征集CV损害管制方面的文章或资料，欢迎讨论

舰船知识上以前有专门介绍霉菌CV的损害管制尤其是防火方面的。。说了很多霉菌CV很多案例

能否具体一点，哪年哪期？

航母损管人员犯了严重错误。他们在还没有确定危险状况确实结束的情况下就向消防队下达了“进入事故现场”的命令。结果酿成更大的惨剧。

      接到命令后的消防队员和部分水兵进入还冒着屡屡青烟的火场开始清理。就在此时，一枚F-14携带的AIM-54“不死鸟”重型远程空空导弹由于受到烈火长时间的高温烧烤而发生爆炸！这枚长3.96米，直径380毫米，全重455公斤，战斗部为重达61公斤高爆炸药的“不死鸟”爆炸后将多名正在灭火的舰员当场打死。就在现场人员还没来得及撤退时，另一枚AIM-9“响尾蛇”近程空空导弹再次爆炸，更近一步加重了人员伤亡，所幸其他弹药和被烧飞机被消防队用大量海水进行了冷却，否则更多更猛的爆炸随时可能发生......直到次日凌晨两点多，“尼米兹”号才解除危险警报。

      这次发生在“尼米兹”号航母上的严重的坠机事故是美国海军“尼米兹”级核动力航母服役以来最严重的，造成的损失也是最惨重的。整个事件共造成14人死亡，42人受伤。共有11架飞机被毁，损失达5883万美元。如此惨重的人员伤亡和财产、装备损失决不亚于在实战中敌方攻击所造成的破坏！

      事后，美国海军组织了全面调查，结果证实：首先，标号为610的EA-6B“徘徊者”电子战飞机的驾驶员史蒂夫.怀特严重违反规定，擅自服用抗组胺类药物。这种本来用于缓解炎症反应的药物容易引起人的神经系统副反应，如打瞌睡和精神运动失调等。这对飞行员特别是舰载机飞行员是绝对禁止的。正是由于史蒂夫.怀特的擅自服用禁药这种严重违法行为直接导致他无法处理紧急突发情况，在降落过程中无法进行正常操作最终酿成惨祸。同时，舰上6名工作人员公然违反条令吸食大麻，造成在引导飞机降落过程中精神涣散无法正确引导飞机着落。因此，造成这场美国海军核动力航母历史上最惨重事故的首要原因就是曾经被其视为骄傲的海军舰载机飞行员和舰上空管人员的严重违失职。其次，美国海军一向夸耀其航母技术设备非常先进可靠。但是，事发当时，“尼米兹”号飞行甲板上对飞机降落最重要的设备即显示飞机降落过程中飞行高度的灯光导引降落系统（灵云注：即有名的“肉球”系统）大部分居然是熄灭的，这造成飞行员无法依靠设备来校对方向对准跑道。同时，当灾难发生后，舰上指挥、抗损管系统发生故障，造成现场指挥人员无法和控制中心取得联系，而对舰上灭火最重要的18台消防水泵中当时居然有6个是失灵的，其余的也存在不同程度的问题。这直接导致无法有效控制火情，美国人引以为毫的精密设备在最关键时刻却没能发挥应有的作用。因此，正是美国人一直夸耀的“优秀的舰载机飞行员”和“先进可靠的技术装备”亲手造成了这场美国海军“尼米兹”级核动力航母服役以来最惨重的事故。灵云认为，当时“尼米兹”号距离美国本土只有70海里，可以说就在家门口，在没有任何外敌攻击的情况下尚且发生如此惨重的事故。如果是与他国交战过程中，一旦遭到对方突袭，可以想像美国航母的惨状。

航空母舰大量伤员紧急救护的组织与实施

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建议你去看一看1967年7月29日福莱斯特事故和1969年1月14日企业事故，这两次事故都比较有代表性。尤其是1967年7月29日福莱斯特事故，你所提到尼米茨事故与其比起来可以说是小巫见大巫。福莱斯特事故一共造成134人死亡，161人受伤，21架飞机受损报废（7架F-4，11架A-4E，3架RA-5C）以及大量导弹（有相当一部分是被抛入大海以防诱爆），直接经济损失7200万美元。而企业事故一共造成27人死亡，314人受伤，15架飞机受损报废。

另外还有一次事故就是1966年10月26日奥尼斯坎尼事故，这次事故造成44人死亡。

建议你去看一看1967年7月29日福莱斯特事故和1969年1月14日企业事故，这两次事故都比较有代表性。尤其是1967年7月29日福莱斯特事故，你所提到尼米茨事故与其比起来可以说是小巫见大巫。福莱斯特事故一共造成134人死亡，161人受伤，21架飞机受损报废（7架F-4，11架A-4E，3架RA-5C）以及大量导弹（有相当一部分是被抛入大海以防诱爆），直接经济损失7200万美元。而企业事故一共造成27人死亡，314人受伤，15架飞机受损报废。

另外还有一次事故就是1966年10月26日奥尼斯坎尼事故，这次事故造成44人死亡。

我的意思是资料太少 就一句话 什么状况都搞不清楚

1966年10月26日奥尼斯坎尼事故
The carrier was on station the morning of 26 October 1966 when a fire erupted on the starboard side of the ship's forward hangar bay and raced through five decks, killing 44 men. Many who lost their lives were veteran combat pilots who had flown raids over Vietnam a few hours earlier. Oriskany had been put in danger when a magnesium parachute flare exploded in the forward flare locker of Hangar Bay 1, beneath the carrier's flight deck. Subsequent investigation showed the flare functioned as designed and the cause of the fire was human error. A seaman accidentally ignited the flare, and in a panic, threw it into the weapons locker where the flares were kept for storage, instead of throwing it over the side into the water; this allowed the entire storage locker to ignite and caused horrific damage. Some of her crewmen jettisoned heavy bombs which lay within reach of the flames, while others wheeled planes out of danger, rescued pilots, and helped quell the blaze throughout the next three hours. Medical assistance was rushed to the carrier from sister aircraft carriers Constellation (CV-64) and Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42). Later investigation by Captain Iarrobino of the Oriskany and analysis by the Naval Ammunition Depot in Crane, Indiana, showed that one in every thousand flares could ignite accidentally if jarred. Five crew members were court-martialed as a result of the incident but were acquitted. After this incident and others, the flare design used by the Navy was changed to a safer design immune to accidental ignition, and crews were increased to stabilize numbers so all activities could be properly supervised.

1967年7月29日福莱斯特事故
1967 USS Forrestal fire
The 1967 USS Forrestal fire was a devastating fire and series of chain-reaction explosions on 29 July 1967 that caused great loss of life on the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (CV-59) after an unusual electrical anomaly discharged a Zuni rocket on the flight deck. 134 sailors were killed, 161 injured. Forrestal was engaged in combat operations in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War at the time, and the damage totaled $72 million (not including damage to aircraft).

Background
Forrestal had departed Norfolk in early June. Upon completion of the required inspections for the upcoming WESTPAC Cruise, she then went on to Brazil for a show of force. She then set sail "around the horn" of Africa, and went on to dock for a short while at Leyte Pier at N.A.S. Cubi Point in the Phillipine Islands. She then set sail to "Yankee Station" in the Gulf of Tonkin. For four days in the gulf, aircraft of Attack Carrier Air Wing 17 flew about 150 missions against targets in North Vietnam. Because of a shortage of 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs, old Composition B bombs had been loaded from the ammunition ship USS Diamond Head, instead of newer Composition H6, capable of withstanding higher heat.

Fire
About 10:50 (local time) on 29 July, while preparations for the second strike of the day were being made near 19°9′5″N 107°23′5″E / 19.15139°N 107.38472°E / 19.15139; 107.38472, an unguided 5-inch Mk-32 "Zuni" rocket, one of four contained in a LAU-10 underwing rocket pod mounted on a F-4 Phantom II, was accidentally fired due to an electrical power surge during the switch from external power to internal power.

The rocket flew across the flight deck, striking a wing-mounted external fuel tank on an A-4 Skyhawk awaiting launch, either aircraft No. 405, piloted by LCDR Fred D. White, or No. 416, piloted by LCDR John McCain.[4] The warhead's safety mechanism prevented it from detonating, but the impact tore the tank off the wing and ignited the resulting spray of escaping JP-5 fuel, causing an instantaneous conflagration. Other external fuel tanks overheated and ruptured, releasing more jet fuel to feed the flames which spread along the flight deck, leaving pilots in their aircraft with the options of being incinerated in their cockpits or running through the flames to escape. LCDR White leaped from his burning aircraft but was killed instantly (along with many firefighters) by the cooking off of the first bomb. LCDR Herbert A. Hope of VA-46 (and operations officer of CVW-17) jumped out of the cockpit of his Skyhawk between explosions, rolled off the flight deck and into the starboard man-overboard net. Making his way down below to the hangar deck, he took command of a firefighting team. "The port quarter of the flight deck where I was", he recalled, "is no longer there."[3] With his aircraft surrounded by flames, McCain escaped by climbing out of the cockpit, walking down the nose and jumping off the refueling probe.

The impact of the Zuni dislodged two of the 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs, which lay in the burning fuel. The fire team's chief, Gerald Farrier (without benefit of protective clothing) immediately smothered the bombs with a PKP fire extinguisher in an effort to knock down the fuel fire long enough to allow the pilots to escape. According to their training, the fire team normally had almost three minutes to reduce the temperature of the bombs to a safe level, but the chief did not realize the "Comp. B" bombs were already critically close to cooking-off until one split open. The chief, knowing a lethal explosion was imminent, shouted for the fire team to withdraw but the bomb exploded seconds later - only one and a half minutes after the start of the fire.

The detonation destroyed McCain's aircraft (along with its remaining fuel and armament), blew a crater in the armored flight deck, and sprayed the deck and crew with shrapnel and burning jet fuel. It killed the entire on-deck firefighting contingent, with the exception of three men who survived with critical injuries. The two bomb-laden A-4s in line ahead of McCain's were riddled with shrapnel and engulfed in the flaming jet fuel still spreading over the deck, causing more bombs to detonate and more fuel to spill.

Nine bomb explosions occurred on the flight deck, eight caused by the "Comp. B" bombs and the ninth occurred as a sympathetic detonation between an old bomb and a newer H6 bomb. The explosions tore large holes in the armored flight deck, causing flaming jet fuel to drain into the interior of the ship, including the living quarters directly underneath the flight deck, and the below-decks aircraft hangar.

Sailors and Marines controlled the flight deck fires by 12:15, and continued to clear smoke and to cool hot steel on the 02 and 03 levels until all fires were under control by 13:42. They finally declared the fire defeated at 04:00 the next morning, due to additional flare-ups.

Throughout the day the ship’s medical staff worked in dangerous conditions to assist their comrades. HM2 Paul Streetman, one of 38 corpsmen assigned to the carrier, spent over 11 hours on the mangled flight deck tending to his shipmates. The large number of casualties quickly overwhelmed the ship’s Sick Bay staff, and Forrestal was escorted by USS Henry W. Tucker (DD-875) to rendezvous with hospital ship USS Repose (AH-16) at 20:54, allowing the crew to begin transferring the dead and wounded at 22:53.

Aftermath
The fire left 134 crewmen dead and 161 more injured. Many planes and armament were jettisoned to prevent them from catching fire or exploding. Twenty-one aircraft also sustained enough damage from fire, explosions and salt water to be stricken from naval inventory, including seven F-4 Phantom IIs (BuNos 153046, 153054, 153060, 153061, 153066, 153069 and 153912); eleven A-4E Skyhawks (149996, 150064, 150068, 150084, 150115, 150118, 150129, 152018, 152024, 152036 and 152040); and three RA-5 Vigilantes (148932, 149282 and 149305). The fire also revealed that Forrestal required a heavy duty, armored forklift for use in the emergency jettisoning of aircraft (particularly heavier types such as the RA-5C Vigilante), since the sailors of Forrestal had been forced to manually jettison numerous aircraft through human force, which was both inefficient and dangerous to the exposed crew.

From 31 July to 11 August 1967, Forrestal was moored at Leyte Pier at Naval Air Station Cubi Point in the Philippines for temporary repairs. On September 12-13, Forrestal arrived at Mayport and unloaded aircraft and the crews of squadrons based in Florida. On September 14, the ship returned to Norfolk and was welcomed home by over 3,000 family members and friends gathered on Pier 12 and onboard Randolph, Forrestal's host ship.

From 19 September 1967 to 8 April 1968, Forrestal underwent repairs in Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The carrier occupied drydock number 8 from 21 September 1967 to 10 February 1968. The ship floated from drydock and shifted to Berths 42 and 43 in front of the drydock to complete repairs. During the post-fire refit, the ship's four aft 5"/54 caliber Mark 42 guns were removed. The forward four guns were removed prior to 1962.

From April 8-15 1968, CAPT Robert B. Baldwin sailed the carrier down the Elizabeth River and out into the waters off the Virginia capes for her post repair trials, the ship’s first time at sea in 207 days. While accomplishing trials the ship also recorded her first arrested landing since the fire when CDR Robert E. Ferguson, Commander, CVW-17, landed on board.

Even today the Navy commonly refers to the fire aboard the Forrestal, and the lessons learned, when teaching damage control and ammunition safety. The Navy circulated the lessons which the men of Forrestal re-learned at such cost throughout the Fleet, and the flight deck film of the flight operations, subsequently entitled Learn Or Burn, became mandatory viewing for fire fighting trainees for years.[3] All new Navy recruits are required to view a training video titled "Trial by Fire: A Carrier Burns", produced from footage of the fire and damage control efforts, both successful and unsuccessful. On the one hand there were damage control teams spraying foam on the deck to contain the flames, which was the correct procedure, while on the other hand crewmen on the other side of the deck sprayed seawater, washing away the foam and worsening the situation by washing burning fuel through the hole in the flight deck into the decks below; burning fuel is not easily extinguished and can in fact be spread by water. Due to the first bomb blast killing nearly all of the specially trained firefighters on the ship, the remaining crew, who had no formal firefighting training, had to improvise.

Nowadays, it is said that every Navy Sailor is a firefighter first. A large portion of basic training is dedicated to firefighting and prevention tactics. Though there were many firefighting tools available on the Forrestal, including emergency respirators, the general crew were not trained in their use and failed to use them correctly.

In response, a "wash down" system was incorporated into all carriers, which floods the flight deck with foam or water. Many other fire safety improvements stemmed from this incident.

The Farrier Fire Fighting School Learning Site in Norfolk is named for Chief Aviation Boatswain's Mate Gerald W. Farrier, the sailor who died in the initial explosion in an attempt to extinguish the fire with a single PKP extinguisher.

Eighteen crew members were buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Names of the dead are also listed on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

The Forrestal was unkindly nicknamed the "Forest Fire" for the remainder of her career.

Investigation
Although investigators could not identify the exact chain of events behind the carnage, they revealed potential maintenance issues including concerns in circuitry (stray voltage) associated with LAU-10 rocket launchers and Zunis, as well as the age of the 1,000 pound "fat bombs" loaded for the strike, shards from one of which dated it originally to the Korean War in 1953.

Safety regulations should have prevented the Zuni rocket from firing. A triple ejector rack (TER) electrical safety pin prevented any electrical signal from reaching the rockets but it was known that high winds could sometimes catch the attached tags and blow them free. The backup was the “pigtail” connection of the electrical wiring to the rockets pod. Regulations required they be connected only when the aircraft was attached to the catapult ready to launch. The Navy investigation found that four weeks before the fire the Forrestal's Weapons Coordination Board had a meeting to discuss the possible problem of a faulty pigtail delaying a mission while the aircraft was removed from the launcher. The board ruled that in the future the crew could ignore protocol and connect the pigtails while the aircraft were still queued. Though never made official, the crew immediately acted on the ruling. The inquiry found that the TER pin was likely blown free while the pigtail was connected and that the missile fired due to a power surge when the pilot transferred his systems from external to internal power. This incident also led the U.S. Navy to implement safety reviews for weapons systems going on board ships (whether for use or for shipping). Today, this evaluation still exists as the Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board.

1969年1月14日企业事故：
In the morning of 14 January 1969, a MK-32 Zuni rocket loaded on a parked F-4 Phantom short circuited (due to stray voltage during aircraft engine start) and fired, setting off fires and additional explosions across the flight deck. The fire was brought under control relatively quickly (when compared with previous carrier flight deck fires), but 27 lives were lost. An additional 314 personnel were injured. The fire destroyed 15 aircraft, and the resulting damage forced Enterprise to put in for repairs, primarily to repair the flight deck's armored plating.[8] In early March 1969, repairs to the ship were completed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and the ship proceeded on her deployment to Vietnam and the Tonkin Gulf.

我的意思是资料太少 就一句话 什么状况都搞不清楚
DC_Water 发表于 2009-5-1 10:58

1966年10月26日奥尼斯坎尼事故
The carrier was on station the morning of 26 October 1966 when a fire erupted on the starboard side of the ship's forward hangar bay and raced through five decks, killing 44 men. Many who lost their lives were veteran combat pilots who had flown raids over Vietnam a few hours earlier. Oriskany had been put in danger when a magnesium parachute flare exploded in the forward flare locker of Hangar Bay 1, beneath the carrier's flight deck. Subsequent investigation showed the flare functioned as designed and the cause of the fire was human error. A seaman accidentally ignited the flare, and in a panic, threw it into the weapons locker where the flares were kept for storage, instead of throwing it over the side into the water; this allowed the entire storage locker to ignite and caused horrific damage. Some of her crewmen jettisoned heavy bombs which lay within reach of the flames, while others wheeled planes out of danger, rescued pilots, and helped quell the blaze throughout the next three hours. Medical assistance was rushed to the carrier from sister aircraft carriers Constellation (CV-64) and Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42). Later investigation by Captain Iarrobino of the Oriskany and analysis by the Naval Ammunition Depot in Crane, Indiana, showed that one in every thousand flares could ignite accidentally if jarred. Five crew members were court-martialed as a result of the incident but were acquitted. After this incident and others, the flare design used by the Navy was changed to a safer design immune to accidental ignition, and crews were increased to stabilize numbers so all activities could be properly supervised.

1967年7月29日福莱斯特事故
1967 USS Forrestal fire
The 1967 USS Forrestal fire was a devastating fire and series of chain-reaction explosions on 29 July 1967 that caused great loss of life on the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (CV-59) after an unusual electrical anomaly discharged a Zuni rocket on the flight deck. 134 sailors were killed, 161 injured. Forrestal was engaged in combat operations in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War at the time, and the damage totaled $72 million (not including damage to aircraft).

Background
Forrestal had departed Norfolk in early June. Upon completion of the required inspections for the upcoming WESTPAC Cruise, she then went on to Brazil for a show of force. She then set sail "around the horn" of Africa, and went on to dock for a short while at Leyte Pier at N.A.S. Cubi Point in the Phillipine Islands. She then set sail to "Yankee Station" in the Gulf of Tonkin. For four days in the gulf, aircraft of Attack Carrier Air Wing 17 flew about 150 missions against targets in North Vietnam. Because of a shortage of 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs, old Composition B bombs had been loaded from the ammunition ship USS Diamond Head, instead of newer Composition H6, capable of withstanding higher heat.

Fire
About 10:50 (local time) on 29 July, while preparations for the second strike of the day were being made near 19°9′5″N 107°23′5″E / 19.15139°N 107.38472°E / 19.15139; 107.38472, an unguided 5-inch Mk-32 "Zuni" rocket, one of four contained in a LAU-10 underwing rocket pod mounted on a F-4 Phantom II, was accidentally fired due to an electrical power surge during the switch from external power to internal power.

The rocket flew across the flight deck, striking a wing-mounted external fuel tank on an A-4 Skyhawk awaiting launch, either aircraft No. 405, piloted by LCDR Fred D. White, or No. 416, piloted by LCDR John McCain.[4] The warhead's safety mechanism prevented it from detonating, but the impact tore the tank off the wing and ignited the resulting spray of escaping JP-5 fuel, causing an instantaneous conflagration. Other external fuel tanks overheated and ruptured, releasing more jet fuel to feed the flames which spread along the flight deck, leaving pilots in their aircraft with the options of being incinerated in their cockpits or running through the flames to escape. LCDR White leaped from his burning aircraft but was killed instantly (along with many firefighters) by the cooking off of the first bomb. LCDR Herbert A. Hope of VA-46 (and operations officer of CVW-17) jumped out of the cockpit of his Skyhawk between explosions, rolled off the flight deck and into the starboard man-overboard net. Making his way down below to the hangar deck, he took command of a firefighting team. "The port quarter of the flight deck where I was", he recalled, "is no longer there."[3] With his aircraft surrounded by flames, McCain escaped by climbing out of the cockpit, walking down the nose and jumping off the refueling probe.

The impact of the Zuni dislodged two of the 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs, which lay in the burning fuel. The fire team's chief, Gerald Farrier (without benefit of protective clothing) immediately smothered the bombs with a PKP fire extinguisher in an effort to knock down the fuel fire long enough to allow the pilots to escape. According to their training, the fire team normally had almost three minutes to reduce the temperature of the bombs to a safe level, but the chief did not realize the "Comp. B" bombs were already critically close to cooking-off until one split open. The chief, knowing a lethal explosion was imminent, shouted for the fire team to withdraw but the bomb exploded seconds later - only one and a half minutes after the start of the fire.

The detonation destroyed McCain's aircraft (along with its remaining fuel and armament), blew a crater in the armored flight deck, and sprayed the deck and crew with shrapnel and burning jet fuel. It killed the entire on-deck firefighting contingent, with the exception of three men who survived with critical injuries. The two bomb-laden A-4s in line ahead of McCain's were riddled with shrapnel and engulfed in the flaming jet fuel still spreading over the deck, causing more bombs to detonate and more fuel to spill.

Nine bomb explosions occurred on the flight deck, eight caused by the "Comp. B" bombs and the ninth occurred as a sympathetic detonation between an old bomb and a newer H6 bomb. The explosions tore large holes in the armored flight deck, causing flaming jet fuel to drain into the interior of the ship, including the living quarters directly underneath the flight deck, and the below-decks aircraft hangar.

Sailors and Marines controlled the flight deck fires by 12:15, and continued to clear smoke and to cool hot steel on the 02 and 03 levels until all fires were under control by 13:42. They finally declared the fire defeated at 04:00 the next morning, due to additional flare-ups.

Throughout the day the ship’s medical staff worked in dangerous conditions to assist their comrades. HM2 Paul Streetman, one of 38 corpsmen assigned to the carrier, spent over 11 hours on the mangled flight deck tending to his shipmates. The large number of casualties quickly overwhelmed the ship’s Sick Bay staff, and Forrestal was escorted by USS Henry W. Tucker (DD-875) to rendezvous with hospital ship USS Repose (AH-16) at 20:54, allowing the crew to begin transferring the dead and wounded at 22:53.

Aftermath
The fire left 134 crewmen dead and 161 more injured. Many planes and armament were jettisoned to prevent them from catching fire or exploding. Twenty-one aircraft also sustained enough damage from fire, explosions and salt water to be stricken from naval inventory, including seven F-4 Phantom IIs (BuNos 153046, 153054, 153060, 153061, 153066, 153069 and 153912); eleven A-4E Skyhawks (149996, 150064, 150068, 150084, 150115, 150118, 150129, 152018, 152024, 152036 and 152040); and three RA-5 Vigilantes (148932, 149282 and 149305). The fire also revealed that Forrestal required a heavy duty, armored forklift for use in the emergency jettisoning of aircraft (particularly heavier types such as the RA-5C Vigilante), since the sailors of Forrestal had been forced to manually jettison numerous aircraft through human force, which was both inefficient and dangerous to the exposed crew.

From 31 July to 11 August 1967, Forrestal was moored at Leyte Pier at Naval Air Station Cubi Point in the Philippines for temporary repairs. On September 12-13, Forrestal arrived at Mayport and unloaded aircraft and the crews of squadrons based in Florida. On September 14, the ship returned to Norfolk and was welcomed home by over 3,000 family members and friends gathered on Pier 12 and onboard Randolph, Forrestal's host ship.

From 19 September 1967 to 8 April 1968, Forrestal underwent repairs in Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The carrier occupied drydock number 8 from 21 September 1967 to 10 February 1968. The ship floated from drydock and shifted to Berths 42 and 43 in front of the drydock to complete repairs. During the post-fire refit, the ship's four aft 5"/54 caliber Mark 42 guns were removed. The forward four guns were removed prior to 1962.

From April 8-15 1968, CAPT Robert B. Baldwin sailed the carrier down the Elizabeth River and out into the waters off the Virginia capes for her post repair trials, the ship’s first time at sea in 207 days. While accomplishing trials the ship also recorded her first arrested landing since the fire when CDR Robert E. Ferguson, Commander, CVW-17, landed on board.

Even today the Navy commonly refers to the fire aboard the Forrestal, and the lessons learned, when teaching damage control and ammunition safety. The Navy circulated the lessons which the men of Forrestal re-learned at such cost throughout the Fleet, and the flight deck film of the flight operations, subsequently entitled Learn Or Burn, became mandatory viewing for fire fighting trainees for years.[3] All new Navy recruits are required to view a training video titled "Trial by Fire: A Carrier Burns", produced from footage of the fire and damage control efforts, both successful and unsuccessful. On the one hand there were damage control teams spraying foam on the deck to contain the flames, which was the correct procedure, while on the other hand crewmen on the other side of the deck sprayed seawater, washing away the foam and worsening the situation by washing burning fuel through the hole in the flight deck into the decks below; burning fuel is not easily extinguished and can in fact be spread by water. Due to the first bomb blast killing nearly all of the specially trained firefighters on the ship, the remaining crew, who had no formal firefighting training, had to improvise.

Nowadays, it is said that every Navy Sailor is a firefighter first. A large portion of basic training is dedicated to firefighting and prevention tactics. Though there were many firefighting tools available on the Forrestal, including emergency respirators, the general crew were not trained in their use and failed to use them correctly.

In response, a "wash down" system was incorporated into all carriers, which floods the flight deck with foam or water. Many other fire safety improvements stemmed from this incident.

The Farrier Fire Fighting School Learning Site in Norfolk is named for Chief Aviation Boatswain's Mate Gerald W. Farrier, the sailor who died in the initial explosion in an attempt to extinguish the fire with a single PKP extinguisher.

Eighteen crew members were buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Names of the dead are also listed on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

The Forrestal was unkindly nicknamed the "Forest Fire" for the remainder of her career.

Investigation
Although investigators could not identify the exact chain of events behind the carnage, they revealed potential maintenance issues including concerns in circuitry (stray voltage) associated with LAU-10 rocket launchers and Zunis, as well as the age of the 1,000 pound "fat bombs" loaded for the strike, shards from one of which dated it originally to the Korean War in 1953.

Safety regulations should have prevented the Zuni rocket from firing. A triple ejector rack (TER) electrical safety pin prevented any electrical signal from reaching the rockets but it was known that high winds could sometimes catch the attached tags and blow them free. The backup was the “pigtail” connection of the electrical wiring to the rockets pod. Regulations required they be connected only when the aircraft was attached to the catapult ready to launch. The Navy investigation found that four weeks before the fire the Forrestal's Weapons Coordination Board had a meeting to discuss the possible problem of a faulty pigtail delaying a mission while the aircraft was removed from the launcher. The board ruled that in the future the crew could ignore protocol and connect the pigtails while the aircraft were still queued. Though never made official, the crew immediately acted on the ruling. The inquiry found that the TER pin was likely blown free while the pigtail was connected and that the missile fired due to a power surge when the pilot transferred his systems from external to internal power. This incident also led the U.S. Navy to implement safety reviews for weapons systems going on board ships (whether for use or for shipping). Today, this evaluation still exists as the Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board.

1969年1月14日企业事故：
In the morning of 14 January 1969, a MK-32 Zuni rocket loaded on a parked F-4 Phantom short circuited (due to stray voltage during aircraft engine start) and fired, setting off fires and additional explosions across the flight deck. The fire was brought under control relatively quickly (when compared with previous carrier flight deck fires), but 27 lives were lost. An additional 314 personnel were injured. The fire destroyed 15 aircraft, and the resulting damage forced Enterprise to put in for repairs, primarily to repair the flight deck's armored plating.[8] In early March 1969, repairs to the ship were completed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and the ship proceeded on her deployment to Vietnam and the Tonkin Gulf.

美国攻击航空母舰“星座”号竣工时起火
79000吨的“星座”号是美国第二次世界大战后建造的攻击型航空母舰的第六艘。这级舰配置和使用了携带核武器的重型飞机。
该舰于1960年10月下水，两月后舰上发生大火，造成人员的大量死伤和物质的严重损失。这一事件震撼了美国，大火不是发生在战斗活动和海上航行中，而是发生在海军的船厂里。
1960年12月19日，该舰已经完成了90%，它的右舷紧靠船厂码头系泊准备竣工。当时舰上机库甲板临时安装了燃油柜，供辅助柴油机——发电机使用。燃油柜容量为4500升，火灾发生时还剩有1900升。上午10时30分，当升降机卸载金属屑箱时，不巧碰倒了机库内放置架上的钢板。钢板受撞后碰坏了燃油柜底部的开关。燃油开始流出，逐渐漫流机库甲板，并通过升降机的升降道进入下甲板，在这里燃油由于与焊接后加热的金属接触而燃烧起来。大火很快的沿全舰蔓延，席卷到机库甲板和飞行甲板，并从起火中心向舰的首位窜去。由于横舱壁走廊甲板（低于飞行甲板的第二层甲板）上配置的设施较少，使火焰更加猛烈扩展。在横舱壁内有许多未堵塞的电缆孔，甚至在关紧水密门后也未能从孔后限制住火势的发展。
火灾开始后不久，很快发现伴有屡屡浓烟的大火，已在舰中部出现。这时机库已经全部着火。大火向全舰和船厂蔓延，上升高度竟达几十米。由于火烟极大，平时消防队员的呼吸装置一般可用45分钟，而此时只能用上20分钟就无法使用。
起初试图用舰上设备，如泡沫发生器、喷水系统来灭火，但没有成功。后来，救火任务由基地和城市消防队来担任，很快派来了拖船和消防船。他们主要采用水来灭火，往舰上浇注了15000吨之多的消防水，其中约80%的水是通过污水和排水系统排出舷外，但仍有一些舱室灌注满了水。
这时要迅速解决从舰上撤退和营救人员的任务。由于该舰建造工程接近完成，舰上来了各种专业人员。火灾这天，共有4200人，大多是船厂员工。当时无线电发出命令：“全体人员迅速离开本舰！”由于舰上通信联系不好，因而许多人未能听见。大多数人看见舰上起火后，还在打听怎么回事。工人们通过各种办法已离开舰。但在主火源区，出口实际已经被封闭。有些人所以得救，不是跳到冰上，就是沿缆索下到靠舰的驳船。另外，舰上有2台起重机，分别将人员从舰上运到码头，舰的飞行甲板要比码头高出20米以上。
以后，城里下了大雪，码头被厚雪和薄冰覆盖，这使救人工作更加困难。舰上尚未来及撤走的工人，为了避火跑进舱室，躲在里面将门紧闭，等待营救。火灾持续了12个多小时，在城市和基地消防队的共同努力下才将火扑灭。
由于这场火灾，死亡50人，受伤数百人。该舰舰体和机械等部位遭到重大破坏，物质损失约5000万美元。延误工期7-8个月。
舰上45毫米厚的飞行甲板的装甲铺板，已有190米变形，变形性质是波形长24米，最大弯曲挠度约250毫米。正如以后调查指出，在飞行甲板下的空间温度已达600度，高温作用区甲板铺板的式样分析也指出，它的钢板仍保持最初的机械性能，没有因临界高温而改变，这是因为甲板上厚铺板的高热容和甲板下的热绝缘层两者的共同作用。于是决定不更换飞行甲板上已变形的铺板，而采用原地矫正的方法，即绝大部分铺板并不拆卸，而是用千斤顶矫正。至于处在大火区的飞行甲板由于其构架破坏严重，需要拆卸更换。19毫米厚的走廊甲板也遭到严重损伤，约有120米长需要更换。原载海陆空天惯性世界。飞行甲板和走廊甲板之间的大多数横舱壁也需更换。31毫米厚的机库甲板的变形与飞行甲板的变形相似，它们的距离才几十米。这层甲板部分需要原地修理，有些则需要更换。飞行甲板与机库甲板均未断裂。舰体主要的支承构建没有遭到破坏。在火灾后的四个星期，对舰体挠度的测量指出，挠度增加不大于38毫米时，这被认为是完全允许的。此外，由铝合金制的横舱壁和围壁，由于处在火灾区受到严重破坏，因而需要完全更换。在这些部位，还要更换热和声绝缘，它们因火、水和烟渣也遭到了破坏。
该舰的机械设备损坏严重。首部弹射器全部已经不能再用。由于火灾，铜管系以变形，以铬钼钢制的管系遭到破坏尤为严重，在温度800摄氏度以上时，其性能就已变化。承建厂为此调查了该舰的机械设备，根据他们的建议送厂或就地修理或更换。在修理过程中，制定了管系合格鉴定的标准。根据该标准，有关材料制造的管系必须在以下温度更换：1.315摄氏度（镍铜、镀锌钢和碳素钢）；2.260摄氏度（铜和黄铜）；3.93摄氏度（电木）。
电气设备，尤其是电缆也受到破坏。带聚乙烯绝缘的电缆和同轴电缆，由于受热特别敏感，它们已经完全不能使用，需要大部分更换。
战斗情报中心的仪器和与之相邻舱室的电子设备也遭到了破坏。大部分无线电仪器覆盖上了很厚的一层烟尘。造水破坏的仪器大部分浮出水面。在修理战斗情报中心时，采用了引线配电盘，盘上安装导线和连接件，供代换暂缺的仪器使用。在新仪器上舰后，将它安装在指定位置并接入电路。这种方法能在新仪器上舰前就可以使用，从而加快了军舰的修理过程。
为了加快修理工作，还采用了其他方法。例如，成立了专门配套小组去签订关于新设备的合同，大部分设备可以从仓库或根据现行合同获得。又如，采取了破损小零件不修理，用新零件更换的方法。
在修理过程中遇到的复杂问题之一是，如何清洗严重破坏后弄脏的设备。为此，造船厂安装了专门的清洗传送装置。该装置由带液体和辅助机械的贮藏箱组成，采用超声波、高压空气和烘干等方法除去破损设备上的污物，然后将清洁的设备送往装配台修理。这种装置使用后，节省了大量时间和资金。
该舰发生火灾后，美军方公布了关于新舰和改装舰防火安全上的新规定。新规定要求新舰应设置火灾报警系统，检查工人消防知识水平、教会消防队员灭火方法、严禁舰上存放易燃物品。建议将这些物品贮存在驳船或者工厂码头，并采取一定的防火措施。转贴于超级大本营论坛。然而，在这些新规定中没有专门谈到关于限制使用木料的问题。因为木料会使舰上火灾加速蔓延。有人认为金属板也很危险，有时在电流转差和触电时会引起人员的伤亡。另外，对舱壁上电缆通孔，作为增加防火孔盖的规定，以防止火灾发生后在舰上伸展。航空母舰“星座”号的火灾教育了美国人，但是这种教训是以无数人员的伤亡和大量财产的损失作为代价来获得的。最后应指出的一点是，在此事故以前，该舰仅在一年时间内就发生过42起火灾，足见舰上人员忽视防火规定，应该引以为戒。

美国攻击航空母舰“星座”号竣工时起火
79000吨的“星座”号是美国第二次世界大战后建造的攻击型航空母舰的第六艘。这级舰配置和使用了携带核武器的重型飞机。
该舰于1960年10月下水，两月后舰上发生大火，造成人员的大量死伤和物质的严重损失。这一事件震撼了美国，大火不是发生在战斗活动和海上航行中，而是发生在海军的船厂里。
1960年12月19日，该舰已经完成了90%，它的右舷紧靠船厂码头系泊准备竣工。当时舰上机库甲板临时安装了燃油柜，供辅助柴油机——发电机使用。燃油柜容量为4500升，火灾发生时还剩有1900升。上午10时30分，当升降机卸载金属屑箱时，不巧碰倒了机库内放置架上的钢板。钢板受撞后碰坏了燃油柜底部的开关。燃油开始流出，逐渐漫流机库甲板，并通过升降机的升降道进入下甲板，在这里燃油由于与焊接后加热的金属接触而燃烧起来。大火很快的沿全舰蔓延，席卷到机库甲板和飞行甲板，并从起火中心向舰的首位窜去。由于横舱壁走廊甲板（低于飞行甲板的第二层甲板）上配置的设施较少，使火焰更加猛烈扩展。在横舱壁内有许多未堵塞的电缆孔，甚至在关紧水密门后也未能从孔后限制住火势的发展。
火灾开始后不久，很快发现伴有屡屡浓烟的大火，已在舰中部出现。这时机库已经全部着火。大火向全舰和船厂蔓延，上升高度竟达几十米。由于火烟极大，平时消防队员的呼吸装置一般可用45分钟，而此时只能用上20分钟就无法使用。
起初试图用舰上设备，如泡沫发生器、喷水系统来灭火，但没有成功。后来，救火任务由基地和城市消防队来担任，很快派来了拖船和消防船。他们主要采用水来灭火，往舰上浇注了15000吨之多的消防水，其中约80%的水是通过污水和排水系统排出舷外，但仍有一些舱室灌注满了水。
这时要迅速解决从舰上撤退和营救人员的任务。由于该舰建造工程接近完成，舰上来了各种专业人员。火灾这天，共有4200人，大多是船厂员工。当时无线电发出命令：“全体人员迅速离开本舰！”由于舰上通信联系不好，因而许多人未能听见。大多数人看见舰上起火后，还在打听怎么回事。工人们通过各种办法已离开舰。但在主火源区，出口实际已经被封闭。有些人所以得救，不是跳到冰上，就是沿缆索下到靠舰的驳船。另外，舰上有2台起重机，分别将人员从舰上运到码头，舰的飞行甲板要比码头高出20米以上。
以后，城里下了大雪，码头被厚雪和薄冰覆盖，这使救人工作更加困难。舰上尚未来及撤走的工人，为了避火跑进舱室，躲在里面将门紧闭，等待营救。火灾持续了12个多小时，在城市和基地消防队的共同努力下才将火扑灭。
由于这场火灾，死亡50人，受伤数百人。该舰舰体和机械等部位遭到重大破坏，物质损失约5000万美元。延误工期7-8个月。
舰上45毫米厚的飞行甲板的装甲铺板，已有190米变形，变形性质是波形长24米，最大弯曲挠度约250毫米。正如以后调查指出，在飞行甲板下的空间温度已达600度，高温作用区甲板铺板的式样分析也指出，它的钢板仍保持最初的机械性能，没有因临界高温而改变，这是因为甲板上厚铺板的高热容和甲板下的热绝缘层两者的共同作用。于是决定不更换飞行甲板上已变形的铺板，而采用原地矫正的方法，即绝大部分铺板并不拆卸，而是用千斤顶矫正。至于处在大火区的飞行甲板由于其构架破坏严重，需要拆卸更换。19毫米厚的走廊甲板也遭到严重损伤，约有120米长需要更换。原载海陆空天惯性世界。飞行甲板和走廊甲板之间的大多数横舱壁也需更换。31毫米厚的机库甲板的变形与飞行甲板的变形相似，它们的距离才几十米。这层甲板部分需要原地修理，有些则需要更换。飞行甲板与机库甲板均未断裂。舰体主要的支承构建没有遭到破坏。在火灾后的四个星期，对舰体挠度的测量指出，挠度增加不大于38毫米时，这被认为是完全允许的。此外，由铝合金制的横舱壁和围壁，由于处在火灾区受到严重破坏，因而需要完全更换。在这些部位，还要更换热和声绝缘，它们因火、水和烟渣也遭到了破坏。
该舰的机械设备损坏严重。首部弹射器全部已经不能再用。由于火灾，铜管系以变形，以铬钼钢制的管系遭到破坏尤为严重，在温度800摄氏度以上时，其性能就已变化。承建厂为此调查了该舰的机械设备，根据他们的建议送厂或就地修理或更换。在修理过程中，制定了管系合格鉴定的标准。根据该标准，有关材料制造的管系必须在以下温度更换：1.315摄氏度（镍铜、镀锌钢和碳素钢）；2.260摄氏度（铜和黄铜）；3.93摄氏度（电木）。
电气设备，尤其是电缆也受到破坏。带聚乙烯绝缘的电缆和同轴电缆，由于受热特别敏感，它们已经完全不能使用，需要大部分更换。
战斗情报中心的仪器和与之相邻舱室的电子设备也遭到了破坏。大部分无线电仪器覆盖上了很厚的一层烟尘。造水破坏的仪器大部分浮出水面。在修理战斗情报中心时，采用了引线配电盘，盘上安装导线和连接件，供代换暂缺的仪器使用。在新仪器上舰后，将它安装在指定位置并接入电路。这种方法能在新仪器上舰前就可以使用，从而加快了军舰的修理过程。
为了加快修理工作，还采用了其他方法。例如，成立了专门配套小组去签订关于新设备的合同，大部分设备可以从仓库或根据现行合同获得。又如，采取了破损小零件不修理，用新零件更换的方法。
在修理过程中遇到的复杂问题之一是，如何清洗严重破坏后弄脏的设备。为此，造船厂安装了专门的清洗传送装置。该装置由带液体和辅助机械的贮藏箱组成，采用超声波、高压空气和烘干等方法除去破损设备上的污物，然后将清洁的设备送往装配台修理。这种装置使用后，节省了大量时间和资金。
该舰发生火灾后，美军方公布了关于新舰和改装舰防火安全上的新规定。新规定要求新舰应设置火灾报警系统，检查工人消防知识水平、教会消防队员灭火方法、严禁舰上存放易燃物品。建议将这些物品贮存在驳船或者工厂码头，并采取一定的防火措施。转贴于超级大本营论坛。然而，在这些新规定中没有专门谈到关于限制使用木料的问题。因为木料会使舰上火灾加速蔓延。有人认为金属板也很危险，有时在电流转差和触电时会引起人员的伤亡。另外，对舱壁上电缆通孔，作为增加防火孔盖的规定，以防止火灾发生后在舰上伸展。航空母舰“星座”号的火灾教育了美国人，但是这种教训是以无数人员的伤亡和大量财产的损失作为代价来获得的。最后应指出的一点是，在此事故以前，该舰仅在一年时间内就发生过42起火灾，足见舰上人员忽视防火规定，应该引以为戒。

美国攻击航空母舰“奥里斯坎尼”号上机库着火
本世纪六十年代，使美国航空母舰编队不走运的年代。在这个历史阶段，美国许多新建的攻击航空母舰相继发生大火。攻击航空母舰“奥里斯坎尼”号揭开了海上一系列火灾的序幕。
该舰是参加越南战争的一艘军舰。这次火灾发生在越南沿岸北部湾。1966年10月26日，该舰正准备派出飞机去轰炸越南沿岸，机组人员十分忙碌，飞行甲板上正在检查飞机准备弹射的情况，机库内飞机也在检查和调配，舰内舱室人员各就各位。
7时27分，在右舷机库首部的弹药库，突然引爆了镁信号弹。爆炸的原因是，有一枚信号弹拉线不巧搭在一名水兵的肩上，被挂在水密门上，该信号弹被拉线抛出后开始冒烟。由于惊慌失措，水兵不慎误将这枚燃烧的信号弹投进了装有700枚信号弹的箱子内。尔后接上消防系统，希望以此扑灭火焰。然而，这起了副作用，因为火与燃烧的镁接触后会释放出挥发性的氢。这名水兵忘记，或者不知道镁的这个特性，结果造成该舰失火。于是马上发生火灾报警，并组织了与沿舰猛烈蔓延的大火的斗争。转贴于超级大本营论坛。不久，火舌席卷了机库首部和邻近舱室。由于火势发展迅猛，全舰安全受到威胁。因为大火正向燃料舱和弹药库逼近。舰首部舱室充满了刺鼻的浓烟，要想从这里撤走人员极为困难。火灾几分钟后，信号弹箱也发生爆炸，这使灾情更加恶化。以后，火舌奔向两架直升机，并已接近液态氧的存放处。但是，只有使用水管才能排除造成该舰最大危险的氢爆炸。经过一段时间，从舰的首部取来水管，由于水管被烧坏，只得从舰尾部拉来完好的水管，耽误了不少时间。
为了避免弹药爆炸，以将许多吨飞机炸弹、炮弹和其他易燃物品抛出舷外。由于部分20毫米炮弹在消防队员活动区爆炸，致使不少人员伤亡。在机库，卸下飞机和直升机上的武器后，将它们运往飞行甲板，使其远离逼近的火焰。在飞行甲板上，再将这些飞机移到尾部，因为首部已有灾情。
与此同时，采取了一些措施救人。首先，组织了搜寻队去搭救已被大火包围的舱室中的指挥人员，并且调查了与大火相邻的舱室，以便营救尚处在险境中的人员。再将受伤和烧伤的病员送往飞行甲板后，从这里用直升飞机将他们运往不远处的航空母舰“星座”号，在该舰上对病员给予了必要的医疗。其次，为了自救，采用氧气装置。为了将机库甲板下已着火舱室的人员救出，使用了单人潜水呼吸用具。
从起火到扑灭，经过了8小时。由于这场火灾，死亡44人，受伤41人，4架喷气式强击机破损，2架直升机损坏。舰首部机库和舱室，弹射器，一切飞机升降机和电气设备均遭到严重破坏。
这场火灾扑灭后，该舰驶向苏毕克湾基地进行小修，以后去美国应急翻修，花了数月时间。该舰舰长以下列一段话来评价这场火灾的后果：“这次悲剧是可怕的，它也许可能发展得更坏。如果没有全体舰员的果敢和英勇行为，人员伤亡势必更大，舰机破坏也势必更为严重。”“奥里斯坎尼”号的起火和美国攻击航空母舰上的其他火灾，若从评价美海军指挥能力的角度看的话，表明了指挥官对航空母舰的防火安全不是得心应手的。为了提高安全而采取应急措施，这正是从低水平安全角度提出来的任务。

美国攻击航空母舰“福莱斯特”号起火
美国76000吨攻击航空母舰“福莱斯特”号是美国航空母舰编队的旗舰，是第二次世界大战后该级舰的首制舰。由于根据该舰制造的大批攻击航空母舰，所以“福莱斯特”号在战后头十年已成为美国和其他资本主义强国大型水面舰艇攻击力量的象征。但在60年代末，由于美国航空母舰上火灾和爆炸频繁发生，而且这些灾难实在没有军事行动的情况下出现的，只是航空母舰声誉受到很大影响，一度成为海上悲剧和不幸的标志。
航空母舰“福莱斯特”号从诺福克基地去越南参战以前，曾经进行过10个月的大修和现代化改装，花费了5000万美元，约为它制造费用的四分之一。大修和改装完成后，该舰被认为在技术上是完全现代化的，并特别重视改进它的防火器材。
1967年7月29日，该舰在北部湾已机动航行五天，处在据越南沿岸60海里处，正准备进行野蛮的轰炸。这天港口气候晴朗，离舰不远处是“奥里斯坎尼”号和“好人理查德”号两艘航空母舰，另有两艘驱逐舰警戒了航空母舰的活动区。
这天早上，从航空母舰“福莱斯特”号上已弹射出一组飞机。第二组飞机21架（主要由强击机和拦截歼击机组成）正准备分头起飞。突然，在飞行甲板的尾部出现了火焰。爆炸时间是10时53分，关于起火的原因说法纷纭。一种说法是，由于一架拦截歼击机下悬挂的空对地导弹不知何故起动，导弹由于本身运动撞击了另一架强击机的油箱，于是燃油沿甲板溢出。转贴于超级大本营论坛。由于导弹的喷气式尾浪，引起了燃烧。另一种说法是，由于这架强击机上机组人员不慎，机上悬挂的油箱落到了飞行甲板上，油箱内燃油起火，并沿飞行甲板流出。在火焰的作用下，导弹的战斗部脱落，油箱被烧坏。尽管这两种说法不一，但都证实了导弹的爆炸及其对以后火势发展的影响。在另一些说法中，导弹无故起动的事实，归咎于它的安全机构出现了故障。
为了消除火灾，采取的初步措施是使用水消防总管和泡沫发生器，但是并未奏效。由于飞行甲板上飞机配置密集，火焰很快地席卷了整个机群。飞机的油箱开始燃烧，机上的导弹和其他弹药开始爆炸。于是火灾迅速蔓延至飞行甲板的尾部。重为340千克和450千克的飞机炸弹在甲板上相继爆炸。飞机的油箱伴着爆炸声冒出黑烟，烟沿飞行甲板弥漫，并窜入了舰内舱室。
每次爆炸后都出现死伤人员。由于最初的爆炸，很多消防人员死亡或退下火线。火和弹片使防火技术器材受到损坏。不少舰员被冲击波甩出舷外，另一些舰员从燃烧的舰舷跳入水中。在落水人中出现重伤和死亡的情况，这是因为舰的干舷高达18米所致。另外，有些驾驶员未能从飞行甲板上烧着的机群中救出。尽管如此，大多数舰员一直在舰上，并从一开始就与火灾和爆炸进行了顽强的斗争。例如，有些舰员试图通过飞行甲板上的弹孔进入舱内，取出冒烟的炸弹。然而，火越烧越旺，以潜入舱内。在机库甲板上，他们必须在昏暗中与火灾进行斗争，摸索着从飞机上取下炸弹和导弹，并将它们扔出舰外。由于从上面到机库的通道实际上已不存在，为了进入机库，在飞行甲板、走廊甲板和舷边用气割装置开了许多切口。仅一层飞行甲板上的开口就多达十个以上，这就有可能使船员进出内舱，并组织他们与火灾斗争。但是，在灭火中遇到了不少困难。例如，由于洒下泡沫，甲板变得较滑，加之火烟太浓，即使借助灯光，能见度不也不超过0.3-0.4米。转贴于超级大本营论坛。在这种条件下，呼吸装置起了一定作用。然而呼吸装置上的玻璃常常被水气蒙住，影响了舰员的视界。所以当消防水管从舰首部运到尾部时，由于火焰和弹片的作用，它们已无法使用。为了压制火焰，有些舰员对着火的飞机成功地使用了二氧化碳灭火器。
该舰出依靠自己力量救火外，还得到了航空母舰“奥里斯坎尼”号和“好人理查德”号以及两艘警卫驱逐舰的支援。这两艘航空母舰在停止飞机起动后，即派直升飞机来搭救受难舰。驱逐舰离“福莱斯特”号的舰舷只有3米，用自己的消防水管享受难舰直接喷水。
在灭火时，出现过不少差错。首先是舰员缺乏经验。由于大部分有经验的消防专家在火灾初期就已死去，因此该舰的救援工作只好落在没有救火经验的舰员身上。他们为制止火势蔓延作的工作很少，因此火焰逐渐向存放在飞行甲板上的炸弹和导弹窜去，是炸弹的爆炸接二连三地震动了全舰。其次，在火灾开始8分钟以后，才下达命令关闭舱时各门，这就促使了火灾沿舰相继蔓延。最后，未受过消防训练的舰员往往干扰别人工作。例如，一部分舰员沿着飞行甲板喷洒泡沫灭火时，另一部分舰员却用水管冲洗了这些泡沫，反而促进了火灾进一步发展。
经过几小时的艰苦努力，终于将飞行甲板和机库甲板上的主要火源限制住，并堵住火舌通往机库中部和首部的去向，因为那里停放了携带武器的飞机。但是，这两层甲板间的火焰一直怒号到晚上。10小时后，火灾开始沉寂。经过一昼夜火才完全熄灭，直至次日12时30分。由于贱内充满了大量有害气体，它们是在火灾时形成的，历时3昼夜才完全清除。此外，还花了不少时间在冷却甲板上的炽热不见和其他金属构件。
这场火灾造成134人死亡，62人受伤，26架喷气飞机烧毁，40架飞机连同弹射器、火炮、以及舰上各种设备都受到了严重破坏。特别提出的是舰体，它的10层甲板有6层被破坏，尤其是飞行甲板以及与其相邻配置的构件。甲板为45毫米厚的飞行甲板，由于受到爆炸，形成了7个裂口，其中有些裂口的尺寸较大。
火灾后该舰的外形使人感到它仿佛遭受过战斗的攻击。据该舰的一名军官回忆，在第二次世界大战中，日本“神风”飞机的驾驶员也不曾使舰遭受过如此严重的破坏。
这场火灾使物质损失高达一亿四千万美元，该舰紧急修理费用为1400万美元。根据物资损失的程度和人员伤亡的情况，美国认为这场火灾是战后美舰队海上遇难中最严重的一次。1963年美国核潜艇“长尾鲨”号沉没的损失，已被认为美国民族的灾难，但它的损失较之“福莱斯特”号要小得多。
为了消除火灾后果，该舰首先开往苏比克湾基地进行应急修理。舰以27节速度航行，使用了4个主锅炉（一共8个）。在去基地途中，有许多伤员被专程来此的一艘医院船接走。此后，该舰在苏比克湾基地停留了10天，进行了飞行甲板临时性的修理，使舰在必要时能进行飞机的起降操作。不久，官方宣称，该舰奉命访问一些港口，为的是向殉难者及其家属表示慰问。每到一个港口，岸上挤满几千人迎接，其中有采访记者，摄影师，海军和各界人士的代表。美刊指出，这艘庞大的军舰看上去活像一座“灰色的城市”，由于它的雄伟壮观，似乎一点伤痕也未留下。在接见采访记者时，舰长夸口此舰的结构坚固，并谈到舰员的救火壮举。可是，导致这场灾难的后果，很多美国家庭遭到的巨大不幸，他却只字不提。
1个半月后，该舰才去诺福克海军船厂去大修。飞行甲板的大部分必须更换，为此花去了800吨装甲钢。127毫米炮、飞机升降机和其他飞行设备由于破坏严重已重新修理或更换。同时，在舰上进行了现代化改装，特别是改装了无线电设备和导弹装置等。该舰修理近十个月，在事故一年后才服役。此后该舰编入了美大西洋舰队，舰员重新编制，舰长更换，并派往地中海执行任务。
在60年代中期，美国就下述问题进行过辩论：应该建造什么样的航空母舰？核动力的还是常规的？核动力的观点当时领先，争论似乎平息下来。但是，“福莱斯特”号悲剧出现后，这场争论又重新开始，现在这种观点叫得最凶，即今后建造像“福莱斯特”号这种大尺度的军舰一般是合理的说法受到了怀疑。可是，新争论没有动摇美国海军指挥部主要人物的想法，他们认为新型大的航空母舰今后将继续建造，并承认必须采取及时和有效的措施来提高这类军舰的防火安全性。
由于航空母舰“福莱斯特”号的火灾在类似事故中最为严重，因此把航空母舰防火安全保障的问题，已作为美国十分重要的问题提出。为就该问题提出的有关建议，美国政府成立了一个高级委员会，并吸收海、空军权威人士参加。该委员会开始工作以前，当时的美国海军作战部长特•姆勒作过如下指示：“即使采取各种预防措施，但爆炸和火灾总会发生，重要的是，我们要有迅速和极为有效的手段，使物质损伤、破坏和人员的伤亡减小到最小限度。为此，务必在与爆炸和火灾的斗争中，使舰员受到最小程度的危害。”与此同时，成立了另一个委员会，负责调查“福莱斯特”号事故的原因。通过大量工作，该委员会认为，美国航空母舰防火安全不够的主要原因是防火器材不足、人员训练较差和组织灭火不力。
根据“福莱斯特”号事故的教训，为了提高航空母舰的安全性，调查委员会提出了以下建议：
舰上应设置有效的防火设备，特别是在飞行甲板，这里防火安全的标准应该与机库一样；
舰上应有足够的救火用的遥控系统，特别是飞行甲板上；
在航空母舰的消防系统中，应采用高效能的灭火剂，并规定在大部分的飞行甲板上使用这种灭火剂；
舰上应配置生命保障和个人防护用的器材，以保证火灾时舰员能在任何舱室工作，特别是舰上应有抽气通风设备，以排除舱内烟气，并给舰员配置氧气器具和防手用具；
改进舰上燃料和弹药贮存的方法和手段；
重视舰上飞机的防火安全和保障工作；
认真检查和改进舰上通信和话报系统，能在救火时发挥作用；
特别应重视舰上武器安全机构的保障，以避免没意料到的爆炸事故发生。
此外，对舰员在救火时的训练，委员会提出以下建议：
无论何时何地，培养舰员重视安全工作；
要善于根据舰上事故的通报教育舰员，并将通报上报海军的安全中心；
未来的航空母舰指挥官不应回避与火灾斗争的问题，为此要进行专门的训练，使他们获得这方面的知识；
舰上机组人员在保障舰的生命力方面应与舰员紧密配合，同时也要严格区分彼此之间不同的作用；
舰队应严格要求舰员在任何时候都要坚决执行现行的安全规则，对其中有些不当规则应用新的和更完善的规则来代替。
委员会的以上意见，虽不是解决航空母舰防火安全上的“灵丹妙药”，但它们的主要内容是在研究“福莱斯特”号事故的基础上总结出来的经验，因此这些经验不仅对美国航空母舰编队，而且对其他国家（特别是英、法两国）的航空母舰来讲，是值得借鉴的。

美国核动力航空母舰“企业”号上飞行甲板起火和爆炸
“企业”号是美国舰队第一艘核动力航空母舰。60年代初，该舰是世界上独一无二的核动力军舰，被看作美国海军的“骄傲”。
该舰满载排水量85000吨，长341米。飞行甲板最大宽度78.3米，吃水11.3米，舰员4300人。
火灾发生在1969年1月14日檀香山以西70海里处。当时“企业”号已离开在阿拉米达（加利福尼亚）的登记港口，完成战斗准备后正开往东南亚，拟参加侵越战争。
从海军专门委员会调查事故的报告中可以看出，事故原因是在给舰上飞机供弹时，飞机甲板的尾部发生了爆炸。在机身下悬挂的导弹，由于发动机废气流的作用，使导弹加热到很高的温度，因此出现爆炸。接着，火灾不断发生，又出现了在附近配置的机群中炸弹核导弹的相继爆炸。转贴于超级大本营论坛。这时，很大程度上重现了“福莱斯特”号上火势发展的情形，它们区别只在于，“企业”号上发生的爆炸和火灾离尾部较远，携带的飞机较少，并且装有悬挂式武器的飞机没有落入火灾区。由此看出，该舰飞行甲板上爆炸的次数要少，因而舰遭到破坏的规模也小。
火灾前，“企业”号已调转方向，试图利用风力来起动飞机。火灾时，该舰继续转向，想借风力把火引向离上层建筑和其它飞机远一些的尾部。然而火势越来越旺，爆炸声接二连三，飞行甲板上相继发生了8次爆炸。火舌开始进入内舱，其势头比“福莱斯特”号要小。火灾后约1小时，飞行甲板上的大火虽被控制，但甲板下火焰继续猖獗了数小时。
最初，“企业”号为灭火采用的装置是远距离喷射器，它装有2个喷头，可喷射灭火剂，有一名舰员操作。但这种装置每隔4分钟才供给少量灭火剂，灭火作用不大，所以当飞机上燃油点着后，又发生了炸弹的爆炸。炸弹炸坏了该装置的软管，破坏了它的压缩空气瓶的密封性，使其失效。此外，炸弹还破坏了水管和泡沫管，因此舰上全被水和泡沫注满。那时，要想灭火，的确难度很大。当时警戒该舰的两艘驱逐舰距离着火舰只有15米，便使用了自己的水管来灭火。以后，甲板上未爆炸的弹药不断被清理出来。尽管大多数舰员与火灾进行了顽强的斗争，持续近2小时，但有些军官和士兵在惊慌失措中纷纷跳入水中，不少舰员后被直升机救起。
这场事故死亡27人，受伤120人，另有资料报道，死亡24人，受伤85人或300人，说法不一。该舰遭到了严重损坏，设有装甲的飞行甲板上形成了3个大裂口，其中一个占满二层甲板和舰舷。右舷开了一个直接为4.5米的裂口。甲板上另一个裂口接近8米。在高温作用下，一部分飞行甲板变形。转贴于超级大本营论坛。军舰的甲板内部也受到了破坏，但核动力装置没有受到损害。15架喷气式飞机受到损伤和破坏。该舰的损失费（飞机除外）为640万美元，每架损失的飞机价格为500-700万美元。当天，“企业”号以12节航速返回基地。以后在两家大型船厂进行了修理，历时3个月。
事故发生后，“企业”号舰长宣布，如果该舰舰员没有吸收“奥里斯坎尼”号和“福莱斯特”号的经验和教训的话，那么也许该舰的破损和后果会更为严重。事实上，该舰90%的舰员在专门的消防学校已经学习过半年，学校的教学大纲中已考虑到过去火灾的经验。
鉴于“福莱斯特”号和“企业”号航空母舰的事故，美海军杂志经常看在关于提高这类军舰生命力的文章。文章认为，军舰的生命力是一个综合的复杂概念。它反映了舰的重要性能，如不沉性、防火性和抗爆性等。根据美国人的意见，在当时条件下攻击航空母舰难以处理防火问题。事故经验也表明，由于一系列原因，抗爆性问题不可能完全查明。首先，每次爆炸力相对的不大。因为对这类大舰来讲，炸弹在飞行甲板上爆炸时一般含有300-400千克黄色炸药量的炸药，由于设装甲的飞行甲板具有较大的穿透能力，即使甲板上出现了大尺寸的破坏，对它危害也不大。其次，爆炸是表面的，露天的，它的威力要比封闭空间内的爆炸要小。最后，爆炸是在空中，而不是水中发生的，因此它的作用与舱室淹没毫无关系，淹没可能会影响到舰上武器和设备，甚至会影响全舰的安危。根据上述理由，或已发生的事故，还不能全面评估攻击航空母舰的抗爆性。但可以指出的是，在现有条件下这种航空母舰的飞行甲板可以承受8-10次航空炸弹的爆炸。
总之，在战后两年多时间内，在“奥里斯坎尼”号、“福莱斯特”号和“企业”号上相继出现了三次事故，共死亡200多人，受伤近225人。它们向美国专家和海军指挥部提出了关于航空母舰防火安全和生命保障的新问题。

美国核动力航空母舰“尼米兹”号上飞机着落时起火
1981年5月26日晚，一架飞机正向美国核动力航空母舰“尼米兹”号着降。飞行员把飞行速度已降低到了150英里/小时，尽力下降到约有600英尺长的飞行甲板上。为了安全着舰，在飞行甲板上装置了4根钢索，用以钩住下降的飞机。“尼米兹”号排水量91400吨，是世界上最大的一艘战舰。当时，它在离佛罗里达州海岸60英里处的大西洋海面上急速航行。虽然已近午夜，但它的甲板上不少水兵和军官们仍在工作着。航空母舰在微风中行驶，舰上13架飞机已飞出，作例行的飞行训练。其中一架电子雷达干扰机EA-6B的飞行员，在“尼米兹”号后方2英里处，正准备对好位置着降。但是，这架飞机航向偏转，着降时玉庭在飞行甲板上的其它一排飞机相撞。几秒钟内，这架飞机上的3名飞行员全部死亡。舰上11人被着火的飞机燃油烧死，或被飞起的弹片打死，48名水兵受伤。
事情原来是这样的。当这架雷达干扰机将要着降时，“尼米兹”号上的着陆指挥官发现该机把握不准航向，左右摇摆不定。于是他通过无线电下令飞行员按着陆不成时的例行规定加大油门，立刻远离甲板。该机飞行员没有服从这一命令，飞机仍以145英里/小时的速度，冲过了飞行甲板上最后一条阻拦索约500英尺，沿途先后擦撞了6架加满油的F-14战斗机和其它飞机。于是，舰上发出一声猛烈的爆炸，到处呈现一片火海。
在报警时，“你米兹”号上5000名舰员中已有很多人入睡。消防人员走上甲板后立即用水和泡沫灭火，但未能奏效。大火越烧越旺，油箱变成燃烧弹，弹射座椅从着火的飞机中弹出，一门机关炮由于被火烧得过热而自动开炮，导弹也相继爆炸。
事故发生时，“尼米兹”号上另12架飞机正在空中飞行，接到命令后按规定只好在岸上着陆。次日凌晨1时，由于舰员的努力，大火终被扑灭。从燃烧的残骸中挖出13具尸体，另一具尸体没有找到，48人受伤，由于医疗设备不足，4时30分飞来了直升机，运走了21名重伤者。
这次事故造成的损失是巨大的，EA-6B干扰机被烧坏，内装的10台的干扰发射机和由计算机控制的接收机全部烧毁。损失6800万美元；2架价值3600万美元的F-14战斗机完全报废，另3架严重受损，4架A-7战斗机不能使用，另有10架飞机和一架直升机不同程度地损伤。全部损失高达1.5亿美元之多。
官方对这次事故原因进行调查可能需要半年之久。原因是调查人员缺少一些证据，因为在事故后几小时，EA-6B肇事机和2架损坏的F-14战斗机已被抛入海中。因为这些机上载有位爆炸的弹药和炸弹，危及该舰和人员的安全。尽管沉入海底的这架闯祸飞机再也不会找回，但它在“尼米兹”号上的每一次着陆，都已录像。这次事故的责任最终应该由飞行员承担。当时舰长在舰桥上，看见这架飞机着陆时航向不对，未能及早下命令让它重飞。
“尼米兹”号核动力航空母舰花了20亿美元建成，这次事故只收到表面的损坏。舰上核反应堆由于用数层钢板加固，没有受到危害。出事后两天，该舰返回诺福克海军基地。经过检修后，它驶往加勒比海参加航行训练，比规定日期只拖延了3天。

学了不少

非常感谢！~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

福莱斯特事故的资料非常值得学习，谢谢 歌剧院幽灵

共有11架飞机被毁，损失达5883万美元
才5883万？

3架猫猫就多少钱了.....

xiaolu 发表于 2009-5-1 20:24
也要减少责任问题嘛...什么国家的基层单位都是一样想法

福莱斯特号火灾

福莱斯特号火灾

星座号火灾

企业号火灾

企业号火灾

几点启示，不敢藏私，跟大家分享一下：

1.国产钢材质量是否过关？能否像米军那样只炸几个小洞洞？
2.损管系统设计如何？据说老瓦是全部破坏了的。
3.工人是否经过专门的消防培训？
4.编队里的护卫舰艇是否装备专用高压水枪？
5.灭火时除了需要专门考虑损管外，还要考虑哪些相关的情况？比如舰艇航向、风向等。
6.救护直升机和消防车。米军CV上都是有这个东东的吧。
7.如果发生星座号那样的事故，会不会推迟很久甚至取消？

DC_Water 发表于 2009-5-1 21:10
你当是wal-mart验国内小厂那，什么这培训那配备。你自卑也不用自卑到把自己国家比喻成封建国家吧，还钢材质量是否过关~是不是你们家楼那钢筋得美国造你才安心住呀

xiaolu 发表于 2009-5-1 22:00
人家不过是虚心求教

您是上来就劈头盖脸地扣帽子，嗤之以鼻

看来贵宾的水平的确分三六九等

赶明俺也捐一个贵宾头衔，好去训斥人去:D

DC_Water 发表于 2009-5-1 21:10

这个可以放心，网友能想到的，相关单位肯定更早就想到了

这些美国航母火灾的资料就是从海军的书里面抄来的:)

探索频道播过一个案例，美国的，究竟那艘忘了，是工作人员机翼上安装导弹的时候，由于某种原因，突然就通了，导致导弹发射，结果就引起了大火

飞行甲板的钢材至少要多少毫米？

肯定在12到122之间，而且极可能分防滑飞行甲板层和复合装甲隔离层两层。

差点被你这个贵宾忽悠了 :P

歌剧院幽灵 发表于 2009-5-2 00:17
去啊，我看看您老能倦多少出来，你有没有资格当个贵宾

场面惨烈呀。。。当时可以当作反面例子论证社会主义的先进性

顶出来，看看还有什么货没有

xiaolu 发表于 2009-5-1 22:00
你仔细看看人家说的话，你这么个口气还不至于吧？火大也伤身的！