诺门坎：日苏的冲突中的战术

来源：百度文库编辑：超级军网时间：2024/04/29 10:12:59

SONICBBS上的一位网友提供了一个网址，http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp里面有一篇写于1980年的关于诺门坎之站的文章，http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp，我试图将其译出，并将译出部分发在了SONICBBS的二战论坛上，但这几天SONICBBS突然打不开了，我不知道为什么，也不知道何时才能打开，只好将原文和译文重新发出，只可惜许多高人所做的修改和精彩的评论是找不到了。SONICBBS上的一位网友提供了一个网址，http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp里面有一篇写于1980年的关于诺门坎之站的文章，http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp，我试图将其译出，并将译出部分发在了SONICBBS的二战论坛上，但这几天SONICBBS突然打不开了，我不知道为什么，也不知道何时才能打开，只好将原文和译文重新发出，只可惜许多高人所做的修改和精彩的评论是找不到了。

Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet tactical combat.诺门坎：日苏冲突中的战术 FOREWORD 前言Military history is the peacetime laboratory for the professional soldier. As duPicq reminds us, "only study of the past can give us a sense of reality and show us how the soldier will fight in the future." Serious study of our profession helps narrow the gap between training and battle. Publication and dissemination of tactical battle studies is the central focus of the Combat Studies Institute and the Leavenworth Paper series.军事历史是职业军人在和平时期的实验室。正如杜皮克对我们指出的“只有研究过去才能给我们以正确的见解，并且启示我们在未来士兵应如何战斗。”我们职业的严肃研究有助于缩小训练和实战之间的差距。战术性战役研究论文的出版和发行是“战斗研究学会”和《利文沃思学术系列报告》的中心任务。 At first glance, the study of the Imperial Japanese Army fighting the Soviet Red Army would appear to have little pertinence to the current doctrinal concerns of the U.S. Army. The great advances in weapons technology seem to relegate the Nomonhan fighting to antiquarian status as remote as the Outer-Mongolian border where the battle occurred However, Dr. Edward J. Drea's, Nomonhan: Japanese Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939, which is the second publication in the Leavenworth Paper series, goes beyond the mere narration of a remote combat engagement. 乍看起来，关于日本帝国军和苏联红军之间的战斗的研究与当前美国军队的学术重点并不显示出多大的关系。诺门坎之战的文物研究状况在武器科技上的重要进展，看起来如同战争的发生地，外蒙古国境一样遥远。（鸟注：翻译不准确，请高人指教。）但是Edward J. Drea博士在《利文沃思学术系列报告》上第二次发表的《诺门坎：日苏战术冲突，1939》，超越了对这场遥远的冲突交战的单纯叙述。 At its most basic level, this study provides an insight into how two foreign armies conducted field operations in the days just before World War II. Of particular interest is the manner in which Japanese stereotypes of Soviet tactics and doctrine adversely influenced the Japanese operations. At an intermediate level, this essay describes the Imperial Japanese Army's formulation of operational doctrine and the application of that doctrine against the Red Army- It clearly reveals that doctrine must be dynamic in both formulation and application, the theoretical must be relevant to the reality of the battlefield. Finally, the paper makes us aware of the human factor in combat. Outnumbered, outgunned, and outmaneuvered, the Japanese officers and men of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, held their positions until they received orders to withdraw. Tradition, unit esprit, training, and doctrine all contributed to this exceptional display of courage in the face of awesome enemy superiority. 在最基本的层次上，本研究提供了对两支外国军队如何在大战前夕执行他们的野战作战的观察，特别是日军对于俄军战术与教义的刻板印象如何对日军的作战产生不利的影响。在中间层次上，本论述描述了日本帝国陆军的作战教义构想，以及如何运用该教义来对抗俄军，这清楚地显现这个教义必须在构想与运用上都要是动态的，理论也必须符合战场的实况。最后，这篇报告让我们了解到战斗中人的因素，日军第7步兵师团28步兵连队第2大队的士兵在面对数量，火力以及机动力都超过自己的敌军时仍旧坚守阵地，直到奉命撤退。传统，部队的精神，训练以及教义，在面对优势敌军时所表现的过人勇气上都起了作用。（鸟注：本段由NUTS网友修改过）

Today the U.S. Army stresses the concept of fighting outnumbered and winning. To achieve that difficult feat of arms will require thorough preparation and intensive, realistic training before the first battle of the next war. This account of how the Imperial Japanese Army prepared for its "'first battle"' should help us profit from the Japanese experience against a formidable Soviet enemy. While it points out errors, it also identifies several Japanese strengths which almost prevailed against the greatest concentration of armor and mechanized forces then known.今天，美军强调以寡击众并取胜的观念。要达成这个艰巨的任务，部队必须要在下个战争的第一场战斗行进行全面的准备与密集而真实的训练。对于日本帝国陆军如何准备它的第一场战斗的报导，将有助于我们从日本对抗可畏的俄国敌人的经验中获取益处。虽然指出了(日军的)失误，但也表彰几支在与当时已知最大的装甲与机械化武力集结对抗中几乎战胜了的日军部队。（鸟注：NUTS所修改） AcknowledgementsMany persons have contributed their time helping in the preparation of this monograph. Special thanks must be given to the Military History Department staff of the Japan National Defense College whose kind assistance made it possible to assemble most of the documents used in this study. In particular, LTG (RET) Toga Hiroshi. director of the Military History Department, allowed me access to the IJA archive holdings at the College. Messrs. Kondo Shinji and Arima Seiichi provided valuable advice, suggestions, and graciously agreed to read the manuscript. LTC Inoue Motomu acted as my escort at the College and continues to be a source of information of Japanese military history. Without such able professionals, this paper could not have been written. 鸣谢 许多人贡献出他们的时间，以帮助完成这篇专业论文。特别感谢日本国国防学院军事历史部的全体同仁，因为他们的热情帮助，我才能够收集这么多对本论文有用的档案文献。特别地，LTG広志利賀（鸟注：此专有名词和日本人名非吾所能知也，请高人补救），军事历史部主任，允许我查阅在大学里的日本帝国军的档案。今度真司，有馬正一（鸟注：这些日本人名都是用南极星拼出来的，全无参考价值，切勿引用）提供了有价值的忠告和意见，并且爽快地同意阅读我的手稿。LTC，井上本武在大学里作我的引导人，并且一直向我提供日本军事历史上的信息。没有这些能干的专业人员的帮助，这篇论文是不可能写出来的。

Introduction 简介"A Strange War," observed a 20 July 1939 New York Times editorial about the fighting between the Soviet Red Army and the Imperial Japanese Army on the Mongolian steppes. The Times derided both combatants' claims as exaggerated but inadvertently touched on the distinctive feature of the fighting when it described the battle as "raging in a thoroughly out-of-the-way corner of the world where it cannot attract a great deal of attention." Geography, the combatants' compulsive secrecy, and the subsequent outbreak of World War II in September 1939 all combined to overshadow the most massive use of tanks theretofore recorded. The Soviets used over 1,000 tanks during the fighting and, under the command of General Georgi K. Zhukov, evidenced skill and sophistication at mechanized warfare. The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), essentially an infantry force, fared poorly, and fell victim to a Soviet double envelopment. “一场陌生的战争”，1939年7月20日，纽约时报的社论这样评价这场苏联红军和日本帝国军在蒙古草原上的战斗。时报嘲笑战斗双方的声明夸大其词，将这场战斗描述为“在大路之外，世界上人们注意不到的角落里发泄愤怒”，但它却没有涉及这场战斗与众不同的面貌。由于地理因素，战斗双方严格保密，以及随后于1939年9月爆发的二战等原因，这次二战前坦克最重大的使用纪录被遮在了幕后。在整个战斗中，苏联出动了超过1000辆坦克，由格奥尔基.K.朱可夫将军指挥，展现了机械化战争的纯熟技巧。日本帝国军本质上是一支步兵军队，运动力不良而沦为俄军双重包围下的牺牲品。（鸟注：由史东和NUTS网友指导）While this "Strange War" may be all but forgotten in the West, the Soviets continue to regard it as a brilliant example of the proper manner in which to fight a limited border war. During the time of border clashes with the Peoples' Republic of China in 1968 and 1969, it was no coincidence that several articles about the 1939 border war appeared in Soviet military journals. At least a dozen such articles have appeared in Soviet military literature in the 1970s. Soviet experience gained in 1939 apparently still carries great weight today. 当这场“陌生的战争”几乎被西方遗忘时，苏联方面仍然把它当作形式特殊的边境局部战争中一个光辉的战例。（鸟注：proper manner一词在本文中似乎有特别含义，请高手指正。）在1968年至1969年，与中华人民共和国发生边境摩擦的时期，几篇关于1939年边境战争的文章并非巧合地出现在苏联军事杂志上。1970年，在苏联军事刊物中，至少出现了一打这样的文章。明显地,苏联在1939年得到的经验大量延用到了今天。 Similarly, IJA staff officers subsequently examined the Japanese Army's performance at Nomonhan in minute detail, and even today the battle serves as a case study at the advanced tactical schools of the Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces. The interest of an ally and of a potential adversary suggests that it would be beneficial for the U.S. Army to know what happened at Nomonhan/ Khalkhin Gol in the summer of 1939. 同样地帝国日军参谋部的军官事后巨细靡遗地检验了日军在诺门汗的表现。甚至到了今日，该战役仍是日本陆上自卫队高级战术学校的一个研究战例。基于对盟国与可能(面临)的敌手的关注，(我们建议)了解1939年在诺门坎/ Khalkhin Gol发生的事将有助于美军。（鸟注：由NUTS网友修改）

Yet little on the subject has appeared in English. Furthermore, Japanese studies and the few accurate English language accounts tend to focus on affairs at the division level or above. The purpose of this paper is to examine the battalion and company level tactics that Japanese infantrymen used to fight the Soviets and the degree of success those tactics achieved. 有关这个课题的英文资料仍然很少。而且，日文研究资料和仅有的精确的英语资料都倾向于注重事件中的中层和上层（的行为）。本文的目的是检查这次战役和日本步兵与苏军对抗中连级战术的运用，以及这些战术取得了何种程度的成功。 All modern armies have a tactical doctrine, the officially approved method for their various units to fight on the battlefield. The IJA invested much time, talent, and treasure to formulate a tactical doctrine that would be successful against their potential enemy, the Soviets, who were superior to the IJA in manpower and materiel. This essay briefly describes the evolution of that IJA tactical doctrine, and then presents a detailed examination of how a particular Japanese infantry battalion applied that tactical doctrine in combat against the Soviets in 1939.所有的现代军队都有战斗条令（鸟注：tactical doctrine译成战斗条令妥否？），即被正式核准的各种部队在战场上的战斗方法。日本帝国军投入了大量的时间，精力和财力去制定一部战斗条令，以便战胜他们的假想敌，在人力和物力上都较日本帝国军占优势的苏联。这篇评论文章简要地叙述了日本帝国军战斗条令的演进，然后对一支特别（鸟注：particular可否译为优秀？）的日本步兵联队在1939年的对苏战争中如何运用战斗条令作了详细的分析。Looking at a small unit in combat allows the historian the chance to analyze and to scrutinize doctrine in the test of battle. Such an approach, in turn, surfaces questions about the flexibility, applicability, and effectiveness of doctrine which should concern all armies. 对一支战斗中的小部队的观察，使历史学家有机会对实战考验中的条令进行分析和审查。这种方法将条例的灵活性，适用性和实际效力等与所有军队密切相关的问题逐一暴露出来。

诺门坎：日苏冲突中体现了两种不同的作战思想新式与旧式的较量就当时而言小日本正和世界一流陆军较量而他们始终成醉日俄战争辉煌中

The day-by-day account of a single Japanese battalion in battle is not, however, a comprehensive treatment of the entire Nomonhan fighting. Ordinary Japanese combat infantrymen, like those of any army, did not have the time to reflect on whether or not their fighting techniques followed official IJA doctrine. The Japanese private, clinging to a sand dune during an enemy artillery barrage, could not have a clear grasp of the overall battle, the socalled "Big Picture," which retrospect provides. He received orders and carried out those orders based on his previous training. His was a limited but unique view of land warfare. Here an overview of the Nomonhan campaign is provided, but the theme is small unit tactics and the focus is the battalion, the microcosm, not the division or the army. 一支单独的日军大队的每天的纪录毕竟不可能全面反映整个诺门坎之战。参战的普通日军步兵，正如其他军队一样，没有时间思考他们的战斗方式是否符合日本帝国军的正式条令。一名日军士兵，在敌军的枪林弹雨中坚守在沙丘上，他并不清楚地了解整个战役,即所谓“全景”。他接受命令，并且根据以前的训练来执行命令。他的回忆为这场陆战（提供了）一个有限但独特的视角。（本文提供了）一个关于诺门坎战役的总的看法，但主题是小部队战术并且焦点在营级和微观视角，而非师级，军级。（鸟注：这一段又译得一塌糊涂，又要有劳高人。）The IJA's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (2/28th Infantry), serves as the vehicle for this study. There are several reasons for the selection of this particular unit. First, the 2/28th Infantry's report of the fighting- (hereafter referred to as War Diary) is available and provides detailed information on its day-to-day operations against the Red Army at Nomonhan. Second, the battalion operated as an independent unit attached to different task force commanders for different missions. Third, it is neither so small that its activities were overshadowed by a parent unit nor too large for the study of small unit tactics. Finally, the battalion participated in both offensive and defensive operations against the Red Army, providing an insight into IJA tactics for each situation. 日本帝国军第7步兵师团，第28步兵联队，第2大队，被当作本研究的载体(鸟注：标本？)。选择这个特定的团体有好几个理由。首先，第28联队第2大队的战斗报告（以下提及处称为“战争日记”）能够找到，并且提供了在诺门坎地区与苏军每天作战行动的详细信息。其次，这个大队被当作一独立单位分配给各支参战部队的指挥官，运用在不同的任务中。（鸟注：这句话颇难，请高人指正）。再次，它既不是小到它的活动被上级单位所掩没，对小部队战术的研究也不算太大。最后，这个大队先后参加了对苏联红军的进攻和防御行动，提供了对各种情况下的日军战术的观察。The primary documents used in this study are in the IJA archives, which are open to the general public. One collection is available on microfilm in the U.S. Library of Congress. The original documents are kept at the National Defense College Archives in Tokyo, Japan. These IJA documents were originally classified materials, and I have included the original military classification when citing the documents to allow the reader to have a sense of the importance that the IJA attached to these papers. Throughout this study all Japanese personal names are given in the Japanese manner, surname preceding given name. 本研究中所使用的主要文件来自于对公众开放的日本帝国军档案。美国国会图书馆的缩微胶片所收集的资料也很有用（鸟注：实在拗口，请帮助修改）。原始文件存放在日本东京的国防大学档案室里。这些日本帝国军的文件曾是机密材料，我在引用这些文件时采用了原始的军用分类法，以便使读者对这些附加在论文上的日本帝国军材料有深刻的印象。（鸟评：水平有限，请高人补救。）在全篇论文中，所有的日本人名都以日本习惯写出，即姓在名前。

Edward J. Drea
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The Nomonhan Campaign
(May—September 1939):A Summary诺门坎战役（五月—九月，1939）:摘要 Japanese Initiatives日本主动 The Imperial Japanese Army's takeover of Manchuria in 1931 brought Japanese and Soviet armed forces eyeball to eyeball along a 3,000-mile border. Numerous border skirmishes and disputes characterized the next several years as both sides reinforced their respective forces. In 1936 the Soviets signed a mutual assistance treaty with Outer Mongolia, and in January 1937 the Soviet High Command organized the 57th Special Rifle Corps consisting of the 36th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Cavalry Brigade, 11th Tank Brigade, and 7th, Sth, and 9th Armored Car brigades. These units moved into Outer Mongolia in 1938.日本帝国军于1931年对满洲的占领，使日苏两军在3000公里的边境线上面对面（地接触了）。随后的几年里，随着双方各自军事力量的加强，出现了无数的边境冲突和纠纷。1936年，苏联和外蒙古签定了互助条约，并且于1937年根据苏联高级司令部的命令（鸟注：Soviet High Command该如何译？），建立了第57特别集团军，由第36摩托化步兵师，第6骑兵旅，第11坦克旅，和第7，第S（鸟注：原文如此，疑是第8之误），第9装甲旅组成。这些部队于1938年进入了外蒙古。

The 72d Infantry Regiment, 23d Infantry Division, approaching Nomonhan in early July. 第23师团第72联队，7月上旬，诺门坎附近。

Map 1. Opposing orders of battle

An especially bloody affray at Changkufeng/Lake Khasan in 1938 resulted in over 2,500 casualties on both sides. It also seemed to stiffen Soviet resolve because the following year, Joseph Stalin, speaking before the Eighteenth Soviet Party Congress in March 1939, warned that any acts of aggression against the inviolable Soviet frontiers would be met by twice the force of any invader. Two months later, a handful of Soviet allied Outer Mongolian cavalry troops wandered into a disputed border area between the Halha River (Soviet name, Khalkhin Gol) and the tiny village of Nomonhan. The Japanese claimed that the boundary followed the river, but the Soviets maintained that it passed just east of the village of Nomonhan. 1938年，在张鼓峰/哈桑湖地区发生了流血冲突，导致双方伤亡超过了2500人。这件事可能使苏联坚定了决心，因为在第二年，即1939年3月，约瑟夫.斯大林在联共第十八次代表大会上，警告说，任何入侵神圣不可侵犯的苏联边境的行为都将遇到到双倍力量的还击。（鸟注：这一段译得不好，请高手修改）。两个月后，一支苏联军队由蒙古骑兵协同，进入了哈拉哈河（苏联名：Khalkhin Gol）和小村庄诺门坎之间的一块有争议的边境地区。日本主张边界线应沿河流（划分），但苏联坚持边界线在诺门坎村以东。 On 11 May 1939 Japanese sponsored Manchukuoan* cavalrymen drove the Outer Mongolians back across the Halha River. Two days later, however, the Outer Mongolian cavalry forces returned to the same location, but the Manchukuoan troops were unable to evict them. The Japanese Kwantung Army, the designation for Japanese forces stationed in Manchukuo, then stepped into the act. Its 23d Infantry Division was responsible for border security in the region where the skirmishes had occurred. The commander of the 23d Division ordered its 64th Infantry Regiment (minus two companies) and its reconnaissance element to drive the Mongolians from the Japanese claimed border area. 1939年5月11日，日军出动满洲国骑兵，将外蒙古人驱逐回哈拉哈河（以西）。（鸟评：这算不算是保家卫国呢？）可是，两天后，外蒙古骑兵又回到了同一地区，而满洲国军无力驱逐他们。日本关东军，日本驻满洲军队，开始准备行动。它的第23师团负责冲突发生地区的边境防务。第23师团长命令所属第64步兵联队（缺2个连）和（师属）侦察部队将外蒙古人驱逐出日本所主张的边境地区。

LTC Azuma Yaozo on 14 May led the reconnaissance element into the disputed territory, but the Outer Mongo lian troops refused to fight and retreated across the Halha. A Soviet and Outer Mongolian build-up, however, continued in the area, and Azuma returned one week later to oust the intruders. This time the enemy surrounded and annihilated Azuma's force. Despite this bloody setback, the Kwantung Army wanted to drop the matter, but more and more Soviet troops poured into the area. (See Map 3.) 14日，中佐东八百藏率侦察部队进入争议地区，但外蒙军放弃战斗并且撤过了哈拉哈河。但是，一支苏蒙联合部队（鸟注：build-up，如何翻译？）仍呆在这一地区，一周后东（又）回来驱逐这些入侵者。这一次，敌人包围并消灭了东的部队。尽管遭到血腥的打击，关东军（仍）想结束这一事件，但是越来越多的苏联军队进入了这一地区。

The Kwantung Army decided that a division size attack was needed to oust the Soviets and their allies. This opera tion began on 1 July when the 23d Division's 71st and 72d Infantry Regiments seized the high ground overlooking the Halha about eighteen kilometers north of its confluence with the Holsten River. On 2 July this force crossed the Halha and drove Soviet units from Baintsagan Heights. Simultaneously, an armored task force consisting of the 3d and 4th Tank Regiments (seventy-three tanks total), the 64th Infantry Regiment, and the 2d Battalion, 28th Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, attacked Soviet positions on the Halha's east bank. (See Map 4.) 关东军认为，为了驱逐苏军和他们的盟友，需要发动一个师级攻势。行动于7月1日开始，，第23师团所属第71和72联队夺取了哈拉哈河与豪斯腾河汇合处以北18公里处的高地（鸟注：此处翻译有无错误？）。7月2日，这支部队越过哈拉哈河，并将苏军驱逐出巴音查冈高地。同时，一支由第3和第4坦克联队（共有73辆坦克），第64步兵联队，和第7师团第28联队第2大队所组成的装甲部队，攻击了哈拉哈河东岸的苏军阵地。

Although initially successful, the Japanese drive on the Halha's west bank stalled by dusk of 3 July. General Zhukov, realizing the Japanese threat to his artillery on the west bank, committed his 11th Tank Brigade (minus one battalion), 7th Motorized Armored Brigade, and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 36th Motorized Rifle Division, including approximately 186 tanks and 266 armored cars, against the Japanese forces on the west bank. Zhukov accepted the risk of sending armor unsupported by infantry against the Japanese soldiers because his own infantry formations still had not appeapred at the front, and he believed that to await their arrival would squander an opportunity to destroy the Japanese.
尽管初战得胜，进占哈拉哈河西岸的日军（还是因为）7月3日黄昏的到来而停止了（进攻）。朱可夫将军觉察到日本人威胁到他部署在西岸的炮兵，遂命令所属第11坦克旅（缺1个营），第7摩托化装甲旅和第36摩步师下属的第24摩步团，共计约186辆坦克和266辆装甲车，对西岸日军发起进攻。朱可夫冒险派出无步兵支援的装甲力量去进攻日军，因为他所指挥的步兵部队都不在前线，而且他确信，等待他们（后续步兵部队）到来将会错过消灭日本人的机会。

Japanese infantry with heavy machine gun operating on two Soviet armored cars. Halha probably on 3 July. Note two Soviet armored cars.

The unsupported Soviet tanks and armored cars rolled forward and did blunt the Japanese offensive. The cost, however, to both sides was high. Japanese troops destroyed at least 120 Soviet tanks or armored cars with Molotov cocktails, 37-mm antitank guns, and antitank mines. The Japanese, in turn, lost several hundred troops killed or wounded. Moreover, the Japanese forces depended for resupply on one pontoon bridge across the Halha. the rest of the Japanese bridging equipment having been diverted to the China front. This single bridge proved unable to handle the amount of ammunition and equipment required if the Japanese were to continue the battle. Over the next two days, consequently, the Japanese withdrew to the east bank of the Halha. 无支援的苏联坦克和装甲车开到了前线并且遏止了日军的攻势。结果，（鸟注：此处however该如何翻译？）双方都付出了高昂的代价。日军使用莫洛托夫鸡尾酒，37mm反坦克炮和反坦克地雷摧毁了至少120辆苏联坦克和装甲车。另一方面，日军伤亡约数百人。此外，日军依靠架设在哈拉哈河上的浮桥进行补给，而其余的架桥设备已被转运至中国前线。这座唯一的桥梁不足以输送足够的军火和必需的装备供日军继续这场战役。因此，接下来两天以后，日军撤回了哈拉哈河东岸。 Meanwhile both Japanese tank regiments operating on the east bank had failed to break through Soviet defenses despite the loss of half their armor. The 64th Infantry and 2/28 Infantry also could not penetrate Soviet lines. After the repulse of this two-pronged attack, the battle centered on Japanese attempts to wrest Hill 733 from the Soviets. 同时，在东岸作战的日本坦克联队，在损失了一半装甲力量后，仍未能突破苏军防御阵地。第64步兵联队和第28步兵联队第2大队也未能渗透进苏军战线。在这个钳形攻势被击退后，日军的战役意图（改为）从苏军手中夺取733高地。From 7 through 22 July, a four-kilometer wide front stretching from the Holsten River to just north of Hill 733 was the location of the heaviest fighting. The Soviets continued to reinforce their positions, as the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 11th Tank Brigade, 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 5th Machine Gun Brigade, and 602d and 603d Rifle Regiments of the 82d Rifle Division established themselves on the Halha's east bank. 自7月7日至22日，从豪斯腾河（鸟注：一般称为胡鲁斯台河）到733高地正北约4公里宽的战线上发生了重大的战斗。苏军继续增援他们的阵地，以第24摩步团，第11坦克旅，第149摩步团，第5机枪旅（鸟注：是否应译为第5筑垒地域？）和第82步兵师所属第602和603步兵团部署在哈拉哈河东岸。 Unable to evict the Soviets from the east bank, the Japanese moved in more artillery guns to prepare for a late-July general offensive. The Soviets also increased their artillery, placing twentyfour artillery pieces on the east bank and another seventy-six on the west. By shipping artillery units to Manchukuo from Japan, the Japanese managed to accumulate eighty-two artillery weapons. (See Map 5.) （因）未能将苏军从东岸驱逐，日军调集了更多的火炮，为7月晚些时候发动全面进攻作准备。苏军同样在加强他们的炮兵，在东岸布置了24个炮位，在西岸另有76个。（鸟注：artillery pieces是什么意思？）通过从日本向满洲国运送炮兵部队，日军设法集中了82门重炮。（鸟注：artillery weapons？是什么意思？92式步兵炮和掷弹筒显然不是炮兵武器，但也是炮啊。）

On 23 July the 64th and 72d Infantry Regiments launched a frontal attack against elements of the 11th Tank Brigade, 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 5th Machine Gun Brigade. The Japanese had expected that their intense artillery preparation would silence the Soviet artillery batteries and allow the Japanese infantry to drive the Soviet infantry back across the Halha. Soviet gunners quickly disabused them of that erroneous notion. Even though Japanese artillery pieces fired over 25,000 rounds from 23 to 25 July, the Soviets responded with a greater volume of counterfire. While the Japanese did succeed in pushing the Soviets back, Japanese casualties continued to be heavy. More than 5,000 Japanese troops had been killed or wounded from late May through 25 July. 7月23日，第64和第72步兵联队对第11坦克旅，第149摩步师和第5机枪旅所据地域发动了一次正面进攻。日军预期他们强大的炮火准备会压制苏联炮兵火力并且确保日军步兵将苏军步兵赶过哈拉哈河。（鸟注：artillery batteries是炮兵连队的意思吗？）苏军火炮很快便使他们从错误想法中醒悟过来。尽管日军炮兵从7月23日至25日发射了超过25000发炮弹，苏军却回应以更加猛烈的反击炮火。当日军成功逼退苏军时，日军伤亡居高不下。从五月后至7月25日，日军伤亡已超过5000人。（鸟注：push…back可否译为逼退？）After the limited Japanese gains, both sides settled down to a war of attrition along a thirty-kilometer front. North of the Holsten River, a Japanese reconnaissance unit guarded the northern flank from Hill 721. About twelve kilometers south, the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, and the 64th and 72d Infantry Regiments held the line. The Soviet 36th Motorized Rifle Division and 5th Machine Gun Brigade opposed these forces. South of the Holsten, the 8th Border Guards Regiment, 2/28th Infantry Battalion, and 71st Infantry Regiment held a fifteen-kilometer front. The Soviet 82d Rifle Division opposed them. 在日军取得了有限的成功之后，双方沿一条三十公里长的战线开始了消耗战。豪斯腾河以北，一支日军侦搜部队据守在721高地，警戒北方侧翼。往南约12公里，由第26步兵联队第1大队，以及第64和72步兵联队把守战线。当面之敌为苏军第36摩步师和第5机枪旅。豪斯腾河以南，由第8国境警备团（鸟注：据网友鸣称，该部队为日本人组成，并非伪军），第28步兵联队第2大队，和第71步兵联队把守一条15公里长的战线。当面之敌为苏军第82步兵师。

The Soviet Offensive苏军进攻Throughout early August, probing attacks and occasional battalion-sized assaults by the Soviets characterized the activity on the battleground. Soviet artillery gained superiority and daily pounded Japanese positions. At the same time General Zhukov built up his forces in preparation for a great Soviet offensive. The Soviets completed these preparations in complete secrecy, concealing the movement and disposition of their forces. 在整个八月早期，试探性的进攻和偶尔的营级规模袭击成为苏军战场行动的特色。苏军炮兵赢得了优势并且每天都轰击日军阵地。同时，朱可夫将军使他的部队为一次重大的苏联特色的攻势作好了准备。苏军在完全的保密中完成了这些准备，隐蔽了军队的行动和部署。Zhukov launched his offensive along a thirty-kilometer front and caught the Japanese defenders offguard. He concentrated two rifle divisions, two cavalry divisions, a motorized rifle division, a machine gun brigade, two tank brigades, and two motorized armored brigades against slightly more than two Japanese infantry divisions. (See Map 6.) 朱可夫沿一条三十公里长的战线发动了进攻而且使防守的日军毫无警觉。他集中了两个步兵师，两个骑兵师，一个摩步师，一个机枪旅，两个坦克兵旅和两个摩托化装甲旅来对付只有略超过两个步兵师的日军。（见地图6）（鸟注：所谓摩托化装甲旅是否就是以装甲汽车为主要装备的部队？）

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-6-22 20:29:56编辑过]

The Soviets apparently were content with driving Japanese units east of Nomonhan, but they also may have lacked the resources in manpower and materiel to conduct a vigorous pursuit. As the Soviet offensive halted and Soviet troops dug in, a new blitzkrieg style of warfare unveiled itself on the plains of Poland. Faced with the drastically new situation in Europe, the antagonists at Nomonhan/Khalkhin Gol suspended major military operations. The tempo of diplomatic negotiations already underway between Japan and the Soviet Union quickened and the fighting diminished in early September. A cease-fire was declared on 16 September. Japanese losses in the four months of fighting were extremely heavy: over 17,000, including 8,440 killed and 8,766 wounded. Soviet casualties were given as 9,284 killed and wounded. 苏军显然满足于将日军驱逐至诺门坎以东，但他们也许是缺乏实行一个大追击所需的人力和物力资源。当苏联的攻势停止下来，苏军部队开始掘壕固守时，一个新的闪电战在波兰平原上揭幕了。面对这种在欧洲前所未有的新局面，诺门坎的一对敌手暂时停止了主要军事行动。日苏之间业已起步的外交谈判步伐加速了，九月初的战斗也减少了。9月16日宣布停火。日本在四个月战斗中的损失是沉重的：超过17000人，其中死8840人，伤8766人。苏联人员损失据了解为伤亡共计9284人。（鸟注：given as是什么意思？） With this brief outline of the fighting at Nomonhan/Khalkhin Gol as background, a detailed examination of the action of the Imperial Japanese Army's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, will illustrate the types of problems and the difficulties Japanese infantry encountered when fighting the Soviets. It will also illuminate Japanese and Soviet small unit- tactics and doctrine of that period and give the reader the opportunity to gain an appreciation of why an outnumbered and weary Japanese battalion continued to fight against enormous odds. 以诺门坎之战的梗概为背景，对日本帝国军第7步兵师团第28步兵联队第2大队行为的详细检查，将举例说明日本步兵在与苏军的战斗中所遭遇的种种问题和困难。这也将阐明在那个时代日本和苏联的小部队战术和教义，并且使读者有机会正确认识为什么一支弱小且疲惫的日军大队能够在恶劣的处境下坚持战斗。(鸟注：最后一句还是要请高人修改。)

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-6-22 21:15:55编辑过]

待俺细细品品

烟酒中……

Men, Doctrine, Weapons人员，教义，武器 Manchuria in the Middle二者之间的满洲 From the beginning of the twentieth century, the Imperial Japanese Army regarded Czarist Russia and later the Soviet Union as its primary potential opponent. Japanese successes in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1900) temporarily removed the Russian threat and placed IJA units on permanent garrison duty in Manchuria, the main battleground of that war. Following the creation in 1900 of a governor-general's office (directed by an IJA general) to oversee Japanese interests along the South Manchurian Railroad, troops from two IJA divisions remained in Manchuria to protect Japanese lives and property. These units were eventually rotated back to Japan, and by 1910 six battalions composed of reservists formed the independent garrison unit and thereafter assumed responsibility for the defense of Japanese interests in Manchuria. IJA regulars replaced the reservists in 1916, and in 1919 Army Order Number Twelve established Headquarters Kwantung Army to control IJA garrison units in Manchuria. The Japanese contingent mustered about 10,000 troops. 自二十世纪初开始，日本帝国军就将帝俄和后来的苏联当作第一假想敌。日本在日俄战争中的胜利暂时排除了俄国的威胁，并获得了在满洲，这场战争的主战场，永久驻军的权利。自1900年成立总督将军办公室（由一名日本帝国军将军领导）以监护南满铁路沿线的的日本利益起，（鸟注：a governor-general's office系专有名词，不知日本原名如何，请高人指教。）就有两个日本帝国军师团驻在满洲，以保护日本国民和财产。上述部队最后返回了日本，并于1910年由六个大队的预备役部队形成了专门的卫戍部队，并且从此承担起保卫日本在满洲利益的职责。1916年日本帝国军正规军取代预备役部队，并于1919年根据第12号军令成立了关东军司令部，管辖日本帝国军驻满洲部队。这支日本派遣军聚集了大约一万名军人。Kwantung Army headquarters staff officers regarded themselves as the guardians of Japan's frontiers, in Manchuria's case a frontier for which over 160,000 Japanese casualties in the Russo-Japanese War had paid in blood. They came to believe that the War Ministry and General Staff officers in Tokyo did not fully realize the dangers posed by the Soviet Union to Japanese holdings in Manchuria. To meet this threat, Kwantung Army officers took unilateral action to manufacture a casus belli between Japan and a Manchurian warlord that ultimately enabled Kwantung Army units to extend their control throughout Manchuria. Following this so-called Manchurian Incident of 1931, Kwantung Army staff officers quickly forced the creation in early 1932 of a puppet state called Manchukuo. 关东军司令部的参谋军官们把自己视为日本国境的保卫者，一条在日俄战争中以十六万日军将士的鲜血为代价获得的满洲现实国境线。他们都认为陆军省和东京的参谋本部对苏联对日本在满洲权益形成的危险态势根本不完全了解。为了解除这个威胁，关东军军官们采取了单边行动，在日本和满洲军阀之间制造了一个危机，（鸟注：casus belli是否是虚假案例的意思？）最终使关东军将统治扩展到整个满洲。继1931年的所谓“满洲事变”后，关东军的参谋军官们很快于1932年初强制建立了一个叫做“满洲国”的傀儡政权。 Although the Kwantung Army had rapidly conquered Manchuria and with equal speed created a satellite state, its ultimate success could not be assured as long as the Soviet Union threatened the new Japanese possession on three sides. Kwantung Army officers and, eventually after accepting the faitaccompli, their counterparts on the general staff in Tokyo viewed the creation of Manchukuo as an intermediate step in Japanese preparations for a war with the Soviets. The IJA, by exploiting the rich natural resources of Manchukuo, could renovate and modernize itself for the impending struggle. In 1937, however, the Japanese found themselves fighting an unplanned war against China–a classic case of the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong enemy. 尽管关东军迅速征服了满洲，并以同样的速度建立了一个卫星国，但只要苏联从三个方向威胁着这块日本的新领地，它就没有把握取得最终的胜利。（鸟注：这一段译的“达”否？）关东军的军官们，以及那些曾经是对头而最终接受了既成事实的东京总部的将军们，都把满洲国的建立视为与苏联作战准备过程中的一个中间步骤。（鸟注：这一段译的“信”否？）日本帝国军，通过开采满洲丰富的自然资源，使它能够为日益迫近的斗争进行革新和现代化。然而，1937年，日本发现他们对中国发动了一场毫无计划的战争——在错误的地点，错误的时间和错误的敌人打了一场经典的错误战争。As casualty lists from the China theater mounted (100,000 Japanese troops killed or wounded by December 1937), War Ministry and General Staff officers tried to bring hostilities to a rapid conclusion. In general terms, these officers may be divided into expansionists and anti-expansionists. The expansionists believed that any show of weakness by the Japanese would only encourage Chinese resistance. Only smashing military force would convince the Chinese of their errors. The anti-expansionists viewed the China War as a debilitating effort that was bleeding the IJA white while the main enemy, the USSR, continued a military build-up in the Soviet Far East and menaced Japan and Manchuria from the north. A common denominator between the two groups was that both accepted the premise that the Soviets were indeed Japan's number one foe. The expansionists preferred to eliminate by military force any potential Chinese threat to the Japanese flank in operations against the USSR. The antiexpansionists opted to end the senseless drain on IJA resources in order to use such resources to prepare for war with the USSR. Yet Japan's military and civilian leaders discovered no solution to stop the fighting, and by 1939 the IJA had twenty-five infantry divisions, and about one million men total, committed on the endless China front. 当流血的悲剧正在中国上演时（截止1937年12月有10万日本军人伤亡），陆军部和军队将领们试图迅速结束对抗。在军官团中，军官们大致可以分成扩张主义者的反扩张主义者。（鸟注：可否译成主战派和反战派？）扩张主义者坚信日本方面任何示弱的表现都只会鼓励中国的抵抗。只有粉碎性的军事打击才能使中国认识到他们的错误。（鸟注：military force译为军事打击妥否？）反扩张主义者认为中国战争是一种使日本帝国军白白流血的自杀行为（鸟注：debilitating effort译为自杀行为妥否？），尤其是当主要敌人苏联继续在远东地区进行军事集结并从北方威胁日本和满洲的时候。两派达成了一个共识，双方都接受了一个前提，即苏联是日本真正的头号敌人。扩张主义者宁可在对苏军事行动之前，先排除中国对日本侧翼的潜在威胁。而反扩张主义者选择结束对日本帝国军资源无意义的消耗，以便使用这些资源准备对苏战争。但日本的军政首脑们发现没有结束战事的办法，到1939年，日本帝国军已有25个步兵师团，合计100万人，被投入了无止境的中国前线。

Since the Kwantung Army's mission, the protection of Manchukuo from Soviet aggression, remained un changed, its main forces were not engaged in the China fighting. The IJA continued to strengthen and to expand forces assigned to the Kwantung Army, whose size almost doubled from five infantry divisions in 1937 to nine infantry divisions by 1939 while that of the IJA rose from twenty–four to forty–one divisions. Nor was it difficult for the Kwantung Army to justify such troop augmentations. Increasing numbers of incidents–border violations, shootings, kidnappings–led in turn to increases in border security–pillboxes, barbed wire obstacles, new border guard units–all along the 3,000-mile Soviet Manchukuoan border.2 As early as 1936 clashes between Soviet and IJA units involving mechanized forces and aircraft had occurred. 由于关东军的使命，保护满洲免受苏联入侵，没有改变，它的主要力量没有被用在中国的战斗中。日本帝国军继续加强和扩充关东军，它的规模几乎增长了两倍，从1937年的5个步兵师团增长到1939年的9个步兵师团，同时，日本帝国军也从24个师团增长到了41个师团。对关东军来说，证明增加军队的必要性并不困难。越来越多的越境，射击，诱拐等事件，导致了在3000公里长的苏联与满洲边境线上对边境安全的不断加强—碉堡，带刺铁丝网，新增的巡逻队。早在1936年苏日之间就发生了动用机械化军队和空军的冲突。It became a vicious circle. As the Kwantung Army grew, so did the Red Army, from six rifle divisions in 1931 to twenty in 1936 with more than 1,000 tanks and a like number of aircraft. The Special Far Eastern Army became too large and loomed as a threat to Stalin. Consequently, in 1935 it lost its westerly elements with the creation of the Trans-Baikal Military District. After the Lake Khasan Incident in 1938, Stalin abolished the Special Far Eastern Army and established the 1st and 2d Special Red Banner Armies, responsible for the Ussuri and Amur areas respectively, both directly subordinate to the Defense Commissariat. Also in 1938 the 57th Special Rifle Corps moved into Outer Mongolia.3 这变成了一个恶性循环。随着关东军的增长，红军也增长了，从1931年的6个步兵师增长到了1936年的20个，另有超过1000辆坦克和数目可观的空军。远东特别集团军变得太大了以至于成为斯大林的隐忧。因此，1935年，它失去了起家的西部基地，外贝加尔军区。（鸟注：这一段翻译的对否？）1938年哈桑湖事件后，斯大林撤销了远东特别集团军，建立了第1和第2红旗特别集团军，分别负责乌苏里和阿穆尔地区，两者直接受国防人民委员会领导。（鸟注：Defense Commissariat是国防人民委员会的意思吧？）同在1938年，第57特别步兵军移驻外蒙古。In 1938 the IJA's 19th Infantry Division engaged in a bloody twelve-day struggle with the Red Army in mid summer heat at Changkufeng/Lake Khasan on Korea's northern border with the USSR. Although the 19th Division was able to hold the ground until it had initially seized against fierce Soviet counterattacks, it suffered heavy losses. Over 500 Japanese troops were killed and more than 900 wounded. Soviet losses amounted to 236 killed and 611 wounded. In the view of the IJA staff, however, the Soviets did not display innovative ground tactics or skillful troop deployments, thus confirming Kwantung Army observations that the ongoing purges of the Red Army had seriously impaired its battlefield efficiency. As a result, in early 1939 Kwantung Army headquarters adopted a more aggressive series of rules of engagement designed to crush any future Soviet encroachments on Manchukuoan territory.1938年，在朝鲜北部与苏联交界处的张鼓峰/哈桑湖地区，日本帝国军第19步兵师团与红军爆发了一场持续12天的流血冲突。尽管第19师团能够守住最初占据的地区并顶住了苏军的凶猛反攻，但它承受了沉重的损失。逾500名日本军人阵亡，伤者超过900人。苏联损失总计为死236人，伤611人。但在日本帝国军军官们看来，苏联并没有显示出革新的地面战术和熟练的部队部署技巧，从而坚定了关东军的判断，即经过大清洗之后，苏军的作战能力严重地削弱了。结果，1939年初关东军司令部采纳了一系列更为积极主动的作战规则，设想粉碎将来苏联对满洲领土的任何入侵。

Preliminary
Skirmishes初步冲突 In April 1939 the Kwantung Army drafted a new operations order called "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet Manchurian Border Disputes." Later that month the Kwantung Army commander, General Ueda Kenkichi, explained these new guidelines at a corps commanders' meeting.6 Henceforth, according to Operations Order Number 1488, Kwantung Army units could prevent both the frequency and escalation of border incidents by decisively punishing illegal Soviet violations. The same order authorized Japanese troops to invade Soviet or Outer Mongolian territory as required to achieve their objectives. In such cases, all Japanese dead and wounded would be collected from the battlefield and, along with enemy corpses or prisoners of war, would be returned to Manchukuoan territory. Locally, aggressive patrolling was expected and commanders had the right, in cases where the border was unclear, to determine the boundary for themselves.7 Empowered with such sweeping authority, IJA division commanders who were responsible for specific sectors of the long, unstable border would be expected to use it. 1939年4月，关东军草拟了一个新的行动方案，叫做“苏满边境纠纷处理纲要”。该月晚些时候，关东军总指挥，植田谦吉，在一个部队首长会议上解释了这些新的指导方针。此后，根据1488号军事行动命令，关东军部队将果断地反击苏军的非法入侵，以防止边境纠纷的频繁发生和扩大。该命令还授权日军部队在必要时进入苏联和外蒙古领土以达成作战目的。在种情形下，所有在战场上伤亡的日军，都要同敌人的军队或战俘一起，被送回满洲的土地。（鸟注：这一段不好译，请指教。）局部的巡逻队级的入侵可以想见，而且指挥官有权在并不清楚的国境线上确定自己的边界线。（鸟注：译的很生硬，请谅解。）被授予了如此彻底的权力，分头负责把守各段漫长的并不明确的国境线的日本师团长们可以想见如何去使用这权力。（鸟注：这一段译的太烂，不好意思。）On 11 May, about two weeks after the promulgation of the new operations order, about seventy to eighty Outer Mongolian cavalry troops armed with heavy and light machine guns crossed the Halha River into Manchukuoan claimed territory in search of grazing land and water for their horses. Near the village of Nomonhan they attacked a small Manchukuoan security force. A battalion-size Manchukuoan force in turn counterattacked the Outer Mongolians and succeeded in driving them back across the Halha River. The Mongolians abandoned five bodies, four horses, and considerable small arms and ammunition in their flight. The next day a like number of Outer Mongolian troops appeared southwest of Nomonhan but a 13 May counterattack against them by Manchukuoan troops proved unsuccessful. Such were the beginnings of what the Japanese called the Nomonhan Incident and the Soviets, Khalkhin Gol.85月11日，新行动命令颁布两周后，七八十名装备有轻重机枪的外蒙古骑兵越过哈拉哈河，进入满洲国所主张的领土，为他们马匹寻找草场和饮水。在诺门坎村附近，他们攻击了一小支满洲国警备部队。一支营级满洲国军队随即发动了反击，并成功将外蒙古人驱逐过哈拉哈河。在逃跑中，外蒙古人丢下了五具尸体，4匹马和很多轻武器及弹药。第二天，差不多同样数量的外蒙古军队出现在诺门坎西南方，但是，满洲国军队于5月13日对他们发起的反击没有成功。这就是日方所称的诺门坎事件和苏方所称的Khalkhin Gol事件的开始。To LTG Komatsubara Michitaro, commander of the IJA's 23d Infantry Division, which was stationed at Hailaerh, and in whose area of operations the incident had occurred, this latest border skirmish seemed to be typical. He believed that rapid application of sufficient force would quickly resolve the incident. Initial reports, wildly exaggerated, indicated that approximately 700 Outer Mongolian troops had transgressed the boundary. Komatsubara ordered a quick reaction force composed of the 23d Division's reconnaissance element (one cavalry company, one heavy armored car company, and a headquarters element–593 men total) and the lst Battalion, 64th Infantry Regiment (minus two companies) with a platoon of 37-mm rapid fire guns attached, along with 100 automobiles into the area. Japanese staff officers were having great difficulty even locating Nomonhan on their operational maps, so there seemed no reason to believe that additional force might be required to resolve the affray. Confident in their training and tactics, officers and men of the 23d Division eagerly anticipated putting their long months of preparation to use in battle. 对于驻扎在海拉尔，负责事件发生地防务的日本帝国军第23师团长，小松原道太郎中将来说，这场最后的边境冲突看起来很普通。他相信现有部队的快速反击，将很快结束事件。（鸟注：这一段译的很不妥，请帮助修改。）最初的报告，过于夸张了，声称有约700名外蒙古军人非法越界。小松原指派了一支由第23师团侦搜队（1个骑兵连，1个重装甲汽车连和1名司令部成员，共计593人）和第64步兵联队第1大队（缺2个中队，加强1个37毫米速射炮小队）组成的快速反应部队，乘100辆汽车抵达作战地域。（鸟注：the lst Battalion, 64th Infantry Regiment (minus two companies)，第1大队究竟隶属于哪支部队？）日本参谋军官们在作战地图上查找诺门坎时遇到了很大的困难，（鸟注：太小了几乎找不到？），因而看来起没有理由相信需要更多的军队来结束这一事件。出于对平时训练和战术的自信，第23师团的官兵们热切地希望将数月来的准备投入实战。

LTG Komatsubara Michitaro Commander, 23d Infantry Division at Nomonhan. 小松原道太郎中将，诺门坎的第23师团的的指挥官

The 23d Division was a relatively new division activated in July 1938 and sent to Manchuria for training one month later. Most of its enlisted troops were first- or second-year soldiers conscripted from the southern Japanese cities of Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Hiroshima, and Oita. Traditionally troops from these recruiting districts proved to be able fighters, particularly in offensive operations. Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) had originally organized the division expecting to use it to garrison occupied areas in China. However, given the additional requirement to strengthen the Kwantung Army, IGHQ finally assigned the 23d Division responsibility for the defense of Heilungkiang Province in northwest Manchukuo. Despite the quality of its fighting men, Kwantung Army headquarters staff officers regarded the division as organizationally deficient to meet a major Soviet threat. 第23师团是一个于1938年正式成立的较新的师团，经过1个月的训练后派到满洲。大部分应征入伍的士兵都是第一年或第二年服役，来自于福冈，熊本，广岛，大分等日本南方城市。传统上，来自这些征兵区的部队被证明是勇敢善战的，特别是在进攻行动中。日军大本营组建这个师团时，打算用以驻防占领的中国领土。但是，考虑到加强关东军的额外要求，大本营最终指派23师团负责防守满洲西北部的黑龙江省。尽管该部人员有善战的品质，关东军司令部的参谋军官们仍视其为一支正在编组中的部队，不足以应付重大的苏联威胁。The maneuver elements of a triangular division like the 23d had one infantry brigade with three infantry regiments attached to it. Regular pre-1937 Kwantung Army divisions, like the 7th Division, to which the 2/28th Infantry was attached, were square-two brigades of two regiments each with three battalions per regiment. The triangular division had 12,000 men while the square division had 15,000. Furthermore, the triangular divisions lacked the artillery power needed to combat a first-line Soviet division. The 23d Division, for instance, had only sixty-five artillery pieces, including seventeen 37-mm guns, in its Table of Equipment compared to sixty-four artillery guns and sixteen 37-mm guns organic to the 7th Infantry Division.1个三三制师团，例如第23师团，有一个下属三个步兵联队的步兵旅团加强，，作为机动部分。1937年前，普通的关东军师团，例如加强有第28步兵联队第2大队的第7师团，是四四型的——下属2个旅团，每旅团下属2个联队，每联队下属3个大队。（鸟注：square是正方形之意，这里译为四四制实为不妥，但译为正方制亦不妥，请达人指教。）三三制师团有12000人，同时期的四四制师有15000人。而且，三三制师团缺乏与苏联一线师对抗所需的炮兵火力。以23师团为例，仅有65门大炮，包括17门37毫米炮，在这张装备表上，与装备有64门大炮和16门37毫米炮的第7师团对比如下。

以上所发地图皆为缩小图，在原网站上有大图，请自行前往观看。

Weapons and Doctrine武器和教义Debates had raged within IJA for a decade over whether or not the triangular division should be adopted as the main combat division organization. The decisive factor in the adoption of the triangular division was the realization among IJA planners that the triangular infantry division offered a quick way to increase the number of IJA divisions. Otherwise, by maintaining the square division, Japan lacked the resources and the IJA lacked the military budget required to expand the army. It was more economical to build triangular divisions. The army reorganization in 1936, by adopting the triangular plan, squeezed six new infantry divisions from the IJA's standing force of seventeen divisions. The money saved by creating such "new" divisions was spent on tank and aircraft development. Operations during the China War also favored a light division since the Nationalist Chinese armies seldom used armor effectively and the Chinese Communists had none to use. 关于是否采取三三制师团作为主要作战师团的编制模式，日本帝国军内部激烈争论了十年以上。采纳三三制师团的决定性因素是现实的，日本帝国军的规划者们认为三三制师团提供了一条增加日本帝国军师团番号的捷径。（鸟注：有点难以置信，我翻译的对吗？）否则，维持四四制师团，日本和日本帝国军缺乏扩充军队所必需的资源和军费。建立三三制师则更为经济。（鸟注：不把人命当回事啊！）1936年进行军队改编，采用了三三制，从现有的十七个常备师团里挤出了六个新师团。建立“新”师团时所节约的经费用于坦克和飞机的发展。在中国的作战也促使建立轻型师，因为国民党军队缺乏有效的装甲力量，而共产党军队根本没有。（鸟注：这一段是意译，不当之处请指出。）Within either type of division, the battalion was the IJA's smallest single tactical unit capable of conducting independent combat operations. Ideally the battalion consisted of a headquarters and four rifle companies of 194 men each, a heavy weapons company with eight 7.7-mm heavy machine guns, and a battalion artillery platoon of two 70-mm howitzers designed to support advancing infantry by destroying enemy machine gun nests. Each company had three rifle platoons, which in turn had three rifle squads each. A rifle squad had eleven riflemen and a 6.5-mm light machine gun crew, and each weapons squad had eleven more riflemen and three grenadiers carrying 50-mm grenade dischargers, often incorrectly referred to as knee mortars. There was, however, no battalion staff organization, so the battalion commander and his aide-de-camp had to coordinate all staff functions like logistics, intelligence, operations, and communications.在两种师团中，大队是日本帝国军中能够独立执行作战任务的最小独立战术单位。理论上，大队组成部分有一个指挥部，四个步兵中队（每个中队194人），一个重机枪连（8挺7.7毫米重机枪），一个队属炮兵排（2门70毫米榴弹炮，负责支援前线步兵，摧毁敌方机枪火力点）。（鸟注：是否为70毫米步兵狙击炮？）每个中队下辖3个步兵小队，每小队下辖3个步兵班。每个步兵班有11名步兵和1个6.5毫米轻机枪组，每个火器班有11名以上的步兵和3个携带50毫米掷弹筒的掷弹兵（常被误以为轻型迫击炮）。但是，没有营属参谋机构，所以大队长和他的副手不得不承担参谋的职责，诸如后勤，计策，部队运转，通迅等等。 鸟注：下有大队武器一览表，无法贴出，请见谅。

IJA units attached to the Kwantung Army, whether regular infantry divisions like the 7th or new divisions like the 23d, spent most of their time in Manchukuo undergoing rigorous training to prepare them to meet the Red Army. For the 7th Division, training exercises focused on infantry combat, hand-to-hand combat, infantry tactics as opposed to combined arms tactics, and spiritual training. Spiritual training emphasized a certainty in victory, loyalty and patriotic devotion to duty, military tradition, and esprit de corps all premised on instilling the spirit of the offensive into every soldier.隶属于关东军的日本帝国军部队，无论是常备步兵师团，如第7师团，还是新建步兵师团，如第23师团，在驻满洲期间，都把大部分时间用于严格的训练，准备与红军作战。对于第7师团，训练科目集中于单兵战术，近身肉搏，与合成兵种战术恰成对比的步兵战术，以及精神训练。精神训练强调必胜的信念，忠诚和爱国的义务，军队传统，以及集体荣誉感，所有这些成为向士兵灌输进攻精神的前提。（鸟注：这一段军事术语极多，请各位高手仔细参详。）Every Japanese infantry training and drill manual from 1909 through 1945 stressed the importance of the role of the offensive in combat operations. The deadly new weaponry of the RussoJapanese War and the staggering Japanese losses necessitated a new combat doctrine that would compel the infantryman to continue the fight even after he saw his friends killed or wounded. Based on the lessons of that war, the 1909 field manual emphasized the need to inculcate spiritual factors, such as the soldier's belief in his inevitable triumph and an unflagging offensive spirit, throughout the entire IJA. This reliance on the intangibles of battle required each soldier to possess an even higher morale and an aggressive spirit based on a zealous patriotism and esprit de corps. Morale, already at a high level during the Russo-Japanese War, received such increased emphasis that Japanese commanders came to rely on these intangibles to compensate for materiel and technological deficiencies on the battlefield. Such doctrine pervaded the IJA to the extent that by 1932 the manual advised division commanders that if the enemy forced them unavoidably to take the defensive, they still had to look for the opportunity to deliver the "enemy a decisive blow by attacking."在1909年至1945年间，所有的训练和练习手册，无不强调作战行动中进攻的重要。日俄战争中致命的新武器和日军令人惊愕的伤亡显示出寻找一种新战术的必要性，这种新战术要能够使步兵在目睹战友伤亡后仍能坚持战斗。基于那次战争的教训，1909的野战手册强调了反复灌输精神因素的必要，诸如士兵的必胜信念，不屈不挠的进攻精神等等，弥漫于整个日本帝国军上下。对战争中无形力量的依赖，需要每一个士兵都要在爱国热情和集体荣誉感下，激发出高昂的士气和斗志。在日俄战争中已经达到很高的水平的士气，被认为是加强的重点，因为日军指挥官都要依靠这些无形因素来弥补战场上物质和科技的不足。这种教义遍及整个日军，1932年，给师团长们看的手册中建议，如果敌人迫使己方不得不转入防御，己方仍要寻找机会发起进攻，给敌人以决定性的一击。The IJA founded its battle doctrine on bold offensive operations. Thus it had to devise tactics suitable to apply such doctrine against its main enemy, the Red Army. Both the Russo-Japanese War and World War I had demonstrated that massed infantry formations on the battlefield were deadly anachronisms. The IJA, however, relied on the infantry as its main battle force, a force whose objective was to attack the enemy and destroy him in hand-to-hand combat. IJA tacticians had to guarantee that the attacking Japanese infantry reached the enemy positions with a minimum of friendly losses. Thus, the 1920s and the early 1930s became times of significant doctrinal ferment within the IJA. 日本帝国军把它的战役教义基于大胆的进攻上。从而就不得不制定与这教义相适应的战术，以针对它的主要敌人红军。日俄战争和一战已经证明，战场上的密集步兵集群是致命的时代错误。但是，日本帝国军的主要战斗力依赖于步兵，这种在白刃战中攻击敌人和消灭敌人的兵种。日本帝国军的战术专家们不得不保证，在进攻中的步兵在冲到敌人阵地时，其伤亡是可以接受的。因此，1920年代至1930年代早期，日本帝国军内部，发生了重大的学说混乱。（鸟注：语法越来越难，我技穷矣。）

By 1920 IJA tacticians realized the need to disperse infantry formations in order to reduce losses when attacking a defender who possessed the lethal firepower of modern weapons. The revised 1925 edition of the Infantry Manual emphasized tactics designed to allow the attacker to reach the enemy defender's position. These included infantry cooperation with other combat arms, improved communications for command and control, night fighting and maneuver, coordination of infantry firepower with hand-to-hand combat, and increased reliance on the independent decision making ability of junior officers and non-commissioned officers.1920年，日本的战术家们认识到，在向使用现代武器，拥有致命火力的防守方进攻时，需要疏散步兵队形，以减少伤亡。1925年修订版的步兵操典，强调运用精巧的战术来接近敌人的防御阵地。这包括了步兵与其他兵种的协同，改良的指挥通信，夜战和机动能力，步兵火力与白刃突击的协调，以及对下级军官和军士独立决定能力的依赖。 Reliance on junior officers' leadership ability was central to the new tactics but it required high-quality, welltrained junior officers who were concerned about their troops' welfare and who matured by continual service with their regiments. In peacetime when an average Military Academy class might have 300–350 graduates and NCOs might be given commissions to leaven the junior officer force, the development of aggressive, independent junior officers was possible. However, junior officer attrition during the China fighting, abbreviated academy graduating classes each of more than 500 cadets, and officer training schools producing still more subalterns diluted officer quality. Furthermore, outstanding company grade officers achieved rapid promotion to field grade rank in order to alleviate the acute shortage of majors and lieutenant colonels caused by the IJA's rapid wartime expansion. By 1941 only 36 percent of all IJA officers were Academy graduates and the percentage was even lower for company grade ranks. At the same time, the new revisions to the Infantry Manual required junior officers capable of exhibiting imaginative leadership and initiative. 对下级军官领导能力的依赖是新战术的核心，但这需要高素质的训练有素的下级军官，这些下级军官要关心部队福利，而且要在所属团队长期工作，成熟老练。在和平时期，一个普通军校，每届大约有300—350名毕业生，也可以提拔军士以充实下级军官队伍，培养出一批锐意进取，独立自主的下级军官是有可能的。但是，下级军官消耗在中国的战争中，短期军校毕业班每期都超过500人，军官在学校的训练过程更加低下，降低了军官的素质。此外，为了弥补日本帝国军战时快速扩充所造成的少佐和中佐的严重短缺，表现优异的连级军官被飞快地提升到更高的军衔。（鸟注：field grade rank在这里是什么意思？lieutenant colonels是中佐吗？officer training schools producing是什么意思？）1941年，全部日本帝国军军官中，只有36%是军校毕业生，在连级军官中，这一比例更为低下。同时，新修订的步兵操典要求下级军官展现出非凡的领导能力和主动精神。The 1928 revised edition of Infantry Manual placed great emphasis on the use of cover and concealment to protect advancing infantry and reduced the distance to be covered in one dash by an infantry under enemy fire from fifty to thirty meters. Most of the revisions, however, stressed night combat and the requirement for night combat and maneuver training. Day and night dispersal tactics also required new weapons, and the revised manual paid particular attention to the use of the light machine gun and the grenade discharger. Despite these alterations, the basic IJA reliance on offensive operations which culminated in hand-to-hand combat never changed. 1928年版的步兵操典，着重强调了掩蔽和伪装对保护前线步兵的作用，并将步兵在敌火下一次冲击的距离从50米减少到30米。（鸟注：这一句话很复杂，我不敢保证准确。）大部分修订内容，强调了夜战和对夜战及机动训练的要求。全天候的疏散队形的战术需要新式武器，修订的步兵操典对轻机枪和掷弹筒给予了特别关注。尽管有这些改动，日本帝国军战术思想的基础，以白刃战为顶点的攻势行动，并未改变。

By the 1930s, IJA planners realized more than ever that the Japanese army could not fight a war of attrition against the ever-growing might of the Soviet Union. Consequently, they designed and refined their tactics to wage a short war fought to a quick and decisive conclusion of hostilities (sokusen sokketsu). The goal of sokusen sohketsu was to encircle the enemy and then destroy him. The tactics employed to achieve that end relied on unit mobility, initiative, concentration of forces, night attack and night movement, and close cooperation between artillery and infantry. Coupled with the spiritual or psychological values of offensive spirit and the belief in the absolute supremacy of Japanese arms, such tactics produced one of the finest infantry armies in the world. It was, however, still an infantry army whose emphasis on the value of intangibles like morale or Japanese fighting spirit on the battlefield perhaps resulted from its status as an army poor in the weapons of modern warfare. It was an army, in short, that tried to use doctrine to compensate for materiel deficiencies. 1930年代，日本帝国军的规划者们认识到日本军队不能像过去那样与实力日益强大的苏联打一场消耗战了。因此，他们精心制定了他们的新战术，发动一场短期战争，快速而决定性地击倒对手结束敌对行动（速战速决）。速战速决的目标是包围敌人，然后摧毁敌人。要使用这种战术达到预想结果，依赖于部队的机动性，主动精神，多兵种联合作战，夜战和夜间行动能力，以及步兵和炮兵之间的密切配合。将进攻精神的精神或者说心理价值，与日本武装力量至高无上的狂热信念结全起来，这些战术制造出了一支世界上最好的步兵军队。但是，它仍是一支步兵军队，强调诸如士气或日本战斗精神（鸟注：大和魂？）之类的无型价值，这也许是因为它缺乏现代作战争武器的处境所致。它是一支短缺的军队，试图通过战术教义来物质的不足。（鸟注：doctrine还是译为战术比较好）By 1939 battlefield experiences in China and against the Soviets seemed to confirm the validity of the Japanese way of warfare. In China time and time again numerically inferior Japanese forces routed Chinese troops. Against the Soviets at Changkufeng/Lake Khasan the decision was not so clear cut, but since that engagement also served to "prove" the efficacy of Japanese tactics, particularly night combat and hand-to-hand fighting, it merits closer attention. 1939年在中国的战场经验和对苏联的斗争看来起确认了日本战争方式的有效性。在中国，一次又一次，数量上处于劣势的日本军队赶跑了中国军队。在与苏联发生的张鼓峰/哈桑湖冲突中，这个决定还不很清楚，（鸟注：clear cut在这里是什么意思？），但是这次交战，也“证明”了日本战术的效能，特别是夜战和白刃战，有利于证明这个观点。（鸟注：it merits closer attention是什么意思？）The engagement that would provide a battle test for staff planners' theories began in the early morning hours of 31 July 1938. Members of the 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry, 19th Infantry Division launched a night attack against Soviet troops occupying an approximately 150-meter high ridgeline at Changkufeng/Lake Khasan. The attackers carried the position and, after fierce hand-to-hand fighting in the darkness, the Soviet troops fled in disorder. The Japanese troops held their gains despite heavy losses during the next twelve days. More important, because this action was the first IJA night attack against the Red Army, tacticians regarded it as a brilliant success which strengthened their faith in the tactic of night attack. Paradoxically, although all proponents of the offensive, these same tacticians paid greater attention to the defensive lessons of Changkufeng, particularly that a division in a strong natural or fortified position could resist successfully a three-division frontal assault. Simultaneously, the IJA chose to overlook the superior firepower of the Soviet infantry and artillery and continued to stress the other intangible factors on the battlefield. To paraphrase the official Japanese history of Nomonhan, clearly a Japanese lack of firepower was the main reason for the emphasis on spiritual training, but contributing to the intangible factors was an absolute faith in night combat, especially a night attack that culminated in handto-band combat with the enemy.这次发生在1938年7月31日凌晨的交战，给制定计划的参谋们的理论提供了一次实战检验。第19步兵师团第75联队第1大队的官兵们，对占据在约150米高的张鼓峰/哈桑湖顶山脊线上的苏联军队发动了一场夜袭。进攻者们冲进了阵地，经过黑暗中凶猛的白刃战，苏联军队仓皇撤退。日本军队获得了胜利，尽管在接下来的十二天中伤亡惨重。更重要的是，因为这次行动是日本帝国军与红军的第一次夜战，战术家们把它当成了一次辉煌的胜利，强化了对夜战战术的信赖。荒谬的是，同样是这一群战术家，尽管全部是这次进攻的支持者，却对张鼓峰事件的防御中的教训给予了更多的关注，特别是一个师在坚固的天然或加强的阵地上可以成功地抵抗三个师的正面进攻。（鸟注：这一句大费周折，请高人指教。）同时，日本帝国军选择了藐视苏联步兵和炮兵的较之日军更为强大的火力，继续强调战场上的其他无形因素。根据日本官方历史上对诺门坎事件的解释，很明显地，日本在火力上的缺乏是强调精神训练的主要原因，但是对夜战的绝对信赖也助长了对无形因素（的重视），特别是夜战的高潮，白刃战。(鸟注：contributing to这里作何解释？)

As the new conscripts of the 7th Division underwent their advanced infantry training on the dusty plains near Tsitsihar, its members concentrated on the three cardinal drills of the IJA: bayonet practice, firing practice, and maneuver. They learned, as did others before them, that a charge which carried them face-to-face to the enemy to kill him was the climax of infantry combat. Most of the riflemen were just completing their first year of company training, a year that contained thirty-eight weeks of night combat instruction averaging about ten hours per week. The men studied night attacks in various echelons, obstacle clearing, concealment, noise prevention, orientation at night, patrolling, and security. Their officers taught them that night attacks exploited the unique Japanese characteristics of bravery, tenacity, shrewdness, and audacity. In May 1939 the men of the 7th Division perhaps were jealous that their comrades in the 23d Division were about to get the first crack at the Red Army at Nomonhan. 第7师团的入伍新兵们在齐齐哈尔附近尘土飞扬的草原上经受高强度步兵训练，他们的主要集中于三种日本帝国军所重视的训练：刺杀训练，射击训练，以及机动。（鸟注：maneuver在此是否可译为越野？）他们一如既往地学习，学习在一次冲锋中，冲上敌人的阵地，与敌人面对面地交手，在步兵战的高潮中杀死敌人。（鸟注：这一段中想象多于翻译，请高人勿笑。）大多数步兵刚刚完成了在连队中的第一年训练，一年中有38周进行了夜战培训，平均每周10小时。他们学习各种夜战方式（鸟注：in various echelons究竟是指人的层次不同，还是指夜战方式的层次不同？），包括清除障碍物，隐蔽，静默，夜间定向，巡逻，以及警戒。他们的官长教育他们，夜战发扬了独特的日本精神，如勇敢，坚韧，机灵和大胆。1939年5月，第7师团的军人们也许受到了第23师团的战友们的嫉妒，因为他们在诺门坎与红军的作战大约是他们的第一次作战。On 14 May 1939 the 23d Division's previously dispatched reconnaissance detachment, consisting of an armored car company and a cavalry squadron commanded by LTC Azuma Yaozo, arrived in the vicinity of Nomonhan. The following day Azuma. hoping to trap the Outer Mongolian troops on the east side of the Halha River, launched a two-pronged enveloping movement in conjunction with 150 Manchukuoan cavalrymen also from Hailaerh. The attack began at 1300, but the Outer Mongolian troops slipped through the closing pincers of the attempted encirclement and escaped to the western side of the Halha. Three squadrons of IJA aircraft bombed and strafed the area causing some damage to about twenty Mongol yurts. Since the Mongols had fled back across the border, Lieutenant General Komatsubara considered the incident closed and ordered the Azuma unit to return to Hailaerh.1939年5月14日，第23师团先前派出的侦搜队，（包括一个装甲汽车连和一个骑兵中队，由东八百藏中佐指挥），到达了诺门坎附近。第2天，东希望捕捉到东岸的外蒙古军，汇同也是从海拉尔来的150名满洲国骑兵，发起一场钳型合围。攻击开始于13：00，但是外蒙古军钻出了正试图合拢中的钳口并逃回了哈拉哈河西岸。日本航空兵的三个中队轰炸并扫射了这一地区，造成了一些破坏，大约是二十个蒙古包。（鸟注：战果显赫否？）自从蒙古人败退回边境外，小松原道太郎中将就认为事件已结束并命令东部队回到海拉尔。A few days later, aerial reconnaissance and Manchukuoan cavalry reports revealed that about sixty Outer Mongolian troops had again crossed the Halha south of its confluence with the Holsten River. By 21 May, an estimated 300 to 400 enemy troops with at least two cannon and light tanks were busily constructing fortified positions both north and south of the Holsten River. That same day Lieutenant General Komatsubara ordered a task force headed by COL Yamagata Takemitsu, commander of the 64th Infantry Regiment, 23d Division, to move into the area and destroy Outer Mongolian forces. The 64th Infantry (minus two battalions), Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's reconnaissance element, a wireless communications platoon, transportation, and a field sanitation unit composed the task force. They set out to track down and destroy an elusive foe in the barren desert steppes around Nomonhan.几天后，空中侦察和满洲国骑兵的报告显示，大约60名外蒙古军又越过了哈拉哈河，地点是哈拉哈河与豪斯腾河交汇处以南。5月21日，一支估计有300至400人的敌军部队，携带至少两门加农炮和数目不详的轻型坦克，在豪斯腾河南北两岸忙碌地修筑坚固阵地。同日，小松原中将任命Yamagata Takemitsu大佐为任务部队首脑，指挥第23师团第64步兵联队，抵达该地区并消灭外蒙古军。第64联队（缺2个大队），东八百藏中佐的侦搜队，一个无线电通迅排，运输部队，和一个野战卫生单位组成了任务部队。（鸟注：一个疑问，一个联队只有三个大队，这64联队竟然缺编达2个大队，这怎么打？）他们向诺门坎周围那荒芜的戈壁沙漠进发，去追捕和消灭那飘忽不定的敌人。

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-6-24 20:07:02编辑过]

From the village of Nomonhan Japanese troops descended to the Halha over ground shaped like a basin the center of which was the confluence of the Halha and Holsten Rivers. The Holsten was between three and four meters wide and presented no impediment to military operations. It was, however, the sole source of potable under water in the region. The swamp lands resulting from flash floods were almost all saline. There were many wells in the vicinity, but salt water also had contaminated most of these.
（地形）从日本所在的诺门坎村下降，直到哈拉哈河，之间的土地形成了一个盆地，中心就是哈拉哈河和豪斯腾河交汇处。豪斯腾河的宽度在3到4米之间，不会给军事行动带来障碍。但是，它是这一地区唯一的饮用水源。这里的沼泽地由于速来速去的洪水全都盐碱化了。附近有许多水井，但大多数都被盐水污染了。

Terrain profile bordering Halha River (Khalkhin Gol). 哈拉哈河地形剖面图

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-6-24 20:22:08编辑过]

Approximately one hour of dawn allowed Japanese infantrymen to see very close targets completely, but at 700 to 1,000 meters, the mid-ranges where enemy heavy machine guns and light artillery were found, observation was exceedingly difficult.利用日出时的大约1个小时，日本步兵可以完全看见近处的目标，但是在700米到1000米之外，设置在山体中部的敌人重机枪和轻型火炮阵地，极难被观察到。The desolation of the region affected basic strategy, logistics, and the selection of lines of communications. IJA operations hinged on railroads as conventional IJA thought held that multidivision operations could not be conducted outside of a 200- to 250-kilometer zone from a major resupply base situated on a rail line. (See Map 8.) Nomonhan was aproxiniately 200 kilometers south of the IJA base at Hailaerh, but it was about 750 kilometers from the nearest Soviet bases of operations at Borzya, USSR, and Ondorhann, Outer Mongolia, respectively. Looking at their maps, Kwantung Army planners estimated that large scale Soviet operations around Nomonhan would be impossible. They thought that the great distances from the nearest Soviet railhead insured that the Red Army could never concentrate large armor and infantry forces at Nomonhan. This meant, in turn, that the only Soviet troops around Nomonhan would be those assigned to the 7th Border Guard Brigade. The 23d Division expected to encounter only Outer Mongolian and second-rate Soviet troops. Based on assumed Soviet capabilities, a single IJA division would suffice to handle this latest border flare-up. 36
该地区的荒凉对作战策略，后勤保障和通信线路的选择有根本性的影响。日本帝国军的行动，习惯上都围绕铁路线进行。日本帝国军主张，大兵团行动不应在离开铁路线上的主要补给点200到250公里外的地区展开。（见地图8）诺门坎在日本帝国军海拉尔基地以南大约200公里处，但离最近的苏联行动基地，布尔贾，和外蒙古的温都尔汗，各有750公里远。看着他们的军事地图，关东军的参谋们估计苏联在诺门坎周围不太可能展开大规模军事行动。他们认为即使最近的苏联铁路终端也太遥远了，这限定了红军在诺门坎无法聚集大批装甲和步兵部队。这意味着，in turn，（鸟注：in turn在这里是什么意思？）诺门坎周围仅有的苏联军队可能就是第7国境警备旅所面对的那些。第23师团希望遇到的仅仅是外蒙古军队和二流的苏军部队。根据假想中的苏军战斗力，单单一个日本帝国军师团将足以对付这次边境冲突。

Near Arshaan troops of Yasuoka Detachment pulling a truck bogged down in swamp on 在阿尔山附近，安岗支队的士兵们正在推一辆陷入泥沼中的卡车

Roads from the Japanese railheads approached Nomanhan from the north and south. (See Map 9.) One northern approach from Hailaerh to Chiangchunmiao, the IJA staging area ten kilometers northeast of Nomonhan, was unimproved sand or grass road suitable for wheeled vehicles. It was also completely exposed to aerial reconnaissance and attack. An alternate route from Hailaerh via Kanchuerhmiao (approximately eighty-five kilometers northwest of Chiangchunmiao) could also handle wheeled traffic and was similarly exposed to aerial hazards. Additionally, there was no water between Kanchuerhmiao and Chiangchunmiao. From the south, the sixtyfive kilometer road running from the railhead at Handagai to Chiangchunmiao became a bog in late June with the onset of the rainy season. While light repairs corduroying the road would allow trucks passage, about twothirds or forty kilometers of the road were subject to flooding and rapidly could turn into a quagmire in which trucks sank to their undercarriages. The IJA employed the logistics route that ran from Hailaerh via Kanchuerhmiao which was used as a stopover and sorting point.从日本（鸟注：明明是中国啊！）的铁路终端出发，道路从南北两个方向通向诺门坎。（见地图9）。北边的那条从海拉尔通往将军庙，将军庙是诺门坎以北十公里处一个日本运输中转站点，这是一条未经改造的沙漠或草原路，适于轮式车辆。但它也完全暴露在航空侦察和火力之下。从海拉尔经甘珠尔庙（大约在将军庙西北方约85公里处）有一条备用路线，也适宜于轮式车辆运行，也同样地暴露在空中威胁下。另外，在甘珠尔庙和将军庙之间没有水。从南方的铁路终端罕达盖到将军庙的路有65公里，随着六月末雨季的到来，这条路变成了沼泽。尽管在路面上铺设了木排，可供卡车通过，（鸟注：light repairs是什么意思？）大约三分之二，或者说四十公里的公路还是为洪水所困，很快成了泥淖，卡车在里面陷到底盘。日本帝国军使用了海拉尔经甘珠尔庙的后勤路线，把甘珠尔庙作为停靠和集散的站点。

诺门坎：日苏的冲突中的战术诺门坎的苏联坦克棒子的诺门坎战役 [讨论]关于苏日诺门坎边界冲突事件中的一次坦克战有没有熟悉诺门坎的？有关于诺门坎战役的问题~ 一张著名的投降照诺门坎诺门坎战役中苏日双方火炮对比诺门坎之战中苏日军队兵器大比武关于056在低烈度冲突中的战术运用问题假设诺门坎关于诺门坎战役。。。。。