也没有什么大的飞行限制，这一年的数据才能真实反映它的每飞行小时运行成本。在正式列装5年后，这个数据能够真实反映它的实际维护和运行成本。空军统计F-22在2010年的每飞行小时耗费是63929美元：2011年的一半。 It is that amount that should serve as the starting point for consideringplausible F-35 operating costs. Optimistically speaking, a downward adjustmentcan be made for the F-35: Lockheed is attempting to reduce the cost andmaintenance hours needed for the F-35’s version of stealth coatings, whichcomprises a large portion of F-22 operating costs, and an allowance should alsobe made for the single engine design of the F-35. 这个数据可以作为F-35运行成本的比较基数。乐观预计F-35的成本应该更低一些：洛马正在努力降低F-35隐身版本战绩的维护时间和成本，而这个维护时间占了F-22运行时间的很大一部分，而且F-35作为单发战机它的费用自然应该更低一些。 However, it is currently unknowable whether the lesser stealth cost goalwill be achieved (as noted above, GAO found the F-35 is encountering problems),and it is also unknowable if the single engine design compensates, or not, forthe added operating costs for the more complex communications, sensors,displays and software integration. While highly optimistic, perhaps a 20%improvement over the F-22 can be analytically useful. 但是，目前而言无法得知降低隐身蒙皮成本的目标是否能够实现（正如上面所提到的，审计总署发现F-35遇到了一些问题），而且现在也不从了解单发是否能够降低成本——因为它增加了更加复杂的通信、侦测、显示和软件集成系统。从很乐观的角度来判断，成本上相对F-22有20%的降低是一个比较可行的分析。 Assuming that 20% cost per-flying-hour improvement over the F-22, the F-35would cost $51,143 per hour to fly. Rather than an F-35A operating cost that is56% more than the non-analogous F-16; it is more plausible, and analyticallyconservative, to calculate an operating cost that is 80% less than the highlycomparable F-22—even if the improvement has not yet been demonstrated. The question should not be whether the F-35 can achieve 156% of the operatingcost of the F-16; it should be whether it can achieve 80% of the operatingcosts of the F-22. 假定每飞行小时的成本相比F-22降低20%，那么F-35将是51143美元每小时。和没有太多共同点的F-16相比，F-35A的消耗多出了56%；保守分析来看F-35A和更相似的F-22相比耗资大概略少于80%——当然这个改善还无法得到确认。因此问题不是F-35的运行成本是否降到F-16的156%，而是是否能够降到F-22的80%。 Posing the question in that manner, however, presents a serious dilemma:if the currently projected estimate of operating costs for the complete fleetof all three F-35 variants of $1.1 trillion is “unaffordable and simplyunacceptable,” what is the meaning of a plausible—even if optimistic—operatingcost that is well above that unsustainable $1.1 trillion? 从这个角度来考虑就会产生一个很大的问题：如果现行的F-35的3个型号飞机总共耗资为1.1万亿美元是“无法承受和绝对不能接受的”，那么一个大概准确的—甚至还是乐观的—（判断）总共耗资远远超过不能承受的1.1万亿那该怎么办？ During the nine years I worked in GAO’s methodology division, specializingin national-security evaluations, we took very seriously the selection ofreasonable criteria for the purposes of comparing DOD systems. When DOD’scriteria were biased, we selected more appropriate ones. In this recent report,GAO failed to take that step. 我在审计总署的9年工作期间专门负责国防安全评估，我们采用非常公允的准则对国防部的项目进行评估。当国防部自身所采用的标准有偏颇时，我们会采用更加公允的其他准则。而在最近的这份报告上，审计总署没有采用这样的方式。

We also used tojoke in the cafeteria about the tepid titles senior management would give thereports we wrote. This new GAO report, Joint Strike Fighter: DODActions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and Address Affordability Risksisvery unfortunate example: it does not simply understate the message the dataconvey; it misstates what the data say. The cost growth inherent in the F-35program is huge and still growing: far more than to “enhance restructuring”and “address affordability” is needed. 我们还经常会对高层领导给我们提交的报告拟的比较温和的标题开玩笑。审计总署的这份新报告《联合攻击战斗机：国防部需要采取行动进一步提高应变能力和应对预算压力能力》很不幸是一个典范：它不只是对文章内容的轻描淡写，而是在对文章内容所反映的实质问题做虚假陈述。F-35项目耗资的增长是非常巨大的，而且仍在不断增长：它不仅需要“提高应变能力”和“应对预算压力能力”。 The F-35 shouldnow be officially called “unaffordable and simply unacceptable.” All that islacking is a management that will accept — and act — on thatfinding. F-35项目应该公开承认为“无法承受和绝对不可接受”的。我们唯一欠缺的就是一个接受该事实并采取行动应对的管理部门。

关于无人机的使用仍然没有定论。尽管无人机的使用已经带来很多战术上的胜利，但还不能完全证明它们能够起到关键性的战略决定作用。而F-35的问题和这个很相似：材料应用上的领先使得F-35这样的项目具有战术上的优势，但即便具有这样的战术优势仍然有可能在运行和战略层面上失败。这些项目耗资是如此的巨大，因为它们从这么一个错误的观点出发：美国所花的每一分钱最终都能产生价值。无人机还没有经历过真正地空中实战，它们仍然会因为我们目前“大到不能倒”的军购模式而面临衰落。 Kevin Brent This story does a good job of explaining'how' the numbers are fudged, but it still does not tell the 'why'. And, thewhy is Lock-Mart's Union Thuggery. Costs a lot of money to pay some imbecile$30 per hour with full benefits and a parking space to sweep the floor of the factory. 这篇文章很好地解释了这些金额是“如何”被捏造的，但并没有告诉我们“为什么”。还有，原因其实就是洛马公司的工会在谋财害命。给那些扫地的傻X每小时30美元的报酬和全额保险金加停车位是很大一笔开销。 Starshiprarity
Oh yes, lets blame the unions instead ofthe inherent corruption of the military industrial complex. 好的，我们开始喷工会吧，而不是军工企业联合体身上固有的贪污腐败。 Christopher Kidwell Bottom line in the world today is thatif you have nukes, you are golden. NO other country in the world is going totry to invade your country with the threat of M.A.D. hanging over their heads. 如果这个世界的信条就是如果你有核武器，你就牛X。在相互确保摧毁的威胁之下，没有哪个国家还会有入侵的想法。
BjammindD
Fools, don't you know contracts are forplebians?
The military-industrial machine willcharge what it damn well wants to charge and your going to like it. 傻X，你不知道合同这玩意都是为普通人准备的吗？军工企业联合体想开多高价格就开多高，你只能去接受。