超级军网和油霸关于东风21的交易流言（中英文对照，水平有限，各 ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 08:53:55
【俺水平着实有限，翻译这片文章花了大概2个小时，各位指正啊】
Riyadh to Beijing: We’ll Pay for Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missiles with All the Oil You Need（从利雅得到北京：石油与核弹道导弹的交易）
King Abdullah restored National Security Adviser Prince Bandar bin Sultan to favor for a very special mission. DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s military and intelligence sources reveal that the talented former ambassador to the US was recently brought back from exile to conduct secret negotiations with China for the oil kingdom’s acquisition of single-nuclear warhead, medium-range MRBM ballistic missiles – the Dong-Feng 21 (DF-21) model (NATO code name CSS-5).（沙特国王阿卜杜拉恢复了国家安全顾问班达尔王子的职务以支持一项非常特殊的任务。来自以色列的戴博卡军事情报网的消息显示沙特最近将前任驻美国大使召回国内来负责跟中国的秘密谈判，以期获得这个是有王国梦寐以求的能携带核弹头的中程核导弹——东风21型（北约代号CSS-5）。）
After acting as the king’s confidential coordinator of Saudi intelligence in the Arab revolt, Bandar removed himself (or was removed) some months ago from Riyadh to escape the royal infighting plaguing the court.在之前的阿拉伯世界的动乱中他作为国王的亲信负责协调工作，后来班达尔离开（或者说是“被离开”）了利雅得以躲避皇家内讧和法庭的责难。
Facing him across the negotiating table in Beijing was Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie who reported directly to Chinese President Hu Jintao.（谈判桌上跟他面对面的是中国国防部长梁光烈，梁会把谈判情况告知中国国家主席HJT。）
The first Saudi approach for these missiles was made when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called on the Saudi monarch on January 15. In their official communiqué, the two leaders announced they had “agreed to make concerted efforts to enhance bilateral relations under a strategic framework.”（在1月15号中国总理温家宝对沙特的国事访问中沙特第一次与中国在这些导弹的议题上有了接触。随后，在两国的官方公报上，两位领导人宣布中沙双方愿意共同努力以期在一个战略框架内加强双边关系。）
The phrase “under a strategic framework” referred to the Saudi request for Chinese nuclear missiles.（这里的“在一个战略框架内”指代的就是沙特寻求获得中国核导弹的这一要求。）
The Saudis keep one-third of their missiles ready for instant launch（沙特人1/3的导弹都保持随时发射的状态。）
Saudi Arabia’s present arsenal, our military sources report, contains three Chinese CSS-2 ballistic missile batteries from the 1970s (IRBM, with conventional warheads and a range of 2,600 kilometers), the oldest type of liquid propellant ballistic missiles in the Chinese inventory.（我们的军事情报显示：沙特目前的兵器库内还保留有上个世纪70年代从中国获得的中程弹道导弹CSS-2（装备常规弹头射程2600公里），这种以液体燃料为动力的中程弹道导弹在目前中国的库存中已属最老的型号。）
Responsible for their maintenance is a Chinese missile corps battalion composed mostly of missile technicians who are employed at three military facilities – Sulail, 500 kilometers south of Riyadh near the Khamis Mushait military complex, which is Headquarters of the Saudi Southern Area Command and home to the Field Artillery and Infantry Schools and to the King Khalid Air Base; Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj, 77 kilometers south of Riyadh; and Al-Dilam, also south of Riyadh and bordering on the Sultan Air Base.（负责导弹维护的是沙特雇佣来的中国导弹专家和工程师，他们分布在沙特的三个地方。首先是位于利雅得以南约500公里、靠近Khamis Mushait综合军事基地的Sulail，Khamis Mushait综合军事基地是沙特南部地区的指挥总部并且还是野战炮兵及步兵学校和哈立德国王空军基地的所在地。其次是位于利雅得以南77公里海尔季的苏丹王子空军基地。还有一个是在A1-Dilam，也是在利雅得以南方向并且与苏丹王子空军基地紧邻。）
DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s military sources note that the Saudis keep their ballistic missiles in three stages of readiness – those at Sulail sit on pads prepared for instantaneous launch; those at Al Kharj are also on launching pads with their tanks half full; and the third group is still in storage at Al-Dilam.（戴博卡军事情报网指出沙特人的弹道导弹共分三个战备等级，Sulail基地的弹道导弹在发射架上处于随时可以发射的状态；位于海尔季的导弹也在发射架上但是处于燃料半满状态；第三组导弹则在A1-Dilam储备。）
The newest updated variants of the DF-21s are capable of delivering either nuclear warheads or conventional weapons. They have a maximum range of 1,700 kilometers and a payload of 600 kg. Submunitions with high explosives and chemical warheads are believed to be available.（最新型号的东风21既可以携带核弹头也可以携带常规弹头，具有最大1700公里的有效射程和600公斤的有效载荷。据信也能携带分导弹头和化学武器弹头。）
A colossal price payable in 23 years’ worth of oil supplies（交易将由持续23年的石油供应来支付。）
Confident that Washington was unaware of the secret negotiations going on in Beijing, our intelligence sources report the Saudis offered the Chinese two major incentives for the deal:（可以确信华盛顿方面还没有意识到利雅得与北京的这次秘密谈判，我们的情报显示沙特方面为促成这笔交易给了中国两大诱因。）
1. The fabulous sum of $60 billion in payment for the purchase of the missiles. Part of the package would be the construction of new bases to house them in Saudi desert regions most inaccessible for Iranian attack.（1、为了购买这批导弹沙特要为此支付令人难以置信的600亿美元巨款。在沙特的这次一揽子计划中还包括在沙漠地区修建可以最大程度躲避伊朗攻击的导弹基地的计划。）
2. Since solid investment outlets are hard to find in the global economy’s present state and Beijing suffers from a surfeit of cash, Bandar also put on the table as part of the price a long-term Saudi commitment to cover all of China’s oil needs until the year 2035, no matter what happens in the interim and irrespective even of an oil crisis besetting the desert kingdom.
Never before has any oil-producing country offered such terms – least of all the world’s largest oil exporter. In effect, Gulf sources point out, Riyadh agreed to open its oil fields to partial Chinese control for the sake of gaining nuclear missiles.（2、在当今的全球经济背景下实业投资遭遇困难，北京也陷入货币过度发行的困境，谈判桌上班达尔也表示沙特将长期恪守为中国提供石油直到2035年的承诺。在这25年的石油供应中，这个承诺不会因任何事而暂停即便是这片沙漠遭遇石油危机。以前还从来没有一个产油国做出过这种承诺——当然沙特这样的世界最大原油输出国也没有做出过这种承诺。实际上，来自《海湾》的消息指出，为了得到核导弹利雅得同意开放他的部分油田给中国控制。）
Not surprisingly, Chinese President Hu informed the Saudi King of his assent to the transaction once all the particulars are ironed out.（显然谈判的结果都在料想之中，中国国家主席HJT通知沙特国王他同意了这笔交易，一旦细节敲定马上可以开始。）
One of the weightiest would be the criteria to be fixed for calculating the price of oil on sale to China and the number of barrels; whether the baseline would be the 2020 or 2030 market prices.（还有一点很重要，就是确定出口到中国的原油价格和数量，考虑到汇率波动，可能用2020亦或是2030年的汇率作为计算标准。）
Back-up talks for Pakistan’s Gauri nuclear missiles（与巴基斯坦的高里核导弹谈判作为备份）
Also to be decided is how China will get around its signature on the Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR, an informal and voluntary association of countries dedicated to the non-proliferation of unmanned systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
Another snag is presented by the commitments Riyadh undertook in signing nuclear conventions at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.（（是否能达成交易）还有一个决定因素是中国怎样逃避她已签署的MTCR协议（导弹及技术控制制度）的限制，MTCR是非正式的自由联盟，致力于防止大规模杀伤性武器的扩散。）
DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s intelligence sources report further that Saudi Arabia has launched back-up negotiations with Pakistan for the purchase of its Ghauri nuclear ballistic missiles in case the transaction with China falls through.（以色列的戴博卡军事情报网的消息进一步报道称沙特阿拉伯还把与巴基斯坦有关购买高里核导弹的谈判作为备份以防与中国的交易流产。）
【俺水平着实有限，翻译这片文章花了大概2个小时，各位指正啊】
Riyadh to Beijing: We’ll Pay for Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missiles with All the Oil You Need（从利雅得到北京：石油与核弹道导弹的交易）
King Abdullah restored National Security Adviser Prince Bandar bin Sultan to favor for a very special mission. DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s military and intelligence sources reveal that the talented former ambassador to the US was recently brought back from exile to conduct secret negotiations with China for the oil kingdom’s acquisition of single-nuclear warhead, medium-range MRBM ballistic missiles – the Dong-Feng 21 (DF-21) model (NATO code name CSS-5).（沙特国王阿卜杜拉恢复了国家安全顾问班达尔王子的职务以支持一项非常特殊的任务。来自以色列的戴博卡军事情报网的消息显示沙特最近将前任驻美国大使召回国内来负责跟中国的秘密谈判，以期获得这个是有王国梦寐以求的能携带核弹头的中程核导弹——东风21型（北约代号CSS-5）。）
After acting as the king’s confidential coordinator of Saudi intelligence in the Arab revolt, Bandar removed himself (or was removed) some months ago from Riyadh to escape the royal infighting plaguing the court.在之前的阿拉伯世界的动乱中他作为国王的亲信负责协调工作，后来班达尔离开（或者说是“被离开”）了利雅得以躲避皇家内讧和法庭的责难。
Facing him across the negotiating table in Beijing was Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie who reported directly to Chinese President Hu Jintao.（谈判桌上跟他面对面的是中国国防部长梁光烈，梁会把谈判情况告知中国国家主席HJT。）
The first Saudi approach for these missiles was made when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called on the Saudi monarch on January 15. In their official communiqué, the two leaders announced they had “agreed to make concerted efforts to enhance bilateral relations under a strategic framework.”（在1月15号中国总理温家宝对沙特的国事访问中沙特第一次与中国在这些导弹的议题上有了接触。随后，在两国的官方公报上，两位领导人宣布中沙双方愿意共同努力以期在一个战略框架内加强双边关系。）
The phrase “under a strategic framework” referred to the Saudi request for Chinese nuclear missiles.（这里的“在一个战略框架内”指代的就是沙特寻求获得中国核导弹的这一要求。）
The Saudis keep one-third of their missiles ready for instant launch（沙特人1/3的导弹都保持随时发射的状态。）
Saudi Arabia’s present arsenal, our military sources report, contains three Chinese CSS-2 ballistic missile batteries from the 1970s (IRBM, with conventional warheads and a range of 2,600 kilometers), the oldest type of liquid propellant ballistic missiles in the Chinese inventory.（我们的军事情报显示：沙特目前的兵器库内还保留有上个世纪70年代从中国获得的中程弹道导弹CSS-2（装备常规弹头射程2600公里），这种以液体燃料为动力的中程弹道导弹在目前中国的库存中已属最老的型号。）
Responsible for their maintenance is a Chinese missile corps battalion composed mostly of missile technicians who are employed at three military facilities – Sulail, 500 kilometers south of Riyadh near the Khamis Mushait military complex, which is Headquarters of the Saudi Southern Area Command and home to the Field Artillery and Infantry Schools and to the King Khalid Air Base; Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj, 77 kilometers south of Riyadh; and Al-Dilam, also south of Riyadh and bordering on the Sultan Air Base.（负责导弹维护的是沙特雇佣来的中国导弹专家和工程师，他们分布在沙特的三个地方。首先是位于利雅得以南约500公里、靠近Khamis Mushait综合军事基地的Sulail，Khamis Mushait综合军事基地是沙特南部地区的指挥总部并且还是野战炮兵及步兵学校和哈立德国王空军基地的所在地。其次是位于利雅得以南77公里海尔季的苏丹王子空军基地。还有一个是在A1-Dilam，也是在利雅得以南方向并且与苏丹王子空军基地紧邻。）
DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s military sources note that the Saudis keep their ballistic missiles in three stages of readiness – those at Sulail sit on pads prepared for instantaneous launch; those at Al Kharj are also on launching pads with their tanks half full; and the third group is still in storage at Al-Dilam.（戴博卡军事情报网指出沙特人的弹道导弹共分三个战备等级，Sulail基地的弹道导弹在发射架上处于随时可以发射的状态；位于海尔季的导弹也在发射架上但是处于燃料半满状态；第三组导弹则在A1-Dilam储备。）
The newest updated variants of the DF-21s are capable of delivering either nuclear warheads or conventional weapons. They have a maximum range of 1,700 kilometers and a payload of 600 kg. Submunitions with high explosives and chemical warheads are believed to be available.（最新型号的东风21既可以携带核弹头也可以携带常规弹头，具有最大1700公里的有效射程和600公斤的有效载荷。据信也能携带分导弹头和化学武器弹头。）
A colossal price payable in 23 years’ worth of oil supplies（交易将由持续23年的石油供应来支付。）
Confident that Washington was unaware of the secret negotiations going on in Beijing, our intelligence sources report the Saudis offered the Chinese two major incentives for the deal:（可以确信华盛顿方面还没有意识到利雅得与北京的这次秘密谈判，我们的情报显示沙特方面为促成这笔交易给了中国两大诱因。）
1. The fabulous sum of $60 billion in payment for the purchase of the missiles. Part of the package would be the construction of new bases to house them in Saudi desert regions most inaccessible for Iranian attack.（1、为了购买这批导弹沙特要为此支付令人难以置信的600亿美元巨款。在沙特的这次一揽子计划中还包括在沙漠地区修建可以最大程度躲避伊朗攻击的导弹基地的计划。）
2. Since solid investment outlets are hard to find in the global economy’s present state and Beijing suffers from a surfeit of cash, Bandar also put on the table as part of the price a long-term Saudi commitment to cover all of China’s oil needs until the year 2035, no matter what happens in the interim and irrespective even of an oil crisis besetting the desert kingdom.
Never before has any oil-producing country offered such terms – least of all the world’s largest oil exporter. In effect, Gulf sources point out, Riyadh agreed to open its oil fields to partial Chinese control for the sake of gaining nuclear missiles.（2、在当今的全球经济背景下实业投资遭遇困难，北京也陷入货币过度发行的困境，谈判桌上班达尔也表示沙特将长期恪守为中国提供石油直到2035年的承诺。在这25年的石油供应中，这个承诺不会因任何事而暂停即便是这片沙漠遭遇石油危机。以前还从来没有一个产油国做出过这种承诺——当然沙特这样的世界最大原油输出国也没有做出过这种承诺。实际上，来自《海湾》的消息指出，为了得到核导弹利雅得同意开放他的部分油田给中国控制。）
Not surprisingly, Chinese President Hu informed the Saudi King of his assent to the transaction once all the particulars are ironed out.（显然谈判的结果都在料想之中，中国国家主席HJT通知沙特国王他同意了这笔交易，一旦细节敲定马上可以开始。）
One of the weightiest would be the criteria to be fixed for calculating the price of oil on sale to China and the number of barrels; whether the baseline would be the 2020 or 2030 market prices.（还有一点很重要，就是确定出口到中国的原油价格和数量，考虑到汇率波动，可能用2020亦或是2030年的汇率作为计算标准。）
Back-up talks for Pakistan’s Gauri nuclear missiles（与巴基斯坦的高里核导弹谈判作为备份）
Also to be decided is how China will get around its signature on the Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR, an informal and voluntary association of countries dedicated to the non-proliferation of unmanned systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
Another snag is presented by the commitments Riyadh undertook in signing nuclear conventions at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.（（是否能达成交易）还有一个决定因素是中国怎样逃避她已签署的MTCR协议（导弹及技术控制制度）的限制，MTCR是非正式的自由联盟，致力于防止大规模杀伤性武器的扩散。）
DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s intelligence sources report further that Saudi Arabia has launched back-up negotiations with Pakistan for the purchase of its Ghauri nuclear ballistic missiles in case the transaction with China falls through.（以色列的戴博卡军事情报网的消息进一步报道称沙特阿拉伯还把与巴基斯坦有关购买高里核导弹的谈判作为备份以防与中国的交易流产。）
Riyadh to Beijing: We’ll Pay for Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missiles with All the Oil You Need（从利雅得到北京：石油与核弹道导弹的交易）
King Abdullah restored National Security Adviser Prince Bandar bin Sultan to favor for a very special mission. DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s military and intelligence sources reveal that the talented former ambassador to the US was recently brought back from exile to conduct secret negotiations with China for the oil kingdom’s acquisition of single-nuclear warhead, medium-range MRBM ballistic missiles – the Dong-Feng 21 (DF-21) model (NATO code name CSS-5).（沙特国王阿卜杜拉恢复了国家安全顾问班达尔王子的职务以支持一项非常特殊的任务。来自以色列的戴博卡军事情报网的消息显示沙特最近将前任驻美国大使召回国内来负责跟中国的秘密谈判，以期获得这个是有王国梦寐以求的能携带核弹头的中程核导弹——东风21型（北约代号CSS-5）。）
After acting as the king’s confidential coordinator of Saudi intelligence in the Arab revolt, Bandar removed himself (or was removed) some months ago from Riyadh to escape the royal infighting plaguing the court.在之前的阿拉伯世界的动乱中他作为国王的亲信负责协调工作，后来班达尔离开（或者说是“被离开”）了利雅得以躲避皇家内讧和法庭的责难。
Facing him across the negotiating table in Beijing was Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie who reported directly to Chinese President Hu Jintao.（谈判桌上跟他面对面的是中国国防部长梁光烈，梁会把谈判情况告知中国国家主席HJT。）
The first Saudi approach for these missiles was made when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called on the Saudi monarch on January 15. In their official communiqué, the two leaders announced they had “agreed to make concerted efforts to enhance bilateral relations under a strategic framework.”（在1月15号中国总理温家宝对沙特的国事访问中沙特第一次与中国在这些导弹的议题上有了接触。随后，在两国的官方公报上，两位领导人宣布中沙双方愿意共同努力以期在一个战略框架内加强双边关系。）
The phrase “under a strategic framework” referred to the Saudi request for Chinese nuclear missiles.（这里的“在一个战略框架内”指代的就是沙特寻求获得中国核导弹的这一要求。）
The Saudis keep one-third of their missiles ready for instant launch（沙特人1/3的导弹都保持随时发射的状态。）
Saudi Arabia’s present arsenal, our military sources report, contains three Chinese CSS-2 ballistic missile batteries from the 1970s (IRBM, with conventional warheads and a range of 2,600 kilometers), the oldest type of liquid propellant ballistic missiles in the Chinese inventory.（我们的军事情报显示：沙特目前的兵器库内还保留有上个世纪70年代从中国获得的中程弹道导弹CSS-2（装备常规弹头射程2600公里），这种以液体燃料为动力的中程弹道导弹在目前中国的库存中已属最老的型号。）
Responsible for their maintenance is a Chinese missile corps battalion composed mostly of missile technicians who are employed at three military facilities – Sulail, 500 kilometers south of Riyadh near the Khamis Mushait military complex, which is Headquarters of the Saudi Southern Area Command and home to the Field Artillery and Infantry Schools and to the King Khalid Air Base; Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj, 77 kilometers south of Riyadh; and Al-Dilam, also south of Riyadh and bordering on the Sultan Air Base.（负责导弹维护的是沙特雇佣来的中国导弹专家和工程师，他们分布在沙特的三个地方。首先是位于利雅得以南约500公里、靠近Khamis Mushait综合军事基地的Sulail，Khamis Mushait综合军事基地是沙特南部地区的指挥总部并且还是野战炮兵及步兵学校和哈立德国王空军基地的所在地。其次是位于利雅得以南77公里海尔季的苏丹王子空军基地。还有一个是在A1-Dilam，也是在利雅得以南方向并且与苏丹王子空军基地紧邻。）
DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s military sources note that the Saudis keep their ballistic missiles in three stages of readiness – those at Sulail sit on pads prepared for instantaneous launch; those at Al Kharj are also on launching pads with their tanks half full; and the third group is still in storage at Al-Dilam.（戴博卡军事情报网指出沙特人的弹道导弹共分三个战备等级，Sulail基地的弹道导弹在发射架上处于随时可以发射的状态；位于海尔季的导弹也在发射架上但是处于燃料半满状态；第三组导弹则在A1-Dilam储备。）
The newest updated variants of the DF-21s are capable of delivering either nuclear warheads or conventional weapons. They have a maximum range of 1,700 kilometers and a payload of 600 kg. Submunitions with high explosives and chemical warheads are believed to be available.（最新型号的东风21既可以携带核弹头也可以携带常规弹头，具有最大1700公里的有效射程和600公斤的有效载荷。据信也能携带分导弹头和化学武器弹头。）
A colossal price payable in 23 years’ worth of oil supplies（交易将由持续23年的石油供应来支付。）
Confident that Washington was unaware of the secret negotiations going on in Beijing, our intelligence sources report the Saudis offered the Chinese two major incentives for the deal:（可以确信华盛顿方面还没有意识到利雅得与北京的这次秘密谈判，我们的情报显示沙特方面为促成这笔交易给了中国两大诱因。）
1. The fabulous sum of $60 billion in payment for the purchase of the missiles. Part of the package would be the construction of new bases to house them in Saudi desert regions most inaccessible for Iranian attack.（1、为了购买这批导弹沙特要为此支付令人难以置信的600亿美元巨款。在沙特的这次一揽子计划中还包括在沙漠地区修建可以最大程度躲避伊朗攻击的导弹基地的计划。）
2. Since solid investment outlets are hard to find in the global economy’s present state and Beijing suffers from a surfeit of cash, Bandar also put on the table as part of the price a long-term Saudi commitment to cover all of China’s oil needs until the year 2035, no matter what happens in the interim and irrespective even of an oil crisis besetting the desert kingdom.
Never before has any oil-producing country offered such terms – least of all the world’s largest oil exporter. In effect, Gulf sources point out, Riyadh agreed to open its oil fields to partial Chinese control for the sake of gaining nuclear missiles.（2、在当今的全球经济背景下实业投资遭遇困难，北京也陷入货币过度发行的困境，谈判桌上班达尔也表示沙特将长期恪守为中国提供石油直到2035年的承诺。在这25年的石油供应中，这个承诺不会因任何事而暂停即便是这片沙漠遭遇石油危机。以前还从来没有一个产油国做出过这种承诺——当然沙特这样的世界最大原油输出国也没有做出过这种承诺。实际上，来自《海湾》的消息指出，为了得到核导弹利雅得同意开放他的部分油田给中国控制。）
Not surprisingly, Chinese President Hu informed the Saudi King of his assent to the transaction once all the particulars are ironed out.（显然谈判的结果都在料想之中，中国国家主席HJT通知沙特国王他同意了这笔交易，一旦细节敲定马上可以开始。）
One of the weightiest would be the criteria to be fixed for calculating the price of oil on sale to China and the number of barrels; whether the baseline would be the 2020 or 2030 market prices.（还有一点很重要，就是确定出口到中国的原油价格和数量，考虑到汇率波动，可能用2020亦或是2030年的汇率作为计算标准。）
Back-up talks for Pakistan’s Gauri nuclear missiles（与巴基斯坦的高里核导弹谈判作为备份）
Also to be decided is how China will get around its signature on the Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR, an informal and voluntary association of countries dedicated to the non-proliferation of unmanned systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
Another snag is presented by the commitments Riyadh undertook in signing nuclear conventions at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.（（是否能达成交易）还有一个决定因素是中国怎样逃避她已签署的MTCR协议（导弹及技术控制制度）的限制，MTCR是非正式的自由联盟，致力于防止大规模杀伤性武器的扩散。）
DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s intelligence sources report further that Saudi Arabia has launched back-up negotiations with Pakistan for the purchase of its Ghauri nuclear ballistic missiles in case the transaction with China falls through.（以色列的戴博卡军事情报网的消息进一步报道称沙特阿拉伯还把与巴基斯坦有关购买高里核导弹的谈判作为备份以防与中国的交易流产。）
【俺水平着实有限，翻译这片文章花了大概2个小时，各位指正啊】
Riyadh to Beijing: We’ll Pay for Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missiles with All the Oil You Need（从利雅得到北京：石油与核弹道导弹的交易）
King Abdullah restored National Security Adviser Prince Bandar bin Sultan to favor for a very special mission. DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s military and intelligence sources reveal that the talented former ambassador to the US was recently brought back from exile to conduct secret negotiations with China for the oil kingdom’s acquisition of single-nuclear warhead, medium-range MRBM ballistic missiles – the Dong-Feng 21 (DF-21) model (NATO code name CSS-5).（沙特国王阿卜杜拉恢复了国家安全顾问班达尔王子的职务以支持一项非常特殊的任务。来自以色列的戴博卡军事情报网的消息显示沙特最近将前任驻美国大使召回国内来负责跟中国的秘密谈判，以期获得这个是有王国梦寐以求的能携带核弹头的中程核导弹——东风21型（北约代号CSS-5）。）
After acting as the king’s confidential coordinator of Saudi intelligence in the Arab revolt, Bandar removed himself (or was removed) some months ago from Riyadh to escape the royal infighting plaguing the court.在之前的阿拉伯世界的动乱中他作为国王的亲信负责协调工作，后来班达尔离开（或者说是“被离开”）了利雅得以躲避皇家内讧和法庭的责难。
Facing him across the negotiating table in Beijing was Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie who reported directly to Chinese President Hu Jintao.（谈判桌上跟他面对面的是中国国防部长梁光烈，梁会把谈判情况告知中国国家主席HJT。）
The first Saudi approach for these missiles was made when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called on the Saudi monarch on January 15. In their official communiqué, the two leaders announced they had “agreed to make concerted efforts to enhance bilateral relations under a strategic framework.”（在1月15号中国总理温家宝对沙特的国事访问中沙特第一次与中国在这些导弹的议题上有了接触。随后，在两国的官方公报上，两位领导人宣布中沙双方愿意共同努力以期在一个战略框架内加强双边关系。）
The phrase “under a strategic framework” referred to the Saudi request for Chinese nuclear missiles.（这里的“在一个战略框架内”指代的就是沙特寻求获得中国核导弹的这一要求。）
The Saudis keep one-third of their missiles ready for instant launch（沙特人1/3的导弹都保持随时发射的状态。）
Saudi Arabia’s present arsenal, our military sources report, contains three Chinese CSS-2 ballistic missile batteries from the 1970s (IRBM, with conventional warheads and a range of 2,600 kilometers), the oldest type of liquid propellant ballistic missiles in the Chinese inventory.（我们的军事情报显示：沙特目前的兵器库内还保留有上个世纪70年代从中国获得的中程弹道导弹CSS-2（装备常规弹头射程2600公里），这种以液体燃料为动力的中程弹道导弹在目前中国的库存中已属最老的型号。）
Responsible for their maintenance is a Chinese missile corps battalion composed mostly of missile technicians who are employed at three military facilities – Sulail, 500 kilometers south of Riyadh near the Khamis Mushait military complex, which is Headquarters of the Saudi Southern Area Command and home to the Field Artillery and Infantry Schools and to the King Khalid Air Base; Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj, 77 kilometers south of Riyadh; and Al-Dilam, also south of Riyadh and bordering on the Sultan Air Base.（负责导弹维护的是沙特雇佣来的中国导弹专家和工程师，他们分布在沙特的三个地方。首先是位于利雅得以南约500公里、靠近Khamis Mushait综合军事基地的Sulail，Khamis Mushait综合军事基地是沙特南部地区的指挥总部并且还是野战炮兵及步兵学校和哈立德国王空军基地的所在地。其次是位于利雅得以南77公里海尔季的苏丹王子空军基地。还有一个是在A1-Dilam，也是在利雅得以南方向并且与苏丹王子空军基地紧邻。）
DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s military sources note that the Saudis keep their ballistic missiles in three stages of readiness – those at Sulail sit on pads prepared for instantaneous launch; those at Al Kharj are also on launching pads with their tanks half full; and the third group is still in storage at Al-Dilam.（戴博卡军事情报网指出沙特人的弹道导弹共分三个战备等级，Sulail基地的弹道导弹在发射架上处于随时可以发射的状态；位于海尔季的导弹也在发射架上但是处于燃料半满状态；第三组导弹则在A1-Dilam储备。）
The newest updated variants of the DF-21s are capable of delivering either nuclear warheads or conventional weapons. They have a maximum range of 1,700 kilometers and a payload of 600 kg. Submunitions with high explosives and chemical warheads are believed to be available.（最新型号的东风21既可以携带核弹头也可以携带常规弹头，具有最大1700公里的有效射程和600公斤的有效载荷。据信也能携带分导弹头和化学武器弹头。）
A colossal price payable in 23 years’ worth of oil supplies（交易将由持续23年的石油供应来支付。）
Confident that Washington was unaware of the secret negotiations going on in Beijing, our intelligence sources report the Saudis offered the Chinese two major incentives for the deal:（可以确信华盛顿方面还没有意识到利雅得与北京的这次秘密谈判，我们的情报显示沙特方面为促成这笔交易给了中国两大诱因。）
1. The fabulous sum of $60 billion in payment for the purchase of the missiles. Part of the package would be the construction of new bases to house them in Saudi desert regions most inaccessible for Iranian attack.（1、为了购买这批导弹沙特要为此支付令人难以置信的600亿美元巨款。在沙特的这次一揽子计划中还包括在沙漠地区修建可以最大程度躲避伊朗攻击的导弹基地的计划。）
2. Since solid investment outlets are hard to find in the global economy’s present state and Beijing suffers from a surfeit of cash, Bandar also put on the table as part of the price a long-term Saudi commitment to cover all of China’s oil needs until the year 2035, no matter what happens in the interim and irrespective even of an oil crisis besetting the desert kingdom.
Never before has any oil-producing country offered such terms – least of all the world’s largest oil exporter. In effect, Gulf sources point out, Riyadh agreed to open its oil fields to partial Chinese control for the sake of gaining nuclear missiles.（2、在当今的全球经济背景下实业投资遭遇困难，北京也陷入货币过度发行的困境，谈判桌上班达尔也表示沙特将长期恪守为中国提供石油直到2035年的承诺。在这25年的石油供应中，这个承诺不会因任何事而暂停即便是这片沙漠遭遇石油危机。以前还从来没有一个产油国做出过这种承诺——当然沙特这样的世界最大原油输出国也没有做出过这种承诺。实际上，来自《海湾》的消息指出，为了得到核导弹利雅得同意开放他的部分油田给中国控制。）
Not surprisingly, Chinese President Hu informed the Saudi King of his assent to the transaction once all the particulars are ironed out.（显然谈判的结果都在料想之中，中国国家主席HJT通知沙特国王他同意了这笔交易，一旦细节敲定马上可以开始。）
One of the weightiest would be the criteria to be fixed for calculating the price of oil on sale to China and the number of barrels; whether the baseline would be the 2020 or 2030 market prices.（还有一点很重要，就是确定出口到中国的原油价格和数量，考虑到汇率波动，可能用2020亦或是2030年的汇率作为计算标准。）
Back-up talks for Pakistan’s Gauri nuclear missiles（与巴基斯坦的高里核导弹谈判作为备份）
Also to be decided is how China will get around its signature on the Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR, an informal and voluntary association of countries dedicated to the non-proliferation of unmanned systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
Another snag is presented by the commitments Riyadh undertook in signing nuclear conventions at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.（（是否能达成交易）还有一个决定因素是中国怎样逃避她已签署的MTCR协议（导弹及技术控制制度）的限制，MTCR是非正式的自由联盟，致力于防止大规模杀伤性武器的扩散。）
DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s intelligence sources report further that Saudi Arabia has launched back-up negotiations with Pakistan for the purchase of its Ghauri nuclear ballistic missiles in case the transaction with China falls through.（以色列的戴博卡军事情报网的消息进一步报道称沙特阿拉伯还把与巴基斯坦有关购买高里核导弹的谈判作为备份以防与中国的交易流产。）
600亿美金，23年原油合同。GDH的钱也不是这么花的。不过我认为中国卖DF21是有可能的，毕竟前面也卖过射程更远的，依据美国和沙特的基友情，卖DF21这件事美国估计也是睁一只眼闭一只眼，至于核弹，估计中国肯定不会自己卖得，但是巴铁就不一定了。另外，在国际黑市上，核弹这些东西也应该可以搞到吧。求消息来源。 否则没法不质疑真实性丫。=。=
坚决不相信
以前沙特也承诺过的啊，但是没有时间限制。
条件很诱人啊！卖吧！！只要打不到我们头上就行
我又想了想，为什么中沙两国不成立一个蛋蛋公司呢？知识产权共享，在中国和沙特同时成立公司，各占50％股份，中国以沙特提供的石油入股，沙特以现金入股，双方进行蛋蛋技术的研发，中国还可以在沙特成立组装公司，实验场地。这样对双方都是有巨大好处的啊！中国不愁资金发展蛋蛋技术，沙特借助中国的人才和技术实现了国家安全和掌握制造蛋蛋的部分技术，中国还能得到可靠的石油供应，沙特得到一个可靠的消费市场！一举数得的妙策怎么可能没有人想到呢？
真实性值得怀疑，只能以后看班达尔王子的回忆录来证实了
bashenanbas832 发表于 2012-7-8 19:09 ![]()
求消息来源。 否则没法不质疑真实性丫。=。=
消息来自国外的网站，至于真实性，也许常规弹头的还有可能，而核弹头的可能性近似于0啊
求消息来源。 否则没法不质疑真实性丫。=。=
消息来自国外的网站，至于真实性，也许常规弹头的还有可能，而核弹头的可能性近似于0啊
应该是针对阿拉法特死因调查的反制，意在破局，即使是真的，普通情况下未必会报道。特殊时期，就不一样。
/mg心茧： 发表于 2012-7-8 19:08 ![]()
600亿美金，23年原油合同。GDH的钱也不是这么花的。不过我认为中国卖DF21是有可能的，毕竟前面也卖过 ...
国际黑市、核弹头·····电影里面都这么说
600亿美金，23年原油合同。GDH的钱也不是这么花的。不过我认为中国卖DF21是有可能的，毕竟前面也卖过 ...
国际黑市、核弹头·····电影里面都这么说
这个可以把DF-21通过巴铁转手油霸，这样兔子就避过某条约了
我记得有个条约吧，专门限制了弹道导弹的出口的，就那个射程就是严重超标了
这到底是真的还是假的？如果是真的话，就目前的中东局势来说，这可是注入了一个冲击性变量啊！
x_jia 发表于 2012-7-8 19:31
我记得有个条约吧，专门限制了弹道导弹的出口的，就那个射程就是严重超标了
就导弹管制条例和清单，有关人士答记者问
问：中国何时加入MTCR？
刘：多年来，中国与MTCR成员国一直保持着密切磋商，就MTCR现状及其发展方向交换意见。中国在起草清单 时也参考了其他方面的经验，包括MTCR，因为其附件有一定的参考价值。有效的防扩散机制应具有普遍性和非歧视性。MTCR 在此方面需要进一步改进。
问：您提到中国的条例比MTCR更进了一步，中国的清单中所没有包括的物项与中国无关。那么为什么中国不加入 MTCR并采纳其规定，因为反正这对中国不会造成什么影响，这样不是更严格吗？存在什么障碍吗？
刘：我不认为MTCR的规定更严格。对中国而言，中国的条例与清单比MTCR更严格，因为包括了一些未列入MTCR 的物项。关于中国与MTCR的关系，我刚才已说过，我不认为加入MTCR与否与中国采取什么样的严格出口控制机制有直 接关系。
问：我的理解是，美国要求控制清单上的一些物项应该完全禁止出口，而中方控制清单中的所有物项都可以在逐案审 批的前提下出口，中国为什么这么做？
刘：所有国家都是这么做的，包括美国、欧洲国家以及其他国家和MTCR成员国。MTCR本身只是一个控制机制 ，而不是禁止机制，其中没有哪个物项是被完全禁止出口的。因此，中国采取了与其他国家一样的做法，同时充分考虑了相关 领域的扩散危险。
x_jia 发表于 2012-7-8 19:31
我记得有个条约吧，专门限制了弹道导弹的出口的，就那个射程就是严重超标了
就导弹管制条例和清单，有关人士答记者问
问：中国何时加入MTCR？
刘：多年来，中国与MTCR成员国一直保持着密切磋商，就MTCR现状及其发展方向交换意见。中国在起草清单 时也参考了其他方面的经验，包括MTCR，因为其附件有一定的参考价值。有效的防扩散机制应具有普遍性和非歧视性。MTCR 在此方面需要进一步改进。
问：您提到中国的条例比MTCR更进了一步，中国的清单中所没有包括的物项与中国无关。那么为什么中国不加入 MTCR并采纳其规定，因为反正这对中国不会造成什么影响，这样不是更严格吗？存在什么障碍吗？
刘：我不认为MTCR的规定更严格。对中国而言，中国的条例与清单比MTCR更严格，因为包括了一些未列入MTCR 的物项。关于中国与MTCR的关系，我刚才已说过，我不认为加入MTCR与否与中国采取什么样的严格出口控制机制有直 接关系。
问：我的理解是，美国要求控制清单上的一些物项应该完全禁止出口，而中方控制清单中的所有物项都可以在逐案审 批的前提下出口，中国为什么这么做？
刘：所有国家都是这么做的，包括美国、欧洲国家以及其他国家和MTCR成员国。MTCR本身只是一个控制机制 ，而不是禁止机制，其中没有哪个物项是被完全禁止出口的。因此，中国采取了与其他国家一样的做法，同时充分考虑了相关 领域的扩散危险。
好大一笔买卖 兔子又有小钱钱赚了~~~
此消息对中东的局势无疑是个冲击呀。
1.不能说卖，说升级。
2.可以有部分去掉核装药的核弹头，或者其他高度接近成品的半成品核弹头，必要时可以迅速全功能化，然后就可以理直气壮说不是核弹头。
2.可以有部分去掉核装药的核弹头，或者其他高度接近成品的半成品核弹头，必要时可以迅速全功能化，然后就可以理直气壮说不是核弹头。
弱弱地问一下，到底狗大户是啥意思啊。
真的要卖啊，不是说由小巴提供核弹头吗？
不太可能吧，再说那个卖油的承诺有什么意思？难道沙特还准备不卖给中国？
油霸国就是有钱，不服不行
好大一笔买卖啊，咱们稳赚不赔啊，打不到咱头上就行，顾客就是上帝啊
这似乎可以为YL核武装制造一个合理借口，促成最暴力破局。。
真心不会
是不是意味着伊朗不久将开片？
班达尔也表示沙特将长期恪守为中国提供石油直到2035年的承诺。在这25年的石油供应中，这个承诺不会因任何事而暂停即便是这片沙漠遭遇石油危机。
DF的魅力真大阿
DF的魅力真大阿
楼上那些人都被石油美元闪瞎了眼，沙特对我们中国做了什么忘记的干干净净了？沙特可是用尽一切手段对我们输入绿教，中国到处帮白帽子们建清蒸寺，其目的是让我们中国人的后代都找个阿拉伯爸爸改姓穆罕默德，沙特想核弹？可以，等中东石油干枯了或者核聚变发电站商业化后我们会免费发射1000枚DF41给沙特作为它输入绿教极端派支持白帽子豆奶分裂中国的回报。
核弹是不能卖的,我们是安理会常任国,什么能卖核弹呢,导弹是大大的有的,美刀是要的,至于23年石油合同,你觉得沙特还能安定23年吗?他的国王,他的王子,他的政权,这中间时间太长,不确定因素多啊!
amac 发表于 2012-7-8 19:35 ![]()
就导弹管制条例和清单，有关人士答记者问
问：中国何时加入MTCR？
呵呵，典型的大流氓语言啊
就导弹管制条例和清单，有关人士答记者问
问：中国何时加入MTCR？
呵呵，典型的大流氓语言啊
600亿美刀，按每年三公消费9000亿RMB算，可以吃167天
xmfj88 发表于 2012-7-8 20:05 ![]()
楼上那些人都被石油美元闪瞎了眼，沙特对我们中国做了什么忘记的干干净净了？沙特可是用尽一切手段对我们输 ...
TG和油霸的合作由来已久
沙特人驾机撞毁了世贸双子楼，也没见MD和油霸翻脸
楼上那些人都被石油美元闪瞎了眼，沙特对我们中国做了什么忘记的干干净净了？沙特可是用尽一切手段对我们输 ...
TG和油霸的合作由来已久
沙特人驾机撞毁了世贸双子楼，也没见MD和油霸翻脸
兔子的红眼里全是小钱钱。
只要利益足够大，就是094也好商量
离间tb和yl吧，看看笑笑罢了
这个消息较早之前PUPU就爆料过了，DF21B
你说保命好.还是保钱好.是人的都知保命啦.钱失了还可以在油上赚.命得一条.死了再多的钱也没用.要反舰的D型不？
造谣，都是造谣。
ASFQ 发表于 2012-7-8 19:25 ![]()
消息来自国外的网站，至于真实性，也许常规弹头的还有可能，而核弹头的可能性近似于0啊
巴铁有啊
消息来自国外的网站，至于真实性，也许常规弹头的还有可能，而核弹头的可能性近似于0啊
巴铁有啊