翻译完了，但很多地方读不通，一起来斟酌斟酌

Shock and Awe

（一）
（1）The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. （2）War, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." （3）In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist.（4） Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. （5）Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. （6）Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. （7）He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.

快速控制的基础在于我们拥有通过足够的和剧烈的“震动和敬畏”打击，摧毁敌人意志力，感知力和理解力，进而取得我们在这场危机或冲突中所要达到政治，战略和战术目标的能力。从广意上讲，战争包括被Clausewitzian称为“迷惑，摩擦和畏惧”的实际要素。在Clausewitzian 的理论中，从军事力量形成以来，以摧毁敌人抵抗意志为目的的“震动和敬畏”就成为其组成部分。大约在公元前500年，伟大的中国军事家孙武就更早地提出了与此相似的观点。孙武指出“不战而屈人之兵”是将帅用兵的最高境界。孙武深刻领悟了在战前、战时、战后实施打击和震慑是至关重要的。他还提出“兵不厌诈”，意指凭谋略可以使打击和震慑事半功倍，不能智取时，才以力敌。

向东流 ， 虾米 翻译
----------------------------------------------------------------------

（二）
（1）In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted. （2）To identify and present these facets, we need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an adversary. （3）One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare.（4） These images and expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. （5）Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.

在快速控制当中，通过“震慑与恐吓”来达到动摇敌人的意志、理解和感知是多方面的。想要辨别和呈现这些方面，我们首先需要考察“震慑与恐吓”的不同面貌和是通过何种机制影响敌人。一个人会从老照片和电影或电视中播放的节目回忆起一战期间猛烈炮战中的生还者呆钝的表情以及参加者恐惧和堑壕战中的屠杀场景。这些震撼的画面和表情远远超越种族、文化和历史。实际上，电视分析和报道伊拉克士兵们在沙漠风暴行动中的举动生动地展示了“震慑和恐吓”战场是有效的。

（三）
（1）In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. （2）Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.

我们寻求决定“震慑与恐吓”是否和如何能成为有效的胁迫和策反因素迫使或使敌人信服地接受我们的观点（in the clausewitzian sense），例如是次战役的战略目标和军事目标将能达到一种政治成果。然后，“震慑与恐吓”是与快速控制定义中的四个特征紧密相连的：知识，速度，才华和控制。

leozhou 翻译
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

（四）
（1）The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differentiate each model as unique or important. （2）At this stage, historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of Shock and Awe.（3） From this identification, the next step in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. （4）To repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative force package. （5）Then the mission capability package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.

首先，我们要建立一个体系，该体系包括与“震慑与恐吓”相关的各种类型(??)，模型和例子，以便我们能够区分在“震慑与恐吓”中起主要作用的机制，目标和方面(that differentiate each model as unique or important????)。在现阶段，存在历史的例子(供我们使用???)。 然而，在现在和以后的事例中，我们必须分析“震慑与恐吓”在其中能起到的作用。通过这些分析，我们建立一个包括理论和操作准则、战术策略、武力结构、组织和系统结构的任务能力集合来进一步分析和测定这些变化因素的每种组合能在多大程度上达到我们的要求。重复一遍，威吓和服从是我们威胁使用或实际使用武力的结果。这样，任务能力集合就在 MRCs 和 OOTW 两种条件下完成检测(?)

（五）
（1）For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have been derived. （2）These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists between and among them. （3）The first example is "Overwhelming Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure.（4） The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as possible.（5） The superiority of American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to successful application.

出于讨论的目的。九个实例在 historical types，variants和特征上表现出与“震慑与恐吓”的不一致。这些实例不是孤立，相反，它们之间存在相互重叠的部分。
第一个实例是“压倒性的力量”理论，该教条或者说理论左右着今天美国武力的结构。该教条的目标是在最短的时间内在敌人面前集中大量的和压倒性的力量以便以最小的伤亡、损失和平民伤亡来解除，incapacitate ,  or render 敌人。美国无与伦比的军力，科技和operationally在该理论中占有重要地位。

爱国者III代  翻译， 虾米做了些词语修改，不知道 爱国者III代 会不会生气，^_^
------------------------------------------------------------------------

（六）
（1）There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this approach. （2）The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and 18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capability.（3） In other words, this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from this doctrine.

这种方案有几个主要的遭受非议之处和隐藏的弱点。首先，它明显依赖于数量庞大的高性能（也是高价）作战平台，例如：M-1主战坦克、F-14/15/18战斗机、CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688舰船 [航空母舰、伯克级驱逐舰、洛杉矶级核潜艇]这些主要设计用途是用来协同或独立摧毁和消耗对方战斗和支援能力的武器。或者说，这个例子只是针对直接作战的消耗关系，即使在指挥控制、后勤补给、战斗支援系统不能通过此方案瓦解的情况下。

（七）
（1）The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. （2）While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation.（3） It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.

这种关于“面-面”或“点-点”直接作战消耗的理论依据有另一个主要缺点是，自身资源的消耗和敌军装备的充足将导致某些人反对这个方案，论证这个方案并质询国会和公众将会更加困难。尽管“体系之体系”概念是清楚的，而且其他的替代军事观念尚在考虑中，但到目前为止，当前的作战平台和直接作战消耗的定位还未被取代。应该注意到，在做出足够努力对可能的替代方案进行全面细致的验证之前，是不会有替代方案出台的。

向东流 ，哈萨克雄鹰  翻译
-----------------------------------------------------------

（八）
（1）Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to transport the necessary forces. （2）Rapidity may not always follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of decisive force to remote or distant regions. （3）Third, the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed.（4） Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense sector. （5）This will compound the tension between quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily fatal.（6） However, none should be dismissed without fuller understanding.

第二，这种方法根本是以增加军队人数为基础，这就要求有效的后勤工作并且及时把必要的兵力运送到边远或偏僻的地区。第三，用来维持和保养大量军队的费用可能超出实际需要的部队人数所需的军费。最后，每当商业市场增加它产品的同时也降低价格并且周期接更新代系统的性能，相反的趋势仍然在地方的防御部门这将会把质量与数量的紧张状态累加，这些缺点都不一定致命，但是，再没有完全弄明白之前没有一个应当撤除。

随缘飞
----------------------------------------------------------------

（九）
（1）Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives that are similar to those of current doctrine. （2）A major distinction is that Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force across a broader spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock and Awe. （3）This breadth should lead to a more comprehensive and integrated interaction among all the specific components and units that produce aggregate military capability and must include training and education, as well as new ways to exploit our technical and industrial capacity. （4）It is possible that in these resource, technical, and commercial industrial areas that Rapid Dominance may provide particular utility that otherwise may constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.

当然,快速的控制寻求符合那些当前的教条的特定的目的.一个主要的区别是快速的控制正视一种通过影响震动和敬畏之间平衡点的更宽的光谱来达到更广的力量的运用.这个宽度导致一种概括所有能产生军事能力的成分和单元，包括训练和教育间的更全面、综合的相互作用，就像开拓技术和工业能力的新方法。可能在这些资源、技术和化学工业领域里快速的控制能提供特别的作用，另外可以限制决定性力量的效能。

fireadder
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Shock and Awe

（一）
（1）The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. （2）War, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." （3）In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist.（4） Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. （5）Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. （6）Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. （7）He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.

快速控制的基础在于我们拥有通过足够的和剧烈的“震动和敬畏”打击，摧毁敌人意志力，感知力和理解力，进而取得我们在这场危机或冲突中所要达到政治，战略和战术目标的能力。从广意上讲，战争包括被Clausewitzian称为“迷惑，摩擦和畏惧”的实际要素。在Clausewitzian 的理论中，从军事力量形成以来，以摧毁敌人抵抗意志为目的的“震动和敬畏”就成为其组成部分。大约在公元前500年，伟大的中国军事家孙武就更早地提出了与此相似的观点。孙武指出“不战而屈人之兵”是将帅用兵的最高境界。孙武深刻领悟了在战前、战时、战后实施打击和震慑是至关重要的。他还提出“兵不厌诈”，意指凭谋略可以使打击和震慑事半功倍，不能智取时，才以力敌。

向东流 ， 虾米 翻译
----------------------------------------------------------------------

（二）
（1）In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted. （2）To identify and present these facets, we need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an adversary. （3）One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare.（4） These images and expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. （5）Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.

在快速控制当中，通过“震慑与恐吓”来达到动摇敌人的意志、理解和感知是多方面的。想要辨别和呈现这些方面，我们首先需要考察“震慑与恐吓”的不同面貌和是通过何种机制影响敌人。一个人会从老照片和电影或电视中播放的节目回忆起一战期间猛烈炮战中的生还者呆钝的表情以及参加者恐惧和堑壕战中的屠杀场景。这些震撼的画面和表情远远超越种族、文化和历史。实际上，电视分析和报道伊拉克士兵们在沙漠风暴行动中的举动生动地展示了“震慑和恐吓”战场是有效的。

（三）
（1）In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. （2）Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.

我们寻求决定“震慑与恐吓”是否和如何能成为有效的胁迫和策反因素迫使或使敌人信服地接受我们的观点（in the clausewitzian sense），例如是次战役的战略目标和军事目标将能达到一种政治成果。然后，“震慑与恐吓”是与快速控制定义中的四个特征紧密相连的：知识，速度，才华和控制。

leozhou 翻译
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

（四）
（1）The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differentiate each model as unique or important. （2）At this stage, historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of Shock and Awe.（3） From this identification, the next step in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. （4）To repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative force package. （5）Then the mission capability package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.

首先，我们要建立一个体系，该体系包括与“震慑与恐吓”相关的各种类型(??)，模型和例子，以便我们能够区分在“震慑与恐吓”中起主要作用的机制，目标和方面(that differentiate each model as unique or important????)。在现阶段，存在历史的例子(供我们使用???)。 然而，在现在和以后的事例中，我们必须分析“震慑与恐吓”在其中能起到的作用。通过这些分析，我们建立一个包括理论和操作准则、战术策略、武力结构、组织和系统结构的任务能力集合来进一步分析和测定这些变化因素的每种组合能在多大程度上达到我们的要求。重复一遍，威吓和服从是我们威胁使用或实际使用武力的结果。这样，任务能力集合就在 MRCs 和 OOTW 两种条件下完成检测(?)

（五）
（1）For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have been derived. （2）These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists between and among them. （3）The first example is "Overwhelming Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure.（4） The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as possible.（5） The superiority of American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to successful application.

出于讨论的目的。九个实例在 historical types，variants和特征上表现出与“震慑与恐吓”的不一致。这些实例不是孤立，相反，它们之间存在相互重叠的部分。
第一个实例是“压倒性的力量”理论，该教条或者说理论左右着今天美国武力的结构。该教条的目标是在最短的时间内在敌人面前集中大量的和压倒性的力量以便以最小的伤亡、损失和平民伤亡来解除，incapacitate ,  or render 敌人。美国无与伦比的军力，科技和operationally在该理论中占有重要地位。

爱国者III代  翻译， 虾米做了些词语修改，不知道 爱国者III代 会不会生气，^_^
------------------------------------------------------------------------

（六）
（1）There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this approach. （2）The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and 18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capability.（3） In other words, this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from this doctrine.

这种方案有几个主要的遭受非议之处和隐藏的弱点。首先，它明显依赖于数量庞大的高性能（也是高价）作战平台，例如：M-1主战坦克、F-14/15/18战斗机、CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688舰船 [航空母舰、伯克级驱逐舰、洛杉矶级核潜艇]这些主要设计用途是用来协同或独立摧毁和消耗对方战斗和支援能力的武器。或者说，这个例子只是针对直接作战的消耗关系，即使在指挥控制、后勤补给、战斗支援系统不能通过此方案瓦解的情况下。

（七）
（1）The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. （2）While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation.（3） It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.

这种关于“面-面”或“点-点”直接作战消耗的理论依据有另一个主要缺点是，自身资源的消耗和敌军装备的充足将导致某些人反对这个方案，论证这个方案并质询国会和公众将会更加困难。尽管“体系之体系”概念是清楚的，而且其他的替代军事观念尚在考虑中，但到目前为止，当前的作战平台和直接作战消耗的定位还未被取代。应该注意到，在做出足够努力对可能的替代方案进行全面细致的验证之前，是不会有替代方案出台的。

向东流 ，哈萨克雄鹰  翻译
-----------------------------------------------------------

（八）
（1）Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to transport the necessary forces. （2）Rapidity may not always follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of decisive force to remote or distant regions. （3）Third, the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed.（4） Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense sector. （5）This will compound the tension between quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily fatal.（6） However, none should be dismissed without fuller understanding.

第二，这种方法根本是以增加军队人数为基础，这就要求有效的后勤工作并且及时把必要的兵力运送到边远或偏僻的地区。第三，用来维持和保养大量军队的费用可能超出实际需要的部队人数所需的军费。最后，每当商业市场增加它产品的同时也降低价格并且周期接更新代系统的性能，相反的趋势仍然在地方的防御部门这将会把质量与数量的紧张状态累加，这些缺点都不一定致命，但是，再没有完全弄明白之前没有一个应当撤除。

随缘飞
----------------------------------------------------------------

（九）
（1）Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives that are similar to those of current doctrine. （2）A major distinction is that Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force across a broader spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock and Awe. （3）This breadth should lead to a more comprehensive and integrated interaction among all the specific components and units that produce aggregate military capability and must include training and education, as well as new ways to exploit our technical and industrial capacity. （4）It is possible that in these resource, technical, and commercial industrial areas that Rapid Dominance may provide particular utility that otherwise may constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.

当然,快速的控制寻求符合那些当前的教条的特定的目的.一个主要的区别是快速的控制正视一种通过影响震动和敬畏之间平衡点的更宽的光谱来达到更广的力量的运用.这个宽度导致一种概括所有能产生军事能力的成分和单元，包括训练和教育间的更全面、综合的相互作用，就像开拓技术和工业能力的新方法。可能在这些资源、技术和化学工业领域里快速的控制能提供特别的作用，另外可以限制决定性力量的效能。

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[此贴子已经被作者于2003-4-7 21:40:30编辑过]