ZT:中国vs 美国 《历史的终结》的“终结”1、2、3+网民 ...

翻译地址：http://www.ptfcn.com/ptfcn/j/765/

说实话，这种回帖的确比泥轰那群YAHOO众有水平得多，顺手求泥轰有水平有讨论有回帖的时政论坛。

原文标题：China v America The end of the end of history

导读：上世纪80年代末年代90年代初美国人福山发布了《历史的终结》，该书在当时风靡一时，今年该书的作者发布新作《政治秩序诸起源》，经济学人对此书发表了书评，读者评论比较激烈，共有91条，由于评论太多，不得不分给几个翻译合作。
今天放上的是由ingiz同学翻译的正文和前20条评论，后面的70的评论将在周末分批发布，敬请期待。




FRANCIS FUKUYAMA'S 1990 article "The End of History" profoundly shaped my political identity: I thought it was so completely wrong-headed that I spent weeks working out the many ways in which I disagreed. I found it extremely implausible that Friedrich Hegel had simply figured out the direction of human political evolution in the early 19th century, and that everything else had been a matter of slow progress towards that goal, culminating in the Reagan-Mitterand-era spectrum of Western welfare-state capitalist democracies (with a preference for the Reagan end). Worse, Mr Fukuyama's thesis seemed like a strange right-wing version of the complacency of Soviet ideologues: the arc of history has already been mapped, and we are its apotheosis. It seemed a recipe for intellectual stagnation and a likely excuse for all sorts of foolishness and misconduct. After all, if we're the goal of history, how can we do wrong?

弗朗西斯 福山1990年的作品《历史的终结》深深影响了我政治认同的成形：因为这部作品是如此的刚愎自用，我花了数周的时间来总结出我所不认同的各种看法。佛里德里希 黑格尔在19世纪早期就指出了人类政治演化的方向，我认为这听起来太假了。并且，其他的所有一切都是这个缓慢进程中的一个因素，而这个进程的终点就是里根-密特朗时代的西方社会福利国家的资本主义民主（最终还是偏向里根式）。更有甚者，福山先生的论调听起来就像是苏联理论家自鸣得意的右翼版本：历史前进的方向早已注定，而我们就是其最终典范。这看起来就像是给思维停滞之人的一张处方，也是一个为各种各样愚蠢或者不端行为开脱的合适借口。毕竟，如果我们是历史的终点，我们怎么可能会犯错？

I never would have imagined that I would read a Francis Fukuyama essay 20 years later about the current direction of world history, and agree vehemently with every single word of it. Mr Fukuyama's Financial Times piece yesterday, headlined "US democracy has little to teach China", is brilliant. It's not the first time anyone has expressed these ideas, but Mr Fukuyama puts it all together in a fashion that's close to perfect. As he writes, America "managed to fritter away" the immense moral capital it held in 2000 "in remarkably short order", due to foreign-policy missteps such as the invasion of Iraq and, later, the American-centred global financial crisis. (It didn't help that American treasury and central-bank officials, who months earlier had been lecturing China on the need to decrease state involvement in the financial sector, found themselves feverishly doing just what Chinese officials were doing—funneling money to state-champion companies, hectoring large banks to cut profits and lend more—but with less success.) Meanwhile, China is "riding high", increasingly confident that it has nothing to learn from America. Here's the catch:

我从未曾想象到在20年后的今天，当我读到弗朗西斯 福山先生的一篇关于当前历史走向的文章，其中的每一个字都深得我心。《金融时报》昨天以“美式民主没多少可以教给中国”为大标题刊登了福山先生的文章，非常出色。这不是第一次有人表达这些观点，但是福山先生把它们几近完美地整合到了一起。正如他写的那样，美国“以吃快餐般的惊异速度”“设法浪费了”其在2000年拥有的巨大的道德资本，这都得归咎于外交政策的失足如入侵伊拉克，以及之后以美国为中心席卷全球的金融危机。（美国财政部和中央银行的官员数月之前还给中国上课说国家有必要减少对金融领域的介入，而他们自己现在正狂热地做着中国官员正在干的事情——为国内一流企业注资，恐吓大银行削减其利润并借贷更多——但做得不如中国政府成功，而且根本无济于事。）与此同时，中国“洋洋得意”，逐渐膨胀的信心令其认为从美国这里再无东西可学。他们追上来了。

But what is the Chinese model? Many observers casually put it in an “authoritarian capitalist” box, along with Russia, Iran and Singapore. But China’s model is sui generis; its specific mode of governance is difficult to describe, much less emulate, which is why it is not up for export.The most important strength of the Chinese political system is its ability to make large, complex decisions quickly, and to make them relatively well, at least in economic policy. This is most evident in the area of infrastructure, where China has put into place airports, dams, high-speed rail, water and electricity systems to feed its growing industrial base. Contrast this with [democratic] India, where every new investment is subject to blockage by trade unions, lobby groups, peasant associations and courts...Nonetheless, the quality of Chinese government is higher than in Russia, Iran, or the other authoritarian regimes with which it is often lumped—precisely because Chinese rulers feel some degree of accountability towards their population. That accountability is not, of course, procedural; the authority of the Chinese Communist party is limited neither by a rule of law nor by democratic elections. But while its leaders limit public criticism, they do try to stay on top of popular discontents, and shift policy in response.

但何谓“中国模式”？许多观察家轻率地将其和俄罗斯、伊朗及新加坡一道，归类为“威权资本主义”的范畴。但是，中国模式是自成一格的；它具体的治理方式很难形容，更不用说模仿了，这就是该模式未能输出的原因所在。中国政治体系最重要的威力在于它能够迅速做出庞大而复杂的决策，并使其相对合理适宜，至少在经济政策制定上是这样的。最明显的证据就在基建领域，中国建造了大量的机场、大坝、高铁、水电站来满足其不断增多的工业基地。“民主的”的印度正好相反，那边的每一笔新投资都会遭到工会、游说团体、农会以及法院的层层阻挠…尽管如此，中国政府的能力远超俄罗斯、伊朗、或者其他威权政体——通常权力都是集中的——而这恰恰因为中国的统治者对其人民感到一定程度上的责任。这责任当然不是程序上的；TG既没有法律的限制，也不受民主选举的制约。但是领导者在限制公开批评的同时，他们也确实试图回应大众的不满情绪，转变政策以为回应。

Mr Fukuyama thinks American hopes that China's economic modernisation will require a shift to multi-party democracy are misplaced.

福山先生认为，美国期望中国经济的现代化会向导致多党民主的转变的算盘落空了。

Americans have long hoped China might undergo a democratic transition as it got wealthier, and before it became powerful enough to become a strategic and political threat. This seems unlikely, however. The government knows how to cater to the interests of Chinese elites and the emerging middle classes, and builds on their fear of populism. This is why there is little support for genuine multi-party democracy. The elites worry about the example of democracy in Thailand—where the election of a populist premier led to violent conflict between his supporters and the establishment—as a warning of what could happen to them

长久以来，美国人一直期望在中国变得更加富裕的同时也会经历一个民主化的转变，在其变得足够强大成为战略上和政治上的威胁之前。然而，现在看来是不可能了。政府知道怎样去迎合那些精英和新兴中产阶级的兴趣，这有赖于他们对民粹主义的恐惧。这就是为什么只有极少数人支持多党民主的原因所在。中国的精英们对泰国民主政治的先例感到担心——一个平民总理的当选导致了其支持者和反对派之间的暴力冲突——这对他们来说是个警示。

Ultimately, Mr Fukuyama's sympathies are clearly with a less statist economic policy and democratic governance. But he doesn't think this model is assured of triumph on its own.

最终，福山先生明显偏向较少中央集权色彩的经济政策和民主治理的模式。但他自己也不认为这个模式就一定能够确保胜利。

[I]f the democratic, market-oriented model is to prevail, Americans need to own up to their own mistakes and misconceptions. Washington’s foreign policy during the past decade was too militarised and unilateral, succeeding only in generating a self-defeating anti-Americanism. In economic policy, Reaganism long outlived its initial successes, producing only budget deficits, thoughtless tax-cutting and inadequate financial regulation.These problems are to some extent being acknowledged and addressed. But there is a deeper problem with the American model that is nowhere close to being solved. China adapts quickly, making difficult decisions and implementing them effectively. Americans pride themselves on constitutional checks and balances, based on a political culture that distrusts centralised government. This system has ensured individual liberty and a vibrant private sector, but it has now become polarised and ideologically rigid. At present it shows little appetite for dealing with the long-term fiscal challenges the US faces. Democracy in America may have an inherent legitimacy that the Chinese system lacks, but it will not be much of a model to anyone if the government is divided against itself and cannot govern.

如果民主的、以市场为导向的模式盛行，那么美国人必须爽快地承认他们自己的错误和误解。过去十年，华盛顿的外交政策过于军事化和单边主义，只在引发弄巧成拙的反美主义上获得了成功。在经济政策方面，里根主义在初见成效后的漫长岁月中，只是不断制造财政赤字、轻率的减税和不充分的金融监管等等问题。这些问题在一定程度上是公认的，并且被反复提及。但是美国模式有一个深层次的问题从未曾解决。中国适应得很快，做出艰难的决策并且能有效地执行。美国人很为他们基于宪法的核查和制衡体系感到自豪，而这是基于对中央集权政府的不信任的政治文化。这个体系保证了个人自由和充满活力的私营成分，但是现在它造成了分化和意识形态上的僵化。现在它几乎无法显现出对解决美国面临的长期财政挑战的欲望。美国的民主政治可能拥有中国体系所欠缺的内在的合法性，但当政府的分歧足以阻碍自身运作，以致无法行使管理职能，那么对任何人来说它也不过只是个失败模式罢了。

I really have nothing to add to this. What Mr Fukuyama understands, and what so many Americans can't seem to accept, is that the Chinese mode of governance seems to be quite stable. There is no plausible threat to the political monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party. Eastern Europeans abandoned belief in Soviet Communism because its economic model was a pathetic shambles, and even so, it took decades to collapse. The Chinese economic model, meanwhile, is a productive powerhouse. As long as it maintains the confidence of its citizens, there's little reason to think that China's political system is going to change on any timescale subject to punditry.

我真的对此没有任何可补充的。福山先生所理解的，也是那么多美国人看来所不能接受的是中国的管理模式看起来相当的稳固。对于TG来说，没有任何看似可信的威胁。东欧各国抛弃了共产主义信仰是因为苏联的经济模式摇摇欲坠，即便如此，它的崩溃也花费了数十年的时间。相比之下，中国的经济模式就如同富有成效的发电所。只要她能维持国民的信心，没有理由认为中国的威权政治体系将会在未来某个时候发生改变。

More broadly, what Mr Fukuyama is doing here (and he's been on this track for years now) really retracts the thesis to which he subscribed in the early 1990s. History, he's saying, isn't closed. It's by no means clear that the United States or any other welfare-state capitalist liberal democracy is the goal. It's not clear where we're heading, and we should keep our wits about us and adapt; we can be left behind, just as others were before us.

更宽泛地讲，福山先生的所为（他在这条道上已经很多年了）真的是在自打自己1990年代早期所提出的观点的嘴巴。他认为历史不是封闭的。很明显，美国或者其他任何一个福利国家的资本主义自由民主制绝不是终点。我们正在前往的目的地依旧不明朗，我应该保持自己的睿智并且去适应；我们可能会落人之后，就像曾经其他国家领先我们的时候一样。

(Photo credit: AFP)



评论翻译


g cross wrote: Jan 18th 2011 10:12 GMT

@ ccusa: "So throw out the Constitution? The fact is there's nowhere to turn except to what Mr. Fukuyama calls the model based on inherent legitimacy."

That is a false dichotomy; there are plenty of functional democracies in the world that don't use our Constitution.

回复ccusa：“那么就扔掉宪法吧？事实是你无法反驳福山先生所说的基于内在合法性的模式。”

这是一个错误的二分法；这世界上有很多正在运作的民主政治并没有采用我们的宪法。

Recommend (88)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

kid destroyer wrote: Jan 18th 2011 11:07 GMT

While I love reading what Fukuyama writes, he has a tendency to express whatever the current consensus is quite well but without much real critical ability. China is growing! Exactly as we'd expect it to, re: unshackling China's economy, Krugman's "myth of asian economies", etc.

我很喜欢看福山写的东西，他总能够很好的表达出当前舆论热点，但是没有太强的真正的批判能力。中国正在发展！正像我们之前所期望的那样，《重新解缚的中国经济》、克鲁格曼的《亚洲经济神话》等等书籍

China can efficiently make decisions! Except, of course, when it can't, when it's blocked by infighting (see: currency decisions which different parts of government have different opinions on, the military independently making decisions, Hu's declarations and retractions).

中国能有效地做出决策！当然，有时候也不能，当有内斗阻碍时。（货币政策的制定，政府的不同部门都有各自不同的想法；军队决策独立，涛哥的任务只是宣告和撤销）

Chinese people are happy! Except for the increase in protests despite a growing economy (what will happen when they have an inevitable recession? who knows?).

中国人民很高兴！但随着经济的发展，不满和抗议也在增多（当他们遇到不可避免的不景气时会发生什么呢？谁知道？）

This isn't to say that he's not RIGHT. But all he's doing here is once again giving voice to common conceptions while ignoring the complexities of the real world. I don't ever get the sense that he's digging deeply, here.

这不是说他说的不对。但是他在这所作的一切不过是再一次表达一种普遍观念，却忽视了现实世界的复杂性。我甚至没有感觉到他有在深入挖掘这个问题。

Recommend (67)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LaContra wrote: Jan 18th 2011 11:35 GMT

The western liberal perspective is anchored by the belief that Chinese leaders (and other market orientated authoritarians) secretly realise that they are on the wrong side of history, clinging to their centralised power by denying their people any meaningful democratic discourse.

西方自由主义者一个根深蒂固的看法是中国领导人（以及其他市场导向的独裁者）暗地里意识到他们处于历史错误的对立面上，通过打压人民的一切有意义的民主呼声维持权力的集中。

This is where the western liberal mindset, which claims its legitimacy through its declared universality, departs from reality. The Chinese not only believe that liberal democracy is not inevitable, they view it as truly undesirable.

这就是西方自由主义者的心态，通过宣扬其普适性来主张其合法性，而没有从实际出发。中国人不单认为民主自由不是不可避免的，他们视其为不受欢迎的东西。

Westerners of course have an inherent belief in superiority of their system, unfortunately history has not progressed enough to validate that perspective. Philosophically, there is no reason to elevate one system above the other and comparatively the Chinese model, being sui generis, has not been in existence long enough to be judged.

西方人想当然地有一种内在的信念认为他们的体系更加优越，不幸的是历史未能更前进一步以证实那种观点。从哲学观点来讲，没有理由刻意抬高一种体系来置于其他之上，相较来说，中国模式是自成一格，也没有经历足够长时间的考验从而对其优劣作出判决。

The Soviet system collapsed because of the contradictions within a planned centralised communist economy and the economic pressures of the Cold War. The Cold War was fought by the US because the USSR offered a then plausible alternative to capitalism and aggressively exported their system. The Chinese are fellow capitalists but are canny enough not to threaten the west in the ideological stakes, they don't export their model thus their place in the capitalist system protects them from a cold war like engagement with the west.

苏联体系的崩溃是因为中央规划的共产主义经济体制和冷战带来的经济压力之间不可调和的矛盾造成。美国挑起的冷战是因为当时苏联提供了资本主义之外看似合理的第二种选择，并且它们积极地输出这种体系。中国人也是资本主义道上的同伴，但他们足够精明以避免在意识形态上威胁西方，他们不输出自己的模式，因此他们在资本主义体系中的位置保护他们免受冷战，卷入和西方的斗争之中。

Fukuyama is right on the money this time...America, of late, has wasted its moral, economic, and political capital thus its ability to cajole or influence China which is a shame because there is no inevitability of China morphing into a liberal democratic state over time nor do they stand athwart the path of history in resisting political liberalisation.

福山这次在货币方面是对的。。。美国近来浪费了它道德、经济以及政治的资本，因此它诱骗或者影响中国的能力成了一件丢脸的事情，因为没有任何迹象表明中国会随着时间的推移不可避免地转变成为一个自由民主国家，而他们也没有在历史前进的道路上挡道、拒绝政治自由化。

The argument is whether market capitalism or liberal democracy is the true engine of modernisation and development. Just because America considers that its democratic credentials created its economic development does not make it axiomatic and universal....So far the Chinese are proving that the opposite is equally true, that economic development extends a legitimacy to their political system

争论在于市场资本主义或者自由民主是否是现代化和发展进步的真正引擎。只是因为美国认为它自己那张民主牌子是经济发展的之源，也不能说明这就是放之四海而皆准的真理。迄今为止，中国人一直在证明相反的做法一样可行，而经济发展也赋予了他们政治体系的正当性。

Recommend (59)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OneAegis wrote: Jan 18th 2011 10:14 GMT

I don't think the Constitution needs to be thrown out, nor was that the recommendation. If anything, the document allows for its own amendment. That being said, we're riding our moral high horse straight towards a cliff. The Constitution will be of little comfort should some plausible scenarios play out within the next 50 years or so. The issue at hand is that many of the problems we have today will become unfixable if we do not address them in a timely manner, if they aren't already.

我不认为有必要丢掉宪法，也没有推荐的必要。非要说点啥的话，这份文件允许其对自身的修订，那即是说，我们正骑着道德的高头大马直奔悬崖而去。在接下来的50年左右的时间内，那些看起来让人稍感安慰貌似合理的戏码也会逐渐演完。眼前首要问题是很多我们目前碰到的难题如果我们不准备好及时去解决的话，以后将会变得一发不可收拾。

Recommend (56)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

bampbs wrote: Jan 18th 2011 11:18 GMT

I thought "The End of History" was hubristic nonsense.

我认为《历史的终结》完全是傲慢自大的废话。

China has a large majority who have not enjoyed the blessings of explosive growth. I wonder how long the CCP has to deliver them to the have-nots before they get dangerous. It is one thing to order peasant soldiers to shoot down students; it may not work if their own families rise.

中国有相当大的一部分人没有享受到经济爆炸式增长带来的恩惠。我在想在他们变得危险之前，TG得花多少时间把他们全部变得一无所有。让农民出身的士兵去射杀学生是一码事，当他们面对自己家人奋起之时这招就行不通了。

Recommend (54)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

John Albert Robertson wrote: Jan 18th 2011 11:03 GMT

As somebody wrote in response to the (infamous) Tiger Mom article, "The Chinese feel that they can learn from Western education. Why can't Westerners learn from Chinese parents?"

正如有人在回复那篇虎妈（骂名远扬）文章时写的那样，“中国人觉得他们能从西方教育之中学到东西，为什么西方人就不能学习一下中国父母？”

Similarly, China has had no problem learning from the American way of doing business. It's time for our lawmakers to take a hard, nondogmatic look at Chinese business (and government) practices, and to return the favor.

类似的，中国在学习美国人做生意的时候完全不会有任何问题。我们的立法委员是时候该去好好审视一下中国人做生意的（或者政府管理）方式，并且加以实践，以彼之道还施彼身。

Recommend (52)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

JGradus wrote: Jan 18th 2011 10:18 GMT

I am not the greatest fan of the end of history meme myself (it is sort of dissaproved by now right) especially when used in Europe as a defense for no defense.

我自己并不是《历史的终结》一书的超级狂热粉丝（到现今倒是一种不赞同了），尤其是拿欧洲来说事最后没能说明啥。翻译地址：http://www.ptfcn.com/ptfcn/j/765/

说实话，这种回帖的确比泥轰那群YAHOO众有水平得多，顺手求泥轰有水平有讨论有回帖的时政论坛。

原文标题：China v America The end of the end of history

导读：上世纪80年代末年代90年代初美国人福山发布了《历史的终结》，该书在当时风靡一时，今年该书的作者发布新作《政治秩序诸起源》，经济学人对此书发表了书评，读者评论比较激烈，共有91条，由于评论太多，不得不分给几个翻译合作。
今天放上的是由ingiz同学翻译的正文和前20条评论，后面的70的评论将在周末分批发布，敬请期待。




FRANCIS FUKUYAMA'S 1990 article "The End of History" profoundly shaped my political identity: I thought it was so completely wrong-headed that I spent weeks working out the many ways in which I disagreed. I found it extremely implausible that Friedrich Hegel had simply figured out the direction of human political evolution in the early 19th century, and that everything else had been a matter of slow progress towards that goal, culminating in the Reagan-Mitterand-era spectrum of Western welfare-state capitalist democracies (with a preference for the Reagan end). Worse, Mr Fukuyama's thesis seemed like a strange right-wing version of the complacency of Soviet ideologues: the arc of history has already been mapped, and we are its apotheosis. It seemed a recipe for intellectual stagnation and a likely excuse for all sorts of foolishness and misconduct. After all, if we're the goal of history, how can we do wrong?

弗朗西斯 福山1990年的作品《历史的终结》深深影响了我政治认同的成形：因为这部作品是如此的刚愎自用，我花了数周的时间来总结出我所不认同的各种看法。佛里德里希 黑格尔在19世纪早期就指出了人类政治演化的方向，我认为这听起来太假了。并且，其他的所有一切都是这个缓慢进程中的一个因素，而这个进程的终点就是里根-密特朗时代的西方社会福利国家的资本主义民主（最终还是偏向里根式）。更有甚者，福山先生的论调听起来就像是苏联理论家自鸣得意的右翼版本：历史前进的方向早已注定，而我们就是其最终典范。这看起来就像是给思维停滞之人的一张处方，也是一个为各种各样愚蠢或者不端行为开脱的合适借口。毕竟，如果我们是历史的终点，我们怎么可能会犯错？

I never would have imagined that I would read a Francis Fukuyama essay 20 years later about the current direction of world history, and agree vehemently with every single word of it. Mr Fukuyama's Financial Times piece yesterday, headlined "US democracy has little to teach China", is brilliant. It's not the first time anyone has expressed these ideas, but Mr Fukuyama puts it all together in a fashion that's close to perfect. As he writes, America "managed to fritter away" the immense moral capital it held in 2000 "in remarkably short order", due to foreign-policy missteps such as the invasion of Iraq and, later, the American-centred global financial crisis. (It didn't help that American treasury and central-bank officials, who months earlier had been lecturing China on the need to decrease state involvement in the financial sector, found themselves feverishly doing just what Chinese officials were doing—funneling money to state-champion companies, hectoring large banks to cut profits and lend more—but with less success.) Meanwhile, China is "riding high", increasingly confident that it has nothing to learn from America. Here's the catch:

我从未曾想象到在20年后的今天，当我读到弗朗西斯 福山先生的一篇关于当前历史走向的文章，其中的每一个字都深得我心。《金融时报》昨天以“美式民主没多少可以教给中国”为大标题刊登了福山先生的文章，非常出色。这不是第一次有人表达这些观点，但是福山先生把它们几近完美地整合到了一起。正如他写的那样，美国“以吃快餐般的惊异速度”“设法浪费了”其在2000年拥有的巨大的道德资本，这都得归咎于外交政策的失足如入侵伊拉克，以及之后以美国为中心席卷全球的金融危机。（美国财政部和中央银行的官员数月之前还给中国上课说国家有必要减少对金融领域的介入，而他们自己现在正狂热地做着中国官员正在干的事情——为国内一流企业注资，恐吓大银行削减其利润并借贷更多——但做得不如中国政府成功，而且根本无济于事。）与此同时，中国“洋洋得意”，逐渐膨胀的信心令其认为从美国这里再无东西可学。他们追上来了。

But what is the Chinese model? Many observers casually put it in an “authoritarian capitalist” box, along with Russia, Iran and Singapore. But China’s model is sui generis; its specific mode of governance is difficult to describe, much less emulate, which is why it is not up for export.The most important strength of the Chinese political system is its ability to make large, complex decisions quickly, and to make them relatively well, at least in economic policy. This is most evident in the area of infrastructure, where China has put into place airports, dams, high-speed rail, water and electricity systems to feed its growing industrial base. Contrast this with [democratic] India, where every new investment is subject to blockage by trade unions, lobby groups, peasant associations and courts...Nonetheless, the quality of Chinese government is higher than in Russia, Iran, or the other authoritarian regimes with which it is often lumped—precisely because Chinese rulers feel some degree of accountability towards their population. That accountability is not, of course, procedural; the authority of the Chinese Communist party is limited neither by a rule of law nor by democratic elections. But while its leaders limit public criticism, they do try to stay on top of popular discontents, and shift policy in response.

但何谓“中国模式”？许多观察家轻率地将其和俄罗斯、伊朗及新加坡一道，归类为“威权资本主义”的范畴。但是，中国模式是自成一格的；它具体的治理方式很难形容，更不用说模仿了，这就是该模式未能输出的原因所在。中国政治体系最重要的威力在于它能够迅速做出庞大而复杂的决策，并使其相对合理适宜，至少在经济政策制定上是这样的。最明显的证据就在基建领域，中国建造了大量的机场、大坝、高铁、水电站来满足其不断增多的工业基地。“民主的”的印度正好相反，那边的每一笔新投资都会遭到工会、游说团体、农会以及法院的层层阻挠…尽管如此，中国政府的能力远超俄罗斯、伊朗、或者其他威权政体——通常权力都是集中的——而这恰恰因为中国的统治者对其人民感到一定程度上的责任。这责任当然不是程序上的；TG既没有法律的限制，也不受民主选举的制约。但是领导者在限制公开批评的同时，他们也确实试图回应大众的不满情绪，转变政策以为回应。

Mr Fukuyama thinks American hopes that China's economic modernisation will require a shift to multi-party democracy are misplaced.

福山先生认为，美国期望中国经济的现代化会向导致多党民主的转变的算盘落空了。

Americans have long hoped China might undergo a democratic transition as it got wealthier, and before it became powerful enough to become a strategic and political threat. This seems unlikely, however. The government knows how to cater to the interests of Chinese elites and the emerging middle classes, and builds on their fear of populism. This is why there is little support for genuine multi-party democracy. The elites worry about the example of democracy in Thailand—where the election of a populist premier led to violent conflict between his supporters and the establishment—as a warning of what could happen to them

长久以来，美国人一直期望在中国变得更加富裕的同时也会经历一个民主化的转变，在其变得足够强大成为战略上和政治上的威胁之前。然而，现在看来是不可能了。政府知道怎样去迎合那些精英和新兴中产阶级的兴趣，这有赖于他们对民粹主义的恐惧。这就是为什么只有极少数人支持多党民主的原因所在。中国的精英们对泰国民主政治的先例感到担心——一个平民总理的当选导致了其支持者和反对派之间的暴力冲突——这对他们来说是个警示。

Ultimately, Mr Fukuyama's sympathies are clearly with a less statist economic policy and democratic governance. But he doesn't think this model is assured of triumph on its own.

最终，福山先生明显偏向较少中央集权色彩的经济政策和民主治理的模式。但他自己也不认为这个模式就一定能够确保胜利。

[I]f the democratic, market-oriented model is to prevail, Americans need to own up to their own mistakes and misconceptions. Washington’s foreign policy during the past decade was too militarised and unilateral, succeeding only in generating a self-defeating anti-Americanism. In economic policy, Reaganism long outlived its initial successes, producing only budget deficits, thoughtless tax-cutting and inadequate financial regulation.These problems are to some extent being acknowledged and addressed. But there is a deeper problem with the American model that is nowhere close to being solved. China adapts quickly, making difficult decisions and implementing them effectively. Americans pride themselves on constitutional checks and balances, based on a political culture that distrusts centralised government. This system has ensured individual liberty and a vibrant private sector, but it has now become polarised and ideologically rigid. At present it shows little appetite for dealing with the long-term fiscal challenges the US faces. Democracy in America may have an inherent legitimacy that the Chinese system lacks, but it will not be much of a model to anyone if the government is divided against itself and cannot govern.

如果民主的、以市场为导向的模式盛行，那么美国人必须爽快地承认他们自己的错误和误解。过去十年，华盛顿的外交政策过于军事化和单边主义，只在引发弄巧成拙的反美主义上获得了成功。在经济政策方面，里根主义在初见成效后的漫长岁月中，只是不断制造财政赤字、轻率的减税和不充分的金融监管等等问题。这些问题在一定程度上是公认的，并且被反复提及。但是美国模式有一个深层次的问题从未曾解决。中国适应得很快，做出艰难的决策并且能有效地执行。美国人很为他们基于宪法的核查和制衡体系感到自豪，而这是基于对中央集权政府的不信任的政治文化。这个体系保证了个人自由和充满活力的私营成分，但是现在它造成了分化和意识形态上的僵化。现在它几乎无法显现出对解决美国面临的长期财政挑战的欲望。美国的民主政治可能拥有中国体系所欠缺的内在的合法性，但当政府的分歧足以阻碍自身运作，以致无法行使管理职能，那么对任何人来说它也不过只是个失败模式罢了。

I really have nothing to add to this. What Mr Fukuyama understands, and what so many Americans can't seem to accept, is that the Chinese mode of governance seems to be quite stable. There is no plausible threat to the political monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party. Eastern Europeans abandoned belief in Soviet Communism because its economic model was a pathetic shambles, and even so, it took decades to collapse. The Chinese economic model, meanwhile, is a productive powerhouse. As long as it maintains the confidence of its citizens, there's little reason to think that China's political system is going to change on any timescale subject to punditry.

我真的对此没有任何可补充的。福山先生所理解的，也是那么多美国人看来所不能接受的是中国的管理模式看起来相当的稳固。对于TG来说，没有任何看似可信的威胁。东欧各国抛弃了共产主义信仰是因为苏联的经济模式摇摇欲坠，即便如此，它的崩溃也花费了数十年的时间。相比之下，中国的经济模式就如同富有成效的发电所。只要她能维持国民的信心，没有理由认为中国的威权政治体系将会在未来某个时候发生改变。

More broadly, what Mr Fukuyama is doing here (and he's been on this track for years now) really retracts the thesis to which he subscribed in the early 1990s. History, he's saying, isn't closed. It's by no means clear that the United States or any other welfare-state capitalist liberal democracy is the goal. It's not clear where we're heading, and we should keep our wits about us and adapt; we can be left behind, just as others were before us.

更宽泛地讲，福山先生的所为（他在这条道上已经很多年了）真的是在自打自己1990年代早期所提出的观点的嘴巴。他认为历史不是封闭的。很明显，美国或者其他任何一个福利国家的资本主义自由民主制绝不是终点。我们正在前往的目的地依旧不明朗，我应该保持自己的睿智并且去适应；我们可能会落人之后，就像曾经其他国家领先我们的时候一样。

(Photo credit: AFP)



评论翻译


g cross wrote: Jan 18th 2011 10:12 GMT

@ ccusa: "So throw out the Constitution? The fact is there's nowhere to turn except to what Mr. Fukuyama calls the model based on inherent legitimacy."

That is a false dichotomy; there are plenty of functional democracies in the world that don't use our Constitution.

回复ccusa：“那么就扔掉宪法吧？事实是你无法反驳福山先生所说的基于内在合法性的模式。”

这是一个错误的二分法；这世界上有很多正在运作的民主政治并没有采用我们的宪法。

Recommend (88)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

kid destroyer wrote: Jan 18th 2011 11:07 GMT

While I love reading what Fukuyama writes, he has a tendency to express whatever the current consensus is quite well but without much real critical ability. China is growing! Exactly as we'd expect it to, re: unshackling China's economy, Krugman's "myth of asian economies", etc.

我很喜欢看福山写的东西，他总能够很好的表达出当前舆论热点，但是没有太强的真正的批判能力。中国正在发展！正像我们之前所期望的那样，《重新解缚的中国经济》、克鲁格曼的《亚洲经济神话》等等书籍

China can efficiently make decisions! Except, of course, when it can't, when it's blocked by infighting (see: currency decisions which different parts of government have different opinions on, the military independently making decisions, Hu's declarations and retractions).

中国能有效地做出决策！当然，有时候也不能，当有内斗阻碍时。（货币政策的制定，政府的不同部门都有各自不同的想法；军队决策独立，涛哥的任务只是宣告和撤销）

Chinese people are happy! Except for the increase in protests despite a growing economy (what will happen when they have an inevitable recession? who knows?).

中国人民很高兴！但随着经济的发展，不满和抗议也在增多（当他们遇到不可避免的不景气时会发生什么呢？谁知道？）

This isn't to say that he's not RIGHT. But all he's doing here is once again giving voice to common conceptions while ignoring the complexities of the real world. I don't ever get the sense that he's digging deeply, here.

这不是说他说的不对。但是他在这所作的一切不过是再一次表达一种普遍观念，却忽视了现实世界的复杂性。我甚至没有感觉到他有在深入挖掘这个问题。

Recommend (67)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LaContra wrote: Jan 18th 2011 11:35 GMT

The western liberal perspective is anchored by the belief that Chinese leaders (and other market orientated authoritarians) secretly realise that they are on the wrong side of history, clinging to their centralised power by denying their people any meaningful democratic discourse.

西方自由主义者一个根深蒂固的看法是中国领导人（以及其他市场导向的独裁者）暗地里意识到他们处于历史错误的对立面上，通过打压人民的一切有意义的民主呼声维持权力的集中。

This is where the western liberal mindset, which claims its legitimacy through its declared universality, departs from reality. The Chinese not only believe that liberal democracy is not inevitable, they view it as truly undesirable.

这就是西方自由主义者的心态，通过宣扬其普适性来主张其合法性，而没有从实际出发。中国人不单认为民主自由不是不可避免的，他们视其为不受欢迎的东西。

Westerners of course have an inherent belief in superiority of their system, unfortunately history has not progressed enough to validate that perspective. Philosophically, there is no reason to elevate one system above the other and comparatively the Chinese model, being sui generis, has not been in existence long enough to be judged.

西方人想当然地有一种内在的信念认为他们的体系更加优越，不幸的是历史未能更前进一步以证实那种观点。从哲学观点来讲，没有理由刻意抬高一种体系来置于其他之上，相较来说，中国模式是自成一格，也没有经历足够长时间的考验从而对其优劣作出判决。

The Soviet system collapsed because of the contradictions within a planned centralised communist economy and the economic pressures of the Cold War. The Cold War was fought by the US because the USSR offered a then plausible alternative to capitalism and aggressively exported their system. The Chinese are fellow capitalists but are canny enough not to threaten the west in the ideological stakes, they don't export their model thus their place in the capitalist system protects them from a cold war like engagement with the west.

苏联体系的崩溃是因为中央规划的共产主义经济体制和冷战带来的经济压力之间不可调和的矛盾造成。美国挑起的冷战是因为当时苏联提供了资本主义之外看似合理的第二种选择，并且它们积极地输出这种体系。中国人也是资本主义道上的同伴，但他们足够精明以避免在意识形态上威胁西方，他们不输出自己的模式，因此他们在资本主义体系中的位置保护他们免受冷战，卷入和西方的斗争之中。

Fukuyama is right on the money this time...America, of late, has wasted its moral, economic, and political capital thus its ability to cajole or influence China which is a shame because there is no inevitability of China morphing into a liberal democratic state over time nor do they stand athwart the path of history in resisting political liberalisation.

福山这次在货币方面是对的。。。美国近来浪费了它道德、经济以及政治的资本，因此它诱骗或者影响中国的能力成了一件丢脸的事情，因为没有任何迹象表明中国会随着时间的推移不可避免地转变成为一个自由民主国家，而他们也没有在历史前进的道路上挡道、拒绝政治自由化。

The argument is whether market capitalism or liberal democracy is the true engine of modernisation and development. Just because America considers that its democratic credentials created its economic development does not make it axiomatic and universal....So far the Chinese are proving that the opposite is equally true, that economic development extends a legitimacy to their political system

争论在于市场资本主义或者自由民主是否是现代化和发展进步的真正引擎。只是因为美国认为它自己那张民主牌子是经济发展的之源，也不能说明这就是放之四海而皆准的真理。迄今为止，中国人一直在证明相反的做法一样可行，而经济发展也赋予了他们政治体系的正当性。

Recommend (59)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OneAegis wrote: Jan 18th 2011 10:14 GMT

I don't think the Constitution needs to be thrown out, nor was that the recommendation. If anything, the document allows for its own amendment. That being said, we're riding our moral high horse straight towards a cliff. The Constitution will be of little comfort should some plausible scenarios play out within the next 50 years or so. The issue at hand is that many of the problems we have today will become unfixable if we do not address them in a timely manner, if they aren't already.

我不认为有必要丢掉宪法，也没有推荐的必要。非要说点啥的话，这份文件允许其对自身的修订，那即是说，我们正骑着道德的高头大马直奔悬崖而去。在接下来的50年左右的时间内，那些看起来让人稍感安慰貌似合理的戏码也会逐渐演完。眼前首要问题是很多我们目前碰到的难题如果我们不准备好及时去解决的话，以后将会变得一发不可收拾。

Recommend (56)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

bampbs wrote: Jan 18th 2011 11:18 GMT

I thought "The End of History" was hubristic nonsense.

我认为《历史的终结》完全是傲慢自大的废话。

China has a large majority who have not enjoyed the blessings of explosive growth. I wonder how long the CCP has to deliver them to the have-nots before they get dangerous. It is one thing to order peasant soldiers to shoot down students; it may not work if their own families rise.

中国有相当大的一部分人没有享受到经济爆炸式增长带来的恩惠。我在想在他们变得危险之前，TG得花多少时间把他们全部变得一无所有。让农民出身的士兵去射杀学生是一码事，当他们面对自己家人奋起之时这招就行不通了。

Recommend (54)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

John Albert Robertson wrote: Jan 18th 2011 11:03 GMT

As somebody wrote in response to the (infamous) Tiger Mom article, "The Chinese feel that they can learn from Western education. Why can't Westerners learn from Chinese parents?"

正如有人在回复那篇虎妈（骂名远扬）文章时写的那样，“中国人觉得他们能从西方教育之中学到东西，为什么西方人就不能学习一下中国父母？”

Similarly, China has had no problem learning from the American way of doing business. It's time for our lawmakers to take a hard, nondogmatic look at Chinese business (and government) practices, and to return the favor.

类似的，中国在学习美国人做生意的时候完全不会有任何问题。我们的立法委员是时候该去好好审视一下中国人做生意的（或者政府管理）方式，并且加以实践，以彼之道还施彼身。

Recommend (52)PermalinkReport abuse




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

JGradus wrote: Jan 18th 2011 10:18 GMT

I am not the greatest fan of the end of history meme myself (it is sort of dissaproved by now right) especially when used in Europe as a defense for no defense.

我自己并不是《历史的终结》一书的超级狂热粉丝（到现今倒是一种不赞同了），尤其是拿欧洲来说事最后没能说明啥。