超级军网《经济学人》：中印的百年之争(图)
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/30 02:04:00
| 《经济学人》：中印的百年之争(图) |
| 2010年08月23日 来源： 新华国际 |
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2010年8月19日出版的英国《经济学人》杂志封面 100多年前，号称“日不落帝国”的大英帝国开始衰落，美国、日本、德国等新兴势力开始登上国际舞台。现在，中国超越日本成为世界第二大经济体，很多西方人开始关注中国何时超越美国。但在亚洲，中国有一个正在恢复经济的对手——印度。随着这两个亚洲超级大国的先后崛起，它们之间的关系将对世界政治产生深远影响。 作为世界上人口最多的国家，中国已经成为世界最大出口国、最大的汽车市场。随着权力平衡的改变，中国的军事实力和科技实力都在不断升级，太空科技和网络技术也在高速发展。印度同样不甘落后，与中国50年前的短暂冲突依然留下恨意，对中国的猜忌依然根深蒂固。印度将中国看作破坏其各个领域发展的对手，包括能源供应、联合国安理会常任理事国地位、与南亚小国的友谊等。印度近年来还与中国在边境问题上强硬起来，更加与美国接近，并且签署了有争议的核合作协议。 中国将印度列为重点关注的长期对手。中国的适龄工作人口正在减少，而印度却有充足的人力支持其继续发展，甚至有朝一日超越中国也并非幻想。印度的军队数量仅次于中国，成为西方平衡中国的主要力量。但中印爆发大战的可能性正在降低，20世纪已经证明，利益冲突导致的战争将产生致命的后果。 20世纪西方设置的规则体系给与了新兴力量巨大的优势，但这反映了过时的世界秩序，而不是当前的全球平衡。中国和印度应该在21世纪形成的新秩序中起到更大的作用。但这要求西方作出让步，也要求中印对以规则为基础的国际秩序做出承诺，努力解决他们之间的分歧。(来源：国际在线 杨柳) |
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-08/23/c_12472532.htm《经济学人》：中印的百年之争(图)
2010年08月23日 来源： 新华国际
2010年8月19日出版的英国《经济学人》杂志封面
100多年前，号称“日不落帝国”的大英帝国开始衰落，美国、日本、德国等新兴势力开始登上国际舞台。现在，中国超越日本成为世界第二大经济体，很多西方人开始关注中国何时超越美国。但在亚洲，中国有一个正在恢复经济的对手——印度。随着这两个亚洲超级大国的先后崛起，它们之间的关系将对世界政治产生深远影响。
作为世界上人口最多的国家，中国已经成为世界最大出口国、最大的汽车市场。随着权力平衡的改变，中国的军事实力和科技实力都在不断升级，太空科技和网络技术也在高速发展。印度同样不甘落后，与中国50年前的短暂冲突依然留下恨意，对中国的猜忌依然根深蒂固。印度将中国看作破坏其各个领域发展的对手，包括能源供应、联合国安理会常任理事国地位、与南亚小国的友谊等。印度近年来还与中国在边境问题上强硬起来，更加与美国接近，并且签署了有争议的核合作协议。
中国将印度列为重点关注的长期对手。中国的适龄工作人口正在减少，而印度却有充足的人力支持其继续发展，甚至有朝一日超越中国也并非幻想。印度的军队数量仅次于中国，成为西方平衡中国的主要力量。但中印爆发大战的可能性正在降低，20世纪已经证明，利益冲突导致的战争将产生致命的后果。
20世纪西方设置的规则体系给与了新兴力量巨大的优势，但这反映了过时的世界秩序，而不是当前的全球平衡。中国和印度应该在21世纪形成的新秩序中起到更大的作用。但这要求西方作出让步，也要求中印对以规则为基础的国际秩序做出承诺，努力解决他们之间的分歧。(来源：国际在线 杨柳)
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-08/23/c_12472532.htm
说到适龄人口就知道什么鸟文章了
印度人就是被太多这样的狗屁文章给忽悠傻的。
中国从来不把印度当对手。
当然了，为了照顾印度的情绪，可以那几个中西部的省，和印度比一下。
当然了，为了照顾印度的情绪，可以那几个中西部的省，和印度比一下。
就像中国短时间内无法超越美国，印度在短时间内无法超越中国。
回复 1# 大刀斩RB
可有全文?:D
可有全文?:D
As China and India rise in tandem, their relationship will shape world politics. Shame they do not get on better: : leader
Contest of the century
As China and India rise in tandem, their relationship will shape world politics. Shame they do not get on better
Aug 19th 2010
201034ldp001.jpg
A HUNDRED years ago it was perhaps already possible to discern the rising powers whose interaction and competition would shape the 20th century. The sun that shone on the British empire had passed midday. Vigorous new forces were flexing their muscles on the global stage, notably America, Japan and Germany. Their emergence brought undreamed-of prosperity; but also carnage on a scale hitherto unimaginable.
Now digest the main historical event of this week: China has officially become the world’s second-biggest economy, overtaking Japan. In the West this has prompted concerns about China overtaking the United States sooner than previously thought. But stand back a little farther, apply a more Asian perspective, and China’s longer-term contest is with that other recovering economic behemoth: India. These two Asian giants, which until 1800 used to make up half the world economy, are not, like Japan and Germany, mere nation states. In terms of size and population, each is a continent--and for all the glittering growth rates, a poor one.
Not destiny, but still pretty important
This is uncharted territory that should be seen in terms of decades, not years. Demography is not destiny. Nor for that matter are long-range economic forecasts from investment banks. Two decades ago Japan was seen as the main rival to America. Countries as huge and complicated as China can underachieve or collapse under their own contradictions. In the short term its other foreign relationships may matter more, even in Asia: there may, for instance, be a greater risk of conflict between rising China and an ageing but still powerful Japan. Western powers still wield considerable influence.
So caveats abound. Yet as the years roll forward, the chances are that it will increasingly come down once again to the two Asian giants facing each other over a disputed border (see [43]article). How China and India manage their own relationship will determine whether similar mistakes to those that scarred the 20th century disfigure this one.
Neither is exactly comfortable in its skin. China’s leaders like to portray Western hype about their country’s rise as a conspiracy--a pretext either to offload expensive global burdens onto the Middle Kingdom or to encircle it. Witness America’s alliances with Japan and South Korea, its legal obligation to help Taiwan defend itself and its burgeoning friendships with China’s rivals, notably India but also now Vietnam.
This paranoia is overdone. Why shouldn’t more be asked from a place that, as well as being the world’s most-populous country, is already its biggest exporter, its biggest car market, its biggest carbon-emitter and its biggest consumer of energy (a rank China itself, typically, contests)? As for changing the balance of power, the People’s Liberation Army’s steady upgrading of its technological capacity, its building of a blue-water navy and its fast-developing skills in outer space and cyberspace do not yet threaten American supremacy, despite alarm expressed this week about the opacity of the PLA’s plans in a Pentagon report. But China’s military advances do unnerve neighbours and regional rivals. Recent weeks have seen China fall out with South Korea (as well as the West) over how to respond to the sinking in March, apparently by a North Korean torpedo, of a South Korean navy ship. And the Beijing regime has been at odds with South-East Asian countries over its greedy claim to almost all of the South China Sea.
India, too, is unnerved. Its humiliation at Chinese hands in a brief war nearly 50 years ago still rankles. A tradition of strategic mistrust of China is deeply ingrained. India sees China as working to undermine it at every level: by pre-empting it in securing supplies of the energy both must import; through manoeuvres to block a permanent seat for India on the United Nations Security Council; and, above all, through friendships with its smaller South Asian neighbours, notably Pakistan. India also notes that China, after decades of setting their border quarrels to one side in the interests of the broader relationship, has in recent years hardened its position on the disputes in Tibet and Kashmir that in 1962 led to war. This unease has pushed India strategically closer to America--most notably in a controversial deal on nuclear co-operation.
Autocrats in Beijing are contemptuous of India for its messy, indecisive democracy. But they must see it as a serious long-term rival--especially if it continues to tilt towards America. As recently as the early 1990s, India was as rich, in terms of national income per head. China then hurtled so far ahead that it seemed India could never catch up. But India’s long-term prospects now look stronger. While China is about to see its working-age population shrink (see [44]article), India is enjoying the sort of bulge in manpower which brought sustained booms elsewhere in Asia. It is no longer inconceivable that its growth could outpace China’s for a considerable time. It has the advantage of democracy--at least as a pressure valve for discontent. And India’s army is, in numbers, second only to China’s and America’s: it has 100,000 soldiers in disputed Arunachal Pradesh (twice as many as America will soon have in Iraq). And because India does not threaten the West, it has powerful friends both on its own merits and as a counterweight to China.
A settlement in time
The prospect of renewed war between India and China is, for now, something that disturbs the sleep only of virulent nationalists in the Chinese press and retired colonels in Indian think-tanks. Optimists prefer to hail the $60 billion in trade the two are expected to do with each other this year (230 times the total in 1990). But the 20th century taught the world that blatantly foreseeable conflicts of interest can become increasingly foreseeable wars with unforeseeably dreadful consequences. Relying on prosperity and more democracy in China to sort things out thus seems unwise. Two things need to be done.
First, the slow progress towards a border settlement needs to resume. The main onus here is on China. It has the territory it really wants and has maintained its claim to Arunachal Pradesh only as a bargaining chip. It has, after all, solved intractable boundary quarrels with Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar and Vietnam. Surely it cannot be so difficult to treat with India?
That points to a second, deeper need, one that it took Europe two world wars to come close to solving: emerging Asia’s lack of serious institutions to bolster such deals. A regional forum run by the Association of South-East Asian Nations is rendered toothless by China’s aversion to multilateral diplomacy. Like any bully, it prefers to pick off its antagonists one by one. It would be better if China and India--and Japan--could start building regional forums to channel their inevitable rivalries into collaboration and healthy competition.
Globally, the rules-based system that the West set up in the second half of the 20th century brought huge benefits to emerging powers. But it reflects an out-of-date world order, not the current global balance, let alone a future one. China and India should be playing a bigger role in shaping the rules that will govern the 21st century. That requires concessions from the West. But it also requires commitment to a rules-based international order from China and India. A serious effort to solve their own disagreements is a good place to start.
Leaders
Contest of the century
As China and India rise in tandem, their relationship will shape world politics. Shame they do not get on better
Aug 19th 2010
201034ldp001.jpg
A HUNDRED years ago it was perhaps already possible to discern the rising powers whose interaction and competition would shape the 20th century. The sun that shone on the British empire had passed midday. Vigorous new forces were flexing their muscles on the global stage, notably America, Japan and Germany. Their emergence brought undreamed-of prosperity; but also carnage on a scale hitherto unimaginable.
Now digest the main historical event of this week: China has officially become the world’s second-biggest economy, overtaking Japan. In the West this has prompted concerns about China overtaking the United States sooner than previously thought. But stand back a little farther, apply a more Asian perspective, and China’s longer-term contest is with that other recovering economic behemoth: India. These two Asian giants, which until 1800 used to make up half the world economy, are not, like Japan and Germany, mere nation states. In terms of size and population, each is a continent--and for all the glittering growth rates, a poor one.
Not destiny, but still pretty important
This is uncharted territory that should be seen in terms of decades, not years. Demography is not destiny. Nor for that matter are long-range economic forecasts from investment banks. Two decades ago Japan was seen as the main rival to America. Countries as huge and complicated as China can underachieve or collapse under their own contradictions. In the short term its other foreign relationships may matter more, even in Asia: there may, for instance, be a greater risk of conflict between rising China and an ageing but still powerful Japan. Western powers still wield considerable influence.
So caveats abound. Yet as the years roll forward, the chances are that it will increasingly come down once again to the two Asian giants facing each other over a disputed border (see [43]article). How China and India manage their own relationship will determine whether similar mistakes to those that scarred the 20th century disfigure this one.
Neither is exactly comfortable in its skin. China’s leaders like to portray Western hype about their country’s rise as a conspiracy--a pretext either to offload expensive global burdens onto the Middle Kingdom or to encircle it. Witness America’s alliances with Japan and South Korea, its legal obligation to help Taiwan defend itself and its burgeoning friendships with China’s rivals, notably India but also now Vietnam.
This paranoia is overdone. Why shouldn’t more be asked from a place that, as well as being the world’s most-populous country, is already its biggest exporter, its biggest car market, its biggest carbon-emitter and its biggest consumer of energy (a rank China itself, typically, contests)? As for changing the balance of power, the People’s Liberation Army’s steady upgrading of its technological capacity, its building of a blue-water navy and its fast-developing skills in outer space and cyberspace do not yet threaten American supremacy, despite alarm expressed this week about the opacity of the PLA’s plans in a Pentagon report. But China’s military advances do unnerve neighbours and regional rivals. Recent weeks have seen China fall out with South Korea (as well as the West) over how to respond to the sinking in March, apparently by a North Korean torpedo, of a South Korean navy ship. And the Beijing regime has been at odds with South-East Asian countries over its greedy claim to almost all of the South China Sea.
India, too, is unnerved. Its humiliation at Chinese hands in a brief war nearly 50 years ago still rankles. A tradition of strategic mistrust of China is deeply ingrained. India sees China as working to undermine it at every level: by pre-empting it in securing supplies of the energy both must import; through manoeuvres to block a permanent seat for India on the United Nations Security Council; and, above all, through friendships with its smaller South Asian neighbours, notably Pakistan. India also notes that China, after decades of setting their border quarrels to one side in the interests of the broader relationship, has in recent years hardened its position on the disputes in Tibet and Kashmir that in 1962 led to war. This unease has pushed India strategically closer to America--most notably in a controversial deal on nuclear co-operation.
Autocrats in Beijing are contemptuous of India for its messy, indecisive democracy. But they must see it as a serious long-term rival--especially if it continues to tilt towards America. As recently as the early 1990s, India was as rich, in terms of national income per head. China then hurtled so far ahead that it seemed India could never catch up. But India’s long-term prospects now look stronger. While China is about to see its working-age population shrink (see [44]article), India is enjoying the sort of bulge in manpower which brought sustained booms elsewhere in Asia. It is no longer inconceivable that its growth could outpace China’s for a considerable time. It has the advantage of democracy--at least as a pressure valve for discontent. And India’s army is, in numbers, second only to China’s and America’s: it has 100,000 soldiers in disputed Arunachal Pradesh (twice as many as America will soon have in Iraq). And because India does not threaten the West, it has powerful friends both on its own merits and as a counterweight to China.
A settlement in time
The prospect of renewed war between India and China is, for now, something that disturbs the sleep only of virulent nationalists in the Chinese press and retired colonels in Indian think-tanks. Optimists prefer to hail the $60 billion in trade the two are expected to do with each other this year (230 times the total in 1990). But the 20th century taught the world that blatantly foreseeable conflicts of interest can become increasingly foreseeable wars with unforeseeably dreadful consequences. Relying on prosperity and more democracy in China to sort things out thus seems unwise. Two things need to be done.
First, the slow progress towards a border settlement needs to resume. The main onus here is on China. It has the territory it really wants and has maintained its claim to Arunachal Pradesh only as a bargaining chip. It has, after all, solved intractable boundary quarrels with Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar and Vietnam. Surely it cannot be so difficult to treat with India?
That points to a second, deeper need, one that it took Europe two world wars to come close to solving: emerging Asia’s lack of serious institutions to bolster such deals. A regional forum run by the Association of South-East Asian Nations is rendered toothless by China’s aversion to multilateral diplomacy. Like any bully, it prefers to pick off its antagonists one by one. It would be better if China and India--and Japan--could start building regional forums to channel their inevitable rivalries into collaboration and healthy competition.
Globally, the rules-based system that the West set up in the second half of the 20th century brought huge benefits to emerging powers. But it reflects an out-of-date world order, not the current global balance, let alone a future one. China and India should be playing a bigger role in shaping the rules that will govern the 21st century. That requires concessions from the West. But it also requires commitment to a rules-based international order from China and India. A serious effort to solve their own disagreements is a good place to start.
Leaders
8亿牲口被算作适龄人口了？
没看明白到底想说个啥！[:a1:]