超级军网质疑贴：该帖找不到原文“英国《经济学家》周刊：解放军 ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 13:12:22
看到有人发贴名字叫做“英国《经济学家》周刊：解放军现代化正在变得“越来越艰难””看着感觉很奇怪，不像是经济学家文章的那种口气，直接上网搜索“the fourth modernization”的确搜到一篇文章，但是是2005年11月6号的，题名“The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age”内容完全跟这贴不同。然后根据该帖所提供《经济学家》的12月2号去查http://www.economist.com/，依然没有搜索到这个内容，最新跟中国军事相关的倒是有“The dangers of a rising China”“China's missiles ”等文章，依然查不到该帖所提到的题为：第四个现代化，这篇文章。给个传送门：http://lt.cjdby.net/thread-1024747-1-1.html
希望给出原文来源，不要让所谓的翻译混淆视听。
“The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age”的原文提供在下面：
链接地址：http://www.postmodernclog.com/archives/001255.html
The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age
Here's a paper I've put together on the rise of the Chinese military:
In the West, the popular conception of the Chinese military is still in large measure shaped by the human wave attacks of the Korean conflict -- the last time a Western power clashed directly with China. The notion of a mainland invasion of Taiwan was for many years dismissed with quips about a ‘Million Man Swim’. Large-scale reform and modernization have made these perceptions increasingly false in the new century, though the Atlantic nations are only slowly awakening to these changed realities. A spate of recent articles and think tank reports are correcting this, and a new danger of overestimating Chinese military potential may arise. The temptation for critics to overstate its military strength may increase as China continues its transition from Cold War enemy-of-my-enemy to a key strategic competitor. But while balance is needed, it is undeniable that China has made tremendous advances in war fighting potential.
The roots of this progress can be found in the ‘Four Modernizations’ announced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970’s which set the stage for the economic boom China enjoys today.1 Defense was actually one of the enumerated Modernizations, but it took a backseat until the late 1990s. Several factors combined at that time to push defense budgets upward. First was the economic progress itself, which made possible the production of butter and guns. Secondly, the government felt a need to compensate the military establishment for its support during the Tiananmen crisis and for its stepping back from entrepreneurial ventures.2 Most decisively, many were stunned by the technological prowess exhibited by the United States in both the first Gulf War and the Kosovo intervention. There was a sense that China was losing ground militarily, being left behind as the West underwent a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).3
Any discussion of contemporary Chinese military history must contend with a lack of transparency which introduces a speculative element into most available statistics. For example, the official People’s Liberation Army budget for 2003 was 22.4 billion dollars, an increase of 9.6%. The CIA estimated the true level of spending at between 45 and 65 billion, while the DoD places it from 65 to 80 billion dollars.4 What is undeniable is that even official numbers have climbed steadily in recent years. With Western technology embargoed in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, Russia and Ukraine remain the prime suppliers of high technology weaponry to the PLA. Foreign weapons purchases averaged 700 million per annum in the 90s, but this rate has doubled in the past five years.5
Alongside the increase in spending have come large-scale troop reductions in the final years of the 20th century. Between 1997 and 2000, the army was trimmed by 18.6%, the navy by 11.4% and the air force by 12.6%.6 In place of weight of numbers, China is substituting smaller, better equipped and more professional units. As one White Paper states the situation, ‘the Chinese military persists in taking the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese characteristics’ and is focused on ‘the historical tasks of mechanization and IT application, thereby bringing about leapfrog development in the modernization of the military’7
These changes are taking place within the greatly altered context of post-Cold War realities. Russia was formerly a hostile neutral which Chinese strategists viewed as their primary territorial threat. However, the direction in recent years has been toward a ‘strategic partnership’ to counterbalance the United States. This has been expressed primarily through arms sales, but the recent large-scale joint military exercises point to a deepening of the relationship.8
Meanwhile, the United States has replaced Russia as China’s focus of concern. Much commentary is devoted to the post-Soviet shift to a unipolar world.9 Many view America as the prime obstacle to achieving China’s overriding foreign policy goal – to take its natural place as the dominant regional power. US support for Taiwan; its participation with the EU in a post-Tiananmen arms embargo against China; the SDI program; and its abrogation of the ABM treaty are all seen as evidence of hostile intent. For its part, China’s diplomatic energies are devoted to undermining the foundation of US policy in the region – a series of bilateral security arrangements with nations like Japan, South Korea and others.10
While growing, China’s military profile in the world is still quite small. Overseas basing is still minimal, as is participation in UN peacekeeping missions. As of 2002, China had only fifty-three blue helmets spread out over six regions.11 One effort to increase their visibility is seen in the round-the-world cruise conducted in May 2002, a first for the Chinese navy.12
Chinese military doctrine has evolved to face the changing world situation. Since the time of Mao, strategy has centered on a ‘People’s War’ involving ‘defense in depth’ – in other words, a war against a large-scale, continental enemy. In recent years this has yielded to an ‘active peripheral defense’ strategy which emphasizes smaller, higher-tech units and a large maritime component.13 A phrase one often hears is ‘limited war under high-tech conditions.’ Rather than a grinding war of attrition, strategists now seek a quick victory geared toward limited policy goals.14 With potential opponents like Japan and the US enjoying a large qualitative edge, the Chinese are focusing on asymmetrical war-fighting tactics which will exploit the dependence of foreign militaries on high technology by attacking critical vulnerabilities in communication, command and control. To accomplish this, Chinese leaders believe they do not need to fully overcome the tech gap, but can instead rely on what Deng Xiaoping called ‘selective pockets of excellence.’15
As stated, active peripheral defense brings the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into its own.16 Rather than merely defending the coast, the PLAN now focuses on sea denial, such as preventing the US Navy from participating in any potential defense of Taiwan.17 One of PLAN’s primary duties is safeguarding the flow of oil to China. In pursuit of this, they are building a ‘string of pearls’ from home to the Middle East, the largest pearl in the string being the naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan.18
Geographically, China’s military attention has shifted from the Soviet Union to the southeast.19 The two largest regional flashpoints are Taiwan and the South China Sea. Taiwan has garnered the lion’s share of attention, with Taipei taking tentative steps in the direction of independence and China’s sabers rattling with ever-increasing volume. Early in 2005 China passed an anti-secession law which provides a stronger legal rationale for military intervention than ever previously existed.20 On a more tangible level, they have positioned several hundred ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan, and greatly stepped up acquisition of and training with amphibious landing craft over the past two years. 21
While less publicized, China is enmeshed in multiple territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This is primarily over ownership of several island groups, including the Spratlys and the Senkaku Islands of Japan. China’s interest in the area stems both from security concerns and from its insatiable need for energy – Chinese experts believe 213 billion barrels of oil wait beneath those waters. The PLAN has acted quite assertively in these disagreements, going so far as to build a full-scale fortress on one island claimed by the Philippines.22
In response to these challenges, China has moved aggressively to update its outmoded weaponry. The PLA is transitioning away from mass infantry formations to a Western combined-arms concept in which armor, infantry and airpower are integrated in mutually supporting formations.23 A third-generation tank has finally made an appearance, the Type 98/99. Few have thus far been produced, but it does represent a huge step forward for Chinese armor.24
The air force and navy have changed most dramatically. China seems to have postponed its carrier dreams, focusing instead on carrier-killers, such as the Sovremenny-class destroyers purchased from Russia and Ukraine. These feature the highly effective Sunburn cruise missile. Four Kilo-class submarines have also been purchased, with eight more on order.25,26 At present the PLAN fields ‘69 submarines, 62 surface combatants, 56 amphibious ships, 39 mine warfare ships, 368 coastal patrol craft, and 3 replenishment-at-sea oilers.’27 A major surprise for the US is the large ship being built in the Dalian shipyards, which looks to be comparable to a Russian Slava-class cruiser.28 Additionally, PLAN is improving the quality of its officer corps, with 85% of naval officers now college educated.29
If anything, the PLAAF has made even greater strides. While venerable MIG-21s still make up the bulk of the fighter force, cutting-edge SU-27s have been purchased from Russia.30 Recent joint US-India exercises were a shock to US strategists – Russian fighters stack up quite well against F-15s. China is pressing ahead with domestic production of Russian fighters, as well as combat support craft like airborne refuelers and AWACS aircraft. Their power projection was greatly enhanced by the purchase of IL-76 transport planes, sufficient to carry an entire combat brigade. These are assigned to the 15th Airborne Army.31
The Second Artillery, custodian of China’s nuclear weapons, is also undergoing rapid modernization. Policymakers have decided to upgrade the Chinese deterrent force from a ‘minimal’ to a ‘moderate’ level. 32 This entails an increase from around four hundred up to nine hundred warheads, as well as efforts to ensure a credible second-strike capability.33 China’s aging ICBM force is currently silo-bound, so plans are in motion to replace the old DF-5 force with road-mobile DF-31s around 2010.34 In part thanks to export decisions made by the Clinton administration, these missiles will feature MIRV technology, allowing multiple warheads on a single delivery vehicle. Anticipating that the Americans will have a limited missile defense umbrella by that time, China is also incorporating a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV). In theory, this will enable their warheads to evade US defenses.35 The DF-31 has a projected range of 12,000 km, sufficient to strike the continental United States.36 Additionally, the Russians are assisting in the construction of at least one Type-094 ballistic missile submarine. This will carry the new JL-2 SLBM, with a range of 8,000 km.37
Reviewing such military advances, it is important to view them in context. These new acquisitions and doctrinal changes represent a Great Leap Forward in power projection for the Chinese military. Nevertheless, it will be some time before they can challenge the United States and her allies for supremacy in the Pacific Rim. If these trends continue in future decades, however, it is likely that China will accomplish what many see as their long-term goal – reversing the verdict of the Sino-Japanese War and replacing Japan as the preeminent power in the region. Conflict between the United States and China is in no way guaranteed, but China’s burgeoning economic power coupled with a growing sense of nationalism seems to make a level of rivalry inevitable. Thanks to the continued modernization of the Chinese military, America is now faced with a formidable strategic competitor.
Endnotes
1 United States, Department of Defense, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, 2000) .
2 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power: Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2003)
< http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/China_TF.pdf > 31.
3 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
4 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 18.
5 Ibid., 58.
6 China, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2002 (Beijing: 2002) .
7 Ibid.
8 “Li Peng Stresses Strategic Partnership with Russia,” People's Daily Online [Beijing] 13 September 2000 .
9 Richard A. Bitzinger, A Paper Tiger No More? The U.S. Debate over China’s
Military Modernization (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, December 2003) 8.
10 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 82.
11 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2002.
12 Ibid.
13 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
14 Richard A. Bitzinger, A Paper Tiger No More? 2.
15 Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” The Naval War College Review Winter 2004 .
16 David B. Matthews, Military Modernization and the People’s Republic of China (Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College, 1998) 22.
17 Bruce Elleman, “China’s New Imperial Navy,” The Naval War College Review Summer 2002
.
18 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I,” The Washington Times 27 June 2005
< http://washingtontimes.com/specialreport/20050626-122138-1088r_page2.htm >.
19 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
20 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
21 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 14, 41.
22 Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions.”
23 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 41-41.
24 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
25 Rich Chang, “Chinese subs a growing threat to region,” Taipei Times 18 March 2005
.
26 John C.K. Daly, “Can the Dragon Swim? The Naval Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” China Brief 4:2 (2004) .
27 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 52.
28 Giuseppe Anzera, “The Modernization of the Chinese Navy,” OCNUS.net 12 Sep 2005
< http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article_20248.shtml>.
29 Bruce Elleman, “China’s New Imperial Navy.”
30 Sergei Blagov, “More Russian Weapons Go to China,” Asia Times 29 Jan. 2003
.
31 The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, (Santa Monica: RAND Center
for Asia-Pacific Policy, 1999) 13.
32 Vijai K Nair, “China’s Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications for Asian Security,” China Brief 4:3 (2004) .
33 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 51.
34 Nuclear Delivery System Modernization, (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2003)
.
35 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
36 Nuclear Delivery System Modernization.
37 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 60.看到有人发贴名字叫做“英国《经济学家》周刊：解放军现代化正在变得“越来越艰难””看着感觉很奇怪，不像是经济学家文章的那种口气，直接上网搜索“the fourth modernization”的确搜到一篇文章，但是是2005年11月6号的，题名“The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age”内容完全跟这贴不同。然后根据该帖所提供《经济学家》的12月2号去查http://www.economist.com/，依然没有搜索到这个内容，最新跟中国军事相关的倒是有“The dangers of a rising China”“China's missiles ”等文章，依然查不到该帖所提到的题为：第四个现代化，这篇文章。给个传送门：http://lt.cjdby.net/thread-1024747-1-1.html
希望给出原文来源，不要让所谓的翻译混淆视听。
“The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age”的原文提供在下面：
链接地址：http://www.postmodernclog.com/archives/001255.html
The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age
Here's a paper I've put together on the rise of the Chinese military:
In the West, the popular conception of the Chinese military is still in large measure shaped by the human wave attacks of the Korean conflict -- the last time a Western power clashed directly with China. The notion of a mainland invasion of Taiwan was for many years dismissed with quips about a ‘Million Man Swim’. Large-scale reform and modernization have made these perceptions increasingly false in the new century, though the Atlantic nations are only slowly awakening to these changed realities. A spate of recent articles and think tank reports are correcting this, and a new danger of overestimating Chinese military potential may arise. The temptation for critics to overstate its military strength may increase as China continues its transition from Cold War enemy-of-my-enemy to a key strategic competitor. But while balance is needed, it is undeniable that China has made tremendous advances in war fighting potential.
The roots of this progress can be found in the ‘Four Modernizations’ announced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970’s which set the stage for the economic boom China enjoys today.1 Defense was actually one of the enumerated Modernizations, but it took a backseat until the late 1990s. Several factors combined at that time to push defense budgets upward. First was the economic progress itself, which made possible the production of butter and guns. Secondly, the government felt a need to compensate the military establishment for its support during the Tiananmen crisis and for its stepping back from entrepreneurial ventures.2 Most decisively, many were stunned by the technological prowess exhibited by the United States in both the first Gulf War and the Kosovo intervention. There was a sense that China was losing ground militarily, being left behind as the West underwent a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).3
Any discussion of contemporary Chinese military history must contend with a lack of transparency which introduces a speculative element into most available statistics. For example, the official People’s Liberation Army budget for 2003 was 22.4 billion dollars, an increase of 9.6%. The CIA estimated the true level of spending at between 45 and 65 billion, while the DoD places it from 65 to 80 billion dollars.4 What is undeniable is that even official numbers have climbed steadily in recent years. With Western technology embargoed in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, Russia and Ukraine remain the prime suppliers of high technology weaponry to the PLA. Foreign weapons purchases averaged 700 million per annum in the 90s, but this rate has doubled in the past five years.5
Alongside the increase in spending have come large-scale troop reductions in the final years of the 20th century. Between 1997 and 2000, the army was trimmed by 18.6%, the navy by 11.4% and the air force by 12.6%.6 In place of weight of numbers, China is substituting smaller, better equipped and more professional units. As one White Paper states the situation, ‘the Chinese military persists in taking the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese characteristics’ and is focused on ‘the historical tasks of mechanization and IT application, thereby bringing about leapfrog development in the modernization of the military’7
These changes are taking place within the greatly altered context of post-Cold War realities. Russia was formerly a hostile neutral which Chinese strategists viewed as their primary territorial threat. However, the direction in recent years has been toward a ‘strategic partnership’ to counterbalance the United States. This has been expressed primarily through arms sales, but the recent large-scale joint military exercises point to a deepening of the relationship.8
Meanwhile, the United States has replaced Russia as China’s focus of concern. Much commentary is devoted to the post-Soviet shift to a unipolar world.9 Many view America as the prime obstacle to achieving China’s overriding foreign policy goal – to take its natural place as the dominant regional power. US support for Taiwan; its participation with the EU in a post-Tiananmen arms embargo against China; the SDI program; and its abrogation of the ABM treaty are all seen as evidence of hostile intent. For its part, China’s diplomatic energies are devoted to undermining the foundation of US policy in the region – a series of bilateral security arrangements with nations like Japan, South Korea and others.10
While growing, China’s military profile in the world is still quite small. Overseas basing is still minimal, as is participation in UN peacekeeping missions. As of 2002, China had only fifty-three blue helmets spread out over six regions.11 One effort to increase their visibility is seen in the round-the-world cruise conducted in May 2002, a first for the Chinese navy.12
Chinese military doctrine has evolved to face the changing world situation. Since the time of Mao, strategy has centered on a ‘People’s War’ involving ‘defense in depth’ – in other words, a war against a large-scale, continental enemy. In recent years this has yielded to an ‘active peripheral defense’ strategy which emphasizes smaller, higher-tech units and a large maritime component.13 A phrase one often hears is ‘limited war under high-tech conditions.’ Rather than a grinding war of attrition, strategists now seek a quick victory geared toward limited policy goals.14 With potential opponents like Japan and the US enjoying a large qualitative edge, the Chinese are focusing on asymmetrical war-fighting tactics which will exploit the dependence of foreign militaries on high technology by attacking critical vulnerabilities in communication, command and control. To accomplish this, Chinese leaders believe they do not need to fully overcome the tech gap, but can instead rely on what Deng Xiaoping called ‘selective pockets of excellence.’15
As stated, active peripheral defense brings the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into its own.16 Rather than merely defending the coast, the PLAN now focuses on sea denial, such as preventing the US Navy from participating in any potential defense of Taiwan.17 One of PLAN’s primary duties is safeguarding the flow of oil to China. In pursuit of this, they are building a ‘string of pearls’ from home to the Middle East, the largest pearl in the string being the naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan.18
Geographically, China’s military attention has shifted from the Soviet Union to the southeast.19 The two largest regional flashpoints are Taiwan and the South China Sea. Taiwan has garnered the lion’s share of attention, with Taipei taking tentative steps in the direction of independence and China’s sabers rattling with ever-increasing volume. Early in 2005 China passed an anti-secession law which provides a stronger legal rationale for military intervention than ever previously existed.20 On a more tangible level, they have positioned several hundred ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan, and greatly stepped up acquisition of and training with amphibious landing craft over the past two years. 21
While less publicized, China is enmeshed in multiple territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This is primarily over ownership of several island groups, including the Spratlys and the Senkaku Islands of Japan. China’s interest in the area stems both from security concerns and from its insatiable need for energy – Chinese experts believe 213 billion barrels of oil wait beneath those waters. The PLAN has acted quite assertively in these disagreements, going so far as to build a full-scale fortress on one island claimed by the Philippines.22
In response to these challenges, China has moved aggressively to update its outmoded weaponry. The PLA is transitioning away from mass infantry formations to a Western combined-arms concept in which armor, infantry and airpower are integrated in mutually supporting formations.23 A third-generation tank has finally made an appearance, the Type 98/99. Few have thus far been produced, but it does represent a huge step forward for Chinese armor.24
The air force and navy have changed most dramatically. China seems to have postponed its carrier dreams, focusing instead on carrier-killers, such as the Sovremenny-class destroyers purchased from Russia and Ukraine. These feature the highly effective Sunburn cruise missile. Four Kilo-class submarines have also been purchased, with eight more on order.25,26 At present the PLAN fields ‘69 submarines, 62 surface combatants, 56 amphibious ships, 39 mine warfare ships, 368 coastal patrol craft, and 3 replenishment-at-sea oilers.’27 A major surprise for the US is the large ship being built in the Dalian shipyards, which looks to be comparable to a Russian Slava-class cruiser.28 Additionally, PLAN is improving the quality of its officer corps, with 85% of naval officers now college educated.29
If anything, the PLAAF has made even greater strides. While venerable MIG-21s still make up the bulk of the fighter force, cutting-edge SU-27s have been purchased from Russia.30 Recent joint US-India exercises were a shock to US strategists – Russian fighters stack up quite well against F-15s. China is pressing ahead with domestic production of Russian fighters, as well as combat support craft like airborne refuelers and AWACS aircraft. Their power projection was greatly enhanced by the purchase of IL-76 transport planes, sufficient to carry an entire combat brigade. These are assigned to the 15th Airborne Army.31
The Second Artillery, custodian of China’s nuclear weapons, is also undergoing rapid modernization. Policymakers have decided to upgrade the Chinese deterrent force from a ‘minimal’ to a ‘moderate’ level. 32 This entails an increase from around four hundred up to nine hundred warheads, as well as efforts to ensure a credible second-strike capability.33 China’s aging ICBM force is currently silo-bound, so plans are in motion to replace the old DF-5 force with road-mobile DF-31s around 2010.34 In part thanks to export decisions made by the Clinton administration, these missiles will feature MIRV technology, allowing multiple warheads on a single delivery vehicle. Anticipating that the Americans will have a limited missile defense umbrella by that time, China is also incorporating a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV). In theory, this will enable their warheads to evade US defenses.35 The DF-31 has a projected range of 12,000 km, sufficient to strike the continental United States.36 Additionally, the Russians are assisting in the construction of at least one Type-094 ballistic missile submarine. This will carry the new JL-2 SLBM, with a range of 8,000 km.37
Reviewing such military advances, it is important to view them in context. These new acquisitions and doctrinal changes represent a Great Leap Forward in power projection for the Chinese military. Nevertheless, it will be some time before they can challenge the United States and her allies for supremacy in the Pacific Rim. If these trends continue in future decades, however, it is likely that China will accomplish what many see as their long-term goal – reversing the verdict of the Sino-Japanese War and replacing Japan as the preeminent power in the region. Conflict between the United States and China is in no way guaranteed, but China’s burgeoning economic power coupled with a growing sense of nationalism seems to make a level of rivalry inevitable. Thanks to the continued modernization of the Chinese military, America is now faced with a formidable strategic competitor.
Endnotes
1 United States, Department of Defense, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, 2000) .
2 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power: Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2003)
< http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/China_TF.pdf > 31.
3 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
4 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 18.
5 Ibid., 58.
6 China, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2002 (Beijing: 2002) .
7 Ibid.
8 “Li Peng Stresses Strategic Partnership with Russia,” People's Daily Online [Beijing] 13 September 2000 .
9 Richard A. Bitzinger, A Paper Tiger No More? The U.S. Debate over China’s
Military Modernization (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, December 2003) 8.
10 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 82.
11 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2002.
12 Ibid.
13 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
14 Richard A. Bitzinger, A Paper Tiger No More? 2.
15 Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” The Naval War College Review Winter 2004 .
16 David B. Matthews, Military Modernization and the People’s Republic of China (Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College, 1998) 22.
17 Bruce Elleman, “China’s New Imperial Navy,” The Naval War College Review Summer 2002
.
18 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I,” The Washington Times 27 June 2005
< http://washingtontimes.com/specialreport/20050626-122138-1088r_page2.htm >.
19 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
20 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
21 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 14, 41.
22 Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions.”
23 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 41-41.
24 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
25 Rich Chang, “Chinese subs a growing threat to region,” Taipei Times 18 March 2005
.
26 John C.K. Daly, “Can the Dragon Swim? The Naval Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” China Brief 4:2 (2004) .
27 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 52.
28 Giuseppe Anzera, “The Modernization of the Chinese Navy,” OCNUS.net 12 Sep 2005
< http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article_20248.shtml>.
29 Bruce Elleman, “China’s New Imperial Navy.”
30 Sergei Blagov, “More Russian Weapons Go to China,” Asia Times 29 Jan. 2003
.
31 The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, (Santa Monica: RAND Center
for Asia-Pacific Policy, 1999) 13.
32 Vijai K Nair, “China’s Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications for Asian Security,” China Brief 4:3 (2004) .
33 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 51.
34 Nuclear Delivery System Modernization, (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2003)
.
35 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
36 Nuclear Delivery System Modernization.
37 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 60.
希望给出原文来源，不要让所谓的翻译混淆视听。
“The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age”的原文提供在下面：
链接地址：http://www.postmodernclog.com/archives/001255.html
The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age
Here's a paper I've put together on the rise of the Chinese military:
In the West, the popular conception of the Chinese military is still in large measure shaped by the human wave attacks of the Korean conflict -- the last time a Western power clashed directly with China. The notion of a mainland invasion of Taiwan was for many years dismissed with quips about a ‘Million Man Swim’. Large-scale reform and modernization have made these perceptions increasingly false in the new century, though the Atlantic nations are only slowly awakening to these changed realities. A spate of recent articles and think tank reports are correcting this, and a new danger of overestimating Chinese military potential may arise. The temptation for critics to overstate its military strength may increase as China continues its transition from Cold War enemy-of-my-enemy to a key strategic competitor. But while balance is needed, it is undeniable that China has made tremendous advances in war fighting potential.
The roots of this progress can be found in the ‘Four Modernizations’ announced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970’s which set the stage for the economic boom China enjoys today.1 Defense was actually one of the enumerated Modernizations, but it took a backseat until the late 1990s. Several factors combined at that time to push defense budgets upward. First was the economic progress itself, which made possible the production of butter and guns. Secondly, the government felt a need to compensate the military establishment for its support during the Tiananmen crisis and for its stepping back from entrepreneurial ventures.2 Most decisively, many were stunned by the technological prowess exhibited by the United States in both the first Gulf War and the Kosovo intervention. There was a sense that China was losing ground militarily, being left behind as the West underwent a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).3
Any discussion of contemporary Chinese military history must contend with a lack of transparency which introduces a speculative element into most available statistics. For example, the official People’s Liberation Army budget for 2003 was 22.4 billion dollars, an increase of 9.6%. The CIA estimated the true level of spending at between 45 and 65 billion, while the DoD places it from 65 to 80 billion dollars.4 What is undeniable is that even official numbers have climbed steadily in recent years. With Western technology embargoed in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, Russia and Ukraine remain the prime suppliers of high technology weaponry to the PLA. Foreign weapons purchases averaged 700 million per annum in the 90s, but this rate has doubled in the past five years.5
Alongside the increase in spending have come large-scale troop reductions in the final years of the 20th century. Between 1997 and 2000, the army was trimmed by 18.6%, the navy by 11.4% and the air force by 12.6%.6 In place of weight of numbers, China is substituting smaller, better equipped and more professional units. As one White Paper states the situation, ‘the Chinese military persists in taking the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese characteristics’ and is focused on ‘the historical tasks of mechanization and IT application, thereby bringing about leapfrog development in the modernization of the military’7
These changes are taking place within the greatly altered context of post-Cold War realities. Russia was formerly a hostile neutral which Chinese strategists viewed as their primary territorial threat. However, the direction in recent years has been toward a ‘strategic partnership’ to counterbalance the United States. This has been expressed primarily through arms sales, but the recent large-scale joint military exercises point to a deepening of the relationship.8
Meanwhile, the United States has replaced Russia as China’s focus of concern. Much commentary is devoted to the post-Soviet shift to a unipolar world.9 Many view America as the prime obstacle to achieving China’s overriding foreign policy goal – to take its natural place as the dominant regional power. US support for Taiwan; its participation with the EU in a post-Tiananmen arms embargo against China; the SDI program; and its abrogation of the ABM treaty are all seen as evidence of hostile intent. For its part, China’s diplomatic energies are devoted to undermining the foundation of US policy in the region – a series of bilateral security arrangements with nations like Japan, South Korea and others.10
While growing, China’s military profile in the world is still quite small. Overseas basing is still minimal, as is participation in UN peacekeeping missions. As of 2002, China had only fifty-three blue helmets spread out over six regions.11 One effort to increase their visibility is seen in the round-the-world cruise conducted in May 2002, a first for the Chinese navy.12
Chinese military doctrine has evolved to face the changing world situation. Since the time of Mao, strategy has centered on a ‘People’s War’ involving ‘defense in depth’ – in other words, a war against a large-scale, continental enemy. In recent years this has yielded to an ‘active peripheral defense’ strategy which emphasizes smaller, higher-tech units and a large maritime component.13 A phrase one often hears is ‘limited war under high-tech conditions.’ Rather than a grinding war of attrition, strategists now seek a quick victory geared toward limited policy goals.14 With potential opponents like Japan and the US enjoying a large qualitative edge, the Chinese are focusing on asymmetrical war-fighting tactics which will exploit the dependence of foreign militaries on high technology by attacking critical vulnerabilities in communication, command and control. To accomplish this, Chinese leaders believe they do not need to fully overcome the tech gap, but can instead rely on what Deng Xiaoping called ‘selective pockets of excellence.’15
As stated, active peripheral defense brings the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into its own.16 Rather than merely defending the coast, the PLAN now focuses on sea denial, such as preventing the US Navy from participating in any potential defense of Taiwan.17 One of PLAN’s primary duties is safeguarding the flow of oil to China. In pursuit of this, they are building a ‘string of pearls’ from home to the Middle East, the largest pearl in the string being the naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan.18
Geographically, China’s military attention has shifted from the Soviet Union to the southeast.19 The two largest regional flashpoints are Taiwan and the South China Sea. Taiwan has garnered the lion’s share of attention, with Taipei taking tentative steps in the direction of independence and China’s sabers rattling with ever-increasing volume. Early in 2005 China passed an anti-secession law which provides a stronger legal rationale for military intervention than ever previously existed.20 On a more tangible level, they have positioned several hundred ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan, and greatly stepped up acquisition of and training with amphibious landing craft over the past two years. 21
While less publicized, China is enmeshed in multiple territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This is primarily over ownership of several island groups, including the Spratlys and the Senkaku Islands of Japan. China’s interest in the area stems both from security concerns and from its insatiable need for energy – Chinese experts believe 213 billion barrels of oil wait beneath those waters. The PLAN has acted quite assertively in these disagreements, going so far as to build a full-scale fortress on one island claimed by the Philippines.22
In response to these challenges, China has moved aggressively to update its outmoded weaponry. The PLA is transitioning away from mass infantry formations to a Western combined-arms concept in which armor, infantry and airpower are integrated in mutually supporting formations.23 A third-generation tank has finally made an appearance, the Type 98/99. Few have thus far been produced, but it does represent a huge step forward for Chinese armor.24
The air force and navy have changed most dramatically. China seems to have postponed its carrier dreams, focusing instead on carrier-killers, such as the Sovremenny-class destroyers purchased from Russia and Ukraine. These feature the highly effective Sunburn cruise missile. Four Kilo-class submarines have also been purchased, with eight more on order.25,26 At present the PLAN fields ‘69 submarines, 62 surface combatants, 56 amphibious ships, 39 mine warfare ships, 368 coastal patrol craft, and 3 replenishment-at-sea oilers.’27 A major surprise for the US is the large ship being built in the Dalian shipyards, which looks to be comparable to a Russian Slava-class cruiser.28 Additionally, PLAN is improving the quality of its officer corps, with 85% of naval officers now college educated.29
If anything, the PLAAF has made even greater strides. While venerable MIG-21s still make up the bulk of the fighter force, cutting-edge SU-27s have been purchased from Russia.30 Recent joint US-India exercises were a shock to US strategists – Russian fighters stack up quite well against F-15s. China is pressing ahead with domestic production of Russian fighters, as well as combat support craft like airborne refuelers and AWACS aircraft. Their power projection was greatly enhanced by the purchase of IL-76 transport planes, sufficient to carry an entire combat brigade. These are assigned to the 15th Airborne Army.31
The Second Artillery, custodian of China’s nuclear weapons, is also undergoing rapid modernization. Policymakers have decided to upgrade the Chinese deterrent force from a ‘minimal’ to a ‘moderate’ level. 32 This entails an increase from around four hundred up to nine hundred warheads, as well as efforts to ensure a credible second-strike capability.33 China’s aging ICBM force is currently silo-bound, so plans are in motion to replace the old DF-5 force with road-mobile DF-31s around 2010.34 In part thanks to export decisions made by the Clinton administration, these missiles will feature MIRV technology, allowing multiple warheads on a single delivery vehicle. Anticipating that the Americans will have a limited missile defense umbrella by that time, China is also incorporating a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV). In theory, this will enable their warheads to evade US defenses.35 The DF-31 has a projected range of 12,000 km, sufficient to strike the continental United States.36 Additionally, the Russians are assisting in the construction of at least one Type-094 ballistic missile submarine. This will carry the new JL-2 SLBM, with a range of 8,000 km.37
Reviewing such military advances, it is important to view them in context. These new acquisitions and doctrinal changes represent a Great Leap Forward in power projection for the Chinese military. Nevertheless, it will be some time before they can challenge the United States and her allies for supremacy in the Pacific Rim. If these trends continue in future decades, however, it is likely that China will accomplish what many see as their long-term goal – reversing the verdict of the Sino-Japanese War and replacing Japan as the preeminent power in the region. Conflict between the United States and China is in no way guaranteed, but China’s burgeoning economic power coupled with a growing sense of nationalism seems to make a level of rivalry inevitable. Thanks to the continued modernization of the Chinese military, America is now faced with a formidable strategic competitor.
Endnotes
1 United States, Department of Defense, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, 2000) .
2 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power: Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2003)
< http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/China_TF.pdf > 31.
3 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
4 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 18.
5 Ibid., 58.
6 China, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2002 (Beijing: 2002) .
7 Ibid.
8 “Li Peng Stresses Strategic Partnership with Russia,” People's Daily Online [Beijing] 13 September 2000 .
9 Richard A. Bitzinger, A Paper Tiger No More? The U.S. Debate over China’s
Military Modernization (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, December 2003) 8.
10 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 82.
11 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2002.
12 Ibid.
13 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
14 Richard A. Bitzinger, A Paper Tiger No More? 2.
15 Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” The Naval War College Review Winter 2004 .
16 David B. Matthews, Military Modernization and the People’s Republic of China (Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College, 1998) 22.
17 Bruce Elleman, “China’s New Imperial Navy,” The Naval War College Review Summer 2002
.
18 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I,” The Washington Times 27 June 2005
< http://washingtontimes.com/specialreport/20050626-122138-1088r_page2.htm >.
19 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
20 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
21 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 14, 41.
22 Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions.”
23 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 41-41.
24 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
25 Rich Chang, “Chinese subs a growing threat to region,” Taipei Times 18 March 2005
.
26 John C.K. Daly, “Can the Dragon Swim? The Naval Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” China Brief 4:2 (2004) .
27 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 52.
28 Giuseppe Anzera, “The Modernization of the Chinese Navy,” OCNUS.net 12 Sep 2005
< http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article_20248.shtml>.
29 Bruce Elleman, “China’s New Imperial Navy.”
30 Sergei Blagov, “More Russian Weapons Go to China,” Asia Times 29 Jan. 2003
.
31 The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, (Santa Monica: RAND Center
for Asia-Pacific Policy, 1999) 13.
32 Vijai K Nair, “China’s Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications for Asian Security,” China Brief 4:3 (2004) .
33 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 51.
34 Nuclear Delivery System Modernization, (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2003)
.
35 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
36 Nuclear Delivery System Modernization.
37 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 60.看到有人发贴名字叫做“英国《经济学家》周刊：解放军现代化正在变得“越来越艰难””看着感觉很奇怪，不像是经济学家文章的那种口气，直接上网搜索“the fourth modernization”的确搜到一篇文章，但是是2005年11月6号的，题名“The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age”内容完全跟这贴不同。然后根据该帖所提供《经济学家》的12月2号去查http://www.economist.com/，依然没有搜索到这个内容，最新跟中国军事相关的倒是有“The dangers of a rising China”“China's missiles ”等文章，依然查不到该帖所提到的题为：第四个现代化，这篇文章。给个传送门：http://lt.cjdby.net/thread-1024747-1-1.html
希望给出原文来源，不要让所谓的翻译混淆视听。
“The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age”的原文提供在下面：
链接地址：http://www.postmodernclog.com/archives/001255.html
The Fourth Modernization: China’s Military Comes of Age
Here's a paper I've put together on the rise of the Chinese military:
In the West, the popular conception of the Chinese military is still in large measure shaped by the human wave attacks of the Korean conflict -- the last time a Western power clashed directly with China. The notion of a mainland invasion of Taiwan was for many years dismissed with quips about a ‘Million Man Swim’. Large-scale reform and modernization have made these perceptions increasingly false in the new century, though the Atlantic nations are only slowly awakening to these changed realities. A spate of recent articles and think tank reports are correcting this, and a new danger of overestimating Chinese military potential may arise. The temptation for critics to overstate its military strength may increase as China continues its transition from Cold War enemy-of-my-enemy to a key strategic competitor. But while balance is needed, it is undeniable that China has made tremendous advances in war fighting potential.
The roots of this progress can be found in the ‘Four Modernizations’ announced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970’s which set the stage for the economic boom China enjoys today.1 Defense was actually one of the enumerated Modernizations, but it took a backseat until the late 1990s. Several factors combined at that time to push defense budgets upward. First was the economic progress itself, which made possible the production of butter and guns. Secondly, the government felt a need to compensate the military establishment for its support during the Tiananmen crisis and for its stepping back from entrepreneurial ventures.2 Most decisively, many were stunned by the technological prowess exhibited by the United States in both the first Gulf War and the Kosovo intervention. There was a sense that China was losing ground militarily, being left behind as the West underwent a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).3
Any discussion of contemporary Chinese military history must contend with a lack of transparency which introduces a speculative element into most available statistics. For example, the official People’s Liberation Army budget for 2003 was 22.4 billion dollars, an increase of 9.6%. The CIA estimated the true level of spending at between 45 and 65 billion, while the DoD places it from 65 to 80 billion dollars.4 What is undeniable is that even official numbers have climbed steadily in recent years. With Western technology embargoed in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, Russia and Ukraine remain the prime suppliers of high technology weaponry to the PLA. Foreign weapons purchases averaged 700 million per annum in the 90s, but this rate has doubled in the past five years.5
Alongside the increase in spending have come large-scale troop reductions in the final years of the 20th century. Between 1997 and 2000, the army was trimmed by 18.6%, the navy by 11.4% and the air force by 12.6%.6 In place of weight of numbers, China is substituting smaller, better equipped and more professional units. As one White Paper states the situation, ‘the Chinese military persists in taking the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese characteristics’ and is focused on ‘the historical tasks of mechanization and IT application, thereby bringing about leapfrog development in the modernization of the military’7
These changes are taking place within the greatly altered context of post-Cold War realities. Russia was formerly a hostile neutral which Chinese strategists viewed as their primary territorial threat. However, the direction in recent years has been toward a ‘strategic partnership’ to counterbalance the United States. This has been expressed primarily through arms sales, but the recent large-scale joint military exercises point to a deepening of the relationship.8
Meanwhile, the United States has replaced Russia as China’s focus of concern. Much commentary is devoted to the post-Soviet shift to a unipolar world.9 Many view America as the prime obstacle to achieving China’s overriding foreign policy goal – to take its natural place as the dominant regional power. US support for Taiwan; its participation with the EU in a post-Tiananmen arms embargo against China; the SDI program; and its abrogation of the ABM treaty are all seen as evidence of hostile intent. For its part, China’s diplomatic energies are devoted to undermining the foundation of US policy in the region – a series of bilateral security arrangements with nations like Japan, South Korea and others.10
While growing, China’s military profile in the world is still quite small. Overseas basing is still minimal, as is participation in UN peacekeeping missions. As of 2002, China had only fifty-three blue helmets spread out over six regions.11 One effort to increase their visibility is seen in the round-the-world cruise conducted in May 2002, a first for the Chinese navy.12
Chinese military doctrine has evolved to face the changing world situation. Since the time of Mao, strategy has centered on a ‘People’s War’ involving ‘defense in depth’ – in other words, a war against a large-scale, continental enemy. In recent years this has yielded to an ‘active peripheral defense’ strategy which emphasizes smaller, higher-tech units and a large maritime component.13 A phrase one often hears is ‘limited war under high-tech conditions.’ Rather than a grinding war of attrition, strategists now seek a quick victory geared toward limited policy goals.14 With potential opponents like Japan and the US enjoying a large qualitative edge, the Chinese are focusing on asymmetrical war-fighting tactics which will exploit the dependence of foreign militaries on high technology by attacking critical vulnerabilities in communication, command and control. To accomplish this, Chinese leaders believe they do not need to fully overcome the tech gap, but can instead rely on what Deng Xiaoping called ‘selective pockets of excellence.’15
As stated, active peripheral defense brings the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into its own.16 Rather than merely defending the coast, the PLAN now focuses on sea denial, such as preventing the US Navy from participating in any potential defense of Taiwan.17 One of PLAN’s primary duties is safeguarding the flow of oil to China. In pursuit of this, they are building a ‘string of pearls’ from home to the Middle East, the largest pearl in the string being the naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan.18
Geographically, China’s military attention has shifted from the Soviet Union to the southeast.19 The two largest regional flashpoints are Taiwan and the South China Sea. Taiwan has garnered the lion’s share of attention, with Taipei taking tentative steps in the direction of independence and China’s sabers rattling with ever-increasing volume. Early in 2005 China passed an anti-secession law which provides a stronger legal rationale for military intervention than ever previously existed.20 On a more tangible level, they have positioned several hundred ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan, and greatly stepped up acquisition of and training with amphibious landing craft over the past two years. 21
While less publicized, China is enmeshed in multiple territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This is primarily over ownership of several island groups, including the Spratlys and the Senkaku Islands of Japan. China’s interest in the area stems both from security concerns and from its insatiable need for energy – Chinese experts believe 213 billion barrels of oil wait beneath those waters. The PLAN has acted quite assertively in these disagreements, going so far as to build a full-scale fortress on one island claimed by the Philippines.22
In response to these challenges, China has moved aggressively to update its outmoded weaponry. The PLA is transitioning away from mass infantry formations to a Western combined-arms concept in which armor, infantry and airpower are integrated in mutually supporting formations.23 A third-generation tank has finally made an appearance, the Type 98/99. Few have thus far been produced, but it does represent a huge step forward for Chinese armor.24
The air force and navy have changed most dramatically. China seems to have postponed its carrier dreams, focusing instead on carrier-killers, such as the Sovremenny-class destroyers purchased from Russia and Ukraine. These feature the highly effective Sunburn cruise missile. Four Kilo-class submarines have also been purchased, with eight more on order.25,26 At present the PLAN fields ‘69 submarines, 62 surface combatants, 56 amphibious ships, 39 mine warfare ships, 368 coastal patrol craft, and 3 replenishment-at-sea oilers.’27 A major surprise for the US is the large ship being built in the Dalian shipyards, which looks to be comparable to a Russian Slava-class cruiser.28 Additionally, PLAN is improving the quality of its officer corps, with 85% of naval officers now college educated.29
If anything, the PLAAF has made even greater strides. While venerable MIG-21s still make up the bulk of the fighter force, cutting-edge SU-27s have been purchased from Russia.30 Recent joint US-India exercises were a shock to US strategists – Russian fighters stack up quite well against F-15s. China is pressing ahead with domestic production of Russian fighters, as well as combat support craft like airborne refuelers and AWACS aircraft. Their power projection was greatly enhanced by the purchase of IL-76 transport planes, sufficient to carry an entire combat brigade. These are assigned to the 15th Airborne Army.31
The Second Artillery, custodian of China’s nuclear weapons, is also undergoing rapid modernization. Policymakers have decided to upgrade the Chinese deterrent force from a ‘minimal’ to a ‘moderate’ level. 32 This entails an increase from around four hundred up to nine hundred warheads, as well as efforts to ensure a credible second-strike capability.33 China’s aging ICBM force is currently silo-bound, so plans are in motion to replace the old DF-5 force with road-mobile DF-31s around 2010.34 In part thanks to export decisions made by the Clinton administration, these missiles will feature MIRV technology, allowing multiple warheads on a single delivery vehicle. Anticipating that the Americans will have a limited missile defense umbrella by that time, China is also incorporating a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV). In theory, this will enable their warheads to evade US defenses.35 The DF-31 has a projected range of 12,000 km, sufficient to strike the continental United States.36 Additionally, the Russians are assisting in the construction of at least one Type-094 ballistic missile submarine. This will carry the new JL-2 SLBM, with a range of 8,000 km.37
Reviewing such military advances, it is important to view them in context. These new acquisitions and doctrinal changes represent a Great Leap Forward in power projection for the Chinese military. Nevertheless, it will be some time before they can challenge the United States and her allies for supremacy in the Pacific Rim. If these trends continue in future decades, however, it is likely that China will accomplish what many see as their long-term goal – reversing the verdict of the Sino-Japanese War and replacing Japan as the preeminent power in the region. Conflict between the United States and China is in no way guaranteed, but China’s burgeoning economic power coupled with a growing sense of nationalism seems to make a level of rivalry inevitable. Thanks to the continued modernization of the Chinese military, America is now faced with a formidable strategic competitor.
Endnotes
1 United States, Department of Defense, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, 2000) .
2 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power: Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2003)
< http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/China_TF.pdf > 31.
3 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
4 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 18.
5 Ibid., 58.
6 China, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2002 (Beijing: 2002) .
7 Ibid.
8 “Li Peng Stresses Strategic Partnership with Russia,” People's Daily Online [Beijing] 13 September 2000 .
9 Richard A. Bitzinger, A Paper Tiger No More? The U.S. Debate over China’s
Military Modernization (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, December 2003) 8.
10 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 82.
11 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2002.
12 Ibid.
13 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
14 Richard A. Bitzinger, A Paper Tiger No More? 2.
15 Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” The Naval War College Review Winter 2004 .
16 David B. Matthews, Military Modernization and the People’s Republic of China (Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College, 1998) 22.
17 Bruce Elleman, “China’s New Imperial Navy,” The Naval War College Review Summer 2002
.
18 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I,” The Washington Times 27 June 2005
< http://washingtontimes.com/specialreport/20050626-122138-1088r_page2.htm >.
19 Department of Defense, Report to Congress.
20 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
21 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 14, 41.
22 Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions.”
23 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 41-41.
24 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
25 Rich Chang, “Chinese subs a growing threat to region,” Taipei Times 18 March 2005
.
26 John C.K. Daly, “Can the Dragon Swim? The Naval Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” China Brief 4:2 (2004) .
27 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 52.
28 Giuseppe Anzera, “The Modernization of the Chinese Navy,” OCNUS.net 12 Sep 2005
< http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article_20248.shtml>.
29 Bruce Elleman, “China’s New Imperial Navy.”
30 Sergei Blagov, “More Russian Weapons Go to China,” Asia Times 29 Jan. 2003
.
31 The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, (Santa Monica: RAND Center
for Asia-Pacific Policy, 1999) 13.
32 Vijai K Nair, “China’s Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications for Asian Security,” China Brief 4:3 (2004) .
33 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 51.
34 Nuclear Delivery System Modernization, (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2003)
.
35 Bill Gertz, “Chinese dragon awakens, part I.”
36 Nuclear Delivery System Modernization.
37 Harold Brown, et al., Chinese Military Power 60.
更新一下，12月2日经济学家杂志所发表的跟中国相关文章：
A special report on China's place in the world
Brushwood and gall
China insists that its growing military and diplomatic clout pose no threat. The rest of the world, and particularly America, is not so sure, says Edward Carr
地址：http://www.economist.com/node/17601499
A special report on China's place in the world
Brushwood and gall
China insists that its growing military and diplomatic clout pose no threat. The rest of the world, and particularly America, is not so sure, says Edward Carr
地址：http://www.economist.com/node/17601499
这里有一个我已经把对中国的军事崛起共同文件：
在西方，对中国军队流行的概念仍处于由朝鲜冲突的人浪形的攻击很大程度上 - 最后一次中国与西方列强发生冲突，直接。一个入侵台湾的大陆概念是为约一个'百万人游泳，妙语连珠解雇多年。大规模的改革和现代化建设取得了这些观念，在新世纪日益虚假，尽管大西洋国家只是在缓慢地领悟到这些变化的现实。最近的一些文章和智囊团的报告接二连三正在纠正这一点，高估中国的军事潜力可能出现新的危险。对于批评诱惑夸大其军事实力可能会增加中国继续从冷战敌人的，我的敌人过渡到一个关键的战略竞争对手。不过，虽然平衡是必要的，但不可否认的是，中国已经在战争中的战斗潜力的巨大进步。
这种进步的根源可以在'四化'邓小平在70年代末公布的这为中国经济繁荣的阶段享有today.1国防部发现竟是经点算的现代化建设之一，但它采取了后座上，直到20世纪90年代末。几个因素结合当时的国防预算向上推。首先是经济发展本身，它能够把黄油和大炮生产。其次，政府觉得有必要在天安门补偿危机和其离职创业ventures.2最坚定地支持军事机构的支持，许多人由美国表现出的技术实力都惊呆了第一次海湾战争和科索沃的干预。有一种感觉，中国是军事上节节败退，被落在了后面西方经历了一个在军事事务（RMA）的0.3革命
当代中国的任何军事史上的讨论必须与缺乏透明度，介绍到大多数可用的统计信息的投机成份。例如，官方的人民解放军2003年的预算是22.4亿美元，增长9.6％。美国中央情报局估计开支的真实水平在45至65亿美元，而美国国防部的地方是从65到800亿dollars.4不可否认的是，即使官方数字都在近年来不断攀升。与西方技术在天安门屠杀事件禁运，俄罗斯和乌克兰仍然是高技术武器装备到解放军的主要供应商。采购外国武器平均每年7.00亿，在90年代，但这个比率在过去五年years.5一倍
伴随着增加开支来在20世纪的最后几年大规模的部队削减。 1997年至2000年，军队削减了11.4％和18.6％，空军，海军12.6％，在0.6的人多势众的地方，中国是代小，更好的装备和更多的专业单位。正如一个国家的情况白皮书'的中国军队坚持走有中国特色的精兵之路'，是对'机械化的历史任务，重点和资讯科技应用，从而带来的跨越式发展的现代化military'7
这些变化正在内冷战后的现实情况下发生很大改变。俄罗斯的前身是一个敌对的中立领土作为他们的主要威胁视为中国战略家。然而，近年来一直朝着一个方向的战略伙伴关系，以抗衡美国。这已经表示，主要是通过军售，但最近的大规模联合军事演习指向一个深化的relationship.8
与此同时，美国已经取代中国的俄罗斯关注的焦点。很多评论是用于后苏联转变作为首要障碍，实现中国的外交政策的首要目标是单极world.9许多人认为美国 - 以此作为地区主要大国的天然场所。美国支持台湾，在SDI计划;，它与在后天安门对中国武器禁运的欧盟参与其废除反导条约都视为敌对意图的证据。就其本身而言，中国的外交精力致力于破坏了该地区对美国政策的基础 - 以双边安全安排，如日本，韩国和others.10国家系列
随着年龄的增长，中国在世界上的军事个人资料仍然相当小。海外基础仍然很小，这在联合国维和行动的参与。截至2002年，中国已遍布六regions.11出一种努力提高企业的知名度，是在2002年5月进行的环游世界的邮轮，为中国navy.12第一只看到五十三蓝盔
中国的军事学说已经发展到面对不断变化的世界局势。自从毛泽东时代，战略都围绕一个'人民战争'参与'纵深防御' - 换句话说，对一个大规模的，欧式敌人的战争。近年来，该让位给了一个'主动周边防御的战略，强调小，较高科技单位和一个大型海上component.13短语人们经常听到的是'高技术条件下局部战争。'而不是战争磨自然减员，战略家寻求一种快速的胜利对有限的政策goals.14面向与日本和美国的潜在对手一大享受质量优势，在中国的重点是不对称的作战战术，将利用高依赖的外国军队在通信技术的攻击，指挥和控制关键漏洞。要做到这一点，中国领导人认为他们没有必要完全克服技术差距，但可以改为依靠邓小平什么所谓的'卓越选择性的口袋。'15
如上所述，积极周边防御带入其own.16而不仅仅是保卫沿海的解放军海军（PLAN），该计划目前的重点海上封锁，如防止任何潜在的防卫台湾参加美国海军。 17计划的主要职责之一是维护中国的石油流量。在这种追求，他们正在建立一个从家里'珍珠链'到中东，字符串中的最大的珍珠是在瓜达尔，Pakistan.18海军基地
从地理上看，中国的军事注意力已经从苏联转移到southeast.19最大的两个地区爆发点是台湾及南中国海。台湾已经获得了大部分的关注份额，与台北参加的独立和中国的军刀不断增加的数量暂定剑拔弩张方向的步骤。早在2005年中国通过了反分裂国家法提供了比以往任何时候以前existed.20在一个更具体的层面上加强军事干预的法律依据，他们有几百名台湾对面的位置弹道导弹，并大大加强了收购及培训在过去两年两栖登陆艇。 21
而较少的宣传，中国是沉浸在南方中国Sea多个领土争端。这主要是对几个岛屿群，包括南沙和日本尖阁列岛的所有权。中国在这一地区的兴趣来自无论从安全问题和对能源无法满足需求 - 中国专家认为，2130亿美元的石油桶等待下面的水域。该计划采取了行动颇为自信地在这些分歧，竟然以建立一个全面的堡垒上的一个岛屿声称Philippines.22
为应对这些挑战，中国已积极更新其过时的武器装备。人民解放军是由大量步兵过渡到西编队联合兵种概念，即装甲，步兵和空中力量在相互支持formations.23集成了第三代坦克终于露面，98/99型。迄今为止，已经很少生产，但它代表了中国armor.24迈进了一大步
空军和海军已经改变最显着。中国似乎已经推迟了运营商的梦想，而不是侧重于运营商的杀手，如俄罗斯和乌克兰购买了Sovremenny级驱逐舰。这些功能的高效炙巡航导弹。四基洛级潜艇也已购买，与八个更多order.25，目前该计划的26场'69潜艇，水面舰艇62，56两栖舰艇，39水雷战舰艇，368海岸巡逻艇和3补充，海上油人。'27一个令人惊讶的是，美国主要的大型船舶正在大连造船厂，这看起来是相当于建立了一个俄罗斯光荣级cruiser.28此外，计划是提高军官队伍的素质，有85％的海军军官已经大学educated.29
如果有的话，解放军空军已取得了更大进展。虽然古老的米格-21仍然占据了大部分战斗机部队，尖端苏-27已购买Russia.30最近联合美印演习是对美国的战略家冲击 - 叠起对俄罗斯战斗机F颇有15秒。中国正加紧与国内生产的俄罗斯战斗机，以及像空中加油机和预警飞机的战斗支援船。他们的权力大大提高了投影的IL - 76运输机购买，携带足够整个战斗旅。这些被分配到第15空降Army.31
第二炮兵，对中国的核武器保管，也正在经历快速现代化。决策者决定要升级从'最小'的威慑力量中一个'适度'的水平。 32这就需要一至九百弹头增加约四百，以及努力确保可信的第二次打击capability.33中国的老龄化洲际弹道导弹发射井队目前正在限制的，所以在运动计划，以取代旧的DF - 5公路机动的DF - 31秒迫使全球2010.34部分由于出口克林顿政府作出的决定，这些导弹将采用的MIRV技术，允许在一个单一的货运车辆多弹头。预计，美国人将有一个有限的导弹防御伞到那个时候，中国也纳入机动再入飞行器（的MARV）。从理论上讲，这将使他们的弹头，以逃避美国defenses.35的DF - 31有一个预测范围12,000公里，足以攻击美国大陆States.36此外，俄罗斯人在建造协助至少一种类型， 094弹道导弹潜艇。这将携带新的JL - 2潜射弹道导弹，与8000 km.37范围
回顾这样的军事进展，重要的是要查看上下文中。这些新的收购和理论的变化代表执政的中国军事投射一大跃进。不过，这将是一段时间才能够挑战美国和环太平洋地区霸权她的盟友。如果这些趋势继续在未来几十年，但是，它很可能是中国能做到许多人视为其长期目标 - 扭转了抗日战争的判决和更换作为该地区卓越的动力日本。与美国和中国的冲突是没有保证的方式，但中国蓬勃发展的经济实力和不断增强的民族意识似乎使耦合的竞争不可避免的水平。到中国军队现代化建设继续下，美国现在面临着一个艰巨的战略竞争对手。
在西方，对中国军队流行的概念仍处于由朝鲜冲突的人浪形的攻击很大程度上 - 最后一次中国与西方列强发生冲突，直接。一个入侵台湾的大陆概念是为约一个'百万人游泳，妙语连珠解雇多年。大规模的改革和现代化建设取得了这些观念，在新世纪日益虚假，尽管大西洋国家只是在缓慢地领悟到这些变化的现实。最近的一些文章和智囊团的报告接二连三正在纠正这一点，高估中国的军事潜力可能出现新的危险。对于批评诱惑夸大其军事实力可能会增加中国继续从冷战敌人的，我的敌人过渡到一个关键的战略竞争对手。不过，虽然平衡是必要的，但不可否认的是，中国已经在战争中的战斗潜力的巨大进步。
这种进步的根源可以在'四化'邓小平在70年代末公布的这为中国经济繁荣的阶段享有today.1国防部发现竟是经点算的现代化建设之一，但它采取了后座上，直到20世纪90年代末。几个因素结合当时的国防预算向上推。首先是经济发展本身，它能够把黄油和大炮生产。其次，政府觉得有必要在天安门补偿危机和其离职创业ventures.2最坚定地支持军事机构的支持，许多人由美国表现出的技术实力都惊呆了第一次海湾战争和科索沃的干预。有一种感觉，中国是军事上节节败退，被落在了后面西方经历了一个在军事事务（RMA）的0.3革命
当代中国的任何军事史上的讨论必须与缺乏透明度，介绍到大多数可用的统计信息的投机成份。例如，官方的人民解放军2003年的预算是22.4亿美元，增长9.6％。美国中央情报局估计开支的真实水平在45至65亿美元，而美国国防部的地方是从65到800亿dollars.4不可否认的是，即使官方数字都在近年来不断攀升。与西方技术在天安门屠杀事件禁运，俄罗斯和乌克兰仍然是高技术武器装备到解放军的主要供应商。采购外国武器平均每年7.00亿，在90年代，但这个比率在过去五年years.5一倍
伴随着增加开支来在20世纪的最后几年大规模的部队削减。 1997年至2000年，军队削减了11.4％和18.6％，空军，海军12.6％，在0.6的人多势众的地方，中国是代小，更好的装备和更多的专业单位。正如一个国家的情况白皮书'的中国军队坚持走有中国特色的精兵之路'，是对'机械化的历史任务，重点和资讯科技应用，从而带来的跨越式发展的现代化military'7
这些变化正在内冷战后的现实情况下发生很大改变。俄罗斯的前身是一个敌对的中立领土作为他们的主要威胁视为中国战略家。然而，近年来一直朝着一个方向的战略伙伴关系，以抗衡美国。这已经表示，主要是通过军售，但最近的大规模联合军事演习指向一个深化的relationship.8
与此同时，美国已经取代中国的俄罗斯关注的焦点。很多评论是用于后苏联转变作为首要障碍，实现中国的外交政策的首要目标是单极world.9许多人认为美国 - 以此作为地区主要大国的天然场所。美国支持台湾，在SDI计划;，它与在后天安门对中国武器禁运的欧盟参与其废除反导条约都视为敌对意图的证据。就其本身而言，中国的外交精力致力于破坏了该地区对美国政策的基础 - 以双边安全安排，如日本，韩国和others.10国家系列
随着年龄的增长，中国在世界上的军事个人资料仍然相当小。海外基础仍然很小，这在联合国维和行动的参与。截至2002年，中国已遍布六regions.11出一种努力提高企业的知名度，是在2002年5月进行的环游世界的邮轮，为中国navy.12第一只看到五十三蓝盔
中国的军事学说已经发展到面对不断变化的世界局势。自从毛泽东时代，战略都围绕一个'人民战争'参与'纵深防御' - 换句话说，对一个大规模的，欧式敌人的战争。近年来，该让位给了一个'主动周边防御的战略，强调小，较高科技单位和一个大型海上component.13短语人们经常听到的是'高技术条件下局部战争。'而不是战争磨自然减员，战略家寻求一种快速的胜利对有限的政策goals.14面向与日本和美国的潜在对手一大享受质量优势，在中国的重点是不对称的作战战术，将利用高依赖的外国军队在通信技术的攻击，指挥和控制关键漏洞。要做到这一点，中国领导人认为他们没有必要完全克服技术差距，但可以改为依靠邓小平什么所谓的'卓越选择性的口袋。'15
如上所述，积极周边防御带入其own.16而不仅仅是保卫沿海的解放军海军（PLAN），该计划目前的重点海上封锁，如防止任何潜在的防卫台湾参加美国海军。 17计划的主要职责之一是维护中国的石油流量。在这种追求，他们正在建立一个从家里'珍珠链'到中东，字符串中的最大的珍珠是在瓜达尔，Pakistan.18海军基地
从地理上看，中国的军事注意力已经从苏联转移到southeast.19最大的两个地区爆发点是台湾及南中国海。台湾已经获得了大部分的关注份额，与台北参加的独立和中国的军刀不断增加的数量暂定剑拔弩张方向的步骤。早在2005年中国通过了反分裂国家法提供了比以往任何时候以前existed.20在一个更具体的层面上加强军事干预的法律依据，他们有几百名台湾对面的位置弹道导弹，并大大加强了收购及培训在过去两年两栖登陆艇。 21
而较少的宣传，中国是沉浸在南方中国Sea多个领土争端。这主要是对几个岛屿群，包括南沙和日本尖阁列岛的所有权。中国在这一地区的兴趣来自无论从安全问题和对能源无法满足需求 - 中国专家认为，2130亿美元的石油桶等待下面的水域。该计划采取了行动颇为自信地在这些分歧，竟然以建立一个全面的堡垒上的一个岛屿声称Philippines.22
为应对这些挑战，中国已积极更新其过时的武器装备。人民解放军是由大量步兵过渡到西编队联合兵种概念，即装甲，步兵和空中力量在相互支持formations.23集成了第三代坦克终于露面，98/99型。迄今为止，已经很少生产，但它代表了中国armor.24迈进了一大步
空军和海军已经改变最显着。中国似乎已经推迟了运营商的梦想，而不是侧重于运营商的杀手，如俄罗斯和乌克兰购买了Sovremenny级驱逐舰。这些功能的高效炙巡航导弹。四基洛级潜艇也已购买，与八个更多order.25，目前该计划的26场'69潜艇，水面舰艇62，56两栖舰艇，39水雷战舰艇，368海岸巡逻艇和3补充，海上油人。'27一个令人惊讶的是，美国主要的大型船舶正在大连造船厂，这看起来是相当于建立了一个俄罗斯光荣级cruiser.28此外，计划是提高军官队伍的素质，有85％的海军军官已经大学educated.29
如果有的话，解放军空军已取得了更大进展。虽然古老的米格-21仍然占据了大部分战斗机部队，尖端苏-27已购买Russia.30最近联合美印演习是对美国的战略家冲击 - 叠起对俄罗斯战斗机F颇有15秒。中国正加紧与国内生产的俄罗斯战斗机，以及像空中加油机和预警飞机的战斗支援船。他们的权力大大提高了投影的IL - 76运输机购买，携带足够整个战斗旅。这些被分配到第15空降Army.31
第二炮兵，对中国的核武器保管，也正在经历快速现代化。决策者决定要升级从'最小'的威慑力量中一个'适度'的水平。 32这就需要一至九百弹头增加约四百，以及努力确保可信的第二次打击capability.33中国的老龄化洲际弹道导弹发射井队目前正在限制的，所以在运动计划，以取代旧的DF - 5公路机动的DF - 31秒迫使全球2010.34部分由于出口克林顿政府作出的决定，这些导弹将采用的MIRV技术，允许在一个单一的货运车辆多弹头。预计，美国人将有一个有限的导弹防御伞到那个时候，中国也纳入机动再入飞行器（的MARV）。从理论上讲，这将使他们的弹头，以逃避美国defenses.35的DF - 31有一个预测范围12,000公里，足以攻击美国大陆States.36此外，俄罗斯人在建造协助至少一种类型， 094弹道导弹潜艇。这将携带新的JL - 2潜射弹道导弹，与8000 km.37范围
回顾这样的军事进展，重要的是要查看上下文中。这些新的收购和理论的变化代表执政的中国军事投射一大跃进。不过，这将是一段时间才能够挑战美国和环太平洋地区霸权她的盟友。如果这些趋势继续在未来几十年，但是，它很可能是中国能做到许多人视为其长期目标 - 扭转了抗日战争的判决和更换作为该地区卓越的动力日本。与美国和中国的冲突是没有保证的方式，但中国蓬勃发展的经济实力和不断增强的民族意识似乎使耦合的竞争不可避免的水平。到中国军队现代化建设继续下，美国现在面临着一个艰巨的战略竞争对手。
http://www.economist.com/node/17601487
A special report on China's place in the world
The fourth modernisation
China is becoming a military force to reckon with in the western Pacific. How should America respond?
Dec 2nd 2010 | from PRINT EDITION
THIRTY-FIVE years ago Deng Xiaoping accused the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of “bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance and inertia”. Even so, three years later, when he set about modernising China, he put the PLA last in the queue, behind farming, industry and science. And when the commander of the navy in 1982 laid out his plans for China to become a world sea power, he did not expect his goal to be realised before 2040.
Later military modernisation became more of a priority, thanks to two demonstrations of American firepower. First, America’s use of precision weapons in Operation Desert Storm during the first Gulf war convinced China that it could no longer base its defence on the weight of numbers. Second, when the PLA was hectoring Taiwan with missile tests in 1996, President Bill Clinton ordered two aircraft-carrier strike groups into the region, one of them headed by the provocatively named USS Independence. China had to back down.
The collapse of the Soviet Union had persuaded China’s leaders that an arms race with the world’s only superpower could squander enough money to pose a threat to the party’s grip. To challenge America head on made no sense. Instead China put its efforts into affordable “asymmetric” weapons.
This unorthodox strategy has made the PLA’s progress harder to measure. Western opinion is deeply divided. Military analysts are alarmed at what they see as a growing threat to American maritime supremacy in the western Pacific. China security specialists tend to scoff at all the scaremongering. Who is right?
Three areas of the PLA’s modernisation stand out. First, China has created what the Pentagon calls “the most active land-based ballistic- and cruise-missile programme in the world”. The Second Artillery has about 1,100 short-range ballistic missiles facing Taiwan and has been extending their range and improving their accuracy and payload. The Second Artillery is also improving its medium-range ballistic missiles, able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. The PLA has deployed several hundred air- and land-launched long-range cruise missiles. And it is developing the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, fitted with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle for added menace.
Second, China has transformed and enlarged its submarine fleet, which can now berth in the newly completed base on Hainan Island, just off China’s southern coast. In the eight years to 2002 China bought 12 Russian Kilo-class submarines, a big improvement on its own noisy Ming- and Romeo-class boats. Since then the PLA navy has been introducing longer-range and stealthier Chinese designs, including the nuclear-powered Jin class, which carries ballistic missiles, and the Shang class, a nuclear-powered attack submarine. China has about 66 submarines against America’s 71, though the American boats are superior. By 2030, according to the Kokoda Foundation, an Australian think-tank, China could have 85-100 submarines.
And third, China has concentrated on what it calls “informatisation”, a tongue-twister that Jiang Zemin coined in 2002 to describe how the PLA needs to function as one force, using sensors, communications and electronic and cyber-warfare. China now has a good idea of what is going on far into the Pacific, thanks to a combination of satellites, over-the-horizon radar, medium-range surface-wave radars, reconnaissance drones and underwater-sensor arrays.
China has also been working on anti-satellite weapons. American satellites have been “dazzled” by lasers fired from the ground. And in 2007 a ballistic missile launched from Xichang space centre in Sichuan blew up a broken weather satellite—no mean feat, though other countries were furious because it produced more than 35,000 new pieces of space debris.
Chinese hackers have been busy, too. In March last year Canadian researchers discovered a spy network containing more than 1,300 computers, many of them in China, that had got into governments’ systems. Taiwanese and Western targets suffered from severe Chinese cyber-attacks at least 35 times in the decade to 2009, according to Northrop Grumman, an American defence contractor. The Pentagon concedes that it is not sure the PLA was behind such attacks, but argues that “authoritative” analysts in the PLA see cyber-warfare as important.
The new arsenal
What does this amount to? Military experts in America, Australia and Japan think China’s new arsenals are a greater threat than its higher-profile plans to launch aircraft-carriers in the next decade or so. Alan Dupont, of the University of Sydney in Australia, says that “missiles and cyber-equivalents are becoming the weapons of choice for the conventionally outgunned.”
According to the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an American research institute, Chinese firepower threatens America’s Asian bases, which until now have been safe from all but nuclear attack. The Second Artillery’s missiles could swamp the bases’ defences and destroy runways as well as large numbers of fighters and ships. Japan is already within range of Chinese missiles, many of them currently pointing at Taiwan. Guam soon will be (see chart 1).
China’s submarines, missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles threaten America’s aircraft-carrier strike groups within 1,000 to 1,600 nautical miles of the Chinese coast. According to Ross Babbage, an Australian defence analyst and founder of the Kokoda Foundation, if China had an anti-ship ballistic missile, coming in fast and without much warning, it would be even harder to defend against. And China’s space and cyber-weapons could serve as what Chinese planners label an “assassin’s mace” in a surprise attack designed to smash America’s elaborate but fragile electronic networks. That would leave American forces half-blind and mute, and its bases and carriers more vulnerable still.
In sum, China’s abilities to strike have soared far beyond seeking to deter American intervention in any future mainland dispute with Taiwan. Today China can project power out from its coastline well beyond the 12-mile (19km) limit that the Americans once approached without a second thought. Mr Okamoto, the Japanese security expert, believes China’s strategy is to have “complete control” of what planners call the First Island Chain. Ultimately, China seems to want to stop the American fleet from being able to secure its interests in the western Pacific.
America’s most senior officials have taken note. Last year Robert Gates, the defence secretary, gave warning that “investments [of countries like China] in cyber- and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry and ballistic missiles could threaten America’s primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups.”
Mr Babbage is blunter: “Current defence planning is invalid,” he says. He and the analysts at CSBA argue that America needs to rethink its strategy in the Pacific. It should strengthen its bases and be able to disrupt Chinese attacks with decoys and by spreading aircraft and ships around the region. American forces must have better logistics and be able to fight even when their information networks are impaired. Crucially, they must be in a position to disable China’s electronic reconnaissance, surveillance and battle-damage assessment, some of which is protected by a system of tunnels beyond easy reach of American weapons.
Pacific in name only
Critics say the cold warriors are suffering from a bad case of “enemy-deprivation syndrome”. For a start, the impression that China’s defence spending has soared is misleading. The PLA’s budget has broadly kept pace with GDP in the past decade, after two decades in which its share of GDP fell (see chart 2). Experts differ about the size of China’s defence budget, which is only partly disclosed. Sam Perlo-Freeman, of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, puts overall spending in 2009 at $99 billion in 2008 dollars, though some estimates are higher and the official total is only $70 billion. The United States is planning to spend $663 billion. As a share of GDP, China spends less than half the American figure and less than it did at the start of the 1990s. “There is not much evidence of an arms race,” says Mr Perlo-Freeman.
Some doubt the quality of China’s equipment. One retired American admiral says that much of the Russian equipment it bought was “junk”. Despite China’s progress, it lags in guidance and control, turbine engines, machine tools, diagnostic and forensic equipment and computer-aided design and manufacturing. “China has come a long way fast,” says Professor Dupont, “but military modernisation gets harder from here.”
Some have doubts about China’s manpower, too. The PLA is much more professional now than when it was a peasant army, but it lacks experience. Nigel Inkster, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), recalls one of the founders of the Chinese navy once telling him: “It’s not that I didn’t know much about sailing, but I hadn’t ever seen the sea.”
Complex subjects like submarine warfare take years to master. “If you fight, there are holes,” says the IISS’s Christian Le Mière. “And until you do, you don’t know where they are.” The retired admiral thinks Chinese forces suffer from a lack of trust, which could slow them up in battle. “We give our people responsibility and initiative,” he says. “That’s anathema to them.”
Robert Ross, a professor at Harvard, argues that the pessimists overestimate China’s threat and underestimate America’s powers. The United States is better able to track the other side’s submarines; it is superior in cyber-warfare and less vulnerable than China in space—if only because it has built-in redundancy. China would struggle to penetrate the countermeasures and electronic camouflage that protect American ships. Carlyle Thayer, of the Australian Defence Force Academy, notes that it has already deployed 31 of its 53 fast-attack submarines and three Ohio class nuclear submarines to the Pacific.
For all the uncertainties in this debate, three things are beyond dispute. First, China has already forced American ships to think about how and when they approach the Chinese coast. The closer American vessels come, the more missiles and submarines they face and the less time they would have to react to a strike. Anyone sailing a carrier worth $15 billion-20 billion with a crew of 6,000 would think twice about taking on that extra risk. To deny America possession of seas it has dominated for decades, China does not need to control its own coastal waters; it just has to be able to threaten American ships there. Hugh White, a former Australian security and defence official, foresees the western Pacific becoming a “naval no-go zone”.
Second, China’s ability to project power is improving. Its submarines, fighter aircraft, missiles, and cyber- and electronic warfare, once poor, now pose a threat. China’s weapons will continue to improve, and its forces will gather experience. Provided that the economy does not fall over, budgets will grow, too, absolutely and possibly as a share of GDP. Other things being equal, China can project power into its backyard more easily than America can project power across the Pacific Ocean. At risk is what Mr Gates has called “the operational sanctuary our navy has enjoyed in the western Pacific for the better part of six decades”.
Third, although the United States is able to respond to China, it will have to overcome some obstacles first. America’s military spending in Asia is overshadowed by the need to cut overall government spending and by other military priorities, such as Afghanistan. Jonathan Pollack, of the Brookings Institution, points out that some ideas, such as replacing aircraft-carriers with more submarines, would inevitably run into opposition from the navy and from politicians whose constituencies would suffer. “For many officers the navy’s core institutional identity is indelibly tied to carriers and the power-projection mission they perform,” he says. “Reducing their numbers is going to be a very painful process.” Above all, big shifts in military planning take decades: America needs to think now about China in 2025.
All this points to an important principle. Military planning is framed differently from diplomacy. Diplomats are interested in what they think states intend to do, but military planners have to work with what they think states can do. Intentions change and states can mislead. If you are charged with defending your country, you need to be able to meet even improbable threats.
That logic works in China, too. America has not been shy of going to war in recent years. Not long ago a retired Chinese admiral likened the American navy to a man with a criminal record “wandering just outside the gate of a family home”. American strength in the 1990s made China feel insecure, so it transformed the PLA to shore up its policy on Taiwan and protect its economically vital coastline. Yet by adding to its own security, China has taken away from that of its neighbours and of the United States. Perhaps China does not mean ever to use its weapons aggressively. But American defence planners cannot rely on that, so they must respond.
In this way two states that never intend harm can begin to perceive each other as growing threats. If you do not arm, you leave yourself open to attack. If you do, you threaten the other country. A British historian, Herbert Butterfield, called this the “absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma”. It is one reason why relations between China and America will probably sour.
from PRINT EDITION | Special reports
A special report on China's place in the world
The fourth modernisation
China is becoming a military force to reckon with in the western Pacific. How should America respond?
Dec 2nd 2010 | from PRINT EDITION
THIRTY-FIVE years ago Deng Xiaoping accused the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of “bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance and inertia”. Even so, three years later, when he set about modernising China, he put the PLA last in the queue, behind farming, industry and science. And when the commander of the navy in 1982 laid out his plans for China to become a world sea power, he did not expect his goal to be realised before 2040.
Later military modernisation became more of a priority, thanks to two demonstrations of American firepower. First, America’s use of precision weapons in Operation Desert Storm during the first Gulf war convinced China that it could no longer base its defence on the weight of numbers. Second, when the PLA was hectoring Taiwan with missile tests in 1996, President Bill Clinton ordered two aircraft-carrier strike groups into the region, one of them headed by the provocatively named USS Independence. China had to back down.
The collapse of the Soviet Union had persuaded China’s leaders that an arms race with the world’s only superpower could squander enough money to pose a threat to the party’s grip. To challenge America head on made no sense. Instead China put its efforts into affordable “asymmetric” weapons.
This unorthodox strategy has made the PLA’s progress harder to measure. Western opinion is deeply divided. Military analysts are alarmed at what they see as a growing threat to American maritime supremacy in the western Pacific. China security specialists tend to scoff at all the scaremongering. Who is right?
Three areas of the PLA’s modernisation stand out. First, China has created what the Pentagon calls “the most active land-based ballistic- and cruise-missile programme in the world”. The Second Artillery has about 1,100 short-range ballistic missiles facing Taiwan and has been extending their range and improving their accuracy and payload. The Second Artillery is also improving its medium-range ballistic missiles, able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. The PLA has deployed several hundred air- and land-launched long-range cruise missiles. And it is developing the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, fitted with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle for added menace.
Second, China has transformed and enlarged its submarine fleet, which can now berth in the newly completed base on Hainan Island, just off China’s southern coast. In the eight years to 2002 China bought 12 Russian Kilo-class submarines, a big improvement on its own noisy Ming- and Romeo-class boats. Since then the PLA navy has been introducing longer-range and stealthier Chinese designs, including the nuclear-powered Jin class, which carries ballistic missiles, and the Shang class, a nuclear-powered attack submarine. China has about 66 submarines against America’s 71, though the American boats are superior. By 2030, according to the Kokoda Foundation, an Australian think-tank, China could have 85-100 submarines.
And third, China has concentrated on what it calls “informatisation”, a tongue-twister that Jiang Zemin coined in 2002 to describe how the PLA needs to function as one force, using sensors, communications and electronic and cyber-warfare. China now has a good idea of what is going on far into the Pacific, thanks to a combination of satellites, over-the-horizon radar, medium-range surface-wave radars, reconnaissance drones and underwater-sensor arrays.
China has also been working on anti-satellite weapons. American satellites have been “dazzled” by lasers fired from the ground. And in 2007 a ballistic missile launched from Xichang space centre in Sichuan blew up a broken weather satellite—no mean feat, though other countries were furious because it produced more than 35,000 new pieces of space debris.
Chinese hackers have been busy, too. In March last year Canadian researchers discovered a spy network containing more than 1,300 computers, many of them in China, that had got into governments’ systems. Taiwanese and Western targets suffered from severe Chinese cyber-attacks at least 35 times in the decade to 2009, according to Northrop Grumman, an American defence contractor. The Pentagon concedes that it is not sure the PLA was behind such attacks, but argues that “authoritative” analysts in the PLA see cyber-warfare as important.
The new arsenal
What does this amount to? Military experts in America, Australia and Japan think China’s new arsenals are a greater threat than its higher-profile plans to launch aircraft-carriers in the next decade or so. Alan Dupont, of the University of Sydney in Australia, says that “missiles and cyber-equivalents are becoming the weapons of choice for the conventionally outgunned.”
According to the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an American research institute, Chinese firepower threatens America’s Asian bases, which until now have been safe from all but nuclear attack. The Second Artillery’s missiles could swamp the bases’ defences and destroy runways as well as large numbers of fighters and ships. Japan is already within range of Chinese missiles, many of them currently pointing at Taiwan. Guam soon will be (see chart 1).
China’s submarines, missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles threaten America’s aircraft-carrier strike groups within 1,000 to 1,600 nautical miles of the Chinese coast. According to Ross Babbage, an Australian defence analyst and founder of the Kokoda Foundation, if China had an anti-ship ballistic missile, coming in fast and without much warning, it would be even harder to defend against. And China’s space and cyber-weapons could serve as what Chinese planners label an “assassin’s mace” in a surprise attack designed to smash America’s elaborate but fragile electronic networks. That would leave American forces half-blind and mute, and its bases and carriers more vulnerable still.
In sum, China’s abilities to strike have soared far beyond seeking to deter American intervention in any future mainland dispute with Taiwan. Today China can project power out from its coastline well beyond the 12-mile (19km) limit that the Americans once approached without a second thought. Mr Okamoto, the Japanese security expert, believes China’s strategy is to have “complete control” of what planners call the First Island Chain. Ultimately, China seems to want to stop the American fleet from being able to secure its interests in the western Pacific.
America’s most senior officials have taken note. Last year Robert Gates, the defence secretary, gave warning that “investments [of countries like China] in cyber- and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry and ballistic missiles could threaten America’s primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups.”
Mr Babbage is blunter: “Current defence planning is invalid,” he says. He and the analysts at CSBA argue that America needs to rethink its strategy in the Pacific. It should strengthen its bases and be able to disrupt Chinese attacks with decoys and by spreading aircraft and ships around the region. American forces must have better logistics and be able to fight even when their information networks are impaired. Crucially, they must be in a position to disable China’s electronic reconnaissance, surveillance and battle-damage assessment, some of which is protected by a system of tunnels beyond easy reach of American weapons.
Pacific in name only
Critics say the cold warriors are suffering from a bad case of “enemy-deprivation syndrome”. For a start, the impression that China’s defence spending has soared is misleading. The PLA’s budget has broadly kept pace with GDP in the past decade, after two decades in which its share of GDP fell (see chart 2). Experts differ about the size of China’s defence budget, which is only partly disclosed. Sam Perlo-Freeman, of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, puts overall spending in 2009 at $99 billion in 2008 dollars, though some estimates are higher and the official total is only $70 billion. The United States is planning to spend $663 billion. As a share of GDP, China spends less than half the American figure and less than it did at the start of the 1990s. “There is not much evidence of an arms race,” says Mr Perlo-Freeman.
Some doubt the quality of China’s equipment. One retired American admiral says that much of the Russian equipment it bought was “junk”. Despite China’s progress, it lags in guidance and control, turbine engines, machine tools, diagnostic and forensic equipment and computer-aided design and manufacturing. “China has come a long way fast,” says Professor Dupont, “but military modernisation gets harder from here.”
Some have doubts about China’s manpower, too. The PLA is much more professional now than when it was a peasant army, but it lacks experience. Nigel Inkster, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), recalls one of the founders of the Chinese navy once telling him: “It’s not that I didn’t know much about sailing, but I hadn’t ever seen the sea.”
Complex subjects like submarine warfare take years to master. “If you fight, there are holes,” says the IISS’s Christian Le Mière. “And until you do, you don’t know where they are.” The retired admiral thinks Chinese forces suffer from a lack of trust, which could slow them up in battle. “We give our people responsibility and initiative,” he says. “That’s anathema to them.”
Robert Ross, a professor at Harvard, argues that the pessimists overestimate China’s threat and underestimate America’s powers. The United States is better able to track the other side’s submarines; it is superior in cyber-warfare and less vulnerable than China in space—if only because it has built-in redundancy. China would struggle to penetrate the countermeasures and electronic camouflage that protect American ships. Carlyle Thayer, of the Australian Defence Force Academy, notes that it has already deployed 31 of its 53 fast-attack submarines and three Ohio class nuclear submarines to the Pacific.
For all the uncertainties in this debate, three things are beyond dispute. First, China has already forced American ships to think about how and when they approach the Chinese coast. The closer American vessels come, the more missiles and submarines they face and the less time they would have to react to a strike. Anyone sailing a carrier worth $15 billion-20 billion with a crew of 6,000 would think twice about taking on that extra risk. To deny America possession of seas it has dominated for decades, China does not need to control its own coastal waters; it just has to be able to threaten American ships there. Hugh White, a former Australian security and defence official, foresees the western Pacific becoming a “naval no-go zone”.
Second, China’s ability to project power is improving. Its submarines, fighter aircraft, missiles, and cyber- and electronic warfare, once poor, now pose a threat. China’s weapons will continue to improve, and its forces will gather experience. Provided that the economy does not fall over, budgets will grow, too, absolutely and possibly as a share of GDP. Other things being equal, China can project power into its backyard more easily than America can project power across the Pacific Ocean. At risk is what Mr Gates has called “the operational sanctuary our navy has enjoyed in the western Pacific for the better part of six decades”.
Third, although the United States is able to respond to China, it will have to overcome some obstacles first. America’s military spending in Asia is overshadowed by the need to cut overall government spending and by other military priorities, such as Afghanistan. Jonathan Pollack, of the Brookings Institution, points out that some ideas, such as replacing aircraft-carriers with more submarines, would inevitably run into opposition from the navy and from politicians whose constituencies would suffer. “For many officers the navy’s core institutional identity is indelibly tied to carriers and the power-projection mission they perform,” he says. “Reducing their numbers is going to be a very painful process.” Above all, big shifts in military planning take decades: America needs to think now about China in 2025.
All this points to an important principle. Military planning is framed differently from diplomacy. Diplomats are interested in what they think states intend to do, but military planners have to work with what they think states can do. Intentions change and states can mislead. If you are charged with defending your country, you need to be able to meet even improbable threats.
That logic works in China, too. America has not been shy of going to war in recent years. Not long ago a retired Chinese admiral likened the American navy to a man with a criminal record “wandering just outside the gate of a family home”. American strength in the 1990s made China feel insecure, so it transformed the PLA to shore up its policy on Taiwan and protect its economically vital coastline. Yet by adding to its own security, China has taken away from that of its neighbours and of the United States. Perhaps China does not mean ever to use its weapons aggressively. But American defence planners cannot rely on that, so they must respond.
In this way two states that never intend harm can begin to perceive each other as growing threats. If you do not arm, you leave yourself open to attack. If you do, you threaten the other country. A British historian, Herbert Butterfield, called this the “absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma”. It is one reason why relations between China and America will probably sour.
from PRINT EDITION | Special reports
关于中国在世界上的地位的特别报告
第四现代化
中国正在成为一个不可忽视的军事力量在西太平洋。美国应如何应对？
2010年12月2号
第三十被告年前邓小平“腹胀，松弛，骄，奢，惯性”的解放军（解放军）。即便如此，三年后，当他开始对中国现代化建设，他把解放军队列中最后一个，仅次于农业，工业和科学。当海军司令于1982年制定了他的计划为中国成为世界海上强国，他没想到，他的目标是在2040年实现。
后来军事现代化变得更加优先，这要归功于两个美国人火力示范。首先，美国的沙漠风暴行动中使用精确制导武器在第一次海湾相信中国，它再也不能立足于人多势众的防御战争。其次，当解放军威吓与台湾在1996年试射导弹，美国总统克林顿下令对地区两个航空母舰战斗群，其中一人为首的挑逗独立号航空母舰命名。中国不得不后退。
苏联解体已经说服中国领导人，一个与世界上唯一的超级大国的军备竞赛足够的钱可以挥霍构成了党的控制的威胁。挑战美国头部没有任何意义。相反中国投入负担得起的“非对称”武器的努力。
这种非正统的战略取得了解放军的进步难以衡量的。西方舆论的严重分歧。军事分析家感到震惊的是他们作为一个日益严重的威胁到美国在西太平洋的海上霸权看到的。中国安全专家倾向于在所有的危言耸听嗤之以鼻。谁是对的？
三，解放军的现代化领域脱颖而出。首先，中国已经开发出了五角大楼称为“最活跃的陆基弹道导弹和巡航导弹的世界方案”。第二炮兵拥有约1100短程弹道导弹，面对台湾，并已扩大其范围，提高其准确度和有效载荷。第二炮兵还改进了中程弹道导弹，能携带常规方式或核弹头。解放军已经部署了数百空气和土地发射远程巡航导弹。它是发展中世界上第一个反舰弹道导弹，具有机动性重新入境的车辆将安装的威胁。
其次，中国已经改变，扩大潜艇舰队，可现在停泊在新建成的海南岛基地就在中国南部海岸。在八年到2002年中国购买了12个俄罗斯基洛级潜艇，在它自己的嘈杂明和罗密欧级船一大进步。自那时以来，解放军海军已经引进较隐蔽的范围和设计中，包括核动力金类，它携带弹道导弹，与殷商类，核动力攻击潜艇。中国对美国有大约66的71艘潜艇，但美国船只优越。到2030年，根据科科达基金会，澳大利亚的智囊团，中国可以有85-100潜艇。
第三，中国都集中在所谓的“信息化”，一个舌头，捻线，江泽民在2002年创造来形容解放军需要的功能为一体的力量，使用传感器，通信，电子和网络战。中国现在有什么打算，是对远在太平洋好主意，在卫星的组合下，过度的超视距雷达，中程表面波雷达，无人驾驶侦察机和水下传感器阵列。
中国也一直在研究反卫星武器。美国卫星已“眼花缭乱”的从地面发射激光。并在2007年的弹道导弹在四川西昌航天中心发射炸毁了一个破碎的气象卫星，绝非易事，但其他国家愤怒，因为它生产了超过35000件新的空间碎片。
中国黑客一直很忙。去年三月加拿大研究人员发现了一个间谍网中含有超过1300的计算机，其中许多是在中国，这已成为各国政府的系统了。台湾和西方目标中遭受了严重的网络，至少在35倍至2009年十年的袭击，据诺斯罗普格鲁门公司，美国国防承包商。五角大楼承认，这是不能确定解放军背后搞鬼，但认为“权威”解放军分析家认为网络作为重要的战争。
这一数额是什么？在美国，澳大利亚和日本军事专家认为中国的新库是一个比其高专计划在未来十年左右的航空母舰更大的威胁。艾伦杜邦在澳大利亚悉尼大学，说，“导弹和网络等值洛迪克成为对于传统的首选武器。”
据美国战略与预算评估（CSBA），美国研究所，中心中火力威胁美国在亚洲的基地，到现在为止已经从所有，但核攻击的安全。第二炮兵的导弹可能沼泽这些基地的防御系统，摧毁机场跑道以及大量战斗机和军舰。日本已经对中国导弹的射程之内，其中许多目前指向台湾。关岛将很快（见表1）。
中国的潜艇，导弹和反舰巡航导弹的威胁在1000美国的航母战斗群到1600的中国沿海海里。据罗斯巴贝奇，澳大利亚国防分析家和科科达基金会创办人，如果中国有一个反舰弹道导弹，它们以快捷，没有太多的警告，这将是更难抵御。而中国的太空和网络武器可以作为中国的规划者什么标签的设计，粉碎美国的精心易碎的电子网络，但突然袭击的“刺客的权杖”。这将使美国军队的半盲人和哑巴，其基地和运营商更容易之中。
总之，中国的能力已经远远超出工罢旨在对付未来在大陆与台湾的任何争议美国干预飙升。今天，中国可以从它的海岸线电力项目远远超出了12英里（19公里）的限制，美国人一次没有第二个想法接近。冈本先生，日本安全专家认为，中国的战略是有“完全控制”是什么？规划者称为第一岛链。最终，中国似乎想阻止能够确保在西太平洋的美国舰队的利益。
美国最高级官员已经注意到这一点。去年罗伯特盖茨的国防部长警告说，“投资[像中国国家]在网络和反卫星战，防空和反舰武器和弹道导弹的可能威胁美国的主要方式项目的权力和帮助在太平洋地区的盟友，尤其是我们前进的空军基地和航母战斗群。“
议员巴贝奇更加直率：“当前国防规划是无效的，”他说。他和在CSBA分析家认为，美国需要重新考虑其在太平洋的战略。它应加强其基础，并能破坏中国与诱饵攻击，散布在该地区的飞机和船只。美国军队必须拥有更好的物流和能战斗，即使他们的信息网络受损。重要的是，他们必须在一个中国禁用的电子侦察，监视和战斗损伤评估，其中一些是由一个隧道以后可以方便地前往美国武器系统的保护地位。
仅在名义上太平洋
批评人士说，冷战斗士是从“敌人剥夺综合症”的毛病。一开始，认为中国的国防开支飙升的印象是一种误导。解放军的预算大致保持在过去十年中，国内生产总值的步伐，在二十年后是其占GDP的比重下降（见图表2）。不同专家对中国的国防预算，这只是部分披露的大小。山姆Perlo -弗里曼斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所，在2009年提出的整体开支为99亿美元，2008年，虽然有些高，估计只有总的官方700亿美元。美国计划花费六千六百三十〇点零零亿美元。作为GDP的一部分，中国花费不到一半的美国数字和不足，这在20世纪90年代开始做。 “没有军备竞赛的很多证据，说：”先生Perlo -弗里曼。
有些怀疑中国的设备的质量。一位退休的海军上将说，美国对俄罗斯设备收购了多少是“垃圾”。尽管中国的进步，但落后于指导和控制，涡轮发动机，机床，诊断和法医设备和电脑辅助设计和制造。 “中国已经走过了很长的路快，”彭教授说，“但军队现代化愈来愈难在这里。”
一些对中国的人力怀疑了。人民解放军是更专业时相比，现在这是一个农民的军队，但它缺乏经验。奈杰尔英克斯特，在对国际战略研究所（战略研究所），回顾了曾经告诉他中国海军的创始人之一：“这并不是说我不知道关于航海的不多，但我还没有见过大海。 “
像潜艇战复杂的问题需要时间去掌握。 “如果你打，有洞，说：”国际战略研究所的基督教乐Mière。 “，直到你做什么，你不知道他们在哪里。”这位退休海军上将认为，中国军队从一个缺乏信任，这可能会减缓它们在战斗中受损。 “我们给我们的人民责任感和主动性，”他说。 “这是诅咒他们。”
罗伯特罗斯，哈佛大学教授，悲观者认为，过高估计中国的威胁和低估美国的权力。美国能够更好地跟踪对方的潜艇，它是优越的网络战，不到中国脆弱的空间，如果仅仅是因为它具有内置冗余。中国将难以渗透的对策和电子伪装，以保护美国船只。凯雷塞耶，澳大利亚国防学院，注意到它已经部署了53个快速攻击潜艇和三俄亥俄级核潜艇31到太平洋。
对于所有在这次辩论中的不确定性，三件事情是不容置疑的。首先，中国已经迫使美国军舰去思考如何当他们接近中国海岸。越接近美国船只来，更多的导弹和潜艇以及他们所面临的时间就越少，他们将不得不作出反应工罢。任何航行了6000名机组人员价值150亿美元，200亿承运人将三思而后行的额外承担风险。美国否认它已拥有几十年的统治海洋，中国并不需要控制自己的沿海水域，它只是能够威胁美国的舰艇了。休怀特，前澳大利亚安全和国防官员说，预计成为西太平洋“海军无禁区”。
第二，中国的电力项目的能力正在改善。潜艇，战斗机，导弹，以及网络和电子战，曾经贫穷，现在构成了威胁。中国的武器将继续改善，它的力量会积累经验。只要经济不摔倒，预算将增长，也绝对，也可能占GDP的份额。在其他条件相同的事情，中国可以投射到它的后院功率比美国可以更容易地跨越太平洋项目的权力。风险是盖茨先生所说的“我们的业务避难所海军在西太平洋地区享有了六十年的大部分时间。”
第三，虽然美国能够应对中国，它必须先克服一些障碍。美国在亚洲的军事开支是蒙上了一层阴影需要削减整体政府开支和其他军事优先事项，如阿富汗。乔纳森波拉克在布鲁金斯研究所指出，如更换更潜艇航空母舰一些想法，将不可避免地遇到来自海军和政治家的选举会受到反对。 “对于很多海军军官的身份是不可磨灭的核心机构捆绑运营商和电力投影他们执行任务，”他说。 “。减少它们的数量将是一个非常痛苦的过程”首先，在军事规划需要几十年的大转变：美国需要考虑中国现在在2025年。
所有这些都指向一个重要的原则。不同的军事计划是从外交的框架。外交官们在他们认为国打算这样做，但军方规划者必须与他们认为国家可以做的兴趣。意向变化，各国可以误导。如果你对你的国家辩护费用，您需要能够满足甚至不可能的威胁。
这种逻辑在中国工作了。美国并没有打算在最近几年的战争害羞。不久前，一位退休的中国比作美国的海军少将对一个人有犯罪记录“在外面的一个家门口就是”。 20世纪90年代美国的力量使中国感到不安全，所以它改变了解放军支撑其对台湾的政策和保护本国经济的重要海岸线。然而，通过添加到自身的安全，中国采取了远离它的邻国和美国的。也许，中国并不意味着在任何时候用武器积极。但是，美国国防规划者不能依赖关于这一点，所以他们必须作出反应。
这样两个国家从未打算损害可以开始认识到，越来越多的威胁对方。如果你没有手臂，你会把自己暴露给攻击。如果你这样做，你威胁到其他国家。英国历史学家，赫伯特菲尔德，称这是“绝对的困境和束缚的困境”。这就是为什么中国和美国之间的关系可能会酸的。
第四现代化
中国正在成为一个不可忽视的军事力量在西太平洋。美国应如何应对？
2010年12月2号
第三十被告年前邓小平“腹胀，松弛，骄，奢，惯性”的解放军（解放军）。即便如此，三年后，当他开始对中国现代化建设，他把解放军队列中最后一个，仅次于农业，工业和科学。当海军司令于1982年制定了他的计划为中国成为世界海上强国，他没想到，他的目标是在2040年实现。
后来军事现代化变得更加优先，这要归功于两个美国人火力示范。首先，美国的沙漠风暴行动中使用精确制导武器在第一次海湾相信中国，它再也不能立足于人多势众的防御战争。其次，当解放军威吓与台湾在1996年试射导弹，美国总统克林顿下令对地区两个航空母舰战斗群，其中一人为首的挑逗独立号航空母舰命名。中国不得不后退。
苏联解体已经说服中国领导人，一个与世界上唯一的超级大国的军备竞赛足够的钱可以挥霍构成了党的控制的威胁。挑战美国头部没有任何意义。相反中国投入负担得起的“非对称”武器的努力。
这种非正统的战略取得了解放军的进步难以衡量的。西方舆论的严重分歧。军事分析家感到震惊的是他们作为一个日益严重的威胁到美国在西太平洋的海上霸权看到的。中国安全专家倾向于在所有的危言耸听嗤之以鼻。谁是对的？
三，解放军的现代化领域脱颖而出。首先，中国已经开发出了五角大楼称为“最活跃的陆基弹道导弹和巡航导弹的世界方案”。第二炮兵拥有约1100短程弹道导弹，面对台湾，并已扩大其范围，提高其准确度和有效载荷。第二炮兵还改进了中程弹道导弹，能携带常规方式或核弹头。解放军已经部署了数百空气和土地发射远程巡航导弹。它是发展中世界上第一个反舰弹道导弹，具有机动性重新入境的车辆将安装的威胁。
其次，中国已经改变，扩大潜艇舰队，可现在停泊在新建成的海南岛基地就在中国南部海岸。在八年到2002年中国购买了12个俄罗斯基洛级潜艇，在它自己的嘈杂明和罗密欧级船一大进步。自那时以来，解放军海军已经引进较隐蔽的范围和设计中，包括核动力金类，它携带弹道导弹，与殷商类，核动力攻击潜艇。中国对美国有大约66的71艘潜艇，但美国船只优越。到2030年，根据科科达基金会，澳大利亚的智囊团，中国可以有85-100潜艇。
第三，中国都集中在所谓的“信息化”，一个舌头，捻线，江泽民在2002年创造来形容解放军需要的功能为一体的力量，使用传感器，通信，电子和网络战。中国现在有什么打算，是对远在太平洋好主意，在卫星的组合下，过度的超视距雷达，中程表面波雷达，无人驾驶侦察机和水下传感器阵列。
中国也一直在研究反卫星武器。美国卫星已“眼花缭乱”的从地面发射激光。并在2007年的弹道导弹在四川西昌航天中心发射炸毁了一个破碎的气象卫星，绝非易事，但其他国家愤怒，因为它生产了超过35000件新的空间碎片。
中国黑客一直很忙。去年三月加拿大研究人员发现了一个间谍网中含有超过1300的计算机，其中许多是在中国，这已成为各国政府的系统了。台湾和西方目标中遭受了严重的网络，至少在35倍至2009年十年的袭击，据诺斯罗普格鲁门公司，美国国防承包商。五角大楼承认，这是不能确定解放军背后搞鬼，但认为“权威”解放军分析家认为网络作为重要的战争。
这一数额是什么？在美国，澳大利亚和日本军事专家认为中国的新库是一个比其高专计划在未来十年左右的航空母舰更大的威胁。艾伦杜邦在澳大利亚悉尼大学，说，“导弹和网络等值洛迪克成为对于传统的首选武器。”
据美国战略与预算评估（CSBA），美国研究所，中心中火力威胁美国在亚洲的基地，到现在为止已经从所有，但核攻击的安全。第二炮兵的导弹可能沼泽这些基地的防御系统，摧毁机场跑道以及大量战斗机和军舰。日本已经对中国导弹的射程之内，其中许多目前指向台湾。关岛将很快（见表1）。
中国的潜艇，导弹和反舰巡航导弹的威胁在1000美国的航母战斗群到1600的中国沿海海里。据罗斯巴贝奇，澳大利亚国防分析家和科科达基金会创办人，如果中国有一个反舰弹道导弹，它们以快捷，没有太多的警告，这将是更难抵御。而中国的太空和网络武器可以作为中国的规划者什么标签的设计，粉碎美国的精心易碎的电子网络，但突然袭击的“刺客的权杖”。这将使美国军队的半盲人和哑巴，其基地和运营商更容易之中。
总之，中国的能力已经远远超出工罢旨在对付未来在大陆与台湾的任何争议美国干预飙升。今天，中国可以从它的海岸线电力项目远远超出了12英里（19公里）的限制，美国人一次没有第二个想法接近。冈本先生，日本安全专家认为，中国的战略是有“完全控制”是什么？规划者称为第一岛链。最终，中国似乎想阻止能够确保在西太平洋的美国舰队的利益。
美国最高级官员已经注意到这一点。去年罗伯特盖茨的国防部长警告说，“投资[像中国国家]在网络和反卫星战，防空和反舰武器和弹道导弹的可能威胁美国的主要方式项目的权力和帮助在太平洋地区的盟友，尤其是我们前进的空军基地和航母战斗群。“
议员巴贝奇更加直率：“当前国防规划是无效的，”他说。他和在CSBA分析家认为，美国需要重新考虑其在太平洋的战略。它应加强其基础，并能破坏中国与诱饵攻击，散布在该地区的飞机和船只。美国军队必须拥有更好的物流和能战斗，即使他们的信息网络受损。重要的是，他们必须在一个中国禁用的电子侦察，监视和战斗损伤评估，其中一些是由一个隧道以后可以方便地前往美国武器系统的保护地位。
仅在名义上太平洋
批评人士说，冷战斗士是从“敌人剥夺综合症”的毛病。一开始，认为中国的国防开支飙升的印象是一种误导。解放军的预算大致保持在过去十年中，国内生产总值的步伐，在二十年后是其占GDP的比重下降（见图表2）。不同专家对中国的国防预算，这只是部分披露的大小。山姆Perlo -弗里曼斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所，在2009年提出的整体开支为99亿美元，2008年，虽然有些高，估计只有总的官方700亿美元。美国计划花费六千六百三十〇点零零亿美元。作为GDP的一部分，中国花费不到一半的美国数字和不足，这在20世纪90年代开始做。 “没有军备竞赛的很多证据，说：”先生Perlo -弗里曼。
有些怀疑中国的设备的质量。一位退休的海军上将说，美国对俄罗斯设备收购了多少是“垃圾”。尽管中国的进步，但落后于指导和控制，涡轮发动机，机床，诊断和法医设备和电脑辅助设计和制造。 “中国已经走过了很长的路快，”彭教授说，“但军队现代化愈来愈难在这里。”
一些对中国的人力怀疑了。人民解放军是更专业时相比，现在这是一个农民的军队，但它缺乏经验。奈杰尔英克斯特，在对国际战略研究所（战略研究所），回顾了曾经告诉他中国海军的创始人之一：“这并不是说我不知道关于航海的不多，但我还没有见过大海。 “
像潜艇战复杂的问题需要时间去掌握。 “如果你打，有洞，说：”国际战略研究所的基督教乐Mière。 “，直到你做什么，你不知道他们在哪里。”这位退休海军上将认为，中国军队从一个缺乏信任，这可能会减缓它们在战斗中受损。 “我们给我们的人民责任感和主动性，”他说。 “这是诅咒他们。”
罗伯特罗斯，哈佛大学教授，悲观者认为，过高估计中国的威胁和低估美国的权力。美国能够更好地跟踪对方的潜艇，它是优越的网络战，不到中国脆弱的空间，如果仅仅是因为它具有内置冗余。中国将难以渗透的对策和电子伪装，以保护美国船只。凯雷塞耶，澳大利亚国防学院，注意到它已经部署了53个快速攻击潜艇和三俄亥俄级核潜艇31到太平洋。
对于所有在这次辩论中的不确定性，三件事情是不容置疑的。首先，中国已经迫使美国军舰去思考如何当他们接近中国海岸。越接近美国船只来，更多的导弹和潜艇以及他们所面临的时间就越少，他们将不得不作出反应工罢。任何航行了6000名机组人员价值150亿美元，200亿承运人将三思而后行的额外承担风险。美国否认它已拥有几十年的统治海洋，中国并不需要控制自己的沿海水域，它只是能够威胁美国的舰艇了。休怀特，前澳大利亚安全和国防官员说，预计成为西太平洋“海军无禁区”。
第二，中国的电力项目的能力正在改善。潜艇，战斗机，导弹，以及网络和电子战，曾经贫穷，现在构成了威胁。中国的武器将继续改善，它的力量会积累经验。只要经济不摔倒，预算将增长，也绝对，也可能占GDP的份额。在其他条件相同的事情，中国可以投射到它的后院功率比美国可以更容易地跨越太平洋项目的权力。风险是盖茨先生所说的“我们的业务避难所海军在西太平洋地区享有了六十年的大部分时间。”
第三，虽然美国能够应对中国，它必须先克服一些障碍。美国在亚洲的军事开支是蒙上了一层阴影需要削减整体政府开支和其他军事优先事项，如阿富汗。乔纳森波拉克在布鲁金斯研究所指出，如更换更潜艇航空母舰一些想法，将不可避免地遇到来自海军和政治家的选举会受到反对。 “对于很多海军军官的身份是不可磨灭的核心机构捆绑运营商和电力投影他们执行任务，”他说。 “。减少它们的数量将是一个非常痛苦的过程”首先，在军事规划需要几十年的大转变：美国需要考虑中国现在在2025年。
所有这些都指向一个重要的原则。不同的军事计划是从外交的框架。外交官们在他们认为国打算这样做，但军方规划者必须与他们认为国家可以做的兴趣。意向变化，各国可以误导。如果你对你的国家辩护费用，您需要能够满足甚至不可能的威胁。
这种逻辑在中国工作了。美国并没有打算在最近几年的战争害羞。不久前，一位退休的中国比作美国的海军少将对一个人有犯罪记录“在外面的一个家门口就是”。 20世纪90年代美国的力量使中国感到不安全，所以它改变了解放军支撑其对台湾的政策和保护本国经济的重要海岸线。然而，通过添加到自身的安全，中国采取了远离它的邻国和美国的。也许，中国并不意味着在任何时候用武器积极。但是，美国国防规划者不能依赖关于这一点，所以他们必须作出反应。
这样两个国家从未打算损害可以开始认识到，越来越多的威胁对方。如果你没有手臂，你会把自己暴露给攻击。如果你这样做，你威胁到其他国家。英国历史学家，赫伯特菲尔德，称这是“绝对的困境和束缚的困境”。这就是为什么中国和美国之间的关系可能会酸的。
支持...
LZ此等认真、严谨、有根有据的态度在我国网友中确实少见，非常值得称赞。+1
[:a15:]
[:a15:]
支持一下，楼主这样的坛友多些，超大定能再迈上新的台阶
楼主精神可嘉，不过四楼才是真相。
我也没有找到原文, 不过我做为Economist杂志的读者, 我相信economist绝对写的出这篇文章.
回复 10# RAF
四楼有链接了。不过我在Economist上用它的站内搜索都没搜到这篇。
http://www.economist.com/node/17601487
四楼有链接了。不过我在Economist上用它的站内搜索都没搜到这篇。
http://www.economist.com/node/17601487
西行寺幽々子 发表于 2010-12-8 19:03 
经济学人杂志是有名的意识形态主导的杂志, 我都习惯了...
经济学人杂志是有名的意识形态主导的杂志, 我都习惯了...
RAF 发表于 2010-12-8 19:13
去年冬天他们降价促销的时候还买过几本（摊手
去年冬天他们降价促销的时候还买过几本（摊手
支持认真的态度！
看来过于相信搜索引擎的确有点问题，我还是应该更为严谨一些，谢谢大家的支持，尤其的che贵宾的强大令我汗颜……
那篇文章，我在参考消息上看到了
童鞋们经济学人的文章算是文风非常幽默 写的非常好的，句法，用词都很地道，华丽的，用Google翻译，铁定啥都看不懂。。很多表达都用到了slang 和idioms还得外加词的引申义。
经济学人的意识形态那是哗哗的呀:D
这就是为什么中国和美国之间的关系可能会酸的……
我爱死这个句子了……
我爱死这个句子了……
非常支持楼主
路子还很长，且不可避免的会与他国发生冲突
这个翻译太厉害了。
经济学人有论坛，专门有人比谁翻译的准确漂亮
che 发表于 2010-12-8 16:38
这个翻译，啧啧。
这个翻译，啧啧。
世界上最大的骗子、白食、枪手群体就是“经济学家”