(转贴)Alex Callinicos:Margaret Thatcher: a brutal r ...

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The official response—including of course that of the establishment media—to Margaret Thatcher’s death will seek to embalm her in “statesmanship”.

Those who remember what Thatcher did to the miners—and to many other working class communities—will prefer her immortalised as the poet Shelley did another Tory politician, Lord Castlereagh, after the Peterloo massacre in 1819: “I met murder on the way— / he had a mask like Castlereagh”.

For murder was Thatcher’s business. Sometimes the murder was metaphorical—of industries and communities. It still destroyed people’s lives.

Sometimes the murder was real. She oversaw the ongoing dirty war in Ireland. Thatcher’s callousness was on display also when she condemned Irish Republican hunger strikers to death rather than concede the recognition as political prisoners for which they were campaigning.

The 907 Argentine and British military personnel killed in the 1982 Falklands war would not have died if Thatcher hadn’t decided to take back an absurd colonial anomaly by force. Her legacy was continued British possession of the Malvinas that still poisons relations with Argentina.

Thatcher gloried in war. When her cabinet finally decided to remove her in November 1990, she pleaded to stay on as prime minister till the forthcoming war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was over.

Morally contemptible though Thatcher was, she could probably claim to be the last British political leader of world-historic importance. She came to office in May 1979 at a critical historical juncture.

The world economy was entering its second great recession that decade—evidence that the long boom of the 1950s and 1960s was well and truly over. Underlying the economic crisis was a sharp fall in the rate of profit on the capital compared to the last boom years.

Restoring profitability required forcing up the rate of exploitation for workers. But, particularly in Britain, the ruling class was caught between hammer and anvil. It faced a well organised, combative working class that had built up powerful rank and file workplace organisation during the boom.

Led by the miners and the dockers, the British workers’ movement had put paid to Thatcher’s Tory predecessor, Ted Heath, between 1972 and 1974. The great pay revolt of 1978-9, the “winter of discontent” that destroyed the Social Contract brought in after Heath by Labour, showed the enduring strength of this movement.

Before Thatcher won the 1979 general election, Thatcher had already branded herself as the “Iron Lady”, represented a much harsher and more combative form of ruling-class politics than had become common in the boom years. She disinterred free-market orthodoxies that had been buried with the Great Depression of the 1930s.

More than any other leading capitalist politician Thatcher pioneered what would soon come to be known as neoliberalism. She soon had an immensely powerful ally in the shape of the new right-wing Republican President of the United States, Ronald Reagan.

But Reagan faced a less powerful workers’ movement, and by the time he took office in January 1981 he could benefit from the impact of the brutal recession imposed by Paul Volcker, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, in October 1979.

Thatcher and her sycophants liked to praise her courage. In fact, particularly in her early years in Downing Street, she ducked and dived, often avoiding premature confrontations that could provoke too powerful a working-class response.

She enjoyed one huge advantage that she inherited from her predecessors, the Labour prime minister Harold Wilson and, after him, Jim Callaghan. The Social Contract eventually failed, but it succeeded in integrating an increasingly bureaucratised layer of senior shop stewards into collaboration with management and the state.

This meant, for example, the bosses at the British Leyland car giant could move against one of the most powerful of these stewards. Derek Robinson, the convenor at the Longbridge plant in Birmingham, found himself cut off from the shop floor and was successfully victimised.

It also meant that sectionalism often trumped solidarity. This made it easier for Thatcher to isolate the epic miners’ strike of 1984-5.

But she was lucky as well. If Argentine armourers had put the right fuses in their bombs, most of the British battle fleet would have ended up on the floor of the South Atlantic and Thatcher would have had to resign in ignominy.

She was also fortunate in her enemies. This was true of her Labour opponents—first Michael Foot and then Neil Kinnock concealed increasingly right wing politics beneath a hot-air balloon of rhetoric.

Above all, it was true of the trade union leaders who to their eternal shame allowed the men and women of the mining communities fight on alone for a year. Militarised police squads occupied pit villages and Thatcher’s cronies organised a scab union, as despair and privation sapped the miners’ will to fight.

But there were moments when she could have been defeated—above all in July 1984, when an organised scabbing operation provoked a national dockers’ strike, and then again the same autumn, when the pit deputies (supervisors) threatened to walk out. On both occasions, trade union officialdom came to her rescue.

In the aftermath of this victory, Thatcher sought to radicalise her efforts to remodel Britain for the possessive individualism of the market. By the late 1980s she and her chancellor of the exchequer Nigel Lawson had engineered the first of the financial bubble-driven booms of the neoliberal era.

But, in the end, Thatcher overreached herself. Vaingloriously, in 1989-90 she imposed the poll tax, charging everyone from billionaires to paupers the same amount to finance local government.

Out of nowhere came a social explosion—the biggest riot London had seen since the 1930s and a mass movement of 14 million people refusing to pay the tax. Eventually self-preservation forced the Tories to expel from Thatcher from her bunker and to scrap the tax.

This is the most important lesson of Thatcher’s premiership. By chance she has died as an even greater assault on the welfare state than any she mounted is coming into force.

The best form of class revenge on Thatcher would be to build an even bigger social movement to break the coalition government and bury everything she stood for even deeper than her coffin will lie.

http://www.socialistworker.co.uk ... ass+warrior+is+dead






The official response—including of course that of the establishment media—to Margaret Thatcher’s death will seek to embalm her in “statesmanship”.

Those who remember what Thatcher did to the miners—and to many other working class communities—will prefer her immortalised as the poet Shelley did another Tory politician, Lord Castlereagh, after the Peterloo massacre in 1819: “I met murder on the way— / he had a mask like Castlereagh”.

For murder was Thatcher’s business. Sometimes the murder was metaphorical—of industries and communities. It still destroyed people’s lives.

Sometimes the murder was real. She oversaw the ongoing dirty war in Ireland. Thatcher’s callousness was on display also when she condemned Irish Republican hunger strikers to death rather than concede the recognition as political prisoners for which they were campaigning.

The 907 Argentine and British military personnel killed in the 1982 Falklands war would not have died if Thatcher hadn’t decided to take back an absurd colonial anomaly by force. Her legacy was continued British possession of the Malvinas that still poisons relations with Argentina.

Thatcher gloried in war. When her cabinet finally decided to remove her in November 1990, she pleaded to stay on as prime minister till the forthcoming war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was over.

Morally contemptible though Thatcher was, she could probably claim to be the last British political leader of world-historic importance. She came to office in May 1979 at a critical historical juncture.

The world economy was entering its second great recession that decade—evidence that the long boom of the 1950s and 1960s was well and truly over. Underlying the economic crisis was a sharp fall in the rate of profit on the capital compared to the last boom years.

Restoring profitability required forcing up the rate of exploitation for workers. But, particularly in Britain, the ruling class was caught between hammer and anvil. It faced a well organised, combative working class that had built up powerful rank and file workplace organisation during the boom.

Led by the miners and the dockers, the British workers’ movement had put paid to Thatcher’s Tory predecessor, Ted Heath, between 1972 and 1974. The great pay revolt of 1978-9, the “winter of discontent” that destroyed the Social Contract brought in after Heath by Labour, showed the enduring strength of this movement.

Before Thatcher won the 1979 general election, Thatcher had already branded herself as the “Iron Lady”, represented a much harsher and more combative form of ruling-class politics than had become common in the boom years. She disinterred free-market orthodoxies that had been buried with the Great Depression of the 1930s.

More than any other leading capitalist politician Thatcher pioneered what would soon come to be known as neoliberalism. She soon had an immensely powerful ally in the shape of the new right-wing Republican President of the United States, Ronald Reagan.

But Reagan faced a less powerful workers’ movement, and by the time he took office in January 1981 he could benefit from the impact of the brutal recession imposed by Paul Volcker, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, in October 1979.

Thatcher and her sycophants liked to praise her courage. In fact, particularly in her early years in Downing Street, she ducked and dived, often avoiding premature confrontations that could provoke too powerful a working-class response.

She enjoyed one huge advantage that she inherited from her predecessors, the Labour prime minister Harold Wilson and, after him, Jim Callaghan. The Social Contract eventually failed, but it succeeded in integrating an increasingly bureaucratised layer of senior shop stewards into collaboration with management and the state.

This meant, for example, the bosses at the British Leyland car giant could move against one of the most powerful of these stewards. Derek Robinson, the convenor at the Longbridge plant in Birmingham, found himself cut off from the shop floor and was successfully victimised.

It also meant that sectionalism often trumped solidarity. This made it easier for Thatcher to isolate the epic miners’ strike of 1984-5.

But she was lucky as well. If Argentine armourers had put the right fuses in their bombs, most of the British battle fleet would have ended up on the floor of the South Atlantic and Thatcher would have had to resign in ignominy.

She was also fortunate in her enemies. This was true of her Labour opponents—first Michael Foot and then Neil Kinnock concealed increasingly right wing politics beneath a hot-air balloon of rhetoric.

Above all, it was true of the trade union leaders who to their eternal shame allowed the men and women of the mining communities fight on alone for a year. Militarised police squads occupied pit villages and Thatcher’s cronies organised a scab union, as despair and privation sapped the miners’ will to fight.

But there were moments when she could have been defeated—above all in July 1984, when an organised scabbing operation provoked a national dockers’ strike, and then again the same autumn, when the pit deputies (supervisors) threatened to walk out. On both occasions, trade union officialdom came to her rescue.

In the aftermath of this victory, Thatcher sought to radicalise her efforts to remodel Britain for the possessive individualism of the market. By the late 1980s she and her chancellor of the exchequer Nigel Lawson had engineered the first of the financial bubble-driven booms of the neoliberal era.

But, in the end, Thatcher overreached herself. Vaingloriously, in 1989-90 she imposed the poll tax, charging everyone from billionaires to paupers the same amount to finance local government.

Out of nowhere came a social explosion—the biggest riot London had seen since the 1930s and a mass movement of 14 million people refusing to pay the tax. Eventually self-preservation forced the Tories to expel from Thatcher from her bunker and to scrap the tax.

This is the most important lesson of Thatcher’s premiership. By chance she has died as an even greater assault on the welfare state than any she mounted is coming into force.

The best form of class revenge on Thatcher would be to build an even bigger social movement to break the coalition government and bury everything she stood for even deeper than her coffin will lie.

http://www.socialistworker.co.uk ... ass+warrior+is+dead




Social Contract是啥东西?撒切尔对矿工开过枪吗?
Pinochet 发表于 2013-4-9 14:12
Social Contract是啥东西?撒切尔对矿工开过枪吗?
The Social Contract was a policy by the Labour government of Harold Wilson in 1970s Britain.

In return for the repeal of 1971 Industrial Relations Act, food subsides and a freeze on rent increase, the Trade Union Congress would be able to persuade its members to cooperate in a programme of voluntary wage restraint.

The Social Contract aimed to avoid the difficulty of former incomes policies, allowing the employers, who in nationalised industries were the state, to treat individual groups separately in wage negotiations. There would be 12-month interval between wage settlements to prevent repeated wage demands and allow the State some level of predictability in future wage expenses, and negotiated increases in wages should be confined either to compensating for inflation since the last settlement or for anticipated future price increases before the next settlement.

It was to be the foundation on which the Chancellor Denis Healey could introduce a stronger budget in order to control the high inflation and growing government spending of the era, which Edward Heath's previous government had failed to do.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Contract_(Britain)
Pinochet 发表于 2013-4-9 14:12
Social Contract是啥东西?撒切尔对矿工开过枪吗?
the security services were prepared to become involved, a pseudo-national police force was mooted and a tough chairman, Ian Macgrefor, was transferred from British Steel to manage the National Coal Board.

Brendan Evans Thatcherism and British Politics 1975-1999 pp.83
stresemann 发表于 2013-4-9 14:34
the security services were prepared to become involved, a pseudo-national police force was mooted  ...
但最终还是没有开是吧?
stresemann 发表于 2013-4-9 14:24
The Social Contract was a policy by the Labour government of Harold Wilson in 1970s Britain.

I ...
这样说撒切尔之前的英国政府已经开始逐手削减福利,控制工资涨幅了
Pinochet 发表于 2013-4-9 15:03
这样说撒切尔之前的英国政府已经开始逐手削减福利,控制工资涨幅了
当然

Wilson、Callaghan、英国工党和任何一个社会(民主)党一样,

都是资本主义秩序的忠实卫士。
Pinochet 发表于 2013-4-9 15:02
但最终还是没有开是吧?
这个有什么分别吗?难道不开枪就伟光正了?

何况callinicos也说了那“有时”是metaphorical
stresemann 发表于 2013-4-9 15:10
当然

Wilson、Callaghan、英国工党和任何一个社会(民主)党一样,
英国工党是不是一开始就是,而不是像欧洲那些社民党有个蜕变的过程?
Pinochet 发表于 2013-4-9 15:45
英国工党是不是一开始就是,而不是像欧洲那些社民党有个蜕变的过程?

英国工党本来就是有点混合的意思,工联主义和费边派都有,但“精英”一直掌控着……

英国工人的组织性是不如欧洲大陆的。

stresemann 发表于 2013-4-9 15:10
当然

Wilson、Callaghan、英国工党和任何一个社会(民主)党一样,
为何说social contract政策成功官僚化了工会高层以至于资本家能够成功开除不听话的工会代表?
Pinochet 发表于 2013-4-9 16:01
为何说social contract政策成功官僚化了工会高层以至于资本家能够成功开除不听话的工会代表?
英国工会的官僚化

是Social Contract的前提,不是结果。

很明显这个政策要求的就是工会官僚压制普通工人……
stresemann 发表于 2013-4-9 16:04
英国工会的官僚化

是Social Contract的前提,不是结果。
那为何social contract最终失败了撒切尔成功了?因为她比工党那帮更“强硬”?
Pinochet 发表于 2013-4-9 16:07
那为何social contract最终失败了撒切尔成功了?因为她比工党那帮更“强硬”?
当然如此。

工党毕竟以工会为政治、选举基础,当然不可能对工会太过强硬。

撒切尔在贯彻所谓“社会”亦即资产阶级秩序的“利益”方面当然要比工党强硬,


1950-1960年代,资本主义秩序需要吸收工人的时候当然工党和老式保守主义占上风

1970年代……