[真相大白]关于海湾战争期间打印机病毒的问题,简单的说 ...

来源:百度文库 编辑:超级军网 时间:2024/05/01 13:38:33
<br /><br />SC看到的,这个说法除了国内,在国外有记载嘛?
链接http://www.sbanzu.com/topicdispl ... amp;TopicID=2997226
军大衣教主被拍了,不过问题还是值得探讨的,期待CD的高人

维基上的条目

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AF/91

AF/91
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
AF/91 was a hoax about a computer virus which was allegedly used in the First Gulf War; its name refers to April Fool's Day.

The original article appeared in InfoWorld Magazine on April 1,1991 in article named &quot;Meta-Virus Set to Unleash Plague on Windows 3.0 Users&quot; by John Gantz.[1] What makes this virus different from others is that it was the first of its type in terms of cyber warfare between 2 countries. What people need to realize is that what happened was an April Fools Joke that was misunderstood by the public and media, which created a huge frenzy of media activity about the virus.

[edit] History of Virus
&quot;Before the 1st Gulf War the U.S. drew up plans to take down an Iraqi anti-aircraft system with &quot;specially designed computer viruses [to] infect the system from within. Agents inserted the virus in a printer shipped to an Iraqi air defense site.&quot; Special Forces men were also said to have infiltrated Iraq, where they dug up a fiber-optic cable and jammed a computer virus into it. &quot;It remained dormant until the opening moments of the air war, when it went active...&quot; wrote the columnist. Iraq's air defense system was vanquished.&quot; [2] The story went on to say that the National Security Agency had developed the computer virus to disable Iraqi air defense computers by eating windows and that it was smuggled into Iraq through Jordan, hidden in a chip in a printer.[3]

[edit] Media Stir
After this article was written and published by InfoWorld Magazine, other major media sources went ecstatic about the virus, such as U.S. News &amp; World Report, Associated Press, CNN, ABC Nightline, and newspapers across the country, without even checking to see if the story was true.[4] The editors of the major media organizations forgot that something written on April 1 could not possibly be a joke, so they forgot to confirm the story. When this story appeared, it took off with the public imagination on forums everywhere all over the internet imagining what the virus would look like.

[edit] References
^ &lt;http://books.google.com/books?id ... 091&amp;f=false&gt;
^ Smith, George. &quot;Iraqi Cyberwar: an Ageless Joke.&quot; SecurityFocus. 10 Mar. 2003. Web. 11 Oct. 2009. &lt;http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/147&gt;.
^ &lt;http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/147&gt;.
^ &lt;http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/147&gt;.
Retrieved from &quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AF/91&quot;

One printer, one virus, one disabled Iraqi air defence
Alert   Print You can't keep a good April Fool's down

By George Smith, SecurityFocus • Get more from this author

Posted in Security, 10th March 2003 10:06 GMT

Did U.S. infowar commandos smuggle a deadly computer virus into Iraq inside a printer? Of course not. So why does it keep getting reported, George Smith asks.

A creepy enthusiasm for tales of weird weapons rises as war approaches. Denied substantive information by the Pentagon and grasping for eye-grabbing news, journalists and pundits speculate daily about what might be used in Iraq.

In this environment, where everyone charges full speed ahead for the hot scoop or astonishing apocrypha, even the oldest hoaxes can return for one more bow.

In a February piece for the Memphis Commercial Appeal, a retired air force man mused on the subject of information warfare and how it might be used to strike Iraq down. Dabbling in a little history, the author recounted how in Gulf War I the U.S. drew up plans to take down an Iraqi anti-aircraft system with &quot;specially designed computer viruses [to] infect the system from within. Agents inserted the virus in a printer shipped to an Iraqi air defense site.&quot;

Special Forces men were also said to have infiltrated Iraq, where they dug up a fiber-optic cable and jammed a computer virus into it. &quot;It remained dormant until the opening moments of the air war, when it went active...&quot; wrote the columnist. Iraq's air defense system was vanquished.

Frankly, this is a great story. It's amusing to remember how it kicked up a storm in 1991 after its initial appearance as an April Fool's joke in Infoworld magazine.

The gag asserted the National Security Agency had developed the computer virus to disable Iraqi air defense computers by eating windows -- &quot;gobbling them at the edges...&quot; The virus, called AF/91, was smuggled into Iraq through Jordan, hidden in a chip in a printer -- the latter being a distinguishing feature of many subsequent appearances of the hoax.

Chat board gossip on it echoed for days, not only from people who thought the joke quite funny, but also those who missed the original citation and engaged in laborious discussion on the imagined technology of the virus.

Inevitably, a large media organization got wind of the story and pounced without bothering to track down the tale's provenance.

U.S. News &amp; World Report published news of the Gulf War virus in its coverage of the war, a narrative that also found its way into &quot;Triumph Without Victory,&quot; the magazine's subsequent book on Desert Storm.

The Gulf War virus, wrote U.S. News, attacked Saddam's defenses by &quot;devouring windows&quot; Iraqi defenders used to check on aspects of their air defense system. &quot;Each time a technician opened a window ... the window would disappear and the information would vanish.&quot; The virus was &quot;smuggled to Baghdad through Amman, Jordan&quot; in chips inside a printer.

From there, the bogus story was reported by the Associated Press, CNN, ABC Nightline, and newspapers across the country.

'The Next World War'

When queried about the tale's uncanny resemblance to the Infoworld joke, Brian Duffy, the primary author of the U.S. News article (and now executive editor of the magazine) stubbornly defended his sources -- &quot;senior officials&quot; all. In a follow-up Associated Press article outlining the imbroglio, Duffy maintained he had &quot;no doubt&quot; that U.S. intelligence agents had carried out the Gulf War virus attack, but admitted similarities to the Infoworld joke were &quot;obviously troubling.&quot; Duffy's sources, were, of course, anonymous.

Many have been enthralled by the Gulf War virus' siren call through the decade, almost all in efforts to hold up some proof of the magical power of information warfare.

In the March 1999 issue of Popular Mechanics magazine, in a piece on cyberwar, the publication wrote: &quot;In the days following the Gulf War, stories circulated that [cyber] weapons had been unleashed on the Iraqi air defense system.&quot; The nefarious printers were again used containing &quot;chips [with] programs designed to infect and disrupt...&quot;

A Hudson Institute analyst peddling a paper on Russian thoughts on cyberwar fell for it and when confronted aggressively argued that it was true because, well, just because.

Other appearances include an allegedly seminal book on computer combat entitled &quot;The Next World War.&quot; In this instance, the miraculous Gulf War virus failed to do its job because the U.S. Air Force accidentally bombed the building where Iraq stored the virus-laden printers. The author went on to found an infosecurity firm known for its publicity-happy hyperbolic proclamations on cyberwar.

Why was the hoax so successful?

The easy answer is to simply call everyone who falls for the joke a momentary idiot. But the Gulf War virus plays to a uniquely American trait: a child-like belief in gadgets and technology and the people who make them as answers to everything. Secret National Security Agency computer scientists made viruses that hobbled Saddam's anti-air defense without firing a shot! Or maybe it didn't work but it sure was a good plan!

In this respect, the joke is ageless. People are just as able to nebulously theorize about the tech of it and its implications in 2003 as they were in 1991. Will an updated version of the nonexistent AF/91 virus be used against unwired Iraq? Stay tuned... April 1st is less than a month away. &amp;copy; SecurityFocus Online

George Smith is Editor-at-Large for VMYTHS and founder of the Crypt Newsletter. He has written extensively on viruses, the genesis of techno-legends and the impact of both on society. His work has appeared in publications as diverse as the Wall Street Journal, the Village Voice and the National Academy of Science's Issues in Science &amp; Technology, among others

最早刊登AF91病毒的 InfoWorld杂志91年4月1日版39页

http://books.google.com/books?id ... p;q=&amp;f=true


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6.合.彩!!足球!篮球...各类投注开户下注
<P>&nbsp;</P>
推荐→第一投注!!倍率高.!存取速度快.国内最好的投注平台<br /><br />SC看到的,这个说法除了国内,在国外有记载嘛?
链接http://www.sbanzu.com/topicdispl ... amp;TopicID=2997226
军大衣教主被拍了,不过问题还是值得探讨的,期待CD的高人

维基上的条目

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AF/91

AF/91
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
AF/91 was a hoax about a computer virus which was allegedly used in the First Gulf War; its name refers to April Fool's Day.

The original article appeared in InfoWorld Magazine on April 1,1991 in article named &quot;Meta-Virus Set to Unleash Plague on Windows 3.0 Users&quot; by John Gantz.[1] What makes this virus different from others is that it was the first of its type in terms of cyber warfare between 2 countries. What people need to realize is that what happened was an April Fools Joke that was misunderstood by the public and media, which created a huge frenzy of media activity about the virus.

[edit] History of Virus
&quot;Before the 1st Gulf War the U.S. drew up plans to take down an Iraqi anti-aircraft system with &quot;specially designed computer viruses [to] infect the system from within. Agents inserted the virus in a printer shipped to an Iraqi air defense site.&quot; Special Forces men were also said to have infiltrated Iraq, where they dug up a fiber-optic cable and jammed a computer virus into it. &quot;It remained dormant until the opening moments of the air war, when it went active...&quot; wrote the columnist. Iraq's air defense system was vanquished.&quot; [2] The story went on to say that the National Security Agency had developed the computer virus to disable Iraqi air defense computers by eating windows and that it was smuggled into Iraq through Jordan, hidden in a chip in a printer.[3]

[edit] Media Stir
After this article was written and published by InfoWorld Magazine, other major media sources went ecstatic about the virus, such as U.S. News &amp; World Report, Associated Press, CNN, ABC Nightline, and newspapers across the country, without even checking to see if the story was true.[4] The editors of the major media organizations forgot that something written on April 1 could not possibly be a joke, so they forgot to confirm the story. When this story appeared, it took off with the public imagination on forums everywhere all over the internet imagining what the virus would look like.

[edit] References
^ &lt;http://books.google.com/books?id ... 091&amp;f=false&gt;
^ Smith, George. &quot;Iraqi Cyberwar: an Ageless Joke.&quot; SecurityFocus. 10 Mar. 2003. Web. 11 Oct. 2009. &lt;http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/147&gt;.
^ &lt;http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/147&gt;.
^ &lt;http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/147&gt;.
Retrieved from &quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AF/91&quot;

One printer, one virus, one disabled Iraqi air defence
Alert   Print You can't keep a good April Fool's down

By George Smith, SecurityFocus • Get more from this author

Posted in Security, 10th March 2003 10:06 GMT

Did U.S. infowar commandos smuggle a deadly computer virus into Iraq inside a printer? Of course not. So why does it keep getting reported, George Smith asks.

A creepy enthusiasm for tales of weird weapons rises as war approaches. Denied substantive information by the Pentagon and grasping for eye-grabbing news, journalists and pundits speculate daily about what might be used in Iraq.

In this environment, where everyone charges full speed ahead for the hot scoop or astonishing apocrypha, even the oldest hoaxes can return for one more bow.

In a February piece for the Memphis Commercial Appeal, a retired air force man mused on the subject of information warfare and how it might be used to strike Iraq down. Dabbling in a little history, the author recounted how in Gulf War I the U.S. drew up plans to take down an Iraqi anti-aircraft system with &quot;specially designed computer viruses [to] infect the system from within. Agents inserted the virus in a printer shipped to an Iraqi air defense site.&quot;

Special Forces men were also said to have infiltrated Iraq, where they dug up a fiber-optic cable and jammed a computer virus into it. &quot;It remained dormant until the opening moments of the air war, when it went active...&quot; wrote the columnist. Iraq's air defense system was vanquished.

Frankly, this is a great story. It's amusing to remember how it kicked up a storm in 1991 after its initial appearance as an April Fool's joke in Infoworld magazine.

The gag asserted the National Security Agency had developed the computer virus to disable Iraqi air defense computers by eating windows -- &quot;gobbling them at the edges...&quot; The virus, called AF/91, was smuggled into Iraq through Jordan, hidden in a chip in a printer -- the latter being a distinguishing feature of many subsequent appearances of the hoax.

Chat board gossip on it echoed for days, not only from people who thought the joke quite funny, but also those who missed the original citation and engaged in laborious discussion on the imagined technology of the virus.

Inevitably, a large media organization got wind of the story and pounced without bothering to track down the tale's provenance.

U.S. News &amp; World Report published news of the Gulf War virus in its coverage of the war, a narrative that also found its way into &quot;Triumph Without Victory,&quot; the magazine's subsequent book on Desert Storm.

The Gulf War virus, wrote U.S. News, attacked Saddam's defenses by &quot;devouring windows&quot; Iraqi defenders used to check on aspects of their air defense system. &quot;Each time a technician opened a window ... the window would disappear and the information would vanish.&quot; The virus was &quot;smuggled to Baghdad through Amman, Jordan&quot; in chips inside a printer.

From there, the bogus story was reported by the Associated Press, CNN, ABC Nightline, and newspapers across the country.

'The Next World War'

When queried about the tale's uncanny resemblance to the Infoworld joke, Brian Duffy, the primary author of the U.S. News article (and now executive editor of the magazine) stubbornly defended his sources -- &quot;senior officials&quot; all. In a follow-up Associated Press article outlining the imbroglio, Duffy maintained he had &quot;no doubt&quot; that U.S. intelligence agents had carried out the Gulf War virus attack, but admitted similarities to the Infoworld joke were &quot;obviously troubling.&quot; Duffy's sources, were, of course, anonymous.

Many have been enthralled by the Gulf War virus' siren call through the decade, almost all in efforts to hold up some proof of the magical power of information warfare.

In the March 1999 issue of Popular Mechanics magazine, in a piece on cyberwar, the publication wrote: &quot;In the days following the Gulf War, stories circulated that [cyber] weapons had been unleashed on the Iraqi air defense system.&quot; The nefarious printers were again used containing &quot;chips [with] programs designed to infect and disrupt...&quot;

A Hudson Institute analyst peddling a paper on Russian thoughts on cyberwar fell for it and when confronted aggressively argued that it was true because, well, just because.

Other appearances include an allegedly seminal book on computer combat entitled &quot;The Next World War.&quot; In this instance, the miraculous Gulf War virus failed to do its job because the U.S. Air Force accidentally bombed the building where Iraq stored the virus-laden printers. The author went on to found an infosecurity firm known for its publicity-happy hyperbolic proclamations on cyberwar.

Why was the hoax so successful?

The easy answer is to simply call everyone who falls for the joke a momentary idiot. But the Gulf War virus plays to a uniquely American trait: a child-like belief in gadgets and technology and the people who make them as answers to everything. Secret National Security Agency computer scientists made viruses that hobbled Saddam's anti-air defense without firing a shot! Or maybe it didn't work but it sure was a good plan!

In this respect, the joke is ageless. People are just as able to nebulously theorize about the tech of it and its implications in 2003 as they were in 1991. Will an updated version of the nonexistent AF/91 virus be used against unwired Iraq? Stay tuned... April 1st is less than a month away. &amp;copy; SecurityFocus Online

George Smith is Editor-at-Large for VMYTHS and founder of the Crypt Newsletter. He has written extensively on viruses, the genesis of techno-legends and the impact of both on society. His work has appeared in publications as diverse as the Wall Street Journal, the Village Voice and the National Academy of Science's Issues in Science &amp; Technology, among others

最早刊登AF91病毒的 InfoWorld杂志91年4月1日版39页

http://books.google.com/books?id ... p;q=&amp;f=true


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6.合.彩!!足球!篮球...各类投注开户下注
<P>&nbsp;</P>
推荐→第一投注!!倍率高.!存取速度快.国内最好的投注平台
听说过。分析一下的话。应该是有可能的。
听说过有种东西叫还原卡的没有?
伊拉克大把的毛货、法货,纯美制的防空系统还真不多
不仅是电器,几乎所有美国IT设备都有隐蔽通道
美国, 电器, 设备, 通道
[em03]TEMPEST:隐蔽通道的信息泄漏与防护(计算机安全杂志2002年第9期总第19期) 孙德刚引言 TEMPEST是来自美国的秘密专业术语,它的研究对象是处理敏感信息设备和系统的信息泄漏问题,是信息安全的一个重要组成部分。TEMPEST主要威胁信息的保密性,预防非常困难,后果可能非常严重。 根据资料,在美国情报搜集工作分为人工的情报获取(HUMINT)和电子的情报获取(ELINT)。电子情报获取又分为入侵式和非入侵式,入侵式系统常指在敏感区域有意安装窃收装置获取情报;而非入侵式系统在非敏感区域利用接收空中的泄漏信号得到情报,这种方式危险小,不易被发现和察觉,其中TEMPEST泄漏发射的接收是这种获取情报方式的一个重要手段。美国近年来解密了90年代初之前的部分TEMPEST标准内容,这不是美国认为TEMPEST不重要的一个信号,相反,很有可能是美国发展了TEMPEST技术,进入了一个新阶段的标志。 随着我国信息化水平的不断提高,我国涉密部门大量使用计算机、网络终端等办公自动化设备,很多部门使用的设备没有经过相应的TEMPEST防护措施就处理涉密数据,涉密信息的安全保密受到严重威胁,这种威胁不像网络攻击和病毒攻击那样从后果中可以看到或者有迹可循,它的隐蔽性强,危害极大。同时,因为大多数设备和系统是进口的,所以基于TEMPEST技术的主动攻击,在更远的距离,以更容易的方式获取情报的可能性也是存在的。虽然在我国TEMPEST的认识和研究已有多年,但由于这个领域是多学科交叉的边缘技术,相对于它本身内容的广泛性和在信息安全的地位,国家相应的投入较少,近年来TEMPEST安全的声音越来越小,影响了我国深入开展TEMPEST技术的研究和相应产业的形成,也影响了有关人才的培养和研发队伍的建设。/article_0209005a TEMPEST概念和内涵 TEMPEST是否为缩略语至今尚无定论。认定为缩略语的有文献可查至少有四种说法,但近年来美国非官方资料常常引用的说法是:TEMPEST-Transient Electro-Magnetic Pulse Emanation Standard–瞬态电磁脉冲发射标准。也有人认为不是缩略语,而是美国政府当初秘密研究计划的代号。 TEMPEST研究起始于二十世纪五十年代的美国和英国。从发现设备杂散电磁发射中可以复现设备处理的信息这一现象促使两国开展了这一研究,在美国是政府控制的工业TEMPEST计划(ITP),英国是政府通信总部管辖的工业TEMPEST计划(ITS)。两个计划都归属于北大西洋公约的军事通信安全与判定委员会(SECAN)。经过二十多年的研究,到1981年美国颁布了TEMPEST标准。1982年英国和北约也相继颁布了类似标准。这些标准为国家最高机密。美国对其盟国也不公开。有了标准,使TEMPEST产品的研制、生产、测试、认证和使用得以规范。从安全考虑,政府涉密部门及军事部门开始广泛使用TEMPEST设备(如低泄漏发射的计算机及外设、加密机等设备)取代商用设备,这一需求大大推动了TEMPEST产品市场的扩大,形成了产值可观的TEMPEST产业,在1998年美国TEMPEST产品国内销售额达到30亿美元。 近年来,虽然美国公开了TEMPEST部分标准的部分内容,但是TEMPEST的关键内容,特别是技术细节仍属机密,从解密的资料和背景材料上分析TEMPEST原来的内涵大体可归纳为:TEMPEST是指对涉及国家秘密信息的设备和系统的传导和辐射泄漏发射的研究。它既包含关于设备电磁泄漏理论的基础性研究,也包括如泄漏发射信号的接收、测试和防护等技术。同时负责TEMPEST管理,规范TEMPEST标准等,总之TEMPEST涵盖了管理、技术、标准与产业诸多领域。 任何电子设备或线路,如果存在时变电流信号就会产生电磁波,发射强度与电流的强度和变化率成正比。发射信号沿自由空间或沿着接触或者接近发射源的导体进行传播。如果该时变电流信号与涉密信息有关,则称为红信号(Red Signal),该时变电流信号引起的发射被称为泄漏发射(Compromising Emanation),该发射信号象广播、电视信号一样,可以远距离接收,能够被重构,复原涉密信息的内容。根据《NACSIM 5000(美国国家通信安全信息备忘录)TEMPEST基本理论》,红信号电磁泄漏发射通常可分为红信号基带信号发射、红信号调制信号发射、冲激信号发射和其它红信号发射;按照发射场特性,又可分为红信号辐射发射与传导发射二类。原有TEMPEST标准和规范的目标就是以某种方式控制这种发射,防止红信号被截收和分析。 TEMPEST是一个逐渐发展和完善的技术领域。20多年来,美国多次修订和补充TEMPEST技术标准和规定,从标准名称上,能够发现TEMPEST的内涵在逐渐扩大。原来标准名称都冠以NACSIM,即国家通信安全信息备忘录,进入20世纪90年代后名称冠以NSTISSIAM,即国家安全电信和信息系统安全咨询备忘录,这说明TEMPEST已经从原来的通信安全领域扩展到信息安全的范围。根据很多非官方的专家意见,TEMPEST的内涵更广泛,大家往往把所有非故意泄漏信息的现象,都归类于TEMPEST问题。如声音信号的泄漏和光信号的泄漏现象,例如通过点阵式打印机击打打印纸发出的声音能够复原出打印的字符,通过显示器荧光在墙面的反射重构显示器显示内容等现象。美国一个TEMPEST专家认为理解TEMPEST的最好方法就是重新给出它的定义,认为TEMPEST是通信理论的逆向应用,包括处理涉密信息的设备和系统所有涉及到的设计和检测问题。虽然该定义不符合业内人士的行话,但这个定义确实符合了TEMPEST面临和关心的问题的实际现状。 TEMPEST研究面临的问题 TEMPEST的研究范围很广,它的研究方法已经不仅仅局限于辐射测量法(Radiometry)。 辐射测量法是以平稳随机过程模型作为理论基础分析和检测红信号,而实际上信息技术设备泄漏发射信号往往满足非平稳随机过程或者循环平稳随机过程模型,同时辐射测量法不能在时频域对信号进行分析,不能利用红信号和干扰信号的时域和相位特征,因此辐射测量法用于检测红信号,存在先天不足的缺陷。美国有专家早在1987年已经指出TEMPEST技术要充分利用现代通信理论和数字信号处理的方法进行更细致和更深入的研究和分析,美国近年来解密的TEMPEST标准中提到的测试方法都是测量设备的发射频谱,用限值划分等级,但在红信号检测方法中能看到利用长相关技术和域变换分析的名称。无论对实验室测试技术还是现场测试技术,利用现代通信理论和数字信号处理方法进行红信号的检测都是必然的选择。/article_0209005b 随着技术发展,设备和系统的处理速度不断提高,数字脉冲信号的边沿越来越陡峭,同时,军方和商业通信系统3GHz以下的通信频段急剧增长,红信号存在的频率范围不断扩大,背景噪声和干扰信号更加复杂,增加了检测和识别红信号的难度。在现场环境检测红信号,一方面,可能会收集到包含了几十、几百个发射器的信号;另一方面,很多系统使用复杂的信号形式,如直接序列(Direct-Sequence)和跳频(Frequency-Hopping)的扩频调制技术(这些技术用来克服噪声和干扰的影响,同时防止发射信号被检测到)。这种情况下,用常规的辐射测量法测试接收到的信号能量,以信噪比的观点来分析红信号通常是不可能实现的。往往红信号完全淹没在收集的无数信号下面,同时由于复杂调制技术的使用,红信号和背景噪声难以区分。在码分和跳频系统中,红信号之间还彼此干扰,几个具有相同分布频谱特征的红信号,会使基于能量或者信噪比检测的系统难于判断。虽然有很多处理方法抑制干扰和噪声,但是,最主要的问题在于不知道红信号在哪里,因为红信号有可能掩盖在噪声中或其他公用发射信号下面,只有知道了红信号的时频特征,才能考虑使用这些处理方法,从而得到红信号。 分析和识别红信号的技术需要不断发展和深入,以适应设备和系统安全新的需要。泄漏发射通常理解为非故意产生的,信号通过天然的天线或者线路传播和发射,同时TEMPEST系统的通信信道不是用来有意传输信息的,泄漏发射信号不能被优化得到最理想的接收效果。但随着现代通信技术和计算机网络技术的发展,使得借助电磁泄漏发射的信息隐藏技术进行主动攻击成为可能,如果隐藏算法采用抗噪声和适于接收的通信技术,足以对计算机信息安全构成更大的威胁。 在现场环境下,泄漏发射信号传输的实际信道比较复杂。数字信号(如视频信号)的辐射泄漏发射在室内信道大部分是频率选择性慢衰落信道,将引起码间串扰,接收机必须采用相关的信号处理才能判断红信号的存在。室外信道由于多谱勒扩展的增加,信道的时变特征更加明显,信号失真加剧,此时信道变为快衰落信道,这时接收还原红信号就更加复杂,但是红信号却的确存在。因此研究复杂情况下的红信号检测和现代通信理论面临的问题是一致的,这也是TEMPEST的一个难点。 TEMPEST工程师要想对泄漏发射问题的范围和深度有全面理解,必须熟悉信息理论、复杂调制理论和传输线理论,不断适应TEMPEST出现的新问题。因为TEMPEST设计通常是修复事后的问题,这种情况下TEMPEST所涉及的技术和理论知识常常被掩盖了。目前大多数工程师采用“试一试,看一看”的方法设计产品,来修复发现的泄漏发射问题。类似在线路上加一个电容看看结果怎么样。这种方法的结果通常导致过长的开发周期,通常将问题转移到别的地方,并可能引起其他问题。在TEMPEST系统中,信号通常调制在噪声源的某个谐波上,所以泄漏发射可以在频谱的任何频点上。如果工程师不懂得信号发射的机理和传输理论,不了解信号信道的源和负载阻抗匹配原理,仅仅简单地调整其特征阻抗,泄漏发射仍然会存在,只不过转移到其他频率上。另外,因为背景噪声通常较高,同时高斯噪声分布有时与红信号相近,所以简单地假定检测到的信号就是泄漏发射信号会导致产品设计上的过度防护的努力。因此,如果工程师忽视通信理论,忙于通过试验和错误的检测技术来完善产品设计,不但代价高昂而且难以得到合理的设计周期。 TEMPEST与加密设备 1960年,在加入欧共体谈判中,为了摸清法国人态度,英国特工Peter Wright注意到法国密码机线路上的加密信息会携带微弱的辅助信号,并以电磁波形式辐射出来,他们用设备接收到它,利用该信号成功的复现了明文信息,使英国完全掌握了法国代表团在谈判中的态度。根据分析,这个信号是由加密设备红信号在线路上的互调引起的电磁泄漏发射。 另外,设备与附近的射频发射系统能够产生联合交调现象,这主要是由设备中非线性器件(如门电路、模数转化器等)引起的。红信号被发射器发射信号携带发射到空中,并可以被远端接收机接收和还原。如现场中的移动台、无线电话等发射器,有可能会携带出去现场中加密设备以及其他设备的泄漏发射信号。 加密设备的电磁泄漏发射至关重要,这种电磁泄漏发射往往使构造密码算法的努力前功尽弃,使窃收者轻而易举地得到想得到的数据。1999年美国学者Kelsey、Schneier、Wagner和Hall四人联合发表了一篇利用间接信息对密码算法进行攻击的论文,讨论了利用定时信息、处理器状态标志和功率等间接信息对IDEA、RC5和DES等密码算法的攻击。他们认为密码攻击理论上的东西很多,实际上的可操作性较差,往往密码算法理论上的漏洞被称为“证明的缺陷(Certificational Weakness)”,在实际的攻击中往往不太实用。近年来对密码算法的破译出现了定时攻击(timing attacks)和差分功率分析(differential power analysis),这类方法充分利用了加密设备泄漏出来的间接信息(如定时信息和功耗信息)进行破译,他们将此类方法归类于侧通道密码分析(side-channel cryptanalysis)。使用侧通道密码分析破译密码算法对于情报部门是一个强有力的工具,英国特工就是基于侧通道信息破译了法国的密码。 美国公开的TEMPEST资料中出现的NONSTOP和HIJACK两个术语都与加密设备红信号的泄漏发射有关,用以防止加密设备的明文和侧通道信息泄漏出去。 TEMPEST防护方法 泄漏发射的防护是一项非常复杂和细致的工程,随着信息泄漏渠道的增加,防护技术不断扩展和深入,并涉及信息理论、电磁场、微电子、机电加工、材料学等多个学科的技术应用。其中电磁泄漏发射的防护技术可简单的分为物理隔离、电磁隔离和使发射电平最小化等多种方法。 物理隔离-保证非授权人员远离红设备区域,使得在非授权人员所在区域得到的红设备的泄漏发射信号远小于该区域的背景噪声强度。电磁隔离-使用屏蔽、滤波和其他电磁场隔离方法衰减红设备无意识的发射。 发射电平最小化-电路的设计和操作使用的功率电平应降到最低可行的水平,减小无意识发射的强度。 实际中常常多种方法共同使用,相互补充,综合使用可以达到最佳的性价比。比如美国在TEMPEST标准中对TEMPEST设备划分了发射水平不同的级别,每个级别对应距离不同的应用环境,每一种情况都有相应的推荐使用方法,充分利用了物理隔离、电磁隔离和泄露发射水平三种方法。 在公开的美国TEMPEST标准中没有提到利用干扰的方法对红设备进行保护,但干扰保护是经济、有效和简单的保护手段。因为非相关的噪声干扰容易通过周期的平均而得到抑制,所以干扰信号应该与被保护的泄漏发射信号具有相关性,好的干扰器能产生相关的输出信号。美国专利号5165098和5297201就描述了类似的相关干扰器。欧洲有专家分析认为,美国TEMPEST标准似乎不会只强调屏蔽和隔离而忽视相关干扰这种简单实用的方法。 TEMPEST的非官方研究成果 国外非官方学者对TEMPEST技术研究的学术气氛较浓,不断有成果出现,一定程度上促进了TEMPEST研究的深入和发展。 1985年2月,在英国广播公司(BBC)“明日世界”栏目5分钟的电视节目里,播出了对计算机电磁泄漏发射进行接收的表演。节目中首先出现一辆篷车停在一座大楼前的远景,渐渐转为近景,篷车内的电视屏幕上显示出一份文件,解说员说明该文件来自远处大楼内的计算机屏幕。这个节目展示的是荷兰工程师Van Eck对计算机CRT显示器泄漏发射研究的部分结果。篷车内在10米高的杆子上安装了一个超高频三波段天线(10dB增益)。被天线接收的信号经过放大18dB后,显示在车内的电视屏幕上。1985年3月,Van Eck在法国戛纳召开的85年安全计算机会议上介绍了他的研究结果,并用改装的黑白电视机演示接收了计算机显示器图像。在会上,Van Eck说明他的所有设备总共造价为225美元。Van Eck说,使用较复杂,较昂贵的设备,可以在远达1公里的地方侦收视频显示终端屏幕上的数据。Van Eck的论文和演示引起了巨大反响,一周之内欧洲各种报纸发表了700多篇相关文章。据报道,美国的TEMPEST专家对Van Eck的研究也感到很吃惊。因为Van Eck的研究成果具有开创性,国外很多文章将计算机显示器的泄漏发射称为“Van Eck发射”。 1990年荷兰学者Peter Smulders在一篇论文中讨论了RS232通信线的电磁泄漏发射的原理和接收技术,并介绍了利用改装调频收音机接收电缆中传输数据的实验。论文给出了不同环境下的实验结果,利用调频收音机可以在远离RS232缆线(非屏蔽线和屏蔽线两种)7、8米远的地方接收线上传输的数据。Smulders用实验证实了利用线路传导发射获取红信号的可能性。 TEMPEST技术习惯上指电磁信号无意识的泄漏及其防护技术,而1998年英国剑桥大学Kuhn和Anderson两位学者通过实验介绍了利用电磁泄漏传递隐藏数据进行主动攻击获取计算机信息的技术和防范方法,并将其称之为Soft TEMPEST。在他们的论文中通过简单的演示,说明这种隐藏方法的有效性和隐蔽性。从攻击角度,通过事先植入目标计算机的程序,窃取硬盘中的数据,并以适于电磁泄漏发射的方式隐藏到目标计算机的视频信息上,利用接收还原设备接收隐藏的数据。论文发表后,引起广泛的关注。有很多人通过实验,验证了不但可以利用CRT隐藏泄漏信息,而且其它硬件如CPU和PCI总线,通过编程,在总线上周期的改变数据,也可达到隐蔽传递泄漏发射信息的目的。这种所谓“TEMPEST病毒”适合于攻击物理隔离的计算机,隐蔽性更强。 英国剑桥大学Kuhn和Anderson利用电磁泄漏传递隐藏数据的演示 剑桥大学的Kuhn今年还发表了一篇论文,讨论了接收远距离CRT显示器光泄漏信号的原理和防范技术,他认为这种光泄漏和Van Eck的电磁泄漏异曲同工,在目前复杂的电磁环境下更容易实现。Kuhn在论文中提供了利用光敏器件接收显示器荧光经过墙面的反射并复原显示器屏幕数据的实验结果。经过墙面反射后的光线会产生漫射,但是通过一个高通滤波器后,可以得到相对清晰的画面,如果对信道进行了估计后,利用匹配滤波器,可以得到相当清晰的结果。在论文中他指出如果在背景光线相对较暗的环境下接收,接收距离可以达到几十米到几百米。相应的,通过远距离接收指示网络数据的状态灯的开关得到传输数据的内容,也通过试验得到证实。 结束语 TEMPEST概念从美国的标准中来,经过多年的发展,已经被赋予了非常丰富的内涵,也许已经超过美国人原来的初衷。TEMPEST研究是一项需要长期和系统地发展的工程,面对国外研究的高速发展和有关技术、设备的高度封锁,我国的TEMPEST研究任重道远。经过多年的努力,我国已经在低泄漏发射设备、干扰防护设备、有关技术标准和测试技术上取得了一定的成果。从目前TEMPEST展现的广阔领域和其对信息安全的威胁,我们在包括基础理论,技术应用和相应的管理制度等诸多方面还需要进行大量的研究。在TEMPEST技术领域我国应加大资金和人力的投入,立足于自主研发,实现TEMPEST技术研究、管理和产业化的突破和全面发展。
2004年4月23日,中科院信息安全中心召开了“隐蔽通道分析技术评审会”,对中国科学院知识创新工程项目“结构化保护级安全操作系统设计”(KGCX2-SW-104)中的“隐蔽通道分析”专题进行评审。 以蔡吉人院士为主任委员,周仲义院士、何新贵院士为副主任委员,曲成义研究员、董占球研究员、何良生研究员和郭瑞明高工为委员的鉴定委员会认真听取了卿斯汉研究员的“专题总结报告”及朱继锋博士的“隐蔽通道分析技术报告”,深入探讨了该中心首创的隐蔽通道标识技术——“回溯分析法”的原理和应用过程,并且观看了使用该方法找到的18个隐蔽通道场景的实时演示。 隐蔽通道分析是开发高安全等级信息系统(包括操作系统、数据库等等)的关键技术,长期以来一直是我国大型安全信息系统开发无法达到美国“橘皮书”B2级以上安全评估等级的技术瓶颈。美国将隐蔽通道分析视为高度敏感的技术,高度保密关键技术,甚至不许向我国出口进行过隐蔽通道分析与处理的安全信息系统。信息安全中心经过3年多的理论研究与工程实验,不但提出了自主创新的标识方法“回溯分析法”,从理论上解决了这个难题,而且找出18个真实隐蔽存储通道场景,全面满足了美国“橘皮书”B2级、ISO/IEC15408即CC标准第EAL5级、国标GB17859-1999第4级和国标GB/T18336-2001第EAL5级关于隐蔽通道的安全要求。 评审委员会肯定了信息安全中心的工作,特别是高度评价了“回溯分析法”。鉴定报告指出:“该专题突破了国外的技术封锁,理论上创新性强,工作量大,技术难度高。该专题在国内外首次报道安全Linux系统的隐蔽通道分析结果,发现了多个国内外从未报道过的真实隐蔽通道,总体上达到了国际先进与国内领先水平,首创的隐蔽通道“回溯搜索方法”等关键技术达到了国际领先水平
http://bbs.cjdby.net/viewthread.php?tid=77851&highlight=
"Kuhn在论文中提供了利用光敏器件接收显示器荧光经过墙面的反射并复原显示器屏幕数据的实验结果。经过墙面反射后的光线会产生漫射,但是通过一个高通滤波器后,可以得到相对清晰的画面,如果对信道进行了估计后,利用匹配滤波器,可以得到相当清晰的结果"

汗~~~天顶星技术啊,已经超出我的认知范围了,哪位高人能提供一些关于这个东东的资料?
CIA可以通过侦测键盘的委托电磁辐射来还原出在键盘上打了些什么
辐射能传多远距离?真是荒谬的东西。
到底是真的还是假的呀!:dizzy:
turboram 发表于 2009-12-29 18:09
的确是有侦测距离限制的,但是间谍往往就是隔墙有耳
怕怕呀,我们的CPU、主板芯片组都是人家的
辐射能传多远距离?真是荒谬的东西。
==
就算只能传三五米
别人在办公室窗外埋一个探头也够了

还有捕捉眼镜片/眼球/茶杯/光洁表面反射的屏幕信息的
(当然用上了一些高级图像处理算法)
从视频电缆泄漏的辐射还原显示内容的

幸好大部分泄密手段只需要你拉上窗帘就能拦住
《环球科学》09年第六期
网络时代的非典型黑客
IT这玩意玄乎,关键是核心全美地的,手脚肯定有,这个太令人怕怕了。

看discovery就有微软协助fbi缉拿杀人魔的解密。透过一张3.5存软盘,微软能找到这张软盘在某洲某地的某一台电脑使用过。 太厉害了
不懂IT行业技术细节的人杜撰
有差距也不会这么大吧,真有这样的问题,TG会不知道吗?
qnxchina 发表于 2010-1-2 15:55

听没听说过,美国摩托罗拉手机即使在关机情况下也可以被悄悄启动用以窃听手机使用人的说话?杜撰?只有你想不到,没有别人做不到
nxga 发表于 2010-1-2 23:32
moto的手机软件基本都是在国内开发的...
回复 19# nxga

这个据说是真的。据说是卫星控制的。米国那些电子侦察卫星不是吃白饭的。
啧啧,好大能的手机

还能自带卫星天线
molec 发表于 2010-1-3 02:52


    要能达到这水平,成本得和铱星电话一样,亏死了
moto手机绝佳的robustness性能,居然能被人忽悠到关机了也能运行。嘿嘿,不得不佩服忽悠人的那人
的点子。
qnxchina 发表于 2010-1-3 10:48


    铱星电话要能“手提”,moto也不至于放弃了。
忽悠,就跟那种幻想敲几下键盘搞定老美战略导弹的人半斤八两
qnxchina 发表于 2010-1-3 10:48
这个 跟某密级挺高的研究所的高工很熟 他说他们开会时确实是拔手机电板的···
  当时伊拉克打印机和电脑都是独立的,没有联网,说病毒传播,太荒诞了。
sunlibo1986 发表于 2010-1-3 12:38


    晕,拔电池就够了,拔电路板?难道高工的手机是DIY的?
qnxchina 发表于 2010-1-3 16:55

就是拔电池 习惯把手机电池叫电板 sorry```
sunlibo1986 发表于 2010-1-3 12:38

这个是需要的, 移动运营商在技术上是有可能(不保证成功)通过基站操纵特定手机外拨一个号码, 如果你当时不知情而正在讨论重要的事情, 那就是起到了窃听器的作用了.

做到这样的事情, 买通一个管机房的基层员工就可以了.
blueworld 发表于 2010-1-3 11:07

主要是手机里的SIM卡, 这个SIM卡其实是个很强悍的东西, 不要以为SIM卡的作用就像一个加密U盘存储些数据, SIM卡相当于一台完整的计算机, 拥有自己的CPU和存储器, 网络接口, 拥有独立的操作系统和应用软件, SIM卡上的程序负责与运营商网络交互, 同时也通过特定的协议指挥手机执行相应指令, (手机是否100%按SIM卡的指示执行操作要看手机软件的设计)

重点在这:SIM卡上的操作系统和应用软件是可以由运营商全权控制的, 运营商是可以通过空中网络完全重写SIM卡上的软件, 加入特定功能的软件并运行.........

手机关机不等于100%设备断电, 某些手机会用少量电量维持特定设备的运行, 例如时钟, 某些手机可能还把SIM卡系统作为需要维持的系统在关机状态下保持供电.

这样, 运营商可以通过控制SIM卡, 随意让SIM卡向手机发送指令, 而假如手机软件对这些指令太过信任的话, 就可能导致手机自身被运营商操控.
roadrunner 发表于 2010-1-3 17:24


    抱歉,您对相关电路设计根本就是一窍不通
很多CPU都有深度睡眠模式,不过需要IO或TIMER激活回正常状态,而SIM卡本身并不作为激活的来源
qnxchina 发表于 2010-1-3 17:49

是否将SIM卡作为激活的来源, 要看手机厂家的设计, 人家也没说所有手机都可以用SIM卡激活
SIM卡和手机是两台独立运作的计算机, SIM卡激活手机的原理就和一台电脑通过网线唤醒另一台电脑一样.
roadrunner 发表于 2010-1-3 17:55


    太想当然了
哎吧掉电池这个也不是说手机电路如何,就是怕一些人的手机里被别人安装了窃听器,这些窃听器采用手机电池供电(但现在有手机电池窃听器了,本身也是电池)还有手机关机后CPU等设备并不是完全断电只不过是出于休眠状态,如果某个后台程序是接到关机指令后再工作,那么关机和没关机没什么区别。
回复 30# sunlibo1986

人家只是说电板,有没说是电路板还是电池板,你怎么就是要去想成电路板呢?
roadrunner 发表于 2009-12-28 09:00


能够穿透还原卡的病毒已经有了
TripleX 发表于 2010-1-2 23:46


只有软件才能做这些活计?硬件不可以么?
blueworld 发表于 2010-1-3 11:09

商用和间谍用差别很大