超级军网展望中国————中央情报局眼里的真实中国
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/05/04 15:16:30
前记：不知道怎么回事，网上总有些所谓中情局CIA的中国情报分析，扰人视线。美国报纸上的中国也经常千变万化，这更加使我们困惑：美国人到底怎么考虑中国和中国人的？什么才是真话。
很早在CIA的网站上找到这份公开文献，感觉是说的很深刻，想的很远，不少内容是我们普通人都不曾注意到的。这里专门翻译出来，让大家好好看看美国中央情报局眼里的中国。个人而言，最为对手，他们确实很了解我们！
最后水平有限，也不是直接对照翻译，有改动，望见谅。如有错误，欢迎指正。
———— little 周
The Outlook for China: A CIA Perspective
Address by Deputy DDI John Gannon
at the College of the Holy Cross
Worcester, Massachusetts
w w w.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1996/ddi_speech_112096.html
展望中国
———中情局官员的讲演
1996年11月20日，代理情报主任John Gannon 于马萨诸塞州伍斯特市圣十字学院
November 20, 1996
Good evening. Thank you for that warm welcome. It is always a pleasure to return to my hometown and a real kick to come back to my alma mater.
I want to talk about China tonight. But first let me say a couple of words about the Jesuits.
晚上好。谢谢诸位的热烈欢迎。重返故土和母校，心情之高兴自然不言而喻。今晚想跟你们探讨一下中国。不过，首先请听我追溯一下耶稣会派和中国的关系。（注：耶稣会是天主教的一个分支，1535年成立，本身尊尚教皇，后面也提到这一点。演讲者自己应该属于这个教派的，而这个学校也是一所耶稣会的教会学院。）
As some of you undoubtedly know, the Jesuits have a strong link to China, which is the subject of my address tonight. Italian-born Father Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) brought the first Jesuit missionaries to the then-village of Shanghai in the late 1500s. He adopted the language and culture of China and gained access as a teacher to its elite. He converted a Chinese scholar official, Xu Guangqi, who later became Grand Secretary to the Ming Emperor. Because of Xu's influence, the Jesuits were able to start a congregation in Shanghai, and ultimately they brought much Western science and learning to China. The Jesuits also taught an ignorant West a great deal about China. Their great cathedral, St. Ignatius, is still in Shanghai, and the observatory they founded continues to provide weather data for the central China coast.
正如你们有些人所知，耶稣会和今天演讲对象中国之间，关系源远流长，十分密切。16世纪晚期，出生意大利的神父利玛窦 (1552-1610)背负耶稣会首批传教使命来到中国上海。他不但适应了中国的语言和文化，并且作为教书先生接触到国家的精英阶层。他的努力下，读书人徐光启开始皈依上帝，后者随后成为大明帝国的翰林院庶吉士（这个是查看资料明确，原文不好直译）。正因为徐的影响力，利玛窦开始在上海进行宗教集会，还将很多西方科学文化知识传开来。就这样，一个被忽略的西方世界被耶稣会介绍给中国。他们修建的圣伊格内修斯大教堂（即徐家汇天主教教堂）依然竖立在上海市区。而当时的气象台也继续为中国东海岸提供气象资料。
China today is the world's most populous country--1.2 billion people in an area slightly larger than the United States--and it is in dramatic transition. As we look for solid trends, the indicators are bound to be contradictory. Economic reform has fostered economic growth, for example, but China's leaders continue to resist political reform and improvement in human rights for its citizens. For some experts, it is the dark scenarios that will prevail. The painful memory of Tiananmen in 1989 and the later arrests of dissidents Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan remind us that political freedom is still more of a hope than a reality in contemporary China.
中国是世界最大的人口国———足足12亿，生活在比美国稍微大点，又翻天覆地变化的一块地方。我们试图找出其变化趋势时，却发现内部充满矛盾。比如，经济改革已经推动经济增长，但领导人依然居然拒绝政治改革和公民人权改善。在有些专家眼里，过去的黑暗一面终会揭开。89年政治事件提醒我们，政治方面前路还很长。（美国人习惯性提这了）
My own assessment of China's future, despite the downsides, is admittedly on the bullish side. We'll see fits and starts, peaks and valleys. China's development will not be linear. But the broader, long-term trends will be decidedly positive for China. And development will benefit from the legendary energy and ingenuity of the Chinese people--which I have seen firsthand.
Making sense of such an enormous, diverse country as China can be a little overwhelming. For instance, you might recall that when Nixon made his historic visit to China in Feburary 1972 he took some time out to tour the Great Wall. Naturally, he was jointed by a grand entourage of reporters and cameramen, all eager for a story. When one reporter asked Nixon what he thought of the tour, Nixon, apparently a bit flustered, paused and tried to give his most statesman-like response: "This . . . . I would have to say . . . . is . . . . truly . . . . a. . . . great . . . . wall."
尽管如此，我认为中国未来会向前继续发展（原文bullish也有股市上涨之意）。当然，一时好一时坏，有高潮和低谷，不会是像线一样平稳发展（估计就是马爷爷说的螺旋形爬升）。但对中国而言，大的趋势来看还是肯定向前的。并且，我亲眼所见中华民族的勤劳智慧，就是国家发展的有利保证。
治理像这样庞大又多样化的一个国家是困难的。比如你们可能回忆尼克松总统1972年访问中国时游览过万里长城。那时一大批兴奋的新闻报道者急于挖掘有价值事件。当问及有何感想时，总统先生明显有点紧张，停顿片刻后试着用最政治家的声明回应道“这…………我不得不说…………是…………真的……一个……伟大……建筑”。
In characterizing the outlook for China, I will make five points，
First, China is pursuing the right mix of economic policies needed to sustain economic growth into the next century.
Second, China is developing the labor force and technical base necessary to compete internationally and support military modernization.
Third, China is pursuing a vigorous military modernization program that will enhance its force- projection capability.
Fourth, although China's future political leadership remains unsettled, it seems quite capable of governing for now.
Finally, China's leadership seeks to deter challenges to Chinese interests by combining all the elements I just noted and gaining for China recognition as a great power.
接下来，我会给出展望中国演讲的五个关键点。
首先，中国正在寻求利用正确的混合（所有制）经济政策来确保增长到下世纪。
其次，中国正在提升劳动力和发展必备的技术基础，以有益于国际竞争和军事现代化。
第三，中国正在寻求强大的现代化军事力量来加强远程投放能力。
第四，虽然未来的政治领导层仍未明确，当前政府还是特别符合现实情况。
最后， 中国领导层一直试图用上述手段来阻止外界势力对国家利益的挑战，同时还希望得到强国地位的承认。
前记：不知道怎么回事，网上总有些所谓中情局CIA的中国情报分析，扰人视线。美国报纸上的中国也经常千变万化，这更加使我们困惑：美国人到底怎么考虑中国和中国人的？什么才是真话。
很早在CIA的网站上找到这份公开文献，感觉是说的很深刻，想的很远，不少内容是我们普通人都不曾注意到的。这里专门翻译出来，让大家好好看看美国中央情报局眼里的中国。个人而言，最为对手，他们确实很了解我们！
最后水平有限，也不是直接对照翻译，有改动，望见谅。如有错误，欢迎指正。
———— little 周
The Outlook for China: A CIA Perspective
Address by Deputy DDI John Gannon
at the College of the Holy Cross
Worcester, Massachusetts
w w w.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1996/ddi_speech_112096.html
展望中国
———中情局官员的讲演
1996年11月20日，代理情报主任John Gannon 于马萨诸塞州伍斯特市圣十字学院
November 20, 1996
Good evening. Thank you for that warm welcome. It is always a pleasure to return to my hometown and a real kick to come back to my alma mater.
I want to talk about China tonight. But first let me say a couple of words about the Jesuits.
晚上好。谢谢诸位的热烈欢迎。重返故土和母校，心情之高兴自然不言而喻。今晚想跟你们探讨一下中国。不过，首先请听我追溯一下耶稣会派和中国的关系。（注：耶稣会是天主教的一个分支，1535年成立，本身尊尚教皇，后面也提到这一点。演讲者自己应该属于这个教派的，而这个学校也是一所耶稣会的教会学院。）
As some of you undoubtedly know, the Jesuits have a strong link to China, which is the subject of my address tonight. Italian-born Father Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) brought the first Jesuit missionaries to the then-village of Shanghai in the late 1500s. He adopted the language and culture of China and gained access as a teacher to its elite. He converted a Chinese scholar official, Xu Guangqi, who later became Grand Secretary to the Ming Emperor. Because of Xu's influence, the Jesuits were able to start a congregation in Shanghai, and ultimately they brought much Western science and learning to China. The Jesuits also taught an ignorant West a great deal about China. Their great cathedral, St. Ignatius, is still in Shanghai, and the observatory they founded continues to provide weather data for the central China coast.
正如你们有些人所知，耶稣会和今天演讲对象中国之间，关系源远流长，十分密切。16世纪晚期，出生意大利的神父利玛窦 (1552-1610)背负耶稣会首批传教使命来到中国上海。他不但适应了中国的语言和文化，并且作为教书先生接触到国家的精英阶层。他的努力下，读书人徐光启开始皈依上帝，后者随后成为大明帝国的翰林院庶吉士（这个是查看资料明确，原文不好直译）。正因为徐的影响力，利玛窦开始在上海进行宗教集会，还将很多西方科学文化知识传开来。就这样，一个被忽略的西方世界被耶稣会介绍给中国。他们修建的圣伊格内修斯大教堂（即徐家汇天主教教堂）依然竖立在上海市区。而当时的气象台也继续为中国东海岸提供气象资料。
China today is the world's most populous country--1.2 billion people in an area slightly larger than the United States--and it is in dramatic transition. As we look for solid trends, the indicators are bound to be contradictory. Economic reform has fostered economic growth, for example, but China's leaders continue to resist political reform and improvement in human rights for its citizens. For some experts, it is the dark scenarios that will prevail. The painful memory of Tiananmen in 1989 and the later arrests of dissidents Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan remind us that political freedom is still more of a hope than a reality in contemporary China.
中国是世界最大的人口国———足足12亿，生活在比美国稍微大点，又翻天覆地变化的一块地方。我们试图找出其变化趋势时，却发现内部充满矛盾。比如，经济改革已经推动经济增长，但领导人依然居然拒绝政治改革和公民人权改善。在有些专家眼里，过去的黑暗一面终会揭开。89年政治事件提醒我们，政治方面前路还很长。（美国人习惯性提这了）
My own assessment of China's future, despite the downsides, is admittedly on the bullish side. We'll see fits and starts, peaks and valleys. China's development will not be linear. But the broader, long-term trends will be decidedly positive for China. And development will benefit from the legendary energy and ingenuity of the Chinese people--which I have seen firsthand.
Making sense of such an enormous, diverse country as China can be a little overwhelming. For instance, you might recall that when Nixon made his historic visit to China in Feburary 1972 he took some time out to tour the Great Wall. Naturally, he was jointed by a grand entourage of reporters and cameramen, all eager for a story. When one reporter asked Nixon what he thought of the tour, Nixon, apparently a bit flustered, paused and tried to give his most statesman-like response: "This . . . . I would have to say . . . . is . . . . truly . . . . a. . . . great . . . . wall."
尽管如此，我认为中国未来会向前继续发展（原文bullish也有股市上涨之意）。当然，一时好一时坏，有高潮和低谷，不会是像线一样平稳发展（估计就是马爷爷说的螺旋形爬升）。但对中国而言，大的趋势来看还是肯定向前的。并且，我亲眼所见中华民族的勤劳智慧，就是国家发展的有利保证。
治理像这样庞大又多样化的一个国家是困难的。比如你们可能回忆尼克松总统1972年访问中国时游览过万里长城。那时一大批兴奋的新闻报道者急于挖掘有价值事件。当问及有何感想时，总统先生明显有点紧张，停顿片刻后试着用最政治家的声明回应道“这…………我不得不说…………是…………真的……一个……伟大……建筑”。
In characterizing the outlook for China, I will make five points，
First, China is pursuing the right mix of economic policies needed to sustain economic growth into the next century.
Second, China is developing the labor force and technical base necessary to compete internationally and support military modernization.
Third, China is pursuing a vigorous military modernization program that will enhance its force- projection capability.
Fourth, although China's future political leadership remains unsettled, it seems quite capable of governing for now.
Finally, China's leadership seeks to deter challenges to Chinese interests by combining all the elements I just noted and gaining for China recognition as a great power.
接下来，我会给出展望中国演讲的五个关键点。
首先，中国正在寻求利用正确的混合（所有制）经济政策来确保增长到下世纪。
其次，中国正在提升劳动力和发展必备的技术基础，以有益于国际竞争和军事现代化。
第三，中国正在寻求强大的现代化军事力量来加强远程投放能力。
第四，虽然未来的政治领导层仍未明确，当前政府还是特别符合现实情况。
最后， 中国领导层一直试图用上述手段来阻止外界势力对国家利益的挑战，同时还希望得到强国地位的承认。
Scholars can and do debate what constitutes power status. The intelligence officer at CIA who oversees most of our work on Asia argues for a simple test: a nation is powerful to the degree that it is a valued friend or a feared foe. By this measure China has been a potential power for some time. Now, however, we are starting to see that potential realized.
First, China has been the fastest growing major economy in the world over the last decade. At some point in the not-too-distant future it will become the largest in the world, surpassing the United States. In the past few years, China has taken steps to overcome the boom-bust cycle that has plagued it since the reforms were launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1979.
Chinese officials project that in 1996 China's GDP will grow by about 10 percent and retail price inflation will be about 7 percent. China continues to run a trade surplus with the world, and Chinese officials predict it will be about $6 billion this year.
任何学者都可以讨论国家实力是什么。与此类似，主要关注亚洲的中情局情报人给出一个简单测试方法。一个国家，如果能够成为美国不可或缺的盟友，或者反过来又可以当上恐怖的对手话，那么它就是强大的国家（注：总感觉原文不好翻译，改动很大，希望意思没有变。其实有句类似话就是，一个人是否强大，通过其对手什么水平可以判断）。依这样来看，中国有时已算潜在的世界一级了。
首先，在过去十年内是世界最快的经济体。在不远将来就会力压美国，荣登世界第一。从1979年邓小平改革开始的短暂时间里，中国摆脱繁荣—衰退循环并大步向前进。
中国官员计划本年GDP将会增长10%，同时维持通货膨胀在7%左右。对外贸易顺差继续存在，同时政府预测年底会达到60亿美元。
What is significant for the long term is the series of recent reforms that address China's troubled state enterprise sector. These bloated relics of the past are a major drain on state coffers and are contributing less and less to China's total industrial output. The problem is that any reform will increase unemployment and remove the social safety net for a large portion of the urban population.
But China is stepping up to this challenge. It has put in place a number of laws that it hopes will allow it to strengthen the performance of the 1,000 most important state enterprises while instituting ownership reform in 90,000 others.
China has a long way to go, and structural problems will not be easily overcome. Infrastructure, energy, corruption, distribution of income, and a host of other issues must also be dealt with.
对未来长期都有重要影响的就是中国困难国企的近期改革。后者背着沉重历史包袱，资产价值不断在缩水，对国家总的出口贡献也越来越小。但问题就是，任何改革都会带来大部分下层民众失去工作，并且接下来就影响社会安全。
但中国正在一步步面对这个挑战。国家通过颁布很多法律，希望使千家重要国企实力变强，同时对余下其他九万家进行改革。
前路依然遥远，结构问题也不能轻易跨过去。基础设施、能源、腐败、收入分配和其他一系列问题，都必须要好好处理。
But it is important to keep the problems in perspective. Legitimate concerns about the accuracy of Chinese statistics notwithstanding, living standards in China have increased dramatically in less than 20 years, and the upward trend should continue.
A second element of national power is China's technological base. China remains at heart an agricultural nation--more than 80 percent of its population are farmers. But we cannot dismiss China as a nation of peasants. Its scientific and technological capabilities are robust and growing. We see these capabilities reflected in the composition of its exports, which include not just squirt guns and firecrackers but also fiber optics and semiconductors.
A third key element is a large, skilled labor force. China has a highly disciplined, talented, and energetic population that values education and has a demonstrated flair for business. There is also a tradition of sacrifice and respect for authority, as long as authority fulfills its responsibilities. In China that means maintaining order locally and looking after Chinese interests globally.
但是不管怎么样看问题要深刻，这点很重要。尽管中国经济数据的准确性依然值得怀疑，国民生活标准在不到20年内已经发生翻天覆改变，并且还处在一个上升的趋势里。
国家实力的第二个基本关键点是技术基础。中国骨子里还是个农业国，超过八成还是农民。但我们也不能把中国当做一个农民为主国家。其科技能力足够强大，并且发展趋势还在延续。我们可以看到这些实力反映在出口货物种类上，其中不仅仅包括儿童玩具枪和鞭炮，还有光纤产品和半导体产品。
至于第三个关键因素就是训练有素的庞大劳动力。中国拥有纪律严明、勤劳智慧的人群，不断能够接受教育能力，并且还具有经商的天赋。中国人也有自我奉献的传统，同时尊重权威，并要求权威对象履行其责任（也就是在其位，谋其职）。换句话就是说，中国在东亚会维持游戏规则，同时也会踏遍全球寻找国家利益。
Any government would be challenged to manage a country that is home to almost one-fourth of the world's population. But before we conclude that the Chinese leadership cannot meet the demands for jobs, schools, and infrastructure, we need to remember that the four out of five Chinese who live in the countryside ask remarkably little of Beijing.
China's military modernization, the fourth element of national power, stands out among nations in the post–Cold War period. We see in China a military that is concentrating on building its force-projection capabilities with an eye to defending China's strategic perimeter out to the first island chain--that is, Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
As part of its modernization effort, China has made some high-profile purchases of military equipment, such as Su-27 aircraft and Sa-10 missiles from the former Soviet Union. More significant for the longer term in our judgment is China's indigenous development. It will soon field a F-16-class multirole aircraft. It is continuing to develop new naval systems, including attack submarines and destroyers. It continues to weigh the wisdom of developing or acquiring an aircraft carrier.
世界四分之一人口所在的国家，对任何政府而已，本身都是一个管理上的挑战。但在总结归纳中国领导人不能满足工作、学校和基建需求之前，我们需要记住的是，五分之四的中国人住在农村，并不向国家索取太多。
中国的军事现代化，作为第4个关键点，开始于冷战后。我们可以看到中国注重构建军力投放的能力，这样在第一岛链外就能保卫中国战略防线。
作为现代化努力一部分，中国已经购买某些高级军事装备，如前苏联的苏-27战斗机和萨姆-10导弹。不过长期以来，我们关注更多的是中国自行研制的武器。用不了多久，就有类似F-16多用途战斗机的出现。新的海军装备还在开发中，包括攻击性潜艇和驱逐舰。并且，他们也会继续努力研制或引进一艘航空母舰。
（注：这位老兄全说对了。歼-10于1998年3月首飞，同年澳门创律公司购买瓦良格，首艘052B型驱逐舰02年下水）
China continues to improve and expand its strategic forces, including developing mobile missiles. All this speaks to the previous points I made: the robustness of the Chinese economy, which can afford this sort of investment, and the quality of China's technological base and work force, which can support military R & D.
China's military modernization is more than just hardware. We are also seeing an evolution in Chinese military doctrine. The Taiwan Straits exercise this spring was notable on three levels. First, it featured China's most advanced military hardware, including the Su-27s and short-range ballistic missile. Second, China displayed a level of sophistication and integration in its forces that was unprecedented. The exercise was heavily scripted and subject to weather, but it is clear that, in addition to new equipment, the PLA is also acquiring the skills to use it effectively.
中国还在继续发展和增强战略力量，包括研发机动式导弹。这些都和前面所提及相符合： 经济实力强大，就能够进行大规模军事投资，而国家的技术基础和工人力量也能支持军事研发。
军事现代化也不仅仅限于硬件。因而我们也看到军事学说的改进。今年春天的台海军事演习就有三点值得注意。第一，中国最现代化的装备，包括苏-27战斗机和DF-15短程弹道导弹都系数登场。第二，显示了前所未有的复杂系统整合力量。这次演习是特别规划好的，虽然受制于天气，但很清楚的是在拥有新装备以外，解放军也逐步学会怎么更好地使用。
Lastly, the exercise was significant for what it says about China's willingness to use intimidation and force to achieve political ends, in this case sending a strong message to Taiwan about its efforts to raise its international profile. There are many inefficiencies and deficiencies in China's military forces, and China is still not a global military power, but there is no question it has the potential to be one.
The final element is leadership, and here the picture is more mixed. China's senior statesman, Deng Xiaoping, is 92 years old and ill, and he has not been a factor in policy decisions for nearly a year. For all intents and purposes, China is now governed by a younger post-Deng leadership. By younger, I mean leaders in their sixties and seventies.
最后，这次演习很重要的就是向谋求国际地位的台湾发出强烈信号，中国只要愿意，就会不得不进行威慑以达到政治目的。目前军事力量依然有很多不足和缺陷，所以现在算不是世界军事强国，但毫无疑问，中国有这个潜力。
最后一个关键要素是领导层，而现在一切还很复杂。中国的领导核心邓小平年已过九旬，身患疾病。近一年来已经不能参与国家决策。年轻的下一代正在管理这个国家。当然，年轻也都六七十岁。
This leadership exhibits a mixture of hubris and insecurity. It is made up of men of approximately the same political strength and with little affection for one another. And there is no visionary or strategic thinker in the present group that we can identify--someone like Mao or Deng.
It is a group that takes great pride in what China has accomplished in the last 15 years, but it also fears the forces it has unleashed in the process that could limit Beijing's control.
It follows, therefore, that this group takes a cautious and uninspired approach to policymaking. And with the de facto death of Marxism as an ideology, it is a group that seems to be relying more and more on nationalist appeals for popular support that unnerve some of China's neighbors.
当前领导层展示了自我傲傲与恐惧不安的复杂心态。中国领导层都是差别不大的政治人物，相互之间没影响。中情局感觉现在他们之中没有毛泽东、邓小平那样的战略思想家。（注，也许几十年也不需要，因为前面的策略还没有用完）
领导层既对中国15年来的成功而自豪，但也害怕出现限制中央政府权力的力量。因此，这个国家正在小心平庸地进行政策制定，与此同时克思主义已经在法理层上死亡（de facto，法语词，意思是法理上的）。很多时候政府看起来，像是越来越依靠民族主义来获得广泛支持，这也令某些亚洲邻国不安。（注，nationalist既代表国家主义者，也指民族主义者。中国的国家领导人，很少不是民主主义者的。）
We do not foresee the sort of factional infighting or succession struggles that marked the passing of Mao. This group may be uninspiring, and ultimately it may be a transitional leadership, with the ultimate heir to Deng emerging several years from now. But it seems capable of making major decisions and dealing with the issues that will face China.
Let me make a small aside at this point and address two notions about China that surface periodically that I believe are mistaken. Sometimes we hear predictions China is going to fragment. We think this line of analysis tends to overstate the tensions and faultlines between regions and classes. Chinese everywhere think of themselves as Chinese, accept that Beijing is the capital of China, and share a cultural fear of chaos and disorder--"luan" in Chinese--that their history teaches them is the certain result of dissolution. The pressures are there, but the fact is the glue remains strong.
我们不能判断中国政治高层到底是充满着内部纷争，还是毛泽东之后的成功努力（就可以担当大任）（注，这句话有点拗口，不好意思）。这一领导层可能仅仅是平庸之人，也说不定就是等待最终继承邓小平衣钵的过渡者罢了。不过现在还是很适合解决当前的中国大部分决策事宜的。
请让我此时抛开话题，来说明下关于两种反复错误的中国看法。有时，某些人预测中国即将分崩离析。实际上，这种分析趋向于过度估计内外界压力，以及地域和社会阶层之间的分裂。中华大地处处都把自己当做是中国人，不但认同北京是国家首都，文化上还一致担忧社会的混乱。字面上讲，汉字里的“乱”字，历史老师就解释为分裂的必然结果。尽管各种压力依然存在，但国家凝聚力依然很强。
（注，这里说的就是“中国崩溃论”，在某些西方人眼里，中国已经N次“崩溃”!）
The second notion we hear is that China's economic bubble will inevitably burst--that it will not be able to feed itself or that it will run out of steam for lack of energy. It is useful to remember that Japan can also be described as resource poor. When a nation exports as successfully as China has, it should be able to buy whatever it needs on the world market.
This does not mean the Chinese economy is free of problems. Double-digit growth rates are neith er sustainable nor desirable over the long run. But the Chinese have shown a remarkable ability to reform a Stalinist economy and learn from their mistakes.
So, to return to my question: are the elements present that will propel China to major power status? Yes. The real question then is not whether China will be a major regional power, but rather how big a power will it be and, more important, how it will use its power.
第二个观点就是中国的经济泡沫会不可避免的破裂———当国家不能养活自己，或者资源接近枯竭时就会发生。需要记住的是，日本也是被评价为资源不足（，但并没有完全崩溃完蛋）。当一个国家像中国那样成功出口（大量商品）时，就必须要有能力在全球市场上买到任何想要得到的。
这并不是说中国经济就是没有问题。长期的两位数字增长既不稳定，也不可行。但中国已经显示出很强的能力，能够改进斯大林式计划经济体制并且不断吸取教训。
这样再回到我的问题，上面提到的这些能够成为推进中国发展的主要力量吗？是的，确定一定及肯定。到时候真正的问题不是中国是否成为地区大国，而是会强大到哪个程度。并且更重要的是，这股力量如何被使用。（注，现在西方报纸喜欢的一个比方就是，中国像愤怒的公牛闯进了瓷器店）
Before I can address that question, I want to make a small digression and address a widely held but incorrect perception that the job of intelligence officers is to predict the future. That is not the case. Only God is omniscient, and only the Pope is infallible; intelligence officers are too savvy to compete in that league.
Rather, the function of intelligence is to help US decisionmakers better understand the forces at work in any situation, the other fellow's perspective, and the opportunities and consequences of any course of action so that US policymakers can make informed decisions. I should add, and stress, that intelligence officers do not make or recommend policy. What follows then is my own perspective on China's future, based on current trends.
在讲这个问题前，我想偏离话题来强调一个广为人知的错误观念，这就是情报工作似乎是来预测未来的。事实上根本不是这样。只有上帝无所不知，只有教皇永远正确。情报人员就算知道再多，也不能和他们相比。
进一步讲，情报本身只是帮助美国政策制定者时时刻刻都更好了解对手军事力量、其他对象观点看法以及任何行动尝试的机会和相应后果，这样高层能够做到先知晓情况再做判断（注，也就是“知彼知己”）。我必须强调的是，情报人员本身不会做决定，也不提出建议。下面接下来的内容，是基于当前趋势对中国未来的个人观点。
This leadership exhibits a mixture of hubris and insecurity. It is made up of men of approximately the same political strength and with little affection for one another. And there is no visionary or strategic thinker in the present group that we can identify--someone like Mao or Deng.
It is a group that takes great pride in what China has accomplished in the last 15 years, but it also fears the forces it has unleashed in the process that could limit Beijing's control.
It follows, therefore, that this group takes a cautious and uninspired approach to policymaking. And with the de facto death of Marxism as an ideology, it is a group that seems to be relying more and more on nationalist appeals for popular support that unnerve some of China's neighbors.
当前领导层展示了自我傲傲与恐惧不安的复杂心态。中国领导层都是差别不大的政治人物，相互之间没影响。中情局感觉现在他们之中没有毛泽东、邓小平那样的战略思想家。（注，也许几十年也不需要，因为前面的策略还没有用完）
领导层既对中国15年来的成功而自豪，但也害怕出现限制中央政府权力的力量。因此，这个国家正在小心平庸地进行政策制定，与此同时克思主义已经在法理层上死亡（de facto，法语词，意思是法理上的）。很多时候政府看起来，像是越来越依靠民族主义来获得广泛支持，这也令某些亚洲邻国不安。（注，nationalist既代表国家主义者，也指民族主义者。中国的国家领导人，很少不是民主主义者的。）
We do not foresee the sort of factional infighting or succession struggles that marked the passing of Mao. This group may be uninspiring, and ultimately it may be a transitional leadership, with the ultimate heir to Deng emerging several years from now. But it seems capable of making major decisions and dealing with the issues that will face China.
Let me make a small aside at this point and address two notions about China that surface periodically that I believe are mistaken. Sometimes we hear predictions China is going to fragment. We think this line of analysis tends to overstate the tensions and faultlines between regions and classes. Chinese everywhere think of themselves as Chinese, accept that Beijing is the capital of China, and share a cultural fear of chaos and disorder--"luan" in Chinese--that their history teaches them is the certain result of dissolution. The pressures are there, but the fact is the glue remains strong.
我们不能判断中国政治高层到底是充满着内部纷争，还是毛泽东之后的成功努力（就可以担当大任）（注，这句话有点拗口，不好意思）。这一领导层可能仅仅是平庸之人，也说不定就是等待最终继承邓小平衣钵的过渡者罢了。不过现在还是很适合解决当前的中国大部分决策事宜的。
请让我此时抛开话题，来说明下关于两种反复错误的中国看法。有时，某些人预测中国即将分崩离析。实际上，这种分析趋向于过度估计内外界压力，以及地域和社会阶层之间的分裂。中华大地处处都把自己当做是中国人，不但认同北京是国家首都，文化上还一致担忧社会的混乱。字面上讲，汉字里的“乱”字，历史老师就解释为分裂的必然结果。尽管各种压力依然存在，但国家凝聚力依然很强。
（注，这里说的就是“中国崩溃论”，在某些西方人眼里，中国已经N次“崩溃”!）
The second notion we hear is that China's economic bubble will inevitably burst--that it will not be able to feed itself or that it will run out of steam for lack of energy. It is useful to remember that Japan can also be described as resource poor. When a nation exports as successfully as China has, it should be able to buy whatever it needs on the world market.
This does not mean the Chinese economy is free of problems. Double-digit growth rates are neith er sustainable nor desirable over the long run. But the Chinese have shown a remarkable ability to reform a Stalinist economy and learn from their mistakes.
So, to return to my question: are the elements present that will propel China to major power status? Yes. The real question then is not whether China will be a major regional power, but rather how big a power will it be and, more important, how it will use its power.
第二个观点就是中国的经济泡沫会不可避免的破裂———当国家不能养活自己，或者资源接近枯竭时就会发生。需要记住的是，日本也是被评价为资源不足（，但并没有完全崩溃完蛋）。当一个国家像中国那样成功出口（大量商品）时，就必须要有能力在全球市场上买到任何想要得到的。
这并不是说中国经济就是没有问题。长期的两位数字增长既不稳定，也不可行。但中国已经显示出很强的能力，能够改进斯大林式计划经济体制并且不断吸取教训。
这样再回到我的问题，上面提到的这些能够成为推进中国发展的主要力量吗？是的，确定一定及肯定。到时候真正的问题不是中国是否成为地区大国，而是会强大到哪个程度。并且更重要的是，这股力量如何被使用。（注，现在西方报纸喜欢的一个比方就是，中国像愤怒的公牛闯进了瓷器店）
Before I can address that question, I want to make a small digression and address a widely held but incorrect perception that the job of intelligence officers is to predict the future. That is not the case. Only God is omniscient, and only the Pope is infallible; intelligence officers are too savvy to compete in that league.
Rather, the function of intelligence is to help US decisionmakers better understand the forces at work in any situation, the other fellow's perspective, and the opportunities and consequences of any course of action so that US policymakers can make informed decisions. I should add, and stress, that intelligence officers do not make or recommend policy. What follows then is my own perspective on China's future, based on current trends.
在讲这个问题前，我想偏离话题来强调一个广为人知的错误观念，这就是情报工作似乎是来预测未来的。事实上根本不是这样。只有上帝无所不知，只有教皇永远正确。情报人员就算知道再多，也不能和他们相比。
进一步讲，情报本身只是帮助美国政策制定者时时刻刻都更好了解对手军事力量、其他对象观点看法以及任何行动尝试的机会和相应后果，这样高层能够做到先知晓情况再做判断（注，也就是“知彼知己”）。我必须强调的是，情报人员本身不会做决定，也不提出建议。下面接下来的内容，是基于当前趋势对中国未来的个人观点。
When I think about China's tendencies I am inclined to agree with China scholars who argue that China is not a "status quo power." What Beijing wants is change. It wants to be admitted to the club. It wants to help make the rules, especially on such matters as global trade and proliferation and arms control.
More fundamentally, what China wants most is respect. This is sometimes hard for Westerners to comprehend. China's leaders, some of whom were born under the last Emperor, experienced firsthand the unequal treaties that denied China sovereignty on it own soil. These leaders fought a long civil war, a war that is not over in their eyes and that continues only because of US intervention. They fought Japanese invaders who were incredibly brutal. They suffered because Stalin sacrificed their interests for his domestic political needs, and they experienced international isolation. This leadership feels deeply and personally what it views as the century of humiliation at the hands of the West. It seeks recognition as a powerful nation whose views ought to be sought and given weight, especially by other Asian nations.
当我思考中国的发展趋势，内心里同意中国学者讨论中国并不是一个地区老大（status quo power）。中国政府需要的是改变。（要改变什么了？）这不仅仅是加入大国俱乐部，还是参与制定世界规则，特别是全球贸易、军备控制这些话题。
（注，status quo是拉丁文，原意是国家把影响力局限在国内，不向外扩张；也指一个相对稳定的地区政治形势。维基百科举例说台海局势不战不和，很让西方满意，这就是一个很典型的例子！但这对整个中国绝对是不可接受的）
更深一点来讲，中国要的就是西方世界的尊重，这有时让西方人很难理解。部分中国领导人就出生在晚清时期，亲身经历过国家主权被践踏，不平等条约连连被强加。虽然这些领导人进行了一场持久内战（注，这里的内战可以指代清朝灭亡后的国内军阀混战及国共内战），但他们眼里战争还没有结束，就因为美国干预而还在继续（注，需要说明地是台湾还没有统一，法理上内战没有结束。2005年4月26日国共两党领导人历史性会面，发表声明要促进“结束两岸敌对状态”后仍无结果，故谈不上有理论上的和平）。一方面既要与残忍的日本侵略者战斗，另外又不得不忍受斯大林出于国内政治需要一手带来的利益损害。不仅如此他们还继续经历过国际性的孤立封锁。对于这些，当前领导人难以忘怀，认为这正是西方人亲手带来的一个世纪羞辱。中国现在和将来都要寻求的，就是特别能影响其他亚洲国家的决定性强国地位，（这一点正是晚清开始丧失的）。（注，中国需要的，就是重新崛起，玩转亚洲，影响世界）
These feelings are not likely to fade with the passing of this generation either. The Chinese time horizon is a long one. Whereas Americans tend to think in terms of years or decades, the Chinese think in terms of centuries and dynasties. It is an important distinction. You might remember when Kissinger asked Zhou Enlai for his views on the French Revolution and the response, "It's too soon to tell."
In 5,000 years there have been 22 Chinese dynasties, 13 of these have endured as long or longer than the entire history of the United States. It follows that the Chinese are acutely aware of their history, intensely proud of their ancient civilization, and sometimes wary of the United States with its global reach and infectious popular culture.
领导层数次换代，但这样的国家耻辱感一直没有消退。中国人民的时间尺度很长。当美国人趋向于几年几十年来考虑问题时，中国人已习惯用几世纪几朝代来想问题。这是尤为重要的不同。你们可能记得国务卿基辛格曾问周恩来总理怎么看法国大革命，当时回答就是：“时间距离太近，不好回答”。（注，中国史学上对于很争议问题，都强调百年后再总结分析。）
五千年的历史里，22个朝代里有13个时间都比美利坚全部历史还长。中国人都很清楚地知道祖国历史，并对悠久文明感到自豪。对于美国的全球影响能力和瘟疫似的流行文化有时也感到警惕。
In the past two years the Chinese have bristled at Washington's decisions to approve the visit of Taiwan's President Li Teng-Hui to the United States in May 1995; to send two aircraft carriers to waters near the Taiwan Strait in March 1996; to keep selling arms to Taiwan; to levy persistent criticism against China's human right record, its proliferation policies, and its pirating of US technology; and to sign the US-Japan security agreement last spring. Some elements of China's leadership misperceive all this as a US scheme to contain China.
Consider the popularity in China today of such books as China Megatrends and The China That Can Say No. We would call these jingoistic if they were written by Americans about the United States, but they speak to the deep feelings in China of alienation from the United States and the West.
在过去两年里，中国人对美国所作所为感到不安（原文是bristle），这包括95年5月允许台湾领导人李登辉访问；96年3月派出两艘航空母舰到台海附近；不断出售武器到台湾；不停批评中国人权纪录、人口政策以及抄袭美国技术，并在95年签订美日安全声明。有些中国领导人把这些一切都错误看做是（原文用misperceive）给中国的枷锁。
考虑一下今日中国的畅销书，如《中国大趋势》和《中国可以说不》。如果美国人写类似的书话，我们同样称之为狭隘爱国主义。（大意是，美国自己都不说这样的话，更弱的中国说出来自然是更夸张了）不过，这些确实反映了中国人内心中对美国和西方观念的转变。（背景是96年很多人对美国充满很多希望）
Given all this, we should expect China to have ambivalent feelings about the United States for the foreseeable future. Now China recognizes that a peaceful East Asian environment is essential for its continued economic development, and it appreciates the vital role US forces have played and continue to play in guaranteeing peace in the region.
But Beijing also believes that role is rightfully its own, and at least some elements in the leadership (and especially the military) see the United States today as the main obstacle preventing Beijing from reassuming its historical place as the paramount power in Asia. The latest visit of Secretary of State Warren Christopher to China, which is under way as I speak, will undoubtedly surface some of these mixed Chinese feelings toward the United States.
鉴于此，我们可以判断中国在可预见的讲来，对美国都有矛盾冲突的感情。现在中国认识到东亚和平稳定是经济持续发展的必要条件。与此同时，本身也认同美国势力在本地域所扮演的角色，并且希望这种被保证的和平继续下去。
但是中国政府同样确信东亚地区的主角毫无疑问应该是自己，并且在关键的军事领域及其他方面，就要像今日美国一样有支配力。而当前正阻止中国恢复亚洲霸主的历史地位的最大绊脚石就是美国人。正如我所说，国务卿 Warren Christopher 的最近访问就明确感受到中国人对美利坚的这种复杂感情（1996年11月到中国来）。
When I think about China's tendencies I am inclined to agree with China scholars who argue that China is not a "status quo power." What Beijing wants is change. It wants to be admitted to the club. It wants to help make the rules, especially on such matters as global trade and proliferation and arms control.
More fundamentally, what China wants most is respect. This is sometimes hard for Westerners to comprehend. China's leaders, some of whom were born under the last Emperor, experienced firsthand the unequal treaties that denied China sovereignty on it own soil. These leaders fought a long civil war, a war that is not over in their eyes and that continues only because of US intervention. They fought Japanese invaders who were incredibly brutal. They suffered because Stalin sacrificed their interests for his domestic political needs, and they experienced international isolation. This leadership feels deeply and personally what it views as the century of humiliation at the hands of the West. It seeks recognition as a powerful nation whose views ought to be sought and given weight, especially by other Asian nations.
当我思考中国的发展趋势，内心里同意中国学者讨论中国并不是一个地区老大（status quo power）。中国政府需要的是改变。（要改变什么了？）这不仅仅是加入大国俱乐部，还是参与制定世界规则，特别是全球贸易、军备控制这些话题。
（注，status quo是拉丁文，原意是国家把影响力局限在国内，不向外扩张；也指一个相对稳定的地区政治形势。维基百科举例说台海局势不战不和，很让西方满意，这就是一个很典型的例子！但这对整个中国绝对是不可接受的）
更深一点来讲，中国要的就是西方世界的尊重，这有时让西方人很难理解。部分中国领导人就出生在晚清时期，亲身经历过国家主权被践踏，不平等条约连连被强加。虽然这些领导人进行了一场持久内战（注，这里的内战可以指代清朝灭亡后的国内军阀混战及国共内战），但他们眼里战争还没有结束，就因为美国干预而还在继续（注，需要说明地是台湾还没有统一，法理上内战没有结束。2005年4月26日国共两党领导人历史性会面，发表声明要促进“结束两岸敌对状态”后仍无结果，故谈不上有理论上的和平）。一方面既要与残忍的日本侵略者战斗，另外又不得不忍受斯大林出于国内政治需要一手带来的利益损害。不仅如此他们还继续经历过国际性的孤立封锁。对于这些，当前领导人难以忘怀，认为这正是西方人亲手带来的一个世纪羞辱。中国现在和将来都要寻求的，就是特别能影响其他亚洲国家的决定性强国地位，（这一点正是晚清开始丧失的）。（注，中国需要的，就是重新崛起，玩转亚洲，影响世界）
These feelings are not likely to fade with the passing of this generation either. The Chinese time horizon is a long one. Whereas Americans tend to think in terms of years or decades, the Chinese think in terms of centuries and dynasties. It is an important distinction. You might remember when Kissinger asked Zhou Enlai for his views on the French Revolution and the response, "It's too soon to tell."
In 5,000 years there have been 22 Chinese dynasties, 13 of these have endured as long or longer than the entire history of the United States. It follows that the Chinese are acutely aware of their history, intensely proud of their ancient civilization, and sometimes wary of the United States with its global reach and infectious popular culture.
领导层数次换代，但这样的国家耻辱感一直没有消退。中国人民的时间尺度很长。当美国人趋向于几年几十年来考虑问题时，中国人已习惯用几世纪几朝代来想问题。这是尤为重要的不同。你们可能记得国务卿基辛格曾问周恩来总理怎么看法国大革命，当时回答就是：“时间距离太近，不好回答”。（注，中国史学上对于很争议问题，都强调百年后再总结分析。）
五千年的历史里，22个朝代里有13个时间都比美利坚全部历史还长。中国人都很清楚地知道祖国历史，并对悠久文明感到自豪。对于美国的全球影响能力和瘟疫似的流行文化有时也感到警惕。
In the past two years the Chinese have bristled at Washington's decisions to approve the visit of Taiwan's President Li Teng-Hui to the United States in May 1995; to send two aircraft carriers to waters near the Taiwan Strait in March 1996; to keep selling arms to Taiwan; to levy persistent criticism against China's human right record, its proliferation policies, and its pirating of US technology; and to sign the US-Japan security agreement last spring. Some elements of China's leadership misperceive all this as a US scheme to contain China.
Consider the popularity in China today of such books as China Megatrends and The China That Can Say No. We would call these jingoistic if they were written by Americans about the United States, but they speak to the deep feelings in China of alienation from the United States and the West.
在过去两年里，中国人对美国所作所为感到不安（原文是bristle），这包括95年5月允许台湾领导人李登辉访问；96年3月派出两艘航空母舰到台海附近；不断出售武器到台湾；不停批评中国人权纪录、人口政策以及抄袭美国技术，并在95年签订美日安全声明。有些中国领导人把这些一切都错误看做是（原文用misperceive）给中国的枷锁。
考虑一下今日中国的畅销书，如《中国大趋势》和《中国可以说不》。如果美国人写类似的书话，我们同样称之为狭隘爱国主义。（大意是，美国自己都不说这样的话，更弱的中国说出来自然是更夸张了）不过，这些确实反映了中国人内心中对美国和西方观念的转变。（背景是96年很多人对美国充满很多希望）
Given all this, we should expect China to have ambivalent feelings about the United States for the foreseeable future. Now China recognizes that a peaceful East Asian environment is essential for its continued economic development, and it appreciates the vital role US forces have played and continue to play in guaranteeing peace in the region.
But Beijing also believes that role is rightfully its own, and at least some elements in the leadership (and especially the military) see the United States today as the main obstacle preventing Beijing from reassuming its historical place as the paramount power in Asia. The latest visit of Secretary of State Warren Christopher to China, which is under way as I speak, will undoubtedly surface some of these mixed Chinese feelings toward the United States.
鉴于此，我们可以判断中国在可预见的讲来，对美国都有矛盾冲突的感情。现在中国认识到东亚和平稳定是经济持续发展的必要条件。与此同时，本身也认同美国势力在本地域所扮演的角色，并且希望这种被保证的和平继续下去。
但是中国政府同样确信东亚地区的主角毫无疑问应该是自己，并且在关键的军事领域及其他方面，就要像今日美国一样有支配力。而当前正阻止中国恢复亚洲霸主的历史地位的最大绊脚石就是美国人。正如我所说，国务卿 Warren Christopher 的最近访问就明确感受到中国人对美利坚的这种复杂感情（1996年11月到中国来）。
慢慢看..
Grand Secretary to the Ming Emperor
这个肯定是内阁大学士。官职当然应该挑最大的说。
这个肯定是内阁大学士。官职当然应该挑最大的说。
看到说小平的那段我泪目了，老人家就差几个月就可以亲眼看到香港回归了……
应该说这个美国人很有远见，但同时有有美国人固有的思维。
中国从长远来看，只要不内乱，重返世界之颠只是时间问题，是几十年还是上百年？
所以，虽然我不是GCD，也不认同GCD的一些做法，但是我要说，现在绝对应该让GCD继续当政，因为这时现阶段的最佳人选，有利于全体中国人。
中国从长远来看，只要不内乱，重返世界之颠只是时间问题，是几十年还是上百年？
所以，虽然我不是GCD，也不认同GCD的一些做法，但是我要说，现在绝对应该让GCD继续当政，因为这时现阶段的最佳人选，有利于全体中国人。
中国的历史太长，这就是我们的优势，中国人思考问题时间跨度很长，所以总给人反应慢的印象，但实际上我们都讲究顺势而为。我们有与生俱来的傲气，现在不过是恢复我们原有的位置
明白什么是人民内部矛盾 什么是敌我矛盾，
知道什么是可调和的问题 什么是你死我活的斗争，
在西方险恶用心及外埠颠覆面前，国内一些有待调整解决的问题，就都不是大问题。
知道什么是可调和的问题 什么是你死我活的斗争，
在西方险恶用心及外埠颠覆面前，国内一些有待调整解决的问题，就都不是大问题。
不愧MD，比那些欧洲的小国寡民眼光开阔的多，分析的相当犀利和准确。
慢慢看
问周恩来总理怎么看法国大革命，当时回答就是：“时间距离太近，不好回答”，我看到这一句打心里升腾出一股自豪的情节。
中美才是对手，其他的都素渣渣分析的不错
对比一下前段时间漫天飞舞的烂德报告，不得不说国内JY带路党就是渣渣！
感觉时间顺序混乱，说着说着286都出来了
巴托克又一次听了梅纽因演奏他的小提琴奏鸣曲后，直接了当的对梅纽因说：我认为你不能这么演奏，除非乐曲的作者死了很多年以后。也就是说西方并不缺乏审慎自省的人，这不过这种人通常都不是政治家。
这篇文章也太老了，应该是九十年代中期写的吧！
还是一贯的MD式思维……
不过比一般的美国人强的没影了
不过比一般的美国人强的没影了We do not foresee the sort of factional infighting or succession struggles that marked the passing of Mao.
兄弟，succession是指继承人的意思，比如洋鬼子的公司经常选一帮二把手去参加succession plan，以备一把手跑了直接就有二把手上。所以我觉得应该是说“我们无法预测在太祖过世后，兔子内部是否有内讧或者关于继承权的斗争”，但觉得好像也不对
。求牛人
不过中情局这哥们也算牛，10几年前的预测基本上全中。
兄弟，succession是指继承人的意思，比如洋鬼子的公司经常选一帮二把手去参加succession plan，以备一把手跑了直接就有二把手上。所以我觉得应该是说“我们无法预测在太祖过世后，兔子内部是否有内讧或者关于继承权的斗争”，但觉得好像也不对
。求牛人不过中情局这哥们也算牛，10几年前的预测基本上全中。
96年的报告，这个人蛮厉害的。。。
真正的妹帝一直没有看错兔子，神马危险论崩溃论等等都是放出来的烟雾和暂时利益需要，真正的核心认识一直正确。但是妹帝的决策能力却有大问题， 80年代末策划的那一次大动及随后90年代紧跟的对华政策和举动，从今天来看，是战略级的超大失误。
现在来看 这厮说的基本全中 发展趋势也基本吻合兔子这十几年的发展轨迹，国企改革 类似F16的棍子 至少一艘航母 相当牛啊
现在来看 这厮说的基本全中 发展趋势也基本吻合兔子这十几年的发展轨迹，国企改革 类似F16的棍子 至少一艘航母 相当牛啊
ttert0014 发表于 2012-7-28 05:07 ![]()
看到说小平的那段我泪目了，老人家就差几个月就可以亲眼看到香港回归了……
毛和西斯首相定下的调子，邓是执行者。
看到说小平的那段我泪目了，老人家就差几个月就可以亲眼看到香港回归了……
毛和西斯首相定下的调子，邓是执行者。
rogerkkk123 发表于 2012-7-28 09:33
真正的妹帝一直没有看错兔子，神马危险论崩溃论等等都是放出来的烟雾和暂时利益需要，真正的核心认识一直正 ...
额到是不认为是失误，MD计划肯定深思熟虑且具有操作性，要说失误只能说他选错了对手，用在别人身上好使的招 兔子楞是免疫
rogerkkk123 发表于 2012-7-28 09:33
真正的妹帝一直没有看错兔子，神马危险论崩溃论等等都是放出来的烟雾和暂时利益需要，真正的核心认识一直正 ...
额到是不认为是失误，MD计划肯定深思熟虑且具有操作性，要说失误只能说他选错了对手，用在别人身上好使的招 兔子楞是免疫
这文章应该是97年的
在过去两年里，中国人对美国所作所为感到不安（原文是bristle），这包括95年5月允许台湾领导人李登辉访问；96年3月派出两艘航空母舰到台海附近；不断出售武器到台湾；不停批评中国人权纪录、人口政策以及抄袭美国技术，并在95年签订美日安全声明。有些中国领导人把这些一切都错误看做是（原文用misperceive）给中国的枷锁。
在过去两年里，中国人对美国所作所为感到不安（原文是bristle），这包括95年5月允许台湾领导人李登辉访问；96年3月派出两艘航空母舰到台海附近；不断出售武器到台湾；不停批评中国人权纪录、人口政策以及抄袭美国技术，并在95年签订美日安全声明。有些中国领导人把这些一切都错误看做是（原文用misperceive）给中国的枷锁。
卡姆昂卑鄙 发表于 2012-7-28 09:44 ![]()
额到是不认为是失误，MD计划肯定深思熟虑且具有操作性，要说失误只能说他选错了对手，用在别人身上好使 ...
那时候从上到下的大小兔子即使不算哈妹，对妹也是普遍持好感的，8、90年代是妹硬生生把最有可能哈妹的一代（真的是天时地利人和全占齐）砸醒、痛殴推到了对立的一面， 时过境迁，现在的世界经济科技军事政治格局以及人口素质，这兎已经不是那兎，这妹也不再是那妹，妹最好的对华战略机遇期已经完全不在、也不可能重现。
我私下有个想法，当时妹如何能忍一忍，多等个10来年，也许会达到妹的战略构思，一个稍富裕但软弱的肉兔，比如ww和泥盆的混合体。
额到是不认为是失误，MD计划肯定深思熟虑且具有操作性，要说失误只能说他选错了对手，用在别人身上好使 ...
那时候从上到下的大小兔子即使不算哈妹，对妹也是普遍持好感的，8、90年代是妹硬生生把最有可能哈妹的一代（真的是天时地利人和全占齐）砸醒、痛殴推到了对立的一面， 时过境迁，现在的世界经济科技军事政治格局以及人口素质，这兎已经不是那兎，这妹也不再是那妹，妹最好的对华战略机遇期已经完全不在、也不可能重现。
我私下有个想法，当时妹如何能忍一忍，多等个10来年，也许会达到妹的战略构思，一个稍富裕但软弱的肉兔，比如ww和泥盆的混合体。
看来高手不一定总在民间。。。庙堂也很多
96年的东西，有点久远
rogerkkk123 发表于 2012-7-28 09:57 ![]()
那时候从上到下的大小兔子即使不算哈妹，对妹也是普遍持好感的，8、90年代是妹硬生生把最有可能哈妹的一代 ...
部分认同，兔子心气高，偶嚼着就算MD忍到现在 兔子也还是要吃肉的，顶多吃相上温顺一点而已，骨子里兔子是主子，永远不可能像脚盆那样当奴才， 如果说失误个人认为MD最大的失误可能是96台海刺激了军兔
那时候从上到下的大小兔子即使不算哈妹，对妹也是普遍持好感的，8、90年代是妹硬生生把最有可能哈妹的一代 ...
部分认同，兔子心气高，偶嚼着就算MD忍到现在 兔子也还是要吃肉的，顶多吃相上温顺一点而已，骨子里兔子是主子，永远不可能像脚盆那样当奴才， 如果说失误个人认为MD最大的失误可能是96台海刺激了军兔
rogerkkk123 发表于 2012-7-28 09:57
那时候从上到下的大小兔子即使不算哈妹，对妹也是普遍持好感的，8、90年代是妹硬生生把最有可能哈妹的一代 ...
的确如此。如果不是苏联解体后发生在北京的某事件，如果不是九十年代的MD过于自满，MD完全有可能收获一个战略上亲密也更接近美国体系的中国，而不是像现在这样富有战略意志和力量的腹黑兔。（感谢提醒，特此更正：应为解体前后～）
不过WW和泥盆的混合体不可能。即使亲近美国体系，中国政府也不会接受一个如此软弱的定位。更类似的追求是德国或者法国的国际地位。
嘛，无论如何中美蜜月都完蛋了，暧昧期也没了，现在的白头鹰只能是考虑如何和一只武装兔相处了……
rogerkkk123 发表于 2012-7-28 09:57
那时候从上到下的大小兔子即使不算哈妹，对妹也是普遍持好感的，8、90年代是妹硬生生把最有可能哈妹的一代 ...
的确如此。如果不是苏联解体后发生在北京的某事件，如果不是九十年代的MD过于自满，MD完全有可能收获一个战略上亲密也更接近美国体系的中国，而不是像现在这样富有战略意志和力量的腹黑兔。（感谢提醒，特此更正：应为解体前后～）
不过WW和泥盆的混合体不可能。即使亲近美国体系，中国政府也不会接受一个如此软弱的定位。更类似的追求是德国或者法国的国际地位。
嘛，无论如何中美蜜月都完蛋了，暧昧期也没了，现在的白头鹰只能是考虑如何和一只武装兔相处了……
卡姆昂卑鄙 发表于 2012-7-28 10:26 ![]()
部分认同，兔子心气高，偶嚼着就算MD忍到现在 兔子也还是要吃肉的，顶多吃相上温顺一点而已，骨子里兔子 ...
就是因为有这种心态，我们才会不余余力的发展，我们的这种心态是在骨子里的，也是重回世界之巅的基础。
部分认同，兔子心气高，偶嚼着就算MD忍到现在 兔子也还是要吃肉的，顶多吃相上温顺一点而已，骨子里兔子 ...
就是因为有这种心态，我们才会不余余力的发展，我们的这种心态是在骨子里的，也是重回世界之巅的基础。
freemailman 发表于 2012-7-28 09:58 ![]()
看来高手不一定总在民间。。。庙堂也很多
大隐隐于朝
看来高手不一定总在民间。。。庙堂也很多
大隐隐于朝
rogerkkk123 发表于 2012-7-28 09:33 ![]()
真正的妹帝一直没有看错兔子，神马危险论崩溃论等等都是放出来的烟雾和暂时利益需要，真正的核心认识一直正 ...
任何顶层的战略设计都受制于当时的历史背景和现实考量，美帝虽说是毫无争议的全球霸主但也很难超越社会规律的客观制约。很多看似精妙的战略设计在事件发展过程中的无数变量的影响下最后也变得一钱不值了。
真正的妹帝一直没有看错兔子，神马危险论崩溃论等等都是放出来的烟雾和暂时利益需要，真正的核心认识一直正 ...
任何顶层的战略设计都受制于当时的历史背景和现实考量，美帝虽说是毫无争议的全球霸主但也很难超越社会规律的客观制约。很多看似精妙的战略设计在事件发展过程中的无数变量的影响下最后也变得一钱不值了。
freemailman 发表于 2012-7-28 09:58 ![]()
看来高手不一定总在民间。。。庙堂也很多
是啊 官家光是掌握的信息和资源就不是民间可以比的
再说能坐到那个位置的人品手段如何暂且不论，自己肯定是有几把刷子的
看来高手不一定总在民间。。。庙堂也很多
是啊 官家光是掌握的信息和资源就不是民间可以比的
再说能坐到那个位置的人品手段如何暂且不论，自己肯定是有几把刷子的
yorkey 发表于 2012-7-28 09:15 ![]()
We do not foresee the sort of factional infighting or succession struggles that marked the passing o ...
We do not foresee the sort of factional infighting or succession struggles that marked the passing of Mao.
应该译成“我们认为象太祖过世后发生的派系混战和争夺继承权的较量在可预见的未来不会再次发生”
感谢楼主贴出好文，快过10年了还有很好的参考意义。翻译还需要下点功夫。
We do not foresee the sort of factional infighting or succession struggles that marked the passing o ...
We do not foresee the sort of factional infighting or succession struggles that marked the passing of Mao.
应该译成“我们认为象太祖过世后发生的派系混战和争夺继承权的较量在可预见的未来不会再次发生”
感谢楼主贴出好文，快过10年了还有很好的参考意义。翻译还需要下点功夫。
We do not foresee the sort of factional infighting or succession struggles that marked the passing ...
翻译真心好
可是我觉得兔子关于权利的争斗是永远的 只会越来越理智 将争斗控制在可以控制的范围之内 这也是骨子里的
翻译真心好
可是我觉得兔子关于权利的争斗是永远的 只会越来越理智 将争斗控制在可以控制的范围之内 这也是骨子里的
很想看兔子对老鹰的报告。也许更惊人！
很想看兔子对老鹰的报告。也许更惊人！