美国《外交事务》杂志翻译系列——中国崛起的盛名与现实 ...

原创翻译，《外交事务》原文链接http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ar ... ach-other?page=show

How China and Japan See Each Other

中日对视

By Chalmers Johnson

July 1972

1972年7月

Over the past century the politics of East Asia have been influenced more profoundly by the Sino-Japanese relationship than by any other single factor. Because both the two present-day societies have roots in classical Chinese civilization-only a "heritage" for each today-Chinese and Japanese politicians before World War II often argued that there was a special binding relationship between them. Japan's written language and much of its religious, artistic and moral civilization derive from Chinese culture, while Japan was the primary influence both positively and negatively on whole generations of Chinese revolutionaries, some of whom are still alive and active today. Perhaps because of this common heritage of civilization and mutual influence, the enormous misunderstandings, wars, threats and depredations that have characterized Sino-Japanese relations for a century have tended to take on the ferocity of a family or civil feud. Even though well-educated Chinese and Japanese can learn each other's language rather easily, it is doubtful whether any two peoples in the twentieth century have approached each other with more profoundly misleading stereotypes.

过去百年间东亚政局受中日关系影响最深。由于两国均植根于中国传统文明——现如今都只有遗迹残存——中日政治家们在二战前经常声称两家有着特殊的纽带关系。日本的文字和大部分的宗教、艺术、伦理都源于中国文化；日本则或正面或负面地影响着中国数代革命志士，有些依然在世或还很活跃。也许正是因为双方继承了共同的文明遗产且又相互影响，中日百年来的误解、战争、恐吓、劫掠常如萧蔷恶斗般凶狠怨毒。虽然中日知识分子可以轻松地学会对方的语言，但二十世纪中似乎没有哪两个民族在如此深的成见中进行交往。

Three specific historical occurrences continue to mold Chinese and Japanese attitudes toward each other, in addition to the broader pressures on the two nations of different ideologies and national interests. First, China and Japan reacted to the influence of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century in almost diametrically opposite ways: within a few decades after the Western intrusion Japan had accommodated herself to and incorporated modern technology, whereas China disintegrated as a social system and required a century before she could begin her own modernization under conditions of national unity. Second, prior to the First World War Japan served as an exemplar and model for many Chinese modernizers, a role that the Soviet Union took over after the Bolshevik Revolution; and just as in the case of the Sino-Soviet conflict, this earlier relationship has tended to color later antagonisms with feelings of ingratitude on the one hand and betrayal on the other. Third, Japan's ultimate betrayal, in the eyes of Chinese revolutionaries, was her military intervention in China between 1937 and 1945 in order to suppress by force the Chinese anti-imperialist nationalist movement-a savage crucible in which the Chinese Communist Party obtained a mass following as a result of its championing resistance to Japan.

中日两个拥有不同意识形态和利益的国家承受着来自国际大环境的压力，除此之外，三大历史事件持续地影响着中日对对方的态度。其一、两国在19世纪面对西方帝国主义有着截然不同的反应：在西方入侵数十年之内，日本委屈求全并接纳现代科技；中国社会则崩分离析，直到一个世纪之后才能在全国团结的条件下开始现代化进程。其二、在一战前，许多中国变革人士视日本为楷模和榜样，苏联在布尔什维克革命之后接任这一角色；正如同稍后的中苏冲突，中日这层关系为日后两国交恶蒙上了浓重的感情色彩——一方认为对方不知感恩，另一方则认为遭到背叛。其三、在中国革命者的眼里，最大的背叛莫过于1937至1945年日本为平息中国反日民族主义运动而实施的在华军事干预——在这场残酷的浩劫中，共产党因力主抗日受到大众拥戴。

Of these three elements, perhaps the first is of the greatest long-term significance. Pre-modern China and pre-modern Japan were sociologically quite different societies, and Western imperialist pressure impinged upon each of them in different ways. None the less both were similar enough- common Sinitic civilization, closed to foreign intercourse since the seventeenth century, and forced open by the West in the 1840s and 1850s-to cause members of each society to make invidious comparisons about the performance of the other in the face of common challenges. The Chinese, supremely confident of the superiority of their own culture, reacted with various anti-foreign movements until the end of the century, while the Japanese, after a brief experiment with anti-foreignisrn, gave it up as a lost cause and quickly modernized along Western lines.

这三大历史因素中，也许第一个有着最为深远的意义。近代中日在社会学上相当不同，而且西方帝国主义以不同的方式在两国身上施压。尽管如此，两者还是有很多共性，如汉语文化、17世纪以来的闭关锁国、在19世纪四、五十年代被西方强行打开国门等。在面对共同的挑战时，两个社会的成员以鄙夷的眼光打量着对方的表现。中国人对老祖宗的文明极其自负，将抗击外敌的运动一直进行到19世纪未；而日本人在短暂的挣扎之后，放弃无谓的抵抗，迅速师夷长技。

Among the humiliations suffered by the Chinese, none was more galling than the defeat in 1895 of the "Celestial Empire" (China) by the "Wa dwarfs" (Japanese, as seen by the Chinese), a defeat that resulted in the annexation of Taiwan into the Japanese Empire. The initial Chinese reaction to this defeat, which brought the first true Chinese revolutionary movements into being, was to blame their own inept government; and after 1895, thousands of Chinese students flocked to Japan to learn about the modern world. Over time and in light of Japan's subsequent development as an imperialist power in her own right, Chinese admiration of the Japanese modernization effort changed to a hatred of Japan, the quintessential imperialist villain who kept China weak in order to suck her dry.

在中国人所受的屈辱中，最为刻骨铭心的要数1895年天朝败于倭寇（译注：原文如此），台湾因此被割让给日本帝国。中国人对这一惨败的第一反应就是责怪无能的朝廷，首个真正意义的中国革命由此风起云涌。1895年后，数千名中国留学生蜂拥至日本学习了解现代社会。但随着日本帝国主义霸权的升腾，中国人对日本现代化的祟敬逐渐转化成痛恨——日本，一个置中国于贫弱以便将其榨干的帝国主义死敌。

China and Japan offer two of the clearest archetypes in the so-called third world of alternative responses to Western imperialism. Japan adopted the reformist strategy, grafting Western institutions onto her essentially feudal social structure, changing in subtle ways but at the same time maintaining a distinctive national identity and continuity with the past. China rejected reform, since it seemed to imply an unacceptable accommodation of Confucian culture with barbarian (uncivilized) mores, and was ultimately forced by implacable imperialist pressure to revolution-a revolution in which the traditional culture was to be totally dismantled and replaced with a new culture that could prevent the incessant foreign "humiliations" and restore a sense of national dignity. Reform and revolution remain the two broad alternatives open to the so-called "modernizing" nations; and Japan and China, the one perhaps the most reformist nation in modern history and the other the most revolutionary, exemplify the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy to other nations around the world and to each other.

中日两国提供了所谓第三世界应对西方强权的两大最为清晰的原型。日本采取了改革者的策略，将西方体制嫁接到本国的封建社会，潜移默化，但同时保持独特的国格和历史延续性。中国则拒绝改革，因为改革似乎意味着将儒家文化与蛮夷习俗进行不可接受的调和。中国最终在无情的帝国主义压力之下走向革命——日后，革命将完全击碎传统文化，能够抵御外辱和重铸国家尊严的新文化将取而代之。改革和革命是所谓＂正在现代化＂的国家面临的两条路，日本——或许是现代史上最曲型的改革国家，中国——最革命的国家，为世上其它国家以及对方展现了不同出路的利弊。

The attitudes that grew up along with these divergent histories persist to the present time and will have an important influence on any future process of Sino-Japanese reconciliation. To the Chinese the Japanese "economic miracle" is not only a threat; it is also an insult. Today the Chinese trade more with Japan than with any other nation, but they do not praise Japan for her economic success, nor do they appear willing to put Sino- Japanese economic coöperation on a stable long-term footing. For that matter, the Chinese do not display much in the way of understanding as to why Japan's economy continues to grow as fast as it does. Premier Chou En- lai argues that Japan's economic power is an inevitable precursor of remilitarization and imperialism, and the Chinese have not thus far shown the slightest willingness to adjust to the fact that Japan's GNP is infinitely greater than China's and will continue to be so for the indefinite future. By hammering away at the inevitability of "revived Japanese militarism" the Chinese may be setting up a self-fulfilling prophecy.

沿着这两条不同的历史轨迹形成的社会心态一直延续至今，并对未来中日和解进程具有重要影响。对于中国人来讲，日本的经济奇迹不但是一个威胁，也是一个羞辱。日本是中国最大的贸易伙伴，但中国人既不称赞日本在经济上的成功，似乎也不愿意将中日经济合作置于稳定、长期的基础之上。就此而言，中国人好像不理解为什么日本经济会如此快速地成长。周恩来总理认为日本的经济实力必将导致军国主义和帝国主义，到目前为止，中国人没有丝毫表示愿意适应日本经济无数倍于中国、并将无限期如此的现实。中国大力鼓吹＂日本必将重拾军国主义道路＂，有可能一语成谶。

The Japanese, on the other hand, seem to be befogged by an equally long- standing inability to take the Chinese seriously. It is perhaps not too far- fetched to describe Japanese attitudes toward their continental neighbors as somewhat comparable to the English or German industrialist's attitude toward an Italian or Spanish aristocrat recently gone into commerce. He admires, and is slightly intimidated by, the ancient cultural achievements to which his modern counterpart is heir, but he finds it almost impossible in the company board room to suggest seriously that the new boy might become a competitor or a threat. Japan today is interested in doing business with China but her interest in the China business is only a slight fraction of her interest in business generally, and Japanese commercial representatives seem quite willing to sign humiliating Chinese communiqués or other anti-Japanese pronouncements drafted by Peking in order to get what trade there is-presumably because Japanese do not take these Chinese pronouncements very seriously. The Japanese are much more concerned about the possibility that another nation might get ahead of them in the China trade than that the Chinese might compete with them successfully in the rest of Asia.

相对地，日本人似乎被长期以来对中国的轻视所麻痹。日本人对华态度有点像英德商人对待刚步入商界的意大利或西班牙贵族。对方祖上的荣光让他心存敬畏，但在公司董事会上，他始终难以相信这个新来的小子在日后有可能成为强劲的对手。日本如今有意到中国做生意，但在华利益不及日本总体经济利益的零头。日本商业代表们似乎挺乐意签署令人难堪的中国公报或其它由北京起草的反日文书，以换取对华贸易——或许是因为日本对此类声明根本无所谓。相比中国人可能有朝一日在全亚洲与其展开竞争，日本人更担心其他国家会捷足先登，在对华贸易上赢得先机。

Even Chinese nuclear weapons do not appear to have caused the Japanese to see China as a potential threat, even though the Japanese dislike atomic testing by anybody. One sign of this Japanese self-confidence vis-à-vis China is the underdeveloped state of Japanese research and training about the Chinese Revolution in the postwar era. Japan's academic and governmental specialists on Chinese communist developments are among the most knowledgeable in the world, but all of them complain of the relatively slight interest in scholarship on China among students and the Japanese public. Even when Chinese events reach the headlines, they are likely to be regarded as mere "news," and not as developments that might vitally affect Japan as a nation.

虽然日本不喜欢任何人进行核试验，但中国的核武器好像并没有促使日本人视其为潜在威胁。日本在中国面前自信满满还表现在日本人在战后对中国革命的研究不足。日本研究中共发展史的院校、政府专家们当属世上最为博学者，但他们毫无例外地报怨日本学生和大众对研究中国不感兴趣。即使中国事件登上报纸头条，日本人也将其视作普通新闻，而不是有可能影响日本的大事件。

None of this is to suggest that the major sources of tension between China and Japan are attitudinal and that there are no real problems. It is rather to point out that the Chinese tend to regard Japan, for good historical reasons, with the utmost suspicion, remembering how quickly the old samurai of the nineteenth century armed themselves with Western weapons and turned these against China. China's stereotypes of Japan seem to preclude a realistic Chinese assessment of how Japan has changed and of the ways in which she may change in the future, always coming back to the undertone of suspicion that Japan's achievements are likely to be at China's expense. Conversely, the Japanese regard the Chinese as still struggling with their interminable revolutions and are inclined to take the Chinese deadly seriously only when it looks as if the Chinese are about to form an alliance with a non-Asian power, say the Soviet Union or the United States, for that might greatly restrict Japan's freedom of access and maneuver in international commerce.

但这并不意味着紧张状况大多源于中日对立心态，或者中日之间并无真正的问题。基于历史上的原因，中国人牢记19世纪的日本武士是如何用洋人武器武装自己，转而进攻中国的，因此始终对日本人存有最大的戒心。由于对日本的成见，中国似乎不能现实地评价日本的现在已发生的以及未来的变化，动辄缩回到＂日本的成就很可能损及中国利益＂的戒备心态。
相反地，日本人认为中国永远处于没完没了的革命之中，他们只有在中国与亚洲以外的强权结交时才会提高警惕——比如中国与苏联或美国的交往有可能极大地限制日本在国际经济的自由运作空间。

The other two main historical influences affecting Sino-Japanese relations- Japan's erstwhile role as model and leader of an "Asian renaissance," and the second Sino-Japanese war-reinforce and provide sustenance for the deeper suspicions arising out of the two nations' differing responses to the West. From approximately 1895 down to the Treaty of Versailles, and persisting in an attenuated form until Japan's seizure of Manchuria in 1931, Chinese and Asian nationalists of many different political hues traveled to Tokyo to learn modern scientific culture and modern political ideas. During this period, Japan herself was wrestling with the problem of what kind of foreign policy she might appropriately pursue in the world. Should she use her newly acquired power to lead the rest of Asia toward independence and modernity? Or should she, having achieved the industrial underpinnings of great-power status, join the imperialists? Despite what one may think with the benefit of hindsight, the answer was not a foregone conclusion.

其它两大影响中日关系的历史因素（1、日本曾扮演过的亚洲复兴榜样和领导者角色；2、第二次中日战争）加重并维持了两国间因对西方入侵反应不同而产生的猜忌。从1895年到凡尔塞条约，直到1931年日本占领满洲，中国及其它国家各种政治色彩的民族主义者远渡东京学习现代科学和政治思潮。这一时期里，日本正在苦苦思索它应在国际舞台上采取什么样的外交政策。是利用新近获得的力量领导亚洲走向独立和现代化，还是在取得工业强国的地位后加入帝国主义的行列？不管后人如何马后炮，当时这个问题的答案并不是必然的。

Prior to the First World War (and Japan's discovery of how easy it was to step into the enclaves vacated by the then-distracted European imperialists), some Japanese gave considerable aid and assistance to Chinese revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen. Equally important, Japan herself provided the climate for political discussion and ideological exploration that was so essential to the education of revolutionary leaders. In fact, much of the contemporary Chinese vocabulary of politics- terms like anarchism, socialism, communism, nationalism, and so forth- entered the Chinese language from Japanese renderings of these European words. Even when the Japanese began to lean toward an imperialist rather than an Asian role, many Chinese tried to continue to work with them.

在一战之前（欧洲无暇顾及亚洲飞地，日本轻而易举地趁虚而入），一些日本人向孙中山等中国革命者提供了可观的资助和协助。同样重要的是，日本为政治讨论和意识形态探讨提供了一个环境，这些对培养革命领袖不可或缺。实际上，现代中国的许多词汇，如无政府主义、社会主义、共产主义、民族主义等等都是欧洲原词的日文翻译。即使是在日本开始抛弃亚洲领导权、倒向帝国主义之时，许多中国人仍试图与日本人合作。

Japan's progressive development from the Twenty-one Demands on China in 1915 to the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 ultimately filled all Chinese nationalists with enmity against Japan, a sentiment bolstered by fury against Japan's parvenu imperialism and betrayal of her fellow Asians. When, in the 1930s, the Japanese militarists tried to revive an anti- Western Asian nationalism led by Japan, they were too late. In Chinese eyes Japan was no longer Asian; it was imperialist, pure and simple.

日本从1915年《二十一条》一步步走到1931年侵占满洲，最终让中国民族主义者对其充满仇恨，而日本的暴发户式的帝国主义及对亚洲诸国的背叛更是火上浇油。20世纪30年代，日本军国主义者试图倡导反击西方的亚洲民族主义运动，但为时已晚。在中国人的眼里，日本不再属于亚洲，它完全是一个纯粹的帝国主义国家。

The Sino-Japanese War itself bred further animosities and hatreds that continue to influence perceptions today, but it would be wrong to interpret the war's influence solely in terms of its brutalities. The war's more lasting contribution was its cognitive or ideological structure. Virtually all adult Japanese acknowledge and wish to atone for Japan's military actions on the continent, but many fewer will agree that Japan was fighting for a totally worthless national cause. They recall that in the depression era of "economic nationalism" every area of East Asia from India to the Philippines, with the exception of China and Thailand, was a European or American colony and that Japan was threatened with being frozen out in each of these territories. When China, the last country open to Japanese economic activity, began to develop a powerful, quasi-Marxist, anti- imperialist, anti-Japanese social movement-one enjoying the sympathy and sometimes the encouragement of the United States-Japan reacted with panic. Fears of international isolation and of alliances that work against Japan's needs as a resource-poor, overpopulated, insular, industrial economy lay very close to the surface of the Japanese mind, as they still do today. It is one reason why the mentality of "Japan, Inc." and protectionism remain so powerful despite Japan's present global economic outreach.

中日战争滋生出更多的敌意与忿恨，时至今日还影响着人们的看法。但是，这场战争的影响力不能单以凶残程度来衡量，更深远的影响在于它的感知或意识形态结构。几乎所有的日本成年人承认并忏悔日本在亚洲大陆的军事行动，但鲜有人认为日本是为一个毫无价值的目标而战。日本人回忆起在＂经济民族主义＂大萧条时期，除中国和泰国外的所有亚洲国家都沦为欧美的殖民地，日本担心自己会被排挤出这些区域。中国是最后一个向日本打开经济大门的国家，当得到美国同情甚或鼓励的半马克思主义、反帝国主义、反日本的社会运动风起云涌时，日本仓惶间作出反应。在国际上受到孤立、被各联盟包抄是日本这个资源贫乏、人口密集的工业化岛国的一大心病，至今未变。这就解释了为什么今天的日本经济在全球开枝散叶，但＂日本公司＂的心理和保护主义依然十分盛行。

On the Chinese side, World War II tended irresistibly to recommend Marxist and especially Leninist modes of thought to Chinese nationalists, since the progress of Japan from feudalism to capitalism to imperialism seemed to be a compelling confirmation of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Even today, with the decline of ideological rigidity in the communist world and the Sino- Soviet schism, China continues to believe that there is something economically inevitable about Japan's being a menace to China, regardless of what Japanese (or representatives of other economically advanced nations) profess. Needless to say, Japan's postwar alliance with the United States and America's own deep postwar antagonism to the Chinese Communists did nothing to lessen the hold of this ideological cast of mind.

二战是向中国民族主义者推销马列主义的绝佳时机，尤其是日本从封建社会进化到资本主义再到帝国主义，印证了马列理论。即使在中苏决裂、共产阵营中思想教条有所松动的今天，中国仍相信：无论日本或其它发达国家如何表白，日本注定要成为心腹大患。毋须烦言，战后美日结盟以及美国对中共的敌意更加使中国坚定了这一想法。

Chinese communist ideology is a complex subject, and no suggestion is intended that Chinese ideology is unchanged or that it is the sole or primary influence on Chinese behavior in the world. Instead, I wish to stress that the heritage of World War II in Sino-Japanese relations has an ideological dimension-in addition to the legacy of war and killing-and that such set patterns of thinking may be more important in future contacts between China and Japan than other wartime memories. For example, Japan today has a vested interest in international stability, this being a prerequisite for the global commerce on which Japan depends and thrives. In order to secure this stability Japan is increasingly making available foreign aid to the established governments of such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand; and is opposed to revolutionary movements. How does China interpret these Japanese activities-say, economic aid to South Korea or to Thailand? Inevitably, the Chinese explain Japan's posture in ideological terms, as a reflection of the "capitalist-imperalist- reactionary syndrome." China does not and probably will not soon accept the legitimacy of Japan's close commercial and aid ties with the other nations of Asia.

中国共产主义意识形态是一个复杂的课题，但它不是一成不变的，也不是左右中国国际行为的主要或唯一的力量。相反地，笔者要指出：二战给中日关系留下的不只是战乱与杀戮，还有意识形态的层面；对于两国日后交往而言，这种模式化的思维方式或许要比战争回忆更为重要。比如，今天的日本希望世界局势稳定，以便于开展赖以生存的国际商事活动。为了营造安定的国际环境，日本逐步向印尼、马来西亚、泰国等提供外国援助，同时还反对革命运动。中国如何理解日本的外援活动？必然地，中国用意识形态术语来解释日本的姿态——＂资本主义—帝国主义—反动派综合症＂。中国不承认、可能也不会很快承认日本与亚洲其它国家商业和援助关系的合法性。

On the other hand, China's efforts to promote revolution throughout the third world strike Japanese as evidence of China's continuing communist- based hostility to nations such as Japan. China is not-yet-a stability- promoting force in the world, and this stance of China's directly conflicts with a basic Japanese national interest. The Japanese recall what happened to their important prewar China market under revolutionary conditions, and they are not the least bit reassured by the continued virulence of communist ideology on the mainland. In short, both China and Japan have good reasons to fear a recurrence of international conditions similar to those that existed in the 1930s; both nations' perceptions of such a possible recurrence are, however, colored by their respective ideological explanations of why such conditions ever came about in the first place.

另一方面，中国将革命推向整个第三世界的努力，在日本人看来证明了中国以共产主义为基础、持续地敌视日本之流。中国还不是世界格局中的稳定力量，这一立场与日本的基本国家利益直接冲突。日本人仍记得在大战前，日本重要的在华市场是怎样受到革命浪潮的冲击，目前在中国大陆横行的共产流毒岂能让他们安心？总之，中日双方皆有理由害怕国际局势重回30年代的状态；两国对30年代国际状态之所以能够产生的意识形态解释，将影响他们对这一可能回归的看法。

原创翻译，《外交事务》原文链接http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ar ... ach-other?page=show

How China and Japan See Each Other

中日对视

By Chalmers Johnson

July 1972

1972年7月

Over the past century the politics of East Asia have been influenced more profoundly by the Sino-Japanese relationship than by any other single factor. Because both the two present-day societies have roots in classical Chinese civilization-only a "heritage" for each today-Chinese and Japanese politicians before World War II often argued that there was a special binding relationship between them. Japan's written language and much of its religious, artistic and moral civilization derive from Chinese culture, while Japan was the primary influence both positively and negatively on whole generations of Chinese revolutionaries, some of whom are still alive and active today. Perhaps because of this common heritage of civilization and mutual influence, the enormous misunderstandings, wars, threats and depredations that have characterized Sino-Japanese relations for a century have tended to take on the ferocity of a family or civil feud. Even though well-educated Chinese and Japanese can learn each other's language rather easily, it is doubtful whether any two peoples in the twentieth century have approached each other with more profoundly misleading stereotypes.

过去百年间东亚政局受中日关系影响最深。由于两国均植根于中国传统文明——现如今都只有遗迹残存——中日政治家们在二战前经常声称两家有着特殊的纽带关系。日本的文字和大部分的宗教、艺术、伦理都源于中国文化；日本则或正面或负面地影响着中国数代革命志士，有些依然在世或还很活跃。也许正是因为双方继承了共同的文明遗产且又相互影响，中日百年来的误解、战争、恐吓、劫掠常如萧蔷恶斗般凶狠怨毒。虽然中日知识分子可以轻松地学会对方的语言，但二十世纪中似乎没有哪两个民族在如此深的成见中进行交往。

Three specific historical occurrences continue to mold Chinese and Japanese attitudes toward each other, in addition to the broader pressures on the two nations of different ideologies and national interests. First, China and Japan reacted to the influence of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century in almost diametrically opposite ways: within a few decades after the Western intrusion Japan had accommodated herself to and incorporated modern technology, whereas China disintegrated as a social system and required a century before she could begin her own modernization under conditions of national unity. Second, prior to the First World War Japan served as an exemplar and model for many Chinese modernizers, a role that the Soviet Union took over after the Bolshevik Revolution; and just as in the case of the Sino-Soviet conflict, this earlier relationship has tended to color later antagonisms with feelings of ingratitude on the one hand and betrayal on the other. Third, Japan's ultimate betrayal, in the eyes of Chinese revolutionaries, was her military intervention in China between 1937 and 1945 in order to suppress by force the Chinese anti-imperialist nationalist movement-a savage crucible in which the Chinese Communist Party obtained a mass following as a result of its championing resistance to Japan.

中日两个拥有不同意识形态和利益的国家承受着来自国际大环境的压力，除此之外，三大历史事件持续地影响着中日对对方的态度。其一、两国在19世纪面对西方帝国主义有着截然不同的反应：在西方入侵数十年之内，日本委屈求全并接纳现代科技；中国社会则崩分离析，直到一个世纪之后才能在全国团结的条件下开始现代化进程。其二、在一战前，许多中国变革人士视日本为楷模和榜样，苏联在布尔什维克革命之后接任这一角色；正如同稍后的中苏冲突，中日这层关系为日后两国交恶蒙上了浓重的感情色彩——一方认为对方不知感恩，另一方则认为遭到背叛。其三、在中国革命者的眼里，最大的背叛莫过于1937至1945年日本为平息中国反日民族主义运动而实施的在华军事干预——在这场残酷的浩劫中，共产党因力主抗日受到大众拥戴。

Of these three elements, perhaps the first is of the greatest long-term significance. Pre-modern China and pre-modern Japan were sociologically quite different societies, and Western imperialist pressure impinged upon each of them in different ways. None the less both were similar enough- common Sinitic civilization, closed to foreign intercourse since the seventeenth century, and forced open by the West in the 1840s and 1850s-to cause members of each society to make invidious comparisons about the performance of the other in the face of common challenges. The Chinese, supremely confident of the superiority of their own culture, reacted with various anti-foreign movements until the end of the century, while the Japanese, after a brief experiment with anti-foreignisrn, gave it up as a lost cause and quickly modernized along Western lines.

这三大历史因素中，也许第一个有着最为深远的意义。近代中日在社会学上相当不同，而且西方帝国主义以不同的方式在两国身上施压。尽管如此，两者还是有很多共性，如汉语文化、17世纪以来的闭关锁国、在19世纪四、五十年代被西方强行打开国门等。在面对共同的挑战时，两个社会的成员以鄙夷的眼光打量着对方的表现。中国人对老祖宗的文明极其自负，将抗击外敌的运动一直进行到19世纪未；而日本人在短暂的挣扎之后，放弃无谓的抵抗，迅速师夷长技。

Among the humiliations suffered by the Chinese, none was more galling than the defeat in 1895 of the "Celestial Empire" (China) by the "Wa dwarfs" (Japanese, as seen by the Chinese), a defeat that resulted in the annexation of Taiwan into the Japanese Empire. The initial Chinese reaction to this defeat, which brought the first true Chinese revolutionary movements into being, was to blame their own inept government; and after 1895, thousands of Chinese students flocked to Japan to learn about the modern world. Over time and in light of Japan's subsequent development as an imperialist power in her own right, Chinese admiration of the Japanese modernization effort changed to a hatred of Japan, the quintessential imperialist villain who kept China weak in order to suck her dry.

在中国人所受的屈辱中，最为刻骨铭心的要数1895年天朝败于倭寇（译注：原文如此），台湾因此被割让给日本帝国。中国人对这一惨败的第一反应就是责怪无能的朝廷，首个真正意义的中国革命由此风起云涌。1895年后，数千名中国留学生蜂拥至日本学习了解现代社会。但随着日本帝国主义霸权的升腾，中国人对日本现代化的祟敬逐渐转化成痛恨——日本，一个置中国于贫弱以便将其榨干的帝国主义死敌。

China and Japan offer two of the clearest archetypes in the so-called third world of alternative responses to Western imperialism. Japan adopted the reformist strategy, grafting Western institutions onto her essentially feudal social structure, changing in subtle ways but at the same time maintaining a distinctive national identity and continuity with the past. China rejected reform, since it seemed to imply an unacceptable accommodation of Confucian culture with barbarian (uncivilized) mores, and was ultimately forced by implacable imperialist pressure to revolution-a revolution in which the traditional culture was to be totally dismantled and replaced with a new culture that could prevent the incessant foreign "humiliations" and restore a sense of national dignity. Reform and revolution remain the two broad alternatives open to the so-called "modernizing" nations; and Japan and China, the one perhaps the most reformist nation in modern history and the other the most revolutionary, exemplify the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy to other nations around the world and to each other.

中日两国提供了所谓第三世界应对西方强权的两大最为清晰的原型。日本采取了改革者的策略，将西方体制嫁接到本国的封建社会，潜移默化，但同时保持独特的国格和历史延续性。中国则拒绝改革，因为改革似乎意味着将儒家文化与蛮夷习俗进行不可接受的调和。中国最终在无情的帝国主义压力之下走向革命——日后，革命将完全击碎传统文化，能够抵御外辱和重铸国家尊严的新文化将取而代之。改革和革命是所谓＂正在现代化＂的国家面临的两条路，日本——或许是现代史上最曲型的改革国家，中国——最革命的国家，为世上其它国家以及对方展现了不同出路的利弊。

The attitudes that grew up along with these divergent histories persist to the present time and will have an important influence on any future process of Sino-Japanese reconciliation. To the Chinese the Japanese "economic miracle" is not only a threat; it is also an insult. Today the Chinese trade more with Japan than with any other nation, but they do not praise Japan for her economic success, nor do they appear willing to put Sino- Japanese economic coöperation on a stable long-term footing. For that matter, the Chinese do not display much in the way of understanding as to why Japan's economy continues to grow as fast as it does. Premier Chou En- lai argues that Japan's economic power is an inevitable precursor of remilitarization and imperialism, and the Chinese have not thus far shown the slightest willingness to adjust to the fact that Japan's GNP is infinitely greater than China's and will continue to be so for the indefinite future. By hammering away at the inevitability of "revived Japanese militarism" the Chinese may be setting up a self-fulfilling prophecy.

沿着这两条不同的历史轨迹形成的社会心态一直延续至今，并对未来中日和解进程具有重要影响。对于中国人来讲，日本的经济奇迹不但是一个威胁，也是一个羞辱。日本是中国最大的贸易伙伴，但中国人既不称赞日本在经济上的成功，似乎也不愿意将中日经济合作置于稳定、长期的基础之上。就此而言，中国人好像不理解为什么日本经济会如此快速地成长。周恩来总理认为日本的经济实力必将导致军国主义和帝国主义，到目前为止，中国人没有丝毫表示愿意适应日本经济无数倍于中国、并将无限期如此的现实。中国大力鼓吹＂日本必将重拾军国主义道路＂，有可能一语成谶。

The Japanese, on the other hand, seem to be befogged by an equally long- standing inability to take the Chinese seriously. It is perhaps not too far- fetched to describe Japanese attitudes toward their continental neighbors as somewhat comparable to the English or German industrialist's attitude toward an Italian or Spanish aristocrat recently gone into commerce. He admires, and is slightly intimidated by, the ancient cultural achievements to which his modern counterpart is heir, but he finds it almost impossible in the company board room to suggest seriously that the new boy might become a competitor or a threat. Japan today is interested in doing business with China but her interest in the China business is only a slight fraction of her interest in business generally, and Japanese commercial representatives seem quite willing to sign humiliating Chinese communiqués or other anti-Japanese pronouncements drafted by Peking in order to get what trade there is-presumably because Japanese do not take these Chinese pronouncements very seriously. The Japanese are much more concerned about the possibility that another nation might get ahead of them in the China trade than that the Chinese might compete with them successfully in the rest of Asia.

相对地，日本人似乎被长期以来对中国的轻视所麻痹。日本人对华态度有点像英德商人对待刚步入商界的意大利或西班牙贵族。对方祖上的荣光让他心存敬畏，但在公司董事会上，他始终难以相信这个新来的小子在日后有可能成为强劲的对手。日本如今有意到中国做生意，但在华利益不及日本总体经济利益的零头。日本商业代表们似乎挺乐意签署令人难堪的中国公报或其它由北京起草的反日文书，以换取对华贸易——或许是因为日本对此类声明根本无所谓。相比中国人可能有朝一日在全亚洲与其展开竞争，日本人更担心其他国家会捷足先登，在对华贸易上赢得先机。

Even Chinese nuclear weapons do not appear to have caused the Japanese to see China as a potential threat, even though the Japanese dislike atomic testing by anybody. One sign of this Japanese self-confidence vis-à-vis China is the underdeveloped state of Japanese research and training about the Chinese Revolution in the postwar era. Japan's academic and governmental specialists on Chinese communist developments are among the most knowledgeable in the world, but all of them complain of the relatively slight interest in scholarship on China among students and the Japanese public. Even when Chinese events reach the headlines, they are likely to be regarded as mere "news," and not as developments that might vitally affect Japan as a nation.

虽然日本不喜欢任何人进行核试验，但中国的核武器好像并没有促使日本人视其为潜在威胁。日本在中国面前自信满满还表现在日本人在战后对中国革命的研究不足。日本研究中共发展史的院校、政府专家们当属世上最为博学者，但他们毫无例外地报怨日本学生和大众对研究中国不感兴趣。即使中国事件登上报纸头条，日本人也将其视作普通新闻，而不是有可能影响日本的大事件。

None of this is to suggest that the major sources of tension between China and Japan are attitudinal and that there are no real problems. It is rather to point out that the Chinese tend to regard Japan, for good historical reasons, with the utmost suspicion, remembering how quickly the old samurai of the nineteenth century armed themselves with Western weapons and turned these against China. China's stereotypes of Japan seem to preclude a realistic Chinese assessment of how Japan has changed and of the ways in which she may change in the future, always coming back to the undertone of suspicion that Japan's achievements are likely to be at China's expense. Conversely, the Japanese regard the Chinese as still struggling with their interminable revolutions and are inclined to take the Chinese deadly seriously only when it looks as if the Chinese are about to form an alliance with a non-Asian power, say the Soviet Union or the United States, for that might greatly restrict Japan's freedom of access and maneuver in international commerce.

但这并不意味着紧张状况大多源于中日对立心态，或者中日之间并无真正的问题。基于历史上的原因，中国人牢记19世纪的日本武士是如何用洋人武器武装自己，转而进攻中国的，因此始终对日本人存有最大的戒心。由于对日本的成见，中国似乎不能现实地评价日本的现在已发生的以及未来的变化，动辄缩回到＂日本的成就很可能损及中国利益＂的戒备心态。
相反地，日本人认为中国永远处于没完没了的革命之中，他们只有在中国与亚洲以外的强权结交时才会提高警惕——比如中国与苏联或美国的交往有可能极大地限制日本在国际经济的自由运作空间。

The other two main historical influences affecting Sino-Japanese relations- Japan's erstwhile role as model and leader of an "Asian renaissance," and the second Sino-Japanese war-reinforce and provide sustenance for the deeper suspicions arising out of the two nations' differing responses to the West. From approximately 1895 down to the Treaty of Versailles, and persisting in an attenuated form until Japan's seizure of Manchuria in 1931, Chinese and Asian nationalists of many different political hues traveled to Tokyo to learn modern scientific culture and modern political ideas. During this period, Japan herself was wrestling with the problem of what kind of foreign policy she might appropriately pursue in the world. Should she use her newly acquired power to lead the rest of Asia toward independence and modernity? Or should she, having achieved the industrial underpinnings of great-power status, join the imperialists? Despite what one may think with the benefit of hindsight, the answer was not a foregone conclusion.

其它两大影响中日关系的历史因素（1、日本曾扮演过的亚洲复兴榜样和领导者角色；2、第二次中日战争）加重并维持了两国间因对西方入侵反应不同而产生的猜忌。从1895年到凡尔塞条约，直到1931年日本占领满洲，中国及其它国家各种政治色彩的民族主义者远渡东京学习现代科学和政治思潮。这一时期里，日本正在苦苦思索它应在国际舞台上采取什么样的外交政策。是利用新近获得的力量领导亚洲走向独立和现代化，还是在取得工业强国的地位后加入帝国主义的行列？不管后人如何马后炮，当时这个问题的答案并不是必然的。

Prior to the First World War (and Japan's discovery of how easy it was to step into the enclaves vacated by the then-distracted European imperialists), some Japanese gave considerable aid and assistance to Chinese revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen. Equally important, Japan herself provided the climate for political discussion and ideological exploration that was so essential to the education of revolutionary leaders. In fact, much of the contemporary Chinese vocabulary of politics- terms like anarchism, socialism, communism, nationalism, and so forth- entered the Chinese language from Japanese renderings of these European words. Even when the Japanese began to lean toward an imperialist rather than an Asian role, many Chinese tried to continue to work with them.

在一战之前（欧洲无暇顾及亚洲飞地，日本轻而易举地趁虚而入），一些日本人向孙中山等中国革命者提供了可观的资助和协助。同样重要的是，日本为政治讨论和意识形态探讨提供了一个环境，这些对培养革命领袖不可或缺。实际上，现代中国的许多词汇，如无政府主义、社会主义、共产主义、民族主义等等都是欧洲原词的日文翻译。即使是在日本开始抛弃亚洲领导权、倒向帝国主义之时，许多中国人仍试图与日本人合作。

Japan's progressive development from the Twenty-one Demands on China in 1915 to the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 ultimately filled all Chinese nationalists with enmity against Japan, a sentiment bolstered by fury against Japan's parvenu imperialism and betrayal of her fellow Asians. When, in the 1930s, the Japanese militarists tried to revive an anti- Western Asian nationalism led by Japan, they were too late. In Chinese eyes Japan was no longer Asian; it was imperialist, pure and simple.

日本从1915年《二十一条》一步步走到1931年侵占满洲，最终让中国民族主义者对其充满仇恨，而日本的暴发户式的帝国主义及对亚洲诸国的背叛更是火上浇油。20世纪30年代，日本军国主义者试图倡导反击西方的亚洲民族主义运动，但为时已晚。在中国人的眼里，日本不再属于亚洲，它完全是一个纯粹的帝国主义国家。

The Sino-Japanese War itself bred further animosities and hatreds that continue to influence perceptions today, but it would be wrong to interpret the war's influence solely in terms of its brutalities. The war's more lasting contribution was its cognitive or ideological structure. Virtually all adult Japanese acknowledge and wish to atone for Japan's military actions on the continent, but many fewer will agree that Japan was fighting for a totally worthless national cause. They recall that in the depression era of "economic nationalism" every area of East Asia from India to the Philippines, with the exception of China and Thailand, was a European or American colony and that Japan was threatened with being frozen out in each of these territories. When China, the last country open to Japanese economic activity, began to develop a powerful, quasi-Marxist, anti- imperialist, anti-Japanese social movement-one enjoying the sympathy and sometimes the encouragement of the United States-Japan reacted with panic. Fears of international isolation and of alliances that work against Japan's needs as a resource-poor, overpopulated, insular, industrial economy lay very close to the surface of the Japanese mind, as they still do today. It is one reason why the mentality of "Japan, Inc." and protectionism remain so powerful despite Japan's present global economic outreach.

中日战争滋生出更多的敌意与忿恨，时至今日还影响着人们的看法。但是，这场战争的影响力不能单以凶残程度来衡量，更深远的影响在于它的感知或意识形态结构。几乎所有的日本成年人承认并忏悔日本在亚洲大陆的军事行动，但鲜有人认为日本是为一个毫无价值的目标而战。日本人回忆起在＂经济民族主义＂大萧条时期，除中国和泰国外的所有亚洲国家都沦为欧美的殖民地，日本担心自己会被排挤出这些区域。中国是最后一个向日本打开经济大门的国家，当得到美国同情甚或鼓励的半马克思主义、反帝国主义、反日本的社会运动风起云涌时，日本仓惶间作出反应。在国际上受到孤立、被各联盟包抄是日本这个资源贫乏、人口密集的工业化岛国的一大心病，至今未变。这就解释了为什么今天的日本经济在全球开枝散叶，但＂日本公司＂的心理和保护主义依然十分盛行。

On the Chinese side, World War II tended irresistibly to recommend Marxist and especially Leninist modes of thought to Chinese nationalists, since the progress of Japan from feudalism to capitalism to imperialism seemed to be a compelling confirmation of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Even today, with the decline of ideological rigidity in the communist world and the Sino- Soviet schism, China continues to believe that there is something economically inevitable about Japan's being a menace to China, regardless of what Japanese (or representatives of other economically advanced nations) profess. Needless to say, Japan's postwar alliance with the United States and America's own deep postwar antagonism to the Chinese Communists did nothing to lessen the hold of this ideological cast of mind.

二战是向中国民族主义者推销马列主义的绝佳时机，尤其是日本从封建社会进化到资本主义再到帝国主义，印证了马列理论。即使在中苏决裂、共产阵营中思想教条有所松动的今天，中国仍相信：无论日本或其它发达国家如何表白，日本注定要成为心腹大患。毋须烦言，战后美日结盟以及美国对中共的敌意更加使中国坚定了这一想法。

Chinese communist ideology is a complex subject, and no suggestion is intended that Chinese ideology is unchanged or that it is the sole or primary influence on Chinese behavior in the world. Instead, I wish to stress that the heritage of World War II in Sino-Japanese relations has an ideological dimension-in addition to the legacy of war and killing-and that such set patterns of thinking may be more important in future contacts between China and Japan than other wartime memories. For example, Japan today has a vested interest in international stability, this being a prerequisite for the global commerce on which Japan depends and thrives. In order to secure this stability Japan is increasingly making available foreign aid to the established governments of such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand; and is opposed to revolutionary movements. How does China interpret these Japanese activities-say, economic aid to South Korea or to Thailand? Inevitably, the Chinese explain Japan's posture in ideological terms, as a reflection of the "capitalist-imperalist- reactionary syndrome." China does not and probably will not soon accept the legitimacy of Japan's close commercial and aid ties with the other nations of Asia.

中国共产主义意识形态是一个复杂的课题，但它不是一成不变的，也不是左右中国国际行为的主要或唯一的力量。相反地，笔者要指出：二战给中日关系留下的不只是战乱与杀戮，还有意识形态的层面；对于两国日后交往而言，这种模式化的思维方式或许要比战争回忆更为重要。比如，今天的日本希望世界局势稳定，以便于开展赖以生存的国际商事活动。为了营造安定的国际环境，日本逐步向印尼、马来西亚、泰国等提供外国援助，同时还反对革命运动。中国如何理解日本的外援活动？必然地，中国用意识形态术语来解释日本的姿态——＂资本主义—帝国主义—反动派综合症＂。中国不承认、可能也不会很快承认日本与亚洲其它国家商业和援助关系的合法性。

On the other hand, China's efforts to promote revolution throughout the third world strike Japanese as evidence of China's continuing communist- based hostility to nations such as Japan. China is not-yet-a stability- promoting force in the world, and this stance of China's directly conflicts with a basic Japanese national interest. The Japanese recall what happened to their important prewar China market under revolutionary conditions, and they are not the least bit reassured by the continued virulence of communist ideology on the mainland. In short, both China and Japan have good reasons to fear a recurrence of international conditions similar to those that existed in the 1930s; both nations' perceptions of such a possible recurrence are, however, colored by their respective ideological explanations of why such conditions ever came about in the first place.

另一方面，中国将革命推向整个第三世界的努力，在日本人看来证明了中国以共产主义为基础、持续地敌视日本之流。中国还不是世界格局中的稳定力量，这一立场与日本的基本国家利益直接冲突。日本人仍记得在大战前，日本重要的在华市场是怎样受到革命浪潮的冲击，目前在中国大陆横行的共产流毒岂能让他们安心？总之，中日双方皆有理由害怕国际局势重回30年代的状态；两国对30年代国际状态之所以能够产生的意识形态解释，将影响他们对这一可能回归的看法。