超级军网原创:晒一晒我大学几年写的论文,请各位历史帝政治帝指点
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大学四年了,因为是文科所以基本上都在写论文.从一年级写到现在, 在电脑里也攒下了不少. 回头看一看感觉水平还是有一个逐渐提高的过程的,分数也有高有低, 70多到90多都拿过. 这里拿出来请各位评点评点.
文章都是用鸟语写的,不懂鸟语的等翻译吧...
第一个:东德政权崩溃的思考
Regime change throughout history were often accompanied by bloody revolts and armed insurrections. Rarely has an authoritarian government ceded power in such a peaceful and orderly manner as was the case with German Democratic Republic (GDR). Compared to past experiences and that of contemporary non-European states, Germany’s democratization success was a product of its higher level of political maturity, combined with a coincidental aid of international trend that eventually brought down a regime that could only rely on force and secrecy to maintain power.
The “revolution” of 1989 differed from many previous regime changes occurred throughout Continental Europe in several ways. First, it was not triggered by a “catastrophic” event, as World War I was in the context of Russian and German Revolution. Secondly, the living standard of GDR citizens were arguably better off in 1989 compared to that of 1953, in contrast to most other revolutionary events that were often preceded by a period of economic stagnation resulting in tremendous institutional distress. Thirdly, the mutiny of the GDR citizens did not feature a violent class struggle characteristic of the bourgeoisie and proletariat uprisings witnessed throughout the19th and early 20th century. And lastly, the role of the military in the process of this event was relatively minor compared to past experiences. These elements reflected encouraging results of political maturation in that it consolidated a rational approach to the political movement and thus formulated the necessary ground for democratization. At the same time, GDR also embodied similar traits as did other European states in the past that experienced regime change: the government’s institutional authority was severely weakened, its rigid governing apparatus was outgrown by the rapidly developing civil society, and its central leadership became fragmented and indecisive in the face of crisis. While the expanding civil networks in the GDR throughout the 80s seemed to have remained under government control, it would prove to be a key contributor to the regime’s final undoing when the condition was ripe for a revolt. Together these elements facilitated one of the most successful cases of regime change without bloodshed.
Political system, by which a society is to be governed, must modify itself in correspondence to the changes of society in order to maintain its function and legitimacy. The demise of GDR was in some way a radical manifestation of such principle due to the SED’s ineptitude to readapt to the changing social condition in the country. Instead of seeking internal reform to better address the needs of the society, the SED chose to suppress dissenting elements through various means provided by its monopoly over the state’s institutions and resources. In essence, its strategy was to foster a socio-political paradigm in which the people were either coerced or subconsciously led into complicity with the regime. While the first major challenge to the GDR in June 1953 required the harsh intervention of Soviet military, including the use of armoured units, the SED’s have gradually distanced itself from overt use of armed oppression and replaced it with more subtle but systematic social construct. (Maier, 15) The SED endeavoured to “normalize” its modus operandi by establishing a social order in which complicity with the regime was the norm. Use of force was rare precisely because the government’s ability to sanction such measure; it created an intellectual boundary in which oppositional political discourse was confined. This decree was also complemented by the secretive presence of Stasi, the role of which overtime have become more of a psychological deterrence upon dissenters rather than an instrument of blatant mass persecution like the NKVD and Gestapo. Its main goal was to establish deterrence through secrecy and perceived transparency of the people’s private sphere, even for the SED members at a lower level. (Kiep) Perhaps an even more symbolic figure of repression was the Berlin Wall, which served not only as physical but also psychological boundaries for the citizens of GDR. These institutional settings gradually fostered a condition in which people complied with the SED not out of fear, but rather a subconscious recognition of the limits which it must not traverse. It was within this framework that the SED was able to manipulate the system to create individual incentives for obedience by rewarding those who were loyal to the regime with privileges that were otherwise inaccessible to them. (Maier, 43)
But these governing strategies had their fundamental shortcomings as well. While the aforementioned policies and institutions might have created restrictive boundaries for the society, it could not effectively control the development of society within that boundary. The SED began to encounter growing level of social complexity which they were not ready to deal with, thus created power vacuums for its dissenters to exploit. As mentioned above, the political structure under which GDR was governed for three decades was too rigid, but it had little incentive for change since much of the potential challenges brought about by increased social complexity were either suppressed by state apparatus, or too fragmented to carry any political weight. Consequently, over the years the SED grew increasingly detached from the society, believing that it could address the wide scope of social issues within the context of a simple binary opposition between obedience and dissention. Naturally such approach emphasized heavily on the use of secret police and other state apparatus to maintain control, while honest attempts at improving method of governance was marginalized. Once it discovered that it can no longer keep social discontent under water through duress and enticement, the window of opportunity for reform had already been closed. This was not only true for the political and social sphere, but also economic. Despite having outperformed most of its communist neighbours, the GDR suffered from debt issue, environmental degradation, and lack of modern production methods. To tackle these problems would necessitate at least a partial subversion of the socialist ideology by which SED had governed, as was the choice made by Gorbachev and Deng. However, the SED refused to take such risks, mainly due to their obsessive concern for legitimacy and overreliance on isolation to maintain control.
One must not overlook the role of the SED leadership in its own downfall, for its lack of competence was typical of regimes that were nearing its end. To some extent, the leadership deficit had already taken its toll on the regime when it refused to make the difficult decision to actively diffuse various social challenges. When confronted with these issues the regime’s approach were mostly passive and even apathetic. It simply resorted to a politically expedient solution of temporarily suppressing dissent or conceal the truth about the country’s real condition, and hoped to drag on the problem for as long as possible. This was most evident in the SED’s treatment of the country’s debt issues, among others, when the government simply concealed the data from the public. (Maier, 60) Such measures were not a result of the leadership’s lack of awareness of the mounting problems they faced, but rather a combination of short-sightedness and lack of motivation to rally in favour of a difficult but necessary policy.
When the Hungarian government opened border crossing to the west for the citizens of GDR, it had in effect punched a hole in the SED’s fragile system of suppression. (Maier, 120) The inner pressure that had built up over time was suddenly released. The GDR citizens’ mass exodus was a clear indication of their strong disapproval of the regime. The sources of all the public outrage demonstrated against the SED in autumn 1989 can be traced back to the days when the regime was still ostensibly stable. The sudden realization that change is achievable shattered the collective complacency which kept the people from revolting against the government for decades. In light of such opportunity the fragmented social forces quickly mobilized through networks that were previously thought to be apolitical, among the best examples is the protestant church in Leipzig. (Curry, 2009) It was much easier to conclude after the fact that by 1989, the maturity of GDR’s civil society was largely underestimated. It was able to rally dissenting factions together through channels of social network that were tolerated by the SED because they were thought to be harmless. Meanwhile, the SED leadership was thrown into disarray as their entire regime security mechanism collapsed. They were now forced back to the same situation as they once struggled with in June 17th 1953, but this time without Soviet support. The regime will be haunted by its lack of resolve for one last time, fortunately so, and hesitated to make the gamble of armed suppression. When the military stood down as the Berlin Wall was torn apart, it had in effect pronounced the death of communism in Germany.
Though the effort to end communist rule in Germany may seem to have begun only in autumn of 1989, the social condition for this dramatic turn of event was long in the making. Notwithstanding the SED’s attempt to retain control, their approach was fundamentally flawed in its neglect of the need for change. As the government failed to act on social issues it left room for civil society to develop its own solutions and in effect became increasingly autonomous. While the people were largely complicit, they only remained so believing that there were no other alternative. As a result, when this psychological barrier was removed, the previously fragmented social forces inside GDR were finally able to rally together against the government.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Maier, Charles. Dissolution, The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany. New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 1997
Curry, Andrew. “Before the Fall”. Wilson Quarterly. 20091001. Vol. 33, Issue 4.
Kiepe, Jan. “Nationalism as a Heavy Mortgage: SED Cadres Actions between Demand and Reality “, Nationalities Papers. Vol. 37, Issue 4.
大学四年了,因为是文科所以基本上都在写论文.从一年级写到现在, 在电脑里也攒下了不少. 回头看一看感觉水平还是有一个逐渐提高的过程的,分数也有高有低, 70多到90多都拿过. 这里拿出来请各位评点评点.
文章都是用鸟语写的,不懂鸟语的等翻译吧...
第一个:东德政权崩溃的思考
Regime change throughout history were often accompanied by bloody revolts and armed insurrections. Rarely has an authoritarian government ceded power in such a peaceful and orderly manner as was the case with German Democratic Republic (GDR). Compared to past experiences and that of contemporary non-European states, Germany’s democratization success was a product of its higher level of political maturity, combined with a coincidental aid of international trend that eventually brought down a regime that could only rely on force and secrecy to maintain power.
The “revolution” of 1989 differed from many previous regime changes occurred throughout Continental Europe in several ways. First, it was not triggered by a “catastrophic” event, as World War I was in the context of Russian and German Revolution. Secondly, the living standard of GDR citizens were arguably better off in 1989 compared to that of 1953, in contrast to most other revolutionary events that were often preceded by a period of economic stagnation resulting in tremendous institutional distress. Thirdly, the mutiny of the GDR citizens did not feature a violent class struggle characteristic of the bourgeoisie and proletariat uprisings witnessed throughout the19th and early 20th century. And lastly, the role of the military in the process of this event was relatively minor compared to past experiences. These elements reflected encouraging results of political maturation in that it consolidated a rational approach to the political movement and thus formulated the necessary ground for democratization. At the same time, GDR also embodied similar traits as did other European states in the past that experienced regime change: the government’s institutional authority was severely weakened, its rigid governing apparatus was outgrown by the rapidly developing civil society, and its central leadership became fragmented and indecisive in the face of crisis. While the expanding civil networks in the GDR throughout the 80s seemed to have remained under government control, it would prove to be a key contributor to the regime’s final undoing when the condition was ripe for a revolt. Together these elements facilitated one of the most successful cases of regime change without bloodshed.
Political system, by which a society is to be governed, must modify itself in correspondence to the changes of society in order to maintain its function and legitimacy. The demise of GDR was in some way a radical manifestation of such principle due to the SED’s ineptitude to readapt to the changing social condition in the country. Instead of seeking internal reform to better address the needs of the society, the SED chose to suppress dissenting elements through various means provided by its monopoly over the state’s institutions and resources. In essence, its strategy was to foster a socio-political paradigm in which the people were either coerced or subconsciously led into complicity with the regime. While the first major challenge to the GDR in June 1953 required the harsh intervention of Soviet military, including the use of armoured units, the SED’s have gradually distanced itself from overt use of armed oppression and replaced it with more subtle but systematic social construct. (Maier, 15) The SED endeavoured to “normalize” its modus operandi by establishing a social order in which complicity with the regime was the norm. Use of force was rare precisely because the government’s ability to sanction such measure; it created an intellectual boundary in which oppositional political discourse was confined. This decree was also complemented by the secretive presence of Stasi, the role of which overtime have become more of a psychological deterrence upon dissenters rather than an instrument of blatant mass persecution like the NKVD and Gestapo. Its main goal was to establish deterrence through secrecy and perceived transparency of the people’s private sphere, even for the SED members at a lower level. (Kiep) Perhaps an even more symbolic figure of repression was the Berlin Wall, which served not only as physical but also psychological boundaries for the citizens of GDR. These institutional settings gradually fostered a condition in which people complied with the SED not out of fear, but rather a subconscious recognition of the limits which it must not traverse. It was within this framework that the SED was able to manipulate the system to create individual incentives for obedience by rewarding those who were loyal to the regime with privileges that were otherwise inaccessible to them. (Maier, 43)
But these governing strategies had their fundamental shortcomings as well. While the aforementioned policies and institutions might have created restrictive boundaries for the society, it could not effectively control the development of society within that boundary. The SED began to encounter growing level of social complexity which they were not ready to deal with, thus created power vacuums for its dissenters to exploit. As mentioned above, the political structure under which GDR was governed for three decades was too rigid, but it had little incentive for change since much of the potential challenges brought about by increased social complexity were either suppressed by state apparatus, or too fragmented to carry any political weight. Consequently, over the years the SED grew increasingly detached from the society, believing that it could address the wide scope of social issues within the context of a simple binary opposition between obedience and dissention. Naturally such approach emphasized heavily on the use of secret police and other state apparatus to maintain control, while honest attempts at improving method of governance was marginalized. Once it discovered that it can no longer keep social discontent under water through duress and enticement, the window of opportunity for reform had already been closed. This was not only true for the political and social sphere, but also economic. Despite having outperformed most of its communist neighbours, the GDR suffered from debt issue, environmental degradation, and lack of modern production methods. To tackle these problems would necessitate at least a partial subversion of the socialist ideology by which SED had governed, as was the choice made by Gorbachev and Deng. However, the SED refused to take such risks, mainly due to their obsessive concern for legitimacy and overreliance on isolation to maintain control.
One must not overlook the role of the SED leadership in its own downfall, for its lack of competence was typical of regimes that were nearing its end. To some extent, the leadership deficit had already taken its toll on the regime when it refused to make the difficult decision to actively diffuse various social challenges. When confronted with these issues the regime’s approach were mostly passive and even apathetic. It simply resorted to a politically expedient solution of temporarily suppressing dissent or conceal the truth about the country’s real condition, and hoped to drag on the problem for as long as possible. This was most evident in the SED’s treatment of the country’s debt issues, among others, when the government simply concealed the data from the public. (Maier, 60) Such measures were not a result of the leadership’s lack of awareness of the mounting problems they faced, but rather a combination of short-sightedness and lack of motivation to rally in favour of a difficult but necessary policy.
When the Hungarian government opened border crossing to the west for the citizens of GDR, it had in effect punched a hole in the SED’s fragile system of suppression. (Maier, 120) The inner pressure that had built up over time was suddenly released. The GDR citizens’ mass exodus was a clear indication of their strong disapproval of the regime. The sources of all the public outrage demonstrated against the SED in autumn 1989 can be traced back to the days when the regime was still ostensibly stable. The sudden realization that change is achievable shattered the collective complacency which kept the people from revolting against the government for decades. In light of such opportunity the fragmented social forces quickly mobilized through networks that were previously thought to be apolitical, among the best examples is the protestant church in Leipzig. (Curry, 2009) It was much easier to conclude after the fact that by 1989, the maturity of GDR’s civil society was largely underestimated. It was able to rally dissenting factions together through channels of social network that were tolerated by the SED because they were thought to be harmless. Meanwhile, the SED leadership was thrown into disarray as their entire regime security mechanism collapsed. They were now forced back to the same situation as they once struggled with in June 17th 1953, but this time without Soviet support. The regime will be haunted by its lack of resolve for one last time, fortunately so, and hesitated to make the gamble of armed suppression. When the military stood down as the Berlin Wall was torn apart, it had in effect pronounced the death of communism in Germany.
Though the effort to end communist rule in Germany may seem to have begun only in autumn of 1989, the social condition for this dramatic turn of event was long in the making. Notwithstanding the SED’s attempt to retain control, their approach was fundamentally flawed in its neglect of the need for change. As the government failed to act on social issues it left room for civil society to develop its own solutions and in effect became increasingly autonomous. While the people were largely complicit, they only remained so believing that there were no other alternative. As a result, when this psychological barrier was removed, the previously fragmented social forces inside GDR were finally able to rally together against the government.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Maier, Charles. Dissolution, The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany. New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 1997
Curry, Andrew. “Before the Fall”. Wilson Quarterly. 20091001. Vol. 33, Issue 4.
Kiepe, Jan. “Nationalism as a Heavy Mortgage: SED Cadres Actions between Demand and Reality “, Nationalities Papers. Vol. 37, Issue 4.
人口数据运用与资本主义发展
Demography as a discipline emerged only after the beginning of industrial revolution. While production and interpretation of demographic knowledge may seem of little importance since it does not actively limit the conduct of an individual with the force of law. Its function within the framework of state governance was irreplaceable given the critical success state governments have had in wielding it as a tool of control over the population. This represents the rise of a new form of power designed not to instil fear, but conformity and obedience that are ostensibly voluntary but is in fact guided by the will of the state.
The need to exercise such control on the population largely derived from the state’s need to maintain a social mechanism in which individuals, for whatever purpose, is a vital component. The form and substance of this exertion of state power also varies in correspondence to the specific mechanisms it intends to support. Nevertheless, in the modern industrial age, where men and machine become increasingly inseparable, knowledge about the population and each individual is viewed as an important means of control. Demography is in essence the “economy of human beings”. It focuses on the study of the people for the purpose of optimizing their output capacity as individual production units and as a part of a social order that emphasizes efficiency. Production and interpretation of demographic knowledge cannot be viewed in isolation from other aspects of state governance. Nonetheless it is a critical junction of power that enabled the functioning of institutions which made a new modality of dominance over individual human beings possible. Demography expanded the ability of the state to understand and control public and (formerly) private spheres through quantification of the population in a way that traditional bureaucracy was not concerned with.
Modern governing institutions emphasized on collecting “facts” about a population and converting them into statistics, claiming that facts are impartial and indisputable. A regime built on the foundation of facts is therefore always legitimate. Ostensibly, such argument is impossible to challenge because it is always backed by “empirical evidence”, something that has been cherished as the basis of all knowledge and theories since the scientific revolution. Rather than disputing the legitimacy of a set of data or facts, one ought to investigate thoroughly into how data was collected, collated and construed. One set of data, when placed under a certain context or explained from a certain perspective, may generate varying connotations than other circumstances under which it is applied. When utilized in the scope of state governance, such discrepancy may profoundly influence policy formulation and implementation.
Demography was first officially endorsed and accepted by the government as a method of scientific studies during the Malthusian era. Its timing coincided with Europe’s industrial revolution. As capital investment expanded, so was the demand for labour power at the cheapest price available. This socio-economic evolution thus demanded thorough knowledge of the population within a context of capitalist economy which enables the state to develop and implement comprehensive measures that are directed at maximizing the utility of labour power. In effect, demographic knowledge is a critical component in state governance, and increasingly becomes a source of power.
In its most rudimentary form was Malthus’s study which stipulated that population will outgrow means of subsistence because the former was thought to be growing at a much faster rate than the latter. His assertion was not made without factual ground; population at the time his theory was developed could have been growing at a faster rate than food production. However, it must also be noted that his interpretation of the raw data which he had acquired; in this case it is the rate of population growth in comparison with the growth of food production, was framed and eventually applied under a capitalist paradigm. Malthus viewed overpopulation as a positive factor for the development of capitalist commodity economy because the surplus population it generated was an abundant source of cheap labour power for entrepreneurs who sought to maximize surplus value of its production by suppressing workers’ salary. To relieve the wealthy property owners of their obligation to aid the poor, he went on to argue that such phenomenon was a natural consequence of fertility (Ross, 5). This logic was taken up by the British government as a principle of demographic organization, which wielded significant influence on the inauspicious revision of the Poor law. In spite of Malthus’s own interpretation on the demographic data which indicated a threat of overpopulation, the government was willing to accept such argument because its primary concern was the interest of the capitalist class, who were the primary beneficiaries of this policy proposal conceived by his population theory. For this reason, certain aspects of the debate was deliberately ignored if it did not reinforce the motivation to reform the Poor Law the way capitalists had intended to. Several disagreements stemming from Malthus’s population theory remained unresolved within the academic circle, with some scholars such as Karl Marx attempting to table their differing opinions. Hence it could be argued that economic and political interests were the primary motivators behind the British government’s endorsement of the Malthusian model as its principle rationale behind reforming the Poor Law.
What the abovementioned case demonstrated is a new form of power the state wields over the society. Unlike traditional concept of state power, which is backed by institutions of violence (ie. The military and police), it is predicated on producing and manipulating knowledge and data as a technique of intervening demographic trends. Nevertheless, knowledge and data too must itself be validated by a particular socio-economic construct. Contained within Malthus’s population theory is a paradigm which became an instrument of translating empirical knowledge into policy incentives. The creation of such paradigm was the concomitant of a shift in social and economic circumstance precipitated by the industrial revolution and emergence of capitalist commodity economy. It was in essence a process of redefining individuals and population within a changing socio-economic background. The original Poor Law was instituted before industrial revolution and rise of capitalist commodity economy. It served to provide basic subsistence for dispossessed peasants who flocked to the cities, and other population that became unemployed for various reasons. The incentive behind this policy stemmed from the way this group of people, later dubbed as “surplus population”, is viewed by the government. In an agrarian society like Britain was when the Poor Law was established, surplus population was often looked upon as a threat to social stability. During this period there were no major factories to absorb the surplus population by providing large volume of employment opportunities. Since those who were unable to feed themselves may resort to crimes or even hostility against the state, the government was forced to pre-empt such threat by redirecting some of the wealth owned by the higher social strata to keeping these paupers from starving. As industrialization commenced, however, employment opportunities were available in massive numbers due to the rise of the capitalist class. This demand for labour power triggered profound changes in the way people who were receiving government aid was viewed. They were no longer seen as a threat to social stability, but an abundant source of labour power industrial capital investors can tap into. The government, which relied on the wealthy capitalists to not only subsidize their daily operations through taxation, but also maintaining social stability through employment, must reorient its governing approach to foster a partnership with the latter. This was the quintessential role played by demography as an instrument of social control, to generate a policy measure that can mutually benefit both sides. Through the production of data and knowledge on the urban population, the government sought to encourage them to compete for employment in factories. To this end it utilized Thomas Malthus’s population theory as theoretical foundation for a new Poor Law which compelled the paupers to actively seek employment by worsening their standard of living. It maintained that individuals who are unable to find work should not be entitled to government aid, providing justification for the government to allow standard of living in poor houses to depreciate. Meanwhile, the capitalist class stood to gain the most, having benefitted from the new legislative provision in mainly two ways. First, Malthus’s theory reinforced the institution of private property, therefore repudiated the practice of diverting individual wealth to feed those who cannot provide subsistence for themselves. By claiming that the poor will only reproduce if their living conditions improve, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle, Malthus attempted to strip the Poor Law of its moral justification. Its purpose was to give the government a pretext to relieve the wealthy capitalists of their liabilities to finance the Poor Law, so that this money could be invested in expanding their capital. Complementing this benefit for the capitalist class was the deterioration of living conditions and the effect of surplus population, which increased individual desire for employment and pressured them to accept a wage level that was only enough to provide for subsistence.
Even though demography was first employed as an instrument of power under a capitalist regime in Europe, its use was by no means restricted to this particular form of political and social arrangement. The Japanese government applied demography as a method of social survey to capture the trend and ramifications of its population growth. It established a government commission to study relations between population and food, in an approach much similar to that of Malthus’s study of population, albeit the latter was not initially a state-sanctioned initiative. (Taeuber, 366) In Japan’s case however, the population question not only became a subject of intense national debate, but also evoked in its response a much more comprehensive state policy in comparison to what had occurred in Great Britain. Aside from the various political and economic apparatuses that were being inaugurated, the extent of the Japanese government’s endeavour to manipulate trend of population growth into a direction of its preference also impinged upon the control of women’s body.
In the late 1920s worries began to spread about the high rate of population growth causing increased scarcity of food. After some study and deliberation by the Commission on Population and Food, recommendations were made on inducing a natural decline of fertility rates. As industrialization proceeds rapidly in Japan, additional supply of labour forces were required. But the general public had hitherto been inclined to sympathize with population control, contraception was common and penalties on abortion was lenient. (Taeuber, 368) Urbanization and industrialization, which resulted in a rise in consumerism and relative deflation of agricultural economy, meant that for many families had little incentive to have multiple kids. Nevertheless, political atmosphere soon reversed in favour of population expansion, as the government released disheartening figures on projection that indicated a grim outlook for Japanese population if current trend were to persist. It was yet another testimony to the power of persuasion by knowledge and data. This time it was the Japanese nationalist and proponents of military expansion that joined industrial capital owners in an attempt to influence government decision on the long-term orientation of population control. Narrative of population soon escalated from a matter of policy discussion into nationalist rhetoric and was ultimately linked with the nation’s survival (even though the government’s motivation remains economic). Reflective of these characteristics were the languages used in the articulation of government’s objectives, where an emphasis was placed on the quantity and quality of the Japanese race in comparison with other nations. Ensuing policy initiatives, under the influence of such political incentive, centred on service to military and industrial interests. To “ensure perpetual growth of Japanese population”, multiple strategies were executed concurrently to guarantee optimal results, most of which involved manipulation of women and women’s body. Laws were changed to lower the age of legal marriage of women, and mothers of multiple children were praised and rewarded; these among others were part of an effort to increase rate of fertility through manipulation of the body. State control was also ubiquitous in its bid to improve population quality. Major reforms were carried out in the education system to bestow youths with qualities which enables them to fulfill the roles of soldiers and skilled workers. Such system, in essence was a structure of military logistics, constantly supplying the state with the manpower required to proceed with its military conquest in East Asia.
After the empire’s surrender and its subsequent dissolution, the data and knowledge that were produced during and immediately after the war was used by the occupying forces to “re-establish” Japan as a nation that would never re-emerge as a threat to international order. Population was again a key component in this undertaking. The government considered surplus population, which was a consequence of war-time population policy, an obstacle to its governance of Japan. A survey of the Japanese population produced by the occupying forces concluded that concrete actions are required to reduce fertility rate. The rise of this phenomenon was by no means irrelevant from American occupation of Japan, even though the United States inclined to treat it as such. With military heavy industry no longer permissible to absorb Japan’s labour power, and massive repatriation of Japanese who resided in places outside of Japan but was formerly under Japanese rule, the government faced immense pressure to restrict population growth. Hence, the new government of Japan, which claimed to have overturned all “evils deeds” of its predecessor, found itself unable to avoid adopting the same measures in response to what it viewed as an imminent population crisis. Women’s body had once again became a target of manipulation, as uses of contraception was encouraged to lower fertility rate. By its own standard, the state’s population policy was a success, but this would provide a precedent for future practices of population control in Japan, its implications were thus more far-reaching than the government perhaps had anticipated. (Taeuber, 371 – 379)
In modern day Japan, population remains a major social topic, except the primary concern has now shifted from overpopulation to aging population. This social repercussion is arguably an outcome of previous efforts to restrain population growth. Now it is conveniently used by neo-liberals as a political vindication for the rising economic disparity. They argued that in the hyper-aged society, some of the traditional approaches to wealth distribution is no longer affordable. (Coulmas, 136) This argument provided the political cover needed for government to remain indifferent to the growing wealth gaps and other social effects that would otherwise require large public expenditure to address, on top of risks that politicians usually do not want to take. The relationship between scholarly research on demographic trend and government policies in this case is no different from that of Malthus or Japan in occupation years. Except rather than encouraging the government to act in favour of corporate interests, this time it recommended inaction to maintain a status quo which corporate powers found advantageous.
The apparent obsession with population control displayed by some of the most prominent industrial states reflected a general mindset to view human beings equivalently with other factors of production such as machines and raw materials. It must be thoroughly studied, planned, and ultimately controlled for the purpose of optimizing industrial output. From socio-economic perspective, this phenomenon can be interpreted as a necessary product of real subsumption of labour under capital. Nevertheless, its incentive also entailed a political subtext, manifesting a obstinate abhorrence and anxiety towards social reforms that could potentially alter the fundamentals of a capitalist system. Consequently, to evade political pressures instigated by population imbalance, conservative-minded government usually go for the “easy option” of addressing the issue through population control, notwithstanding the fact that these imbalances were sometimes caused by their own actions, as was evident in both of the aforementioned cases. By extracting population issue from the context of policy implications and the underlying structural incongruities within a capitalist system, the government can effectively manipulate the narratives of social and economic problems and disguise them as a population crisis. In Great Britain’s case, Malthus attempted to blame the paupers for being unproductive, when in fact many of them resorted to seeking aid from the poorhouses because they were dispossessed of their land in the countryside by a government-sanctioned policy of enclosure. Meanwhile, the population crisis which the Japanese government sought to pre-empt was a result of the war and post-war policies, though it was treated as something completely spontaneous. This substitution of social reform with population control not only mitigates the potential threat a social reform might pose to the bureaucracy, it also serves capital interest by reinforcing the existing capitalist based hierarchal order.
Even though social scientists, specifically those who concentrate on the discipline of demography, are sometimes guilty of collaborating with the government or corporate interest in producing demographic knowledge and narrating them in a way that is beneficial to the latter, not all of them should be burdened with such accusations as being a tool of government power. The prominent features that made this new method of control possible are the government institutions and the state’s intricate connection with the capitalist system. They provided both the incentive and resources in a bid to influence government policy-making through translation of empirical facts.
As a new modality of power operating under the capitalist system, the use of demographic knowledge was an inevitable outcome of a social development in which all aspects of social activity became relevant with production of commodities and thus were either commodified, or becomes a factor of production, or both. The mass production of demographic knowledge provided a foundation upon which all other social institutions, contributing to a creation of “docile body” (Foucault), was designed and implemented. As demonstrated above, state policies require both direction and justification by demographic knowledge, endowing it with power and influence to facilitate control of all aspects of society by the state. Such control is not established on the basis of traditional sovereign power, composed of monopoly of force and outlines the limit of the conduct of its subjects. Rather, it relies on institutional arrangements under which control over each individual subject is internalized. The comprehensiveness of this new modality of power and the magnitude of control it had exerted on the society through instruments such as production and manipulation of demographic knowledge far surpassed the traditional mode of governance in an agrarian society.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Foucault, “Right of death and Power over life”, from History of Sexuality, volume 1
Ross, Eric, “Introduction,” Ch1 “Politics and Paradigms”; Ch2, “Ireland: The Promised Land of Malthusian Theory?”, from the Malthus Factor, London: ZED books
Taeuber, Irene. Ch16, “The Demography of war”; Ch17, “Problems, Projections, Policies”, from The Population of Japan. Princeton U Press, 1958
Coulmas, Florian. Ch12 “Population ageing and social change” From Population decline and ageing in Japan – the social consequences. London: Routledge
Demography as a discipline emerged only after the beginning of industrial revolution. While production and interpretation of demographic knowledge may seem of little importance since it does not actively limit the conduct of an individual with the force of law. Its function within the framework of state governance was irreplaceable given the critical success state governments have had in wielding it as a tool of control over the population. This represents the rise of a new form of power designed not to instil fear, but conformity and obedience that are ostensibly voluntary but is in fact guided by the will of the state.
The need to exercise such control on the population largely derived from the state’s need to maintain a social mechanism in which individuals, for whatever purpose, is a vital component. The form and substance of this exertion of state power also varies in correspondence to the specific mechanisms it intends to support. Nevertheless, in the modern industrial age, where men and machine become increasingly inseparable, knowledge about the population and each individual is viewed as an important means of control. Demography is in essence the “economy of human beings”. It focuses on the study of the people for the purpose of optimizing their output capacity as individual production units and as a part of a social order that emphasizes efficiency. Production and interpretation of demographic knowledge cannot be viewed in isolation from other aspects of state governance. Nonetheless it is a critical junction of power that enabled the functioning of institutions which made a new modality of dominance over individual human beings possible. Demography expanded the ability of the state to understand and control public and (formerly) private spheres through quantification of the population in a way that traditional bureaucracy was not concerned with.
Modern governing institutions emphasized on collecting “facts” about a population and converting them into statistics, claiming that facts are impartial and indisputable. A regime built on the foundation of facts is therefore always legitimate. Ostensibly, such argument is impossible to challenge because it is always backed by “empirical evidence”, something that has been cherished as the basis of all knowledge and theories since the scientific revolution. Rather than disputing the legitimacy of a set of data or facts, one ought to investigate thoroughly into how data was collected, collated and construed. One set of data, when placed under a certain context or explained from a certain perspective, may generate varying connotations than other circumstances under which it is applied. When utilized in the scope of state governance, such discrepancy may profoundly influence policy formulation and implementation.
Demography was first officially endorsed and accepted by the government as a method of scientific studies during the Malthusian era. Its timing coincided with Europe’s industrial revolution. As capital investment expanded, so was the demand for labour power at the cheapest price available. This socio-economic evolution thus demanded thorough knowledge of the population within a context of capitalist economy which enables the state to develop and implement comprehensive measures that are directed at maximizing the utility of labour power. In effect, demographic knowledge is a critical component in state governance, and increasingly becomes a source of power.
In its most rudimentary form was Malthus’s study which stipulated that population will outgrow means of subsistence because the former was thought to be growing at a much faster rate than the latter. His assertion was not made without factual ground; population at the time his theory was developed could have been growing at a faster rate than food production. However, it must also be noted that his interpretation of the raw data which he had acquired; in this case it is the rate of population growth in comparison with the growth of food production, was framed and eventually applied under a capitalist paradigm. Malthus viewed overpopulation as a positive factor for the development of capitalist commodity economy because the surplus population it generated was an abundant source of cheap labour power for entrepreneurs who sought to maximize surplus value of its production by suppressing workers’ salary. To relieve the wealthy property owners of their obligation to aid the poor, he went on to argue that such phenomenon was a natural consequence of fertility (Ross, 5). This logic was taken up by the British government as a principle of demographic organization, which wielded significant influence on the inauspicious revision of the Poor law. In spite of Malthus’s own interpretation on the demographic data which indicated a threat of overpopulation, the government was willing to accept such argument because its primary concern was the interest of the capitalist class, who were the primary beneficiaries of this policy proposal conceived by his population theory. For this reason, certain aspects of the debate was deliberately ignored if it did not reinforce the motivation to reform the Poor Law the way capitalists had intended to. Several disagreements stemming from Malthus’s population theory remained unresolved within the academic circle, with some scholars such as Karl Marx attempting to table their differing opinions. Hence it could be argued that economic and political interests were the primary motivators behind the British government’s endorsement of the Malthusian model as its principle rationale behind reforming the Poor Law.
What the abovementioned case demonstrated is a new form of power the state wields over the society. Unlike traditional concept of state power, which is backed by institutions of violence (ie. The military and police), it is predicated on producing and manipulating knowledge and data as a technique of intervening demographic trends. Nevertheless, knowledge and data too must itself be validated by a particular socio-economic construct. Contained within Malthus’s population theory is a paradigm which became an instrument of translating empirical knowledge into policy incentives. The creation of such paradigm was the concomitant of a shift in social and economic circumstance precipitated by the industrial revolution and emergence of capitalist commodity economy. It was in essence a process of redefining individuals and population within a changing socio-economic background. The original Poor Law was instituted before industrial revolution and rise of capitalist commodity economy. It served to provide basic subsistence for dispossessed peasants who flocked to the cities, and other population that became unemployed for various reasons. The incentive behind this policy stemmed from the way this group of people, later dubbed as “surplus population”, is viewed by the government. In an agrarian society like Britain was when the Poor Law was established, surplus population was often looked upon as a threat to social stability. During this period there were no major factories to absorb the surplus population by providing large volume of employment opportunities. Since those who were unable to feed themselves may resort to crimes or even hostility against the state, the government was forced to pre-empt such threat by redirecting some of the wealth owned by the higher social strata to keeping these paupers from starving. As industrialization commenced, however, employment opportunities were available in massive numbers due to the rise of the capitalist class. This demand for labour power triggered profound changes in the way people who were receiving government aid was viewed. They were no longer seen as a threat to social stability, but an abundant source of labour power industrial capital investors can tap into. The government, which relied on the wealthy capitalists to not only subsidize their daily operations through taxation, but also maintaining social stability through employment, must reorient its governing approach to foster a partnership with the latter. This was the quintessential role played by demography as an instrument of social control, to generate a policy measure that can mutually benefit both sides. Through the production of data and knowledge on the urban population, the government sought to encourage them to compete for employment in factories. To this end it utilized Thomas Malthus’s population theory as theoretical foundation for a new Poor Law which compelled the paupers to actively seek employment by worsening their standard of living. It maintained that individuals who are unable to find work should not be entitled to government aid, providing justification for the government to allow standard of living in poor houses to depreciate. Meanwhile, the capitalist class stood to gain the most, having benefitted from the new legislative provision in mainly two ways. First, Malthus’s theory reinforced the institution of private property, therefore repudiated the practice of diverting individual wealth to feed those who cannot provide subsistence for themselves. By claiming that the poor will only reproduce if their living conditions improve, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle, Malthus attempted to strip the Poor Law of its moral justification. Its purpose was to give the government a pretext to relieve the wealthy capitalists of their liabilities to finance the Poor Law, so that this money could be invested in expanding their capital. Complementing this benefit for the capitalist class was the deterioration of living conditions and the effect of surplus population, which increased individual desire for employment and pressured them to accept a wage level that was only enough to provide for subsistence.
Even though demography was first employed as an instrument of power under a capitalist regime in Europe, its use was by no means restricted to this particular form of political and social arrangement. The Japanese government applied demography as a method of social survey to capture the trend and ramifications of its population growth. It established a government commission to study relations between population and food, in an approach much similar to that of Malthus’s study of population, albeit the latter was not initially a state-sanctioned initiative. (Taeuber, 366) In Japan’s case however, the population question not only became a subject of intense national debate, but also evoked in its response a much more comprehensive state policy in comparison to what had occurred in Great Britain. Aside from the various political and economic apparatuses that were being inaugurated, the extent of the Japanese government’s endeavour to manipulate trend of population growth into a direction of its preference also impinged upon the control of women’s body.
In the late 1920s worries began to spread about the high rate of population growth causing increased scarcity of food. After some study and deliberation by the Commission on Population and Food, recommendations were made on inducing a natural decline of fertility rates. As industrialization proceeds rapidly in Japan, additional supply of labour forces were required. But the general public had hitherto been inclined to sympathize with population control, contraception was common and penalties on abortion was lenient. (Taeuber, 368) Urbanization and industrialization, which resulted in a rise in consumerism and relative deflation of agricultural economy, meant that for many families had little incentive to have multiple kids. Nevertheless, political atmosphere soon reversed in favour of population expansion, as the government released disheartening figures on projection that indicated a grim outlook for Japanese population if current trend were to persist. It was yet another testimony to the power of persuasion by knowledge and data. This time it was the Japanese nationalist and proponents of military expansion that joined industrial capital owners in an attempt to influence government decision on the long-term orientation of population control. Narrative of population soon escalated from a matter of policy discussion into nationalist rhetoric and was ultimately linked with the nation’s survival (even though the government’s motivation remains economic). Reflective of these characteristics were the languages used in the articulation of government’s objectives, where an emphasis was placed on the quantity and quality of the Japanese race in comparison with other nations. Ensuing policy initiatives, under the influence of such political incentive, centred on service to military and industrial interests. To “ensure perpetual growth of Japanese population”, multiple strategies were executed concurrently to guarantee optimal results, most of which involved manipulation of women and women’s body. Laws were changed to lower the age of legal marriage of women, and mothers of multiple children were praised and rewarded; these among others were part of an effort to increase rate of fertility through manipulation of the body. State control was also ubiquitous in its bid to improve population quality. Major reforms were carried out in the education system to bestow youths with qualities which enables them to fulfill the roles of soldiers and skilled workers. Such system, in essence was a structure of military logistics, constantly supplying the state with the manpower required to proceed with its military conquest in East Asia.
After the empire’s surrender and its subsequent dissolution, the data and knowledge that were produced during and immediately after the war was used by the occupying forces to “re-establish” Japan as a nation that would never re-emerge as a threat to international order. Population was again a key component in this undertaking. The government considered surplus population, which was a consequence of war-time population policy, an obstacle to its governance of Japan. A survey of the Japanese population produced by the occupying forces concluded that concrete actions are required to reduce fertility rate. The rise of this phenomenon was by no means irrelevant from American occupation of Japan, even though the United States inclined to treat it as such. With military heavy industry no longer permissible to absorb Japan’s labour power, and massive repatriation of Japanese who resided in places outside of Japan but was formerly under Japanese rule, the government faced immense pressure to restrict population growth. Hence, the new government of Japan, which claimed to have overturned all “evils deeds” of its predecessor, found itself unable to avoid adopting the same measures in response to what it viewed as an imminent population crisis. Women’s body had once again became a target of manipulation, as uses of contraception was encouraged to lower fertility rate. By its own standard, the state’s population policy was a success, but this would provide a precedent for future practices of population control in Japan, its implications were thus more far-reaching than the government perhaps had anticipated. (Taeuber, 371 – 379)
In modern day Japan, population remains a major social topic, except the primary concern has now shifted from overpopulation to aging population. This social repercussion is arguably an outcome of previous efforts to restrain population growth. Now it is conveniently used by neo-liberals as a political vindication for the rising economic disparity. They argued that in the hyper-aged society, some of the traditional approaches to wealth distribution is no longer affordable. (Coulmas, 136) This argument provided the political cover needed for government to remain indifferent to the growing wealth gaps and other social effects that would otherwise require large public expenditure to address, on top of risks that politicians usually do not want to take. The relationship between scholarly research on demographic trend and government policies in this case is no different from that of Malthus or Japan in occupation years. Except rather than encouraging the government to act in favour of corporate interests, this time it recommended inaction to maintain a status quo which corporate powers found advantageous.
The apparent obsession with population control displayed by some of the most prominent industrial states reflected a general mindset to view human beings equivalently with other factors of production such as machines and raw materials. It must be thoroughly studied, planned, and ultimately controlled for the purpose of optimizing industrial output. From socio-economic perspective, this phenomenon can be interpreted as a necessary product of real subsumption of labour under capital. Nevertheless, its incentive also entailed a political subtext, manifesting a obstinate abhorrence and anxiety towards social reforms that could potentially alter the fundamentals of a capitalist system. Consequently, to evade political pressures instigated by population imbalance, conservative-minded government usually go for the “easy option” of addressing the issue through population control, notwithstanding the fact that these imbalances were sometimes caused by their own actions, as was evident in both of the aforementioned cases. By extracting population issue from the context of policy implications and the underlying structural incongruities within a capitalist system, the government can effectively manipulate the narratives of social and economic problems and disguise them as a population crisis. In Great Britain’s case, Malthus attempted to blame the paupers for being unproductive, when in fact many of them resorted to seeking aid from the poorhouses because they were dispossessed of their land in the countryside by a government-sanctioned policy of enclosure. Meanwhile, the population crisis which the Japanese government sought to pre-empt was a result of the war and post-war policies, though it was treated as something completely spontaneous. This substitution of social reform with population control not only mitigates the potential threat a social reform might pose to the bureaucracy, it also serves capital interest by reinforcing the existing capitalist based hierarchal order.
Even though social scientists, specifically those who concentrate on the discipline of demography, are sometimes guilty of collaborating with the government or corporate interest in producing demographic knowledge and narrating them in a way that is beneficial to the latter, not all of them should be burdened with such accusations as being a tool of government power. The prominent features that made this new method of control possible are the government institutions and the state’s intricate connection with the capitalist system. They provided both the incentive and resources in a bid to influence government policy-making through translation of empirical facts.
As a new modality of power operating under the capitalist system, the use of demographic knowledge was an inevitable outcome of a social development in which all aspects of social activity became relevant with production of commodities and thus were either commodified, or becomes a factor of production, or both. The mass production of demographic knowledge provided a foundation upon which all other social institutions, contributing to a creation of “docile body” (Foucault), was designed and implemented. As demonstrated above, state policies require both direction and justification by demographic knowledge, endowing it with power and influence to facilitate control of all aspects of society by the state. Such control is not established on the basis of traditional sovereign power, composed of monopoly of force and outlines the limit of the conduct of its subjects. Rather, it relies on institutional arrangements under which control over each individual subject is internalized. The comprehensiveness of this new modality of power and the magnitude of control it had exerted on the society through instruments such as production and manipulation of demographic knowledge far surpassed the traditional mode of governance in an agrarian society.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Foucault, “Right of death and Power over life”, from History of Sexuality, volume 1
Ross, Eric, “Introduction,” Ch1 “Politics and Paradigms”; Ch2, “Ireland: The Promised Land of Malthusian Theory?”, from the Malthus Factor, London: ZED books
Taeuber, Irene. Ch16, “The Demography of war”; Ch17, “Problems, Projections, Policies”, from The Population of Japan. Princeton U Press, 1958
Coulmas, Florian. Ch12 “Population ageing and social change” From Population decline and ageing in Japan – the social consequences. London: Routledge
魏玛德国加入国联
Germany’s entrance into the League of Nations was one of its great achievements during the Weimar Republic. It is a result of Stresemann’s vision, dedication and adroit diplomacy, as well as a major development dictated by the international atmosphere, in which the old European state system had become antiquated and replaced by the new League of Nations, but still operated under the principle of balance of power that was the paramount belief of most European strategists at the time. The institution’s acceptance of Germany accounted to its ability to reduce international tension. Meanwhile, the outstanding diplomatic skills and vision demonstrated by Stresemann and other political leaders associated with this occasion cannot be neglected. Their ability and willingness to negotiate common grounds without compromising the core interest of their respective states contributed heavily to Stresemann’s success and temporarily secured continental stability.
From Germany’s point of view, the years following Treaty of Versailles and prior to Locarno were some of the most difficult times. Hence, Stresemann has contemplated Germany’s foreign policy largely on its domestic needs, which at the time was overwhelming. The status quo of the early 1920s was clearly unsustainable for Germany, especially in financial terms. As stated in his letter to the former Crowned Prince “the burden of reparations laid upon us by the Dawes Plan will probably be unendurable by 1927”. (Entry into the League, 503) The urgency of this situation prompted Stresemann to initiate a programme to restore some of Germany’s international status and reduce the burden of war indemnity imposed upon it by the Treaty of Versailles; he proclaimed this to be one of the paramount strategic objectives for Germany. (Entry into the League, 503)
Stresemann established his position based on careful assessment of Germany’s capability and the international environment in which it is situated. His solution is mixed of appeasement and defiance in a bid for gradual restoration of the country’s strength and status. Germany was not in a position to engage in confrontations with other states, but it is also unwilling to compromise the core interests that Stresemann defined as the country’s principle diplomatic objectives. Stresemann views Germany’s failure to participate in the rearrangement of the new international order as particularly harmful to these national interests. This is most evidently manifested in the country’s absence from the League of Nations; he made reference to other European states’ gains at the international arena while Germany is deprived of the right to present its case in defence of its own national interest. (Entry into the League 504) Therefore, Germany’s entry into the league must transpire as both a symbolic and institutional restoration of its “normal” status.
Once he arrived at the conclusion that entry into the League of Nations was necessary to extricate Germany from the strategic dead end to which inaction would lead, Stresemann must devise a strategy to confront the political challenges poised to impede upon his effort. He has already secured domestic support from across the political spectrum, and he must now clear the obstacles on the international arena. Taking consideration of the fact that Germany has some historical rivals on the continent that are not interested in its resurgence, Stresemann took a multilateral approach, knowing that he has a better chance of succeeding. He also focused on appealing to Western European states, calculating that if Germany were to make gains at someone else’s expense, they are more likely to succeed targeting the weaker countries in Eastern Europe. Stresemann does not view the post-war European state system as a zero-sum game, this point was most overtly articulated later in his speech at the signature of Locarno, where he declared “If we go down, we go down together; if we are to reach the heights, we do so not by conflict but by common effort”.(The Final Conflict Over Locarno, 241) For the practical needs of German security and well-being, Stresemann sought to facilitate a state system that underscores the common interests that Germany shares with the rest of Europe as a means to foster cooperation and stifle hostility. He also emphasized on the independence of Germany, rejecting the notion that Germany should ally itself with a certain faction as it is being accepted back into the European state system. (Entry into the League, 505) Stresemann stated that Germany does not have sufficient military power to get involved with factionalism amongst European powers, implying his belief that the traditional alliance system that was the essence of traditional state system would lead to war rather than preserving peace.
Great Britain, as Stresemann predicted in his letter, welcomed Germany’s entry into the league. To them, Germany’s value lies in its potential role as a counterweight to France, who has hitherto enjoyed prominent status in the League of Nations. Such attitude is consistent with Britain’s traditional preference of exerting influence on European affairs by positioning rival continental powers against other. However, the British does not intend to return to the old alliance system that led to the break out of WWI in the first place, foreign minister Austen Chamberlain cautioned his compatriots of the danger of “separate alliances”, a proposition that ultimately coincides with the interest of most European states because establishing a proper channel of reconciliation would prevent radicalization of Germany. (The Security Pact, 61) For this reason, Chamberlain declined to ratify a Geneva Protocol that obligates international assistance to France should conflict arise between Germany and France, an accord that clearly resembles the hostile nature embodied in traditional interstate alliances.
The international resistance to Germany’s recovery resembled the traditional rivalries that existed since the fall of Napoleon, while Britain welcomed Stresemann’s proposal, some continental powers remained cautious of its potential implications. Compared to Chamberlain’s enthusiasm, the French government initially reserved a level of distrust towards Germany, based on their traditional rivalries on the European continent. The French minister of foreign affairs Herriot’s first official reply stroke a welcoming but cautious key for Germany’s return to a “normal” status in the European state system, seeking to consult with other European states before proceeding. Most importantly, France in this very first statement already declared that any future development that Germany seeks will be confined within the framework of Treaty of Versailles, underscoring the treaty’s importance for France in both financial and security aspects. Unlike the Great Britain, whose homeland was left unharmed during the Great War and sees no prospect of invasion by a continental power, France suffered a greater loss and continued to see Germany as a potential threat. The country’s leadership regards the Treaty of Versailles as a crucial instrument in ensuring its acquisition of financial reimbursement and containment of German power. Stresemann must appease the French in order to secure its endorsement for his plan. To achieve this he proposed important concessions that under a different political context would not be tolerable to the German ruling authority and the public. The first is temporarily resigning Germany’s attempt to recover Alsace-Lorraine, which has traditionally been a major point of contention between France and Germany. The second is to decline a union with Austria, a move that would threaten Europe’s balance of power should Germany succeed and arouse suspicion from its neighbours. Germany’s willingness to give up part of her interest to achieve stability, combined with the British government’s decision not to ratify the Geneva Protocol that connoted potential hostility towards Germany, fomented a tolerant atmosphere for compromise and cooperation.
Stresemann’s letter to the former crowned prince also alluded to a division within Germany’s ruling elites on the direction of the country. The extreme right, which he mentioned in the letter, appears to embrace an isolationist approach and regards the current state of Germany to be condescending. Nevertheless, nationalist sentiments will likely express discontent towards Stresemann’s foreign policies, such as the two aforementioned concessions regarding Austria and Alsace-Lorraine. This will place Stresemann under tremendous pressure to seek a balance between arranging peace terms that are acceptable to other European powers, at the same time upholding the country’s integrity. On the other hand, there were also hints of left-wing factions within Germany that supported Bolshevization, which was rejected by Stresemann. Despite their essential disagreement in future policy inclinations, Germany’s domestic and foreign conditions in the early and mid-1920s forced even the radical politicians to concede to the harsh realities and the necessity of a modest approach in order to tackle the most immediate crisis facing Germany. Consequently, Stresemann’s middle course policy was endorsed by most factions in Germany’s ruling class, though it will be proven later on that this political consensus will not endure.
Stresemann’s remarkable endeavour to push Germany into the League of Nations was crucial in stabilizing the country’s faltering domestic and diplomatic situation. Germany desperately needed such advance in foreign relations to alleviate the pressure exerted on its internal development. Meanwhile, Stresemann had to work towards this objective meticulously to ensure that Germany will not impede upon the interest of those it must cooperate with on international issues. He skilfully orchestrated foreign interests in favour of the restoration of Germany’s international status into a force that was proven to be critical to its success. Through this process two important trends in the European state system were identified: that the European state system still relied on the principle of balance of power to maintain stability; but the institution upon which it relies to convene this objective no longer emphasizes separate alliance, but a framework in which states can communicate with each other more easily to avoid conflicts and encourage cooperation.
Germany’s entrance into the League of Nations was one of its great achievements during the Weimar Republic. It is a result of Stresemann’s vision, dedication and adroit diplomacy, as well as a major development dictated by the international atmosphere, in which the old European state system had become antiquated and replaced by the new League of Nations, but still operated under the principle of balance of power that was the paramount belief of most European strategists at the time. The institution’s acceptance of Germany accounted to its ability to reduce international tension. Meanwhile, the outstanding diplomatic skills and vision demonstrated by Stresemann and other political leaders associated with this occasion cannot be neglected. Their ability and willingness to negotiate common grounds without compromising the core interest of their respective states contributed heavily to Stresemann’s success and temporarily secured continental stability.
From Germany’s point of view, the years following Treaty of Versailles and prior to Locarno were some of the most difficult times. Hence, Stresemann has contemplated Germany’s foreign policy largely on its domestic needs, which at the time was overwhelming. The status quo of the early 1920s was clearly unsustainable for Germany, especially in financial terms. As stated in his letter to the former Crowned Prince “the burden of reparations laid upon us by the Dawes Plan will probably be unendurable by 1927”. (Entry into the League, 503) The urgency of this situation prompted Stresemann to initiate a programme to restore some of Germany’s international status and reduce the burden of war indemnity imposed upon it by the Treaty of Versailles; he proclaimed this to be one of the paramount strategic objectives for Germany. (Entry into the League, 503)
Stresemann established his position based on careful assessment of Germany’s capability and the international environment in which it is situated. His solution is mixed of appeasement and defiance in a bid for gradual restoration of the country’s strength and status. Germany was not in a position to engage in confrontations with other states, but it is also unwilling to compromise the core interests that Stresemann defined as the country’s principle diplomatic objectives. Stresemann views Germany’s failure to participate in the rearrangement of the new international order as particularly harmful to these national interests. This is most evidently manifested in the country’s absence from the League of Nations; he made reference to other European states’ gains at the international arena while Germany is deprived of the right to present its case in defence of its own national interest. (Entry into the League 504) Therefore, Germany’s entry into the league must transpire as both a symbolic and institutional restoration of its “normal” status.
Once he arrived at the conclusion that entry into the League of Nations was necessary to extricate Germany from the strategic dead end to which inaction would lead, Stresemann must devise a strategy to confront the political challenges poised to impede upon his effort. He has already secured domestic support from across the political spectrum, and he must now clear the obstacles on the international arena. Taking consideration of the fact that Germany has some historical rivals on the continent that are not interested in its resurgence, Stresemann took a multilateral approach, knowing that he has a better chance of succeeding. He also focused on appealing to Western European states, calculating that if Germany were to make gains at someone else’s expense, they are more likely to succeed targeting the weaker countries in Eastern Europe. Stresemann does not view the post-war European state system as a zero-sum game, this point was most overtly articulated later in his speech at the signature of Locarno, where he declared “If we go down, we go down together; if we are to reach the heights, we do so not by conflict but by common effort”.(The Final Conflict Over Locarno, 241) For the practical needs of German security and well-being, Stresemann sought to facilitate a state system that underscores the common interests that Germany shares with the rest of Europe as a means to foster cooperation and stifle hostility. He also emphasized on the independence of Germany, rejecting the notion that Germany should ally itself with a certain faction as it is being accepted back into the European state system. (Entry into the League, 505) Stresemann stated that Germany does not have sufficient military power to get involved with factionalism amongst European powers, implying his belief that the traditional alliance system that was the essence of traditional state system would lead to war rather than preserving peace.
Great Britain, as Stresemann predicted in his letter, welcomed Germany’s entry into the league. To them, Germany’s value lies in its potential role as a counterweight to France, who has hitherto enjoyed prominent status in the League of Nations. Such attitude is consistent with Britain’s traditional preference of exerting influence on European affairs by positioning rival continental powers against other. However, the British does not intend to return to the old alliance system that led to the break out of WWI in the first place, foreign minister Austen Chamberlain cautioned his compatriots of the danger of “separate alliances”, a proposition that ultimately coincides with the interest of most European states because establishing a proper channel of reconciliation would prevent radicalization of Germany. (The Security Pact, 61) For this reason, Chamberlain declined to ratify a Geneva Protocol that obligates international assistance to France should conflict arise between Germany and France, an accord that clearly resembles the hostile nature embodied in traditional interstate alliances.
The international resistance to Germany’s recovery resembled the traditional rivalries that existed since the fall of Napoleon, while Britain welcomed Stresemann’s proposal, some continental powers remained cautious of its potential implications. Compared to Chamberlain’s enthusiasm, the French government initially reserved a level of distrust towards Germany, based on their traditional rivalries on the European continent. The French minister of foreign affairs Herriot’s first official reply stroke a welcoming but cautious key for Germany’s return to a “normal” status in the European state system, seeking to consult with other European states before proceeding. Most importantly, France in this very first statement already declared that any future development that Germany seeks will be confined within the framework of Treaty of Versailles, underscoring the treaty’s importance for France in both financial and security aspects. Unlike the Great Britain, whose homeland was left unharmed during the Great War and sees no prospect of invasion by a continental power, France suffered a greater loss and continued to see Germany as a potential threat. The country’s leadership regards the Treaty of Versailles as a crucial instrument in ensuring its acquisition of financial reimbursement and containment of German power. Stresemann must appease the French in order to secure its endorsement for his plan. To achieve this he proposed important concessions that under a different political context would not be tolerable to the German ruling authority and the public. The first is temporarily resigning Germany’s attempt to recover Alsace-Lorraine, which has traditionally been a major point of contention between France and Germany. The second is to decline a union with Austria, a move that would threaten Europe’s balance of power should Germany succeed and arouse suspicion from its neighbours. Germany’s willingness to give up part of her interest to achieve stability, combined with the British government’s decision not to ratify the Geneva Protocol that connoted potential hostility towards Germany, fomented a tolerant atmosphere for compromise and cooperation.
Stresemann’s letter to the former crowned prince also alluded to a division within Germany’s ruling elites on the direction of the country. The extreme right, which he mentioned in the letter, appears to embrace an isolationist approach and regards the current state of Germany to be condescending. Nevertheless, nationalist sentiments will likely express discontent towards Stresemann’s foreign policies, such as the two aforementioned concessions regarding Austria and Alsace-Lorraine. This will place Stresemann under tremendous pressure to seek a balance between arranging peace terms that are acceptable to other European powers, at the same time upholding the country’s integrity. On the other hand, there were also hints of left-wing factions within Germany that supported Bolshevization, which was rejected by Stresemann. Despite their essential disagreement in future policy inclinations, Germany’s domestic and foreign conditions in the early and mid-1920s forced even the radical politicians to concede to the harsh realities and the necessity of a modest approach in order to tackle the most immediate crisis facing Germany. Consequently, Stresemann’s middle course policy was endorsed by most factions in Germany’s ruling class, though it will be proven later on that this political consensus will not endure.
Stresemann’s remarkable endeavour to push Germany into the League of Nations was crucial in stabilizing the country’s faltering domestic and diplomatic situation. Germany desperately needed such advance in foreign relations to alleviate the pressure exerted on its internal development. Meanwhile, Stresemann had to work towards this objective meticulously to ensure that Germany will not impede upon the interest of those it must cooperate with on international issues. He skilfully orchestrated foreign interests in favour of the restoration of Germany’s international status into a force that was proven to be critical to its success. Through this process two important trends in the European state system were identified: that the European state system still relied on the principle of balance of power to maintain stability; but the institution upon which it relies to convene this objective no longer emphasizes separate alliance, but a framework in which states can communicate with each other more easily to avoid conflicts and encourage cooperation.
我来灌水了。
LZ本科期间就能用英文写出这种题目和篇幅的论文来，真是令我这废物大学生汗颜。
送上鲜花一支，表示对LZ的尊敬。[:a15:]
LZ本科期间就能用英文写出这种题目和篇幅的论文来，真是令我这废物大学生汗颜。
送上鲜花一支，表示对LZ的尊敬。[:a15:]
第一句就有文法问题
不是学历史的，内容没看，不过还是佩服楼主的论文水平，能拿出来必有过人之处。
xihe 发表于 2011-2-7 14:03 
你说是那个"changes"?我也纠结该不该有那个s,不过我怎么记得好像已经拿掉了...可能这个复制的是未修改的文件
你说是那个"changes"?我也纠结该不该有那个s,不过我怎么记得好像已经拿掉了...可能这个复制的是未修改的文件
话说这个论文我刚交上去,大家应该能比较感兴趣. 讲得是近代情报机构中出现的体制问题.
As World War I approached its end the international order entered a period of drastic transition. In effect, modern institutions of espionage, as a product of war, were obligated to redefine its purpose and function in service to the country. Arising from such transition was a state of uncertainty over the mission of the intelligence service and how they ought to be carried out. In Britain, the cradle of modern espionage, political factions competed for the right to govern according to their respective interests the use of the secret intelligence service. Like all government institutions, intelligence operations are not immune to abuse of power and bureaucratic infighting. Under such circumstances, even if each unitary actor was behaving in the most rational manner, they could still generate irrational results as a collectivity.
To examine the influence of political and bureaucratic factors on intelligence operation in the post-WWI period, this paper will survey “Lockhart Conspiracy” and “Zinoviev Letter” as two historical cases in which these influence was evident. Both cases exemplified the roles of individual and factional goals in the wider context of state policy making execution.
Lockhart’s attempted subversion of the Bolshevik regime in Russia using Britain’s state intelligence apparatus was a testament to the lack of maturity this new service branch has yet to overcome. Originally purported to provide intelligence gathering and analysis in the formulation of military strategies, the intelligence service and its leadership struggled to define its modus operandi in face of an evolving international atmosphere, from which new challenges arose to render the established conventions of practice obsolete. The British policy makers’ “blind faith” in the intelligence branch to topple the Bolshevik regime in Russia was a product of several factors ranging from strategic miscalculation to bureaucratic dysfunction. Certain aspects can be attributed to the inevitable lessons that must be learned throughout the early stages of trial and error to determine how military and political intelligence assets must amalgamate itself into the state’s domestic and international agenda. Meanwhile, other mistakes were avoidable if proper leadership had been exercised. Overall, these deficiencies, while by no means decisive to the failure of “Lockhart Conspiracy”, nevertheless revealed many facets of intelligence operation upon which Britain must improve.
The October Revolution inaugurated the Bolsheviks, which resolutely objected to continuing Russian contribution to the war against Germany. Such drastic reversal of the strategic situation left leaders of western Entente powers in trepidation. Britain’s immediate response was to prevent a Russian withdrawal by whatever means available. The approach that Britain should undertake to achieve this objective had subsequently become a point of contention between various factions within the government. Ultimately, the recommendations of Bruce Lockhart, British envoy to Russia, swayed the bureaucratic deadlock in favour of dialogue with the Bolsheviks. (Debo, 1971) Notwithstanding the condition “on the ground”, Lockhart’s proposal for dialogue with the Bolshevik government was a natural policy inclination dictated by virtue of his position. As a bureaucrat in the Foreign Service, Lockhart's job was to formulate diplomatic solutions to international issues. More hard-line options that were designed to subvert Bolshevik control over Russia, as endorsed by some conservative elements in Britain, would have involved manoeuvres outside of the scope of his authority, resulting in a severe depletion of his potency on the subject in question. Meanwhile, the British government also had a strong incentive for dialogue with Russia, in spite of tenacious opposition from the right. Britain’s strategic situation demanded effective results to be achieved within the shortest possible timeframe. Disregarding Lenin’s promise of “peace”, direct dialogue indeed offered such prospect. However, it was precisely the wilful negligence to this decisive political dynamic that led to its grave miscalculation. British policy-makers have overlooked the crucial contribution Lenin’s pledge for “peace” have made to his ascendancy to power; thus failing to fully acknowledge the likelihood of the Bolsheviks simply turning their back to whatever Britain had to offer. This policy omission, compounded by a weak bureaucratic structure upholding the ad hoc mission to Russia, proved to be the first of a series of failures leading up to the “Lockhart Conspiracy”.
Britain’s endeavour in maintaining the Eastern Front was decimated when the treaty of Brest-Litvosk was signed in March 1918, allowing Germany to redeploy its troops west against itself and France. Dismayed by this unfavourable shift in Europe’s geo-strategic arrangements, Foreign Office in London scrambled to concoct a “Plan B” to keep Russia in the war. Within diplomatic circles this was viewed as a humiliating defeat for Britain, especially those “dovish” elements that pushed for dialogue. Instigated by this fiasco, hawkish attitudes became prevalent, and calls for intervention were strong not only in Britain, but also in France. Despite having initially supported dialogue with Russia before Brest-Litvosk, Lockhart was compelled to reverse his position and adopted a hard-line approach towards the Bolsheviks in order to salvage his political career, which was severely damaged from his failure to prevent Russia’s withdrawal. (Debo, 1971) In pursuit of his objective, Lockhart vehemently appealed for Allied intervention in Russia, hoping that his first-hand account contained enough credibility to sway policy discussions at home in his favour. Meanwhile, Lockhart actively engaged in secretive activities against the Bolshevik regime. In preparation for an imminent Allied intervention, he provided financial subsidies to organizations and individuals that were committed to confronting Bolshevik rule through methods of sabotage, assassination, and rebellion. This enterprise was drastically expanded when Sydney Reilly and other British agents entered; and it was also precisely in this conjunction that Lockhart’s mission in Russia spun beyond his own control.
Principal-agent dilemma was one of the central themes which defined the difficulties encountered by each party involved in “Lockhart Conspiracy”. In this model, the “principal”, who delegates a task to its agent finds the latter approaching the task in a way that does not suit its best interest but is powerless to stop it. Such circumstance often entailed a combination of inept leadership and imbalance of intelligence availability based on which a decision can be made and assessed, as were illustrated in the Foreign Office’s management of Lockhart’s mission. While it cannot be faulted for giving Lockhart considerable freedom to conduct in accordance with specific circumstances “on the ground”, the Foreign Office failed to employ proper measures to ensure those conducts were appropriate. Throughout early stages of the plot’s execution the Foreign Office was generously complicit; Lockhart’s mission promised a critical role for which it could claim credit in a military intervention. If successful, it would indeed have been a remarkable recovery from the embarrassment of Brest-Litvosk. Hence, the Foreign Office had done little to scrutinize the mission and acquiesced to all of Lockhart’s financial requests. Furthermore, even if it attempted to monitor Lockhart’s plot more closely from London, that would not have necessarily led to a more accurate appraisal of the risks involved. Lockhart too was evidently troubled by the “principal-agent” dilemma. Because he lacked the necessary skill set, he therefore must rely on Reilly to administer the operational aspect of the plot. However, the relentless spy had little appetite for bureaucratic constraints and, against the advice of caution from the diplomatic circle, proceeded by his own design leading straight into Dzerzhinsky’s trap. (Debo, 1971)
Very little of what is considered essential components to a functioning bureaucracy existed between leaders in London and their envoys in Russia. The mismatch between the Foreign Office’s traditional overt style and the clandestine operation it attempted to carry out in this occasion was crucial to its ultimate breakdown. Given the sophistication of training and organization required, which the Foreign Office could not independently deliver, the entire chain of command was reversed. Lockhart was relegated to simply a logistic officer for Reilly, providing financial assistance at his request. The individuals that were instrumental to the plot’s success answered to Reilly rather than the Foreign Office, giving the former total control despite the latter’s resistance. This was evident in several important conjunctions throughout the plot’s execution. Buikis and Sprogis, both of whom were Dzerzhinsky’s agent provocateurs, were discovered and introduced to Lockhart by Reilly and another British agent Captain Cromie. When Lockhart received the two agents, his confirmation of their bona fide was an introduction letter from Captain Cromie; it is safe to assume that Lockhart had no other institutional resources at his disposal for further investigation. He therefore must devote his full confidence in the operator’s ability to make the right decision. Under such power arrangement, if Reilly had committed an error, there would not have been any means of remedy available to address it. Unfortunately for the British, Reilly’s error was grave and decisive.
Several years after the debacle of “Lockhart Conspiracy”, it was Britain’s turn to face the threat of intervention on its internal affairs from the Soviet Union. The partisan rivalry over Britain’s Soviet policy persisted through the groundbreaking visit by Soviet trade delegation, and culminated in the controversial “Zinoviev Letter” which led to a severe setback in Soviet-British relation and finally its complete break off in 1927. Debates over the handling of documents with potentially serious ramifications on the Soviet-British relation epitomized a larger conflict over how the government ought to approach a well-entrenched radical Bolshevik regime. In this the liberal Prime Minister Lloyd George was challenged by a robust faction of determined conservatives, who viewed his mild attitude as a hindrance to Britain’s national interest.
To counteract against Lloyd George’s diplomatic initiation, the Tories, which oversaw foreign and secret services, wanted to publicize intercepted cable and wireless messages which indicted the Soviet Union of attempting to subvert the government to expel the Soviet trade delegation. Notwithstanding the risk of alerting the Soviets of their messages being read by foreign secret service, they believed it is in the interest of Britain’s national security to raise public awareness and subsequently political motive to pre-empt the alleged Bolshevik conspiracy. (Andrew, 1977) Within this policy debate, the secret service was instrumental in providing the Tories with incriminating evidence of Soviet subversion, allowing the latter to apply overwhelming pressure on the reluctant Prime Minister to reprimand the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Lloyd George was not in denial of Soviet attempts to command a certain degree of influence over British communist organizations. His belief was that the threat of such activity did not preponderate the benefit of rapprochement between Britain and the Soviet. Hence, while accepting the assertion that the Bolsheviks are conducting propaganda activities in Britain, he resisted demands for a diplomatic break off on the basis that the threat of such activity has been greatly exaggerated by the conservatives. In an attempt to placate their indignation, however, Lloyd George disclosed a package of intercepted messages that were carefully selected to contain the damage. (Strafford, 1997) With little compromise and remarkable persistence, the Prime Minister was able to conclude the trade negotiation with the Soviet delegation.
The British government’s successful endeavours toward formalizing diplomatic relation with the Soviet Union intensified strains between the Prime Minister and the foreign and secret service branches. Under Ramsay MacDonald’s cabinet Britain had signed a commercial treaty with the Soviet Union. This time the Prime Minister circumvented the Foreign Office by appointing a pro-Russian delegate staffed with MPs rather than Foreign Office cadres to be in charge of the negotiations. (Andrew, 1977) The rapid advance of Soviet-British relations, coupled by some signs of obvious distrust displayed by the Prime Minister to the hardliners only enhanced their sense of urgency on regaining control over Soviet policies. Until this point the secret service restrained its release of intercepts to just wireless messages at the cabinet’s consent; there were certain avenues of acquisition that was so controversial nobody considered its leakage appropriate. This would change when the general election puts everything at stake in 1924. When the SIS was provided the “Zinoviev letter” by a “trusted source” (many historians suspect this source to be Sydney Reilly), the hawkish heads of secret service believed that the circumstance warranted the publication of this document. (Carr, 1979) It was the continuous rapprochement between Russia and Britain that precipitated a response of such proportion from the conservatives despite its anticipated repercussion to the works of the secret service. The letter did achieve its purpose of discrediting the Labour cabinet’s foreign policy, but it had also set a regrettable precedent for compromising intelligence work for political expedience. When the conservatives returned to power after the 1924 election, its abhorrent lack of discipline in managing the intelligence apparatus continued in pursuit of a hard-line Soviet policy. Finally, in 1927 it was able to find the proper excuse from its intercepts to break off diplomatic ties with the communist state, but in the process also dealt irreversible damage to what was Britain’s most effective tool of intelligence acquisition against the Soviet Union. After 1927 the Soviet Union adopted new codes for its internal communication, effectively shutting out British access. (Andrew, 1982)
While releases of Soviet intercepts were instrumental in the partisan standoff throughout the early 1920s leading up to the Zinoviev letter, the conservatives’ continuation of such practice after its ascendancy to power in 1924 indicates that it did not view the nation’s intelligence apparatus solely in terms of a tool for power struggle. But neither was it employed to provide information based on which the government devised its Soviet policy. The conservatives had long made it their paramount objective to end such bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union as established by its liberal predecessor; it did not require further corroboration of such intent from intelligence sources. Thus, the primary utility of the state intelligence apparatus in this context was to seek out pieces of information on Soviet activities and intentions that would justify breaking off diplomatic relationship with the communist state beyond any reasonable opposition from the left. This is not to say that these monitoring activities were irrelevant to the government’s effort in maintaining security and stability of the country; the conservatives indeed believed in the existence of a subversive plot against Britain, as reflected in their hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union. However, whether they genuinely perceived the plot to pose as much of a threat as they have claimed is subjected to debate. With what information they have acquired, the conservative leaders of Britain could substantiate nothing more than the existence of a Soviet intention for the crimes they were accused of. Almost no empirical evidence was discovered on any concrete steps taken to fulfill them. Perhaps it is an indication that the Soviet capacity to deliver on their declared intention was severely limited, which would thus invalidate the argument that sacrificing Britain’s capacity to intercept foreign communications was worthy of averting a Bolshevik revolution.
Both of the aforementioned cases displayed issues concerning various aspects of espionage that are either intrinsic to its bureaucratic nature, or have arisen as a result of its transformation towards an institution dedicated to operate in a novel environment. Unlike war-time operations, where the objectives were uniform and clear, during peacetime intelligence work becomes more heterogeneous and ambiguous. This absence of a comprehensive regulation and convention left the secret service open for politicians and bureaucrats to exploit to their own advantage, but not necessarily to the benefit of the state, as were reflected in Lockhart’s attempt to salvage his career, and the conservative’s campaign to influence Britain’s Soviet policy. More knowledge of how and for what purpose espionage should be employed will gradually be accumulated, but intelligence service will remain in essence a government bureaucracy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andrew, Christopher. British Intelligence and the Breach with Russia in 1927. The Historical Journal, vol. 25, No 4 (Dec, 1982), pp. 957-964. Cambridge University Press
Andrew, Christopher. The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920s Part I: From the Trade Negotiations to the Zinoviev Letter. The Historical Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 1977), pp. 673-706
Carr, E.H. The Zinoviev Letter . The Historical Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 209-210
Debo, Richard. Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinskii plot. The Journal of Modern History, vol. 43, No. 3 (Sep, 1971), pp 413-439. University of Chicago Press
Jeffrey T. Richelson. A Century of Spies. Chapter 4. “Lenin’s Spies”
Strafford, David. Churchill and the Secret Service. London: Albemarle Street. 1997
As World War I approached its end the international order entered a period of drastic transition. In effect, modern institutions of espionage, as a product of war, were obligated to redefine its purpose and function in service to the country. Arising from such transition was a state of uncertainty over the mission of the intelligence service and how they ought to be carried out. In Britain, the cradle of modern espionage, political factions competed for the right to govern according to their respective interests the use of the secret intelligence service. Like all government institutions, intelligence operations are not immune to abuse of power and bureaucratic infighting. Under such circumstances, even if each unitary actor was behaving in the most rational manner, they could still generate irrational results as a collectivity.
To examine the influence of political and bureaucratic factors on intelligence operation in the post-WWI period, this paper will survey “Lockhart Conspiracy” and “Zinoviev Letter” as two historical cases in which these influence was evident. Both cases exemplified the roles of individual and factional goals in the wider context of state policy making execution.
Lockhart’s attempted subversion of the Bolshevik regime in Russia using Britain’s state intelligence apparatus was a testament to the lack of maturity this new service branch has yet to overcome. Originally purported to provide intelligence gathering and analysis in the formulation of military strategies, the intelligence service and its leadership struggled to define its modus operandi in face of an evolving international atmosphere, from which new challenges arose to render the established conventions of practice obsolete. The British policy makers’ “blind faith” in the intelligence branch to topple the Bolshevik regime in Russia was a product of several factors ranging from strategic miscalculation to bureaucratic dysfunction. Certain aspects can be attributed to the inevitable lessons that must be learned throughout the early stages of trial and error to determine how military and political intelligence assets must amalgamate itself into the state’s domestic and international agenda. Meanwhile, other mistakes were avoidable if proper leadership had been exercised. Overall, these deficiencies, while by no means decisive to the failure of “Lockhart Conspiracy”, nevertheless revealed many facets of intelligence operation upon which Britain must improve.
The October Revolution inaugurated the Bolsheviks, which resolutely objected to continuing Russian contribution to the war against Germany. Such drastic reversal of the strategic situation left leaders of western Entente powers in trepidation. Britain’s immediate response was to prevent a Russian withdrawal by whatever means available. The approach that Britain should undertake to achieve this objective had subsequently become a point of contention between various factions within the government. Ultimately, the recommendations of Bruce Lockhart, British envoy to Russia, swayed the bureaucratic deadlock in favour of dialogue with the Bolsheviks. (Debo, 1971) Notwithstanding the condition “on the ground”, Lockhart’s proposal for dialogue with the Bolshevik government was a natural policy inclination dictated by virtue of his position. As a bureaucrat in the Foreign Service, Lockhart's job was to formulate diplomatic solutions to international issues. More hard-line options that were designed to subvert Bolshevik control over Russia, as endorsed by some conservative elements in Britain, would have involved manoeuvres outside of the scope of his authority, resulting in a severe depletion of his potency on the subject in question. Meanwhile, the British government also had a strong incentive for dialogue with Russia, in spite of tenacious opposition from the right. Britain’s strategic situation demanded effective results to be achieved within the shortest possible timeframe. Disregarding Lenin’s promise of “peace”, direct dialogue indeed offered such prospect. However, it was precisely the wilful negligence to this decisive political dynamic that led to its grave miscalculation. British policy-makers have overlooked the crucial contribution Lenin’s pledge for “peace” have made to his ascendancy to power; thus failing to fully acknowledge the likelihood of the Bolsheviks simply turning their back to whatever Britain had to offer. This policy omission, compounded by a weak bureaucratic structure upholding the ad hoc mission to Russia, proved to be the first of a series of failures leading up to the “Lockhart Conspiracy”.
Britain’s endeavour in maintaining the Eastern Front was decimated when the treaty of Brest-Litvosk was signed in March 1918, allowing Germany to redeploy its troops west against itself and France. Dismayed by this unfavourable shift in Europe’s geo-strategic arrangements, Foreign Office in London scrambled to concoct a “Plan B” to keep Russia in the war. Within diplomatic circles this was viewed as a humiliating defeat for Britain, especially those “dovish” elements that pushed for dialogue. Instigated by this fiasco, hawkish attitudes became prevalent, and calls for intervention were strong not only in Britain, but also in France. Despite having initially supported dialogue with Russia before Brest-Litvosk, Lockhart was compelled to reverse his position and adopted a hard-line approach towards the Bolsheviks in order to salvage his political career, which was severely damaged from his failure to prevent Russia’s withdrawal. (Debo, 1971) In pursuit of his objective, Lockhart vehemently appealed for Allied intervention in Russia, hoping that his first-hand account contained enough credibility to sway policy discussions at home in his favour. Meanwhile, Lockhart actively engaged in secretive activities against the Bolshevik regime. In preparation for an imminent Allied intervention, he provided financial subsidies to organizations and individuals that were committed to confronting Bolshevik rule through methods of sabotage, assassination, and rebellion. This enterprise was drastically expanded when Sydney Reilly and other British agents entered; and it was also precisely in this conjunction that Lockhart’s mission in Russia spun beyond his own control.
Principal-agent dilemma was one of the central themes which defined the difficulties encountered by each party involved in “Lockhart Conspiracy”. In this model, the “principal”, who delegates a task to its agent finds the latter approaching the task in a way that does not suit its best interest but is powerless to stop it. Such circumstance often entailed a combination of inept leadership and imbalance of intelligence availability based on which a decision can be made and assessed, as were illustrated in the Foreign Office’s management of Lockhart’s mission. While it cannot be faulted for giving Lockhart considerable freedom to conduct in accordance with specific circumstances “on the ground”, the Foreign Office failed to employ proper measures to ensure those conducts were appropriate. Throughout early stages of the plot’s execution the Foreign Office was generously complicit; Lockhart’s mission promised a critical role for which it could claim credit in a military intervention. If successful, it would indeed have been a remarkable recovery from the embarrassment of Brest-Litvosk. Hence, the Foreign Office had done little to scrutinize the mission and acquiesced to all of Lockhart’s financial requests. Furthermore, even if it attempted to monitor Lockhart’s plot more closely from London, that would not have necessarily led to a more accurate appraisal of the risks involved. Lockhart too was evidently troubled by the “principal-agent” dilemma. Because he lacked the necessary skill set, he therefore must rely on Reilly to administer the operational aspect of the plot. However, the relentless spy had little appetite for bureaucratic constraints and, against the advice of caution from the diplomatic circle, proceeded by his own design leading straight into Dzerzhinsky’s trap. (Debo, 1971)
Very little of what is considered essential components to a functioning bureaucracy existed between leaders in London and their envoys in Russia. The mismatch between the Foreign Office’s traditional overt style and the clandestine operation it attempted to carry out in this occasion was crucial to its ultimate breakdown. Given the sophistication of training and organization required, which the Foreign Office could not independently deliver, the entire chain of command was reversed. Lockhart was relegated to simply a logistic officer for Reilly, providing financial assistance at his request. The individuals that were instrumental to the plot’s success answered to Reilly rather than the Foreign Office, giving the former total control despite the latter’s resistance. This was evident in several important conjunctions throughout the plot’s execution. Buikis and Sprogis, both of whom were Dzerzhinsky’s agent provocateurs, were discovered and introduced to Lockhart by Reilly and another British agent Captain Cromie. When Lockhart received the two agents, his confirmation of their bona fide was an introduction letter from Captain Cromie; it is safe to assume that Lockhart had no other institutional resources at his disposal for further investigation. He therefore must devote his full confidence in the operator’s ability to make the right decision. Under such power arrangement, if Reilly had committed an error, there would not have been any means of remedy available to address it. Unfortunately for the British, Reilly’s error was grave and decisive.
Several years after the debacle of “Lockhart Conspiracy”, it was Britain’s turn to face the threat of intervention on its internal affairs from the Soviet Union. The partisan rivalry over Britain’s Soviet policy persisted through the groundbreaking visit by Soviet trade delegation, and culminated in the controversial “Zinoviev Letter” which led to a severe setback in Soviet-British relation and finally its complete break off in 1927. Debates over the handling of documents with potentially serious ramifications on the Soviet-British relation epitomized a larger conflict over how the government ought to approach a well-entrenched radical Bolshevik regime. In this the liberal Prime Minister Lloyd George was challenged by a robust faction of determined conservatives, who viewed his mild attitude as a hindrance to Britain’s national interest.
To counteract against Lloyd George’s diplomatic initiation, the Tories, which oversaw foreign and secret services, wanted to publicize intercepted cable and wireless messages which indicted the Soviet Union of attempting to subvert the government to expel the Soviet trade delegation. Notwithstanding the risk of alerting the Soviets of their messages being read by foreign secret service, they believed it is in the interest of Britain’s national security to raise public awareness and subsequently political motive to pre-empt the alleged Bolshevik conspiracy. (Andrew, 1977) Within this policy debate, the secret service was instrumental in providing the Tories with incriminating evidence of Soviet subversion, allowing the latter to apply overwhelming pressure on the reluctant Prime Minister to reprimand the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Lloyd George was not in denial of Soviet attempts to command a certain degree of influence over British communist organizations. His belief was that the threat of such activity did not preponderate the benefit of rapprochement between Britain and the Soviet. Hence, while accepting the assertion that the Bolsheviks are conducting propaganda activities in Britain, he resisted demands for a diplomatic break off on the basis that the threat of such activity has been greatly exaggerated by the conservatives. In an attempt to placate their indignation, however, Lloyd George disclosed a package of intercepted messages that were carefully selected to contain the damage. (Strafford, 1997) With little compromise and remarkable persistence, the Prime Minister was able to conclude the trade negotiation with the Soviet delegation.
The British government’s successful endeavours toward formalizing diplomatic relation with the Soviet Union intensified strains between the Prime Minister and the foreign and secret service branches. Under Ramsay MacDonald’s cabinet Britain had signed a commercial treaty with the Soviet Union. This time the Prime Minister circumvented the Foreign Office by appointing a pro-Russian delegate staffed with MPs rather than Foreign Office cadres to be in charge of the negotiations. (Andrew, 1977) The rapid advance of Soviet-British relations, coupled by some signs of obvious distrust displayed by the Prime Minister to the hardliners only enhanced their sense of urgency on regaining control over Soviet policies. Until this point the secret service restrained its release of intercepts to just wireless messages at the cabinet’s consent; there were certain avenues of acquisition that was so controversial nobody considered its leakage appropriate. This would change when the general election puts everything at stake in 1924. When the SIS was provided the “Zinoviev letter” by a “trusted source” (many historians suspect this source to be Sydney Reilly), the hawkish heads of secret service believed that the circumstance warranted the publication of this document. (Carr, 1979) It was the continuous rapprochement between Russia and Britain that precipitated a response of such proportion from the conservatives despite its anticipated repercussion to the works of the secret service. The letter did achieve its purpose of discrediting the Labour cabinet’s foreign policy, but it had also set a regrettable precedent for compromising intelligence work for political expedience. When the conservatives returned to power after the 1924 election, its abhorrent lack of discipline in managing the intelligence apparatus continued in pursuit of a hard-line Soviet policy. Finally, in 1927 it was able to find the proper excuse from its intercepts to break off diplomatic ties with the communist state, but in the process also dealt irreversible damage to what was Britain’s most effective tool of intelligence acquisition against the Soviet Union. After 1927 the Soviet Union adopted new codes for its internal communication, effectively shutting out British access. (Andrew, 1982)
While releases of Soviet intercepts were instrumental in the partisan standoff throughout the early 1920s leading up to the Zinoviev letter, the conservatives’ continuation of such practice after its ascendancy to power in 1924 indicates that it did not view the nation’s intelligence apparatus solely in terms of a tool for power struggle. But neither was it employed to provide information based on which the government devised its Soviet policy. The conservatives had long made it their paramount objective to end such bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union as established by its liberal predecessor; it did not require further corroboration of such intent from intelligence sources. Thus, the primary utility of the state intelligence apparatus in this context was to seek out pieces of information on Soviet activities and intentions that would justify breaking off diplomatic relationship with the communist state beyond any reasonable opposition from the left. This is not to say that these monitoring activities were irrelevant to the government’s effort in maintaining security and stability of the country; the conservatives indeed believed in the existence of a subversive plot against Britain, as reflected in their hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union. However, whether they genuinely perceived the plot to pose as much of a threat as they have claimed is subjected to debate. With what information they have acquired, the conservative leaders of Britain could substantiate nothing more than the existence of a Soviet intention for the crimes they were accused of. Almost no empirical evidence was discovered on any concrete steps taken to fulfill them. Perhaps it is an indication that the Soviet capacity to deliver on their declared intention was severely limited, which would thus invalidate the argument that sacrificing Britain’s capacity to intercept foreign communications was worthy of averting a Bolshevik revolution.
Both of the aforementioned cases displayed issues concerning various aspects of espionage that are either intrinsic to its bureaucratic nature, or have arisen as a result of its transformation towards an institution dedicated to operate in a novel environment. Unlike war-time operations, where the objectives were uniform and clear, during peacetime intelligence work becomes more heterogeneous and ambiguous. This absence of a comprehensive regulation and convention left the secret service open for politicians and bureaucrats to exploit to their own advantage, but not necessarily to the benefit of the state, as were reflected in Lockhart’s attempt to salvage his career, and the conservative’s campaign to influence Britain’s Soviet policy. More knowledge of how and for what purpose espionage should be employed will gradually be accumulated, but intelligence service will remain in essence a government bureaucracy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andrew, Christopher. British Intelligence and the Breach with Russia in 1927. The Historical Journal, vol. 25, No 4 (Dec, 1982), pp. 957-964. Cambridge University Press
Andrew, Christopher. The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920s Part I: From the Trade Negotiations to the Zinoviev Letter. The Historical Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 1977), pp. 673-706
Carr, E.H. The Zinoviev Letter . The Historical Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 209-210
Debo, Richard. Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinskii plot. The Journal of Modern History, vol. 43, No. 3 (Sep, 1971), pp 413-439. University of Chicago Press
Jeffrey T. Richelson. A Century of Spies. Chapter 4. “Lenin’s Spies”
Strafford, David. Churchill and the Secret Service. London: Albemarle Street. 1997
看了前面一段。用词风格很奇怪。
嗯。又看了最后一段，语句顺多了，楼主水平进步不少。
看了前面一段。用词风格很奇怪。
嗯。又看了最后一段，语句顺多了，楼主水平进步不少。
方言都还给老师了
屠狗英雄 发表于 2011-2-7 14:23
您误会了,第一个那个我发了未修正版本.写论文的时候一般都搞几个备份文件防止电脑抽风.所以最后修改的时候就会修改一个文件然后其它的就54了.其实这些个也就是最近两年写的论文...再老的找不到了:')
您误会了,第一个那个我发了未修正版本.写论文的时候一般都搞几个备份文件防止电脑抽风.所以最后修改的时候就会修改一个文件然后其它的就54了.其实这些个也就是最近两年写的论文...再老的找不到了:')
LZ这就发了，不怕被turn it in当作plagiarism么？
回复 7# 汝儿乃我
英语里两个意思，最好分成2句话，这样意思清楚。一句话里主语不清，是语病。
英语里两个意思，最好分成2句话，这样意思清楚。一句话里主语不清，是语病。
写得不错。
有外交季刊的风格
有外交季刊的风格
xihe 发表于 2011-2-7 14:58
这您就有所不知了，现在写作流行的是尽量用字母多的单词，然后就是尽量用最复杂的sentence structure。传说中的装13嘛
不过即便如此：Regime change throughout history were often accompanied by bloody revolts and armed insurrections.这句话里也没有两个意思啊，就一个意思
这您就有所不知了，现在写作流行的是尽量用字母多的单词，然后就是尽量用最复杂的sentence structure。传说中的装13嘛
不过即便如此：Regime change throughout history were often accompanied by bloody revolts and armed insurrections.这句话里也没有两个意思啊，就一个意思
gogolo750 发表于 2011-2-7 14:52
这些都是发回来，我都拿到分了的，谁也说不了啥...你们也用turn it in?
这些都是发回来，我都拿到分了的，谁也说不了啥...你们也用turn it in?
26个字母我都认识{:cha:}
呵呵，很牛嘛。 俺大学上了那么多年，最不喜欢写东西。 English Composition 1和2 统统当掉了。。。
怎么是鸟语的 看了前几行 后面的压力太大就不想看了回复 15# 汝儿乃我
哈哈，复杂结构是很不好的习惯。
另外，虽然你又改了下，还是有问题。比如现在的第一段第二句Rarely has an authoritarian government ceded power in such a peaceful and orderly manner as was the case with German Democratic Republic (GDR).应该是rarely there has been。
第一句如果regime changes 改成regime change 那were 也该改成 was 当然在你这句的意思哩我觉得还是加s 比较好。
后面还没看，只看到前两句。哈哈，主题应该不错的，随便提点意见，别见怪。
哈哈，复杂结构是很不好的习惯。
另外，虽然你又改了下，还是有问题。比如现在的第一段第二句Rarely has an authoritarian government ceded power in such a peaceful and orderly manner as was the case with German Democratic Republic (GDR).应该是rarely there has been。
第一句如果regime changes 改成regime change 那were 也该改成 was 当然在你这句的意思哩我觉得还是加s 比较好。
后面还没看，只看到前两句。哈哈，主题应该不错的，随便提点意见，别见怪。
汝儿乃我 发表于 2011-2-7 16:04
用 plain English 造福人民大众吧。。。
用 plain English 造福人民大众吧。。。
回复 21# liangkangping
哈哈，楼主的精神很可嘉，斑竹应该加分。英语如果不是专业学外语或是在国外待过的，也算过得去。最好能多读读圣经之类，把语言修剪得更通顺，更简洁。文法问题主要是语感的问题，多读自然能发掘别扭的地方。
哈哈，楼主的精神很可嘉，斑竹应该加分。英语如果不是专业学外语或是在国外待过的，也算过得去。最好能多读读圣经之类，把语言修剪得更通顺，更简洁。文法问题主要是语感的问题，多读自然能发掘别扭的地方。
额，楼主，我虽然看得懂英文，但是说实话，满篇的英文看的我眼睛痛啊
回复 22# xihe
等茶馆的斑竹给他加分。
等茶馆的斑竹给他加分。
额，看错了，以为你是这边斑竹。
呵呵，首先要表达对LZ的赞许，毕竟一个本科生就能有这种钻研学术的热情，在当今实属难得。不过，不明白LZ为何都要用鸟文写，如果是自己纯为练习英语写作水平，倒也不错，不过我还是觉得，咱还是先用汉语写好论文，写出一篇真正像样的论文，这才是王道。如果只是为了显摆自己的鸟文水平，那就……
另外，不知道LZ是什么专业的，是外语专业的，还是历史专业的。历史论文有历史论文的格式和风格，从这一点说的话，LZ的文章格式都是不合规格的，或者说，LZ你写的这些只能算是文章，不能算是论文。我目前正在读世界史专业的研究生，如果LZ想写历史类的论文的话，我可以和LZ交流交流，呵呵，如果LZ有兴趣，我可以贴几篇我写的文章，大家一起探讨。
另外，不知道LZ是什么专业的，是外语专业的，还是历史专业的。历史论文有历史论文的格式和风格，从这一点说的话，LZ的文章格式都是不合规格的，或者说，LZ你写的这些只能算是文章，不能算是论文。我目前正在读世界史专业的研究生，如果LZ想写历史类的论文的话，我可以和LZ交流交流，呵呵，如果LZ有兴趣，我可以贴几篇我写的文章，大家一起探讨。
回复 26# 水之秋
欢迎原创，贴几篇欣赏下
欢迎原创，贴几篇欣赏下
呃~连二级目和关键词都没有的论文，确实看起来比较费力，何况还是洋文呢。
用 plain English 造福人民大众吧。。。
liangkangping 发表于 2011-2-7 17:58
弄得太直白，老师给分就不高了，这是无情的现实。
用 plain English 造福人民大众吧。。。
liangkangping 发表于 2011-2-7 17:58
弄得太直白，老师给分就不高了，这是无情的现实。
回复 29# Lion
莫非读不懂的英文才是好的？哈哈，如果大学老师都这样，中国教育差不多快完蛋了。
莫非读不懂的英文才是好的？哈哈，如果大学老师都这样，中国教育差不多快完蛋了。
xihe 发表于 2011-2-7 23:05
人家是在国外，要求自然不同。
人家是在国外，要求自然不同。
回复 31# Lion
怪不得，我还以为是中国的历史老师这么要求呢，那简直太bt了。
没在国外读过书，表示不了解国外情况。
怪不得，我还以为是中国的历史老师这么要求呢，那简直太bt了。
没在国外读过书，表示不了解国外情况。
回复 Lion
怪不得，我还以为是中国的历史老师这么要求呢，那简直太bt了。
没在国外读过书，表示不了 ...
xihe 发表于 2011-2-7 23:09
LZ的文章是加拿大学术论文格式，其要求和国内有所不同。
回复 Lion
怪不得，我还以为是中国的历史老师这么要求呢，那简直太bt了。
没在国外读过书，表示不了 ...
xihe 发表于 2011-2-7 23:09
LZ的文章是加拿大学术论文格式，其要求和国内有所不同。
xihe 发表于 2011-2-7 17:26
如果加上there的话是病句,你自己读一读看看能不能读通.
如果加上there的话是病句,你自己读一读看看能不能读通.
回复 34# 汝儿乃我
这个明显是there be 句型，表示有的意思，没加才是病句。
这个明显是there be 句型，表示有的意思，没加才是病句。
水之秋 发表于 2011-2-7 22:02
都贴进来吧
都贴进来吧
楼主是在国外留学么还是英语专业？本科论文，强悍。
楼主是在国外留学么还是英语专业？本科论文，强悍。
汝儿乃我 发表于 2011-2-7 16:06
TURNITIN就先是老美发扬光大的吧。。。。
TURNITIN就先是老美发扬光大的吧。。。。
ROCKYMAN 发表于 2011-2-8 00:53
其实呢，就算是 freshmen 的 paper 正常要求10-15页 差不多2000-3000字，还一个学期至少2篇。。。
不得不说 很多的国内大学教育抓的很不紧。。
其实呢，就算是 freshmen 的 paper 正常要求10-15页 差不多2000-3000字，还一个学期至少2篇。。。
不得不说 很多的国内大学教育抓的很不紧。。
xihe 发表于 2011-2-7 21:06
二炮和转载
二炮和转载