美国外交协会《反思对中国的大战略》报告明确提出中国必 ...

@宋晓军
美普林斯顿大学教授、罗姆尼2012年总统竞选顾问撰文称，与未来来自中国的挑战相比，俄罗斯、伊朗、叙利亚和ISIS的挑战都不算事儿。2016年总统大选应该“主攻”如何应对来自中国的挑战O网页链接他还说2016年沉寂多年的台湾热点可能会再次爆发，而与1996年相比，中国现在的手段更多了。

h ttp://w ww.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/2016-elections-beijing-117831.html#.VVN3MVNY0_g
The Sleeper Issue of 2016 Is China
Why are we so worried about the Islamic State when Beijing is the real challenge?
By AARON L. FRIEDBERG May 11, 2015
As the long march to the presidential nomination begins, most of the likely Republican contenders are talking tough on foreign policy and criticizing the Obama administration for its evident failings in handling Russia, Iran, Syria, and the Islamic State and other Islamist extremists.


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These threats are undeniably pressing but, in the long run, all of them pale in comparison to the strategic challenge posed by China. Yet China and Asia more generally have thus far been almost entirely absent from political discourse over the future of American foreign policy.

Over the next months this is likely to change on the campaign trail.

The challenge from China has been growing since the end of 2012, which marked both the reelection of an American president and the announcement of a new leadership team in Beijing. Since his elevation to the positions of president and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping has proven himself to be a forceful, ambitious and effective figure. Moving quickly to consolidate his personal authority, Xi has also taken steps to secure and extend the CCP’s monopoly on political power. The anti-corruption campaign that he launched immediately on assuming office now targets thousands of mid-to-high-level officials in the military, state and Party bureaucracies. In addition to eliminating opponents and potential rivals it is clearly intended to bolster the regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people.

Even as he goes after official corruption, Xi has overseen a wide-ranging crackdown on dissent, Internet freedom and the operations of non-governmental organizations that seek to promote the development of civil society. According to the Orwellian-sounding “Document 9” (“Communique on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere”) issued in April 2013, these groups are rooted in a dangerous Western “socio-political theory,” which holds that “in the social sphere, individual rights are paramount and ought to be immune to obstruction by the state.” Such notions, together with the concepts of “Western constitutional democracy” and “universal values,” threaten to weaken “the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership” and must be vigorously opposed.

Like his predecessors, Xi hopes to push through measures aimed at sustaining economic growth and, with it, popular support. But in the political realm he is no reformer. To the contrary, China today is even more repressive and more militantly nationalistic than it was only a few years ago.

Another pillar of Xi’s program is the use of new rhetorical formulations that blend resentment over past abuses by foreign powers, and warnings about their continued malign intentions, with references to China’s glorious history, growing strength and future greatness. Xi has sought to back his bold words with a sweeping, if still incomplete, vision for a “new Silk Road,” a series of massive infrastructure development projects that will extend China’s reach and influence westward across all of continental Eurasia. Meanwhile, to the East, Xi has stepped up an aggressive campaign for asserting China’s maritime claims against its neighbors. Towards the end of 2013 Beijing unilaterally announced the creation of an Air Defense Identification Zone over a swath of ocean that includes islands currently controlled by Japan. In the past year China has dramatically accelerated a campaign of land reclamation, creating island bases that will greatly strengthen its ability to enforce its self-proclaimed right to control virtually all of the waters and resources of the South China Sea.

Behind all of this is the steady, seemingly relentless expansion of Chinese military power. Of particular concern to American planners is the rapid maturation of China’s so-called anti-access/area denial capabilities. As it builds out its network of sensors, missiles, ships, submarines, aircraft, anti-satellite systems and cyber weapons Beijing evidently aims to drive up the perceived costs and risks of any future U.S. attempt to project military power into the Western Pacific. The belief that Washington might hesitate to come to the aid of friendly nations, or act to preserve freedom of navigation, could undermine its alliances while increasing the danger of miscalculation and war.

With the United States constrained by tight budgets and preoccupied with other problems, China has been pushing hard, and with some success, to change the status quo and shift the balance of power in its favor. While some China watchers continue to argue otherwise, it has become increasingly difficult to escape the conclusion that Beijing’s ultimate aim is to displace the United States and resume its traditional position as the preponderant power in Asia. This is a strategic challenge of historic dimensions.

While attention remains riveted on other regions, there are a number of developments that could vault Asia, and China in particular, to the top of the foreign policy agenda. According to official statistics, economic growth has now fallen to its lowest level in twenty-five years and the reality may be even worse. A continued slump could heighten regime anxiety about domestic instability and reinforce the tendency, evident since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2009, to use foreign quarrels to divert frustration and rally popular support. China is already engaged in a pattern of provocative behavior towards its maritime neighbors; towing oil rigs off Vietnam, reclaiming islands off the Philippines, and flying aircraft close to the Senkakus. If one of these situations flares up, whether through inadvertence or by design, Beijing seems more likely to escalate than to back down. Whatever China’s leaders intend, a crisis with the United States could easily be the result.

Some older flashpoints, quiet for a time, may also be due for a flare up. In January 2016 Taiwan will hold its own presidential election and the results could bring to power an administration far less congenial to the mainland than the Kuomintang government that has ruled the island for the past eight years. As it has done in the past, Beijing may use threats or displays of force to try to influence the outcome of the election. In contrast to 1996, for example, when for lack of better options it fired dummy missiles into the Taiwan Straits, China today has far more capability. In part as a result it may also have less patience.

Aaron L. Friedberg is professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. He has served as national security aide to Vice President Dick Cheney and as an advisor to Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign.

@宋晓军
美普林斯顿大学教授、罗姆尼2012年总统竞选顾问撰文称，与未来来自中国的挑战相比，俄罗斯、伊朗、叙利亚和ISIS的挑战都不算事儿。2016年总统大选应该“主攻”如何应对来自中国的挑战O网页链接他还说2016年沉寂多年的台湾热点可能会再次爆发，而与1996年相比，中国现在的手段更多了。

h ttp://w ww.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/2016-elections-beijing-117831.html#.VVN3MVNY0_g
The Sleeper Issue of 2016 Is China
Why are we so worried about the Islamic State when Beijing is the real challenge?
By AARON L. FRIEDBERG May 11, 2015
As the long march to the presidential nomination begins, most of the likely Republican contenders are talking tough on foreign policy and criticizing the Obama administration for its evident failings in handling Russia, Iran, Syria, and the Islamic State and other Islamist extremists.


MOST POPULAR
Top Stories, Videos & Photos
Scenes from the Democratic meltdown
Rand Paul tweets fake Hillary Clinton to-do list
Nurse confessions: Don't get sick in July
Hillary Clinton's damage control operation gets more troops
Gowdy vs. Clinton: No end in sight
These threats are undeniably pressing but, in the long run, all of them pale in comparison to the strategic challenge posed by China. Yet China and Asia more generally have thus far been almost entirely absent from political discourse over the future of American foreign policy.

Over the next months this is likely to change on the campaign trail.

The challenge from China has been growing since the end of 2012, which marked both the reelection of an American president and the announcement of a new leadership team in Beijing. Since his elevation to the positions of president and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping has proven himself to be a forceful, ambitious and effective figure. Moving quickly to consolidate his personal authority, Xi has also taken steps to secure and extend the CCP’s monopoly on political power. The anti-corruption campaign that he launched immediately on assuming office now targets thousands of mid-to-high-level officials in the military, state and Party bureaucracies. In addition to eliminating opponents and potential rivals it is clearly intended to bolster the regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people.

Even as he goes after official corruption, Xi has overseen a wide-ranging crackdown on dissent, Internet freedom and the operations of non-governmental organizations that seek to promote the development of civil society. According to the Orwellian-sounding “Document 9” (“Communique on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere”) issued in April 2013, these groups are rooted in a dangerous Western “socio-political theory,” which holds that “in the social sphere, individual rights are paramount and ought to be immune to obstruction by the state.” Such notions, together with the concepts of “Western constitutional democracy” and “universal values,” threaten to weaken “the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership” and must be vigorously opposed.

Like his predecessors, Xi hopes to push through measures aimed at sustaining economic growth and, with it, popular support. But in the political realm he is no reformer. To the contrary, China today is even more repressive and more militantly nationalistic than it was only a few years ago.

Another pillar of Xi’s program is the use of new rhetorical formulations that blend resentment over past abuses by foreign powers, and warnings about their continued malign intentions, with references to China’s glorious history, growing strength and future greatness. Xi has sought to back his bold words with a sweeping, if still incomplete, vision for a “new Silk Road,” a series of massive infrastructure development projects that will extend China’s reach and influence westward across all of continental Eurasia. Meanwhile, to the East, Xi has stepped up an aggressive campaign for asserting China’s maritime claims against its neighbors. Towards the end of 2013 Beijing unilaterally announced the creation of an Air Defense Identification Zone over a swath of ocean that includes islands currently controlled by Japan. In the past year China has dramatically accelerated a campaign of land reclamation, creating island bases that will greatly strengthen its ability to enforce its self-proclaimed right to control virtually all of the waters and resources of the South China Sea.

Behind all of this is the steady, seemingly relentless expansion of Chinese military power. Of particular concern to American planners is the rapid maturation of China’s so-called anti-access/area denial capabilities. As it builds out its network of sensors, missiles, ships, submarines, aircraft, anti-satellite systems and cyber weapons Beijing evidently aims to drive up the perceived costs and risks of any future U.S. attempt to project military power into the Western Pacific. The belief that Washington might hesitate to come to the aid of friendly nations, or act to preserve freedom of navigation, could undermine its alliances while increasing the danger of miscalculation and war.

With the United States constrained by tight budgets and preoccupied with other problems, China has been pushing hard, and with some success, to change the status quo and shift the balance of power in its favor. While some China watchers continue to argue otherwise, it has become increasingly difficult to escape the conclusion that Beijing’s ultimate aim is to displace the United States and resume its traditional position as the preponderant power in Asia. This is a strategic challenge of historic dimensions.

While attention remains riveted on other regions, there are a number of developments that could vault Asia, and China in particular, to the top of the foreign policy agenda. According to official statistics, economic growth has now fallen to its lowest level in twenty-five years and the reality may be even worse. A continued slump could heighten regime anxiety about domestic instability and reinforce the tendency, evident since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2009, to use foreign quarrels to divert frustration and rally popular support. China is already engaged in a pattern of provocative behavior towards its maritime neighbors; towing oil rigs off Vietnam, reclaiming islands off the Philippines, and flying aircraft close to the Senkakus. If one of these situations flares up, whether through inadvertence or by design, Beijing seems more likely to escalate than to back down. Whatever China’s leaders intend, a crisis with the United States could easily be the result.

Some older flashpoints, quiet for a time, may also be due for a flare up. In January 2016 Taiwan will hold its own presidential election and the results could bring to power an administration far less congenial to the mainland than the Kuomintang government that has ruled the island for the past eight years. As it has done in the past, Beijing may use threats or displays of force to try to influence the outcome of the election. In contrast to 1996, for example, when for lack of better options it fired dummy missiles into the Taiwan Straits, China today has far more capability. In part as a result it may also have less patience.

Aaron L. Friedberg is professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. He has served as national security aide to Vice President Dick Cheney and as an advisor to Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign.

很正常啊。现在的中美就是当年英德关系的翻版。

嘿嘿，美国佬见不得咱们好，恼羞成怒了，有种来干架啊，看看谁怕谁，我们一穷二白时都打不过我们，现在想打败，做你们的白日梦去吧

嘿嘿，美国佬见不得咱们好，恼羞成怒了，有种来干架啊，看看谁怕谁，我们一穷二白时都打不过我们，现在想打败，做你们的白日梦去吧

明确提出中国必须被击败，TPP（跨太平洋伙伴关系协议）就是最重要的手段---奥巴马在参院被自己人踢屁屁了{:soso_e120:}

美国开始为军事冒险做舆论铺垫了

我们也要为局势升温做好准备吧

很正常啊，我们的目标一向是霸权必须被打倒

把话直接挑明了是好事啊

TPP都酸了，还击败……
美国的衰落无药可救……

嗯，我们也该增加核弹头和洲际导弹的数量了

他要干，咱就干

错。参议院被否，是因为他们觉得只是tpp对中国还不够狠。
否定者想要对中国更狠的，也就是这个提案要绑定对中国汇率制裁的法案才让通过。

clm221 发表于 2015-5-14 00:38
明确提出中国必须被击败，TPP（跨太平洋伙伴关系协议）就是最重要的手段---奥巴马在参院被自己人踢屁屁了{: ...

错。参议院被否，是因为他们觉得只是tpp对中国还不够狠。
否定者想要对中国更狠的，也就是这个提案要绑定对中国汇率制裁的法案才让通过。

该来的迟早会来。抓紧时间填安达牛轭西门，现在布局好。以后几十百年慢慢耗，有的是时间精力，轻松得很。

superloong 发表于 2015-5-14 00:55
错。参议院被否，是因为他们觉得奥巴马那个提案对中国还不够狠。
否定者想要对中国更狠的，也就是这个 ...
踢屁屁现在被炒作成单向对中国有毒本身就是误导，贸易协议历来是双边协商的

美国是一个有便于利益的国家，即使中国对它是致命的威胁，但只要中国不把它逼得太急，它就一定会有其他更急的全球性事务要它去处理。中国最大的关键，是要发展好自己，内部不出现颠覆性的错误。

从1949年10月1号开始，美国就没停止过颠覆新中国的努力，已经麻木了  话说战场得不到的东西，美帝难道真的想依靠嘴炮和静静们帮你办到吗？

错。参议院被否，是因为他们觉得只是tpp对中国还不够狠。
否定者想要对中国更狠的，也就是这个提案要 ...
这不是说你要签就能签把盟友全当肥羊宰了的，连鬼子这么跪舔的干儿子都受不了这鬼条款死活不肯签还想顺利让盟友全都签下甘心被剪羊毛？呵呵

我这样理解不知对不对：
经济产业结构调整的拉动力是一带一路，一带一路顺利推进的前题是扳倒TPP，TPP的关键是曰本，日本的咽喉是南海。
所以南海要出事，肯定要出事。
那根本就不是什么滨海战斗舰，那就是为挤压撞击追逐设计的“美国海警船”。

我这样理解不知对不对：
经济产业结构调整的拉动力是一带一路，一带一路顺利推进的前题是扳倒TPP，TPP的关键是曰本，日本的咽喉是南海。
所以南海要出事，肯定要出事。
那根本就不是什么滨海战斗舰，那就是为挤压撞击追逐设计的“美国海警船”。

要打就上，不打别BB。打就打出个真理来！

美国开始为军事冒险做舆论铺垫了

我们也要为局势升温做好准备吧
没等选举就开战，奥黑是想自动连任第三届总统?

现在掀桌子就是两败俱伤，谁也不会占便宜
等到096批量服役的时候，大家就可以像调侃阿三那样嘲笑类似的文章了

现在掀桌子就是两败俱伤，谁也不会占便宜
等到096批量服役的时候，大家就可以像调侃阿三那样嘲笑类似的文 ...
如果我是美帝，我肯定认为晚掀不如早掀。

其实国与国之间跟人与人之间一个熊样，要么自觉弱势，忍了吞了，要么豁出去了，只要有一线自己的优势，照死里拼，互殴，殴的不改不带停，告饶都不好使，得是跪舔了才给一机会，还得是掐着脖子享受跪舔，做不到，干脆还是忍了{:soso_e113:}

开拓者1 发表于 2015-5-14 01:42
我这样理解不知对不对：
经济产业结构调整的拉动力是一带一路，一带一路顺利推进的前题是扳倒TPP，TPP的关 ...
它踢它滴屁屁，偶弄偶滴带子路子，这里边有几毛钱关系？其实就看谁能弄成罢了。

话说倭寇这种干儿子加哈巴狗滴货色都不愿对此俯首帖耳滴条款，猴子们就愿意无私滴为鹰酱奉献上菊花了？

结果今天tpa没过，好黑色幽默啊

它踢它滴屁屁，偶弄偶滴带子路子，这里边有几毛钱关系？其实就看谁能弄成罢了。

话说倭寇这种干儿子加 ...
TPP具有排它性，如果成了。一带 就难了。

jqdz1 发表于 2015-5-14 00:24
@宋晓军
美普林斯顿大学教授、罗姆尼2012年总统竞选顾问撰文称，与未来来自中国的挑战相比，俄罗斯、伊朗 ...

这样的作法是错误的
——————中美并没有那么多矛盾
也不会反对美国在亚太的存在
中美应该谋求合谐共处，共同发展才是

作为回应 先上几个核弹工厂的股票连续涨停  

宋鸿兵，一个美国公民，这么关心中国而不是美国，真的好令人感动。

图穷匕首见吗？好吧，我们拭目以待

只希望领袖们能带领人民同甘共苦  

我们要做的是最有利于自己的事 不要去跟着美国的节奏走  他们爱说什么就让他们说去  他们做他们的我们做我们的 我们不会挑起事端 而他们千方百计的挑起事端 一味跟风终究是被动的 被人牵着鼻子走会陷入于对自己不利的境地  我们要做的仅仅是自己认为正确的事而已  

美国各级各部门，各单位各媒体，各协会各网站，各群体各人，意见差别这么大，正确的描述就是一个词——混乱。
要想对付中国，先统一自己意见再说吧，不然，很快不配做中国对手了。

国内一大帮精分期待王师久矣，一旦美国爸爸真跟tg翻脸了，正好趁这机会把这批人渣收拾掉

错。参议院被否，是因为他们觉得只是tpp对中国还不够狠。
否定者想要对中国更狠的，也就是这个提案要 ...
绑定对中国汇率制裁，法案就会被共和党否决，因为这会伤害共和党背后华尔街金融资本和大财团的利益

打到一切 霉 帝国主义
山姆你把你的军舰开过来试试--- 敢嘛

打到一切 霉 帝国主义
山姆你把你的军舰开过来试试--- 敢嘛

香港不压，不代表呆湾不压！

国内一大帮精分期待王师久矣，一旦美国爸爸真跟tg翻脸了，正好趁这机会把这批人渣收拾掉
你希望的即将来临。

美国开始为军事冒险做舆论铺垫了

我们也要为局势升温做好准备吧
人家说的是tpp，这是给日本施压，与军事毛关系都没有。

先把国内带路党杀光