向che同学学习,也翻译几篇菲律宾网文

US vows to help PH build sea patrol capability

原文:globalnation.inquirer.net/35435/us-vows-to-help-ph-build-sea-patrol-capability

美国发誓将帮助菲律宾建立海洋巡逻能力
五月二号

华盛顿--美国说他将帮助菲律宾建立海洋巡逻能力但是不会在菲律宾与中国在有争议的南中国海礁石的对峙中站队.

同盟条约双上的高级外交官和防务官员在周一召开了他们的第一次联合会议,商讨了长达3周的在黄岩岛的对峙.

国务卿希拉里再次强调美国对菲律宾的共同防务条约,航行自由和地区安全的责任.她重申了对外交解决领土争端的支持.

联合声明说他们将共同合作来提升菲律宾的海事安全能力.美国将在今年晚些时候转移第二艘舰艇给装备很差的菲律宾海军.(完)

WASHINGTON — The US says it will help build the Philippines’ sea patrol capability but will not take sides in that nation’s standoff with China at a disputed shoal in the South China Sea.

The top diplomats and defense officials of the treaty allies held their first joint meeting Monday and discussed the three-week standoff at the Scarborough Shoal.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton reaffirmed US commitment to its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, and to freedom of navigation and regional security. She reiterated support for a diplomatic resolution to territorial disputes.

A joint statement said they would cooperate on building the Philippines’ maritime security capabilities. The US will transfer a second ship to the poorly equipped Philippine navy this year.

         

US vows to help PH build sea patrol capability

原文:globalnation.inquirer.net/35435/us-vows-to-help-ph-build-sea-patrol-capability

美国发誓将帮助菲律宾建立海洋巡逻能力
五月二号

华盛顿--美国说他将帮助菲律宾建立海洋巡逻能力但是不会在菲律宾与中国在有争议的南中国海礁石的对峙中站队.

同盟条约双上的高级外交官和防务官员在周一召开了他们的第一次联合会议,商讨了长达3周的在黄岩岛的对峙.

国务卿希拉里再次强调美国对菲律宾的共同防务条约,航行自由和地区安全的责任.她重申了对外交解决领土争端的支持.

联合声明说他们将共同合作来提升菲律宾的海事安全能力.美国将在今年晚些时候转移第二艘舰艇给装备很差的菲律宾海军.(完)

WASHINGTON — The US says it will help build the Philippines’ sea patrol capability but will not take sides in that nation’s standoff with China at a disputed shoal in the South China Sea.

The top diplomats and defense officials of the treaty allies held their first joint meeting Monday and discussed the three-week standoff at the Scarborough Shoal.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton reaffirmed US commitment to its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, and to freedom of navigation and regional security. She reiterated support for a diplomatic resolution to territorial disputes.

A joint statement said they would cooperate on building the Philippines’ maritime security capabilities. The US will transfer a second ship to the poorly equipped Philippine navy this year.

         

‘Stronger Navy’ urged amid Scarborough dispute

五月一号

在此黄岩岛争议之时,殆需更强大的海军

菲律宾,马尼拉--一个立法者(立委?)周二说,正在进行中的黄岩岛对峙说明一个更强大的海军是领土主权确立中所必要的.

"有成效的外交是解决领海争议最好的方法, 一个更强大的海军必然可以加强我们的外交能力" (对菲律宾政治体制不了解,行政院主席?) roman fomulo在一份声明中说.

作为外交事务委员会高级成员, Romulo说内部武装冲突使菲律宾海军无法发展对付外部威胁的能力-而Romulo认为这种能力是绝对必要的,尤其是对一个少见的,有7100个岛屿的群岛国家来说.

"菲律宾是世界上五大群岛国家之一,另外四个是印尼,日本,新西兰和英国. 可是,我们也只拥有世界上最弱小,装备最差的海军."Romulo说. 并解释菲律宾海军最大的军舰,德尔,皮拉尔号只是一艘45年舰龄,退役了的美国海岸警备队船只, 这艘船是通过美国多余国防物处理计划转移给菲律宾的.

十年以来,菲律宾武装部队一直和该国的共产党叛乱和穆斯林武装集团打仗, 也因此迫使菲律宾军队向另一个方向发展,Romulo说.

"相反于优先阻挡外部的潜在威胁,我们的武装力量完全投入到压制内部叛乱上边。这就是为什么我门有一个较大的陆军却只有弱小的海军(译者：百年海军没听说过么？政客啊),他说，解释说菲律宾武装力量有陆军8万人，海军2万6千人，空军1万7千人。"

"当菲律宾军队有非常大批经过训练的步兵，他们习惯于在我们的山林里和徒步的本地叛乱分子打仗，但是这些步兵的建立却是以牺牲一支足够好的海军或者一支过得去的空军为代价的。"他又说

从菲律宾海军被中国海监船阻止处理他们在争议礁石附近水域抓到的一群中国渔民已经接近一个月了. 菲律宾和中国从4月10号开始对峙，而中国政府还没有显示任何微小的信号要放弃他们对这块离菲律宾zambales省124海里，菲方认为在自己的专属经济区内礁石的主张(完).

"MANILA, Philippines — A lawmaker on Tuesday said that the country’s ongoing standoff with China over the ownership of Panatag (Scarborough) shoal indicated that a “stronger Navy” was necessary in asserting its sovereignty.

“Effective diplomacy is the best approach to disagreements over our territorial waters. A stronger Navy will surely reinforce our diplomacy,” House Deputy Majority Leader Roman Romulo said in a statement.

A senior member of the committee on foreign affairs, Romulo said that internal armed conflicts kept the Philippine Navy from developing its capabilities to deal with foreign aggression – something he thought was “absolutely imperative for an unusually large archipelago with more than 7,100 islands.”

“The Philippines is one of the five biggest archipelagos in the world along with Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Yet, we also have one of the smallest and most poorly equipped navies in the world.,” said the lawmaker, explaining that the Navy’s largest warship, BRP Gregorio del Pilar, was a 45-year-old decommissioned US Coast Guard cutter handed over to the country through the United States’ Excess Defense Article Program.


For decades, the Armed Forces of the Philippines has been fighting communist rebels and militant Islamist groups in the country and it was due to this that the military, Romulo said, was forced to grow in another direction.

“Instead of being primed to ward off potential foreign aggression, our Armed Forces have been wholly geared up to suppress domestic dissidents. This is why we have a big Army but a small Navy,” he said, explaining how the AFP’s troop strength was divided into the Army (80,000), the Navy (26,000), and the Air Force (17,000).

While the country had, at its disposal, a “bulky infantry trained to fight on foot local dissidents in our mountains and jungles… this was achieved at the expense of building an adequate Navy, or a passable Air Force,” he added.

It has been almost a month since the Philippine Navy was prevented by maritime surveillance vessels from China from confronting a group of Chinese fishermen they caught poaching in waters off the disputed shoal.

The country has been in a standoff with China since April 10, with the Chinese government not showing any indication of giving up its claim over the shoal located 124 nautical miles west of Zambales province and considered by the Philippines to be within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).



‘Stronger Navy’ urged amid Scarborough dispute

五月一号

在此黄岩岛争议之时,殆需更强大的海军

菲律宾,马尼拉--一个立法者(立委?)周二说,正在进行中的黄岩岛对峙说明一个更强大的海军是领土主权确立中所必要的.

"有成效的外交是解决领海争议最好的方法, 一个更强大的海军必然可以加强我们的外交能力" (对菲律宾政治体制不了解,行政院主席?) roman fomulo在一份声明中说.

作为外交事务委员会高级成员, Romulo说内部武装冲突使菲律宾海军无法发展对付外部威胁的能力-而Romulo认为这种能力是绝对必要的,尤其是对一个少见的,有7100个岛屿的群岛国家来说.

"菲律宾是世界上五大群岛国家之一,另外四个是印尼,日本,新西兰和英国. 可是,我们也只拥有世界上最弱小,装备最差的海军."Romulo说. 并解释菲律宾海军最大的军舰,德尔,皮拉尔号只是一艘45年舰龄,退役了的美国海岸警备队船只, 这艘船是通过美国多余国防物处理计划转移给菲律宾的.

十年以来,菲律宾武装部队一直和该国的共产党叛乱和穆斯林武装集团打仗, 也因此迫使菲律宾军队向另一个方向发展,Romulo说.

"相反于优先阻挡外部的潜在威胁,我们的武装力量完全投入到压制内部叛乱上边。这就是为什么我门有一个较大的陆军却只有弱小的海军(译者：百年海军没听说过么？政客啊),他说，解释说菲律宾武装力量有陆军8万人，海军2万6千人，空军1万7千人。"

"当菲律宾军队有非常大批经过训练的步兵，他们习惯于在我们的山林里和徒步的本地叛乱分子打仗，但是这些步兵的建立却是以牺牲一支足够好的海军或者一支过得去的空军为代价的。"他又说

从菲律宾海军被中国海监船阻止处理他们在争议礁石附近水域抓到的一群中国渔民已经接近一个月了. 菲律宾和中国从4月10号开始对峙，而中国政府还没有显示任何微小的信号要放弃他们对这块离菲律宾zambales省124海里，菲方认为在自己的专属经济区内礁石的主张(完).

"MANILA, Philippines — A lawmaker on Tuesday said that the country’s ongoing standoff with China over the ownership of Panatag (Scarborough) shoal indicated that a “stronger Navy” was necessary in asserting its sovereignty.

“Effective diplomacy is the best approach to disagreements over our territorial waters. A stronger Navy will surely reinforce our diplomacy,” House Deputy Majority Leader Roman Romulo said in a statement.

A senior member of the committee on foreign affairs, Romulo said that internal armed conflicts kept the Philippine Navy from developing its capabilities to deal with foreign aggression – something he thought was “absolutely imperative for an unusually large archipelago with more than 7,100 islands.”

“The Philippines is one of the five biggest archipelagos in the world along with Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Yet, we also have one of the smallest and most poorly equipped navies in the world.,” said the lawmaker, explaining that the Navy’s largest warship, BRP Gregorio del Pilar, was a 45-year-old decommissioned US Coast Guard cutter handed over to the country through the United States’ Excess Defense Article Program.


For decades, the Armed Forces of the Philippines has been fighting communist rebels and militant Islamist groups in the country and it was due to this that the military, Romulo said, was forced to grow in another direction.

“Instead of being primed to ward off potential foreign aggression, our Armed Forces have been wholly geared up to suppress domestic dissidents. This is why we have a big Army but a small Navy,” he said, explaining how the AFP’s troop strength was divided into the Army (80,000), the Navy (26,000), and the Air Force (17,000).

While the country had, at its disposal, a “bulky infantry trained to fight on foot local dissidents in our mountains and jungles… this was achieved at the expense of building an adequate Navy, or a passable Air Force,” he added.

It has been almost a month since the Philippine Navy was prevented by maritime surveillance vessels from China from confronting a group of Chinese fishermen they caught poaching in waters off the disputed shoal.

The country has been in a standoff with China since April 10, with the Chinese government not showing any indication of giving up its claim over the shoal located 124 nautical miles west of Zambales province and considered by the Philippines to be within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

这篇的后边非常好看,也说明我们的外交政策真是混蛋,天天到处求人. 连菲律宾这种破烂国家都希望利用一下

Scarborough: turning crisis into opportunity
黄岩岛 :化危为机
By: Raul C. Pangalangan
Philippine Daily Inquirer
12:53 am | Friday, May 4th, 2012
五月4日
Taiwan has now joined the fray at Scarborough. It is bad news when yet another government lays claim to what we hold as ours, even worse when that government is one that, by fiction of law, we pretend does not even exist. Let’s use the standoff to highlight the truly global character not just of the tussle over Scarborough but of the larger territorial issues in the West Philippine Sea. Taiwan’s intrusion shows that Scarborough is not a purely bilateral dispute as China insists. It should drive the Chinese up the law as they insist that it’s really still bilateral since, technically speaking, Taiwan is part of China.
台湾现在也加入了关于黄岩岛的争吵. 这是一个坏消息特别是又出现一个政府对我们认为是我们的东西提出主张,更糟糕的是,这是一个法律上我们假装不存在的政府.让我们用这次对峙来强调真正的国际因素,不单单来自黄岩岛的争吵还来自西非礼宾海更大的领土问题. 台湾的闯入显示黄岩岛并不是单纯的,像中国坚持的双边问题. 这可能使中国提高调门, 依然坚持这仍然是双边问题(技术上说,台湾是中国的一部分)
Beijing may see the Philippines as mere collateral damage in its bid to assert its primacy in Asia against the United States. We can either allow ourselves to be pushed precisely into the role of the US proxy here, or we can use the conflict to enable us to play off other countries’ insecurities to our advantage and in the end act as a genuinely sovereign nation.
北京可能觉得菲律宾仅仅是其确保在亚洲对美国地位的次要威胁.我们可以要么允许我们自己准确的推上美国亚洲代理人的角色,要么我们可以利用这次冲突来时我们能够和玩弄其他国家(主要指中国)对我们这种美国支持的不安全感并且最终表现为一个真正的主权国家.
First, we should draw attention to the fact that both Beijing and Taipei draw the same “dotted-U” line enclosing the entire South China Sea. The dotted-U was in fact originated by the Kuomintang in a succession of issuances between 1930 and 1947 when it still ruled the mainland. The dotted-U (minus a two-dotted line portion) was merely adopted by the People’s Republic in 1949 when the communists took over and pushed out the Kuomintang across the channel into the island of Taiwan.
首先, 我们应该把注意力引向一个事实,即北京和台北都画出一条相同的断续U型线并包括了整个南海. 这条断续线最开始由国民党在1930-1947年连续发行的地图上所画, 那时,国民党还统治中国大陆. 1949年, 共产党把国民党赶过台湾海峡后这条断续线被中华人民共和国完全继承.

This is nothing surprising since, after all, both states cite the same historical claims as the basis of their title. Indeed Taipei remained neutral during the China-Vietnam and China-Philippine clashes in the Spratlys, and even expressed subtle support for Beijing. In the mid-1990s, there were signs of increasing cross-straits collaboration in oil exploration.
所以没什么好奇怪为什么两个政权在引用同一条历史声明作为他们的根据. 实际上,台北在中国越南和中国菲律宾关于南沙群岛的碰撞中保持了中立(译者:台湾那些人真没种阿), 甚至表达了细微的对北京的支持. 在90年代中, 有一些迹象显示海峡两岸在石油勘探上有月来越多的合作.
Now that Taipei insinuates itself into the Scarborough debate, we should remind Taipei that if it forms a united front with Beijing on this issue, it is doomed to play junior partner, the perpetual “Mini-Me” to Beijing’s Dr. Evil. Taipei already occupies Itu Aba, the largest of the islands in the Spratlys archipelago. What purpose does it serve them to parrot Beijing’s already dubious claims over Scarborough (as I argued in last week’s column “Framing the Scarborough debate”)?
现在台北一步步挤入黄岩岛争端,我们应该提醒台北,如果他要和北京站在一边,那么他注定只能作为一个小弟, 是邪恶北京永远的小弟. 台北已经占据了太平岛,南沙最大的岛屿.  他们有什么理由作北京对黄岩岛模糊不清主张的应声虫?(如我在上周专栏发表的”搞清黄岩岛争端”一文中所说)
Second, we should call attention to the fact that neither state has laid out the exact coordinates of the dotted-U line. Moreover, what precisely does the dotted-U mean? Does it define ownership merely over the enclosed islands but not over the waters? Or does it lay claim over both the islands and waters?
第二, 我们需要把注意引到另一个事实:他们两个都没有给出断续线的精确坐标. 此外, 这个断续线是什么意思? 是对整个其包含内的岛屿都有主权而不是所有水域?还是既有岛屿也有水域?
In 1992, China passed a law demarcating its territorial sea by drawing straight baselines from the Mainland to “its offshore islands, Taiwan and … Nansha Islands [Spratlys] and other islands that belong to [China].” Yes, the dotted-U includes both the islands and the waters, and those waters belong to the “territorial sea” over which it has sovereignty.
1992年,中国通过了划分其领海基线的法律, 该基线”从中国大陆到其外还岛屿,台湾和…南沙群岛和其他属于中国的岛屿”. 是的, 断续线包括了岛屿和水域,而这些水域属于中国拥有主权的领海.日
However, China has subsequently ratified the Law of the Sea Convention, which said that “straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast.” In other words, it should follow the contours (jargon calls them “indentations” and “sinuosities”) of the coast. By that rule, the baseline should track the Chinese coast from the boundary with North Korea in the north to the boundary with Vietnam in the south. It can’t suddenly detour away from Hong Kong all the way to Luzon.
但是,中国后来批准签署了海洋法公约, 在公约中说”直线基线的划定不应再任何明显的程度上偏离海岸的一般方向”. 换句话说, 基线需要跟从海岸线的轮廓(行话叫做锯齿和蜿蜒). 根据海洋法公约规定, 中国的领海基线应该跟从中国的海岸线从北边的中朝边界到南边的中越边界.它不应该突然离开香港直接跑去吕宋.

(Again, this should serve as a reminder to Filipinos. We love to cite our own domestic laws against China. Our laws don’t bind China, in much the same way that China’s laws don’t bind us.)
(再一次的, 要提醒菲律宾人.我们喜欢引用我们的国内法来制约中国, 但是我们的法律对中国没有约束力,就像中国的法律对我们没有约束力一样)
Third, if Taiwan pushes its claim over Scarborough, we will be forced to deal with its government despite the fact that we have no diplomatic relations. Our own country sealed its One-China Policy under the 1975 Joint Communiqué signed by Ferdinand Marcos and Chou En Lai. The Philippines has scrupulously respected the One-China Policy. Indeed you will recall Taiwan’s righteous indignation during the 2010 post-Christmas raid on Internet scammers victimizing citizens at the Mainland. Over Taipei’s protests, we deported the arrested Taiwanese nationals to Beijing.
第三,如果台湾强推他们对黄岩岛的主张,我们应该被迫对付他的政府而不管我们有没有外交关系. 我们国家在1975年由马科斯和周恩来签署的联合声明中赞同一个中国. 菲律宾严格的遵守了一个中国政策. 事实上,你可以回想在2010年圣诞后的针对中国大陆的网诈骗案中台湾的愤慨. 不顾台湾的反对,我们把台湾籍嫌犯交给了北京.

Ironically then, if the Philippines is forced to deal with Taipei now, Beijing’s saber-rattling will have actually forced the hand of the Philippines to do precisely what the One-China Policy seeks to avoid, that is, direct diplomatic engagement with Taipei.
讽刺的是,如果现在菲律宾被迫对付台湾, 北京的武力威胁将事实上迫使菲律宾严格依照一个中国政策去防止,也就是,与台北的直接的外交联系.
Finally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) must not be merely reactive and defensive vis-à-vis Chinese feistiness. It must be proactive in scouting for bargaining chips against China, issues where China will be on the defensive. Already, the Asean, working hand in hand with the United States, has weaned away China’s erstwhile strongest ally in the region, Burma (Myanmar), invoking the loftiest rhetoric of human rights.
最后, 东盟不能仅仅是被动的,防御性的对待中国的霉臭(应该只中国的’入侵’或压力). 东盟必须主动的寻找能够和中国讨价还价的筹码, 或者那些中国不得不采取守势的问题.  过去,东盟手牵手的和美国一起,用最高尚的人权语言,消磨掉了中国以往在区域内最强的同盟, 缅甸. Both the Asean and the United States should next aim at China’s foreign policy bête noire in Asia, Tibetan independence, but do so most earnestly to protect human rights and uphold self-determination. It can be as slow, painstaking and gentle as the wooing of Burma, and can start off with increased assistance and visibility for refugees or informal meetings with dignitaries from Tibet’s government-in-exile. It is a roundabout way for us to send a broader message to China: that might does not make right, that there’s such a thing as international laws and norms, and that even the most brazen of power-trippers, on the verge of graduating from cheap thuggery to empire, will have to “anoint power with piety.”
东盟和美国下来应该瞄准中国外交的眼中钉,肉中刺,西藏独立, 但是要用最有利的方法,比如保护人权和个人自由. 这可能是缓慢的, 有些费力和温和的,就像对缅甸那样,并且以越来越多的,对难民(所以国内的民主自由斗士)的支持和宣传,或者非正式地与流亡的西藏政府的政要会谈. 这是一种对我们来说迂回的给中国发一个更宽泛的信息, 比如这不一定对,比如还有一种国际间的法律和准则,比如即使最厚颜无耻的权力炫耀者, 在从最低级的谋财害命到帝国的边缘,也必须要”给武力抹上神圣的油”
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这篇的后边非常好看,也说明我们的外交政策真是混蛋,天天到处求人. 连菲律宾这种破烂国家都希望利用一下

Scarborough: turning crisis into opportunity
黄岩岛 :化危为机
By: Raul C. Pangalangan
Philippine Daily Inquirer
12:53 am | Friday, May 4th, 2012
五月4日
Taiwan has now joined the fray at Scarborough. It is bad news when yet another government lays claim to what we hold as ours, even worse when that government is one that, by fiction of law, we pretend does not even exist. Let’s use the standoff to highlight the truly global character not just of the tussle over Scarborough but of the larger territorial issues in the West Philippine Sea. Taiwan’s intrusion shows that Scarborough is not a purely bilateral dispute as China insists. It should drive the Chinese up the law as they insist that it’s really still bilateral since, technically speaking, Taiwan is part of China.
台湾现在也加入了关于黄岩岛的争吵. 这是一个坏消息特别是又出现一个政府对我们认为是我们的东西提出主张,更糟糕的是,这是一个法律上我们假装不存在的政府.让我们用这次对峙来强调真正的国际因素,不单单来自黄岩岛的争吵还来自西非礼宾海更大的领土问题. 台湾的闯入显示黄岩岛并不是单纯的,像中国坚持的双边问题. 这可能使中国提高调门, 依然坚持这仍然是双边问题(技术上说,台湾是中国的一部分)
Beijing may see the Philippines as mere collateral damage in its bid to assert its primacy in Asia against the United States. We can either allow ourselves to be pushed precisely into the role of the US proxy here, or we can use the conflict to enable us to play off other countries’ insecurities to our advantage and in the end act as a genuinely sovereign nation.
北京可能觉得菲律宾仅仅是其确保在亚洲对美国地位的次要威胁.我们可以要么允许我们自己准确的推上美国亚洲代理人的角色,要么我们可以利用这次冲突来时我们能够和玩弄其他国家(主要指中国)对我们这种美国支持的不安全感并且最终表现为一个真正的主权国家.
First, we should draw attention to the fact that both Beijing and Taipei draw the same “dotted-U” line enclosing the entire South China Sea. The dotted-U was in fact originated by the Kuomintang in a succession of issuances between 1930 and 1947 when it still ruled the mainland. The dotted-U (minus a two-dotted line portion) was merely adopted by the People’s Republic in 1949 when the communists took over and pushed out the Kuomintang across the channel into the island of Taiwan.
首先, 我们应该把注意力引向一个事实,即北京和台北都画出一条相同的断续U型线并包括了整个南海. 这条断续线最开始由国民党在1930-1947年连续发行的地图上所画, 那时,国民党还统治中国大陆. 1949年, 共产党把国民党赶过台湾海峡后这条断续线被中华人民共和国完全继承.

This is nothing surprising since, after all, both states cite the same historical claims as the basis of their title. Indeed Taipei remained neutral during the China-Vietnam and China-Philippine clashes in the Spratlys, and even expressed subtle support for Beijing. In the mid-1990s, there were signs of increasing cross-straits collaboration in oil exploration.
所以没什么好奇怪为什么两个政权在引用同一条历史声明作为他们的根据. 实际上,台北在中国越南和中国菲律宾关于南沙群岛的碰撞中保持了中立(译者:台湾那些人真没种阿), 甚至表达了细微的对北京的支持. 在90年代中, 有一些迹象显示海峡两岸在石油勘探上有月来越多的合作.
Now that Taipei insinuates itself into the Scarborough debate, we should remind Taipei that if it forms a united front with Beijing on this issue, it is doomed to play junior partner, the perpetual “Mini-Me” to Beijing’s Dr. Evil. Taipei already occupies Itu Aba, the largest of the islands in the Spratlys archipelago. What purpose does it serve them to parrot Beijing’s already dubious claims over Scarborough (as I argued in last week’s column “Framing the Scarborough debate”)?
现在台北一步步挤入黄岩岛争端,我们应该提醒台北,如果他要和北京站在一边,那么他注定只能作为一个小弟, 是邪恶北京永远的小弟. 台北已经占据了太平岛,南沙最大的岛屿.  他们有什么理由作北京对黄岩岛模糊不清主张的应声虫?(如我在上周专栏发表的”搞清黄岩岛争端”一文中所说)
Second, we should call attention to the fact that neither state has laid out the exact coordinates of the dotted-U line. Moreover, what precisely does the dotted-U mean? Does it define ownership merely over the enclosed islands but not over the waters? Or does it lay claim over both the islands and waters?
第二, 我们需要把注意引到另一个事实:他们两个都没有给出断续线的精确坐标. 此外, 这个断续线是什么意思? 是对整个其包含内的岛屿都有主权而不是所有水域?还是既有岛屿也有水域?
In 1992, China passed a law demarcating its territorial sea by drawing straight baselines from the Mainland to “its offshore islands, Taiwan and … Nansha Islands [Spratlys] and other islands that belong to [China].” Yes, the dotted-U includes both the islands and the waters, and those waters belong to the “territorial sea” over which it has sovereignty.
1992年,中国通过了划分其领海基线的法律, 该基线”从中国大陆到其外还岛屿,台湾和…南沙群岛和其他属于中国的岛屿”. 是的, 断续线包括了岛屿和水域,而这些水域属于中国拥有主权的领海.日
However, China has subsequently ratified the Law of the Sea Convention, which said that “straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast.” In other words, it should follow the contours (jargon calls them “indentations” and “sinuosities”) of the coast. By that rule, the baseline should track the Chinese coast from the boundary with North Korea in the north to the boundary with Vietnam in the south. It can’t suddenly detour away from Hong Kong all the way to Luzon.
但是,中国后来批准签署了海洋法公约, 在公约中说”直线基线的划定不应再任何明显的程度上偏离海岸的一般方向”. 换句话说, 基线需要跟从海岸线的轮廓(行话叫做锯齿和蜿蜒). 根据海洋法公约规定, 中国的领海基线应该跟从中国的海岸线从北边的中朝边界到南边的中越边界.它不应该突然离开香港直接跑去吕宋.

(Again, this should serve as a reminder to Filipinos. We love to cite our own domestic laws against China. Our laws don’t bind China, in much the same way that China’s laws don’t bind us.)
(再一次的, 要提醒菲律宾人.我们喜欢引用我们的国内法来制约中国, 但是我们的法律对中国没有约束力,就像中国的法律对我们没有约束力一样)
Third, if Taiwan pushes its claim over Scarborough, we will be forced to deal with its government despite the fact that we have no diplomatic relations. Our own country sealed its One-China Policy under the 1975 Joint Communiqué signed by Ferdinand Marcos and Chou En Lai. The Philippines has scrupulously respected the One-China Policy. Indeed you will recall Taiwan’s righteous indignation during the 2010 post-Christmas raid on Internet scammers victimizing citizens at the Mainland. Over Taipei’s protests, we deported the arrested Taiwanese nationals to Beijing.
第三,如果台湾强推他们对黄岩岛的主张,我们应该被迫对付他的政府而不管我们有没有外交关系. 我们国家在1975年由马科斯和周恩来签署的联合声明中赞同一个中国. 菲律宾严格的遵守了一个中国政策. 事实上,你可以回想在2010年圣诞后的针对中国大陆的网诈骗案中台湾的愤慨. 不顾台湾的反对,我们把台湾籍嫌犯交给了北京.

Ironically then, if the Philippines is forced to deal with Taipei now, Beijing’s saber-rattling will have actually forced the hand of the Philippines to do precisely what the One-China Policy seeks to avoid, that is, direct diplomatic engagement with Taipei.
讽刺的是,如果现在菲律宾被迫对付台湾, 北京的武力威胁将事实上迫使菲律宾严格依照一个中国政策去防止,也就是,与台北的直接的外交联系.
Finally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) must not be merely reactive and defensive vis-à-vis Chinese feistiness. It must be proactive in scouting for bargaining chips against China, issues where China will be on the defensive. Already, the Asean, working hand in hand with the United States, has weaned away China’s erstwhile strongest ally in the region, Burma (Myanmar), invoking the loftiest rhetoric of human rights.
最后, 东盟不能仅仅是被动的,防御性的对待中国的霉臭(应该只中国的’入侵’或压力). 东盟必须主动的寻找能够和中国讨价还价的筹码, 或者那些中国不得不采取守势的问题.  过去,东盟手牵手的和美国一起,用最高尚的人权语言,消磨掉了中国以往在区域内最强的同盟, 缅甸. Both the Asean and the United States should next aim at China’s foreign policy bête noire in Asia, Tibetan independence, but do so most earnestly to protect human rights and uphold self-determination. It can be as slow, painstaking and gentle as the wooing of Burma, and can start off with increased assistance and visibility for refugees or informal meetings with dignitaries from Tibet’s government-in-exile. It is a roundabout way for us to send a broader message to China: that might does not make right, that there’s such a thing as international laws and norms, and that even the most brazen of power-trippers, on the verge of graduating from cheap thuggery to empire, will have to “anoint power with piety.”
东盟和美国下来应该瞄准中国外交的眼中钉,肉中刺,西藏独立, 但是要用最有利的方法,比如保护人权和个人自由. 这可能是缓慢的, 有些费力和温和的,就像对缅甸那样,并且以越来越多的,对难民(所以国内的民主自由斗士)的支持和宣传,或者非正式地与流亡的西藏政府的政要会谈. 这是一种对我们来说迂回的给中国发一个更宽泛的信息, 比如这不一定对,比如还有一种国际间的法律和准则,比如即使最厚颜无耻的权力炫耀者, 在从最低级的谋财害命到帝国的边缘,也必须要”给武力抹上神圣的油”
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排队坐下

排队坐下

俺来了                    

坐等看资料

LZ人呢

楼主不要吊大家胃口！

{:soso_e122:}...排排坐，吃果果！

楼主的处女贴。。给力哈。

好像没什么营养，而且这次拉链顿他老婆这番话说得模棱两可，怎么解读都可以，菲律宾既可以认为是一种对他的支持但又没有说清楚到底是不是支持或者承认菲律宾对黄岩岛的非法要求，中国方面想说什么可又没有什么可以说的，一贯的模糊立场，历次对台湾也是这么个态度，反正一切随机应变。

顶顶，也是一种鼓励～！

1500W刀改成3000W刀。反潜侦察机巡逻舰雷达系统等等

防洪堤 发表于 2012-5-4 13:36
LZ人呢
后边发的说是要审核...

这阿鸡诺迟早悲剧！

少了点啊！！！

有个菲律宾参议员说美菲协定是废纸，那个文章有些意思，不过就是我现在没有时间翻。。。。。。。。。

rage010 发表于 2012-5-4 13:45
好像没什么营养，而且这次拉链顿他老婆这番话说得模棱两可，怎么解读都可以，菲律宾既可以认为是一种对他的 ...
对于MD来说，不表明态度就是一个正确的态度。

其实这事最终得受者就是MD的军火商。。。白白赚了菲佣的小钱钱。。

报告：楼主由于翻译过快　死机了。。。。

楼主最好能给出原文链接~~

magic14 发表于 2012-5-4 15:54
楼主最好能给出原文链接~~
我的权限发不了链接

phoenix_sg 发表于 2012-5-4 13:28
US vows to help PH build sea patrol capability
美国发誓将帮助菲律宾建立海洋巡逻能力


原文:globalnation.inquirer.net/35435/us-vows-to-he ...

标题党啊，美国可没有诅咒发警:D

支持下LZ   辛苦了   

菲菲说他们有较为强大的陆军，确没有好的海军……TG哭了，我们把陆军放到海上去，能把九段线站满了……

bismarck201 发表于 2012-5-4 16:37
菲菲说他们有较为强大的陆军，确没有好的海军……TG哭了，我们把陆军放到海上去，能把九段线站满了……
介个，介个，我们的船够把陆军都搬到九段线上去么

又一个选择武力对抗tg的

这阿鸡诺迟早悲剧！
有道理阿

chrisxua 发表于 2012-5-4 15:42
其实这事最终得受者就是MD的军火商。。。白白赚了菲佣的小钱钱。。
MD军火商赚钱应该不太可能。就菲拥国那点可能连成本价都没给购哦。

晕死  都是元老级别的人物

还强大陆军？战斗力5的渣渣，连游击队都搞不定

lizhiling 发表于 2012-5-4 17:28
MD军火商赚钱应该不太可能。就菲拥国那点可能连成本价都没给购哦。
菲佣正在求干爹卖F16

楼主的第一次哦，当然支持了，英文也很好，

他敢在西藏上动歪脑筋，就等着我们支持菲佣的反政府武装吧

chrisxua 发表于 2012-5-4 18:14
菲佣正在求干爹卖F16
听说了，好像是二手货，不知兄弟知道单价是多少？

国家强大了，说话才有人听！

lizhiling 发表于 2012-5-4 20:04
听说了，好像是二手货，不知兄弟知道单价是多少？
我哪知道啊。。

连菲佣都认为TB不入流啊