超级军网转龙腾：2013中国军力报告（持续翻译、更新中）
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 04:05:13
http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-187473-1-1.html
Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013
涉及中华人民共和国的军事与安全形势--2013
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $95,000 in Fiscal Years 2012-2013
国防部长办公室
制订本报告共花费国防部约95000美元--2012至2013年财政年度
A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
根据《2000财政年度国防授权法》制订本报告
Section 1246, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address U.S.-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report, including through U.S.-China military-to-military contacts, and the U.S. strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future."
该法1246条规定：国防部长应以＂机密＂和＂公开＂两种版本提交关于＂中华人民共和国军事和安全形势＂的报告。报告须讨论人民解放军现有及未来的军事与科技发展路线、中国安全与军事战略的原则及其未来发展、以及未来20年支撑此类发展的军事组织和实战性概念。报告还须讨论美中两国在安全事务上的互动与合作（其中包括通过军方渠道），以及对于未来此类互动与合作之美方策略。
Executive Summary
政府摘要
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional military conflict. Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain the principal focus and primary driver of China’s military investment. However, as China’s interests have grown and as it has gained greater influence in the international system, its military modernization has also become increasingly focused on investments in military capabilities to conduct a wider range of missions beyond its immediate territorial concerns, including counter-piracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and regional military operations. Some of these missions and capabilities can address international security challenges, while others could serve more narrowly-defined PRC interests and objectives, including advancing territorial claims and building influence abroad.
中华人民共和国仍继续追求长期的、综合性的军事现代化，以提高部队打赢短期高强度区域性战役的能力。备战可能的台湾海峡冲突似乎仍是中国军队的主要焦点和投资动力。然而，随着中国利益的扩大和国际影响力的提高，该国的军事现代化也开始越来越多地着眼于发展那些可以实施远程行动的军事能力，不再局限于边境争议，诸如打击海盗、维和、人道主义协助/救灾、区域性军事行动等。其中的某些行动和能力可以用于应对国际安全挑战，其它的则服务于狭义的解放军利益和目标，如扩大领土主张及打造海外影响力等。
To support the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) expanding set of roles and missions, China’s leaders in 2012 sustained investment in advanced short- and mediumrange conventional ballistic missiles, landattack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counterspace weapons, and military cyberspace capabilities that appear designed to enable antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) missions (what PLA strategists refer to as “counterintervention operations”). The PLA also continued to improve capabilities in nuclear deterrence and long-range conventional strike; advanced fighter aircraft; limited regional power projection, with the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning; integrated air defenses; undersea warfare; improved command and control; and more sophisticated training and exercises across China’s air, naval, and land forces.
2012年，为了支撑人民解放军更广泛的功能和任务，中国领导人继续保持了对以下项目的投入：先进的短、中程常规弹道导弹、对地与反舰巡航导弹、太空武器、网络战能力等一批似乎旨在完成＂反进入/驱离＂的军事项目（解放军分析家称之为＂反干涉行动＂）。解放军还在继续加强核威慑与远程常规打击能力、先进战斗机、首艘航母辽宁号入役后形成的有限的区域性战力投射、联合防空、水下武器、指挥与控制系统、海陆空三军联合演习等。
During their January 2011 summit, U.S. President Barack Obama and then-PRC President Hu Jintao jointly affirmed that a “healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part of [their] shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship.” Within that framework, the U.S. Department of Defense seeks to build a military-to-military relationship with China that is sustained and substantive, while encouraging China to cooperate with the United States, our allies and partners, and the greater international community in the delivery of public goods. As the United States builds a stronger foundation for a military-to-military relationship with China, it also will continue to monitor China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development and encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization program. In concert with its allies and partners, the United States will continue adapting its forces, posture, and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment.
在2011年1月峰会上，美国总统奥巴马与时任中国国家主席的Hu发表联合声明：＂健康、稳定、可靠的军队间关系是构建积极、合作性、综合性的美中关系的重要组成部分。＂在此框架内，美国国防部致力于打造可持续、实质性的对华军队间关系，同时敦促中方与美国、我们的盟友和伙伴以及国际社会进行合作，以造福世界。美国在为两国军队关系打下更坚实基础的同时，还将继续监测演进中的中国军事战略原则和军队发展，鼓励中国增大军事现代化的透明度。与盟友和伙伴一道，美国将继续调整其军力、姿态和实战性概念，以维持稳定与安全的亚太环境。
Contents
目录
Executive Summary i
政府摘要
Chapter 1: Annual Update 1
第一章：年度更新
Chapter 2: Understanding China’s Strategy 15
第二章：理解中国的策略
Chapter 3: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 29
第三章：军队现代化的目标和趋势
Chapter 4: Resources for Force Modernization 45
第四章：军队现代化的资源
Chapter 5: Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency 55
第五章：军队现代化以应对台湾危机
Chapter 6: U.S.-China Military-to-Military Contacts 61
第六章：美中军队联络
Special Topic: Space-Based Imaging and Remote Sensing 65
特别议题：空间成像和遥感
Special Topic: China’s First Aircraft Carrier 65
特别议题：中国首艘航空母舰
Special Topic: PLA Air Force Stealth Aircraft 66
特别议题：解放军空军的隐形飞机
Special Topic: PLA Integrated Air Defenses 67
特别议题：解放军的联合防空
Appendix I: Military-to-Military Exchanges 69
附录一：军队间交流
Appendix II: China and Taiwan Forces Data 75
附录二：中国与台湾军队数据
Appendix III: Additional Maps and Chart 79
附录三：其它图表
1 ANNUAL UPDATE
第一章 年度更新
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS
中国的双边和多边关系形势
China’s military engagement with other countries seeks to enhance China’s international presence and influence by improving relationships with foreign militaries, bolstering China’s international and regional image, and assuaging other countries’ concerns about China’s rise. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) engagement activities assist its modernization through the acquisition of advanced weapons systems and technologies, increased operational experience both throughout and beyond Asia, and access to foreign military practices, operational doctrine, and training methods.
中国与他国的军事交流旨在通过改善军队间关系、提升中国国际与地区形象、安抚他国对中国崛起的担忧等措施来增强中国的国际存在和影响力。人民解放军的现代化得益于外事交流，比如获取先进的武器系统和技术、增强在亚洲内外的实战经验、了解外国的军事惯例、行动准则和训练方法等。
In January 2013, China’s Ministry of National Defense released information about the PLA’s 2012 military diplomacy, which it stated had stood severe tests under a difficult international and regional situation throughout the year. In 2012, senior military officials from at least 25 countries visited China, including officials from Australia, Germany, Russia and Ukraine. Senior PLA officials visited at least 33 countries, including India, Poland, Tanzania, and Turkey. The PLA participated in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), carried out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief work in Pakistan and conducted the second global goodwill voyage of the PLA Navy ZHENG HE training vessel. PLA leaders participated in various multilateral meetings, including the Defense Ministers’ Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum Security Policy Conference.
2013年1月，中国国防部发布了2012年度中国军队外事活动信息，称其经受住了国际与地区形势的严峻考验。2012年，至少有25个国家的高级军官访华，其中包括澳大利亚、德国、俄罗斯、乌克兰。解放军高级官员访问了至少33个国家，其中包括印度、波兰、坦桑尼亚和土耳其。解放军参与了联合国维和行动，在巴基斯坦实施了人道主义援助和救灾工作，并举办了海军郑和号训练舰第二次全球友好之旅。解放军领导人参与了各种多边会议，包括上海合作组织国防部长会议和东盟安全政策会议。
Combined Exercises
联合演习
PLA participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises is increasing. The PLA derives political benefit through increased influence and enhanced ties with partner states and organizations. Such exercises provide the PLA opportunities to improve capabilities and gain operational insights by observing tactics, command decision-making, and equipment used by more advanced militaries.
解放军越来越多地参与双边及多边演习。解放军通过提升影响力、增强与伙伴国家及组织的联系来获取政治利益。通过观察更先进国家的战术、指挥决策及装备等，解放军在这些联合演习中获得了提高自身能力和实战经验的机会。
In 2011 and 2012 alone, the PLA held 21 joint exercise and training events with foreign militaries, compared to 32 during the entire 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010). These activities included military exercises with SCO members, naval exercises, ground forces training, peacekeeping, and search and rescue operations/missions. China also conducted joint training for operations other than war, including the 2011 COOPERATION SPIRIT humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) exercise with Australia. China observed KHAN QUEST-11, a peacekeeping exercise in Mongolia – the first time it had done so. The PLA Navy conducted maritime exercises with Russia, Vietnam, and Thailand and counter-piracy exercises with France and the United States
仅在2011和2012年，解放军就举办了21次与外军的联合演习和训练，而在十一五期间（2006至2010年）此类活动只有32次。这些活动包括与上合组织成员国的联合军演、海军演习、地面部队训练、维和行动、搜救行动等。中国还实施了与战争无关的联合训练，包括与澳大利亚举办的2011年协作精神人道主义援助/救灾演习。中国首次派员观摩了蒙古KHAN QUEST-11维和演习。中国海军与俄罗斯、越南、泰国等举办了海上演习，并与法国、美国等开展了打击海盗行动。
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conducted unprecedented bilateral training during 2011, including its first bilateral air exercise with Pakistan and training with air forces in Belarus and Venezuela. In contrast, the PLA Air Force participated in only one bilateral exercise in 2012 – an airborne training exercise with Belarus in November. PEACE MISSION 2012, conducted under the auspices of the SCO, did not include PLA Air Force participation as in the past, and instead focused on what SCO nations called “counterterrorism” training, which more closely resembles training to suppress armed opposition within a member country.
中国空军在2011年分别与巴基斯坦、白俄罗斯、委内瑞拉等国开展了史无前例的双边训练。与此相比，中国空军在2012年只有一次双边训练，即与白俄罗斯于11月举办的空中训练。上合组织框架下的和平使命2012并不包括中国空军，该演习聚焦于上合组织成员国所谓的＂反恐＂训练，更类似于镇压国内武装起义的训练。
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
维和行动
Over the past ten years, China has increased its commitment to UN PKO by approximately ten fold, building to its current level of approximately 2,000 personnel in 11 operations, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. This level of support has been steadily maintained since 2008 and is the highest among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. In total, China has deployed more than 21,000 troops to 30 UN missions and bears 3.93 percent of the UN’s current peacekeeping budget of $7.23 billion.
过去十年，中国对联合国维和行动的投入增加了约十倍，目前在11个行动中投入约两千兵力，大多位于撒哈拉以南非洲地区和中东。这一水平从2008年起保持至今，是联合国安理会五大常任理事国里最高的。中国累计向联合国的30个行动派遣兵力2万1千人，承担联合国目前72.3亿美元维和预算的3.93%
PKO participation can serve various objectives, including improving China’s international image, obtaining operational experience, providing opportunities to gather intelligence, and advancing the PLA’s “New Historic Missions” by taking on roles and generating capabilities for operations far beyond China’s borders. China is currently taking steps to meet these objectives by committing civilian police, military observers, engineers, logistics support, and medical troops to UN missions while abstaining from missions that might result in regime change or lack host country consent.
参与维和行动可服务于多个目标，其中包括改善中国的国际形象、获取实战经验、搜集情报、在远远超越中国边境地区的海外推进解放军的＂历史新任务＂。中国目前正通过向联合国行动投入警察、军事观察员、工程师、后勤人员和医疗队等方式来达到上述目标，与此同时，中国不参与那些可能导致政权更迭或者未获东道国同意的行动。
In 2012, China for the first time deployed infantry to a UN PKO. This “guard unit,” as Chinese media described it, is tasked with security for the PLA engineering and medical formed military units in its contingent deployed to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). These forces, likely no more than 50 personnel from the 162nd Motorized Infantry Division, are equipped with armored vehicles, enabling them to provide fixed-site security and convoy escorts.
2012年，中国首次向联合国维和行动派出步兵。这支被中国媒体称为＂保卫部队＂的任务是：向联合国驻南苏丹共和国维和部队中的解放军工程兵和医疗队提供安全保证。有可能从162摩托化步兵师抽调的不足50名士兵将配备装甲车，因此有能力提供固定地点安保或护送车队。
Chinese Arms Sales
中国军火销售
From 2007 to 2011, Chinese arms sales totaled approximately $11 billion. As of this report’s publication, data for 2012 arms sales was not yet available. China primarily conducts arms sales in conjunction with economic aid and development assistance to support broader foreign-policy goals such as securing access to natural resources and export markets, promoting its increasing political influence among host-country elites, and building support in international forums. Arms sales, however, also can reflect the profit-seeking activities of individual arms trading companies and efforts to offset defense-related research and development costs. For example, China continues to develop and market unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) abroad, and in 2012, unveiled a new tactical UAV, the Yi Long, which will likely be marketed to developing countries.
2007至2011年，中国军火销售额约为110亿美元。截止至本报告发表之日，2012年的军火销售数据尚未公布。大体上，中国将军售与经济援助、发展协助挂钩，以促进更广泛的外交目标，诸如获取自然资源、开拓出口市场、在东道国精英层发挥政治影响力、支持国际论坛等。但军火销售也同时反映出各个武器贸易公司逐利的一面，以及用销售所得抵销部分研发费用的努力。例如，中国继续研发并在海外推销无人飞机。2012年，中国发布了一款名为翼龙的新型战术无人机，有可能销往发展中国家。
From the perspective of China’s arms customers (most of whom are developing countries), Chinese arms are less expensive than those offered by the top international arms suppliers, although they are also generally of lower quality and reliability. Chinese arms also come with fewer political strings attached, which is attractive to those customers who may not have access to other sources of arms for political or economic reasons. China also offers relatively generous terms and flexible payment options to some customers.
站在中国军售客户的角度（大多数是发展中国家），中国武器比国际顶尖供应商的产品便宜，尽管总体上质量和可靠性较低。中国武器附随着较少的政治约束，对那些因政治或经济原因无法从其它渠道获取武器的客户尤有吸引力。中国通常还向一些客户开出较为慷慨的条件和灵活的付款方式。
Counter-Piracy Efforts
反海盗努力
China continues to support counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, a commitment which began in December 2008. In July 2012, the PLA Navy deployed its 12th escort formation, which included two guided missile frigates and one oiler. Operational highlights for this formation included the retrieval of 26 crew members of the fishing vessel Xufu-1 from Somalia following their release by pirates in July 2012 (an operation that was recognized by China’s Central Military Commission); and the first combined counter-piracy exercise with the U.S. Navy. After its departure from the Gulf of Aden, the 11th escort formation visited Ukraine and Turkey, and for the first time for the PLA Navy, Romania, Bulgaria and Israel. Ships engaged in counter-piracy also conducted port calls in Australia, Mozambique, and Thailand during 2012.
中国继续支持在亚丁湾的反海盗行动，这项工作在2008年12月展开。2012年7月，中国海军派出了第12批护航编队，其中包括两艘制导导弹护卫舰和一艘补给船。本次编队行动亮点包括：从索马里取回于2012年7月被海盗释放的26名Xufu-1号渔船船员（中国中央军委嘉奖）；与美国海军举行首次反海盗演习。离开亚丁湾后，第11批护航编队访问了乌克兰和土耳其，并首次造访罗马尼亚、保加利亚和以色列。2012年，参与反海盗行动的船只还停靠了澳大利亚、莫桑比克和泰国的港口。
Territorial Disputes
领土争议
Senior Chinese officials have identified protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as a “core interest” and all officials repeatedly state China’s opposition to and willingness to respond to actions it perceives as challenging this core interest. In 2012, this was demonstrated by Chinese actions at Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
中国高级官员已将保卫中国的主权和领土完整定为＂核心利益＂之一，而且所有的官员反复重申，反对所有被视为挑战其核心利益的行为，并愿意对此做出反应。2012年，中国在南中国海斯卡伯勒浅滩（注：即黄岩岛）和东中国海尖阁诸岛的行动展示了这一点。
（译注：原文使用日本名称）
The Chinese government maintains that its maritime rights extend to virtually the entire South China Sea and often illustrates this claim using a “nine-dash line” that encompasses much of the South China Sea area. At the same time, Beijing is ambiguous about the precise meaning of the nine-dash line; to date, China has not clarified the meaning of the nine-dash line or its legal basis. In April 2012, Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels and Philippine coast guard vessels engaged in a protracted standoff at Scarborough Reef, after the Philippine Navy attempted to conduct a fishing enforcement action against Chinese fishermen.
中国政府坚称其海洋权利延伸至几乎整个南中国海，并经常用囊括了大部分南中国海的＂九段线＂显示其主张。与此同时，北京对九段线的确切含义闪烁其词；到目前为止，中国尚未澄清九段线的含义及其法律依据。2012年4月，菲律宾海军试图对中国渔民进行执法，之后，中国海洋执法船与菲律宾海岸警卫队船只在黄岩岛展开了长期对峙。
Although overt tensions between China and the Philippines subsided by year’s end, both sides continue to claim jurisdiction over the reef. Chinese law enforcement vessels have maintained an almost continuous presence ever since.
虽然中菲之间的紧张局势在年底有所缓解，但双方继续对该岛屿主张主权。中国执法船已几乎不间断地在该处保持存在。
In November 2012, China also added a map which contained the nine-dash line to all of its new passports. This action elicited negative responses from other nations in the AsiaPacific region. China’s increased reference in official government materials to the nine-dash line is a source of concern to its neighbors and other nations because, at a minimum, it creates an impression that China is not merely claiming all the land features within the ninedash line, but it may also be claiming a special sovereign status of all the water and the seabed contained therein.
2012年11月，中国在其全部新护照上加印了包含九段线的地图。这一行为引发了亚太地区其它国家的消极反应。中国在官方文件上越来越多地引用九段线是引发其邻国及其它国家不安的源头之一。因为此举至少造成以下印象，即中国不但对线内所有岛屿主张权利、还可能对线内所有海面和海床主张特别主权。
China claims sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (what the Chinese refer to as the Diaoyu Islands) in the East China Sea, territory also claimed by Taiwan and Japan. In April 2012, the Governor of Tokyo announced plans to purchase three of the five islets from private Japanese owners. In response, in September 2012, the Government of Japan purchased the three islands. China protested the move and since that time has regularly sent maritime law enforcement ships (and, less often, aircraft) to patrol near the Senkakus to protect its claims; this has included regular Chinese maritime operations within 12nm of the islands. On September 25, China published a white paper entitled, “Diaoyu Dao, an ’Inherent Territory’ of China.” In addition, in September 2012, China began using improperly drawn straight baseline claims around the Senkaku Islands, adding to its network of maritime claims inconsistent with international law. In December 2012, China submitted information to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding China’s extended continental shelf in the East China Sea that includes the disputed islands.
中国对东中国海的尖阁诸岛（中国人称为钓鱼岛）声称主权，台湾和日本也同时声称主权。2012年4月，东京市长宣布从日本私人岛主手中购买五岛中的三个岛屿。作为回应，日本政府于2012年9月购买了这三座岛屿。中国抗议这一行为，之后即定期派出海洋执法船只（不时有飞机助阵）在尖阁诸岛周围巡逻，以保护其主张；其间多次进入12海里范围。9月25日，中国发表了题为《钓鱼岛，中国固有领土》的白种书。此外自2012年9月起，中国开始启用不恰当的尖阁诸岛直线领海基线，此举与国际法不符。2012年12月，中国向联合国大陆架界限委员会提交了关于扩大后的东海大陆架的资料，其中包括争议岛屿。
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台湾海峡的安全形势
Dealing with a potential contingency in the Taiwan Strait remains the PLA’s primary mission despite decreasing tensions there - a trend which continued following the reelection of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in January 2012. In this context, should deterrence fail, the PLA could be called upon to compel Taiwan to abandon independence or to re-unify with the mainland by force of arms while defeating any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.
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应对台湾海峡可能发生的危机依然是解放军的首要任务，尽管当地的紧张局势有所缓和——台湾总统马英九2012年1月连任以来一直延续的趋势。在这一环境下，威慑一旦失效，解放军即可奉召迫使台湾放弃独立或以武力统一台湾，同时击败任何外部干预。
Cross-Strait Stability
海峡稳定
China and Taiwan have reached 18 agreements for cross-Strait cooperation on economic, cultural, and functional issues, but Taiwan authorities and the broader Taiwan public do not support negotiation on issues directly related to sovereignty.
中国和台湾签署了18个关于两岸经济、文化、事务性合作的协定，但台湾当局和广大台湾民众并不支持开展与主权直接相关的谈判。
China and Taiwan have also undertaken some combined security and police operations, and held a combined maritime rescue exercise in August 2012 featuring two helicopters, 14 vessels, and 300 personnel, with both sides equally represented. Also in August, Chinese and Taiwan police apprehended 30 suspects in a human-trafficking and prostitution ring – a first collaborative effort to combat human trafficking.
中国和台湾也进行了一些联合安全、警务行动，并于2012年8月举办了由2架直升机、14艘船只、300名人员参与的联合海上营救演习，两岸在此次演习中的投入相当。当月，中台警方逮捕了30名涉嫌拐卖人口和组织卖淫的犯罪嫌疑人，这是首个打击贩卖人口犯罪的联合行动。
During a mid-October 2011 speech, President Ma stated that a cross-Strait peace agreement with China might be attainable in 10 years, but backed down immediately in the face of widespread negative public reaction and Ma specified the conditions under which he would pursue such an agreement. Despite occasional signs of impatience, China appears content to respect Taiwan’s current approach to cross-Strait relations. In November 2012, Xi Jinping, China’s newly selected general secretary of the CCP Central Committee sent a message to President Ma (in the latter’s capacity as chairman of the ruling Kuomintang Party), emphasizing the need to continue promoting the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. This early message suggests that China under Xi Jinping may be willing to follow President Hu Jintao’s multipronged strategy for developing cross-Strait relations rather than compelling unification through the use of force. President Hu in his report to the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 used language that promoted peaceful reunification and called for both sides to explore political relations and make reasonable arrangements to discuss the creation of a military confidence-building mechanism.
马总统在2011年10月中旬的讲话中指出，两岸和平协定或许能在十年内达成。但面对广泛的公众反弹，马英九立即收回发言，设定了进行和平谈判的先决条件。尽管偶而有失去耐心的迹象，中国似乎还满意台湾对两岸关系的处理。中国新任中央军委主席Xi在2012年11月致信马总统（以国民党主席身份接），强调有必要继续促进两岸关系的和平发展。这一信息暗示着在Xi的领导下，中国将继续秉承胡主席的和平发展两岸关系多项战略，而不会诉诸武力强行统一。胡主席在2012年11月十八大报告中使用了促进和平统一的提法，此外还呼吁双方发展政治关系、为建立两岸军队互信机制妥善安排会谈。
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Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013
涉及中华人民共和国的军事与安全形势--2013
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $95,000 in Fiscal Years 2012-2013
国防部长办公室
制订本报告共花费国防部约95000美元--2012至2013年财政年度
A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
根据《2000财政年度国防授权法》制订本报告
Section 1246, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address U.S.-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report, including through U.S.-China military-to-military contacts, and the U.S. strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future."
该法1246条规定：国防部长应以＂机密＂和＂公开＂两种版本提交关于＂中华人民共和国军事和安全形势＂的报告。报告须讨论人民解放军现有及未来的军事与科技发展路线、中国安全与军事战略的原则及其未来发展、以及未来20年支撑此类发展的军事组织和实战性概念。报告还须讨论美中两国在安全事务上的互动与合作（其中包括通过军方渠道），以及对于未来此类互动与合作之美方策略。
Executive Summary
政府摘要
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional military conflict. Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain the principal focus and primary driver of China’s military investment. However, as China’s interests have grown and as it has gained greater influence in the international system, its military modernization has also become increasingly focused on investments in military capabilities to conduct a wider range of missions beyond its immediate territorial concerns, including counter-piracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and regional military operations. Some of these missions and capabilities can address international security challenges, while others could serve more narrowly-defined PRC interests and objectives, including advancing territorial claims and building influence abroad.
中华人民共和国仍继续追求长期的、综合性的军事现代化，以提高部队打赢短期高强度区域性战役的能力。备战可能的台湾海峡冲突似乎仍是中国军队的主要焦点和投资动力。然而，随着中国利益的扩大和国际影响力的提高，该国的军事现代化也开始越来越多地着眼于发展那些可以实施远程行动的军事能力，不再局限于边境争议，诸如打击海盗、维和、人道主义协助/救灾、区域性军事行动等。其中的某些行动和能力可以用于应对国际安全挑战，其它的则服务于狭义的解放军利益和目标，如扩大领土主张及打造海外影响力等。
To support the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) expanding set of roles and missions, China’s leaders in 2012 sustained investment in advanced short- and mediumrange conventional ballistic missiles, landattack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counterspace weapons, and military cyberspace capabilities that appear designed to enable antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) missions (what PLA strategists refer to as “counterintervention operations”). The PLA also continued to improve capabilities in nuclear deterrence and long-range conventional strike; advanced fighter aircraft; limited regional power projection, with the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning; integrated air defenses; undersea warfare; improved command and control; and more sophisticated training and exercises across China’s air, naval, and land forces.
2012年，为了支撑人民解放军更广泛的功能和任务，中国领导人继续保持了对以下项目的投入：先进的短、中程常规弹道导弹、对地与反舰巡航导弹、太空武器、网络战能力等一批似乎旨在完成＂反进入/驱离＂的军事项目（解放军分析家称之为＂反干涉行动＂）。解放军还在继续加强核威慑与远程常规打击能力、先进战斗机、首艘航母辽宁号入役后形成的有限的区域性战力投射、联合防空、水下武器、指挥与控制系统、海陆空三军联合演习等。
During their January 2011 summit, U.S. President Barack Obama and then-PRC President Hu Jintao jointly affirmed that a “healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part of [their] shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship.” Within that framework, the U.S. Department of Defense seeks to build a military-to-military relationship with China that is sustained and substantive, while encouraging China to cooperate with the United States, our allies and partners, and the greater international community in the delivery of public goods. As the United States builds a stronger foundation for a military-to-military relationship with China, it also will continue to monitor China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development and encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization program. In concert with its allies and partners, the United States will continue adapting its forces, posture, and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment.
在2011年1月峰会上，美国总统奥巴马与时任中国国家主席的Hu发表联合声明：＂健康、稳定、可靠的军队间关系是构建积极、合作性、综合性的美中关系的重要组成部分。＂在此框架内，美国国防部致力于打造可持续、实质性的对华军队间关系，同时敦促中方与美国、我们的盟友和伙伴以及国际社会进行合作，以造福世界。美国在为两国军队关系打下更坚实基础的同时，还将继续监测演进中的中国军事战略原则和军队发展，鼓励中国增大军事现代化的透明度。与盟友和伙伴一道，美国将继续调整其军力、姿态和实战性概念，以维持稳定与安全的亚太环境。
Contents
目录
Executive Summary i
政府摘要
Chapter 1: Annual Update 1
第一章：年度更新
Chapter 2: Understanding China’s Strategy 15
第二章：理解中国的策略
Chapter 3: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 29
第三章：军队现代化的目标和趋势
Chapter 4: Resources for Force Modernization 45
第四章：军队现代化的资源
Chapter 5: Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency 55
第五章：军队现代化以应对台湾危机
Chapter 6: U.S.-China Military-to-Military Contacts 61
第六章：美中军队联络
Special Topic: Space-Based Imaging and Remote Sensing 65
特别议题：空间成像和遥感
Special Topic: China’s First Aircraft Carrier 65
特别议题：中国首艘航空母舰
Special Topic: PLA Air Force Stealth Aircraft 66
特别议题：解放军空军的隐形飞机
Special Topic: PLA Integrated Air Defenses 67
特别议题：解放军的联合防空
Appendix I: Military-to-Military Exchanges 69
附录一：军队间交流
Appendix II: China and Taiwan Forces Data 75
附录二：中国与台湾军队数据
Appendix III: Additional Maps and Chart 79
附录三：其它图表
1 ANNUAL UPDATE
第一章 年度更新
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS
中国的双边和多边关系形势
China’s military engagement with other countries seeks to enhance China’s international presence and influence by improving relationships with foreign militaries, bolstering China’s international and regional image, and assuaging other countries’ concerns about China’s rise. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) engagement activities assist its modernization through the acquisition of advanced weapons systems and technologies, increased operational experience both throughout and beyond Asia, and access to foreign military practices, operational doctrine, and training methods.
中国与他国的军事交流旨在通过改善军队间关系、提升中国国际与地区形象、安抚他国对中国崛起的担忧等措施来增强中国的国际存在和影响力。人民解放军的现代化得益于外事交流，比如获取先进的武器系统和技术、增强在亚洲内外的实战经验、了解外国的军事惯例、行动准则和训练方法等。
In January 2013, China’s Ministry of National Defense released information about the PLA’s 2012 military diplomacy, which it stated had stood severe tests under a difficult international and regional situation throughout the year. In 2012, senior military officials from at least 25 countries visited China, including officials from Australia, Germany, Russia and Ukraine. Senior PLA officials visited at least 33 countries, including India, Poland, Tanzania, and Turkey. The PLA participated in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), carried out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief work in Pakistan and conducted the second global goodwill voyage of the PLA Navy ZHENG HE training vessel. PLA leaders participated in various multilateral meetings, including the Defense Ministers’ Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum Security Policy Conference.
2013年1月，中国国防部发布了2012年度中国军队外事活动信息，称其经受住了国际与地区形势的严峻考验。2012年，至少有25个国家的高级军官访华，其中包括澳大利亚、德国、俄罗斯、乌克兰。解放军高级官员访问了至少33个国家，其中包括印度、波兰、坦桑尼亚和土耳其。解放军参与了联合国维和行动，在巴基斯坦实施了人道主义援助和救灾工作，并举办了海军郑和号训练舰第二次全球友好之旅。解放军领导人参与了各种多边会议，包括上海合作组织国防部长会议和东盟安全政策会议。
Combined Exercises
联合演习
PLA participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises is increasing. The PLA derives political benefit through increased influence and enhanced ties with partner states and organizations. Such exercises provide the PLA opportunities to improve capabilities and gain operational insights by observing tactics, command decision-making, and equipment used by more advanced militaries.
解放军越来越多地参与双边及多边演习。解放军通过提升影响力、增强与伙伴国家及组织的联系来获取政治利益。通过观察更先进国家的战术、指挥决策及装备等，解放军在这些联合演习中获得了提高自身能力和实战经验的机会。
In 2011 and 2012 alone, the PLA held 21 joint exercise and training events with foreign militaries, compared to 32 during the entire 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010). These activities included military exercises with SCO members, naval exercises, ground forces training, peacekeeping, and search and rescue operations/missions. China also conducted joint training for operations other than war, including the 2011 COOPERATION SPIRIT humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) exercise with Australia. China observed KHAN QUEST-11, a peacekeeping exercise in Mongolia – the first time it had done so. The PLA Navy conducted maritime exercises with Russia, Vietnam, and Thailand and counter-piracy exercises with France and the United States
仅在2011和2012年，解放军就举办了21次与外军的联合演习和训练，而在十一五期间（2006至2010年）此类活动只有32次。这些活动包括与上合组织成员国的联合军演、海军演习、地面部队训练、维和行动、搜救行动等。中国还实施了与战争无关的联合训练，包括与澳大利亚举办的2011年协作精神人道主义援助/救灾演习。中国首次派员观摩了蒙古KHAN QUEST-11维和演习。中国海军与俄罗斯、越南、泰国等举办了海上演习，并与法国、美国等开展了打击海盗行动。
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conducted unprecedented bilateral training during 2011, including its first bilateral air exercise with Pakistan and training with air forces in Belarus and Venezuela. In contrast, the PLA Air Force participated in only one bilateral exercise in 2012 – an airborne training exercise with Belarus in November. PEACE MISSION 2012, conducted under the auspices of the SCO, did not include PLA Air Force participation as in the past, and instead focused on what SCO nations called “counterterrorism” training, which more closely resembles training to suppress armed opposition within a member country.
中国空军在2011年分别与巴基斯坦、白俄罗斯、委内瑞拉等国开展了史无前例的双边训练。与此相比，中国空军在2012年只有一次双边训练，即与白俄罗斯于11月举办的空中训练。上合组织框架下的和平使命2012并不包括中国空军，该演习聚焦于上合组织成员国所谓的＂反恐＂训练，更类似于镇压国内武装起义的训练。
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
维和行动
Over the past ten years, China has increased its commitment to UN PKO by approximately ten fold, building to its current level of approximately 2,000 personnel in 11 operations, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. This level of support has been steadily maintained since 2008 and is the highest among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. In total, China has deployed more than 21,000 troops to 30 UN missions and bears 3.93 percent of the UN’s current peacekeeping budget of $7.23 billion.
过去十年，中国对联合国维和行动的投入增加了约十倍，目前在11个行动中投入约两千兵力，大多位于撒哈拉以南非洲地区和中东。这一水平从2008年起保持至今，是联合国安理会五大常任理事国里最高的。中国累计向联合国的30个行动派遣兵力2万1千人，承担联合国目前72.3亿美元维和预算的3.93%
PKO participation can serve various objectives, including improving China’s international image, obtaining operational experience, providing opportunities to gather intelligence, and advancing the PLA’s “New Historic Missions” by taking on roles and generating capabilities for operations far beyond China’s borders. China is currently taking steps to meet these objectives by committing civilian police, military observers, engineers, logistics support, and medical troops to UN missions while abstaining from missions that might result in regime change or lack host country consent.
参与维和行动可服务于多个目标，其中包括改善中国的国际形象、获取实战经验、搜集情报、在远远超越中国边境地区的海外推进解放军的＂历史新任务＂。中国目前正通过向联合国行动投入警察、军事观察员、工程师、后勤人员和医疗队等方式来达到上述目标，与此同时，中国不参与那些可能导致政权更迭或者未获东道国同意的行动。
In 2012, China for the first time deployed infantry to a UN PKO. This “guard unit,” as Chinese media described it, is tasked with security for the PLA engineering and medical formed military units in its contingent deployed to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). These forces, likely no more than 50 personnel from the 162nd Motorized Infantry Division, are equipped with armored vehicles, enabling them to provide fixed-site security and convoy escorts.
2012年，中国首次向联合国维和行动派出步兵。这支被中国媒体称为＂保卫部队＂的任务是：向联合国驻南苏丹共和国维和部队中的解放军工程兵和医疗队提供安全保证。有可能从162摩托化步兵师抽调的不足50名士兵将配备装甲车，因此有能力提供固定地点安保或护送车队。
Chinese Arms Sales
中国军火销售
From 2007 to 2011, Chinese arms sales totaled approximately $11 billion. As of this report’s publication, data for 2012 arms sales was not yet available. China primarily conducts arms sales in conjunction with economic aid and development assistance to support broader foreign-policy goals such as securing access to natural resources and export markets, promoting its increasing political influence among host-country elites, and building support in international forums. Arms sales, however, also can reflect the profit-seeking activities of individual arms trading companies and efforts to offset defense-related research and development costs. For example, China continues to develop and market unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) abroad, and in 2012, unveiled a new tactical UAV, the Yi Long, which will likely be marketed to developing countries.
2007至2011年，中国军火销售额约为110亿美元。截止至本报告发表之日，2012年的军火销售数据尚未公布。大体上，中国将军售与经济援助、发展协助挂钩，以促进更广泛的外交目标，诸如获取自然资源、开拓出口市场、在东道国精英层发挥政治影响力、支持国际论坛等。但军火销售也同时反映出各个武器贸易公司逐利的一面，以及用销售所得抵销部分研发费用的努力。例如，中国继续研发并在海外推销无人飞机。2012年，中国发布了一款名为翼龙的新型战术无人机，有可能销往发展中国家。
From the perspective of China’s arms customers (most of whom are developing countries), Chinese arms are less expensive than those offered by the top international arms suppliers, although they are also generally of lower quality and reliability. Chinese arms also come with fewer political strings attached, which is attractive to those customers who may not have access to other sources of arms for political or economic reasons. China also offers relatively generous terms and flexible payment options to some customers.
站在中国军售客户的角度（大多数是发展中国家），中国武器比国际顶尖供应商的产品便宜，尽管总体上质量和可靠性较低。中国武器附随着较少的政治约束，对那些因政治或经济原因无法从其它渠道获取武器的客户尤有吸引力。中国通常还向一些客户开出较为慷慨的条件和灵活的付款方式。
Counter-Piracy Efforts
反海盗努力
China continues to support counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, a commitment which began in December 2008. In July 2012, the PLA Navy deployed its 12th escort formation, which included two guided missile frigates and one oiler. Operational highlights for this formation included the retrieval of 26 crew members of the fishing vessel Xufu-1 from Somalia following their release by pirates in July 2012 (an operation that was recognized by China’s Central Military Commission); and the first combined counter-piracy exercise with the U.S. Navy. After its departure from the Gulf of Aden, the 11th escort formation visited Ukraine and Turkey, and for the first time for the PLA Navy, Romania, Bulgaria and Israel. Ships engaged in counter-piracy also conducted port calls in Australia, Mozambique, and Thailand during 2012.
中国继续支持在亚丁湾的反海盗行动，这项工作在2008年12月展开。2012年7月，中国海军派出了第12批护航编队，其中包括两艘制导导弹护卫舰和一艘补给船。本次编队行动亮点包括：从索马里取回于2012年7月被海盗释放的26名Xufu-1号渔船船员（中国中央军委嘉奖）；与美国海军举行首次反海盗演习。离开亚丁湾后，第11批护航编队访问了乌克兰和土耳其，并首次造访罗马尼亚、保加利亚和以色列。2012年，参与反海盗行动的船只还停靠了澳大利亚、莫桑比克和泰国的港口。
Territorial Disputes
领土争议
Senior Chinese officials have identified protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as a “core interest” and all officials repeatedly state China’s opposition to and willingness to respond to actions it perceives as challenging this core interest. In 2012, this was demonstrated by Chinese actions at Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
中国高级官员已将保卫中国的主权和领土完整定为＂核心利益＂之一，而且所有的官员反复重申，反对所有被视为挑战其核心利益的行为，并愿意对此做出反应。2012年，中国在南中国海斯卡伯勒浅滩（注：即黄岩岛）和东中国海尖阁诸岛的行动展示了这一点。
（译注：原文使用日本名称）
The Chinese government maintains that its maritime rights extend to virtually the entire South China Sea and often illustrates this claim using a “nine-dash line” that encompasses much of the South China Sea area. At the same time, Beijing is ambiguous about the precise meaning of the nine-dash line; to date, China has not clarified the meaning of the nine-dash line or its legal basis. In April 2012, Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels and Philippine coast guard vessels engaged in a protracted standoff at Scarborough Reef, after the Philippine Navy attempted to conduct a fishing enforcement action against Chinese fishermen.
中国政府坚称其海洋权利延伸至几乎整个南中国海，并经常用囊括了大部分南中国海的＂九段线＂显示其主张。与此同时，北京对九段线的确切含义闪烁其词；到目前为止，中国尚未澄清九段线的含义及其法律依据。2012年4月，菲律宾海军试图对中国渔民进行执法，之后，中国海洋执法船与菲律宾海岸警卫队船只在黄岩岛展开了长期对峙。
Although overt tensions between China and the Philippines subsided by year’s end, both sides continue to claim jurisdiction over the reef. Chinese law enforcement vessels have maintained an almost continuous presence ever since.
虽然中菲之间的紧张局势在年底有所缓解，但双方继续对该岛屿主张主权。中国执法船已几乎不间断地在该处保持存在。
In November 2012, China also added a map which contained the nine-dash line to all of its new passports. This action elicited negative responses from other nations in the AsiaPacific region. China’s increased reference in official government materials to the nine-dash line is a source of concern to its neighbors and other nations because, at a minimum, it creates an impression that China is not merely claiming all the land features within the ninedash line, but it may also be claiming a special sovereign status of all the water and the seabed contained therein.
2012年11月，中国在其全部新护照上加印了包含九段线的地图。这一行为引发了亚太地区其它国家的消极反应。中国在官方文件上越来越多地引用九段线是引发其邻国及其它国家不安的源头之一。因为此举至少造成以下印象，即中国不但对线内所有岛屿主张权利、还可能对线内所有海面和海床主张特别主权。
China claims sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (what the Chinese refer to as the Diaoyu Islands) in the East China Sea, territory also claimed by Taiwan and Japan. In April 2012, the Governor of Tokyo announced plans to purchase three of the five islets from private Japanese owners. In response, in September 2012, the Government of Japan purchased the three islands. China protested the move and since that time has regularly sent maritime law enforcement ships (and, less often, aircraft) to patrol near the Senkakus to protect its claims; this has included regular Chinese maritime operations within 12nm of the islands. On September 25, China published a white paper entitled, “Diaoyu Dao, an ’Inherent Territory’ of China.” In addition, in September 2012, China began using improperly drawn straight baseline claims around the Senkaku Islands, adding to its network of maritime claims inconsistent with international law. In December 2012, China submitted information to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding China’s extended continental shelf in the East China Sea that includes the disputed islands.
中国对东中国海的尖阁诸岛（中国人称为钓鱼岛）声称主权，台湾和日本也同时声称主权。2012年4月，东京市长宣布从日本私人岛主手中购买五岛中的三个岛屿。作为回应，日本政府于2012年9月购买了这三座岛屿。中国抗议这一行为，之后即定期派出海洋执法船只（不时有飞机助阵）在尖阁诸岛周围巡逻，以保护其主张；其间多次进入12海里范围。9月25日，中国发表了题为《钓鱼岛，中国固有领土》的白种书。此外自2012年9月起，中国开始启用不恰当的尖阁诸岛直线领海基线，此举与国际法不符。2012年12月，中国向联合国大陆架界限委员会提交了关于扩大后的东海大陆架的资料，其中包括争议岛屿。
THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com
台湾海峡的安全形势
Dealing with a potential contingency in the Taiwan Strait remains the PLA’s primary mission despite decreasing tensions there - a trend which continued following the reelection of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in January 2012. In this context, should deterrence fail, the PLA could be called upon to compel Taiwan to abandon independence or to re-unify with the mainland by force of arms while defeating any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.
龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com
应对台湾海峡可能发生的危机依然是解放军的首要任务，尽管当地的紧张局势有所缓和——台湾总统马英九2012年1月连任以来一直延续的趋势。在这一环境下，威慑一旦失效，解放军即可奉召迫使台湾放弃独立或以武力统一台湾，同时击败任何外部干预。
Cross-Strait Stability
海峡稳定
China and Taiwan have reached 18 agreements for cross-Strait cooperation on economic, cultural, and functional issues, but Taiwan authorities and the broader Taiwan public do not support negotiation on issues directly related to sovereignty.
中国和台湾签署了18个关于两岸经济、文化、事务性合作的协定，但台湾当局和广大台湾民众并不支持开展与主权直接相关的谈判。
China and Taiwan have also undertaken some combined security and police operations, and held a combined maritime rescue exercise in August 2012 featuring two helicopters, 14 vessels, and 300 personnel, with both sides equally represented. Also in August, Chinese and Taiwan police apprehended 30 suspects in a human-trafficking and prostitution ring – a first collaborative effort to combat human trafficking.
中国和台湾也进行了一些联合安全、警务行动，并于2012年8月举办了由2架直升机、14艘船只、300名人员参与的联合海上营救演习，两岸在此次演习中的投入相当。当月，中台警方逮捕了30名涉嫌拐卖人口和组织卖淫的犯罪嫌疑人，这是首个打击贩卖人口犯罪的联合行动。
During a mid-October 2011 speech, President Ma stated that a cross-Strait peace agreement with China might be attainable in 10 years, but backed down immediately in the face of widespread negative public reaction and Ma specified the conditions under which he would pursue such an agreement. Despite occasional signs of impatience, China appears content to respect Taiwan’s current approach to cross-Strait relations. In November 2012, Xi Jinping, China’s newly selected general secretary of the CCP Central Committee sent a message to President Ma (in the latter’s capacity as chairman of the ruling Kuomintang Party), emphasizing the need to continue promoting the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. This early message suggests that China under Xi Jinping may be willing to follow President Hu Jintao’s multipronged strategy for developing cross-Strait relations rather than compelling unification through the use of force. President Hu in his report to the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 used language that promoted peaceful reunification and called for both sides to explore political relations and make reasonable arrangements to discuss the creation of a military confidence-building mechanism.
马总统在2011年10月中旬的讲话中指出，两岸和平协定或许能在十年内达成。但面对广泛的公众反弹，马英九立即收回发言，设定了进行和平谈判的先决条件。尽管偶而有失去耐心的迹象，中国似乎还满意台湾对两岸关系的处理。中国新任中央军委主席Xi在2012年11月致信马总统（以国民党主席身份接），强调有必要继续促进两岸关系的和平发展。这一信息暗示着在Xi的领导下，中国将继续秉承胡主席的和平发展两岸关系多项战略，而不会诉诸武力强行统一。胡主席在2012年11月十八大报告中使用了促进和平统一的提法，此外还呼吁双方发展政治关系、为建立两岸军队互信机制妥善安排会谈。
有两个这样帖子啊