有人說美國軍備先進是因為製造商市場化，可以競爭，軍備 ...

有人說美國軍備先進是因為製造商市場化，可以競爭，軍備市場化真的好嗎？，看這個轉帖
h     ttp://puffinus.blog.163.com/blog/stat ic/178884029201 221581355998/
为什么大宗装备研发项目会失利？
Aviation Week 网络版上刊出了名为 Why Major Acquisition Programs Fail 的文章，分析了 MD 近些年来多个大宗装备现代化项目屡屡失利的原因，很有参考价值，将其核心内容引用并解释如下：

Here we find that seldom is it a matter of unexpected technical problems—indeed, often the reverse is true.

通常项目失利的原因并非未预见到的技术问题，真相往往恰恰相反。(啊哈，F-35 就是经典案例，早就有人指出三军通用是在自找麻烦)

"Most of the time, when unrealistic requirements are promulgated, there are numerous people who know that they are unrealistic, so it’s not a case of their being not fully understood.” The problem is that there are “incentives to promise to deliver revolutionary capabilities quickly at low cost.”

对于不切实际的性能，成本预期等要求一眼看穿的大有人在，问题是装备采购项目中存在着许多促使承包商夸大其辞，许诺以低廉成本提供革命性能力的动机。(抄近路，走捷径的幻想即使在技术经验丰富的MD国内也是大有市场啊，TG土地上指望能以“新概念”装备迅速赶超MD的人多如过江之鲫实在没有什么好奇怪的)



Its failure was a classic of the form. Since the Army was unsure of exactly what threats it would face—and was unwilling to step off of the procurement treadmill long enough to articulate a real strategy—it tried to develop of suite of systems that would work anywhere. In the end, the service was too vague in its requests, Boeing and its partners too ambitious in their promises, and, ultimately, $18 billion was spent with no lasting hardware to show for it by the time of its cancellation in 2009.

以MD陆军的波音 FCS  Future Combat Systems 项目为例，90 年代时的 MD 陆军对未来可能面对的威胁缺乏清晰的认识，所以试图研发能够包打天下的 “万能” 地面作战系统。陆军的要求太过模糊，而波音等承包商的牛皮吹得太大，180 亿美元砸下去后，FCS 于 2009 年无疾而终。



Yet, most military procurement systems reward companies that underestimate the cost of new programs. The first reward is winning the program, and the second is higher revenue as a result of overruns under development contracts that are cost-plus.

军事采购系统奖励低价钓鱼的公司。首先承包商靠低报价钓到了鱼，然后又能利用严重的费用超标赚取额外利润 (MD 的多数大宗装备项目签署的是 cost-plus 合同，上不封顶，军火商稳赚不赔，和毛子忽悠三哥的情形大同小异。MD的智库已经说得明明白白了，军火商吃的是资本主义大锅饭，没有什么真正的市场经济这回事)



Higher acquisition costs also drive company growth, as do higher-than-predicted operating costs, particularly this century as more maintenance work was outsourced to contractors.

装备采购和运作费用的上升驱动军火公司业绩的增长，在维护保养工作日趋外包化的今天，装备运作成本越高，军火商越有得赚。



Some of the same reasons for failure were defined by the U.K. National Audit Office (NAO) close to a decade ago. The NAO called it “the conspiracy of optimism.”

英国国家审计局近 10 年前得出了类似的结论，并将其称为 “乐观主义的阴谋”，大意如下：

Military planners—and it is overwhelmingly military planners—want to obtain a capability they cannot afford, or which is at the risky end of the spectrum. To avoid scaring those assessing or paying the bills, they either under-estimate how much it will cost, or they fudge the risk of the project, or both.

军方的计划制订者希望获得财政上无法负担，或风险极高的装备。为了避免吓得评估人员和掌握钱包的家伙们落荒而逃，计划制订者要么低估项目成本，要么虚报项目风险，或是在两方面同时撒谎。

The most recent poster child for the problem is the British aircraft carrier program. To make it acceptable to London, it was originally budgeted at ?2.8 billion ($4.4 billion) for two complete vessels in 2003-04. At the time, prime contractor BAE Systems opined that it was practically impossible to deliver for this cost. Then the official price rose to ?3.5 billion in 2007, ?5.2 billion in July 2010, and ?6.2 billion in October 2010.
以 “女皇” 级航母为例，为了钓政府的鱼，军方在 2003-2004 年间许诺能以 28 亿英镑完成两艘 6.5 万吨航母。主承包商 BAE 那时就明明白白地表示以这个价格造出两艘大甲板航母完全是不可能的。到 2007 年，军方的报价便涨到了 35 亿英镑，2010 年 7 月进一步上升至 52 亿英镑，同年 10 月则攀升到 62 亿英镑。有人說美國軍備先進是因為製造商市場化，可以競爭，軍備市場化真的好嗎？，看這個轉帖
h     ttp://puffinus.blog.163.com/blog/stat ic/178884029201 221581355998/
为什么大宗装备研发项目会失利？
Aviation Week 网络版上刊出了名为 Why Major Acquisition Programs Fail 的文章，分析了 MD 近些年来多个大宗装备现代化项目屡屡失利的原因，很有参考价值，将其核心内容引用并解释如下：

Here we find that seldom is it a matter of unexpected technical problems—indeed, often the reverse is true.

通常项目失利的原因并非未预见到的技术问题，真相往往恰恰相反。(啊哈，F-35 就是经典案例，早就有人指出三军通用是在自找麻烦)

"Most of the time, when unrealistic requirements are promulgated, there are numerous people who know that they are unrealistic, so it’s not a case of their being not fully understood.” The problem is that there are “incentives to promise to deliver revolutionary capabilities quickly at low cost.”

对于不切实际的性能，成本预期等要求一眼看穿的大有人在，问题是装备采购项目中存在着许多促使承包商夸大其辞，许诺以低廉成本提供革命性能力的动机。(抄近路，走捷径的幻想即使在技术经验丰富的MD国内也是大有市场啊，TG土地上指望能以“新概念”装备迅速赶超MD的人多如过江之鲫实在没有什么好奇怪的)



Its failure was a classic of the form. Since the Army was unsure of exactly what threats it would face—and was unwilling to step off of the procurement treadmill long enough to articulate a real strategy—it tried to develop of suite of systems that would work anywhere. In the end, the service was too vague in its requests, Boeing and its partners too ambitious in their promises, and, ultimately, $18 billion was spent with no lasting hardware to show for it by the time of its cancellation in 2009.

以MD陆军的波音 FCS  Future Combat Systems 项目为例，90 年代时的 MD 陆军对未来可能面对的威胁缺乏清晰的认识，所以试图研发能够包打天下的 “万能” 地面作战系统。陆军的要求太过模糊，而波音等承包商的牛皮吹得太大，180 亿美元砸下去后，FCS 于 2009 年无疾而终。



Yet, most military procurement systems reward companies that underestimate the cost of new programs. The first reward is winning the program, and the second is higher revenue as a result of overruns under development contracts that are cost-plus.

军事采购系统奖励低价钓鱼的公司。首先承包商靠低报价钓到了鱼，然后又能利用严重的费用超标赚取额外利润 (MD 的多数大宗装备项目签署的是 cost-plus 合同，上不封顶，军火商稳赚不赔，和毛子忽悠三哥的情形大同小异。MD的智库已经说得明明白白了，军火商吃的是资本主义大锅饭，没有什么真正的市场经济这回事)



Higher acquisition costs also drive company growth, as do higher-than-predicted operating costs, particularly this century as more maintenance work was outsourced to contractors.

装备采购和运作费用的上升驱动军火公司业绩的增长，在维护保养工作日趋外包化的今天，装备运作成本越高，军火商越有得赚。



Some of the same reasons for failure were defined by the U.K. National Audit Office (NAO) close to a decade ago. The NAO called it “the conspiracy of optimism.”

英国国家审计局近 10 年前得出了类似的结论，并将其称为 “乐观主义的阴谋”，大意如下：

Military planners—and it is overwhelmingly military planners—want to obtain a capability they cannot afford, or which is at the risky end of the spectrum. To avoid scaring those assessing or paying the bills, they either under-estimate how much it will cost, or they fudge the risk of the project, or both.

军方的计划制订者希望获得财政上无法负担，或风险极高的装备。为了避免吓得评估人员和掌握钱包的家伙们落荒而逃，计划制订者要么低估项目成本，要么虚报项目风险，或是在两方面同时撒谎。

The most recent poster child for the problem is the British aircraft carrier program. To make it acceptable to London, it was originally budgeted at ?2.8 billion ($4.4 billion) for two complete vessels in 2003-04. At the time, prime contractor BAE Systems opined that it was practically impossible to deliver for this cost. Then the official price rose to ?3.5 billion in 2007, ?5.2 billion in July 2010, and ?6.2 billion in October 2010.
以 “女皇” 级航母为例，为了钓政府的鱼，军方在 2003-2004 年间许诺能以 28 亿英镑完成两艘 6.5 万吨航母。主承包商 BAE 那时就明明白白地表示以这个价格造出两艘大甲板航母完全是不可能的。到 2007 年，军方的报价便涨到了 35 亿英镑，2010 年 7 月进一步上升至 52 亿英镑，同年 10 月则攀升到 62 亿英镑。