超级军网白裤衩漫天飞的CD，没人关心新词“Chimerica”（中美國 ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/05/02 04:19:08
解讀美國英語新詞：Chimerica中美國
http://www.chinareviewnews.com 2008-11-19 10:55:59
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/d ... mp;mdate=1119105559
中評社香港11月19日電／拿英語中的單詞Chinese（中文）、China（中國）和其他的語言、國名拼起來就可以形成新詞，比如Chinglish就是Chinese與 English的合成詞，表示“中式英文”。美國商業周刊撰稿人皮特•恩加迪奧（Pete Engardio）對中國和印度的崛起深信不疑，將China和India合成創造了Chindia一詞，不妨翻譯為“中印度”。印度同事們對這個詞非常欣賞，因為印度終於和中國平起平坐，而不是把印度與巴基斯坦相提並論，動輒就什麼“印巴”、“印巴”的。不過，印度朋友們不要高興得太早，隨著印度實力的升級，中國的地位也在提高，印度還未必夠得著。經濟史學家尼爾•弗格森（Niall Ferguson）就把China和America合並出Chimerica這個英語新詞，即“中美國”。
到底什麼是“中美國”呢？在弗格森的定義中，這個概念主要是指最大消費國（美國）和最大儲蓄國（中國）構成的利益共同體，以及這個利益共同體對全世界經濟的影響。但是我們還可以從另一個角度來觀察，聯系30年來中國改革開放思想解放的進程和美國應對金融海嘯的政策選擇來說明到底什麼是“中美國”。
先看中國。在中國改革之初面臨的一個敏感的核心問題就是如何看待市場經濟。在當年中國人的固有觀念中，“市場經濟”是“資本主義”的同義詞，所以在相當長的一段時間內，包括改革開放以後的若幹年內，“市場經濟”充其量是社會主義計劃經濟的一種“有益的補充”。
鄧小平在1987年2月6日的一次談話中說：“為什麼一談市場就說是資本主義，只有計劃才是社會主義呢？計劃和市場都是方法嘛！”（《鄧小平文選》第三卷203頁）可惜，鄧公的這次談話並沒有為國人所知，也不為主流學者們所接受。1990年12月24日鄧小平再次指出：“資本主義和社會主義的區分不在於計劃還是市場這樣的問題。社會主義有市場經濟，資本主義也有計劃控制。”（《鄧小平文選》第三卷364頁）此後一再強調，“不要以為一說計劃經濟就是社會主義，一說市場經濟就是資本主義，不是那麼回事，兩者都是手段，市場也可以為社會主義服務。”直到這時，中國人終於醒過夢來：原來市場就是個手段！於是中國人爽快地承認自己也是市場經濟，由於這個問題而僵持多年的“入世”談判也迎刃而解，中國經濟也在十幾年中連續上了幾個台階，GDP總值已經超過了西方G8集團中的6個。解讀美國英語新詞：Chimerica中美國
http://www.chinareviewnews.com 2008-11-19 10:55:59
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/d ... mp;mdate=1119105559
中評社香港11月19日電／拿英語中的單詞Chinese（中文）、China（中國）和其他的語言、國名拼起來就可以形成新詞，比如Chinglish就是Chinese與 English的合成詞，表示“中式英文”。美國商業周刊撰稿人皮特•恩加迪奧（Pete Engardio）對中國和印度的崛起深信不疑，將China和India合成創造了Chindia一詞，不妨翻譯為“中印度”。印度同事們對這個詞非常欣賞，因為印度終於和中國平起平坐，而不是把印度與巴基斯坦相提並論，動輒就什麼“印巴”、“印巴”的。不過，印度朋友們不要高興得太早，隨著印度實力的升級，中國的地位也在提高，印度還未必夠得著。經濟史學家尼爾•弗格森（Niall Ferguson）就把China和America合並出Chimerica這個英語新詞，即“中美國”。
到底什麼是“中美國”呢？在弗格森的定義中，這個概念主要是指最大消費國（美國）和最大儲蓄國（中國）構成的利益共同體，以及這個利益共同體對全世界經濟的影響。但是我們還可以從另一個角度來觀察，聯系30年來中國改革開放思想解放的進程和美國應對金融海嘯的政策選擇來說明到底什麼是“中美國”。
先看中國。在中國改革之初面臨的一個敏感的核心問題就是如何看待市場經濟。在當年中國人的固有觀念中，“市場經濟”是“資本主義”的同義詞，所以在相當長的一段時間內，包括改革開放以後的若幹年內，“市場經濟”充其量是社會主義計劃經濟的一種“有益的補充”。
鄧小平在1987年2月6日的一次談話中說：“為什麼一談市場就說是資本主義，只有計劃才是社會主義呢？計劃和市場都是方法嘛！”（《鄧小平文選》第三卷203頁）可惜，鄧公的這次談話並沒有為國人所知，也不為主流學者們所接受。1990年12月24日鄧小平再次指出：“資本主義和社會主義的區分不在於計劃還是市場這樣的問題。社會主義有市場經濟，資本主義也有計劃控制。”（《鄧小平文選》第三卷364頁）此後一再強調，“不要以為一說計劃經濟就是社會主義，一說市場經濟就是資本主義，不是那麼回事，兩者都是手段，市場也可以為社會主義服務。”直到這時，中國人終於醒過夢來：原來市場就是個手段！於是中國人爽快地承認自己也是市場經濟，由於這個問題而僵持多年的“入世”談判也迎刃而解，中國經濟也在十幾年中連續上了幾個台階，GDP總值已經超過了西方G8集團中的6個。
http://www.chinareviewnews.com 2008-11-19 10:55:59
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/d ... mp;mdate=1119105559
中評社香港11月19日電／拿英語中的單詞Chinese（中文）、China（中國）和其他的語言、國名拼起來就可以形成新詞，比如Chinglish就是Chinese與 English的合成詞，表示“中式英文”。美國商業周刊撰稿人皮特•恩加迪奧（Pete Engardio）對中國和印度的崛起深信不疑，將China和India合成創造了Chindia一詞，不妨翻譯為“中印度”。印度同事們對這個詞非常欣賞，因為印度終於和中國平起平坐，而不是把印度與巴基斯坦相提並論，動輒就什麼“印巴”、“印巴”的。不過，印度朋友們不要高興得太早，隨著印度實力的升級，中國的地位也在提高，印度還未必夠得著。經濟史學家尼爾•弗格森（Niall Ferguson）就把China和America合並出Chimerica這個英語新詞，即“中美國”。
到底什麼是“中美國”呢？在弗格森的定義中，這個概念主要是指最大消費國（美國）和最大儲蓄國（中國）構成的利益共同體，以及這個利益共同體對全世界經濟的影響。但是我們還可以從另一個角度來觀察，聯系30年來中國改革開放思想解放的進程和美國應對金融海嘯的政策選擇來說明到底什麼是“中美國”。
先看中國。在中國改革之初面臨的一個敏感的核心問題就是如何看待市場經濟。在當年中國人的固有觀念中，“市場經濟”是“資本主義”的同義詞，所以在相當長的一段時間內，包括改革開放以後的若幹年內，“市場經濟”充其量是社會主義計劃經濟的一種“有益的補充”。
鄧小平在1987年2月6日的一次談話中說：“為什麼一談市場就說是資本主義，只有計劃才是社會主義呢？計劃和市場都是方法嘛！”（《鄧小平文選》第三卷203頁）可惜，鄧公的這次談話並沒有為國人所知，也不為主流學者們所接受。1990年12月24日鄧小平再次指出：“資本主義和社會主義的區分不在於計劃還是市場這樣的問題。社會主義有市場經濟，資本主義也有計劃控制。”（《鄧小平文選》第三卷364頁）此後一再強調，“不要以為一說計劃經濟就是社會主義，一說市場經濟就是資本主義，不是那麼回事，兩者都是手段，市場也可以為社會主義服務。”直到這時，中國人終於醒過夢來：原來市場就是個手段！於是中國人爽快地承認自己也是市場經濟，由於這個問題而僵持多年的“入世”談判也迎刃而解，中國經濟也在十幾年中連續上了幾個台階，GDP總值已經超過了西方G8集團中的6個。解讀美國英語新詞：Chimerica中美國
http://www.chinareviewnews.com 2008-11-19 10:55:59
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/d ... mp;mdate=1119105559
中評社香港11月19日電／拿英語中的單詞Chinese（中文）、China（中國）和其他的語言、國名拼起來就可以形成新詞，比如Chinglish就是Chinese與 English的合成詞，表示“中式英文”。美國商業周刊撰稿人皮特•恩加迪奧（Pete Engardio）對中國和印度的崛起深信不疑，將China和India合成創造了Chindia一詞，不妨翻譯為“中印度”。印度同事們對這個詞非常欣賞，因為印度終於和中國平起平坐，而不是把印度與巴基斯坦相提並論，動輒就什麼“印巴”、“印巴”的。不過，印度朋友們不要高興得太早，隨著印度實力的升級，中國的地位也在提高，印度還未必夠得著。經濟史學家尼爾•弗格森（Niall Ferguson）就把China和America合並出Chimerica這個英語新詞，即“中美國”。
到底什麼是“中美國”呢？在弗格森的定義中，這個概念主要是指最大消費國（美國）和最大儲蓄國（中國）構成的利益共同體，以及這個利益共同體對全世界經濟的影響。但是我們還可以從另一個角度來觀察，聯系30年來中國改革開放思想解放的進程和美國應對金融海嘯的政策選擇來說明到底什麼是“中美國”。
先看中國。在中國改革之初面臨的一個敏感的核心問題就是如何看待市場經濟。在當年中國人的固有觀念中，“市場經濟”是“資本主義”的同義詞，所以在相當長的一段時間內，包括改革開放以後的若幹年內，“市場經濟”充其量是社會主義計劃經濟的一種“有益的補充”。
鄧小平在1987年2月6日的一次談話中說：“為什麼一談市場就說是資本主義，只有計劃才是社會主義呢？計劃和市場都是方法嘛！”（《鄧小平文選》第三卷203頁）可惜，鄧公的這次談話並沒有為國人所知，也不為主流學者們所接受。1990年12月24日鄧小平再次指出：“資本主義和社會主義的區分不在於計劃還是市場這樣的問題。社會主義有市場經濟，資本主義也有計劃控制。”（《鄧小平文選》第三卷364頁）此後一再強調，“不要以為一說計劃經濟就是社會主義，一說市場經濟就是資本主義，不是那麼回事，兩者都是手段，市場也可以為社會主義服務。”直到這時，中國人終於醒過夢來：原來市場就是個手段！於是中國人爽快地承認自己也是市場經濟，由於這個問題而僵持多年的“入世”談判也迎刃而解，中國經濟也在十幾年中連續上了幾個台階，GDP總值已經超過了西方G8集團中的6個。
哦
支持未来中美合并，让太平洋成为内海
支持未来中美合并，让太平洋成为内海
Team 'Chimerica'
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp ... 601736.html?sub=new
By Niall Ferguson
Monday, November 17, 2008; Page A19
Future historians, I suspect, will look back on Saturday's anticlimactic G-20 gathering in Washington less as Bretton Woods 2.0 and more as a rerun of the London Economic Conference of 1933. Back then, representatives of 66 nations completely failed to agree on a concerted international response to the Great Depression. The fault lay mainly with the newly elected U.S. president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who vetoed European proposals for currency stabilization.
This time around, it wasn't the newly elected Democrat but the outgoing Republican who wielded the veto. Even before his counterparts reached Washington, President Bush made it clear that recent events had done nothing to diminish his faith in free markets and minimalist regulation. Over the weekend, it was the United States that resisted European calls for a new international regulatory body, opposed significant redefinition of the International Monetary Fund's role and showed no interest in the idea of a global stimulus package.
A real opportunity has been missed.
Just as happened in the 1930s, what began as an American banking panic has now escalated into a global economic crisis. And just as happened in the 1930s, a lack of international coordination has the potential to turn a recession into a deep and protracted depression.
The problem that seems scarcely to have been discussed over the weekend is that each national government is currently responding to the crisis with its own monetary and fiscal measures. Some central banks have already slashed official rates to close to zero. Some treasuries have already launched multibillion-dollar bailouts and stimulus packages. The devil lies in the different timing and magnitudes of these measures. The absence of coordination makes it almost inevitable that we will see rising volatility in global foreign exchange and bond markets, as investors react to each fresh national initiative. The results could be nearly as disruptive as the protectionist measures adopted by national governments during the Depression. Now, as then, a policy of "every man for himself" would be lethal.
At the heart of this crisis is the huge imbalance between the United States, with its current account deficit in excess of 1 percent of world gross domestic product, and the surplus countries that finance it: the oil exporters, Japan and emerging Asia. Of these, the relationship between China and America has become the crucial one. More than anything else, it has been China's strategy of dollar reserve accumulation that has financed America's debt habit. Chinese savings were a key reason U.S. long-term interest rates stayed low and the borrowing binge kept going. Now that the age of leverage is over, "Chimerica" -- the partnership between the big saver and the big spender -- is key.
In essence, we need the Chinese to be supportive of U.S. monetary easing and fiscal stimulus by doing more of the same themselves. There needs to be agreement on a gradual reduction of the Chimerican imbalance via increased U.S. exports and increased Chinese imports. The alternative -- a sudden reduction of the imbalance via lower U.S. imports and lower Chinese exports -- would be horrible.
There also needs to be an agreement to avoid a rout in the dollar market and the bond market, which is what will happen if the Chinese stop buying U.S. government bonds, the amount of which is now set to increase massively.
The alternative to such a Chimerican deal is for the Chinese to turn inward, devoting their energies to "market socialism in one country," increasing the domestic consumption of Chinese products and turning away from trade as the engine of growth.
Memo to President-elect Barack Obama: Don't wait until April for the next G-20 summit. Call a meeting of the Chimerican G-2 for the day after your inaugural. Don't wait for China to call its own meeting of a new "G-1" in Beijing.
Niall Ferguson, a professor of history at Harvard University, is the author most recently of "The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp ... 601736.html?sub=new
By Niall Ferguson
Monday, November 17, 2008; Page A19
Future historians, I suspect, will look back on Saturday's anticlimactic G-20 gathering in Washington less as Bretton Woods 2.0 and more as a rerun of the London Economic Conference of 1933. Back then, representatives of 66 nations completely failed to agree on a concerted international response to the Great Depression. The fault lay mainly with the newly elected U.S. president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who vetoed European proposals for currency stabilization.
This time around, it wasn't the newly elected Democrat but the outgoing Republican who wielded the veto. Even before his counterparts reached Washington, President Bush made it clear that recent events had done nothing to diminish his faith in free markets and minimalist regulation. Over the weekend, it was the United States that resisted European calls for a new international regulatory body, opposed significant redefinition of the International Monetary Fund's role and showed no interest in the idea of a global stimulus package.
A real opportunity has been missed.
Just as happened in the 1930s, what began as an American banking panic has now escalated into a global economic crisis. And just as happened in the 1930s, a lack of international coordination has the potential to turn a recession into a deep and protracted depression.
The problem that seems scarcely to have been discussed over the weekend is that each national government is currently responding to the crisis with its own monetary and fiscal measures. Some central banks have already slashed official rates to close to zero. Some treasuries have already launched multibillion-dollar bailouts and stimulus packages. The devil lies in the different timing and magnitudes of these measures. The absence of coordination makes it almost inevitable that we will see rising volatility in global foreign exchange and bond markets, as investors react to each fresh national initiative. The results could be nearly as disruptive as the protectionist measures adopted by national governments during the Depression. Now, as then, a policy of "every man for himself" would be lethal.
At the heart of this crisis is the huge imbalance between the United States, with its current account deficit in excess of 1 percent of world gross domestic product, and the surplus countries that finance it: the oil exporters, Japan and emerging Asia. Of these, the relationship between China and America has become the crucial one. More than anything else, it has been China's strategy of dollar reserve accumulation that has financed America's debt habit. Chinese savings were a key reason U.S. long-term interest rates stayed low and the borrowing binge kept going. Now that the age of leverage is over, "Chimerica" -- the partnership between the big saver and the big spender -- is key.
In essence, we need the Chinese to be supportive of U.S. monetary easing and fiscal stimulus by doing more of the same themselves. There needs to be agreement on a gradual reduction of the Chimerican imbalance via increased U.S. exports and increased Chinese imports. The alternative -- a sudden reduction of the imbalance via lower U.S. imports and lower Chinese exports -- would be horrible.
There also needs to be an agreement to avoid a rout in the dollar market and the bond market, which is what will happen if the Chinese stop buying U.S. government bonds, the amount of which is now set to increase massively.
The alternative to such a Chimerican deal is for the Chinese to turn inward, devoting their energies to "market socialism in one country," increasing the domestic consumption of Chinese products and turning away from trade as the engine of growth.
Memo to President-elect Barack Obama: Don't wait until April for the next G-20 summit. Call a meeting of the Chimerican G-2 for the day after your inaugural. Don't wait for China to call its own meeting of a new "G-1" in Beijing.
Niall Ferguson, a professor of history at Harvard University, is the author most recently of "The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World."
这个词有什么讨论价值？
韩国人也来凑热闹 :D :D
【Opinion】 Chimerica
http://english.donga.com/srv/ser ... ;biid=2008111809708
NOVEMBER 18, 2008 03:10
The United States showed U.S.-style protocol at the Group of 20 financial summit in Washington. The leaders of China and Brazil sat beside President George W. Bush in a White House dinner Friday and the photo shoot at the general meeting Saturday, reflecting their importance to Washington. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, whose country is this year’s chair of the European Union, sat three seats to Bush’s left, and the prime ministers of Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany, whose countries are members of the G8, stood in the back row in the photo op. Korean President Lee Myung-bak, though not in the center, stood in the front row, showing higher U.S. regard for Korea.
A protocol is a set of rules that must be respected among countries or in an official event hosted by a country. The basic principle of a protocol starts with the ranking of participants. For this reason, in the run-up to the G20 summit, countries fiercely competed behind the scenes for position. The Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry was concerned over where President Lee would be seated as the leader of the world’s 13th-largest economy.
China, however, was excited. Chinese media said China is no longer an outsider to the G8, even using the new term “Chimerica,” referring to a new era of coexistence beginning between Washington and Beijing. Chimerica was coined by Harvard University professor Niall Ferguson and Free University of Berlin professor Moritz Schularick. Ferguson said cooperation between China and the United States has been the growth engine of the global economy over the past decade. The two countries account for 13 percent of global territory, a fourth of the world population, and a third of global GDP.
The problem is that China’s power and influence will grow further. Ferguson said in September that the Chimerica era will end in the near future, and China will surpass the United States in two decades. That means the emergence of “Pax Sinica,” an era where the world order will be under the influence of China. Some say China will play a central role in East Asian diplomacy under the Obama administration. The United States has apparently begun preparing for the “China era.”
【Opinion】 Chimerica
http://english.donga.com/srv/ser ... ;biid=2008111809708
NOVEMBER 18, 2008 03:10
The United States showed U.S.-style protocol at the Group of 20 financial summit in Washington. The leaders of China and Brazil sat beside President George W. Bush in a White House dinner Friday and the photo shoot at the general meeting Saturday, reflecting their importance to Washington. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, whose country is this year’s chair of the European Union, sat three seats to Bush’s left, and the prime ministers of Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany, whose countries are members of the G8, stood in the back row in the photo op. Korean President Lee Myung-bak, though not in the center, stood in the front row, showing higher U.S. regard for Korea.
A protocol is a set of rules that must be respected among countries or in an official event hosted by a country. The basic principle of a protocol starts with the ranking of participants. For this reason, in the run-up to the G20 summit, countries fiercely competed behind the scenes for position. The Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry was concerned over where President Lee would be seated as the leader of the world’s 13th-largest economy.
China, however, was excited. Chinese media said China is no longer an outsider to the G8, even using the new term “Chimerica,” referring to a new era of coexistence beginning between Washington and Beijing. Chimerica was coined by Harvard University professor Niall Ferguson and Free University of Berlin professor Moritz Schularick. Ferguson said cooperation between China and the United States has been the growth engine of the global economy over the past decade. The two countries account for 13 percent of global territory, a fourth of the world population, and a third of global GDP.
The problem is that China’s power and influence will grow further. Ferguson said in September that the Chimerica era will end in the near future, and China will surpass the United States in two decades. That means the emergence of “Pax Sinica,” an era where the world order will be under the influence of China. Some say China will play a central role in East Asian diplomacy under the Obama administration. The United States has apparently begun preparing for the “China era.”
原帖由 bjnr 于 2008-11-19 19:12 发表
这个词有什么讨论价值？
你认为什么有讨论价值？有关肖扬的道听途说？民主？自由？人权？TG是不是应该造HM？房价是不是应该涨？工资是不是应该跌？:D :D :D
:D ;P
中언론 G20회의 평가
“서방 국가들 4조위안 부양책에 놀라워해
美와 경제공생 ‘Chimerica’로 본상 올라”
“중국, 주요 8개국(G8) 곁상서 먹던 시대 지났다.”
중국청년보 등 중국 언론은 15일 미국 워싱턴에서 열린 주요 20개국(G20) 금융정상회의에 맞춰 세계 주요국 언론매체들이 중국을 평가한 내용을 종합해 소개하며 이 같은 제목을 달았다.
중국 언론은 미국 하버드대 경제사학자 닐 퍼거슨 교수가 제창한 ‘중미국(Chimerica)’이라는 개념을 소개하면서 “중국과 미국은 이미 단일 경제체제로서, 무역과 투자에서 번영과 손실을 동시에 보는 공생관계로 변모했다”고 보도했다.
중국 언론은 또 “유에스에이투데이와 데일리텔레그래프 등 미국과 유럽의 언론들이 G20 회의에서 중국의 ‘구원자’ 역할을 크게 기대했다”며 “최근 발표한 4조 위안(약 800조 원)의 내수 확대 정책에 대해서도 천문학적인 규모에 놀라움을 금치 못했다”고 전했다.
G20 회의를 계기로 국제무대에서 중국의 위상이 ‘곁상’에서 ‘본상’으로 옮겨졌음을 분명히 한 것이다.
실제 중국은 이번 G20 회의에서 미국 위주로 돼 있는 기존 세계 금융시스템의 전면 개혁을 주장하면서 중국과 개발도상국의 이익을 당당히 요구했다.
후진타오(胡錦濤) 중국 국가주석은 이날 회의에서 “국제금융시스템은 공정하고 공평하며 포용성 있고 질서 있게 이뤄져야 한다”며 “국제사회는 (선진국의) 금융위기로 더 큰 피해를 본 개도국을 배려해 적극 지원을 해야 한다”고 강조했다.
후 주석은 또 금융시스템 개혁은 △전면적이고 △균형에 맞춰 △점진적이며 △실효성 있게 이뤄져야 한다는 4원칙을 제시한 뒤 개혁의 중점사항으로 △국제금융 관리감독 강화 △국제금융조직의 개혁 △지역 금융협력의 추진 △국제통화의 다원화를 주장했다. 앞으로는 세계 기축통화에 위안화도 넣겠다는 의지를 분명히 한 셈이다.
한편 중국 학자들은 “(일부 유럽 국가가 주창하는) 제2의 브레턴우즈 체제의 추진은 시기상조”라며 “달러 독주 체제 역시 쉽게 바꿀 수 있는 게 아니다”라고 말해 중국이 앞으로 상당 기간 미국과의 패권 다툼보다는 패권 공유에 주력할 것임을 시사했다.
베이징=하종대 특파원 orionha@donga.com
▼무대 뒤 ‘오바마의 힘’
대리인 보내 정상들과 의견교환… 부시 측도 결과 바로 알려줘▼
‘주도권은 이미 넘어갔다.’
버락 오바마 미국 대통령 당선인은 워싱턴에서 열린 주요 20개국(G20) 금융정상회의에 참석하지 않고 시카고 자택에 있었지만 실제로는 회담에 적지 않은 영향을 미쳤다는 평가가 많다.
오바마 당선인은 그동안 “내년 1월 20일 취임 전까지는 공식 석상에 나타나 정치적인 영향력을 행사하지 않겠다”는 뜻을 밝혀왔다.
하지만 그는 15일 대리인인 매들린 올브라이트 전 국무장관과 짐 리치 전 하원의원을 통해 “글로벌 금융위기에 대한 공동 대처를 지지하며 취임 후 금융시스템 개선을 위해 G20 국가들과 협력할 준비가 됐다”고 밝혔다.
실제 두 대리인은 G20 회의에서 각국 정상은 물론이고 주요 당국자들과도 만나 글로벌 금융위기 해결책에 대해 논의했고 그 내용을 오바마 당선인에게 보고한 것으로 전해졌다. 오바마 당선인이 전면에 나서지는 않았지만 대리인을 통해 각국 정상들과 의견 교환을 하는 등 정책 조율에 나선 셈이다.
또 조지 W 부시 행정부도 G20 회의 전 오바마 당선인 측과 세부적인 사항까지 논의했고 회의가 끝난 뒤에도 회의 결과를 오바마 당선인 측에 곧바로 알려줬다고 행정부 관계자가 전했다.
한편 전문가들은 오바마 당선인이 대통령으로 취임한 뒤 100일 만인 4월 30일 열리는 제2차 G20 정상회의가 그의 지도력에 대한 ‘혹독한 시험대’가 될 것으로 보고 있다.
中언론 G20회의 평가
“서방 국가들 4조위안 부양책에 놀라워해
美와 경제공생 ‘Chimerica’로 본상 올라”
“중국, 주요 8개국(G8) 곁상서 먹던 시대 지났다.”
중국청년보 등 중국 언론은 15일 미국 워싱턴에서 열린 주요 20개국(G20) 금융정상회의에 맞춰 세계 주요국 언론매체들이 중국을 평가한 내용을 종합해 소개하며 이 같은 제목을 달았다.
중국 언론은 미국 하버드대 경제사학자 닐 퍼거슨 교수가 제창한 ‘중미국(Chimerica)’이라는 개념을 소개하면서 “중국과 미국은 이미 단일 경제체제로서, 무역과 투자에서 번영과 손실을 동시에 보는 공생관계로 변모했다”고 보도했다.
중국 언론은 또 “유에스에이투데이와 데일리텔레그래프 등 미국과 유럽의 언론들이 G20 회의에서 중국의 ‘구원자’ 역할을 크게 기대했다”며 “최근 발표한 4조 위안(약 800조 원)의 내수 확대 정책에 대해서도 천문학적인 규모에 놀라움을 금치 못했다”고 전했다.
G20 회의를 계기로 국제무대에서 중국의 위상이 ‘곁상’에서 ‘본상’으로 옮겨졌음을 분명히 한 것이다.
실제 중국은 이번 G20 회의에서 미국 위주로 돼 있는 기존 세계 금융시스템의 전면 개혁을 주장하면서 중국과 개발도상국의 이익을 당당히 요구했다.
후진타오(胡錦濤) 중국 국가주석은 이날 회의에서 “국제금융시스템은 공정하고 공평하며 포용성 있고 질서 있게 이뤄져야 한다”며 “국제사회는 (선진국의) 금융위기로 더 큰 피해를 본 개도국을 배려해 적극 지원을 해야 한다”고 강조했다.
후 주석은 또 금융시스템 개혁은 △전면적이고 △균형에 맞춰 △점진적이며 △실효성 있게 이뤄져야 한다는 4원칙을 제시한 뒤 개혁의 중점사항으로 △국제금융 관리감독 강화 △국제금융조직의 개혁 △지역 금융협력의 추진 △국제통화의 다원화를 주장했다. 앞으로는 세계 기축통화에 위안화도 넣겠다는 의지를 분명히 한 셈이다.
한편 중국 학자들은 “(일부 유럽 국가가 주창하는) 제2의 브레턴우즈 체제의 추진은 시기상조”라며 “달러 독주 체제 역시 쉽게 바꿀 수 있는 게 아니다”라고 말해 중국이 앞으로 상당 기간 미국과의 패권 다툼보다는 패권 공유에 주력할 것임을 시사했다.
베이징=하종대 특파원 orionha@donga.com
▼무대 뒤 ‘오바마의 힘’
대리인 보내 정상들과 의견교환… 부시 측도 결과 바로 알려줘▼
‘주도권은 이미 넘어갔다.’
버락 오바마 미국 대통령 당선인은 워싱턴에서 열린 주요 20개국(G20) 금융정상회의에 참석하지 않고 시카고 자택에 있었지만 실제로는 회담에 적지 않은 영향을 미쳤다는 평가가 많다.
오바마 당선인은 그동안 “내년 1월 20일 취임 전까지는 공식 석상에 나타나 정치적인 영향력을 행사하지 않겠다”는 뜻을 밝혀왔다.
하지만 그는 15일 대리인인 매들린 올브라이트 전 국무장관과 짐 리치 전 하원의원을 통해 “글로벌 금융위기에 대한 공동 대처를 지지하며 취임 후 금융시스템 개선을 위해 G20 국가들과 협력할 준비가 됐다”고 밝혔다.
실제 두 대리인은 G20 회의에서 각국 정상은 물론이고 주요 당국자들과도 만나 글로벌 금융위기 해결책에 대해 논의했고 그 내용을 오바마 당선인에게 보고한 것으로 전해졌다. 오바마 당선인이 전면에 나서지는 않았지만 대리인을 통해 각국 정상들과 의견 교환을 하는 등 정책 조율에 나선 셈이다.
또 조지 W 부시 행정부도 G20 회의 전 오바마 당선인 측과 세부적인 사항까지 논의했고 회의가 끝난 뒤에도 회의 결과를 오바마 당선인 측에 곧바로 알려줬다고 행정부 관계자가 전했다.
한편 전문가들은 오바마 당선인이 대통령으로 취임한 뒤 100일 만인 4월 30일 열리는 제2차 G20 정상회의가 그의 지도력에 대한 ‘혹독한 시험대’가 될 것으로 보고 있다.
;P :D
Команда "Химерика"
Это партнерство между крупным вкладчиком Китаем и крупной транжирой Америкой
Найал Фергюсон (Niall Ferguson), 17 ноября 2008
Сюжет: Оценка могущества Китая
[отослать ссылку] [версия для печати]
Я подозреваю, что будущие историки, вспоминая вызвавшее глубокое разочарование субботнее сборище "двадцатки" в Вашингтоне, назовут его скорее не Бреттон-Вудской конференцией N2, а повтором лондонской экономической конференции 1933 года. Тогда представители 66 государств потерпели полный провал в своих попытках договориться о согласованном международном ответе на Великую депрессию. Главная вина легла тогда на новоиспеченного президента США Франклина Д. Рузвельта (Franklin D. Roosevelt), который наложил вето на европейские предложения о валютной стабилизации.
На сей раз правом вето воспользовался не новоизбранный демократ, а покидающий свой пост республиканец. Еще до приезда своих коллег и партнеров в Вашингтон президент Буш ясно дал понять, что последние события ни в коей мере не ослабили его веру в свободный рынок и минимальное регулирование. В эти выходные именно Соединенные Штаты Америки выступили против европейских призывов к созданию нового международного регулирующего органа, воспротивились изменению роли и функций Международного валютного фонда и не захотели проявить интерес к идее глобального пакета стимулов.
Упущена реальная возможность.
Партнеры
Как и в 30-е годы, то, что началось недавно как паника американской банковской системы, к настоящему времени переросло в глобальный экономический кризис. Как и в 30-е годы, отсутствие международного взаимодействия может превратить рецессию в глубокую и продолжительную депрессию.
Есть проблема, которой практически не было уделено никакого внимания во время дискуссий в эти выходные. Речь идет о том, что в настоящее время каждое правительство реагирует на кризис своими собственными денежно-кредитными и бюджетными мерами. Некоторые центробанки уже понизили официальные ставки почти до нуля. Некоторые министерства финансов уже запустили в действие систему многомиллиардных выкупов и пакетов стимулирования. Но проблема в международной несогласованности всех этих мер по срокам и объемам. Отсутствие координации почти неизбежно ведет к тому, что скоро мы станем свидетелями неустойчивости и изменчивости на глобальных рынках валюты и ценных бумаг, когда инвесторы начнут реагировать на каждую новую инициативу того или иного государства. Результаты могут быть почти такими же разрушительными, как и протекционистские меры, принимавшиеся национальными правительствами во времена депрессии. Но сегодня, как и тогда, политика по принципу "каждый за себя" окажется смертельной.
В основе данного кризиса лежит огромный дисбаланс между Соединенными Штатами, у которых дефицит текущего счета превышает 1 процент общемирового валового внутреннего продукта, и странами с профицитом, которые данный дефицит финансируют. Это экспортеры нефти, Япония и развивающаяся Азия. В этом ряду критически важное значение приобретают отношения между Китаем и Америкой. Китайская стратегия накопления долларового резерва больше чем что-либо способствовала сохранению американской привычки жить в долг. Китайские сбережения были главной причиной того, что долгосрочные американские ставки были низкими, а долговой кутеж продолжался. Теперь, когда эпохе роста доходов без увеличения капиталовложений пришел конец, ключевое значение приобретает явление, называемое "Химерикой" ("Chimerica"). Это партнерство между крупным вкладчиком Китаем (Chi. . .) и крупной транжирой Америкой (. . .merica).
По сути дела, нам нужно, чтобы Китай поддержал американское снятие денежных ограничений и финансовые стимулы, сделав то же самое и даже больше у себя. Но для этого нужна договоренность о постепенном уменьшении химериканского дисбаланса за счет увеличения экспорта из США и импорта в Китай. Альтернатива такой договоренности - резкое снижение дисбаланса за счет уменьшения американского импорта и китайского экспорта. Но это было бы ужасно.
Также необходима договоренность о предотвращении панического бегства с долларового рынка и рынка ценных бумаг. Именно это произойдет, если китайцы прекратят скупать государственные ценные бумаги США, количество которых сейчас должно существенно возрасти.
Есть и альтернатива такой химериканской сделке. Для этого китайцы должны направить внимание и усилия вовнутрь, посвятив всю свою энергию созданию "рыночного социализма в отдельно взятой стране". Им надо будет увеличить потребление китайских продуктов и отказаться от торговли как от движущей силы развития.
И пару слов на заметку избранному президенту Бараку Обаме. Не дожидайтесь апреля, когда состоится следующий саммит "двадцатки". На следующий же день после инаугурации проведите встречу химериканской "большой двойки". Не дожидайтесь, пока Китай назначит в Пекине свою собственную встречу "большой единицы".
Найал Фергюсон - профессор истории Гарвардского университета, автор недавно вышедшей книги "Восхождение денег: мировая финансовая история" ("The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World").
Команда "Химерика"
Это партнерство между крупным вкладчиком Китаем и крупной транжирой Америкой
Найал Фергюсон (Niall Ferguson), 17 ноября 2008
Сюжет: Оценка могущества Китая
[отослать ссылку] [версия для печати]
Я подозреваю, что будущие историки, вспоминая вызвавшее глубокое разочарование субботнее сборище "двадцатки" в Вашингтоне, назовут его скорее не Бреттон-Вудской конференцией N2, а повтором лондонской экономической конференции 1933 года. Тогда представители 66 государств потерпели полный провал в своих попытках договориться о согласованном международном ответе на Великую депрессию. Главная вина легла тогда на новоиспеченного президента США Франклина Д. Рузвельта (Franklin D. Roosevelt), который наложил вето на европейские предложения о валютной стабилизации.
На сей раз правом вето воспользовался не новоизбранный демократ, а покидающий свой пост республиканец. Еще до приезда своих коллег и партнеров в Вашингтон президент Буш ясно дал понять, что последние события ни в коей мере не ослабили его веру в свободный рынок и минимальное регулирование. В эти выходные именно Соединенные Штаты Америки выступили против европейских призывов к созданию нового международного регулирующего органа, воспротивились изменению роли и функций Международного валютного фонда и не захотели проявить интерес к идее глобального пакета стимулов.
Упущена реальная возможность.
Партнеры
Как и в 30-е годы, то, что началось недавно как паника американской банковской системы, к настоящему времени переросло в глобальный экономический кризис. Как и в 30-е годы, отсутствие международного взаимодействия может превратить рецессию в глубокую и продолжительную депрессию.
Есть проблема, которой практически не было уделено никакого внимания во время дискуссий в эти выходные. Речь идет о том, что в настоящее время каждое правительство реагирует на кризис своими собственными денежно-кредитными и бюджетными мерами. Некоторые центробанки уже понизили официальные ставки почти до нуля. Некоторые министерства финансов уже запустили в действие систему многомиллиардных выкупов и пакетов стимулирования. Но проблема в международной несогласованности всех этих мер по срокам и объемам. Отсутствие координации почти неизбежно ведет к тому, что скоро мы станем свидетелями неустойчивости и изменчивости на глобальных рынках валюты и ценных бумаг, когда инвесторы начнут реагировать на каждую новую инициативу того или иного государства. Результаты могут быть почти такими же разрушительными, как и протекционистские меры, принимавшиеся национальными правительствами во времена депрессии. Но сегодня, как и тогда, политика по принципу "каждый за себя" окажется смертельной.
В основе данного кризиса лежит огромный дисбаланс между Соединенными Штатами, у которых дефицит текущего счета превышает 1 процент общемирового валового внутреннего продукта, и странами с профицитом, которые данный дефицит финансируют. Это экспортеры нефти, Япония и развивающаяся Азия. В этом ряду критически важное значение приобретают отношения между Китаем и Америкой. Китайская стратегия накопления долларового резерва больше чем что-либо способствовала сохранению американской привычки жить в долг. Китайские сбережения были главной причиной того, что долгосрочные американские ставки были низкими, а долговой кутеж продолжался. Теперь, когда эпохе роста доходов без увеличения капиталовложений пришел конец, ключевое значение приобретает явление, называемое "Химерикой" ("Chimerica"). Это партнерство между крупным вкладчиком Китаем (Chi. . .) и крупной транжирой Америкой (. . .merica).
По сути дела, нам нужно, чтобы Китай поддержал американское снятие денежных ограничений и финансовые стимулы, сделав то же самое и даже больше у себя. Но для этого нужна договоренность о постепенном уменьшении химериканского дисбаланса за счет увеличения экспорта из США и импорта в Китай. Альтернатива такой договоренности - резкое снижение дисбаланса за счет уменьшения американского импорта и китайского экспорта. Но это было бы ужасно.
Также необходима договоренность о предотвращении панического бегства с долларового рынка и рынка ценных бумаг. Именно это произойдет, если китайцы прекратят скупать государственные ценные бумаги США, количество которых сейчас должно существенно возрасти.
Есть и альтернатива такой химериканской сделке. Для этого китайцы должны направить внимание и усилия вовнутрь, посвятив всю свою энергию созданию "рыночного социализма в отдельно взятой стране". Им надо будет увеличить потребление китайских продуктов и отказаться от торговли как от движущей силы развития.
И пару слов на заметку избранному президенту Бараку Обаме. Не дожидайтесь апреля, когда состоится следующий саммит "двадцатки". На следующий же день после инаугурации проведите встречу химериканской "большой двойки". Не дожидайтесь, пока Китай назначит в Пекине свою собственную встречу "большой единицы".
Найал Фергюсон - профессор истории Гарвардского университета, автор недавно вышедшей книги "Восхождение денег: мировая финансовая история" ("The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World").
:D ;P :D
Chimerica versus Europe
By
Frank Kane on Sunday, November 16, 2008
Breton Woods, this was not. Although the weekend meeting of world leaders in Washington was commendable in intention (at least something is being seen to be done) and productive in output (the focus was rightly on a financial fix to a financial disaster), it will not have the same impact on the world economy of the famous meeting in 1944.
Then, the United States was perhaps at the apogee of its 20th century power. It was emerging as the only real winner of the biggest war in history, which had transformed its economic and financial system. In 1944 and the years immediately afterwards, the US was by far the richest and most productive country in the world, and it had the resources and will to bail out the rest of the world.
And, perhaps most important, the worst of the Great Depression was behind it. True, it was going to be another 10 years before US share prices recovered to 1929 levels, but the huge stimulus given the American economy by the war had pulled it quickly out of the dust-bowl Depression.
Breton Woods produced the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to facilitate this US global subsidy, but the real instrument of American financial power was the Marshall Plan, which effectively made Europe subservient to and dependent on the USA for the next thirty years. Europe had to borrow money – in the all-conquering dollar at fixed exchange rates - from America to rebuild its war-shattered economies, and it was only in the 1970s, then European industry was functioning properly again and some of the Marshall Plan debt was repaid, that US global financial supremacy was questioned again. That was when Breton Woods effectively fell apart.
Contrast that situation with the circumstances of the G20 meeting. The Americans have never been in a worse financial position. The US-inspired credit crunch has destroyed asset values across the country and exported this awful malignancy across the world, to the extent that the core values of American free-market capitalism are being questioned. Worse still, we do not know when the vicious downward spiral will end. Many commentators still believe there is plenty of fury still left in the financial hurricane that has swept the US, as the "deleveraging" (read "asset destruction") process continues to run its course. It is almost as if the Americans had tried to organize a Breton Woods-style conference in 1929, when the Great Crash was at its height.
Add to this the fact that America – which with its allies in 1944 was on the verge of defeating Germany – is fighting two wars that it has an increasingly slim chance of winning, and the differences with Breton Woods become even more apparent.
There is too, the crucial question of leadership. FD Roosevelt in 1944 had beaten the Depression, and was close to beating the Nazis. He and his administration had all the authority and confidence needed to impose a "new world order". George W Bush, on the other hand, may go down as the worst US president in history. He has presided over the collapse of the US financial system and the humiliation of the US abroad, in terms of military and moral authority. Hank Paulson, his Treasury Secretary, who has changed his mind on the measures needed to save the US financial system so many times that he now lacks all credibility, is certainly no JM Keynes.
The international situation has changed too beyond all recognition. The European Union has its own successful currency, as well as world-leading industries, even if they are in recession (they will blame the Americans for that anyway). Europeans will not be told what to do by the US any longer, as was evident in the weekend discussions.
But the real change is the extent to which the US economy has become dependent on Asia, and especially China. Some analysts call this coupling together "Chimerica" – the interlinking of American and Chinese economic interests – and it is the most important single new reality of the world. Put bluntly, American consumers have been spending Chinese savings for the past 15 years, and now it is payback time. US financial and fiscal policy cannot be conducted without careful attention to Chinese needs, even Chinese approval.
That is the real reason for Bush's insistence on free-trade and free-market approaches. This is a coded insistence that nothing must be done to irritate the Chinese, or prevent their being fully involved in the future of the world economy. If a new American protectionism now was to block Chinese manufacturing's continued domination of US markets, Beijing has the power to destabilise the US financial system further. Even Bush has recognised this, in the end.
In those circumstances, it is worth a little ripple of applause that the G20 managed to concentrate at all on the crux of the current crisis – the financial system, and especially those elements of the banking and capital markets that got us into this sorry mess. A central clearing house for the global market in credit default swaps is a good idea, as are moves towards some uniformity of regulation in private equity and hedge fund businesses. The Europeans would like to go further than this and impose global financial regulations across the board, especially on hedge funds, but the Chinese don't care – in their system of totalitarian capitalism, all their financial institutions are ultimately under central state control anyway. So Chimerica will get its way on that, I suspect.
The gorilla in the living room is, of course, the fact that the US president-elect Barak Obama was not at the G20 gathering, and he will have his own ideas on regulating the bankers and financiers that have brought US capitalism into disrepute. He has been elected into the new world economic order – where the US cannot dictate to the rest of the world, as it could in 1944, and where Europe and Asia are asserting themselves. When he attends the next G20 in April – though it is as likely to be in Frankfurt or Shanghai as Washington – we will see how far he recognises these new realities.
Chimerica versus Europe
By
Frank Kane on Sunday, November 16, 2008
Breton Woods, this was not. Although the weekend meeting of world leaders in Washington was commendable in intention (at least something is being seen to be done) and productive in output (the focus was rightly on a financial fix to a financial disaster), it will not have the same impact on the world economy of the famous meeting in 1944.
Then, the United States was perhaps at the apogee of its 20th century power. It was emerging as the only real winner of the biggest war in history, which had transformed its economic and financial system. In 1944 and the years immediately afterwards, the US was by far the richest and most productive country in the world, and it had the resources and will to bail out the rest of the world.
And, perhaps most important, the worst of the Great Depression was behind it. True, it was going to be another 10 years before US share prices recovered to 1929 levels, but the huge stimulus given the American economy by the war had pulled it quickly out of the dust-bowl Depression.
Breton Woods produced the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to facilitate this US global subsidy, but the real instrument of American financial power was the Marshall Plan, which effectively made Europe subservient to and dependent on the USA for the next thirty years. Europe had to borrow money – in the all-conquering dollar at fixed exchange rates - from America to rebuild its war-shattered economies, and it was only in the 1970s, then European industry was functioning properly again and some of the Marshall Plan debt was repaid, that US global financial supremacy was questioned again. That was when Breton Woods effectively fell apart.
Contrast that situation with the circumstances of the G20 meeting. The Americans have never been in a worse financial position. The US-inspired credit crunch has destroyed asset values across the country and exported this awful malignancy across the world, to the extent that the core values of American free-market capitalism are being questioned. Worse still, we do not know when the vicious downward spiral will end. Many commentators still believe there is plenty of fury still left in the financial hurricane that has swept the US, as the "deleveraging" (read "asset destruction") process continues to run its course. It is almost as if the Americans had tried to organize a Breton Woods-style conference in 1929, when the Great Crash was at its height.
Add to this the fact that America – which with its allies in 1944 was on the verge of defeating Germany – is fighting two wars that it has an increasingly slim chance of winning, and the differences with Breton Woods become even more apparent.
There is too, the crucial question of leadership. FD Roosevelt in 1944 had beaten the Depression, and was close to beating the Nazis. He and his administration had all the authority and confidence needed to impose a "new world order". George W Bush, on the other hand, may go down as the worst US president in history. He has presided over the collapse of the US financial system and the humiliation of the US abroad, in terms of military and moral authority. Hank Paulson, his Treasury Secretary, who has changed his mind on the measures needed to save the US financial system so many times that he now lacks all credibility, is certainly no JM Keynes.
The international situation has changed too beyond all recognition. The European Union has its own successful currency, as well as world-leading industries, even if they are in recession (they will blame the Americans for that anyway). Europeans will not be told what to do by the US any longer, as was evident in the weekend discussions.
But the real change is the extent to which the US economy has become dependent on Asia, and especially China. Some analysts call this coupling together "Chimerica" – the interlinking of American and Chinese economic interests – and it is the most important single new reality of the world. Put bluntly, American consumers have been spending Chinese savings for the past 15 years, and now it is payback time. US financial and fiscal policy cannot be conducted without careful attention to Chinese needs, even Chinese approval.
That is the real reason for Bush's insistence on free-trade and free-market approaches. This is a coded insistence that nothing must be done to irritate the Chinese, or prevent their being fully involved in the future of the world economy. If a new American protectionism now was to block Chinese manufacturing's continued domination of US markets, Beijing has the power to destabilise the US financial system further. Even Bush has recognised this, in the end.
In those circumstances, it is worth a little ripple of applause that the G20 managed to concentrate at all on the crux of the current crisis – the financial system, and especially those elements of the banking and capital markets that got us into this sorry mess. A central clearing house for the global market in credit default swaps is a good idea, as are moves towards some uniformity of regulation in private equity and hedge fund businesses. The Europeans would like to go further than this and impose global financial regulations across the board, especially on hedge funds, but the Chinese don't care – in their system of totalitarian capitalism, all their financial institutions are ultimately under central state control anyway. So Chimerica will get its way on that, I suspect.
The gorilla in the living room is, of course, the fact that the US president-elect Barak Obama was not at the G20 gathering, and he will have his own ideas on regulating the bankers and financiers that have brought US capitalism into disrepute. He has been elected into the new world economic order – where the US cannot dictate to the rest of the world, as it could in 1944, and where Europe and Asia are asserting themselves. When he attends the next G20 in April – though it is as likely to be in Frankfurt or Shanghai as Washington – we will see how far he recognises these new realities.
这个词有什么讨论价值？:handshake
原帖由 wxever 于 2008-11-19 19:53 发表
这个词有什么讨论价值？:handshake
+1
原帖由 耗子药煮面 于 2008-11-19 20:12 发表
+1
这也算数啊，版主想干吗？
cd白褲衩多嗎？不覺得啊
焦国标一类 的家伙
这个词有什么讨论价值吗？
结合标题看，LZ想拿这种文章搅锅浑水，可惜被华丽的无视鸟……
我很奇怪的是这个词与BKC有什么关系。[:a4:]